A Study of the Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability (U)

R. L. Blachly, M. G. Weiner, L. Gouré, S. T. Hosmer,
A. L. Hsieh, B. F. Jaeger, P. F. Langer

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SUMMARY

This Report demonstrates that the anticipated attainment by Communist China of a modest nuclear capability will present important military and political problems to the United States and to the free world. In particular, a nuclear-armed China will pose a substantially broader spectrum of challenges to the U.S. position in Asia than she has to date. Among these will be:

- the direct use of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases or Asian countries;
- the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt, non-nuclear military operations and support of insurgency;
- the political and propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability to capitalize on and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese objectives.

We conclude that, despite this wide range of options, Peiping's exploitation of her nuclear capability will be based on a cautious and rational evaluation of risks and costs. Critical to these risk calculations will be Peiping's assessment of the role of the Soviet Union, the Chinese-U.S. military and political balance in Asia, and the opportunities for low risk gains.

In view of our analysis of Soviet policies, we conclude that Peiping will have to be conservative in evaluating the degree of assistance and support she can anticipate from the Soviet Union in deterrence of the United States or in a military conflict with the United States.

Examination of a series of hypothetical nuclear and non-nuclear campaigns shows that a Chinese military confrontation of U.S. forces in the area could involve very high risks for the Chinese. In view of
past Chinese rationality and caution in their use of force, it is un-
likely that the Chinese will consider such risks acceptable.

So long as China cannot rely on Soviet military support for her
objectives and is confronted with a U.S. capability and a determina-
tion to make the risks of overt military operations extremely high, she is
likely to emphasize the politico-propaganda exploitation of her nu-
clear capability. Targets for such efforts will include the U.S.-
Asian alliance and base system, Asian nations' self-defense develop-
ments, and the internal stability of Asian nations.

However, insofar as China's possession of a nuclear capability
and means for its political exploitation lead her to believe that
risks are low and potential gains high, she will increasingly engage
in low level military operations and supporting actions for indigenou
Communist movements.

To meet Chinese challenges and to counter the wide range of re-
percussions in Asia, which are discussed in this study, the United
States must make credible its determination and its capability to
oppose effectively all Chinese aggressive action. This implies, in
addition to political and economic programs, a continuing requiremen
for a flexible and relatively invulnerable posture that includes fas-
reacting nuclear and non-nuclear delivery and support systems within
the Pacific theater.

The study suggests that a significant contribution to U.S. stra-
tegy would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of
U.S. nuclear forces specifically identifiable as targeted for China
and capable of flexible and selective employment against a wide rang
of Chinese aggressive actions.

Such an identifiable force could present a credible deterrent to Chinese aggression without reducing U.S. deterrence of the Soviet Union, would minimize the risk of Soviet intervention resulting from misinterpretation of U.S. intentions, and would strengthen Asian confidence and will to resist.
PREFACE

This is the major publication of a study of the implications of a Communist Chinese nuclear capability. The study was undertaken at the request of the Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Although all pages of this Report are marked "Secret," Secs. I, II, V, and VI are unclassified.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The growth of Communist Chinese military power represents a threat to non-Communist Asia and to the U.S. interests in the area. This threat will take on new dimensions when China* has nuclear weapons. She is likely to acquire a nuclear capability within the next decade, despite economic reverses, technical limitations, and disagreements within the Communist Bloc.

This Report presents the major implications for the United States that are expected to develop with China’s attainment of a nuclear capability. The Report considers:

- Chinese strategy
- the Soviet role in Chinese policies
- significant military options available to the Chinese, and
- the political impact of a Chinese nuclear capability on Asia and on the U.S. position in the area.

Methodology

A substantial combined military, political, and technical study of China’s acquisition of a nuclear capability underlies this Report.

The scope of this study was delimited in two major ways. First, we have not attempted to analyze the full range of political, military, and economic problems posed by China, nor have we made a full assessment of the relationship between China’s rate of economic growth and her military development. Rather, we have

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*For brevity, Communist China will be referred to as "China," except in part of Sec. IV.
concerned ourselves with the specific problems that will flow from China's acquisition of a "modest" nuclear capability. Second, making use of the best available pertinent data—military, political, and economic—with respect to China and the Soviet Union, we have focused our analysis on their likely behavior, rather than attempting to cover the entire spectrum of conceivable developments. We have used a similar approach in examining the reaction of non-Communist Asia to China's anticipated exploitation of a modest nuclear capability.

The study considers the 1965-1970 period, and assumes:

- There will be no drastic change in the U.S.-Soviet military and political balance of power.
- There will be no drastic change in U.S. commitments or policies in the Far East.
- While the possibility exists that the Chinese may acquire, by concentrated effort, a token, long range, strategic nuclear capability for use or threat against the Continental United States, such a development is considered very unlikely.

The methods of study for the project include (1) military appraisals, war gaming, and tactical analyses of military situations involving the use or threat of nuclear weapons, (2) political analysis based on continuing RAND studies, and (3) syntheses of political, military, economic, and technical findings.

Among the areas considered are:

**Political**

Nuclear Force and Chinese Military Doctrine and Strategy
Reactions to a Chinese Nuclear Capability by Japan, India, and Other Asian Nations

Sino-Soviet Relations

Disarmament and Chinese Strategy

Military

Pacific Force Postures; 1962-1970
Analyses of Possible Nuclear Campaigns Against China

Technical
Analyses of Chinese Weapon Development
Analyses of Chinese Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Development

Economic

Chinese Industrial-technical Capabilities

The Chinese Petroleum Program

Simplified Cost/effectiveness Comparisons of Nuclear Delivery Alternatives.

From some of these areas, studies that support this Report are in preparation or are available.* Published Memoranda are cited in reference.

Organization

Section II of this Report reviews China's basic objectives, the techniques she has used in the past, and trends in her military doctrine and foreign policy—all in the context of expected changes stemming from her acquisition of a nuclear capability.

*Reference 1 is a summary of the major points of this China study in the form of a briefing.
Section III reviews past Soviet influence on Chinese development and policies, examines both joint and conflicting Soviet and Chinese objectives, and considers what appear to be the probable Soviet reactions to and degrees of support for a wide variety of possible Chinese policies, strategies, and actions.

Section IV describes three hypothetical cases of conflict between the United States and a nuclear-armed China in the 1966-67 time period. Case I pertains to a U.S. retaliation to Chinese nuclear aggression against Taiwan. Case II examines a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. bases in Asia, followed by a U.S. nuclear retaliation against the Chinese Mainland. Case III considers overt, non-nuclear Chinese aggression in the Taiwan area.

Section V discusses likely Chinese low risk strategies, including politico-propaganda exploitation of a nuclear capability, and low level military action.

Section VI examines the impact of Chinese possession of a nuclear capability on Asia and on the U.S. position in the area, in terms of

- U.S. alliances and bases
- nuclear disarmament and arms control proposals for Asia
- Asian indigenous self-defense efforts
- political stability of Asian nations, and
- possible low level military operations.

Section VII presents the major conclusions and implications of the study.

The appendixes include possible Chinese and U.S. military developments in Asia and provide the Orders of Battle used in the hypothetical conflict cases of Sec. IV.
II. COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY

China's strategy for the period in which she possesses a modest nuclear capability is explored in terms of her basic objectives, her military doctrine, the options available for direct and indirect use of nuclear weapons, and her evaluation of external conditions at the time.

BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES

Analysis of China's foreign and military policies illuminates certain basic objectives that, barring an extreme reorientation in Chinese leadership, are expected to remain essentially unchanged for the next decade.

These objectives have serious implications for U.S. policies in the Far East; all of them directly or indirectly impinge on U.S. interests in the area.

One major Chinese objective is the achievement of great power status, and recognition of Peiping as the sole voice of China in world councils.

Another major Chinese objective is the achievement of hegemony in Asia--incorporation of Taiwan into Peiping's domain and extension of Chinese dominance to South and Southeast Asia and to Japan and Korea. The Chinese recognize that attainment of this hegemony will depend primarily on the extent to which U.S. power and influence can be removed from the area. As important steps in this direction, Peiping will continue to seek to (1) erode the U.S. base-alliance system generally, (2) eliminate U.S. security and military assistance arrangements, (3) limit U.S. access to the area, and (4) neutralize U.S. allies in the Far East.

A third major Chinese objective is the acceleration of the Communist movement and the enhancement of Peiping's role therein. China will continue to try to draw the Communist parties of Asia, Africa, and Latin America into her sphere of influence. At the same time she will attempt to increase her bargaining power with the
Soviet Union and to gain a greater voice in Bloc decisions regarding international strategy, doctrinal formulation, and the use and disposition of the Bloc's military power.

In the past, China has employed a range of techniques—political psychological, economic, cultural, and military—in pursuing her objectives. These techniques continue to have utility for Peiping, but without nuclear weapons of her own or assurance of Soviet backing China is limited in the military means available to further her objectives in the Far East.

This restriction, however, is temporary. As China enhances her military strength, particularly when she detonates a nuclear device and moves toward acquiring a nuclear capability, she will attempt to use this added power in the interest of her basic objective. China is expected to exploit promptly, by propaganda and political means, her first nuclear detonation. * Premature or precipitate military actions are discounted, although politico-propaganda successes might provide a framework for low level military actions under specific safeguards. *(2) The Chinese have predicted that the manufacture of their own nuclear weapons will mark "another new turning point" in the international situation, at which time "the revolutionary movement in the world in general and Asia in particular will advance with more vigorous steps." *(3)

More important than a nuclear detonation in affecting China's future behavior will be her acquisition of nuclear weapons and the

*The possibility that the Chinese might delay exploitation of their initial nuclear detonation until they have acquired a limited capability is considered very remote. Some reasons are presented in Ref. 2.
means for their delivery. Her exploitation of a nuclear capability in pursuit of her long term objectives will be influenced by:

- traditional Chinese military doctrine
- the impact of nuclear weapons on Chinese military thinking
- options for direct or indirect use of nuclear weapons
- Chinese evaluation of external conditions at the time, such as the Chinese-U.S. politico-military balance, the role of the Soviet Union, and existing opportunities.

CHINESE MILITARY DOCTRINE:

Role of Force in Traditional Strategy

China's traditional military strategy, as reflected in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, evolved pragmatically in response to concrete problems and experience. The most important background factor was the realization that Chinese military equipment and skilled manpower were vastly inferior to those of the main enemy. Because of this inferiority, Mao developed a view of war as a protracted struggle that relies heavily on the use of political, psychological, economic, and diplomatic techniques, in addition to purely military means.

Mao's view of war is both complex and different in important aspects from the traditional Western military view. To Mao, war is more than the application of force when political means fail; instead, war is but one of several instruments of policy operating within a broad political context, an instrument that can operate at any point and time in the struggle. Force is to be used in relation to the political objective and within the framework of the politico-military
balance. Mao holds that force is not to be used in the adventurist sense, but only when the political situation favors or requires it, when opportunities exist, or when the expectation of success is high.

The key to Mao's military thinking lies in the primacy he grants to the political element. He established an integrated doctrine whereby a weak force could hope to succeed against a militarily stronger enemy. Mao expressed it in 1936 as: "Our strategy is to pit one against ten, while our tactic is to pit ten against one."(4)

By 1948 this formula was translated into his famous dictum of "strategically despise, tactically respect" the enemy."(5) By this Mao meant that the trend of historical development was with the forces of socialism even though the strength of the capitalist or imperialist enemy might have to be acknowledged in specific situations. In effect, this was a reaffirmation of his contention that force was an instrument to be used cautiously and rationally, depending on the politico-military balance.

The top military leaders of present-day China have been schooled in these principles and are experienced in their successful application. Mao's military writings are still studied in China today, not because of the tactics, deceits, and ruses they espouse, but because they throw light on the continuing Chinese problem: how to make political gains from a position of military inferiority.

Next we will examine this type of strategy in the context of the nuclear era and in relation to China's assessment of the role of nuclear power.
Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Chinese Military Thinking*

Except for a brief period in 1955, Chinese public statements have in principle disparaged the impact of nuclear weapons on modern military operations and strategic concepts. As differences between the Soviet Union and China became more open after mid-1959, the question of "war" became one of the major issues in the public exchange. In contrast to more conservative Soviet pronouncements were the Chinese arguments that war was inevitable, particularly local wars instigated by U.S. imperialism, that war was not to be feared, and that nuclear war would not result in the annihilation of mankind, but would destroy only capitalism. Chinese statements of this nature have been widely accepted as implying that the Chinese do not understand the significance of nuclear weapons for modern warfare. There is, however, considerable evidence to the contrary, as demonstrated in China's military doctrine on nuclear war, her internal developments, her assessment of the threat, her military caution, and her views on deterrence.

Military Doctrine and Nuclear War. Chinese military thinking recognizes the key implications of nuclear weapons for modern military operations and strategic concepts. In mid-1955, certain Chinese military leaders openly discussed these implications, thus acknowledging that the emergence of nuclear weapons was a new development in military science and expressing concern about the possibility of a "sudden attack." Later statements admitted the full destructiveness of

*This discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons on Chinese military thinking is an abbreviated portion of a more detailed and specific analysis contained in Ref. 6.
nuclear weapons. In October 1957, Chinese Air Force doctrine defined the military threat as that of destruction of military areas, industrial complexes, and communication centers by surprise attack from the air. It emphasized the immediate need for a combat-ready air defense system, and pointed to the need to destroy the enemy in the air before vital centers could be destroyed. In thus admitting the vulnerability of China to attack, Chinese military doctrine acknowledges the concentration of industrial complexes in a few area and weapon production in a few plants. Also implied is an awareness that the transportation system is limited principally to railroads, that despite a long coastline, there are relatively few ports, that command and control are tightly held in Peiping, and that, despite a large number of airfields, there are only a limited number that can be used in air defense.

*"Future wars will be fought with nuclear weapons and will have the character of a very short blitzkrieg. After these two countries [the United States and England] have decided on a new war of aggression, they will make use of bombers carrying nuclear and thermonuclear guided missiles, rockets, and so on. Their airplanes will fly over other countries aiming at destroying important factories, military bases, and vital communication lines and centers... During the duration of the whole war the Air Defense Force (ADF) will play an important role. The ADF should under no circumstances let any hostile plane invade the sky above our own important defense bases and [sho]t protect our nation's political and economic centers and industrial bases and avoid the bombing of our vital military areas and communication centers... Every air attack is expected to be sudden... Sir the invention of atomic, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, as well as the speedy development of newer types of air-attack weapons, the possibility of a surprise air attack is greater and greater, and the destructive power of such an attack becomes correspondingly more terrifying."(7)
Internal Developments. Another indication that the Chinese have recognized the importance of nuclear weapons is their determination to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. Probably as early as 1954-55 they began working toward creating the basis for their own nuclear weapon production. Since 1958, the Chinese have made no secret of their intent to develop their own nuclear weapons and to master rocket technology.

Assessment of the Threat. China's reappraisal of her vulnerability to nuclear warfare in the 1954-55 period can be attributed in part to her growing awareness of the enhancement of U.S. striking power in the Far East during that time. Since then, Chinese policies have shown considerable sensitivity to U.S. military developments and policies in the area. This was particularly evident in the reaction to the statement by then-Secretary of State Dulles on March 8, 1955, in which he described U.S. sea and air forces in the area as "now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision" and counted atomic missiles among "conventional" weapons. Chinese newspapers have commented on the reported assignment of Matador missiles to Taiwan in 1957, the increase in U.S. military (including nuclear) capabilities in the area during the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and more recently, the stationing of Nike-Hercules missiles in Taiwan, the establishment of a Nike-Ajax group in Japan, the proposed buildup of Polaris submarines in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the reported presence of B-52s in the Far East theater, the rotation of jet fighter planes, U.S. and U.S.-SEATO and U.S.-Japanese maneuvers and training exercises, as well as efforts to strengthen U.S. capabilities for
low level military operations in the area.

China's Military Caution. Caution has increasingly dominated China's employment of military force for offensive purposes ever since Peiping developed some recognition of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the implications of these weapons for modern warfare.* In 1954, Chinese decisions not to press the war in Indochina nor to push the Taiwan Strait crisis appeared to be based on a more realistic assessment of what conflict with a nuclear-armed United States might involve. In the 1958 Quemoy crisis, Chinese operations remained at a low level of violence. Apparently, Peiping was anxious to minimize the risk of a direct clash with U.S. forces. Thus there is ample evidence that the U.S. military posture in the Western Pacific has imposed important restraints on Chinese military actions.

View of Deterrence. Chinese awareness of the implications of nuclear war must have brought home to them the real extent of their military dependence on the Soviet Union. Though the nature of the Soviet commitment to China in the 1954-57 period remained unclear, China's leaders had no alternative but to rely on whatever nuclear deterrent the Soviet Union then possessed. At the time of the Soviet

*China's intervention in the Korean War is often cited as evidence of incautious Chinese behavior. This view is subject to important qualifications: (1) there is considerable evidence that the Chinese were slow in identifying themselves with the North Korean cause in mid-1950, carefully assessing risks and gains; (2) the Chinese appear to be prepared to take greater risks in what they regard as "defensive" rather than "offensive" policies, and (3) at the time of their entry into the Korean War, it appeared that the Chinese had only an imperfect understanding of the meaning of nuclear weapons for modern warfare and the role of nuclear weapons seems to have played only a minor, if any, part in their risk calculations.
Union's ICBM and Sputnik successes in late 1957, the Chinese appear to have overestimated the Soviet strategic capability and the gains to be achieved thereby. Since then, the Chinese, while continuing to be cautious in their own military behavior, have attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to take a more aggressive stance toward the West, preferably in support of Chinese objectives. Peiping's unwillingness to risk an independent confrontation of U.S. forces in the area demonstrates that China has been deterred from taking military actions directly involving U.S. interests in the area. To date, the Soviets apparently have been unwilling to give the Chinese an advance commitment.

In other words, Chinese practice—caution and rationality in use of military means and awareness of their dependence on the Soviet deterrent—contrasts sharply with their verbal bellicosity, their continued public disparagement of nuclear warfare, and their persistence in describing the United States as a "paper tiger" to be despised strategically. The reiteration of these themes provides the Chinese with the means for bolstering internal morale, disguising China's present military weakness, and pressing the Soviet Union for support. The themes also serve to indicate the premium that Peiping places on retaining an image of China as revolutionary in behavior. Perhaps more important, they indicate Peiping's belief that American power in the area is transitory, and suggest that China is optimistic about achieving her major objectives in the long run.

**Chinese Options**

With the attainment of a modest nuclear capability, China will
gain an important new instrument for attempting to implement her basic objectives. Among the options open to her will be:

- the direct use of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases or Asian countries
- the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt non-nuclear military operations and support of insurgency, and
- the political and propaganda exploitation of a nuclear capability.

RELEVANT ASPECTS OF A CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY ASSESSMENT

Chinese preference for one or more of these options at the time she possesses a modest nuclear capability will be strongly influenced not only by her basic objectives, her attitude toward the United States, and her "rational" military doctrine, but also by her contemporary assessment of: (1) the role of the Soviet Union, (2) the Chinese-U.S. military balance, and (3) the opportunities for low risk gains in line with Chinese long term goals.

Since Chinese caution has in part been a function of military dependence on the Soviet Union, the Chinese will continue to evaluate the character and scope of Soviet assistance, both political and military, that they might anticipate, and the political price that might be attached. Peiping will continue to assess the East-West balance, particularly the impact on U.S. policy of the Soviet military posture. In the event this posture significantly limits U.S. respons Peiping may be tempted to take advantage of this even without an advance Soviet support commitment. However, in the absence of such a situation, and assuming continued Soviet reluctance to support the Chinese militarily, Peiping will have to determine how best to
manipulate Soviet reaction, what risks can be taken independent of
Soviet support in the hope of compelling Soviet involvement, and
what advantage can be taken of tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations.
While calculating the risks to themselves carefully, the Chinese might
resort to a number of indirect tactics. Peiping may, subject to
safeguards, seek greater Soviet commitment for Chinese objectives by
mobilizing Bloc pressures in her behalf or by attempting to persuade
the Soviet Union that Soviet support would reduce the risk of
escalation.

The Chinese have continually analyzed their military capabilities
in relation to the U.S. force posture in the area. From 1954 on,
such analyses seem to have contributed to a recognition that, lacking
Soviet support, China was deterred from military operations that would
be likely to elicit a U.S. response. The Chinese, however, have not
been reluctant to test the credibility of U.S. political intentions,
as by their restrained use of force in the 1958 Quemoy crisis. It is
anticipated that the Chinese will continue to make such military
analyses and assessments of the U.S. political mood and will base
their evaluation on the risks involved.

In addition, Peiping's policies will be affected by the degree
to which opportunities exist or can be created for low risk gains.
Weaknesses in the U.S. position, ambiguities in U.S. commitments in
the area, and indecisiveness in U.S. reaction to crisis situations
could persuade the Chinese that risks were reduced. Similarly,
vulnerabilities among U.S. allies, areas of friction between the
United States and her allies, as well as instability within both
allied and neutral countries on China's periphery could be viewed by Peiping as providing opportunities for exploitation.

Because of the importance of the Soviet Union in Chinese foreign (and to some extent internal) policy, the following section will consider the implications of Soviet policy for Chinese strategy.
III. THE SOVIET ROLE IN CHINESE POLICY

In view of the different and sometimes conflicting Soviet and Chinese interests and objectives, the future of Sino-Soviet relations is difficult to predict. These relations could range from an open break, through various degrees and forms of cooperation, to close coordination of policies and actions. As will be shown, Moscow-Peiping relations are not likely to take the form of either extreme case within the next decade.

Both China and the Soviet Union have a considerable interest in preserving some form of unity and cooperation. As long as China lacks the military capability for attaining her territorial and political objectives in Asia in the face of U.S. opposition, her dependence on Soviet military and political support is likely to remain very great. Even in specific instances where China may believe that she can achieve her objectives by her own capabilities alone, she would still prefer to be able to count on Soviet support in case of unanticipated responses by the United States or other powers.

Similarly, China is important to Soviet foreign, domestic, and Communist Party politics; China also contributes greatly to the overall strength and prestige of the Communist Bloc. However, her political and territorial ambitions often conflict with Soviet interests and raise many problems for Moscow.

This section will discuss common points and differences in Soviet and Chinese approach, likely Soviet influences on China's military posture, and a possible range of Soviet moves in support of China during military conflicts.
BASIC FACTORS

Foreign policy and foreign relations for the Soviet Union are, of course, governed to a large extent by basic Soviet self-interests. The fundamental, overriding consideration in Soviet policy is the promotion of the interests of the Soviet leadership and of the Soviet Union. These primary interests predominate in Soviet relations, not only with non-Communist states but also with Communist Bloc countries. Consequently the following factors may be expected to contribute heavily to Soviet policy towards China.

Preservation of the Soviet Union and of Its Political System

The Soviet leaders obviously regard the preservation of the Soviet Union as of paramount importance. Since they also regard its preservation as essential to the promotion of world communism, the Soviet leaders would neither consciously sacrifice the Soviet Union to promote the world revolution, nor risk a high probability of suffering heavy damage merely to preserve or expand communism in areas not under Soviet control. Consequently, Soviet policy decisions will reflect a Soviet assessment of the East-West balance of military power and of the risks entailed in each policy choice.

Primacy of Soviet Economic and Foreign Political Interests

The Soviet leaders give priority to the strengthening of Soviet power and economic well-being. They are clearly unwilling to make significant reductions in either the Soviet Union’s rate of economic growth or in its military posture to assist in attainment of China’s objectives.
Neither the present nor any foreseeable Soviet leaders are likely to accede to Peking's demands that the Soviet Union provide sufficient economic aid to permit all other Communist Bloc members to "achieve communism" concurrently with the Soviet Union. It is also evident that the Soviet Union first promotes its own foreign policy interests and would not endanger its chances of success for the sole benefit of other Communist countries. This is especially true in the case of China, whose successes are likely to strengthen her position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and thus to improve Peking's chances for challenging Moscow's leadership of the Communist Bloc.

Preservation of Soviet Leadership of the International Communist Movement

Soviet control over foreign Communist parties has become somewhat less rigid. However, for reasons of prestige and power, Moscow still is determined to remain the leading power in the international Communist movement, retaining control over the European Communist parties and maintaining a dominant influence in other important areas. Moscow is therefore quite sensitive to any challenge to its position in the international Communist movement. Moscow appears also to fear that independent actions by foreign Communist countries or parties could involve the Soviet Union in unwanted and dangerous conflicts with the West.

Preservation of the Unity of the Communist Bloc

A related factor is the importance to the Soviets of the growth of the size and power of the Communist Bloc. Preservation of some degree of Bloc unity, especially in the face of the Western and Asian alliances, contributes to Soviet security as well as foreign policy.
Disintegration of the Bloc could create serious domestic political problems for the Soviet leadership. Moscow would also fear that it might encourage the West to initiate an active rollback policy and to destroy the Communist countries piecemeal. Furthermore, the possible rivalry between contending Communist factions could lead to a disastrous disintegration and weakening of the international Communist movement that would undermine the Western image of Soviet power, again endangering Soviet security.

**COMMON SINO-SOVET OBJECTIVES**

These obvious divergences in the interests and objectives of the Soviet Union and of China should not obscure the fact that the two nations basically share a common ideology and a number of fundamental objectives that have great significance for the United States. These common objectives include:

1. expansion of communism and of Communist Bloc influence in Asia
2. breakup of the anti-Communist alliances in Asia
3. elimination of U.S. military bases in the Pacific area and withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Asia
4. neutralization of Asian countries that at present pursue pro-Western policies, and
5. support for local pro-Communist or so-called national liberation movements and revolts in Asia.

The essence of the Sino-Soviet dispute resides basically in differences over the relative priorities in the attainment of common objectives, over the strategy and tactics that should be used, and in the competition of the two powers for dominant influence in various underdeveloped countries.
Differences in Soviet and Chinese Approaches

China does not seek a break with the Soviet Union, but more support from it. Unlike Yugoslavia for example, whose primary objective was the preservation of its independence from Soviet controls, China's political and territorial ambitions make a break with Moscow undesirable since it could mean a postponement in the attainment of Peiping's objectives. Furthermore, the Chinese leadership would fear that if China were isolated, the West would take advantage of this to demand political concessions and might be encouraged to roll back Communist influence and controls in other Asian countries or even in China herself. Chinese demands for major Soviet support may be moderated by a more realistic picture of Soviet military and economic capabilities.

To bring pressure on the Soviet leadership and to increase China's role in the international Communist movement and in the underdeveloped countries, Peiping has attempted to form a Chinese-controlled bloc of Communist parties within the international Communist movement. This attempt has met with relatively little success, and has brought Peiping into direct conflict with Soviet interests. The Chinese leadership apparently has recognized that unrestricted rivalry with the Soviet Union would be, in view of China's relative economic and military weakness, to her own disadvantage. However, China has not abandoned all efforts to increase her influence and to gain the leadership of Asian and other Communist parties. By remaining in the Communist Bloc, Peiping could better negotiate or pressure Moscow into some recognition of Chinese interests as well as hamper any Soviet attempt to engage in open and unrestricted competition with China. Further, Peiping is more
likely to obtain support from other Communist parties by staying in the Bloc than by forcing the other Communist parties to choose public; and perhaps irrevocably between Moscow and Peking.

Consequently, China would have to pay a high price for breaking with the Soviet Union while anticipating little or no advantage from it. The initiative for a break appears, therefore, to rest primarily with Moscow rather than with Peking. A break is unlikely, however, unless China persists in policies that create intolerable challenges or risks for the Soviet Union.

Completely harmonious relations and close Sino-Soviet cooperation are also unlikely in view of the conflicting interests and ambitions. While China will not accept complete subordination of her policies to Soviet control, it is equally improbable that Moscow would be willing or able to satisfy all of Peking's demands. Although the Soviet Union may attempt to use its military and economic assistance in order to influence Peking's policies, complete control is unlikely. Sino-Soviet relations are thus likely to continue in a state of partial and shifting cooperation and rivalry during which the Soviet Union will give some recognition to Peking's needs and interests and may provide her with relatively low cost and low risk assistance and support. Consequently, Moscow's ability to control or restrain China's policies and actions will be indirect, partial, and unstable.

SOVIET INFLUENCE ON CHINA'S MILITARY POSTURE

In the past, the Soviets have provided considerable military and economic assistance to China, including aid to the latter's missile and nuclear programs. Recently that assistance has been markedly
reduced. In the future, such assistance will depend on the state of Sino-Soviet relations and probably on China's ability to pay for any support she receives. In general, the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome China's acquisition of an independent nuclear capability because it would:

- lessen Peiping's dependence on the Soviet Union and weaken the latter's special status as the Communist Bloc's nuclear shield.

- raise China's prestige in the international Communist movement and in the underdeveloped countries.

- increase the danger of escalation and expansion of any U.S.-Chinese conflict, thus increasing the chances of Soviet involvement.

- lead the Chinese to believe that they were in a position to demand Soviet support for their objectives by threatening to involve the Soviet Union in a nuclear conflict, and

- further weaken Soviet influence over China's actions.

Nor would it be in Moscow's interest to provide China with an independent strategic delivery capability. From the Chinese standpoint, Peiping is unlikely to ask for or agree to the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons on Chinese territory because of the political price, including Soviet control of such weapons. Further, Moscow very probably would not agree to any type of joint control over such weapons.

The Soviet Union probably would also prefer to delay giving Peiping an independent capability for waging protracted and high level non-nuclear local wars. Moscow would be concerned lest Peiping pursue more aggressive policies that might subsequently involve the Soviets in a Chinese-initiated conflict.

In summary then, Soviet economic and non-nuclear military assistance
to China is likely to continue so long as these two powers do not break relations. The rate or level of this assistance will depend on the factors previously discussed, but is unlikely to satisfy all of China's needs.

SOVIET SUPPORT OF CHINA IN MILITARY CONFLICTS

Soviet policy and actions in the event China initiates or becomes involved in a military conflict will be determined by many factors. Among them are Soviet evaluations of:

- the character and locale of the conflict
- Chinese objectives
- U.S. military capability, will, and intentions
- the danger of escalation
- the politico-military impact on other countries
- the effects of its probable outcome on the Soviet political and security situations
- the probable risks and costs arising from various Soviet policy choices, and
- the importance to the Soviets of the area of conflict.

In general, the Soviet Union has little interest in supporting China's expansion, especially by means that appear likely to involve it in an armed conflict with the United States. The following paragraphs will discuss some probable Soviet reactions to varied situation and Chinese actions.

In the event of a Chinese aggressive military threat, one Soviet reaction might be to use this threat as a means for obtaining political concessions from the West by politico-diplomatic means, thereby
exercising some control over the conflict and perhaps acquiring credit for Communist Bloc gains.

If the Chinese do undertake a military campaign outside their own territory, Soviet reaction will depend in part on the area involved in the conflict as it reflects Soviet political interest, prior Soviet investment, risks of escalation, and potential Soviet gains. For example, where the Soviets appear to have little interest, as in the Taiwan area, little support probably would be forthcoming. In the Indochina area, where the Soviets have demonstrated greater interest, they might engage in limited, low risk action themselves, or in cooperation with China. With the far greater Soviet stake and long range expectations in India, Indonesia, and Japan, the Soviet Union will seek to protect its own interests there and to prevent sole Chinese domination of these countries.

In the event a Chinese military campaign appears to be facing defeat outside China, the Soviets are unlikely to intervene overtly or to provide large scale military assistance. They probably would attempt to limit the effects of such a Chinese defeat and to discourage any U.S. attempt to exploit the defeat.

In any Chinese overt military venture, the Soviet Union probably would oppose Chinese initiation of the use of nuclear weapons, especially during a period when the Soviet strategic posture is not significantly superior to that of the United States. From Moscow's point of view, introduction of nuclear weapons could lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict.

Under most circumstances the Soviet Union would prefer to keep any conflict involving China localized and relatively restrained in
its level of violence. The Soviets probably would shape any assistance so as to avoid provoking a dangerous intensification and expansion of the conflict. They might attempt to restrain China from attacking U.S. bases in Asia and the Pacific, in order to have both their own territory and China treated as sanctuaries. Even if the United States were to use nuclear weapons against Chinese forces outside China, Moscow probably would oppose any Peiping plan to attack U.S. bases outside the immediate area of conflict. The Soviets probably would seek to negotiate a cessation of military action and a settlement that would allow the Chinese to retain some gains.

In the event of a threatened or actual U.S. attack against China proper, Soviet actions are neither predetermined nor automatic. The Soviet Union has a treaty of alliance and mutual defense with China, signed in 1950, that provides for mutual assistance in the event either country is attacked by Japan or by a direct or indirect ally of Japan in the act of aggression. Soviet public commitment to China's defense was further expanded in two letters from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower in September 1958, which stated that the Soviet government viewed any attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear weapons in retaliation for any nuclear attack on Chinese territory. However, the Soviet threat of nuclear retaliation expressed in these letters and in the 1962 declaration was kept ambiguous. It did not specify how, against what targets, and on what scale the Soviet Union might use its nuclear weapons and it did not specifically commit Moscow to attacks against U.S. territory or to a general nuclear war. Furthermore,
these Soviet declarations were made after the immediate threat of an attack on China appeared to be past. The Soviet Union thus posed as a protector and ally of China without running serious risks.

Despite the treaty obligations and public commitments, the Soviet Union would refuse to provide Peiping with a blank check by committing itself to an automatic response in advance of a conflict. Otherwise, Soviet influence on Chinese policies and actions would be weakened, and China could involve the Soviet Union in a war not of its choosing.

A large scale U.S. attack on China would create a difficult situation for the Soviet Union. Moscow's response would depend not only on the Soviet assessment of the U.S. military and political objectives* but also on the value that the Soviets place on the preservation of the Communist power position and system in China. Despite Sino-Soviet rivalry and irrespective of the state of Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow has a major stake in preserving Communist rule in China for reasons of prestige, strategy, and security. A collapse of the Chinese regime would have unfavorable repercussions in the international Communist movement and would constitute an unfavorable shift in the over-all East-West balance of power. Moscow would expect that a successful rollback of communism in Asia would encourage the United States to attempt similar operations elsewhere.

Therefore, the Soviets would be under great pressure to intervene if they fail to deter the United States by diplomatic means and threats or low risk demonstrations. Unless the balance of power clearly favors the Soviets, their intervention would not risk an attack on the

*Massive U.S. attacks could be interpreted as punitive measures designed to re-establish the status quo ante bellum in a contested area, to force Chinese withdrawal from another area, to weaken China's economic and military posture, or to destroy the Communist regime in Peiping.
United States and would be designed to avoid provoking a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. The character of such intervention is more likely to be defensive than offensive, and to be combined with political moves and pressure on U.S. allies and neutrals in order to bring the conflict to an end.

At the same time, there would be the danger that the Soviet Union might misinterpret U.S. military moves against China as a prelude to an attack on the Soviet Union, especially if the United States has not clearly distinguished between the Soviet and Chinese threats and the Soviet military plans are based on a pre-emptive strategy.

This problem has relevance for most circumstances in which the United States fails to distinguish between forces, especially if ZI-based, for use against China and those for deterring the Soviet Union. A U.S. policy of separating the threats would also reduce Peiping’s ability to blackmail Moscow for support by threats to take action that might lead to a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union.

In summary, the Soviet Union probably will try to confine its support for Chinese strategy to a minimum level consistent with Soviet objectives and risk calculations. However, during the course of a conflict, as Moscow reassesses the political and military aspects of the conflict, and especially as it is able to test and to clarify U.S. intentions and reactions to various Soviet threats and moves, the Soviet Union might well undertake support of China or increase the extent of assistance to her.

In view of the foregoing, the Chinese are likely to be conservative in their evaluation of the degree of assistance and support
they can anticipate from the Soviet Union in the event of a conflict with the United States. Chinese actions will depend more critically on their contemporary assessments of the Chinese-U.S. politico-military balance and on the available opportunities for low risk gains. Because of the importance that Peiping will attach to her assessments of the power balance in the area, the following section considers the risks for China and the United States in terms of three cases of direct Chinese-U.S. military confrontation. A subsequent section deals with available opportunities for low risk Chinese gains.
IV. SOME HYPOTHETICAL MILITARY CONFLICTS*

The possession of nuclear weapons will enable China to confront the United States and Asian nations with a greater range of military challenges than at present. The Chinese would have the option of using nuclear weapons directly on U.S. bases and Asian countries or as an umbrella for non-nuclear military operations and support of insurgency. The anticipated military consequences of such actions would play a major part in China's determination of the risks involved in each choice.

In this section, three hypothetical conflict situations between Communist China and the United States and its allies are presented.**

These were taken to provide a rough assessment of the military consequences of China's possession of a nuclear capability, and to give some indication of the magnitude of the risks that the Chinese would face in a military confrontation with the United States. We recognize, however, that in reality political conditions will affect the character of U.S. responses and will influence Chinese assessment of the military risks involved. The political conditions are discussed in detail in subsequent sections.

The hypothetical cases are:

Case I: U.S. nuclear retaliation following Chinese aggression in the area, involving

* A more detailed presentation of the material in this section is being prepared by B. F. Jaeger and M. G. Weiner.

** Polito-military analysis, two-sided war-gaming techniques, and standard military planning factors were used in the case studies. Force requirements and the outcomes of the conflicts were based on standard planning factors for U.S. military forces.
A—U.S. programmed theater forces against Chinese offensive air and missile capability, and
B—U.S. programmed theater forces, with augmentation, against Chinese offensive air and missile capability

Case II: Two-sided nuclear exchange, involving
A—Chinese pre-emptive nuclear attack on U.S. air and naval forces, augmented, in the Far East, followed by
B—Retaliation against Chinese offensive air and missile capability by surviving U.S. forces

Case III: Non-nuclear campaigns in the Taiwan Strait area

FORCE POSTURE

The basic Orders of Battle* assumed for these case studies are consistent with present (1962) U.S. military programs for the 1966-67 time period,** the U.S. Military Assistance Program for Nationalist China, and recent intelligence estimates of the military strength of Communist China. For purposes of the study it is assumed that in this time period Communist China would have a "modest" nuclear capability arbitrarily established at 36 MRBM's with nuclear warheads, and approximately 60 nuclear weapons for medium and light bomber delivery. Maximum warhead yield is estimated to be 200 KT.

The Chinese MRBM force is stationed in three complexes, i.e.,

o M-1, in Kiangsi province, approximately 50 miles north of Nan-Ch'ang

* The specific (assumed) Orders of Battle are presented in Appendix B. Further detail on possible Chinese and U.S. military developments is presented in Appendix A.

** Selection of the 1966-67 time period was based on the availability of information of U.S. programs for that period. The size, type, and disposition of the Chinese nuclear capability are not intended as estimates or predictions of Chinese developments. The Chinese capability was selected as a "representative threat" to the U.S. forces programmed for the period. This capability would strain the upper limit of Chinese scientific, industrial, technical capability, according to a study in preparation by D.N. Morris.
- M-2, in Liaoning province, approximately 100 miles north of Mukden, and
- M-3, in Hunan province, approximately 200 miles southwest of Changsha.

Each complex has four launch sites with three missile pads. Installations are not hardened to more than 5 psi.*

The Chinese airbase complex is assumed to consist of more than 200 airfields, over 60 of them with permanent runways of 7000 ft or more. Although there are differences in the condition, facilities and operational readiness of the fields, they provide a broad basis for the support of air operations. Badger aircraft are based on at least seven major airfields, and light bombers (Beagles) on three airfields.

The air defense posture assumed for China consists of an extensive early warning (EW) radar network with complete high altitude coverage along the coast and west to about longitude 100° E, but with very little or no coverage west of that line. Low altitude coverage is present along the entire coast line to about 20-25 n mi offshore, and inland around the principal government and industrial centers and at major military installations. The radar coverage is coupled with enough surface-to-air-missiles (SAM) of the SA-2 type to provide overlapping coverage of the major political, industrial, and military centers. The SAM coverage along the coast opposite Taiwan is fairly

* These complexes are hypothetical, with their locations selected on the basis of the following criteria: as far inland in China as possible while remaining within 1100-n mi (range) of all major U.S. military installations in the Far East; permitting multiple target coverage when possible; on railroad routes; in appropriate terrain, and close to other Chinese military installations, especially large airfields.
heavy. Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) coverage parallels the SAM coverage, in concentrations of both medium (85-mm and 100-mm) and light (57-mm) batteries.

Throughout the case studies we have made the critical assumption that there would be no direct intervention or participation by the Soviet Union within the time frame of the campaigns. This assumption is in line with the analysis in Sec. III.

CASE I: U.S. NUCLEAR RETALIATION FOLLOWING CHINESE AGGRESSION IN THE AREA

This case assumes that the Chinese have attacked Taiwan with nuclear weapons and that the United States launches a coordinated strike against airfields and missile sites on the Chinese Mainland within 24 hours after the Taiwan attack. The U.S. objective is the destruction of Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities.

Restrictions placed on U.S. operations include:

- no U.S. operations from or through Taiwan and no use of Nationalist Chinese forces. This limitation is based on the nature of the assumed attack on Taiwan, which essentially eliminated any possibility of using Taiwan for air operations.

- no operations by U.S. aircraft based in Japan and no use of Japanese bases by any U.S. aircraft. This restriction is based on the assumed nature of Japanese-U.S. relations at the time.

- no U.S. overflights of North Korea, North Vietnam, or the Soviet Union. This restriction is based on the military requirement of minimizing Chinese warning, and on the avoidance of any possible intervention by these countries.
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- no support of U.S. operations by non-U.S. forces. This restriction is based on an assumed U.S. desire to maintain freedom of action and on the desirability of a quick response.*
- no Chinese government, control, industrial, or non-military facilities attacked.

A--Use of Programmed Theater Forces Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability

Case I-A involves a preliminary appraisal of a campaign against China in which only programmed theater forces are to be used. However, there are several difficulties that would limit the effectiveness of such a campaign:

1. Some of the Chinese airfields are beyond the operating radius of the attacking aircraft. A Chinese basing policy that took advantage of this condition would result in the survival of a force large enough to be used in a substantial counterstrike.

2. The Chinese early warning and air defense posture would pose a threat to high altitude attacks. In order to reduce losses to an acceptable level, low altitude penetration would be necessary. Such tactics would further limit the range performance of the aircraft and reduce the target coverage.

3. The penetration of attacking aircraft would provide the Chinese with sufficient time to launch their MREM force, and to have part of their aircraft airborne for air defense operations or withdrawal to secure bases in the interior. Therefore, it would be vital to the success of the U.S. operation that the missile installations and bomber bases be struck with little or no warning. Missiles could provide such a capability, but would not be available in the programmed force in appropriate quantities and with adequate ranges and penetration speeds.

* This restriction was also useful for assessing U.S. ability to attack China without allied support.
As a result of these limitations we concluded that an attack on the Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities would let a reasonably large portion of these capabilities survive. For these reasons Case 1-A was not examined in detail.

**B—U.S. Programmed Theater Forces, with Augmentation, Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability**

The U.S. objective for this campaign is the same, i.e., to destroy Chinese offensive air and missile capability within 24 hours after a Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan. The same target system, airfields and ballistic missile sites, is assumed and operations are to be carried out under the same restrictions.

However, in view of the limitations on the effectiveness of the programmed force described above, the U.S. capability in the theater is augmented and improved, as indicated below.

The two major Chinese offensive target complexes are the MREK sites and the bomber bases, particularly those capable of supporting Badger operations. Some of the Badger bases are 1000 n mi inland.

For the missile sites, a capability to destroy them with little or no warning is desired. This capability should also be highly invulnerable to Chinese offensive and defensive action. We have assumed that the missile sites will be "soft" in the 1967 time period, and thus could be attacked with airburst nuclear weapons that lack a high degree of delivery accuracy.

Attacks on the bomber bases would need surface bursts by nuclear weapons to destroy the runways and preclude their future use. Such attacks call for highly accurate weapons; this implies air drops using laydown weapons. These attacks should also provide minimum warning to the Chinese.
Among the many possible weapon systems or combinations of systems that could provide some or all of these capabilities are:

- B-52s with Hound Dogs or Skybolts and laydown weapons
- MRBM's based in various countries in the Far East
- ICBM's based in the Pacific area, e.g., Alaska, Hawaii, Australia
- SSB(N)'s with Polaris A-3 missiles, operating in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean.

For this campaign, programmed theater forces are augmented by one wing of B-52s based at Guam, and one SSB(N) with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles of 2500-mile range is used.* These two systems are selected as being illustrative of the desired weapon capabilities. The selection does not imply that they are preferred systems since no comparison with other combinations was made.

Concept of Operations. The Badger bases and the MRBM sites are attacked by B-52s, with the coverage of the missile complexes complemented by Polaris missiles that can reach their targets without significant warning. Also, the Okinawa-based Mace are used against the Chinese missile complex nearest Okinawa (M-1), relying on saturation to get through the defenses.

Because the Badger bases are far inland, they are attacked by B-52's that overfly Burma and penetrate the radar coverage from the southwest, providing minimum penetration of Chinese air defenses. Two Hound Dogs per base are used to achieve a high kill probability.

*Appendix B shows several SSB(N)'s assigned to the Pacific Fleet in the 1967 time period. It was assumed that only one of these was assigned to Chinese targets.
with minimum warning. The B-52s also drop laydown weapons on the
7,000-ft (or longer) runways of bases in the same general area. One
Beagle base is attacked by the B-52s. The other two Beagle bases near
the coast are attacked by fighter aircraft with laydown weapons.

Fighter bases with runways of 7,000 ft or longer along the
coast and as far inland as U.S. fighters can reach are attacked by
U.S. fighters, using laydown weapons. Airburst weapons are generally
used against bases with runways shorter than 7,000 ft.

Summary of Operations.* Of the approximately 200 Chinese air-
fields, 88 are targeted for U.S. strikes. These include all fields
known or believed to be occupied (on the basis of assumed intelli-
gence information) and all fields with 7,000-ft (or longer) per-
manent runways. The 12 sites in the three missile complexes and
four radar picket ships are also targeted. Of the total of 104
targets 65 airfields, 12 missile sites, and the picket ships are
known or believed to be occupied.

All the missile sites and 17 airfields are covered by more than
one delivery vehicle. The 17 airfields include all those believed
to be occupied by the light or medium jet bombers and those air-
fields occupied by substantial numbers of fighters that lie along
the major penetration routes.

The methodology used for examining this and the subsequent
military campaigns include two-sided war gaming, and is described in
Ref. 8. Technical and operational characteristics were based on
standard military planning factors. Campaign results were based on
expected-value computations.
From the total force available,* the following forces are used:

- 27 B-52s from Guam, each with 2 Hound Dogs and 4 laydown weapons
- 29 F-4Cs from Kadena, Okinawa
- 34 F-105Ds and F-4Cs from Osan, Korea
- 16 Mace from Okinawa, and
- 12 Polaris missiles.

This provides a total attacking force of 253 weapons against 104 targets.

Campaign Results. All 12 missile sites, the picket ships, and 81 of the 88 airfields were destroyed or severely damaged.

Fourteen targets were hit by fewer than the assigned force, including seven that were not hit at all. Five of these were occupied airfields and two unoccupied.

The missile sites were damaged sufficiently that no offensive missile capability remained. All airfields occupied by light and medium jet bombers were severely damaged, except one central China base occupied by one-half a regiment of Badgers. This represented the major surviving Chinese offensive capability.

Several regiments of fighters survived the attack. Some had been on airfields that escaped attack. Others had been airborne in defensive operations when their home bases were attacked. The surviving fighters would have been severely handicapped in any subsequent action because of the extensive damage to their bases, and support and maintenance facilities. They constitute an extremely limited

*See Appendix B.
offensive threat and only a minor defensive threat to any subsequent U.S. strikes.

The U.S. losses were limited by low altitude approach tactics, and the use of Hound Dogs and ballistic missiles against fast-reacting targets. As a result, the Chinese defensive fighters and SAM batteries had restricted opportunities to engage U.S. forces. Only seven aircraft were lost to enemy action, four to Chinese fighters and three to AAA.* Two of the seven aircraft destroyed had already released their weapons.

Observations. Some observations drawn from these campaigns and force postures are:

1. Operating from an undamaged posture, U.S. programmed theater forces could destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive posture, but these forces would be handicapped by insufficient range, penetration, and quick response capabilities.

2. Augmented theater forces could reduce the Chinese offensive capabilities to a very low level.

3. The U.S. losses in an augmented-theater-force campaign could be quite low. Chinese defenses suffer from serious deficiencies in radar coverage, SAM capability, and defensive fighter effectiveness against high speed, low altitude penetration.

4. The Chinese offensive capability surviving an attack by augmented U.S. forces would be only a minor threat to the U.S. military posture in the Pacific.

5. Commitment of all U.S. forces in the theater was not necessary during this campaign. Neither the Philippine-based USAF aircraft nor the Seventh Fleet aircraft were used.

6. Either surviving elements of the committed U.S. force or the U.S. forces not committed would ensure a U.S. capability for a substantial second strike.

*Attrition computations were based on information in Ref. 9.
7. With a substantial portion of the Chinese airfield complex destroyed, their ability to redeploy surviving or airborne aircraft is very limited. Any attempt to supply replacements for the lost aircraft by the USSR would be limited by the same destruction.

CASE II: TWO-SIDED NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

This Case examines a Chinese-initiated nuclear strike and U.S. retaliation. Part A analyzes a Chinese attack on the augmented U.S. air and naval forces in the Far East, and Part B analyzes a U.S. retaliatory strike using forces that survive the Chinese attack.

The background for this case study assumes that at the time of the Chinese attack (1967), U.S.-Soviet relations are extremely tense, to the degree that nuclear war is a strong possibility. The Chinese believe that in the event of war they would also be attacked by U.S. forces. The Chinese choose to strike first in an attempt to destroy U.S. bases in the Far East, with the presumption that the surviving U.S. theater forces could not critically damage the Chinese Mainland.

The same Orders of Battle as for Case I-B are assumed except for three more aircraft carriers and a number of support ships assigned to the Seventh Fleet. One of these carriers is undergoing maintenance at Subic Bay Naval Base, the Philippines. Two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet has been deployed to the Far East as a result of the extremely tense international situation.

A--Chinese Pre-emptive Nuclear Attack on U.S. Air and Naval Forces, Augmented, in the Far East

The Chinese launch three coordinated attacks: aircraft strike on Guam and Iwo Jima, an aircraft and missile attack on all other U.S. land bases in the Far East (including five Nationalist Chinese airfields on Taiwan), and an aircraft attack on the Seventh Fleet.
The timing of these attacks must be carefully controlled to preserve the element of surprise for all targets. The Chinese tactics call for all airborne attacks to be conducted at low altitude in the hope of achieving surprise and minimizing losses.

Guam and Iwo Jima. The Chinese attack Guam and Iwo Jima with five Badgers, each carrying a nuclear weapon. The bombers fly at low altitude over the water gap between Taiwan and Northern Luzon. On this leg, five other Badgers serving as tankers accompany them to permit this strike to be a round-trip mission. The bombers are refueled and proceed to their assigned targets. Three are assigned to Anderson and Agana air bases on Guam, and two to military targets on Iwo Jima.

Because of the high state of tension, nine of the B-52s based on Guam are assumed to be airborne at any time, and 13 on ground alert. The programmed warning system for Guam has limited capability against low altitude attacks and targets on Guam received only two or three minutes warning of the approaching bombers. Thus only three additional B-52s are safely airborne prior to the detonation of the Chinese 200-KT nuclear weapons.

U.S. and Nationalist Chinese Theater Bases. The Chinese fire 27 of their 36 missiles in this operation. The missile strike is followed immediately by an air strike with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The targets for the Chinese nuclear attack are listed on p. 42.

Six targets survive the missile strike because of various missile malfunctions. The followup air strike is highly effective, and only two targets ultimately survive, Naha Air Base, Okinawa,
and Misawa Air Base, Japan. Neither base constitutes a threat to China. Only transport and air defense aircraft are stationed at Naha, and the aircraft at Misawa are not available for nuclear operations. Because the Chinese believe that threats will suffice to forestall any Japanese action, the Chinese do not conduct a second strike against the Japanese bases.

**TARGETS OF THE CHINESE ATTACK**

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<th>Target</th>
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<td>Missiles</td>
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<td>Okinawa</td>
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<td>Kadena AB</td>
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<td>Naha AB</td>
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<td>Anderson AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agana</td>
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<td>Iwo Jima</td>
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The Chinese lose only two Badgers and two Beagles in this action. Ten F-100D fighters at Clark AFB, Philippines, represent the only surviving offensive force for the United States in this operation. Clark AFB had been missed by the missile strike but was destroyed by the air strike. Chinese losses are low because of the effectiveness of their missile strike, and the ineffectiveness of the U.S. air defenses against the low altitude attack.

The Seventh Fleet. The heavily augmented Seventh Fleet has been divided into two task forces. Task Force 1 is approximately 750 n mi east of Shanghai, off the island of Kyushu, and Task Force 2 is 750 n mi south southeast of Amoy. The 750 n mi distance limits the Chinese to Badgers for a round-trip attack.

Only the attack on Task Force 1 is analyzed. The results are assumed to be applicable to an attack on Task Force 2. Because of the alert status, 50 per cent of the fighters and attack aircraft are armed and ready on deck.* A combat air patrol of F-4B fighters and E-2A early warning aircraft are airborne.

The Chinese launch a strike of 30 Badgers, 20 Beagles, and 20 Farmers against each task force. The Badgers fly low and carry 15 nuclear weapons and 15 large non-nuclear bombs. The Beagles and Farmers fly high and are intended as decoys up to the task force perimeters.** The Chinese know the general location of the task

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* Thirty per cent of the aircraft are assumed to be undergoing maintenance, and 20 per cent are in a non-alert status for other reasons.

** The probability of detecting the low flying aircraft increases to better than 0.6 as they approach the line of deployment of the radar picket ships stationed 150 n mi from fleet center. Assuming
forces, but they do not know the location of the centers of gravity. Further, they do not know the size and disposition of the forces.

In spite of the Chinese attack, a very large percentage of the ready carrier aircraft are launched. Fourteen Chinese aircraft are lost to the U.S. guided-missile ships and air defense fighters during penetration. One carrier in each task force is sunk, and a second in Task Force 1 is damaged sufficiently that its remaining aircraft are assumed not available for a strike against the Chinese Mainland.

After the Chinese strike, the U.S. naval air defense fighters continue to attack the remaining bomber force. With the assistance of the E-2A aircraft for detection and vectoring control, the attacking Badger force is essentially eliminated.

**Summary of Results.** Only two U.S. land bases survive the Chinese nuclear strike, Naha and Misawa ABs. The transport and fighter aircraft on these bases do not constitute a threat to the Chinese. The following U.S. offensive forces survive and are assumed to be available for attacking targets on the Chinese Mainland:

- 12 B-52s from Guam, each with 2 Hound Dogs and 4 laydown weapons
- 10 F-100s from the Philippines
- 8 Mace from Okinawa (100-psi hardened)
- 103 A-4Es and A-4Cs from the Seventh Fleet
- 16 A-3Ds from the Seventh Fleet

detection at the picket ship deployment line, Badger speed of 480 knots, and negligible communication delay to the carriers, the carriers have approximately 20 minutes to launch their aircraft. The minimum time required to launch all combat-ready aircraft is estimated to be eight minutes.
12 A-6As from the Seventh Fleet
1 Polaris submarine (available for this operation), and
2 carriers.

In the operation the Chinese losses are estimated at 44 Badgers
and three other aircraft.

Observations. Some observations drawn from this campaign and
force postures are:

1. A modest nuclear capability could be used by the Chinese
to damage heavily the augmented U.S. theater forces. However,
some portions of the force would survive and be available
for a retaliatory strike against China.

2. The success of the Chinese attack depends critically on a
number of conditions, including:

   a. The timing of the various phases of the operation is
      of major importance. All events must take place on
      a precise schedule to prevent the premature disclo-
      sure of the strike, which would allow the United
      States to get a larger percentage of its offensive
      and defensive aircraft airborne before the attack
      arrives.

   b. The effectiveness of the attack on Guam is dependent
      on (1) the ability of the Chinese bombers to pass
      between Taiwan and Luzon without being detected by
      the task force in the Philippine Sea, (2) the ability
      of the bombers to escape detection by the EC-121K
      aircraft on Guam, and (3) the number of B-52s on air
      alert at the time of the attack.

3. Remaining Chinese offensive forces represent a limited
second-strike capability, which can be used either
directly or as a threat to deter possible responses to
the attack.

4. The U.S. land bases have limited early warning capabili-
ties against low altitude attacks. Since many of these
bases are surrounded by water or must be approached over water, the use of existing over-water detection systems for early warning would further limit the effectiveness of the Chinese attack.

5. There is little likelihood that the Chinese could mount any form of attack on the Seventh Fleet that would prevent the launching of nearly all ready aircraft. The possession of an air-launched guided missile with a nuclear warhead and a range of 150 n mi would increase the effectiveness of the attack, provided the carriers could be located precisely, but this capability is not assumed for the Chinese in the 1967 time period.

B--Retaliation Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability by Surviving U.S. Forces

We next examined an attack on the Chinese Mainland by the U.S. forces that survive the attack described in Case II-A. An attack by these U.S. forces would be carried out in a period of confusion, without coordination, and with some duplication. We assumed that there is preplanning for such a contingency and that each aircraft would attack targets included in existing emergency plans.

Concept of Operations. The target structure is the same as that of Case I. The B-52s attack the MRBM sites and the Badger bases with Hound Dogs and laydown weapons. The B-52s penetrate from the southwest, over Burma, for deep targets. The Polaris are fired against the MRBM sites. The surviving Mace are fired against coastal airfields. All aircraft missions over the Chinese Mainland are carried out at low altitude to minimize detection and losses.

Summary of Attack by USAF Units. Two B-52s are assigned to cover each major target, and each aircraft is assigned up to four targets, using its two Hound Dogs and four laydown weapons. The 12 B-52s hit 18 airfields and 12 missile sites. The eight Mace hit eigh
airfields in the general vicinity of Shanghai. The ten F-100s from Clark AFB hit ten airfields in South China.

**Summary of Attack by Seventh Fleet Aircraft.** The Navy emergency plan calls for two aircraft to be assigned to each target.*

The Navy aircraft attack 72 targets comprising 63 airfields and four radar picket ships. Several of these airfields are also attacked by the Mace and F-100s.

**Summary of Results.** A total of 104 targets are hit by the U.S. retaliatory strike; 17 survive. These consist of one missile site, one bomber base, nine fighter bases, and 6 unoccupied airfields. The U.S. losses are 30 fighter and attack aircraft and three B-52s.** Three Polaris abort in flight, as do two Mace. A third Mace is destroyed by Chinese air defenses.

The surviving Chinese force consists of one MREBM site, 16 Badgers, and several squadrons of air defense fighters.

**Observations.** Some observations drawn from this campaign and its force postures are:

1. The augmented U.S. theater forces surviving the nuclear strike could destroy a substantial portion of the remaining Chinese offensive capability. The success of such a U.S. attack would depend critically on a number of factors:

*With the enemy expecting an attack, losses to the striking force may be high, and duplication of targeting assignments is desirable.

**The attrition of the U.S. force was developed from data given in Ref. 9.
Authorization to attack is necessary within one hour after Seventh Fleet aircraft take off from the carriers that are destroyed in the Chinese attack. Otherwise, these naval aircraft would not have sufficient fuel to complete their missions.

The U.S. retaliatory strike is carried out in a preplanned and relatively orderly fashion. This assumption is probably optimistic and therefore the results should be downgraded to some degree.

Alternate targets are not assigned for the aircraft in a dual coverage role. In the strike, many weapons were not dropped because the target had been destroyed by the first aircraft assigned to that target.

2. The U.S. losses could be high because the U.S. attack is expected, and all elements of the Chinese air defense system are in a high alert status.

3. Range limitations will not permit the naval aircraft to return directly to their task forces and they must recover over such friendly areas as Taiwan, South Vietnam, and South Korea. In the event that adequate landing facilities are not available, the pilots parachute to safety.

4. The Chinese offensive capability surviving an attack by the augmented U.S. forces would not represent a serious threat to U.S. military posture in the Pacific.

5. The U.S. theater forces surviving the attack on the Chinese Mainland do not provide the United States with the capability for a major second strike.

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CASES I AND II

These cases were studied to obtain a general estimate of the effectiveness of programmed theater forces against a Chinese nuclear capability. On the basis of the postulated conditions, the following general conclusions are drawn:

1. Undamaged U.S. theater forces, augmented by one wing of B-52s and with the use of one SSB(N), could destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability.
The augmentation would be required to reach distant targets and to minimize warning time for the MRBMs. The same U.S. forces could carry out a major second strike if necessary.

2. If the Chinese strike first, they could severely damage the U.S. military posture in the area. Further augmentation of air and naval forces would be required to provide a satisfactory U.S. retaliatory strike capability in this case.

3. Both the U.S. and the Chinese effectiveness would depend critically on adequate intelligence concerning the size, disposition, and location of opposing forces. For the Chinese this would be particularly true when attacking the Seventh Fleet; for the United States, in target assignment of occupied airfields.

4. Both sides have deficiencies in early warning in air defense against low altitude attack. The vulnerability of U.S. forces could be reduced by appropriate improvements in equipment.

5. After a U.S. strike from a damaged posture, only minimal theater forces would be available for a second strike against surviving Chinese military, government, control, industrial, and political targets. If such a strike were needed, additional forces would be required.

CASE III: NON-NUCLEAR CAMPAIGNS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA

Provided the United States continues to maintain a nuclear posture commensurate with growing Chinese nuclear weapon development, Cases I and II suggest that direct nuclear aggression by the Chinese would entail high risks for them.

The Chinese would still have the military option of using their nuclear capability as an umbrella for overt non-nuclear military operations, i.e., as a threat to enhance the possibilities of achievement of limited objectives by non-nuclear operations. Case III appraises some of the implications for the United States of such a Chinese strategy.
The locale for Case III is the Taiwan Strait, particularly Quemoy. This area was selected for several reasons. The 1958 crisis provides both a precedent and historical data that permit comparisons with objectives attributed to the Chinese in Sec. II. The Communist Chinese have often voiced their intent to reincorporate Taiwan and the Offshore Islands with the Chinese Mainland. For defense of the Offshore Island U.S. intentions are ambiguous and allied support may be questionable; whereas for the defense of Taiwan, a firm U.S. commitment and a greater probability of allied support are assumed.

Case III is not intended to represent a detailed analysis of the variety of possible situations and events that might develop in the Taiwan Strait area. It is intended to illustrate the increased political implications that could develop in some situations in which the Chinese might attempt a non-nuclear military operation at the time they have the capability to resort to nuclear weapons. It also provides some indications of the possible significance of nuclear weapons to the Chinese for this type of operation, and of some of the consequences for U.S. military responses.

Two situations were examined; the major one is an attack on Big Quemoy.* The second is a limited examination of a Chinese assault on Taiwan. A more complete discussion of both studies is in preparation by B. F. Jaeger and M. G. Weiner.

* A brief analysis of possible Chinese actions against some of the smaller Offshore Islands (Pai-Ch'uan group, Tung-Yin Shan, Wu-Ch'iu Hsu, etc.) was also undertaken. In general, it indicated that the Communist Chinese could successfully assault one or more of these smaller islands without extensive military preparations that might produce warning of their assault. Using standard military planning
Chinese Assault of Big Quemoy

For this situation, we assumed in line with current intelligence that Quemoy's defensive capabilities have been improved since 1958: approximately 60,000 troops on the island, high quality guns increased to more than 350, widespread deployment of mines, barbed wire, and defensive fortifications, and a high level of combat effectiveness maintained in the Nationalist Chinese armed forces. The Nationalist Chinese Orders of Battle, which are based on 1966 Military Aid Program force goals plus an assumed modernization program, and the U.S. Orders of Battle, which are based on current program data, are indicated in Appendix B.

We assumed that Communist Chinese preparations for the attack on Quemoy would provide some warning, resulting in increased levels of alert, certain redeployments within the theater, and augmentation of U.S. theater forces. Japanese reaction to a new Offshore Island crisis in the face of Communist China's nuclear strength is deemed to be uncertain. As a consequence, two tactical fighter squadrons, a tactical reconnaissance detachment, one Marine attack squadron plus a Marine fighter squadron, and supporting elements based in Japan are immediately

factors, an estimated Chinese force of from one to five divisions, approximately 200 combat aircraft, and an appropriate number of landing craft and junks would appear adequate to carry out the attack, depending on the particular island or islands chosen. The military capability to undertake such action exists today and is not dependent upon Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. We found no indication that nuclear weapons would play a dominant role in the local military situation. Such an assault would raise problems concerning possible military responses for the Nationalist Chinese, and would have political implications in the Far East, particularly for U.S.-Nationalist Chinese relations.
deployed to Taiwan and Okinawa. This obviated the need for later dependence on Japanese basing. Provision is made for direct ZI support of these and other Pacific-based forces in the event of a denial or restriction of the Japanese logistic base. A U.S. Army Hawk battalion is airlifted from the United States to Taiwan to augment airfield defenses for the U.S. forces. Two tactical fighter squadrons from the CASF are deployed to the Philippines. Subsequently, two other squadrons are moved from the ZI to Japan, replacing those redeployed to Taiwan. This is to demonstrate the U.S. will to assist in the defense of Japan and other areas in the event of escalation or expansion of the impending conflict. Tactical reconnaissance, inflight refueling aircraft, and troop carrier forces are also increased. The Seventh Fleet is augmented by two attack carriers, an ASW carrier, and support ships, and deployed to the Taiwan Strait. An augmentation force of one B-52 wing based on Guam is also assumed, as in Cases I and II, as well as the use of one SSB(N).

The total Communist Chinese military strength is as described in Appendix B, but a major part of the force is assumed to be held in place by other commitments. Approximately one-fourth of the total Communist Chinese air and naval capability and less than one-fourth of the ground forces are considered available for the Quemoy assault. In line with the assessments in Sec. III, direct Soviet military support for the initial Communist Chinese assault is assumed unlikely.

The direct assault on Quemoy by Communist Chinese amphibious forces is presumed to follow preliminary heavy shelling and air attack on the island to reduce the defenses. The assault force requirements
are estimated to be 15 to 20 divisions, 2,000 to 4,000 air sorties, and 3,000 to 4,000 landing vessels and junks.

In order to estimate the results of such an attack, we assume that there is no opposition by Nationalist Chinese or U.S. air units. Even without Nationalist Chinese air opposition (a highly unlikely condition) Communist Chinese casualties from the Quemoy defenses alone would be in excess of 40,000 men, with heavy materiel losses. However, if Nationalist Chinese or U.S. air forces vigorously oppose the assault through attacks on staging and transit operations, costs in both men and materiel would be greatly increased. This factor, plus the problems the Communist Chinese would face in coordinating and executing an assault of this magnitude, would give them only a marginal chance of success.*

In view of the marginal chance of success, the substantial losses, the limited value of the objective, the many uncertainties in preparation and execution of the operation, and the variety of possible Nationalist Chinese and U.S. responses, an assault on Quemoy under the conditions postulated appears to involve high risks for the Communist Chinese. The value of a Communist Chinese nuclear capability as an umbrella for such operations is highly questionable. Based on the

*Factors that could be strongly adverse to Communist Chinese operations include: the preparation, assembly, and loading of the invasion forces, which could provide hours to weeks of warning, the difficulties in coordinating the 2,000-plus air sorties, the loading, moving, and landing of the 3,000-plus junks, the logistic support required for initial attacks, replacement of losses, and buildup on the beaches, etc. Because these could be major problems for the Communist Chinese, our estimates of force requirements and losses are probably conservative.
circumstances assumed in the case study it would not contribute sig-
ificantly to the military operation. Moreover, the direct use of
nuclear weapons against Quemoy, despite any local military advantage,
would increase the risk of expansion of the conflict out of all pro-
portion to the value of the operation to the Communist Chinese.

While the military situation in both non-nuclear and nuclear
operations would tend to favor the United States, there would be
political problems associated with the Communist Chinese possession
of a nuclear capability that would be aggravated by U.S. participatio
in the defense of Quemoy. These problems would include:

1. pressures on the United States to avoid involvement in
   an issue that is considered unimportant and that is
   "unpopular" in some countries

2. pressures on the United States to limit the nature and
   magnitude of its responses and to avoid actions that
   might increase the danger of escalation, and

3. restrictions on the freedom of use of some U.S. bases
   required for deployment, logistic support, etc., that
   might influence U.S. ability to respond effectively.

No attempt was made to consider these implications in the Taiwar
Case study, but their impact on the U.S. politico-military posture
and actions is considered in Sec. VI.

Chinese Assault of Taiwan

Case III also included a limited examination of Communist Chines
capabilities for a non-nuclear campaign against Taiwan. In this situ-
tion, the U.S. force deployments are the same as those assumed for
the assault on Quemoy. Estimates of the Communist Chinese force
requirements use the same planning factors as those for the attack on
Quemoy.
On this basis the assault force requirements would tax the total Communist Chinese military capability. Naval and air requirements would be particularly demanding. Assuming Communist Chinese air power is used in an attempt to markedly reduce or eliminate the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, the requirements approach the limits of Communist Chinese (estimated) total operational and logistic capability. Commitment of U.S. air and naval units would make the costs of Communist Chinese non-nuclear campaign almost prohibitive, with only the remotest chance of success.

Such a non-nuclear campaign, involving the commitment of the major portion of the total military capability of Communist China, is not in line with our estimates of their risk calculations. If the Communist Chinese were to risk such a campaign, the United States might consider a nuclear response, such as nuclear attacks on the staging bases and invasion fleet. With appropriate timing and targeting (including the timing of the authorization to use nuclear weapons) such a response could be militarily effective in stopping the invasion.

For their part, it seems unlikely that the Communist Chinese would risk using nuclear weapons prior to or as part of the invasion in view of the variety of responses available to the United States. The possibility of a U.S. response from an undamaged posture following a Communist Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan (as in Case I) would be an essential part of their risk calculations.

Like the case of an attack on Quemoy, a Communist Chinese assault on Taiwan would involve political problems. However, U.S. responses would be less subject to the pressures and limitations described above.
because of the generally recognized U.S. obligations to defend Nationalist China and the importance of this area to the free world.

Observations on Case III

1. A Communist Chinese overt, non-nuclear campaign against Quemoy or Taiwan would represent clearly identifiable aggression. Against Quemoy it could be carried out only at considerable cost and with a marginal chance of success. Against Taiwan the costs would be almost prohibitive and the chances of success remote. Both campaigns could bring the Communist Chinese into direct military confrontation with the United States, and involve high risks for them.

2. A Communist Chinese nuclear capability would be of limited military value for use against Quemoy, although possession of such a capability would create political pressures on the United States to limit its response, and might necessitate operational and logistic adjustments.

3. In an assault on Taiwan, the use of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese could have local military value, but would involve extremely high risks for them.

4. A Communist Chinese nuclear capability would appear to create greater political than military problems in U.S. defense of the Taiwan area.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

These Cases have been presented to illuminate the magnitude of the risks that the Communist Chinese would face in military confrontation of U.S. forces in the Pacific area.

Under the conditions postulated in this study, U.S. theater forces operating from an undamaged posture, augmented by B-52s and using one SSB(N), could virtually eliminate Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities. Even in a situation where the Chinese strike first, U.S. capabilities to retaliate are adequate to inflict severe damage on the Chinese offensive capabilities and to reduce them to such a
low level that they represent a very limited threat. In non-nuclear operations, particularly against Nationalist China, the Communist Chinese would suffer heavy losses and would have only a marginal chance of success.*

*A related RAND study of Chinese large scale aggression in Southeast Asia supports this conclusion. Several campaigns involving a U.S.-Chinese confrontation in this area were analyzed. The campaigns assumed military capabilities for the Chinese that are similar, but not identical, to those assumed in this current study, i.e., a smaller Chinese nuclear capability at a somewhat earlier time period. The Southeast Asian study concludes that "early interdiction (of Chinese invasion routes) by tactical use of nuclear weapons against a large scale aggression is likely to be militarily decisive." (11)
V. LIKELY CHINESE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION

As noted earlier, the manner in which China pursues her basic objectives at the time she possesses a modest nuclear capability will be strongly influenced by her contemporary assessment of: the role of the Soviet Union, the Chinese-U.S. military balance, and the opportunities for low risk gains.

Our analysis of the Soviet role in Chinese policy (Sec. III) indicates that there is good reason for Peiping to be conservative in evaluating the degree of assistance and support she can anticipate from the Soviet Union in the event of a military conflict with the United States.

Section IV indicates that a direct Chinese confrontation of U.S. forces in the area could involve very high risks for the Chinese. In view of their past rationality and caution in the use of force, the Chinese are not likely to consider such risks acceptable.

This section considers China's likely politico-propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability and its use in low level military operations. This discussion is an extension of the analysis of Chinese objectives, military doctrine, and strategy presented in Sec. II.

FACTORS FAVORING POLITICO-PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION

So long as China is not certain of Soviet military support for her objectives, either directly or by deterrence of U.S. responses, and is confronted with a U.S. determination and a capability to make the risks of overt military operations extremely high, she is likely to prefer a course of action that emphasizes the politico-propaganda use of her nuclear capability. Such a course would be in accord with past Chinese doctrine, which stresses politico-propaganda techniques, particularly when confronted with a militarily stronger opponent. Moreover, in view of extreme Asian sensitivity to nuclear weapons, such politico-propaganda exploitation may well be considered by Peiping as providing a greater likelihood of success. If effective, such exploitation could in turn create increased opportunities for low level military probes at reduced risk.

CONFIDENTIAL
Targets for Exploitation

There will be no clean break between China's political exploitations of the first detonation and of an operational nuclear weapon capability. Beginning with her first nuclear detonation, China will seek acceptance as a nuclear power, thereby attempting to enhance Chinese prestige, gain recognition of Peiping as the sole voice of China in world councils, effect a "peaceful" but favorable solution to the Taiwan issue, obtain a political price for China's participation in disarmament negotiations, and reinforce trends in Asia toward neutralism and accommodation with Peiping. (2)

As China approaches a true nuclear capability, she will pursue these goals more aggressively and will view this development as a means for securing gains of a more directly military-political nature, in particular, those that would reduce U.S. influence and power in the area. Priority targets for the politico-propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability will include:

1. the U.S.-Asian alliance and base system
2. Asian nations' self-defense efforts, and
3. internal stability in the area.

The U.S.-Asian Alliance and Base System. Peiping is likely to believe that when confronted with a nuclear-armed China, U.S. allies in the area will be more inclined to question the military credibility of the U.S. posture in Asia. She will expect concern by the U.S. allies that their hosting of U.S. bases will increase the possibility of their involvement in a nuclear conflict with Peiping. China would hope that this concern will generate indigenous pressures for a re-appraisal of foreign policy alignments and military alliances and result in restrictions on U.S. use of bases and facilities in the event of conflict with Peiping, particularly over such issues as the Offshore Islands and Taiwan. China would further anticipate pressures for self-imposed limits on U.S. military policies in the Far East, and demands for the United States to "come to terms" with Peiping.
Asian Nations' Self-defense Efforts. Peiping will seek to cast doubt on U.S. military and political intentions in the area, thereby hoping to discourage any effective self-defense efforts by free Asian nations. Peiping would hope to discourage nuclear arming of Asian nations: India and Japan, which might be capable of developing their own nuclear weapons, and such nations as the Republics of China, Korea, and the Philippines, which might well press for nuclear sharing. China might resort to such tactics as nuclear blackmail, mobilization of indigenous pressures in the country concerned, or exploitation of disarmament proposals, whether instigated by China or by other Asian countries.

Internal Stability in the Area. Peiping would also anticipate an exacerbation of political friction within free Asian nations because of her nuclear progress, particularly as regards the nature of an appropriate response to the Chinese achievement. Growing friction within countries allied with the United States when, as in the case of Japan, it is combined with internal pressures to expand trade with China, to restore diplomatic relations with the mainland regime, or to come to an accommodation with Peiping, would be expected to lead to a polarization of political sentiment and increased internal dissension. In the case of Asian neutrals, Peiping would hope that her prestige as a nuclear power would convince such countries that "a pro-Chinese neutrality" represented the wave of the future and that resultant political instability would create opportunities for increased pressures from Peiping.

China is also likely to believe that her nuclear capability will enhance the prestige of indigenous Communist movements, increase their domestic political influence, and stimulate national liberation movements along the Chinese pattern. China's nuclear capability will be expected to intimidate local governments and to inhibit their responses to local Communist activities for fear of antagonizing a nuclear-armed China. Hints of Chinese intervention will be expected to discourage requests for U.S. support of counterinsurgency operations. Well short of any overt Chinese military intervention,
Peiping might anticipate political gains. It is also possible that revolutionary movements in some of the independent Asian countries might be so encouraged by China's growing power and prestige as to attempt to overthrow existing pro-Western governments in anticipation of support from Peiping or at least deterrence of effective resistance.

**Politico-propaganda Techniques**

China's possession of a nuclear capability will enhance the range of politico-propaganda techniques available to her for achieving her long term objectives. Some likely approaches, deriving their significance particularly from China's possession of a nuclear capability, are discussed below:

**Depreciation of the U.S. Military Position in the Area.** Peiping will contend that her possession of nuclear weapons has brought about a decisive shift in the balance of forces in the Far East. She will claim that her nuclear capability cancels out the U.S. nuclear deterrent and that her non-nuclear force is clearly superior to that of the United States and U.S. allies in Asia. In the light of this alleged superiority, Peiping will portray the United States as incapable of defending U.S. allies in Asia, as restrained from using nuclear weapons—in short, as deterred from engaging in either nuclear or non-nuclear conflict in the area.

**Intensification of the Danger of War.** To exploit Asian fear of involvement in a nuclear war, and to generate pressures for restricting U.S. access to the area, Peiping will emphasize the dangers of U.S. miscalculation, of U.S. use of nuclear weapons in desperation, and of war begun by accident or unauthorized action.

Peiping will exploit the fear of a nuclear war to reinforce the unpopularity of the Taiwan issue among Asian neutrals and to generate dissatisfaction with the U.S. China policy among U.S. allies. This would be aimed at making U.S. support of Taiwan more difficult and encouraging the United States to settle the problem on Peiping's terms.
Nuclear Threats and Blackmail. Through these techniques, Peiping would hope to gain advantages from her nuclear capability without incurring the risks of direct action. Peiping would have many options for the use of nuclear threats and blackmail.

She no doubt will also be prepared to make generalized threats, emphasizing the vulnerability of U.S. allies and U.S. bases in Asia to nuclear destruction, while alleging that China, with her large population, vast territory, and less centralized industry could always survive a nuclear attack. Peiping probably will declare, as did the Soviet Union, that those countries containing U.S. bases are hostages for U.S. behavior, that such bases expose the host country to the danger of destruction in a nuclear war if the United States becomes involved in a conflict in Asia. She will argue that the "irresponsible, aggressive behavior and policies of the United States" are raising the danger of a nuclear war and that only removal of U.S. bases and influence from the area will eliminate the threat of a nuclear conflict.

During crises, more specific threats, particularly a warning that U.S. intervention would bring nuclear warfare to an Asian country, might be used to intimidate a local government, to discourage it from seeking U.S. assistance, and to generate pressures on the United States not to intervene or to limit the U.S. intervention. However, such specific threats would leave the Chinese bluff open to challenge.

It is probable that Peiping will prefer more generalized threats and will limit specific threats to unlikely contingencies. For example, Peiping could take public credit for a U.S. failure to provide the Nationalist Chinese with nuclear weapons, knowing full well that the United States had no intention of providing such weapons.

Taiwan and Japan probably will be major targets for nuclear threats and blackmail because of Peiping's high stakes and high expectations of success. In both areas, blandishments may well accompany the threats.
At the same time, Peiping may also be prepared to use her nuclear threats (either overtly or implicitly) to make favorable border adjustments or to increase her influence in buffer areas, such as Nepal.

Credibility of the Chinese Threat. In order to get the United States and Asian countries to accept the alleged Chinese capability and to give an impression of confidence in their own military posture, Chinese nuclear threats probably will be complemented by major efforts to create an impression of great military strength. Chinese military and political leaders will select appropriate occasions to claim certain types of offensive and defensive capabilities. While there are serious limits to the credibility that can be achieved by such assertions, at least among technically sophisticated audiences, it is quite possible that, following the detonation of a device, Peiping might achieve an exaggerated estimate of her nuclear power.

To underline their military claims, the Chinese can be expected to make a concerted use of displays and demonstrations of military equipment, maneuvers, air shows, missile firings, and continued nuclear testing in conjunction with the development of new weapon systems.

Wide publicity would also be given to any reorganization of, or new training in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that would demonstrate its adaptation to a nuclear conflict. The establishment of a rocket command within the PLA, training exercises involving nuclear weapons, or any civil defense measures that would supplement these steps could be cited as evidence of China's reduced vulnerability.

Chinese indication of great military power will be handled with intent to preclude adequate assessment of true capabilities. The propaganda and publicity may be in greater volume than was characteristic of the Soviets during a comparable period, which could lead to misinterpretation of the true extent of Chinese nuclear capabilities, and to a willingness to accept Chinese claims.
The Disarmament Issue. At the same time that she shows her "nuclear flag," China may increasingly make use of the disarmament gambit as a means of mobilizing Asian pressures on the United States. As at present, Peiping will proclaim her "willingness" to participate in disarmament arrangements, but her participation in such negotiations will continue to be dependent on a political price—recognition as the sole voice of China in international organizations and political recognition by the United States, including acceptance of her claim to Taiwan. Peiping will seek to leave the impression that these are its "final" demands and that U.S. acceptance of China's "legitimate interests" would lead not only to disarmament but also to a political settlement in the Far East, to the reduction of tension in the area, and to the elimination of the possibility of a nuclear conflict.

While in no way prepared to accept an Asian nuclear-free zone, China may well continue to advance this concept on an undefined and ambiguous basis. Or she may prefer to let other Asian countries or the Soviet Union press this idea in the belief that concessions would be offered to her in order to secure her acquiescence. By paying lip service to the concept of a nuclear-free zone, China in any event would hope to reduce unfavorable Asian reaction to her nuclear development, inhibit Asian self-defense efforts, particularly of a nuclear character, mobilize Asian pressures for restrictions on U.S. military policies in the area, and elicit some type of U.S. acceptance of the idea in principle. This latter would then be used by Peiping and left-wing Asians as a basis for protesting any further U.S. nuclear and missile buildup in the area, since such action would be propagandized as a violation of the U.S. acceptance in principle of the nuclear-free zone.

The Chinese Image—Revolutionary and Conciliatory. To create an environment that would underline the credibility of their nuclear posture without creating such resentment and suspicion in the area as to prejudice political gains, the Chinese are likely to project an image of themselves as both revolutionary and conciliatory in behavior. On the one hand, they are likely to press for their revolutionary objectives. They will probably give renewed emphasis to
the charge that the United States is a "paper tiger," but now--because of China's nuclear capability—one that should be despised both strategically and tactically. They will continue to assert that they are not afraid of a nuclear war. On the other hand, they are likely to insist that disarmament measures are necessary and possible, and that a nuclear war would be a calamity that can be avoided only if "the United States pursues less aggressive, provocative policies," if U.S. bases and influence are removed from the area, and if the United States moves toward settling outstanding issues with Peiping.

The Chinese will want to create the impression with Asian and other audiences that the United States is the threat to the peace in Asia and that a rapprochement with Peiping is possible and preferable to a direct confrontation.

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOW LEVEL CHINESE MILITARY ACTIONS**

China has been and still is ready to engage in low level military activities such as border conflicts and to provide assistance to indigenous Communist movements when risks are low and potential gains high. Situations vulnerable to this kind of Chinese exploitation will continue to exist whether China possesses a nuclear capability or not.

However, at the time she possesses a nuclear capability, China may believe that the opportunities for low level military actions have increased. She may reason that possession of a nuclear capability will deter resistance to Chinese moves and will keep the risks of such actions within acceptable limits. She may believe too that the politico-propaganda exploitation of her capability has been effective enough to warrant an accelerated drive toward achievement of her long term objectives.

Consequently, at the time she possesses a nuclear capability, China may:

- be more prone to provide overt or covert support to local Communist uprisings and insurgent movements directed against pro-Western and neutral governments in the area,
- consider the time appropriate to test U.S. and free Asian responses in such areas as Taiwan and the Offshore
Islands with a view to exploiting the situation both militarily and politically, and be even more willing to make overt use of her military power to compel the settlement of border problems on her terms.

In turn, China may undertake such actions with the expectation that even limited successes will enhance her position in Asia and add further weight to her politico-propaganda efforts.

However, Peiping is not likely to be insensitive to U.S. or Asian reaction to selective military probing. If U.S. responses tend to raise the risks in a given operation, Peiping is not likely to opt for military action, but rather to seek to capitalize on U.S. firmness with a view to achieving political gains. If Chinese action result in adverse Asian reaction, Peiping is expected to assess carefully the longer term political costs of local military successes. In any event, Peiping will attempt to retain the ability to keep the operation at the desired level or to terminate it quickly if political or military factors so dictate.
VI. THE IMPACT ON ASIA AND ON THE U.S. POSITION IN THE AREA

Section V analyzed probable Chinese political and low level military utilization of a modest nuclear capability. This section examines how such exploitation by China is likely to affect non-Communist Asia and the U.S. position there.

From the outset it must be kept in mind that because of dissimilarities in geographic, economic, and historic conditions, the United States and non-Communist Asia see the problem of China and the question of nuclear weapons somewhat differently. Moreover, in assessing the Asian reaction to the emergence of China as a nuclear power, the diversity of internal and external problems and conditions that prevail in the area must also be recognized. With the exception of Japan, a case of special significance to the United States, no attempt has been made to examine in detail every Asian country’s reaction.* We have preferred to point up the important problems that are caused or intensified throughout Asia by Peiping’s nuclear capability and to single out those factors that will determine the degree to which these problems may become more or less acute. Further, we have attempted to indicate the types of U.S. actions that would seem useful in countering adverse effects that may spring from the impact of China’s emergence as a nuclear power.

As Peiping explodes her first nuclear device—and even more so as she acquires a modest nuclear capability**—we must anticipate four kinds of Asian responses capable of adversely affecting U.S. interests: (1) recognition of Peiping’s increased weight in Asian and world affairs, (2) doubts about the future balance of forces in the area, (3) Asian concern that Peiping will employ her capability for the achievement of

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*A detailed study of the Japanese case is in preparation by P.F. Leng

**Essentially, the Asian response to the emergence of China as a nuclear power will begin at the very moment the shockwaves of Peiping’s first nuclear blast radiate across Asia, since the majority of Asians will tend to equate a Chinese nuclear detonation with the acquisition by Peiping of an effective military capability. Even among the technologically more sophisticated Asians, a Chinese detonation will be viewed at least as confirming the image of a dynamic, aggressive China and as suggesting the imminence of a Chinese nuclear threat.
her immediate objectives, and (4) domestic pressures for a reappraisal of existing foreign policy commitments and alignments in the light of China's emergence as Asia's first nuclear power.

Peiping must be expected to capitalize on these Asian reactions in order to further her ends. As pointed out earlier (Sec. V), Chinese efforts will aim at five major areas of U.S. and Asian co-operation:

1. the U.S.-Asian alliance and base system
2. the U.S. military presence in Asia as affected by Chinese exploitation of the nuclear disarmament and arms control issue
3. the Asian nations' self-defense efforts
4. the internal stability in the area, and
5. low level Chinese or Chinese-instigated military operations.

While these five areas have always been the targets of Peiping's anti-U.S. strategy, China's nuclear power status will provide her with a new instrument for the exploitation of existing opportunities and for the development of new ones. In this sense, nuclear power will add a new dimension to the Chinese challenge in Asia.

A number of factors will generally have an important influence on the nature of the Asian reaction to Peiping's exploitation of nuclear capability. These factors are:

- the local predisposition toward and commitment to a specific foreign policy orientation, largely the result of geopolitical and historic conditions
- the relative awareness of and experience with the Communist threat and more specifically with the Communist threat from China
- a sensitivity to the risks attached to nuclear weapons, modified to the extent that a given Asian nation is able to view a modest Chinese nuclear capability in its proper strategic perspective
- the degree of internal stability and its vulnerability to Chinese external and Communist internal pressures
- the Soviet policy in the area, especially as it appears to maximize, minimize, or counteract the impact of Chinese policies or actions, and
- the Asian estimate of the East-West balance of power in general and the local balance of forces in particular.
Any U.S. program aimed at counteracting Peiping's anticipated military and political exploitation of her future nuclear power status must take these factors into account and must attempt to modify them in line with American interests.

A prerequisite for such U.S. policies is the realization that U.S. actions today and in the near future, as much as those taken after China emerges as a nuclear power, will determine whether a Chinese nuclear capability will lead to Chinese political and military advances. No future U.S. guarantees to protect U.S. Asian allies and the neutral countries of Asia against the threat of a nuclear China is likely to reassure these Asian nations unless such guarantees have been rendered credible by a consistent record of U.S. military and political performance against Communist pressures.

**IMPACT ON U.S. ALLIANCES AND BASES**

The U.S. alliance system presently covers the defense of much of Asia and entails the maintenance of major American bases in Okinawa, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. This treaty system will continue during the next decade to form a cornerstone of American policy in Asia.

The direct military value of this U.S. military presence in Asia, in both operational and logistic terms, is generally accepted. This presence also has important political implications that in turn vitally affect the U.S. military posture in the area. The bases tangibly demonstrate continued U.S. willingness to work for the future of a non-Communist Asia, to protect and serve the local interest, and to assure Asia's freedom for political and social development. Such concrete evidence of American involvement in Asia and of American determination to share the risk implied in the East-West confrontation can be reassuring to U.S. allies and does discourage Communist attempts at seizure of power. Under the proper conditions the American military presence can therefore reinforce the foundations for a mutuality of U.S.-Asian interests and can facilitate a common policy and joint military and political action against the external Communist enemy.
As Peiping acquires some degree of a nuclear capability, however, the presence of U.S. bases on Asian soil will raise for U.S. Asian allies—and indirectly for the United States—two major questions: Will the U.S. alliances continue to be capable of providing protection against Chinese (or Sino-Soviet) pressures? Will such protection entail unacceptable risks for U.S. allies and heighten rather than minimize the danger of conflict with Peiping?

Doubts about the Continued Military Validity of the U.S. Alliances

Peiping’s acquisition of a nuclear capability is likely to be viewed in Asia as having sharply reduced the value of the American nuclear deterrent. It may be reasoned that as soon as the U.S. deterrent is confronted with a growing Chinese nuclear capability, the United States and its Asian allies will face the dilemma of permitting the Chinese to dictate the terms of conflict or risking escalation into a nuclear conflict. Therefore, once China becomes a nuclear power, U.S. allies might come to view their alliances with the United States as having become ineffective or dangerous.

The United States will thus be confronted with the task of convincing its allies that the balance of power remains essentially unchanged and that the U.S. alliances retain their military validity. This may be particularly difficult where the alliances are not rooted in strong commitments of long standing on the side of the West and where public opinion is already deeply divided about the wisdom of the U.S. alliance, as in the case of Japan.

To meet this situation, the United States must seek more even than in the past to make its posture in Asia politically as well as militarily credible by demonstrating to its allies an unchanged U.S. ability to counter any Chinese threat. At the same time, it is important that U.S. allies be convinced that firm and quick U.S. action against China on the local level will be the surest way of keeping the Soviet Union out of the conflict and of preventing the expansion of the conflict into general war.

This suggests a need for the continued presence in Asia of U.S. military forces, equipped to act quickly and decisively, able to choos
the initial level of conflict and to vary that level as the situation requires. Such a capability could greatly relieve the anticipated neutralist pressures generated by fear that the United States, when facing a Chinese nuclear threat, might find itself unable to defend its allies except at the exorbitant price of a nuclear war. Such a U.S. posture could also effectively reduce the impact on Asia of Chinese claims of military parity.

Allied Fear of Increased Risk

The image of a nuclear-armed Chinese regime pitted against what might seem an inflexibly hostile and nuclear-armed United States maintaining forward positions in Asia would be profoundly disturbing for China's neighbors.

Asian nations will tend to fear that the Chinese regime, long frustrated in her immediate goals (such as the Offshore Islands and Taiwan) by superior U.S. power, will now press more vigorously for these goals and that this state of affairs will correspondingly increase the dangers of a direct U.S.-Chinese military confrontation. Concern about the possibility of escalation to nuclear conflict will be particularly strong where there are U.S. bases. Peiping's propaganda, nuclear threats, and blackmail could further intensify the fear that U.S. bases might become the targets for Chinese nuclear action and that the civilian population of the host country may come to play the role of unwilling hostage. Such blackmail is unlikely to result in a complete denial of U.S. bases, but it could substantially stimulate allied efforts to lower the risk inherent in their alliance with the United States.

*Such attempts on the part of U.S. Asian allies to lower the risk factor will not necessarily be prompted by genuine fear of involvement in a U.S.-Chinese conflict, but may well be generated by a particular government's fear of the domestic political consequences of Chinese blackmail, magnified and utilized by neutralist opposition forces.
These efforts are likely to make themselves felt in three ways: (1) as attempts to reinterpret or modify the terms of the alliances, (2) as pressures aimed at restricting the use of American bases or at extracting from the United States a greater return for use of the bases, and (3) as efforts to obtain more influence over U.S. policy toward China.

Allied pressures for a modification of the terms of their American alliances to minimize the risks thought to arise from the emergence of a nuclear-armed China may impose strains on both multilateral and bilateral (U.S.) military arrangements in Asia.

With respect to the multilateral SEATO arrangement, the strains already in evidence may be intensified as a result of this new dimension of China's military power. It seems probable that SEATO's European members, which have already demonstrated a reluctance to support strong SEATO action against Chinese pressures, will be even more cautious with respect to a nuclear-armed China. This concern, when compounded by the Asian nations' concern about China's increased military power, may tend to further reduce confidence in the viability of SEATO guarantees. Asian SEATO members may seek bilateral arrangements with the United States as the preferred way of guaranteeing their security. Such a trend could fragmentize the anti-Communist effort in Southeast Asia and thus render collective action against China even more difficult.

The impact of China's nuclear power status is also likely to make itself felt in strictly bilateral treaty arrangements. Certain U.S. Asian allies, especially Japan, in responding to risk considerations and the resulting internal pressures, may seek to maximize their control over U.S. military action in the area, while minimizing or qualifying their contribution to any U.S.-initiated action in a conflict not interpreted to be of immediate concern to the particular country.
Such a trend could seriously restrict the military value of U.S. alliances in Asia. Once U.S. Asian allies view their alliance with the United States as a one-way street in terms of a narrowly defined local interest, they might gradually acquire a de facto veto over U.S. freedom to initiate military action in the area as well as over U.S. decisions to choose the appropriate level of such action. The U.S. military posture against the Communist Bloc would then to the same degree be deprived of flexibility, the U.S. response to Communist aggression would be slowed down by the need for drawn-out local consultation, and over-all military planning would be rendered increasingly difficult.

Fear on the part of U.S. allies that China's nuclear capability will pose increased risks for them may also affect U.S. military bases in Asia directly. The allies are likely to be less willing to be host to U.S. bases and more desirous of restricting the utilization of U.S. military bases on their territory. They may demand prior consultation as a prerequisite for any use of these bases, particularly if it involves the deployment of military equipment and forces into and out of the area, the storage of nuclear weapons, and the logistic support of U.S. forces. These problems are likely to be most severe in Japan and, by extension, in Okinawa.

It seems important to take preventive action now, when allied pressures for increased control over U.S. bases are still mild. First, despite possible difficulties such actions might entail, the United States might exploit to the fullest its present legal rights. Further, the United States may wish to take military measures that would inhibit allied application of restrictive control over U.S. bases, thereby recapturing a larger measure of flexibility and independence. This could be done, for example, through frequent exercises involving several U.S. bases in various countries to break down or soften the presently existing local restrictions. Another approach would be continuing rotation of forces and equipment among U.S. bases in different Asian countries. The cost of such measures is likely to
be small compared to the possible return in terms of political and military flexibility.

Peiping's attempts to exploit her nuclear power status by mobilizing opposition against the U.S. military presence in Asia may also accentuate the problem of protecting U.S. bases against interference from local Communists, pro-Communist Socialists or fanatically neutralist elements. Particularly vulnerable in that respect would be the deployment of forces, road-bound military traffic, the operation of airfields, and all kinds of local logistic support. As in other respects, Japan may cause the United States the most concern, for it is the ally most vulnerable to neutralist political pressures as well as our most important partner in Asia, strategically and economically.

The United States can reduce such dangers by continuing to work toward the improvement of the general environment in which U.S. forces must operate and by minimizing local sources of friction at the earliest stage. Specific measures will depend on the local context; what may be a major problem in one area is not necessarily so in another. However, as important as any measures the United States might be able to take directly in protecting its bases are the policies—or lack thereof—of the particular local government. At least in the case of Japan it would be desirable to press the government for more active cooperation with the United States in shielding U.S. bases against local interference.

Finally, China's emergence as a nuclear power may accentuate the doubts of Japan and other Asian nations about the soundness and continued validity of the U.S. China policy. The issue may be raised whether the containment line drawn during the era of a pre-nuclear China could or should be maintained unchanged once China is a nuclear power. Such questions will be emphasized where neutralist sentiments are strong, where the threat of direct Chinese aggression appears remote, and where the feeling is widespread that the Offshore Islands and even Taiwan are expendable or not worth a military conflict. The Asian neutralist nations' views on the Offshore Island-Taiwan problem will further tend to affect negatively allied support for any U.S. action in the Taiwan area.
An increase in Chinese pressure against the Offshore Islands, even if unaccompanied by military measures, is likely to cause anxiety in Tokyo and elsewhere in Asia. It may result in pressure on the United States to be "reasonable" and in discouraging the United States from maintaining against China military or political positions that could be considered "provocative." In case of danger of military conflict in the Taiwan area, the United States must anticipate political pressure to reach some kind of peaceful settlement. Should a U.S.-Chinese clash occur over the Offshore Islands, the Japanese government may refrain from lending open support to U.S. operations and proclaim, with an eye to domestic repercussions, that the issue does not involve Japan. The more protracted the conflict, the higher the political cost is likely to be. Difficulties of a political nature in Japan will tend to produce, in turn, adverse repercussions in Okinawa.

To enlist more active Asian support for U.S. policy in the Taiwan area, the United States should seek to clarify, for the benefit of non-Communist Asia, the rationale underlying that policy and point up the fact that it is acting in the interests of free Asia against Communist aggression. It is also important that the United States be in a position to defeat any kind of Chinese attack quickly, before repercussions prejudicial to U.S. interests can gain momentum, and in such a manner as not to expose unduly Asian bases and their environment to Chinese retaliation or Soviet intervention.

In this respect the United States could go a long way in allaying Asian fears regarding a U.S.-Chinese military conflict by giving concrete indications that the U.S. strategic posture allows it to deal separately with China and the Soviet Union.

**IMPACT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN ASIA**

The development of a Chinese nuclear capability will tend to focus Asian attention on arms control and particularly on nuclear disarmament. However, these issues are likely to pose problems for the United States and for its Asian allies since they lend themselves, as was described earlier, to exploitation by the Chinese.
Peiping could raise the question of arms control without producing domestic "peace movements" or otherwise impeding her military development plans. For non-Communist Asia, however, and especially where democratic freedom prevails, as in Japan, a Peiping propaganda campaign for disarmament could stimulate neutralist demands that Asia be "left to its own devices," and that the Pacific be transmuted into an "area free from foreign control." In other words, local responses to such a Chinese campaign could increase popular pressure on U.S. bases and place friendly governments in a difficult position with regard to their domestic neutralist opposition.

More specifically, nuclear disarmament schemes such as proposed for the creation of a "nuclear-free zone of peace" in Asia may constitute a danger to continued maintenance of an effective military presence of the United States in the area because of the vulnerability of the U.S. nuclear posture in Asia to political pressure.

First, the Asian anti-nuclear movement is for the most part dominated by anti-American elements that endorse the Communist "peaceful coexistence" line and link this concept to the demand for the removal of all U.S. bases from Asia. Secondly, there is a spread notion in Asia, strongly supported by Communist propaganda, that to station U.S. nuclear weapons on Asian soil not merely increases the risk of war, but is morally wrong. Thirdly, the concept of a "nuclear-free" Asia enjoys broad popular support in a politically as widely disparate as India and Japan.

Continued sensitivity to nuclear testing and the dangers of fallout* in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, as well as a growing fear

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*It may appear desirable for the United States to stress the dangers of Chinese fallout when the Chinese undertake nuclear testing and to blame Peiping for increased radioactivity in the area. On balance, however, this does not seem to be sound for reasons. First, Chinese testing is not likely to subject Japan to large amounts of fallout. Second, U.S. long range interests would better be served by minimizing rather than stimulating Japanese fears about the dangers of fallout.
of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear clash, will tend to heighten the appeal of any nuclear disarmament proposals. The mere raising of the issue by Peiping will tend to have important repercussions throughout non-Communist Asia, repercussions largely unfavorable to the United States. Especially in Japan and Okinawa, agitation for inspection of or tighter control over U.S. military deployment and weapons will increase, and political pressures for restricting U.S. freedom of military action will mount. The United States may be confronted with strong pressure from the Asian neutrals and some allies to freeze, even if only temporarily, the U.S. military posture in Asia as evidence of U.S. willingness to contribute politically and militarily to a relaxation of tensions. The will of the United States to resist Asian pressures for a removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the area may be further tested by intensified Communist propaganda campaigns dwelling on the dangers of nuclear accidents and of miscalculations that would allegedly lead to inadvertent war and nuclear escalation. Selective Chinese threats against U.S. military bases in Asia, but aimed at host countries, may further weaken the U.S. political position.

It is true that China's development of nuclear weapons will lead some Asians to place the blame for a nuclear-arms confrontation in the Far East at least partly on Peiping. However, considering the general political context of Asia, it must be anticipated that substantial pressure groups in Japan and in the neutralist countries of Asia will be inclined to justify Peiping's action as having been caused by alleged U.S. intransigence and hostility toward China, "forcing Peiping to develop a nuclear capability."

It is evident that the United States should prepare for Chinese or Communist Bloc exploitation of Asian demands for nuclear disarmament. It will be necessary to reveal to U.S. allies and neutral nations in Asia the pitfalls and risks hidden in any Communist proposal for an Asian nuclear-free zone. Also important will be a long range policy for desensitizing allies, especially the Japanese, with regard to nuclear weapons and their implications. The further encouragement of peaceful applications of atomic energy in Asia and bilateral as well as regional atomic development projects in the area might contribute to this goal.
The final answer to the problems posed by Peking's anticipated political use of nuclear disarmament schemes, however, lies essentially in convincing the non-Communist nations of Asia that the U.S. nuclear presence there constitutes a lesser risk for them than would U.S. withdrawal, and that this presence serves not only the interests of the United States, but theirs as well.

IMPACT ON SELF-DEFENSE EFFORTS OF ASIAN ALLIES AND NEUTRAL NATIONS

China's emergence as a nuclear power will tend to stimulate the defense effort of some Asian nations and is likely therefore to confront the United States in certain areas with increased demands for military assistance. This will be particularly true of those allies like Nationalist China, South Korea, and South Vietnam, whose ideological rationale is anti-Communist, whose interests clash directly with those of the Communist Bloc, and whose very existence may seem threatened by the emergence of a militarily strong, nuclear-armed China. This same trend toward an intensified self-defense effort may also become pronounced in those non-allied countries on China's periphery that may feel particularly exposed to a Chinese military threat, but that are unwilling to submit to Chinese pressure, as has been the case with India.

While China's emergence as a nuclear power may thus provide the United States with opportunities to galvanize Asian resistance against Chinese pressures, it may at the same time create a number of problems for the United States.

For one thing, allied requests for U.S. military assistance may reach unrealistic dimensions. There is also the danger of competition among U.S. allies for an increased share in American military allocations, which might force up the level of U.S. military expenditures in Asia. Even more than now, a coordinating effort will therefore be required in implementing military assistance programs in Asia.

Further, the stepped-up military effort of a particular Asian ally may in turn accentuate tensions in the area. A substantially increased military effort on the part of Pakistan, for instance,
would result in a larger Indian military program, and vice versa. Such a situation could then provide the Soviet Union with new opportunities for unbalancing the Asian situation through the increased injection of Soviet military aid.

Another consequence of China's nuclear power status could be Asian requests for U.S. nuclear assistance. Some of the strongly anti-Communist Asian allies may wish to receive U.S. nuclear weapons to enable them to counter the military and psychological pressures of a nuclear-armed Peiping. Or, the United States may be faced with demands for a jointly controlled or a multilateral nuclear deterrent, especially if such an arrangement has meanwhile been made in Europe. In view of the high degree of instability in Asia, the diversity of conditions, and the existence of acute regional conflicts, such proposals would seem dangerous and undesirable in Asia for many years to come.

In order to mitigate the above-mentioned pressures, the United States might attempt to identify clearly the extent of both Peiping's nuclear capability and the credibility of the Chinese use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, a conspicuously strengthened U.S. military position in the theater would boost allied morale. Thirdly, the United States might lend some support to the further buildup of its allies' non-nuclear weapons posture, emphasizing U.S.-allied military cooperation and measures to strengthen the image of a combined U.S.-Asian military effort against the background of a U.S. deterrent posture.

While a nuclear-armed China probably will stimulate self-defense efforts in certain areas of Asia, it may on the other hand tend to discourage and inhibit such efforts in other areas. This applies especially to Japan and to the smaller neutral nations, which are vulnerable to Chinese attempts to "use" nuclear weapons politically.

China's emergence as a nuclear power will once more plunge Japan into violent debates over its foreign policy orientation and the desirability of rearmament. A somewhat larger minority than hitherto may advocate the amendment of the antiwar clause in the Japanese constitution, but there is not likely to be an immediate and marked decrease in opposition to such a move. Unless the Communist
threat is felt more directly than it is today, the Japanese government is unlikely to risk political difficulties by attempting to promote a drastically expanded self-defense effort.

Similarly, Japan's traditional opposition to nuclear weapons may soften somewhat, but is unlikely to change fundamentally or immediately as a result of China's acquisition of a nuclear capability. If Peiping attempts nuclear blackmail against U.S. bases in Japan and against the Japanese people, the response—at least in the near future—will be toward intensified pressure for restricting the functions of U.S. bases, rather than for creation of a Japanese nuclear arsenal. However, as long as a conservative government remains in power, Japan probably would react to Chinese nuclear pressure by increasing its defenses against internal insurrection and against infiltration from abroad.

While the short-run prospects for the Japanese self-defense effort are not very encouraging, Japan's attitude toward rearmament and nuclear weapons may improve gradually, eventually perhaps permitting the integration of nuclear weapons into the Japanese defense system. The speed of this process will depend on several important developments, including:

- Chinese behavior toward Japan and in Asia (especially Southeast Asia), particularly as it affects Japanese interests directly
- the degree of economic and political stability in Japan
- the degree of Japan's economic involvement with the United States and non-Communist Europe, and
- the extent to which the United States has succeeded in convincing the Japanese Socialists that closer Japanese cooperation with and support for American military and political strategy will serve the cause of peace and social progress in Asia.

As long as the United States maintains and continually demonstrates a credible military and political posture, the indigenous defense efforts in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya are likely to show some increase in response to China's emergence as a nuclear power.
On the whole, however, as in Japan, the United States probably will encounter a tendency to concentrate on the strengthening of internal security and to rely for protection against Communist aggression on the American military umbrella and American guarantees. Australia and New Zealand are more likely to respond by displaying both a willingness to allocate greater resources to their defense program and a readiness to subordinate their program and to coordinate it with the needs of a joint military effort with the United States. Australia probably would even accept American nuclear weapons on its territory, but may also consider developing its own modest nuclear arsenal.

The smaller neutralist nations, which presently maintain only limited military forces, are unlikely to react to the emergence of China as a nuclear power by a major self-defense effort. At best they may attempt to offset increased Chinese influence by requests for more U.S. aid and by a strengthening of the internal security forces to combat infiltration and incipient revolutionary movements. On the issue of nuclear weapons, these same nations are likely to press even harder than today for international control of nuclear weapons and for the creation of an Asian nuclear-free zone.

Among the larger neutral nations of Asia, India is particularly significant because of its importance to the balance of power in Asia and its developing rivalry with China. It is the only country in Asia--and will remain so during the next decade--that combines the necessary psychological, political, and material conditions to generate confidence in its ability to contain Chinese pressures largely through an indigenous military effort. India's confidence is not likely to be eroded by a Chinese nuclear detonation, the development of Chinese nuclear weapons, or any other external factor short of military defeat.

However, China's nuclear power status may stimulate the Indian search for political solutions of the China problem (UN admission, settlement of Taiwan issue) and Indian support for disarmament schemes, especially insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned. On the other hand, India is likely to attempt to redress the Indo-Chinese
military balance by increased defense efforts. This may be reflected in increasing Indian demands for U.S. financial and technological aid as well as for military assistance. In this respect, India's inclination to shop abroad for sophisticated or expensive weapons is likely to become more pronounced.

The traditional Indian opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons may undergo some change even in Nehru's lifetime—if China emerges as a nuclear power, if Indian efforts for nuclear disarmament should fail, and if India becomes convinced of China's aggressive intentions, India may then embark on its own nuclear weapon program. Apart from Japan, India is the only Asian power that can hope to produce nuclear weapons within a reasonable length of time and with relatively little outside aid. The emergence of India as a nuclear power could not fail to set off a chain reaction in Pakistan where the magnitude of the defense effort tends to be determined more by the scale of the Indian armament program than by China's military policies, at least as long as the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. Fear of a nuclear-armed India might in turn adversely affect Pakistan foreign policy alignment and its role in the SEATO and CENTO alliance.

As far as the self-defense efforts of U.S. Asian allies and Asian neutrals are concerned, the emergence of China as a nuclear power would seem therefore to present both a danger and an opportunity for the United States.

**IMPACT ON POLITICAL STABILITY OF ASIAN NATIONS**

The discussion of the Chinese approach (Sec. V) has shown that Peking will seek to exploit its nuclear power status to intensify unstable conditions in non-Communist Asia and that in pursuing this objective the Chinese are likely to resort to a selective application of threats and blandishments, tailored to local situations. The threats might include various kinds of pressures on a particular
Asian government, accompanied by indirect pressures exerted through local Communist and other groups sympathetic to Chinese policy. The blandishments are likely to include not only the disarmament ploy, but offers of political and territorial settlements and economic incentives as well.* This Chinese strategy may produce a number of problems for the countries concerned and, indirectly, for the United States.

When subjected to Chinese pressure, the leaders of a particular Asian country must reckon with the sharpening of opposition attacks against their foreign policy orientation and a resulting increase in domestic tensions. To avoid domestic strife, the local government may be tempted to abstain from any action that could be labeled "provocative" by Peiping and by the domestic opposition. In a political or military crisis situation, the United States may therefore be denied support for its policies or actions. Such a passive attitude would encourage the opposition further in pressing its advantage. With growing political instability, external pressures will become increasingly effective, stimulating in turn intensified domestic political agitation.

Further, China's political use of her nuclear capability may generate severe pressures not only against, but also within, the existing governments. The danger of intragovernment struggles will be particularly acute where, as in Japan, the government in power constitutes a rather loosely knit association of factions or interest groups.

*Factors that would favor such a Chinese strategy include: a weak, or apparently weak U.S. military position in the area, acceptance of the Chinese threat as credible, belief that Soviet intervention is quite possible, a high sensitivity to threats of war and implications of nuclear weapons, an increase in neutralist, Communist, or pro-Communist pressures, dependence on China for trade, well developed international mass media channels and internal propaganda channels for Chinese use, explosive international or regional issues, and internal conflicts in the subject country that could create tension and dissension for the local government.
As evidenced by the experience of the past, factional strife within the dominant government coalition, resulting from the confluence of external and internal pressures, could at least temporarily disturb relations with the United States.

Other problems related to the disturbance of internal stability in Asia by a Chinese nuclear capability concern the possibilities of:

- increased Communist influence in non-Communist Asia
- growth of anti-U.S. popular fronts, and
- creation or recrudescence of Communist-style national liberation, underground, and insurrectionary movements.

The virulence of the Asian Communist movement would be increased by the image of a more powerful China, equipped with nuclear weapons. Such an image would tend to support the Communist claim of being the "wave of the future." By this same factor, Peking might gain a greater voice vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the councils of Asian and world Communism and closer organizational ties with other Asian Communist parties. However, U.S. military or political successes over the Chinese would tend to check, and perhaps reverse pro-Peking trends among the Asian Communists.

Peking's revolutionary prescriptions generally will appear more valid and have greater appeal throughout Asia once China becomes a nuclear power. The Asian Communists are likely to be more militant and to press more aggressively for seizure of political power. Further in Japan, where the Socialists continue to cling to the Marxist dogma and the left wing clamors for unqualified recognition of China, acceptance of Peking's political demands, withdrawal of U.S. bases from Asia, and adoption of a neutralist foreign policy, the political left will tend to react positively to Peking's call for a political struggle under the banner of "peace and independence." In such circumstances the dividing line between Communists and non-Communists of the left may become increasingly blurred, and the non-Communist left will be vulnerable to Communist attempts to create a united anti-U.S. front.
Asian nations embroiled in domestic political struggles and containing strongly disaffected elements would, in effect, provide an invitation to Chinese exploitation. As a result, political unrest up to and including the level of insurrections must be expected to increase. The most likely targets for such probing actions are the politically and militarily unstable areas of continental Southeast Asia, perhaps including the Philippines as well. Also, more militant Communist attempts to break the grip of pro-U.S., anti-Communist regimes may extend to South Korea and possibly Taiwan if the regimes there fail conspicuously to create a broader base of popular support.

**IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHINESE LOW LEVEL MILITARY OPERATIONS**

As has been pointed out, a nuclear-armed China may be more likely than present China to resort to low risk military operations. Depending on the political and military context, China may provide low level military support to local Communist uprisings and insurgent movements directed against existing non-Communist governments, may probe U.S. and free Asian responses in such areas as the Offshore Islands, or may attempt to compel a favorable settlement for her border disputes.

Such Chinese military actions would dramatize for the United States many of the problems resulting from the emergence of a nuclear-armed China. Any U.S. response to Chinese military action would be faced with substantial political pressures from many Asian nations to limit its character and scope. While such pressures are manifest in Asia today, they would be intensified and broadened by the new nuclear dimension of the Chinese challenge.

The character and intensity of attempts to restrict U.S. freedom of action vis-à-vis Chinese military moves will depend on a number of factors in addition to internal political considerations and each country's assessment of the prevailing local balance of power: the degree of overt Chinese military involvement, apparent Chinese objectives, local attitudes toward the victim of aggression, the anticipated level of U.S. response, and the risk of escalation, especially concerning the use of nuclear weapons and the danger of Soviet
The anticipated mounting pressures to restrict U.S. freedom of action in Asia would confront the United States with two major problems. On one hand, the United States must maintain the credibility of its deterrent posture in the face of a greater Chinese challenge, and be able to respond to any Chinese probe—should the United States be deterred from reacting vigorously and effectively, serious damage to its political and military position in Asia could ensue. A military setback resulting from the effect of political restraints on U.S. military action would be especially likely to set off a chain reaction that could endanger U.S. alliances and render remedial action exceedingly difficult. On the other hand, the United States, in reacting to Chinese military moves, must reckon on increased adverse political pressures that might endanger the general U.S. posture in Asia and especially its alliance and base system.

It obviously would be desirable for the United States to couch its military responses so as to minimize adverse political pressures. While this will be difficult, some general guidelines suggest themselves.

First, it would seem important that the United States retain the capability of responding unilaterally and rapidly to developing military conflicts in order to pre-empt the mobilization of political pressure that could hinder or render more difficult later U.S. military intervention. Such action would present U.S. allies with a fait accompli and dispel unjustified fears regarding the consequences of responding to Chinese moves and concerning the risk of escalation. In the same manner, the United States should attempt to cut short emerging conflicts as rapidly as possible, since any protracted military involvement would allow undesirable political pressures to gain momentum.

If the United States is to respond rapidly and effectively to the range of covert and overt low level military actions available to the Chinese, continued improvement in its non-nuclear capabilities in the area is indicated. This would require the development of concepts, methods, and equipment to increase the flexibility and speed of U.S. responses that use programmed forces as well as improved capabilities to deploy and support additional forces if the situation requires them.
An obviously important factor will be to obtain Asian backing for U.S. military action against Communist intervention by ensuring that Asians understand the rationale for the general U.S. Asian policy and for the specific U.S. action. The United States should emphasize that U.S. military action in defense of one country is indivisible from the defense of the entire area, and that by reacting promptly to Communist aggression the United States is reducing rather than increasing the danger of general conflict.
THE THREAT

China's initial detonation of a nuclear device will be used by Peiping to create the impression that China possesses a military capability and is a significant nuclear power. From that time on, and increasingly as China develops a nuclear capability, the United States will be confronted with a wider range of possible Chinese threats and actions than hitherto.* By the time China possesses a modest nuclear capability, she will have the following options:

- the direct use of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases or Asian countries
- the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt, non-nuclear military operations and support of insurgency, and
- the political and propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability to capitalize on and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese objectives.

CHINA'S RISK CALCULATIONS

An examination of Chinese military doctrine and past behavior indicates that Peiping's policies are essentially based on a cautious and rational evaluation of risks and costs. Critical to Peiping's risk calculations will be her assessments of the role of the Soviet Union, the Chinese-U.S. military-political balance in Asia, and the opportunities for low risk gains.

*As indicated in Sec. I, the possibility that the Chinese might attain a token, long range, strategic nuclear capability for use or threat against the Continental United States is believed to be unlikely within the time period considered in this study. Although such a capability might be very attractive to the Chinese in view of their objectives, it would present them with formidable economic, technological, and industrial problems. Nevertheless, should the Chinese attain such a capability or create the widespread impression that they possess it, this situation would undoubtedly aggravate the problems confronting the United States. It would not, however, change the basic nature of the conclusions and implications presented in this section.
Consequently, provided the United States maintains a credible military and political posture in the Far East, China is unlikely to risk either direct use of her nuclear capability or high level non-nuclear military operations with her nuclear capability as an umbrella, unless she believes the Soviet Union is prepared to support, militarily, her actions directly or by deterrence of U.S. responses.

THE SOVIET ROLE

However, an examination of Soviet policies toward China indicates that the Soviet Union is unlikely to run major risks or sacrifice its self-interest in China's behalf. In view of this, Peiping is likely to be conservative in her evaluation of support attainable from the Soviets. Such support as Moscow may provide to Peiping will depend on the specific circumstances of the conflict, on the state of Sino-Soviet relations, on Soviet objectives, and on Soviet assessment of U.S. intentions and military capability.

In general, the most likely forms of Soviet assistance to China in a conflict situation will be political support and economic and non-nuclear military aid. The Soviets will attempt to restrain the Chinese from any use of nuclear weapons. And the Soviets are more likely to intervene in a nuclear conflict between the United States and China if:

- U.S. objectives in such a conflict appear to be the overthrow of the Communist regime in China
- the Soviet Union believes itself threatened because the United States fails to (or cannot) distinguish between China and the Soviet Union, or
- the diversion of U.S. forces to attack China weakens significantly the U.S. deterrent posture against the Soviet Union.

CHINESE OPPORTUNITIES

So long as China cannot be certain of Soviet military support for her objectives and is confronted with U.S. determination and capability to make the risk of overt military operations extremely
high, China is likely to exploit her capability on the politico-
propaganda level. Objectives of this exploitation will be to create:

- strains on the U.S. alliance system in Asia
- Asian pressures to restrict the presence and utilization of U.S. bases
- Asian efforts to restrain U.S. freedom of action in responding to Chinese challenges, and
- increases in neutralist trends, political instability, and internal unrest.

A nuclear-armed China probably will also be more likely to engage in low level military operations and probes. The likelihood of this will increase if she achieves significant success in her politico-
propaganda campaign.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

The key factors in minimizing China's ability to exploit her possession of a nuclear capability, either directly or indirectly, are the maintenance of:

- a credible U.S. deterrent military posture, and
- supporting political policies in the Far East.

The U.S. position in Asia would be greatly facilitated by U.S. public policy that clearly distinguishes between the Chinese and Soviet threats.

The credibility of this posture will require the continuing presence of U.S. forces in the theater sufficient to demonstrate to the Chinese and to free Asia the U.S. capability to respond at any level to Chinese aggression. This will involve:

- the augmentation of U.S. forces in the theater to ensure an evident and clear capability to retaliate against any Chinese nuclear attacks, and
- the improvement of U.S. non-nuclear capabilities for responding to levels of Chinese aggression requiring such response.
Designation of Theater-based Nuclear Forces Targeted for China

A major contribution to the U.S. posture in the Far East would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of U.S. nuclear forces specifically identifiable as targeted for retaliation against Chinese aggression.

Impact of Such Forces on China. In general, the Chinese are aware that the United States has the ability to bring overwhelming force to bear on China. However, from the Chinese point of view, the credibility of U.S. will and intent to employ this power would be enhanced by the maintenance of identifiable U.S. nuclear forces in the Pacific area. Such forces would represent a recognizable and credible deterrent to Chinese aggression. In view of past Chinese reactions to the U.S. military posture in the Far East, Chinese policies are likely to remain highly sensitive to any strengthening of U.S. theater forces that are clearly designed to meet any level of Chinese threat, that leave no doubt that Chinese actions could be countered while still deterring the Soviet Union, and that underline the firmness of U.S. political intentions in the area. Chinese policies are not as likely to be influenced by U.S. NI forces, which could leave ambiguous the differentiation between responses to Soviet and Chinese threats and which would not clearly reinforce U.S. political intentions in the area.

Impact of Such Forces on the Soviet Union. Such forces would also reduce the likelihood of Soviet intervention in a U.S.-Chinese conflict. They would demonstrate U.S. capability for selective use against China without weakening or being confused with forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union. The designation of this force would:

- decrease the possibility of Soviet misinterpretation of U.S. actions
- reduce Soviet inclination to interpret U.S. actions as threatening and provocative
- increase Soviet ability to constrain Chinese aggressive actions, and
- enhance Soviet ability to resist Chinese blackmail.
Impact of Such Forces on Free Asia. The presence of such forces would be a major demonstration to Asians that the balance of power in the Far East had not changed and that the United States remains capable of and determined to defend free Asia against Communist aggression. It would also strengthen Asian confidence in the U.S. alliance system, undermine the credibility of Chinese threats against U.S. bases and host countries in the Far East, and contribute to facilitating common defense efforts in the area. Such a posture, if accompanied by U.S. moves emphasizing to the free Asians the risks the Chinese would face in aggressive action and the vulnerability of the Chinese Mainland to nuclear attack, would also impair Chinese political exploitation of their nuclear capability, particularly through nuclear threats against U.S. bases in allied countries.

This combination of political and military policies would increase Asian confidence in the U.S. ability to deal with a nuclear-armed China at low risk to their countries and would decrease both their inclination to seek accommodation with Peking and their reluctance to face the risks involved in countering Chinese aggression.

Characteristics of Such Forces

Such theater-based nuclear forces should be:

1. Relatively invulnerable to political and military threats. Militarily, this means appropriate warning and protective measures against Chinese aircraft and missile attacks. Politically, it means employment capabilities and basing, including the stationing of weapons in areas not readily subject to political restraints on U.S. freedom of action, that minimize the opportunities for the Chinese to threaten attacks against the forces. Emphasis on force rotation among allied bases in the area and full use of existing base rights could increase the evidence of U.S. capability and intention to support its allies, as well as reduce the possibility of allied restrictions on the presence or employment of the forces.

2. Clearly identified at all times as forces targeted for Chin. Further, the United States should be able to launch them without the Soviets confusing these forces with those U.S. forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union. This means that the forces must be
so based as to avoid overflight of the Soviet Union. They also must be powerful enough to permit an adequate response to Chinese aggression without weakening those forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union.

3. Useful under a wide range of conditions. These forces should be capable of quick action against Chinese missile and bomber complexes and of effective retaliation to Chinese attacks.

4. Expandable to meet increased Chinese capabilities. With the acquisition and growth of a Chinese nuclear capability, the structure of the theater-based nuclear forces should permit ready augmentation by additional forces as needed to maintain an identifiable deterrent posture.

The preceding few pages have:

1. described a concept of a nuclear force specifically targeted for China and based in the Pacific theater in order to be identifiable to China, the Soviet Union, and free Asia

2. indicated the likely impacts of such a force posture on these countries, and

3. identified preferred characteristics of such a force.

In the light of the military and political considerations presented in this Report, the establishment and public designation of such a force seems highly desirable.

A theater-based nuclear force could be constituted of one or more of the following:

- B-52s with Hound Dogs or Skybolts and laydown weapons
- MREMs based in various countries in the Far East
- ICBMs based in the Pacific area, e.g., Alaska, Hawaii, Australia
- SSBNs with Polaris A-3 missiles, operating in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean.

Some of these alternatives or combinations of them may be preferable to others when examined in terms of the specific military considerations and the desired political benefits indicated in this study. However, detailed comparisons of the possible alternatives in composition, basing, vulnerability, command and control, or the cost/effective ness for a theater-based nuclear force, or the relation of such a force to programmed theater forces, are outside the scope of this study.
Nuclear-free Zone Problems

China's acquisition of a nuclear capability will result in increased pressures for the concept of an Asian nuclear-free zone. Both Moscow and Peiping can be expected to use this scheme as a propaganda weapon to capitalize on Asian sensitivity to nuclear weapons, to intensify neutralist sentiment in Asia, to weaken the U.S. military and political position there, and particularly to compel the United States to restrict any nuclear buildup in the area.

Consequently, the United States must anticipate opposition to any strengthening of its nuclear presence in the Far East and must be prepared to cope with the dangers inherent in proposals for an Asian nuclear-free zone.

Related Defensive Capabilities

Anticipated Chinese military capabilities (as well as Soviet military developments) require continued emphasis on improving U.S. and allied defensive capabilities in the theater. Consequently, the United States should give greater attention to those programs in the Pacific area that are directed at attaining:

- increased early warning of aircraft or missile attack
- greater integration of the early warning networks through the incorporation of semi-automatic and automatic systems
- increased radar coverage for low altitude enemy penetration
- improved air defense against low altitude attacks
- implementation of a bomb-alarm system
- reduced vulnerability of command and control
- improved command and control capability, particularly following an enemy attack, and
- increased flexibility of U.S. forces through rotation, exercises, and combined U.S.-allied operations.

These and other measures included in U.S. programs for the Pacific area should continue to be directed at decreasing the
vulnerability of the U.S. Pacific posture, at increasing the risks to
the Chinese of any attack on the U.S. posture, and at encouraging
greater participation of alliance members in defense efforts.

Improved Non-nuclear Capabilities

The above improvements in U.S. deterrent and defensive capabilities
would present high risks to Chinese aggressive actions. Under these
circumstances, the Chinese can be expected to exploit their nuclear
military capability in actions involving low risks. The magnitude of
Chinese aggressive actions will depend upon Peiping's assessment of
U.S. capabilities and willingness to respond.

The United States and its allies will be confronted with the
need to deter or respond to Chinese low level aggressive actions, her
support of local conflicts, or situations that provide opportunities
for Communist expansion or intervention.

To respond quickly and effectively to the range of covert and
overt low level military actions in which the Chinese may engage,
improvement in U.S. non-nuclear capabilities seems indicated. The
continuing development of concepts, methods, and equipment that in-
crease the flexibility and speed of U.S. responses - by programmed
forces will be needed, as will be improvements in U.S. capabilities
to deploy and support additional forces in the area if the situation
requires them.

It is likely that the need for such improvements will be greater
when the Chinese possess a nuclear capability than at present, since
delayed, inadequate, or ineffective responses to Chinese actions could
provide the Chinese with additional opportunities for military and
political gains.

Supporting Political Programs

The U.S. military measures in Asia should be accompanied by
political programs designed to reduce any unfavorable impact of Chinese
possession of a nuclear capability and to underline U.S. determination
to resist Communist aggression. The objectives of the political and
information programs should include:
o enhancing Asian appreciation of the U.S. presence and capabilities
o reassuring Asians of U.S. capability for appropriate responses to Chinese aggressive actions without undue risk to U.S. allies
o deriving maximum political benefit from demonstrations of U.S. military and technological advances, particularly from the U.S. space program and missile tests in the Pacific
o reducing pressures on U.S. freedom of military and political action, and
o creating a basis for U.S. efforts to obtain allied military participation and cooperation in subsequent nuclear defense arrangements.

TIMING OF U.S. MEASURES

To obtain greatest effectiveness, U.S. programs should anticipate rather than react to new levels of the Chinese threat. In conjunction with the continued strengthening of the U.S. military posture, efforts should be made in advance of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device to create conditions that will mitigate its unfavorable political effects on Asian countries and degrade expected Chinese propaganda attempts to build up and exploit an image of great Chinese power.

Both before and at the time of the event, a Chinese nuclear detonation should be placed in its proper perspective. While pointing out the difference between a detonation and the acquisition of a nuclear capability, major attention should be directed to emphasizing and demonstrating the continued U.S. military superiority in the area.

As China works toward a nuclear capability, a theater-based deterrent force should be established and publicly designated. As China expands her nuclear forces, the United States should progressively strengthen its deterrent capabilities so as to retain decisive military superiority in the area.
Appendix A

POSSIBLE CHINESE AND U. S. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

CURRENT CHINESE MILITARY POSTURE (1962)

As a result of increased economic difficulties, competing demands on her limited industrial base, and curtailment of Soviet technical and material assistance, China's production of modern weapons is at a low level. Recent intelligence estimates provide the following general picture of the current Chinese military posture.

Ground Forces

The Army (CCA) of more than 2.5 million men, with 158 combat divisions, is the world's largest army. It contains approximately 108 infantry, 3 airborne, 4 armored, 3 cavalry, 25 artillery and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and 15 public security forces. (12)

Naval Forces

The Navy is primarily a coastal defense force. It consists of approximately 40 principal combatant ships, including 29 submarines. The Navy also contains a patrol force of approximately 250 vessels, including 150 motor torpedo boats. It also has approximately 35 mine warfare vessels and 260 amphibious vessels, 200 of them landing craft. Its over-all capability is considered adequate only for operations against a minor naval power. (13)

Air Forces and Air Defenses

The Chinese air forces consist of the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) and naval air forces. These are made up of approximately 10 medium bombers (Bull), 450 jet light bombers (Beagle), 2035 jet fighters (1950 Fagots and Frescos and 85 Farmers) and 200 transports. (14) The air defenses include more than 200 radar sites that provide various degrees of early warning (EW) and low altitude coverage, as well as ground control intercept (GCI) capability. (15) The anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) capability is built around approximately 3000
guns: more than 1700 light (35- to 57-mm) guns, more than 1300 medium (85- to 100-mm) guns, and fewer than 50 heavy (over 100-mm) guns, including those in the CCA. A limited number of surface-to-air missiles (SA-2s) provide some medium and high altitude coverage. (16)

TRENDS IN CHINESE MILITARY POSTURE (1965-1970)

The Chinese military strength probably will change within the next decade as a reflection of several conditions. These include: (1) the indigenous economic capacity and technical capability for the design, development, production, and operation of particular weapons or weapon systems, (2) the amount and type of military and military-economic-technical support received from other countries, primarily the Soviet Union,* and (3) Chinese politico-military objectives and doctrine, and the force levels that are generated as a result.

These conditions have complex interrelationships, and in view of the uncertainties involved, we have not attempted to identify specific Chinese military developments for the future. Instead, we have attempted to indicate probable trends in the development of Chinese military strength during the 1965-1970 period. The Orders of Battle used in the military appraisals of Sec. IV are consistent with these trends, and are listed in Appendix B.

Ground Forces

Some reorganization of the CCA is expected. A decrease in manpower, together with modernization of artillery, armor, transport, and communications that will increase firepower and mobility, are expected to leave the over-all strength about the same.

Naval Forces

The strength and size of the relatively small Navy will remain about the same, but emphasis is expected in development of patrol craft, destroyers, submarines, and amphibious-lift vehicles, with a

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*This could range from no assistance to massive and immediate support in the form of complete, operational weapon systems.
moderate building program for patrol and amphibious craft. Destroyer and submarine construction programs could be seriously handicapped by lack of Soviet technical and material support. Production of associated weapons and equipment also could be seriously hampered.

Air Forces

The air forces probably will undergo the greatest changes, in terms of both amount and types of equipment. We anticipate the following changes:

- a decrease in the number of fighters
- some modernization of aircraft equipment and armament, including air-to-air missiles (AAMs)
- addition of several new types of fighters of Soviet design, some in substantial numbers
- a decrease in jet light bombers
- addition of medium jet bombers, and
- moderate increases in transports and helicopters.

To accommodate these changes, logistic, maintenance, and support facilities may be expanded and modernized. The air base complex is expected to grow slightly from its present size (approximately 200 bases). It will continue to include both operational airfields and those that are not continually operational but can be used. Airfield modernization and expansion programs will continue.

In general, the combat capability of the air forces will improve, with increased development of radar, GCI proficiency, increased pilot and maintenance proficiency, and more technical experience in sophisticated weapon systems.

Other Improvements in Military Capability

In conjunction with these trends in Chinese military strength, several changes in defensive and offensive postures are anticipated. The defensive changes are discussed first.
Older radars will be modernized or replaced. Equipment of foreign manufacture probably will be replaced by Chinese-made equipment. Substantial extension of high and low altitude coverage is expected, particularly along the coast and in western China.

The total number of AAA units probably will decrease. We expect a reduction in the number of medium guns, some augmentation of light guns, particularly 57-mm for low altitude defense, increased emphasis on radar-controlled gun batteries, and improved communication equipment and organization. No marked changes in the deployment policies are foreseen. Government and control centers, large urban industrial complexes, and coastal regions will continue to have high priorities, and there probably will be some new radar installations at airfields used for basing medium bombers, and at surface-to-surface missile (SSM) sites.

Defenses are expected to be augmented by substantial numbers of SAM units of the Soviet SA-2 type, thus increasing the medium and high altitude defense coverage at many points. The same deployment concepts as for the AAA (and Soviet) defenses are expected to dominate, i.e., heavy concentrations around civilian installations and increased concentrations around bomber and SSM locations. Very limited numbers of SA-3 low altitude missiles may become available, with the first installations probably supplementing SA-2 dispositions around principal cities.

Major trends in the development of offensive systems may include the following:

Introduction of short range, non-nuclear tactical air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) that follow Soviet design. These could be used by all the newer aircraft, but by only a few of the older types.

Two major types of SSMs may be developed. There may be limited quantities of mobile 100-300 mile missiles operated by the Army. The second type could be a 700-1100 mile ballistic missile (MRBM) that might carry a nuclear warhead of something under 200-KT yield.

The first Chinese nuclear detonation may take place, perhaps before 1965. Two areas of emphasis in subsequent development of nuclear weapons may be warheads for delivery by Badger and Beagle aircraft and
warheads for MREM delivery. More than a one-year gap is expected between the initial detonation and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Even then, production would be in relatively limited quantities.

Although these trends represent likely directions of Chinese development, there are other possible directions. For example, there could be greater emphasis on missile development. In extreme, this could be an attempt to develop a strategic capability against the Continental United States. Early development of an ICBM might be very attractive to the Chinese in view of their objectives, although it would present formidable economic, technological, and industrial problems.

The Chinese might develop a submarine-launched nuclear weapon that need not necessarily be a ballistic missile. It would be less difficult to develop cruise missiles or specially configured piloted aircraft to be launched from a modified submarine of the types already available to the Chinese.

A nuclear-armed ASM could be developed, although this would be a difficult extension of the anticipated Chinese trend in non-nuclear ASM development.

In summary, the United States could, in the 1965-1970 period, be facing:

- a limited number of nuclear weapons
- delivery vehicles with ranges to cover present U.S. bases and forces in the Far East, and
- increased air defense capabilities in the form of more and improved radars, guns, and missiles.

**ANTICIPATED U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC**

The following material on U.S. military forces likely to be deployed in the Pacific during the next five years is based on current service planning, and emphasizes the USAF deployment. The Orders of
Battle used in Sec. IV are included in Appendix B.

Army

The total Army strength deployed to the Pacific is expected to remain at three divisions. The addition of two divisions to the strategic reserve will improve potential augmentation of U.S. capabilities in the Pacific.

Increased effectiveness is expected from greater emphasis on counterinsurgency activities, with improved equipment, concepts, and tactics, plus an expansion of the Special Forces. Also, augmentation of Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and equipment prestockage in the theater should make possible more rapid reinforcement of theater forces from the U.S.-based reserve. The light-aircraft program should provide improved mobility, reconnaissance, and liaison. Reorganization of the Army into the ROAD Divisions (15,000-16,000) and weapon modernization are estimated to increase firepower by 20 to 25 per cent. The programmed increase in SAMs will improve defense of U.S. installations in the area.

Navy

Navy strength in the Pacific will increase over the next several years. Older carrier aircraft will be replaced. The SAM destroyers and frigates will be tripled to increase fleet defense against attack by manned aircraft. The submarine force will be modernized, with more nuclear-powered boats added for longer cruises and generally more efficient operations, and the older guided-missile submarines replaced by SSB(N)s.

The two Marine divisions and two air wings will remain as at present, under operational control of the Pacific Fleet. Of these, one division (less one regiment at Kaneohe MAS, Hawaii) and one air wing (less one group at Kaneohe) will continue in their deployed Far Eastern locations and the remaining division and air wing will continue to be stationed on the West Coast. Reserves in the United States are assumed to remain the same.
Air Force

Air Force units deployed in the Pacific will increase in number and quality. The B-57 light bombers will be retired and the present three fighter wings will be increased to five. The fighter wings will be modernized by phasing in F-105s and F-4Cs.

The EW and low level coverage of the air defense net will be expanded through bilateral and U.S. programs. Some automatic or semi-automatic data processing will permit more efficient conduct of the air battle. Fewer specific defensive aircraft (F-102s) will be required as indigenous forces become combat-ready and as more versatile U.S. tactical aircraft and SAMs are deployed.

The air transport capability in the theater is expected to grow through the deployment of additional units and aircraft.

Similar increases in numbers and modernization programs are to take place in the USAF units, such as the USAF elements of the Strike Command, that can be deployed from the United States to support contingency operations in the Pacific.
Appendix B
ORDERS OF BATTLE ASSUMED FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL MILITARY CONFLICTS

1966 COMMUNIST CHINESE

Air OB

Fighters
- Fresco A, B, C 1088
- Fresco D, E 128
- Farmer 364
- Flashlight 10
- Fishbed C (new Mig) 48
- Fitter/Fishpot Type (new generation) 112
Total Fighters 1770
Jet Fighter Trainers 116

Bombers
- Light Jet Bomber (Beagle) 90
- Medium Jet Bomber (Badger) 115
Total Bombers 205

Transports
- Light Transport (Cub/Coach/Crate) 205
- Medium Transport (Cub/Camp/Coot) 22
Total Transport 227

Light Helicopter (Hound) 65
Misc. Propeller (ASW) 35

Grand Total 2418

Ground Forces

The Communist Chinese ground forces are assumed to be approximately 2.5 million men in the army, plus about 500,000 men in security forces.

The Chinese are assumed to have a relatively extensive SA-2 and AAA force, with fully adequate high altitude and EW coverage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessels for Amphibious Operations</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank Landing Ship (LST)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Landing Ship (LSH)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Ship Infantry</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility Landing Craft (LCU)</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>200</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auxiliary Vessels</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Others</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Craft</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DD and SS Types

- **Destroyer**: 4
- **Destroyer Escort**: 4
- **Submarine**: 29

### Patrol Craft

- **Patrol Escort**: 10
- **Old Patrol Escort**: 3
- **Radar Picket**: 6
- **Submarine Chaser**: 24
- **Motor Torpedo Boat**: 150
- **Motor Gunboat**: 44
- **Old Motor Gunboat**: 2
- **River Gunboat**: 5

### Mine Warfare Craft

- **Fleet Minesweeper**: 12
- **Coastal Minesweeper**: 4
- **Auxiliary Minesweeper**: 20
### 1966 U.S. WESTERN PACIFIC

#### Air Force OB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Type of Squadron</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokota</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misawa</td>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance</td>
<td>RF-4C</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-105</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itazuke</td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachikawa</td>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>C-124</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadena</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance</td>
<td>RF-100</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Missile</td>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naha</td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-100</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Carrier</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Augmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a One tactical fighter squadron is deployed from each wing in Japan to bases in Korea and 18 aircraft are assumed on alert with nuclear stores.

*b Assumed for campaigns described in Sec. IV.
### Army OB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAM Types</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1-1/2</td>
<td>Defense of airfields and port area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Defense of airfields, port &amp; supply areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense of island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense of island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Defense of Subic Bay and Clark AFB areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Defense of island</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No other army units were examined.

### Navy OB

**Ships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7th Fleet Combat Units</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carrier (CVA)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carrier (CVS)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Missile Cruiser (CAG/CG, CLG)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG, DLG)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer (DL, DD, DDE, DE)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Radar Picket (DDR, DER)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine (SS, SSN)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine, SSB (N)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Aircraft Units (prior to augmentation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Attack</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Attack</td>
<td>16-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW (fixed wing)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW (helicopter)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Marine Air OB (Japan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1966 NATIONALIST CHINESE

Army OB

Infantry Divisions ............... 15a
Reserve Infantry Divisions ...... 9
Armored Divisions ............... 2
Airborne Regiments ............. 1
Guided Missile Command
  Nike-Hercules Battalions ...... 2
  Hawk Battalions ............... 1

aSix divisions or 64,000 troops assigned
to Offshore Islands on rotational basis.

Navy OB

Destroyer/Escort ................ 14
Patrol Craft/Torpedo Boats ...... 24
Mine Warfare Vessels ............ 11
High Speed Transport ........... 1
Amphibious Vessels ............. 42
Marine Brigades ................. 1
Marine Battalions ............... 1

Air Force OBa

Tactical Fighter Squadrons ...... 12
All-weather Fighter Squadrons .. 2
Reconnaissance Squadrons ........ 2
ASW Squadrons ................... 1
Transport Squadrons ............ 7
Air Sea Rescue Squadrons ....... 1

aAir Force modernization was assumed.

*Based on 1966 posture force goals indicated in FY 1963 Military Assistance Program.
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