REACTIONS TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED COMMUNIST CHINA: EUROPE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

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EUROPE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

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The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of IDA or of the Defense Department

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FOREWORD

The following two papers were written for Study PACIFICA, an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power. Study PACIFICA is being prepared by the International Studies Division of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No. SD-50, Task Order T-23, effective 1 July 1961. Brigadier General Sidney F. Giffin, USAF (Ret.) is the Study Leader.

General "X", a retired French officer who prefers to remain anonymous, writes on the perspectives for Continental Europe. Roderick MacFarquhar, the editor of The China Quarterly, discusses the reactions of the United Kingdom.

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SUMMARY

Overpopulated China will become an increasingly important factor in Asia and the Pacific, but will not soon—if ever—develop an industrial power and a nuclear force comparable to those of the Soviet Union or the United States. Shielded by a great nuclear power, China—with its aptitude for subversion, its immense conventional military might, and even a second-rate nuclear force—would constitute a formidable threat in the Asian sphere.

On a world scale, China's emergence as a nuclear power is significant to the degree that this development can influence the global political equilibrium. Either the Soviet Union might acquire a superiority that could prove decisive, or the Soviet Union might be so weakened as to permit an equilibrium in Asia and a true détente in Europe. These two extreme prospects
indicate the possible general directions for the future, while
the first illuminates a dangerous eventuality against which the
West must arm.

In Europe--and especially France--the Chinese problem has
only indirect consequences: those produced in Europe and the
Mediterranean by a change in the world balance. France is par-
ticularly sensitive to the menace posed by a rim of Arab Communist
states supported by China. Western Europeans, with little direct
influence left in Asia, are only anxious spectators of the con-
test to be played by the United States, the Soviet Union, China,
and the other Asian states.

Thus Europe is unlikely to react directly to the establish-
ment of a Chinese nuclear capacity. Rather, Europe's reaction
will be manifested in her attitudes toward the control of nuclear
weapons, and in her stance toward Communist China in regard to
commerce, recognition, and admission to the United Nations. One
cause for concern might be a US withdrawal from Europe to meet
growing commitments in Asia. By 1968, however, Europe should have
achieved a satisfactory military position; so that repercussions
in Europe or the Mediterranean will be caused less by any limited
US withdrawal than by the possibility of a conflict in the Far
East that might spread to Europe.
PART ONE

OVER-ALL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA

It can be foreseen that in a few years China could rise to the rank of a world power. This elevation would introduce into the new world balance of power equation important changes the extent of which should be computed. Only in the light of these changes will it be possible to evaluate the possible consequences of the rise of China, particularly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Chapter I. CHINA'S POTENTIALITIES AND LIMITATIONS

Demography

The essential characteristic of China is her enormous population. The Chinese multitude, already crowded in China proper, represents an inexhaustible reservoir of emigrants ready to swarm throughout Asia, into the entire periphery of the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Already great colonies are mushrooming. In peacetime, even with severe measures of control, they will progressively invade the shores of the Pacific. If, by force or by politics, the barriers were removed or even diminished, a yellow tidal wave would hurl itself quickly over Southeast Asia, Australia, South America, the west coast of the United States, even indeed the east coast of Africa.

The opening of foreign territories to Chinese emigration by force, and a fortiori the conquest of new territories, depends in large measure on China's economic and military achievements.

**Economy**

The economic outlook is contradictory: natural resources are considerable, manpower is more than abundant, but China's feeble technology and the overly rapid augmentation of her population threaten to thwart economic development.

The Chinese economy (whose future possibilities are enormous) is not progressing at the pace set by current plans; it can improve substantially for several decades, moreover, without attaining a level comparable even to that of the Soviet Union.

**Military Forces**

It follows that, if China can by itself ever become a power of the first magnitude in the military field, the achievement will
take several decades, if indeed it is ever accomplished. But this does not mean that China will not be formidable well before then.

Even at present, China's military power—purely conventional—is considerable. The Korean War demonstrated China's ability to deploy numerous and hardy troops, while her military equipment is not negligible. Along all her periphery China can even now undertake conventional military operations or, following her original preferred formula, operations in support of local guerrillas.

Once her economy is developed, China can profit by her enormous population excess to hurl veritable masses into battle. China, employing her usual mixture of political infiltration and resolute combat, could menace and invade the territory of any Asian continental neighbors. But to act beyond the seas would require a powerful fleet, which will not soon exist, or at least some means of long-range force, such as aerial and nuclear power.

**Nuclear Possibilities**

In the nuclear realm it will be a dozen years at best before China is able to deploy thermonuclear arms and missiles in appreciable numbers. This time period presumes an independent effort, that is to say, one undertaken without aid or with minimum aid from the Soviet Union.
Under these conditions, what might be the value of such a striking force? By the time in question, around 1975, military atomic technology will have made spectacular progress. An anti-missile capability will probably have been achieved; and the employment of satellites for reconnaissance, detection, interception, and even bombardment could be considerably developed. Is it possible to believe that China will be able not only to build her nuclear power but also to overcome her backwardness, assimilate the latest developments, and produce missiles of the latest type in significant numbers by 1975? The answer in all probability is no.

China could not deploy a striking force of the latest type and of sufficient magnitude by 1975 without technical assistance from the Soviets. In that case, the Chinese force would be no more than a supplement or annex of the Soviet striking force. This would be the result—and price—of a close, durable, and sure alliance between China and the Soviet Union, that is to say, a sort of "satellization" of China, a situation which a dozen years ago appeared probable but has since been modified by very strong contrary currents. In any event, if this hypothesis were to materialize, the Chinese nuclear force would be closely held in check by the Soviet Union; there would be no separate "Chinese factor" to consider. The situation would be as if the Soviet Union included the territory of China.
Outside of this hypothesis, that is to say, as long as China still enjoyed any independence, the strength of its nuclear force would suffer in comparison with those of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a force could not stand up alone against either of theirs—and even less against the two united. But one must not hurry to conclude from the probable weakness of the Chinese nuclear force, in comparison with the vast strategic power of the United States and the Soviet Union, that China would be effectively paralyzed in actions or threats against her Asian neighbors.

For either of the great nuclear powers can "cover" China against the other great nuclear power. From this reciprocal neutralization China could conceivably gain very great freedom of action, even to the point of initiative beyond the protector's liking (somewhat as if the United States had not intervened during the Suez operation, while continuing to cover Europe through the nuclear deterrent).

**Military Possibilities**

The role of this secondary nuclear force can be evaluated in broad outline. Whatever the future course of technical evaluation, it will always be less costly to obtain land-based, medium- or short-range missiles than missiles based on submarines or of intercontinental or orbital range. Even if the Chinese should
possess any missiles of the latter type, they will be few in comparison to the other kinds. The Chinese force will therefore be essentially of continental, that is to say Asian, application.

On the world strategic plane, China could therefore present little threat of action against America and Europe. The help that she could bring to the Soviet Union against the United States would thus be weak on the strategic level. Her eventual action against Soviet objectives in Asia, on the contrary, would be far from negligible. The existence of an independent China with limited nuclear capability, as it affects the USSR-US strategic confrontation, would therefore be of interest only to the United States.

At the purely Asian level, this second-rate nuclear force would assure China an absolute superiority over her neighbors, at present more or less shielded by the United States. If the Soviet Union were to cover China, the potentialities of atomic blackmail against Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, India, or Pakistan would be enormous and would reinforce the already existent possibilities for conventional and revolutionary warfare. The United States would then have no choice but to constitute in the Far East a more or less autonomous nuclear force (symmetrical to the one which will be imposed in Europe in a few years if there is no détente with the Soviets) based upon local
allies. This problem will have to be faced in the years following the explosion of the first Chinese bomb, if politics does not by then change the course of events.

At any rate, an atomic capability would augment China's defensive power considerably. Landings could be countered and invasion menaced. Moreover, thanks to this capability for blackmail—whether against the United States by means of a few missiles, or by more powerful means against, for example, Japan or India—China could impose a halt on operations unleashed against her by others. This aspect is worth remembering.

Conclusion

In conclusion, an overpopulated China will be a great menace and will, through industrialization, become an important factor in Asia and the Pacific. But China will not be able, in the relatively near future, either to develop a sufficient industrial power or to create a nuclear force comparable to those of the Soviet Union or the United States unless aided technically—and thus made practically a satellite—by the Soviet Union.

Covered by the nuclear forces of one of the great nuclear powers, China's own aptitude for subversion, an immense conventional warfare potential, and a second-rate nuclear force will make that nation a formidable threat throughout Asia, but in Asia only.
Chapter II. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE UNITED STATES

China and the Soviet Union

With its spiraling population and continental military power, China must seek to extend itself in Asia. The probable directions are traced by nature: starving India, like overpopulated Japan, would present the Chinese only with supplementary problems. Southeast Asia, already heavily populated, would provide only rubber. On the continent and at close reach, China's natural lebensraum would seem to be Soviet Asia--from Turkestan to Eastern Siberia--where there are so many riches and where the peoples of different Asiatic races are more or less colonized by the Russians. In these areas, "Asia for the Asians" obviously means, first of all, eviction of the Russians. In the normal course of events, as a result of this fact, the Soviet Union should undergo between 1965 and 1975 the same illnesses of "decolonization" that Europe suffered from 1945 to 1960. The proximity of a powerful China, on the move and overpopulated, cannot but intensify this phenomenon.

The Soviet Union cannot resolve this problem by a withdrawal comparable to that of the British from India. Siberia--with its important, and continually growing, Russian minorities--is more comparable to Algeria or South Africa. Besides, the pressure of neighboring Asia, which dominated Russia at the time of the Tatars,
renders impossible any limited withdrawal to a previously chosen line. The Soviet Union will decide to keep its Asiatic possessions, and will have to fight to do so.

There cannot be, therefore, a powerful and independent China that at the same time would be the ally or friend of the USSR, whatever the nature of Communist solidarity may be. Soviet policy will thus be constrained either:

1) To control a China "satellized" and practically integrated into the Soviet Union, a simple pawn in the hands of Soviet policy; or

2) To oppose the development of an independent China, by internal disorder or by war; or

3) To cover the Asian undertakings of an independent but relatively weak China, in order simultaneously to retain a certain control over Chinese policy and to divert the Chinese masses away from Soviet territory. The danger would be very great in this case for all of the Far East.

The first policy would be the best for the Soviets, but Stalin himself had to renounce it, owing to the obstinacy of his Chinese ally. The Soviet Union will always wish to profit from any favorable occasions to resume this policy, but it is unlikely that the opportunity will arise.

The second policy would visibly break the unity of the Communist bloc. This policy can be imposed if the danger becomes
too great, but will be used only as a last resort. On the other hand, if the United States were to fight China, the resultant weakening of both adversaries would serve the interest of the Soviets, while also giving them numerous opportunities for maneuver. This solution would certainly greatly please the Soviet leaders.

The third policy has the advantage of maintaining the solidarity of the Communist bloc. In practice there is no risk in it, China being still very weak; and the Soviets could well attempt to steer Chinese expansion to the east and southeast, thus inviting conflict with the United States, to the interest of the Soviet Union. In support of this policy, Soviet technical aid to China would be maintained at a very low level, simply as a propaganda matter, in order to brake Chinese progress. This policy appears to be the one that the Soviets are actually following. Its continuance is much the most probable in the ensuing years.

The Soviet Union and the United States

The opposition between the Soviet Union and the United States results from the schism within Western civilization, born of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist movement, and exacerbated, after the common victory of 1945, by the brutal expansionist policy of Stalin.
The consequences have been the creation of NATO—a Western dike—but also the collapse of the world position of Europe—therefore of the white race—and finally the unleashing of an arms race on a scale without precedent in history. The technical developments arising from modern scientific progress have set such a pace that the advanced civilizations—and they alone—are using up their very substance, attaining only a ruinous and precarious equilibrium that remains ever doubtful. The part of wisdom would be for some sort of armistice to permit a pause, freeing resources for more productive investments. Khrushchev, who leans on the desires of the Soviet masses for well-being, is visibly seeking a solution in this direction; and so is the Kennedy administration. One might also say that Europe's reluctance to undertake a full rearmament effort betrays the same underlying thoughts.

The idea of a solution by disarmament has been advanced and tried. Up to the present at least, this has run afoul of excessive propaganda and legitimate suspicions. Any truce in the course of an arms race implies important military risks if the adversary is not to be trusted. The problem is thus less military or technical than political and psychological. It is fear or hostility that must be disarmed first.

Thus we have the Khrushchev policy of "peaceful coexistence," imposed on the Chinese in spite of their opposition, and received
in the West with suspicion, as it appears to be belied in prac-
tice by the indirect offensive that the Soviets are developing
on a world scale to profit from the troubles of "decolonization."
Nonetheless, the signs of a willingness to disengage multiply from
one year to the next. Could the economic necessity of slowing
down the arms race and the perception of a common Chinese danger
perhaps lead to a true accord between the Soviet Union and the
United States?

The Soviet Union and the United States, both offshoots of
eighteenth-century Europe, have many affinities: territorial
extent, variegated climates, vast resources, mass production,
unlimited faith in technology, and federalism. Moreover, the
initials "USSR" convey Lenin's intention to realize the second
Westernization of Russia by copying American methods. America
enjoys a considerable prestige in the Soviet Union. Rapprochement
is therefore not entirely unthinkable.

But the moral differences remain basic, notably on the
religious plane--so important to the United States--and with
regard to liberty, respect for which is at the base of American
civilization. De-Stalinization has mitigated these differences,
which could be reduced even further in proportion as the Soviets
come to know greater prosperity. However, the great conflicts
of history have always arisen between powers of analogous techni-
cal level, but separated by opposite concepts of a religious and
political nature. The material similarities between the Soviet Union and the United States are therefore much less decisive than the ideological contrasts.

More conclusive still are the arguments derived from the political dynamics of Soviet-American relations. Never in the course of history have two great world powers in expansion been able to establish a stable equilibrium. By a sort of fatal gravitation, one of the two has always finished by destroying the other, at least unless some other circumstance has absorbed their energy, a condition generally produced by the intervention of compensating coalitions. It is evidently this phenomenon that we are witnessing: NATO constituted an initial reaction, to which the response was creation of the Bandung Group. The Chinese factor constitutes a new unknown in the East-West equation. The fatigue resulting from expenses caused by the arms race is not sufficient to suppress the dynamic tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under present conditions, peaceful coexistence cannot mean peace, but simply a temporary postponement.

The sole possibility for peaceful coexistence to be anything but a fraud is to establish it in a world where equilibrium is rendered stable by a proper reapportionment of the expanding powers.
China and the United States

From this realistic point of view, China can play the role of a powerful equilibrating factor. Suppose, moreover, that China did not exist or had been destroyed by a hypothetical Soviet-American coalition. Would there not recur a situation analogous to that which followed the collapse of Germany and gave birth to the opposition between the Soviet Union and the United States? The renascence of China would appear to be the effect of the compensatory mechanisms by which Nature tends to reestablish equilibrium when it is broken. On the basis of this concept of equilibrium, it is clear that a conjunction of the Soviet Union and the United States against China would not be logical except if a reunion of their forces became indispensable to deal with the Chinese danger, which should not be the case for a long time. The probability is, therefore, that China will play the role of a counterweight in one or the other of the camps until perhaps eventually, her increasingly dangerous capability will have accrued to the point (doubtless aided by the Afro-Asian "Third World") of bringing about a coalition against her.

In the meantime, the Chinese threat is more distant geographically and less disturbing for the United States than for the Soviet Union.
The only hypothesis that is truly dangerous for the United States is a China closely allied to the Soviets. In this case, the United States must stand resolutely opposed to the alliance, as it had to do at the time of Stalin.

But in reality, this is not the case at present. Since China has assured its independence in relation to the Soviet Union, the laws of international dynamics have made it a potential adversary of the USSR on a more or less long-term basis. Just as the Soviets have an interest in a Sino-American conflict, so the United States has the same sort of interest in a Sino-Soviet conflict. Everything should be done to aid or support this latter possibility, despite the emotional hostility that China arouses in the United States, particularly since the Korean War. In the presence of a China that remains independent, the United States can have three basic policies:

1) To act, against a China more or less supported by the Soviet Union, to limit Chinese expansion in Asia.

2) To help China develop itself, in order to threaten the Soviet Union and further a schism between the Communist powers.

3) To cover China against the Soviets, so as to permit Chinese action in Soviet Asia.
The first policy can be imposed immediately—to contain Chinese expansion in its present direction, and to force China to look for new zones of expansion toward the west and the north.

This policy would be dangerous if it were to lead to a real conflict which would serve only the Soviet Union, or even if it threw China into a closer dependence on the Soviets. It must therefore be very discriminating.

The second policy must be gradual, or even conducted through third powers (Japan or Great Britain, for example). What is important in this area is to seize any favorable occasion to enlarge the existing fissure between the Soviets and the Chinese and to avoid all action that could lead to an irreversible opposition with China. A compromise over Quemoy and Matsu could, if well exploited, open opportunities for leverage toward such a development.

The third policy would not be possible unless China were truly opposed to the Soviet Union. It would then be inevitable, and extraordinarily rewarding.

Conclusion

In a world dominated by the lasting bipolar opposition of the Soviet Union and the United States, the apparition of a challengingly powerful China will present more direct risks for the Soviets than for the United States, whatever the ideological
affinities may be. The United States, if it succeeds directly or indirectly in accentuating the latent division between China and the Soviet Union, will possess very powerful means of influence against the latter. Then, and only then, will peaceful coexistence become truly possible.

If, on the contrary, China became again a Soviet satellite, all the Far East and even the Pacific would be in danger, because the current equilibrium would thereby be broken in favor of the Soviet Union.

If eventually China became dangerous to both the Soviet Union and to the United States, joint action by these last two would become necessary; but this hypothesis will not be realized for several decades and may never be tested, especially if China opposes the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, China could play a useful role as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Far East.

Chapter III. CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO AND FOR EUROP

NATO and Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was first born in reaction to the Stalinist menace. The essential purpose was to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat, which appeared imminent after the Prague coup and the attack on Korea. In
addition, NATO sought to preserve in the Atlantic community those Western European technical and human resources that, if lost, could have tipped the balance in favor of the East. A new system of military power was therefore erected to restore a certain stability to Central Europe, where the disappearance of Germany had created a dangerous vacuum.

Nevertheless, the violent division of Europe, manifest in the shield of Soviet satellites and in the division of Germany, continues to exist as a badly healed wound whose constant festering and possible eruptions create a permanent political peril at the heart of Europe. This is the essential problem for Europeans.

At the same time, Western Europe, which has undergone a spectacular economic revival (in great measure owing to the Marshall Plan), has found itself confronted with a series of difficulties and even grave crises as a result of the "decolonization" of its overseas possessions. This process was hastened by the competitive eagerness with which both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to seduce the young independent states of the "Third World." This has resulted in a number of political disagreements between the United States and the European members of NATO. On the whole, this process has considerably weakened the alliance, whose overly limited geographic and military purpose has proven itself ill adapted to the many-sided and global character of the Soviet menace.
Finally, the military defense of Western Europe has depended, in spite of the Europeans' own partial rearmament, primarily on a United States guarantee whose value stemmed from the power of US nuclear strategic forces and from the presence of American troops in Europe. The fact is that European rearmament, hindered as it was by the economic difficulties of the 1950s and by the fragmentation of military organizations between twelve different nations, has always been insufficient to counterbalance the Soviet forces. In order to increase the yield of the limited European forces, the United States has had to consider giving them the use of American nuclear weapons. This has raised the question of commitment and control in the use of these weapons, which have until now been under the exclusive national control of the United States, as has been the use of US strategic forces. The possession, first by Great Britain and then by France, of national nuclear weapons has served only to make a solution of the problem more urgent; while the United States, committed to a sizable effort to modernize its own strategic striking forces, would prefer to see Europe directing its efforts towards conventional weapons.

Thus NATO, which performed its function very usefully during the 1950s, is today confronted with the necessity of adapting itself to new problems that are difficult to resolve.
Europe, China, and the Soviet Union

Aloof from Asia, now that through "decolonization" she has almost completely abandoned the interests she had there, Europe is primarily concerned with her own problems: economic revival and growth, unification, and the reconstitution—under some acceptable independent form—of her former colonies. Facing eastward, Europe is suffocated by the massive proximity of Soviet Russia, and is tempted to regard a new Far Eastern situation only in the light of the Soviet threat to Europe.

Instinctively Europe awaits a diversion of the Soviet threat because of the renascence of China and also the eventuality of a schism already presaged by the public Sino-Soviet controversy over Communist doctrine. The hope is that this diversion of Soviet concern might create favorable conditions for a détente between East and West permitting an acceptable settlement of the acute problems of Central Europe. At best, a conflict between China and the Soviet Union could bring about a weakening of Soviet power and the realization of a less strained equilibrium within Europe than now exists.

To be sure, the inhuman form of insect civilization represented by the new China does not attract sympathy. One senses that in the long run a new Chinese giant may be dangerous. Even now one sees the effects of Chinese-Soviet competition over the "Third World." Similarly, one cannot be sure that the eventuality
of a United States-Soviet rapprochement facilitated by China will not result in the preservation of the bad status quo of Central Europe. Over a longer run, a powerful China will create the risk of a wave of invasion, first eliminating the last European positions in the Far East, and even breaking into Europe—Tamerlane, Ghenghis Khan, and Attila are not yet forgotten.

These dangers, however, still appear only theoretical; whereas a Chinese-Soviet rift that would shatter the specter of a solid and hostile Communist bloc is generally considered a welcome prospect. The hope is that Europe will be able to profit from such a rift, and also avoid the major risks which it entails. This optimistic tendency is naturally most noticeable in the Federal Republic of Germany, intensively involved in East Europe and suffering from the division of the German nation even though cheered by a refound prosperity. In France, however, where the Algerian problem is dominant, the prospect of Chinese infiltration of Africa is often viewed with anxiety.

The point is that Europe is beginning to perceive future dangers to the south. The successive loss of former territorial possessions has created painful economic and social problems. These questions do not seem amenable to good solutions in places where Europeans form an important minority (Algeria and South Africa), and extremely grave local conflicts may develop or continue.
In regions where European minorities are smaller, the decolonization process, hastened by the American-Soviet competition for the favors of the "Third World," has led to a withdrawal that is premature, in view of the stage of development of the peoples in the areas. Highly unstable new states have thereby been formed wherein the population has created economic problems that exceed the capacities of weak and inefficient governments. There is a danger that a new "Dark Ages" will for some time prevail, providing both Chinese and Soviet communism with good opportunities for infiltration. This evolution, unless carefully supervised, can result in the creation of states hostile to Europe and aligned with the Soviets or the Chinese. From this point of view, the urge for unification in the Arab states between Mesopotamia and the Atlantic, an impulse which for a moment materialized in the United Arab Republic, would revive the ancient Turkish danger and force Europe to look to its southern defenses. Even if no unity emerges, the existence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean of hostile military or political bases, together with the fact that these impoverished countries are in a full-scale population expansion, cannot help but pose serious preoccupations for Europe's security. If one adds to these factors the relative internal brittleness of the economically only partially developed states of Mediterranean Europe, one can only hope that the whole Mediterranean region does not become the soft
underbelly of Europe. To avert this danger, Europe must maintain political and economic ties with its new southern neighbors that could support their development and at the same time prevent their unification into a hostile bloc. In any case, the possibility of a southern front cannot be disregarded.

Thus Europeans, viewing China in the light of their own preoccupations, see at some times a means of diverting the Soviet pressure and perhaps of inducing an acceptable compromise in Central Europe, and at others a new source of subversion capable of creating additional dangers even along the shores of the Mediterranean.

**NATO and China**

The influence of the Chinese factor on NATO depends largely on the evolution of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

If China becomes a satellite or very closely tied to the Soviet Union, the United States will have no choice but to oppose this enormous coalition. Europe will be at the US side. All hope of a détente will have disappeared; and NATO, whose function it is to oppose the Soviets, will be strengthened by the additional threat. European unity will be fostered, and could even evolve into a real Atlantic federation. Europe will have to be prepared to fight to the east, and eventually to the south
against potential Moslem allies of the Soviet Union and China. Since the United States will have to divert a part of her resources toward the Far East, Europe will have to complete her rearmament. This rearmament will probably have to include, in addition to increased conventional forces, a multinational nuclear force of strategic and tactical weapons established with the technical assistance of the United States.

If China maintains her independence, which at this moment appears probable, but remains sufficiently weak to be of no immediate danger, the Soviets can provide a cover for China to help her expansion southward and eastward in Asia, thereby diverting her from Soviet Asia and increasing the chances of conflict with the United States. Europe would in this case doubtless remain neutral; but, as tension with the Soviet Union would remain very acute, NATO would have to be reinforced, with much the same military and political consequences as in the previous case. The Soviets might also attempt to break up European defense efforts by inciting conflict with some Moslem power.

Faced with an independent China, the Soviets could also try to hinder Chinese development. The United States might, in that case, help China. Europe would be neutral, and friendly toward China. Since Europe's opposition to the Soviets would remain great, NATO would enjoy great mutuality of interest, and thus a
good cohesion. But since the danger would appear less pressing, Europe's rearmament would doubtless be less complete or less rapid. Difficulties could develop between some members of NATO and the United States, if the latter overly encouraged Chinese policy toward the "Third World."

If an independent China entered into conflict with the Soviets in Asia, the United States might support and cover China. Europe would be neutral in the Asiatic conflict, except in case of a secondary conflict with a Moslem ally of the Soviets in the Mediterranean or an incident in Central Europe which pulled NATO into conflict with the Soviet Union. More probably, open hostility between China and the USSR would be exploited by Europe in an effort to obtain a Soviet withdrawal in Central Europe. In any case, NATO would remain of major importance to the security of the West. Europe, less subject to Soviet pressure, could accelerate her unification. An approach to global equilibrium would appear possible.

Finally, if China became too dangerous, the United States could ally itself with the Soviet Union against China. We have already suggested that this hypothesis did not appear logical until much time has lapsed. The first consequence would be to suppress completely--but temporarily--East-West tensions. NATO would lose its reason for existence and could only disintegrate; Europe's rearmament would come to a stop, leaving a militarily
weak Europe. Europe would be neutral, but the reversal of alliances could not avoid creating dangerous tensions in a divided Central Europe. It would be imperative for the United States to profit by its favorable position with regard to the Soviet Union by seeking the best possible solution of outstanding problems in that area. In spite of Europe's neutrality, conflicts in the Mediterranean with Moslem states perhaps eventually allied to China would still remain possible. Even more serious would be the fact that a US-USSR alliance might reinforce Soviet policies toward the "Third World." This would undoubtedly result in serious opposition between the United States and certain European powers.

So, in all but one of the above hypotheses, the rise of China leads to the upholding of East-West tensions, and to a greater or lesser strengthening of NATO and either European or Atlantic unity. The reason for this is that in each hypothesis but one, the United States continues to be opposed to the Soviet Union.

In the last hypothesis, on the other hand—even though it is not very probable—the coupling of the United States and the Soviet Union destroys NATO and could even affect the solidarity of Europe and the United States.

Finally, in each of these hypotheses there exists the possibility of secondary conflicts in the Mediterranean. This last
point demonstrates the necessity of a closer alignment of the policies of NATO members toward the "Third World," and principally in the Near East, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

In today's world, dominated as it is by the triple phenomenon of technical development, of the schism in European civilization between East and West, and of the difficulties being met by the "Third World" in its adaptation to modern life, the awakening of China is of considerable importance.

This is largely owing to the fact that the world has changed dimensions. The continuous replacement of maritime routes by aerial routes (which have in their turn become strategically important) leads to a change from the perspective of the world corresponding to Mercator's maps—with the parallel placement of the continents and the bundle of maritime routes converging on the bottlenecks of Gibraltar, Suez, Malacca, and Panama—to a perspective corresponding to a polar projection.¹ One then notices that the continents, facing each other at the North Pole and diverging therefrom, are squeezed into one fourth of the globe; while the rest of the world represents an immense exterior body of water.

¹ See Chart No. 1, p. 29.
This perspective of the world clarifies new geographical relationships. All interior seas become narrow, dead-end streets, with the exception of the Atlantic Ocean, which is the center of the civilized world and thereby corresponds to the Mediterranean of the ancient world. The large red blot of the Soviet Union looms like a veritable "Central Empire," framed on the west by the narrow European peninsula, on the "north" by the American continent, on the southeast by the Chinese protrusion, and on the south by a belt of Moslem desert states. The symmetrical "Land's Ends" of Europe and China are now of only local importance. The belt of Moslem states, lengthened by India, unites in its embrace Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. Beyond this belt, Africa, Australia, and South America appear as only secondary land masses.

On this same projection, the great economic transformations of the modern world show a revealing pattern: the economically developed parts ring the pole from America to Asia. This corresponds essentially to the domain of the white race. The rest of the inhabited world, farther to the south, is the underdeveloped area and the home of the colored races. But there, the population explosion brought about by Pasteur is resulting in the birth of starving ant heaps: by 1975 a billion Chinese, hundreds of millions of Indians, and, along the shores of the Mediterranean,

The World: Physical and Political

Chart No. 1
The World: Economic

Chart No. 2

- Developed Regions
- Partially Developed Regions
- Underdeveloped Regions
- Underdeveloped Regions that are becoming Overpopulated
a hundred million Moslems. One can discern many grave problems which would appear to produce again, after two milleniums, the conditions for a new and gigantic Völkerwanderung.

In this revolutionary and divided world, when China appears with its billion inhabitants, the drama will be played by five principal characters: China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Europe, and the Moslem belt—each with its satellites and under the attentive eyes of more-distant bystanders. The notion that the prospective problems can be resolved only by a great global conflict is not encouraging. The enormous attrition produced by nuclear weapons would mark the final downfall of the white race to the benefit of the more primitive and more prolific races. The result would be the death of our civilization.

The only alternative to conflict in international affairs is equilibrium; that is, a grouping of forces in such a manner that their overly vigorous expansions are mutually exhausting and the great conflict rendered unnecessary. This doctrine, which governed European politics for centuries, should now be raised to a global level.

From this point of view, China could serve as an extremely valuable balancing factor, if she is on the right side. In this case, Communist China, while straining the Soviet Union, would be wearing itself out. At least, geography recommends
this solution as by far the most elegant and the only logical one for the West. It is the only way of breaking the Marxist-Leninist ideological unity, of depriving the Soviet Union of its present position as defender of young national movements, of turning back against the USSR at its most sensitive point the anticolonial ideology the Soviets helped spread, and of (perhaps) thereby regaining an advantageous position toward the "Third World." It is also the only way of peacefully disengaging Europe, of healing the deep wounds of the last war, of obtaining European unity--indeed an Atlantic unity--and of reaching a sufficiently stable peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the West.

A durable Sino-Soviet collusion, on the contrary, gives the West no possibility for maneuver. Fighting in Asia against a powerful China supported by the Soviet Union would be a useless folly. To allow the expansion of China in conjunction with the USSR throughout the "Third World" would be to risk a progressive paralysis of our opportunities, with defeat at the end. Everything must be attempted--and accepted--in order to prevent such collusion.

Finally, the temptation to oppose China from the beginning by a rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union would serve only Soviet interests, for it is the Soviet Union which will sooner or later be most menaced by China.
Besides, such a premature reversal of alliances would shatter the morale of the world, destroy NATO, and push Europe toward neutralism if not communism. If, however, the Chinese danger became pressing, the Soviets having already been exhausted, the same reversal would appear clearly legitimate. In coming years, the specter of China can be an asset in seeking military and political arrangements with the Soviets in Europe, and, more significantly, can permit a relatively stable period of peaceful coexistence. That is why this specter must have real substance. By making common cause with the Soviets prematurely one would deny the specter all its "credibility," that is, all its value for us.

The bipolar world of the 1950s appeared bent on a crazy arms race that could lead only to catastrophe. The world of 1960 saw the rebirth of Europe—though militarily still too weak and politically still too unstable to constitute a third pole. The race continued. The world of 1965-1975 may see opening up for it the chance offered by a fourth participant, an opportunity which, if put to good use, could permit the hope of a new world equilibrium.
PART TWO

DIRECT CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO OF A
NUCLEAR-ARMED CHINA HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES

As opposed to Part I, we are here concerned with a specific well-defined problem, an effort to explore, on the basis of events expected in the near future, national reactions and those of the NATO alliance with respect to measures or countermeasures which might be applicable.

We shall assume that China will remain hostile to the United States and that her position with respect to the Soviet Union will be:

1) A satellite or at least a very close ally.
2) An independent ally, but separated from the Soviets by certain ideological differences.
3) A Communist state that has broken with the Soviet Union over the issue of nationalism or political violence.
These are, of course, only working hypotheses designed to keep the study within a defined framework. The study will be divided into four phases:

First phase: before the first Chinese nuclear explosion
Second phase: the first explosion
Third phase: a small Chinese nuclear force (c. 1966-67)
Fourth phase: after 1968

Chapter IV. FIRST PHASE: BEFORE THE FIRST NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

In this phase, interest is concentrated on the attitude of the Great Powers toward the general problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of nations, and on the attitude of the Great Powers toward China.

In a general way, the nuclear powers are attempting to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, partly so as to retain their privileged position, partly to reduce the risks of nuclear war. Furthermore, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States, nor the United Kingdom has any desire to see the Chinese possess nuclear weapons.

The fear of this eventuality has certainly affected the nuclear policies of these powers. It has contributed to the pressure for opening negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons, parleys undertaken with the hope of reaching an accord that could stem China's progress in this field. It also partly
explains the miser-like unwillingness of the United States to give its allies nuclear materials, an attitude that reflects the effort to avoid inciting the Soviet Union into arming China. It is also possibly the reason behind the Soviets' radical proposals for nuclear disarmament.

These preoccupations, coupled with the obvious interest of the nuclear powers in seeing the ruinous arms race stopped or at least slowed down, could lead to the discovery of a common ground that would allow some agreement on the limitation of nuclear missiles. Such a prospect is not excluded during coming years, but neither is it at all certain. Whatever arrangements might be made in such an agreement, it is very doubtful that China can be made to respect them, particularly if she is not invited to their negotiation. This is the reason why, in spite of opposition in the United States and elsewhere, some people are pressing for the admission of China to the United Nations, hoping that this inclusion would expose China to a certain extent to international pressure. The effectiveness of such an undertaking appears uncertain, to say the least.

China's independence of action may in fact be reinforced by the attitude--official or not--of the non-nuclear powers. Thus NATO wishes, at least as far as its European part is concerned, to possess its own nuclear force. Some states--such as Germany
(in particular), Italy, and the Benelux countries—would prefer to see established a multinational nuclear force at the disposition of NATO. This project has thus far run into numerous obstacles, ranging from financing to methods of control; and, in spite of the efforts of Britain and the United States (who see in this scheme a way of lumping together the small national nuclear forces), it has made little progress. Besides, the question is doubtless inopportune at the moment, as much on account of the actual conditions of strategic equilibrium between the Soviets and the United States as in order to avoid compromising the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. If in a few years a détente has not been achieved, however, the formula will surely be applied.

Meanwhile, France imperturbably pursues her policy creating an autonomous national defense at the heart of the alliance. This policy, which corresponds to the very clear will of General de Gaulle, has no chance of being modified as long as the general is in power. The program has already led to a certain number of accomplishments in the nuclear field and is aimed particularly at building a small national nuclear striking force, based first on airplanes and later on missiles. France lays claim, in spite of a unanimous world opposition, to full freedom in nuclear experimentation. One must note that these objectives are considered by
a part of French military opinion (in general, pilots and technicians seduced by the vision of an independent effort) as justified; whereas another segment remains very hostile on account of the expense met at the cost of detriment to conventional forces. Similarly, one segment of public opinion is concerned at French divergence from the military policy of the alliance, while others see this deviation as justified by America's insistence on keeping exclusive control of all its nuclear weapons.

This French policy probably helps China resist Soviet pressures. Khrushchev has even given the modest French experiences as an excuse for exploding his megatons. The obvious exaggeration in this argument perhaps betrays the Soviets' annoyance at the embarrassment the French precedent causes them with respect to China.

Finally, it appears extremely improbable that China can be prevented from developing her nuclear industry. The only hypothesis under which this would seem possible is if the Soviets had complete control over Chinese policies (the only situation in which the Soviets would not mind China's possessing a nuclear capability). But this improbable hypothesis appears absolutely excluded for the next few years. The Chinese phenomenon is on the march. If China overcomes the problems of her growth despite Soviet noncooperation, she will in a few years' time be an
adolescent economic power and in the same interval explode her first atomic device.

Chapter V. SECOND PHASE: THE FIRST EXPLOSION

This first explosion will have the effect of a shot across the bow; for it will manifest the reality of the Chinese threat, till then only hypothetical.

There will result at the outset a considerable rise of China's prestige throughout the "Third World," providing an opportunity for much greater psychological pressures. At the same time, the fear of China will increase among most of her immediate neighbors: Japan, South Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Pakistan, and India. Some of these countries (notably India) will doubtless be tempted to follow China's lead. Others (particularly Formosa, the Philippines, South Korea, and Pakistan) will look for their security in a reinforcement of the American guarantee. Still others will seek in neutralism an opportunity to find a balance between the two camps. From this point of view the explosion's influence on Japan, traumatized by Hiroshima and belabored by the Soviets, could be important.

The consequences of this novel situation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will obviously depend on the evolution which will have taken place by that time in the Far East. One can, however, foresee the following prospects:
Strategic Consequences

From the standpoint of world strategy, the American and Soviet strategic nuclear striking and survival capabilities will have been far developed by the time the first explosion occurs, say in 1964-65. They will, therefore, very likely be in a state of stable equilibrium; and the risk of a US-USSR conflict will be very slight. On the other hand, from that moment on one must count on the probability that Chinese activities in the Far East will be accompanied by the threat of nuclear blackmail. The question then arises, to what extent could an American nuclear response to a Chinese action induce a Soviet reprisal?

If China is practically a satellite, the distinction between China and the Soviet Union would be artificial. Nevertheless, this artificial distinction was maintained during the Korean War. That is, the direct confrontation of American and Chinese forces did not lead to any direct Soviet reaction. It is true, of course, that at the time the superiority of the American nuclear capability was considerable. One can deduce that in such a case, the engagement of American forces against Chinese—probably welcome to the Soviet Union, happy to see the United States wasting its resources in an Asiatic conflict—would again be possible without Soviet reaction, on condition that nuclear weapons were not used.

For it is very probable that the Soviets, anxious to prevent the crushing of China, will try to prevent the use of American
nuclear weapons by threatening to intervene with their own strategic forces. In spite of the possibility, occasionally recognized, of a game of reciprocal hostages ("If you intervene in Korea, I will destroy Japan!" "If you touch Japan, I will destroy Manchuria!" etc.), it appears wiser—that is to say, less dangerous—to establish in the Far East a separate, and in appearance autonomous, nuclear force. This modest nuclear force (comparable to that of the Chinese), based on the Far Eastern allies—South Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Pakistan, and perhaps Australia—would be designed to compartmentalize the risks and neutralize the Chinese force. This formula recommends itself all the more if China becomes less independent of the Soviet Union, for in such a case it will be clumsy to engage the United States against China and thereby risk bringing in the Soviet Union to support China even when the Soviet Union disapproves of China's actions. It would then be extremely harmful to have our reactions paralyzed at the critical moment.

Thus, in any case, the first explosion should bring about an initial reinforcement of American capabilities in the Far East and, if possible, the preparation of a small Asiatic nuclear force. As the Chinese nuclear capability will not be very modern at the outset (based only on aircraft), perhaps the establishment of means of detection and interception would contribute toward neutralizing this force in certain well-chosen zones.
This American effort in the Far East would be quite modest. The few subtractions that would have to be made from the Atlantic forces would have practically no effect on the defense of Europe.

**Political Consequences**

On the political level, one can foresee three categories of reactions: those which will tend to make China renounce a nuclear arsenal, those which will be produced in Europe and within NATO, and those which will aim at insuring the defense of the Far East.

1) **Nuclear Limitation**—The first Chinese explosion will bring about a new campaign against nuclear testing and for the limitation of armaments. Taking into account the large emotional content attached to nuclear weapons—due, incidentally, in large part to Soviet propaganda—one can be sure that this campaign will develop with a certain intensity, particularly if well prepared. At that moment, the Soviet attitude will be very revealing of her ulterior motives. Normally, the Soviet Union would have to support the arms limitation. This would, however, place her in opposition to China and show that she is influenced by her mistrust of an independent Chinese neighbor. In such a case, the Western attitude would have to be more subtle, because the disadvantage of a more powerful China would be small if China could be separated from the Soviet Union, and these inconveniences would change to advantages if China became opposed to the Soviet
Union. This would present an extremely interesting opportunity for maneuver. In such a case, incidentally, the position of France, assuming she has not changed her policy, would tend to favor the preservation of national freedom of action in nuclear matters.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Union supports China, it means an extended Chinese alliance. That is, she would have sufficient guarantee to feel confident of being able to push the Chinese flow toward the south and southeast, far from Soviet Asia. This signal would be very important—and very disturbing.

2) Europe and NATO--The reactions in Europe to the first Chinese nuclear explosion will depend in large part on the Soviet attitude.

If a Sino-Soviet schism is heralded, the reaction will be generally favorable. The Federal Republic of Germany, preoccupied with the division of Germany and the problems of Central Europe, would perceive the hope of diverting some of the Soviet Union's interest toward Asia and of deriving therefrom a chance for an acceptable compromise on Berlin, the two Germanies, and possibly even the satellite states of Central Europe. Gaullist France would see in this development the vindication of her nuclear policies.
Nevertheless, France will remain strongly engaged in Africa, even if Algeria is by then no longer a problem. France’s attitude toward China will depend largely on the actions China might be able to undertake in Africa, either against France or against the Soviet Union. Great Britain, the only Western power represented in Peiping, will consider confirmed the rightness of her long policy of patience toward and compromise with China, a course perhaps adopted with the hope of preserving Hong Kong.

If, on the contrary, China and the Soviet Union prove to be solidly united, the European reaction will be a recurrence of anxiety; for a disturbed equilibrium in the Far East can only weaken the West, while Sino-Soviet collusion in Africa can create serious difficulties on the southern flank of Europe. The importance of NATO will be increased. The rearmament of Europe will have to be accelerated, and there will doubtless emerge a multinational nuclear force based in Europe (including, or combined with, the French and British nuclear forces) as a counterpart to the future small nuclear force of the Far East. The coordination of NATO members' policies toward the Far East and toward Africa will have to be made effective—that is to say, substantially improved.
3) In the Far East--In the Far East, whatever the relations between China and the Soviet Union, the first order of business will be to reassure China's neighbors by political guarantees and by military reinforcements. Beyond these initial protective measures, the threat of China over the years will pose the question whether there must be created in the Far East a political defense system (in addition to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) analogous to NATO.

There again, everything may depend on the course of Sino-Soviet relations. If their hostility to each other appears to be increasing, then the military measures outlined above will fully suffice. Besides, in such a case, these forces must be limited to what is necessary to reassure the allied Asiatic powers, without at the same time frightening China and thereby driving her back into the Soviets' arms. On the other hand, if China and the Soviets are tending toward the formation of a single bloc, then the formation of a small Asiatic NATO becomes logical. European reactions to such a policy, however, could be different. France, considerably disappointed by the results obtained by the American relief operation in Indochina, where France still maintains interests and opportunities, runs the risk of being tempted by a neutralist formula for Southeast Asia, a formula justified, by the way, by the fact that defense of that area is extremely difficult.
Great Britain, wishing to preserve Hong Kong and the profits of commerce with China, would doubtless wish to avoid taking a clear-cut position. In the final analysis, the new organization could include only South Korea, Japan (if it is not neutral), Formosa, and the Philippines, countries with which the United States already has bilateral military agreements. The rest are otherwise covered--very theoretically--by SEATO.

**Conclusion**

In this phase, China represents only a potential threat. At the outset, what is essential is the reassurance of China's neighbors by some simple political and military measures. But from that moment on, one must face the necessity of putting into order the defense of the Far East.

It appears that these provisions should vary in accordance with the eventual development of Sino-Soviet relations. From this point of view, an extremely valuable indication will be the Soviet attitude toward international measures that could be proposed to China in order to stop or slow down her nuclear arming. If the Soviets should oppose China, the West should encourage this division.

The influence on NATO of military measures to be taken in the Far East during this period would be negligible.
Chapter VI. THIRD PHASE: A SMALL CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCE (c. 1966-67)

Toward 1966-67 China might be in possession of a small nuclear force: perhaps a dozen nuclear weapons deliverable by aircraft. This means, of course, only a very limited military capability.

Military Value

Such a force cannot serve any offensive military action of real importance. The force would at most have a certain defensive value, against a landing, for example. On the offensive, it could serve as a threat against the cities of an enemy country (Formosa, South Korea, Japan); but this menace can be minimized by means of interception, and, for this reason, the threat to the United States would be very small. A small nuclear force can also serve to tip the scales at the decisive moment in a conventional battle (e.g., Dien Bien Phu). On the other hand, the psychological value of this force would be great if coupled with uncertainty as to its exact size, which, by the way, could at any moment be increased by Soviet help. Taking into account the usual Chinese tactics—which include a combination of propaganda, political infiltration, guerrilla fighting, and actual combat—this new means will give China additional military possibilities, but only on the mainland. Beyond the mainland, the only threat is
a psychological one which will be fairly easily neutralized by equivalent counterforces.

Political Consequences

In any case, it may be that China will be able to undertake its expansion in Asia only after it possesses this modest trump, even though China perhaps exaggerates the advantages to be gained from such a small nuclear force. It will therefore be during this period that the initial direction of Chinese expansion plans will be revealed, whether toward the east and southeast, or to the west and north. Under the influence of Stalin, China took the first of the two general directions. It is imperative that China not be tempted to continue in this course by the presence of a military vacuum. Hence the necessity of placing in readiness by that time the military and political means capable of discouraging her. But this preparation should be for a policy of deterrence rather than combat.

The West has nothing to gain from a military conflict with China, in which it would entangle its resources and could not avoid driving China into a closer dependence on the Soviets. At worst, if a conflict does develop, it should be carried on by intermediary powers. It is in order to avoid all direct military intervention that between now and 1966-67 the military reinforcement of the threatened Asian countries must be realized.
If the initial expansion of China were toward the east or southeast, this should be blocked, as in Korea, without at the same time cutting off all possibilities of an agreement. Obviously, the best solution would be to see China turn progressively to the west and north. This should be possible sooner or later. The chances would be increased if China took a "Titcist" position toward the Soviet Union.

Consequences for NATO

Given the impossibility of foreseeing China's future orientation and the development of her relations with the Soviet Union, NATO will find itself obliged to prepare for whatever may happen in the period 1966-68. Considering that the Chinese military threat will still be very limited, there is no need for NATO to be concerned with any important diversion of United States forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But the repercussions of a conflict in the Pacific could have a worldwide effect. It is important, therefore, that Europe should by then have completed its rearmament; assuming, of course, that no disengagement or arms control agreement has been reached in the interim. Even if such accords have been concluded, our vigilance should not be less great, because the period will remain critical and a new "Korea," though certainly undesirable, cannot be excluded.
European reactions will doubtless be those examined in connection with the preceding phase.

Conclusion

During this phase China presents only a minor military threat, but one sufficient to encourage expansionist moves in the Far East. These could occasion local conflicts which would be very dangerous in terms of China's future orientation. In order to reduce the probability of their occurring, the West must be able to deploy in the Far East a good "deterrent," tailored to China's measure. The establishment of such a deterrent would not divert very important resources from Europe. In view of the conjuncture of events, NATO should also by then be militarily ready.

Chapter VII. FOURTH PHASE: AFTER 1968

During this period, and providing no major event has forestalled it, Chinese power will have developed, but without beginning to approach that of the Soviets or the United States. Nevertheless, the weight of this force in the Far East will become progressively greater.

If China is then closely allied to and supported by the Soviet Union, the balance in Asia and the Pacific will have been completely overturned. The "Third World" will be submitted to
the influence of this coalition and the position of NATO will become more and more precarious. A rearmed Europe will have to prepare to defend itself simultaneously on the east and on the south. The United States will be forced to divert a large part of its forces to the Pacific. The situation in South America could become dangerous and absorb a part of US resources.

If China were merely allied with the Soviet Union, but remained separated by ideological differences, the situation would be almost as serious. Each would have its own clients in the "Third World," but their common purpose would bring about the same consequences. Only if China were completely split from and even opposed to the Soviets would the West be in a favorable situation. The existence of a stronger China in the Far East would reestablish a balance on the east flank of the Soviet Union that would doubtless allow a decompression in Central Europe. At this juncture, the system of global forces could rediscover an equilibrium lost for the past thirty years.

Chapter VIII. CONCLUSIONS

We have sought to find the consequences of each of the future successive phases in the nuclear development of China. Beginning with the well-known present situation, we have dealt more and more in conjecture as we have advanced in time.
In spite of the uncertainties inherent in all future situations, it has been possible to determine the characteristics fitting each phase and so to evaluate the importance of the Chinese situation over the coming years.

The first conclusion is that a nuclear-armed China can constitute a real military threat only sometime after 1970, but that long before this—and practically immediately after acquiring a small nuclear force, by 1966-68—China will present dangerous military possibilities, on account of her capabilities in conventional and revolutionary warfare, both of which will be greatly enhanced by even a feeble nuclear capability. It is important that the Far East be prepared to defend itself by 1966-68. NATO must also be in readiness by the same crucial date, which will determine the direction of China's choice, with or against the Soviet Union, neutral or against the West.

Before this date, the Chinese threat will probably assume the form of infiltration as in Laos, but attention will be focussed on the increase in China's nuclear capability. Despite present tendencies, there is little chance that the pressure of world opinion will be able to induce the Chinese to renounce their nuclear weapons. The first Chinese explosion will underline the necessity of providing countermeasures. The Soviet attitude at that time will reveal its estimate of the ties it will be able to maintain with China.
After 1966-68, China will begin to become really dangerous and, if it be united with the Soviets, the West may be placed in an extremely difficult position.

This forces the second conclusion that the Chinese problem can be judged only on the basis of Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet-West relations. This aspect of the problem was considered in detail in the first part of this study.

The third conclusion is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more particularly, Europe are affected in this initial period only to the extent that the development of China and the state of Sino-Soviet relations will have a direct influence on the situation in Europe, either by increasing or decreasing tensions in Central Europe or by creating new threats to Mediterranean Europe in North Africa or the Near East. Europe's interests in the Far East, except perhaps for Hong Kong, have contracted sufficiently to be considered secondary. Until 1966-68, American participation in the defense of Europe will seemingly not be seriously affected on account of China. This may not be the case after 1968.

The fourth conclusion is that the nuclear policy of China, despite its inevitable limitations over several decades, threatens to affect world politics considerably; because this nuclear addition will be coupled with an enormous demographic and revolutionary power and because the nuclear force will be based on a
society whose economy may one day equal that of the greatest and most modern states. These characteristics show that a parallel between the nuclear policies of France and China would be rather misleading; France does not possess any of the giant potentialities of China. If a parallel could be drawn to a Chinese nuclear force, it would have to be the hypothetical nuclear force that might be developed by a united Europe.

In a world which is proceeding either to a complete upheaval or toward a new equilibrium in which China would constitute a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Far East, it would be necessary for a satisfactory equilibrium that Europe, united and rearmed, form a similar counterweight in the west.
PART THREE

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The two preceding parts have examined the possible consequences of the development of China under different conditions.

In general, the consequences appear to be considerable on the global scale in that they can influence the total political equilibrium; and thereby either give the Soviet Union, reinforced by China, a superiority which would rapidly enough prove decisive or, on the other hand, cause the Soviet Union to be so weakened by China as to permit an equilibrium in Asia and a true détente in Europe. These two extreme prospects are each admittedly far from being realized; but they indicate the two possible general directions in which the future might evolve, and they illuminate the most dangerous eventuality against which we must forearm, gradually and patiently, with appropriate measures.
As regards Europe—and especially France—one is forced to conclude that the Chinese problem has, so to speak, only indirect consequences: those produced in Europe and the Mediterranean by a change in the world balance. There is practically no direct European influence left in Asia (with the exception of Great Britain's, and that only on a very reduced scale). In this Chinese affair, Western Europeans are no longer real partners in an Asian game, but only spectators at a match which will be played by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the other Asian states. Nevertheless, Europeans are vitally concerned that this game be played in an appropriate manner and that it take account of their vital interests.

This is why a study of the Chinese problem, seen from Europe, cannot lead to very substantial practical conclusions concerning direct reactions to the forthcoming stages in the establishment of a Chinese nuclear capacity. Reference must almost always be made to European attitudes toward the limitation of nuclear weapons and toward Communist China in regard to commerce, recognition, and her admission to the United Nations. In the coming years, the military influence of Chinese rearma-ment on Europe will be weak. If we accept the period 1966-68 as the crucial period by which Europe should have reached a satisfactory military position, it is less because of the effect
of the limited military withdrawal that may have to be made by
the United States in Europe than because of the general reper-
cussions of a Far Eastern conflict on Europe and the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, no study of the Chinese problem, as seen
from Europe, can avoid insisting on the general direction in
which the attempt should be made to steer China's evolution so as
to obtain therefrom maximum advantages and minimum drawbacks. Now
disengaged from Asia, Europe enjoys a vantage point which, perhaps,
helps it to judge the broad lines of a policy capable of affecting,
and perhaps of assuring, world peace.
THE UNITED KINGDOM

Roderick MacFarquhar
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SUMMARY

Britain's thinking about China revolves around the issue of trade, and Britain's political-diplomatic commitment in China (and indeed in the Far East as a whole) has therefore always been a limited one. This factor--combined with Britain's "realistic" view, her disillusion with Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and her regard for India's general conciliatory mood--helps to explain Britain's policy toward Communist China, and will influence the attitude taken when the first Chinese atomic device is exploded.

Britain's major responsibility in Asia springs from commitments under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, obligations assumed as a result of Britain's willingness to defend her few remaining interests in the area. Liquidation of such interests increases British reluctance to shoulder military and financial responsibility in this region, the defense of which will thus be left more and more to the United States, whose Far Eastern policies Britain will tend to support.
Britain's possession of the nuclear deterrent has militarily been justified only as serving to warn off the Soviet Union in defense of the homeland, and it would therefore be politically impossible to send British nuclear weapons to Asia, even for use by SEATO. The exception might be if India demanded nuclear weapons following the creation of a Chinese nuclear capability. In that case, Britain would do all it could to help India.

Britain is likely to support whatever moves the United States takes to strengthen the defenses of non-Communist Asia as a result of China's acquiring nuclear weapons, but will probably clash strongly with the United States on the latter's policies of non-recognition and exclusion of China from the United Nations. While differences over China may accordingly increase, they are not likely to be pressed by Britain to a point at which the Anglo-American alliance would be severely endangered.
Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China:

The United Kingdom

Britain and China—Historical Background

The history of Britain's relations with China revolves round the question of trade. Britain's first attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the Manchu court, the famous Macartney mission, was made in order to get trade relations properly regulated through an accredited envoy. The "opium wars," whatever their immediate causes, were ultimately the product of British frustration at being unable to trade freely and securely with the Chinese. Such territorial and legal rights as were obtained by the British were designed primarily to protect trade and those Britons who engaged in it.

Throughout most of the British empire, trade had of course been the original attraction. But where for one reason or another—often again, the protection of trade—Britain took over the
administration of a whole foreign land, the importance of the basic economic interest was often overlaid (notably in India) by the grandeur of the imperial idea and the complexity of the tasks of government.

This was never the case with China. And whereas Britain did not give up her non-commercial responsibilities in her South Asian empire until the late 1940s, she had brought the China Squadron back to Europe by the early years of this century to counter the growing power of the continental giant, Germany. While Britain still maintained forces in and around China, she relied on another power, Japan, to act as the prime protector of her interests. Such political power as she retained was abandoned (with the exception of Hong Kong) when she relinquished her extraterritorial rights in the early 1940s.

There was one major British activity in China that was not commercial and that was missionary work. But after dominating the field in the 19th century, British missionaries lost their leading role to their American colleagues during the first five decades of this century. It was therefore America not Britain that felt in a sense rebuffed nationally in its role as the leading Protestant evangelist. Britain's junior role in the missionary field, coupled with the lesser importance of religion in British than in American
life, explains why the Communist victory did not offend this country ideologically in the way it did America; and it explains why (and this is more important in the present context) religious considerations and missionary pressure groups played no role in the formulation of Britain's China policy.

The importance of these facts is twofold. First, it must be understood that Britain's thinking about China is much influenced by the issue of trade. For however unprofitable trade with China may have been during the past twelve years of Communist rule, trade is after all the traditional link between the two countries.

Second, Britain's political-diplomatic commitment in China and indeed in the Far East as a whole has always been a limited one. While she retained gunboats in the China area, Britain relied for some decades before the Communist take-over on a friendly power to protect her interests there; the United States eventually took the place of Japan in this role.

This background helps to explain the attitude of Britain to the accession to power of the Communists in 1949. The British commercial "China lobby," impressed by the stability brought to the great trading cities by the new rulers, strongly pressed the government to recognize the Communist regime, hoping thus to preserve at least something of its position in China. The lobby was aided by the fact that the British government, not having the same
diplomatic involvement with the Nationalists as the American government, did not have to feel guilty at quickly recognizing the new regime.

Other factors were also important. "Realism"—the Communists controlled the country and one had to recognize the fact and then—was one. Disgust with Chiang Kai-shek's regime and a belief that it could never again hope to attract the support of the Chinese people was another. India's attitude was a third—according to a recent study it was recognition of the new regime by India and, shortly thereafter, Pakistan, that was the immediate cause of Britain's decision to recognize.¹

All these factors continue to play a part in making up Britain's attitude toward Communist China and will help shape the position she takes up when the latter explodes her first atomic device.

**Britain's Present Role in the Far East**

Leaving aside Hong Kong which will be dealt with separately, Britain's major responsibility in Asia springs from her commitments under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) pact. These commitments were undertaken because the British government considered it important from the point of view of the global confrontation with communism that its frontiers in Asia should not be allowed to expand further. While one result of any such expansion would probably be

the diminution of British trade with the area, the protection of such immediate interests was not the prime reason for British adherence to SEATO.

At the time of the signature of the Manila Treaty, both Britain and France (the only other European member of SEATO) had significant national commitments in the area—Britain in Malaya, where the danger of Communist subversion if growing less had not yet been eradicated, and France in Indochina under the Geneva agreements. Both powers considered they had a role to play, and justifiably so.

Since then, however, the situation has changed considerably. Malaya has been independent for five years and it seems as if there is a good chance for the Borneo territories and Singapore to combine with Malaya to form Malaysia. While the strength of the left-wing Chinese element in Singapore will be a source of worry to any Malaysian government, the formation of such a union would undoubtedly increase the stability of the area, if only because dissident Chinese would be given less opportunity of contact with their mentors in Communist China. (In this context, it is worth noting that the present writer's conversations with British officialdom indicate that this country would not permit Singapore to opt out of the Malaysia scheme, particularly if there was any sign of the island's government wanting to unite with Communist China; Britain would probably connive at a Malayan take-over of the island if there were any chance of the scheme's falling through.)

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Britain will doubtless maintain forces in Malaysia if it is formed. But with the final severance of administrative ties with the components of Malaysia, the British government will feel subconsciously that it has shed its responsibilities in the SEATO area. There would be no question, of course, of suggesting that Britain no longer supported SEATO's declared aims. It would simply be a case of taking another major step away from our former Asian empire and toward Europe, in terms of association with which Britain increasingly sees her future.

It has always been tacitly understood that in the event of SEATO's acting, American forces, as in Korea, would be the decisive component. Nevertheless, as has been argued, there was some justification in 1954 for Britain and France to enter SEATO as full members, justification in terms of interest in Southeast Asia and willingness to deploy money and forces to defend that interest. It seems inevitable that the liquidation of Britain's interests in the area will make her gradually more and more reluctant to shoulder military responsibilities therein. Britain's decision to go into Europe represents an acceptance of the fact that this country is no longer able to play the role of a great power on the world stage. This acceptance should logically lead also to a desire to abandon the overseas commitments that must be considered extravagances for a second-rank power.
It may be that the American dream of a strong, united Europe, able to play a role approaching that of the United States itself, will materialize. In that event European forces might be sent to Asia. But in the foreseeable future, America will be expected more and more to assume complete responsibility for the SEATO area.

The importance of this is that as Britain gradually sheds her responsibilities in the area, her tendency to follow America's policy leads will become more pronounced. British officials would say that Britain does have a Far Eastern policy and that on the whole it coincides with America's, and certainly this is to a great extent true. A list of desired objectives, however, does not constitute a policy; there is also required the power to back it up. Acceptance of this fact by Britain has led to her accepting also that if America is to bear the greater part of the military and financial burdens in the Far East, America must also take the major role in shaping policy.

This means in turn that in the last analysis Britain will usually be prepared to waive her objections to an American policy, or at least to accept it in public with good grace, if Washington is firmly determined upon it.

It seems logical to suppose therefore that in the event of China's exploding a nuclear device and gradually building up a nuclear armory, Britain will follow America's lead in devising policies to meet this potential threat in Southeast Asia and Asia
in general. It is certainly extremely unlikely, to say the least, that Britain would of her own initiative deploy greater forces, let alone nuclear weapons, in the area. Indeed, bearing in mind Britain's continuing disengagement from Asia outlined above, it is extremely unlikely that Britain would want to deploy any greater forces in the area even if Washington suggested it. One has only to recall British reluctance to station larger forces in a country as close as Germany to realize the kind of reaction there would be to an American suggestion of this nature.

If, as seems likely, SEATO were still in existence when the Chinese exploded their first device, Britain might agree to a token strengthening of her forces in Asia if America decided that this was the appropriate response, though this would be far less likely if a Labour government were in power. But whatever the British government in power, it is virtually certain it would not agree to deploying part of Britain's nuclear striking force in Asia.

Britain's possession of the nuclear deterrent is justified in part by the argument that, however small, it is significant enough to warn off the Soviet Union. Such validity as this contention has would be sapped by a decision to allot part of that deterrent to the defense of Asia.

Besides it would probably be politically impossible to send nuclear weapons to Asia. While British "unilateralists," in the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, form only a small minority of the British population, there is probably a widespread uneasiness about the presence of nuclear weapons on British soil since the government has made no attempt to suggest that a nuclear war would mean anything other than the obliteration of this island. Possession of nuclear weapons can thus be justified only insofar as they are a genuine defense for the homeland, and insofar as it is felt that they are under British control. The idea that British nuclear weapons should be dispatched to SEATO where, it would be popularly supposed, they would be under the control of dangerously bellicose American military men would be unthinkable. Certainly the Labour Party, which is anyway no longer in favor of an independent British deterrent, would be unable even to contemplate such a policy, if it were in power.

Britain and India

The one circumstance that might render the preceding argument invalid would be the announcement by India that the creation of a Chinese stockpile of nuclear weapons rendered it imperative that she, too, acquire such weapons.

The reason for the importance of India is threefold. Britain, like America, considers it vital that the Indian experiment in economic development via democracy should succeed, since this would
be the firmest long-term guarantee that communism would not expand beyond its present Asian frontiers. A strong, democratic India would at the very least help to renew the faith in democracy of the leaders of Pakistan and Burma. And, if Indian diplomats could be persuaded to think more constructively about and be less contemptuous toward Southeast Asia, Delhi could probably influence the thinking of Indonesian leaders.

The second reason for the importance of India to Britain is that Indian membership in the Commonwealth is in practice the factor that holds that grouping together and makes it so impressive. If India had, like Burma, decided not to join the Commonwealth, there can be little doubt that Pakistan and Ceylon would have followed her example or at any rate not stayed in very long. Without this massive non-European component, it is highly unlikely that the Commonwealth would have attracted Malaya or Ghana, Nigeria and the other African members.

The third reason is that India is Britain's diplomatic link with the neutralist world. The fact that India is prepared to maintain her Commonwealth ties with Britain almost certainly palliates Britain's membership of "military blocs" in the eyes of the neutrals. It also ensures that at anti-imperialist gatherings, Britain can hope to have a strong and reasonable spokesman to say friendly things about her.
For all these reasons, the considerations mentioned at the end of the previous section might not apply if India appealed to Britain for help because of China's decision to equip herself with nuclear weapons.

The first relevant factor would be the kind of India that appealed for help. If it were a post-Nehru right-wing government (which, as of now, would seem to be the only kind of Indian regime that would appeal for this kind of aid), Britain would probably decide against giving nuclear weapons to it. This would certainly be the case if a Labour government were in power.

If the Indian government asked only that British nuclear weapons under British control be stationed on Indian soil, and if India had not appealed also to the United States, then it is quite possible that the British government, especially if it were a Conservative one, would agree. For this would be a striking way of proving that the Commonwealth ties were still strong and that Britain could still help protect the largest member.

The argument mentioned in the previous section about the diminution of the British deterrent would probably be got round partly by stressing the importance of the move in terms of Commonwealth solidarity and partly by pointing out that Britain could still rely on America's deterrent.
Such arguments would have particular validity if it could be stated that India's need for British protection was a short-term one in the interval before she made her own nuclear weapons.

If India appealed to the West in general and America in particular, Britain would be far less willing to shoulder the burden of helping India. There would be no prestige involved, since any British effort would inevitably appear as an adjunct to a larger American program. Britain's "retreat from Asia" attitude, outlined on pages 6 and 7 above, would prevail, and America would be expected to do virtually everything.

Where Britain might help under these or other circumstances would be in assisting India to speed up an indigenous program of making nuclear weapons. This would presumably be fairly easy since Britain already helps India's peaceful atomic energy program. This approach would have the advantage of appearing to be in the tradition of British "compromise." This might be the policy adopted if the Indian government concerned were of the Nehru type, but the British government still did not want blatantly to hand over nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear power.

To sum up: Britain would want to take every step, consistent with her international prestige and economic capabilities, to help India if the latter decided that China's possession of nuclear weapons meant she too had to have them in some form. In the event
of the United States having to play the leading role in such assistance, Britain would almost certainly give every backing to any measures she decided on, though a Labour government would probably object to the handing over of nuclear weapons to a right-wing Indian regime.

**Britain's China Policy**

Britain's "realistic" approach to a China policy has already been mentioned. (The quotation marks are designed to indicate that the policy is often so called by its proponents and not to signify any feeling on the writer's part that the policy is not realistic.) Apart from the argument that *de facto* control justifies *de jure* recognition, it is contended also that one cannot ignore a government that controls so vast a segment of the world's population, even if or particularly if it is a hostile government. There can be no doubt that this is still the position of the British government.

Yet for the sake of maintaining Western unity, the British government did not, until the beginning of 1961, press this attitude to its logical conclusion--i.e., voting for China (Peiping) to take the United Nations seat of China (Taipei).

But in February 1961, the British Foreign Secretary in a surprisingly forthright speech warned the new American administration
that the facts of life demanded Communist China's admission to the United Nations. It is still not clear what prompted the British government to time this declaration so ineptly; but presumably the main aim was to attempt to pressure the new administration into rethinking America's China policy. This sharp change in Britain's hitherto publicly conciliatory tone was presumably effective for it must have been one of the main factors leading Washington to adopt new tactics at the General Assembly in the autumn.

At the Assembly meeting, Britain attempted to compromise again by voting for the American-backed motion stating that the question of China's admission should be designated an "important" one, and voting also for the Soviet motion proposing the seating of Peiping, while making the reservation that this did not imply anything about the future status of Formosa.

It can be taken for granted that in the event of a Chinese test explosion, Britain would say even more strongly what it does today, particularly if a Labour government were in power. Britain would feel that the crucial period would lie between the first test explosion and the acquisition of a small nuclear armory.

The Disarmament Issue

A major element in the British argument after a Chinese nuclear explosion would be the overriding importance of getting China into disarmament talks or nuclear test talks if such were in progress.
China, it would be argued, cannot be dismissed as France has been. De Gaulle is really asking only for parity with Britain within the Western alliance, though there is also the element of suspicion that the United States might not be prepared to defend Europe with nuclear weapons in the face of a Soviet attack explicitly directed against Europe only. China, on the other hand, is embarking on a nuclear program as part of her drive to become a superpower equal to the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Peiping has stated that China will not be bound by any weapons agreement she has not signed.

In the opinion of the present writer, it is highly unlikely that China, however great her domestic economic difficulties, will consent to remain outside the nuclear club so long as the United States and the Soviet Union possess a stockpile of nuclear weapons; consequently, unless disarmament negotiations take a dramatic new turn, there is little likelihood of China's admission to the conference room resulting in her forsaking nuclear weapons. But Britain will probably argue that the attempt must be made and that anyway China clearly must participate in the discussions and be allowed to air her views.

**China's Potential for Harm**

Another argument that will probably be used to reinforce the one outlined above will be that China's new power greatly increases
her ability to make mischief in Southeast Asia. Especially after
the acquisition of a small nuclear armory, in particular bombs
deliverable by Badger bombers, she would be in a position to go
it alone without Soviet backing. The danger of war in Asia would
thus be greatly increased.

While Laos would be one possible area for the Chinese to
cause mischief, the most dangerous spot in British eyes would un-
doubtedly be the offshore islands, both because of their nearness
to the mainland and consequent potential vulnerability and because
of the psychological importance of their capture to the Communists.
The British government has apparently emphasized, quite rightly,
in its discussions with America on the offshore islands issue that it
is vital to evacuate them while it can be done in good order and
without the appearance of a retreat. It may well be that Britain
has also drawn attention to the desirability of evacuating them
before the Chinese test explosion. What seems certain is that when
the test explosion occurs, Britain will urge most strongly that
the islands should be evacuated forthwith before China could really
threaten them with nuclear weapons and thus force a damaging retreat.

The American government might respond with the argument
that the Chinese would never actually use nuclear weapons against
the offshore islands, even given that they would eventually be
able to manufacture tactical devices of an appropriate character,
because they would know that the Americans would respond in kind
with devastating effect. The Chinese would know, the argument might run, that they could not depend on Soviet nuclear protection if they (Chinese) launched such an attack.

The British government would almost certainly insist that such a line of reasoning was far too risky to form the basis of a policy. In the event of such a situation, i.e., a Chinese attack and an American response, seeming likely, the British government (particularly if it were a Labour one) might well contemplate issuing a declaration of neutrality stating that while it would deplore the use of force, particularly nuclear weapons, by China to recover the offshore islands, its position had always been that the islands belonged to the mainland government and that it would not support an American decision to defend the islands which would mean a nuclear exchange.

This would clearly be an extreme step. Whether or not it would be contemplated would depend greatly on the British estimation of the strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance at the time and the likelihood of Russia's supporting her ally, and also on the degree to which the US Government had hitherto shown itself responsive to British suggestions that it should pursue a more flexible China policy.

What the situation in Laos will be when the Chinese set off a test explosion is anyone's guess. But assuming that this would
be a feasible policy at the time, the British would argue that the news from China underlined the need for working for a neutral government.

It is unlikely that China's new strength would lead Britain to try to modify American policies in South Vietnam. It is accepted in London that Washington is not particularly pleased with working with Diem but is determined to prevent the country from being taken by the Communists. This attitude is virtually identical with British thinking. Britain would probably assume, too, that there would be no Soviet backing for any suggestion on the part of the Chinese that they might use nuclear weapons in support of the North Vietnamese.

**China's Isolation**

An argument that has often been used in support of bringing China into the United Nations has been that quarantine only deepens her already dangerous ignorance of the outside world and also increases her bellicosity toward the West. A China armed with nuclear weapons and apparently careless of the consequences of provoking a nuclear conflict would obviously be a great menace. Hence the urgency, it would be argued, of bringing her into the comity of nations. It would be suggested, probably, that while bringing China into disarmament negotiations would clearly be a step forward, China herself would be unlikely to accept admission only to those bodies in which the West considered her presence essential.
Britain might well suggest that the situation demanded that America should withdraw her objections to China's entry into the UN and perhaps even take steps that could lead to American recognition of the Communist regime. Such American moves could be made to appear a goodwill gesture, indications of new flexibility on the part of Washington.

At the same time, China's entry into the United Nations would mean that Peiping would have a senior official on American soil with whom talks could be initiated in the event of a crisis. It would probably be argued that the new situation resulting from Chinese possession of nuclear weapons made it imperative that there should be good lines of communication between Washington and Peiping; the periodic meetings in Warsaw would not be considered good enough.

It is of course far from certain that China, who considers her entry into the United Nations as a matter of right and not of America's goodwill, would be impressed by such gestures. It is also doubtful whether she would accept UN membership in the event of the US fleet's continuing to protect Formosa. And it certainly seems very unlikely that the British government would suggest that America "sell Formosa down the river" for the sake of coming to terms with a China armed with nuclear weapons. But Britain would certainly insist on the importance of making every
effort to get China into the United Nations immediately and would probably move over to straight opposition to any American attempt to delay the matter further.

Trade with China

One of the arguments used to justify trading with China has been that it keeps China's contacts with the West, however minor they may be, in existence. When China has nuclear weapons, this argument is likely to be used with even greater emphasis. A corollary of this argument has been the suggestion that such an opening to the West is particularly significant in terms of any Western hope that China and Russia might drift apart. "Do not force China to think that she has only Russia to turn to to obtain the where-withal for her economic development program," has been the kind of remark made in this context. This argument has been heard again as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the apparently consequent decision of the Chinese to buy such a major item as airplanes in the West. This argument, too, is likely to be advanced with greater force once China has nuclear weapons even if the Sino-Soviet dispute shows signs of abating. Only in the event of China's becoming extremely bellicose and threatening to use her nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia would Britain be likely to heed any American suggestions that trade is only building up a confirmed enemy.
Hong Kong

Clearly Britain would not fear a Chinese nuclear attack on Hong Kong which is a Chinese city by population. But she might well fear that Chinese possession of the bomb would increase Chinese bellicosity and thus lead her to take steps to recover Hong Kong. This might occur if, for instance, China, emboldened by her possession of the bomb, attempted a forward policy in Asia and was rebuffed. She might then seek to "compensate" for this humiliation by a move against Hong Kong, rather in the way that India attempted to compensate for her inaction against the Chinese on her borders by taking Goa. Certainly China tolerates "imperialist" possession of Hong Kong at the moment because of its usefulness to her; and certainly, too, it would be simpler for her to move against Macao. But it is quite conceivable that a major diplomatic setback might lead her to recoup some of her prestige by such a move.

While Britain's current attitude is that China is unlikely to want to take Hong Kong by force, for the above reason, but will wait until the lease on the New Territories is up at the end of the century, it is also Britain's belief that any increase in China's power makes the position of Hong Kong more uncertain. It is also true that while the Hong Kong authorities take strong action on occasion against Communists, they are very careful to avoid activities, or the appearance of activities, that might offend Peiping.
This might not seem completely rational in view of the belief that China is prepared to bide her time in recovering Hong Kong. But where one is in a situation like Hong Kong, controlling an alien population whose vast and powerful motherland is merely across a frontier, such nonrational considerations are bound to play a part. The present writer has had described a number of instances on good authority which have led him to this conclusion.

Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that China’s possession of nuclear weapons will lead the Hong Kong authorities themselves to adopt—and to urge on British governments—a more circumspect attitude toward Peiping.

Conclusions

The main conclusions of this paper are two:

1) That Britain is likely to support whatever moves the United States decides to take to strengthen the defenses of non-Communist Asia as a result of China’s getting the bomb, but

2) Britain will probably clash strongly with the United States on what policy should be pursued toward China herself, given that US policy has not changed in the meantime.

One possible qualification to conclusion (1) would concern Japan. Britain seems to take the attitude that it is useless to
try to curb the strong psychological, cultural, and economic attraction Communist China has for Japan by encouraging the latter to abstain from contacts with Peiping. When China has the bomb, Britain might well argue for encouraging Japan to have greater contacts with China in order to prevent the Japanese from building up in their isolation an image of a tremendous Chinese superpower. It might be argued that greater contacts with China would cure the Japanese of their respect for her and assist any natural revulsion they might feel for an Asian country testing atomic weapons. Britain certainly sees the importance of Japan and would probably be prepared to make some sacrifices to encourage her to look to Europe for her economic ties. But in general, it is probably unlikely that Britain would evolve any firm "Japan policy" which we would try to ram down America's throat.

One possible qualification to conclusion (2) would be that if India, because of her border troubles, executed a volte-face and supported in general the American position on China, Britain would think very hard before pressing her own views. Again much would depend on the two variables: the type of government in Delhi and the type of government in London. A British Labour government would probably be swayed very little if the Indian government that initiated the policy switch were of the far right.
At the other extreme, a Conservative government in London would probably accept any joint policy or agreed aims of the United States and India if the latter's government were led by Nehru or was of the Nehru type. Within these two extremes would exist a large range of possible approaches dependent on too many unknowns for it to be worth attempting any elaboration; but the broad possibilities should be indicated by the two extremes.

It is unlikely that Britain will consider that China's possession of nuclear weapons should affect NATO organization. Britain's retreat to Europe, coupled with the fact that she is a member of a different organization that is concerned with the Far East (i.e., SEATO), is likely to make her feel even more strongly that NATO is an organization concerned with Europe alone.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Anglo-American differences over China derive ultimately from the unfortunate fact that the Korean War occurred before, as then seemed inevitable, America recognized the new Communist regime. Developments since then have hardened each country in its position. But even the issue of trade cannot be considered as an "absolute" for Britain, bearing in mind the relatively small size of Sino-British trade. It seems rather that Britain, having taken a certain position, has had to persist in it and press it. This is not to say that Britain is not convinced of the rightness of the views she propounds; but it is to
say that if Britain had not taken up her positions before the Korean War, she probably would not advance those views today with so much firmness.

This being the case, it can be assumed that while Anglo-American differences over China policy are likely to increase in the event of China's getting nuclear weapons, they are not likely to be pressed by Britain to a point at which Western unity would be endangered; but in stating this, one assumption should be made explicit and one qualification expressed. The assumption is that Washington would adopt an understanding attitude toward a British decision to oppose her on the UN issue on the grounds that it is merely a logical extension of British views and past actions. The qualification would be that Britain might dissociate herself explicitly and publicly from America in the event of there being the likelihood of a nuclear clash over the offshore islands (see pages 16 and 17).