MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam

Background and Nature of Objective

At this stage of developments, with negotiations talks seemingly stalled in Paris, with combat activity levels reduced in South Vietnam, but with seemingly rising levels of discontent in the United States, we should review the over-all situation and determine the course of action best calculated to achieve our objective there. As you have stated, our objective in South Vietnam is to achieve for the South Vietnamese people an opportunity to determine the political and economic institutions under which they will live. Various alternatives to achieve that objective are possible. Arrayed in terms of intensity -- and probably duration -- of U.S. involvement, there are at least four alternative concepts: (a) A rapid U.S. exodus under honorable conditions, e.g., under the umbrella of a cease-fire; (b) accelerated Vietnamization of all levels of activity in South Vietnam; (c) pursuit of the currently programmed Vietnamization activity; or (d) escalated U.S. military activity with an eye towards imposing decisively on North Vietnam's will and capability to pursue the war in South Vietnam. This memorandum addresses the last alternative, i.e., that dealing with increased U.S. military activity.

Criteria and General Observations

In seeking our objective in South Vietnam, we must be alert to some constraints. We must, for example, act in a fashion which will:

- Maintain the support of the American people.
- Be within tolerable economic limits, both for the U.S. and South Vietnam, i.e., not create undue inflationary or balance of payments pressures on the one hand or exorbitant and self-defeating controls on the other;
- Not destroy the political, economic, and social fabric of South Vietnam and the other nations of Southeast Asia;
Not disable us from honoring our commitments and protecting our security interests elsewhere in the world;

Not result in the alienation of our friends and allies elsewhere in the world; and

Not precipitate a wider, more costly, and even longer conflict.

The fundamental question is how to gain our objective within these controlling criteria. Would escalated U.S. military activity do so?

A total military victory would require the destruction or ejection of NVN forces from South Vietnam and its immediate borders in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam, plus the reduction of VC forces to impotence. This course has some rudimentary appeal.

A number of questions are raised, however, by the concept of military victory. One question is whether the U.S. people would stand for the concomitant higher casualty levels on both sides. A second question is whether the U.S. economy could sustain, without substantial readjustments, the burden of increased resources for the war effort. A third question, assuming the increased military activity would spread throughout Southeast Asia, is whether the damage levels inflicted, especially in South Vietnam, would preclude achievement of a viable South Vietnamese society. A fourth question implicit in concentration on military victory concerns our ability to honor our other commitments, to prevent alienating our friends and allies, and to avoid creating a larger war with more, and more dangerous, adversaries.

The answers to most of the key questions involved in a concept of military victory, dictate against pursuing such a course. But such answers may be somewhat academic for the very reason you have already ruled out the pursuit of military victory.

The question then is whether there might be some form of escalated U.S. military activity which, short of military victory, could act upon the North Vietnamese will and capability decisively enough to cause them to negotiate a settlement which would allow the U.S. to achieve its basic objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted a proposal to you which purports to achieve that purpose.

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What the Concept Is

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept proposes a high-intensity air and naval campaign against North Vietnam. While the details of the plan are still evolving, the following dimensions are clear:

- Surprise and concentration of effort in the Haiphong/Hanoi area would be emphasized.

- Phase I would involve those "integrated modules" designed to (a) neutralize the NVN air order-of-battle; (b) close key NVN ports; and (c) destroy other "high value" targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

- Phase II would involve additional "attack modules" designed to (a) destroy NVN war-supporting facilities, particularly again in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and (b) interdict the Northeast rail line.

The Phase I concept would involve strikes on thirty (30) targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and mining the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong, Hon Giai, Cam Pha, Ben Thuy, Dong Hoi, and Qui Khi. More than 3500 sorties would be flown. The Chiefs conclude the Phase I operations would have "a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership."

The Phase II concept would involve strikes on an added eight (8) targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. The Chiefs conclude the Phase II operations would "contribute to a reduction of the enemy's ability to carry out its aggression against South Vietnam." The Chiefs add, however, in a significant caveat that "...it must be emphasized that a significant reduction in the flow of material to their (NVN) forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign over an extended period of time." The implied JCS conclusion is that any decisive impact on the war in South Vietnam and the attainment of the basic U.S. objective there depends on (a) the North Vietnamese will being so affected by the initial strikes as to cause them to negotiate a favorable settlement to the U.S., or (b) the prosecution of a sustained and indefinite U.S. air and sea campaign against North Vietnam. Both parts of that implied JCS conclusion involve significant uncertainties, risks, and costs.

CIA Evaluation of the JCS Concept

The single most instructive evaluation of the type of concept proposed by the JCS is a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum.
written in May 1968 and updated on October 7, 1969. The CIA conclusions are as follows:

A Mining program would serve as an effective means of interdicting North Vietnam's normal seaborne commerce. The disruption to this trade would be widespread but temporary, given Communist China's cooperation. Within a short period -- two to three months -- North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The North Vietnamese, however, could sustain the economy and the war effort at present levels for several months solely by drawing down present reserves and maintaining present imports overland. Shipment of goods from the USSR and Eastern Europe by overland routes would raise costs, but constitute a small additional burden on Hanoi's Communist allies.

There seems, in brief, to be no way of overcoming Hanoi's ability to sustain a continuing flow of essential material support from abroad, to distribute these goods internally, and to forward them to its forces in South Vietnam, except in the unlikely event of Chinese intransigence. The existing capacities of the railroad, highway, and river connections with Communist China -- some 16,000 tons a day -- are more than twice the daily volume of North Vietnamese imports.

A mining-bombing program would carry with it significant liabilities. The possibility of damage, sinking, or entrapment in port of foreign shipping is high. This would present the USSR, particularly, with difficult decisions and create new risks of a Soviet-US confrontation. If the mining were effective and forced a shift to alternate overland supply routes, it would require more extensive cooperation and assistance on the part of the Chinese. This conceivably could result in strengthening Chinese political influence in Hanoi. It would also risk a confrontation between US and Red Chinese air and naval forces.

A mining program would also evoke protest and critical reaction from Free World maritime states. Almost all world powers would see the program as further intensification of the war, even if the program were to follow a breakdown of the Paris negotiations.
If the negotiations were in process when the mining program was started, Hanoi would probably break off the talks. However, any such North Vietnamese decision would probably be based on the total war situation, including the status of the fighting in the south and the success of the talks in undermining the position of the Saigon government.

Added Evaluation of the JCS Concept Plan

The CIA evaluation, which technically goes into detail to substantiate the conclusions stated above, can be reinforced by analyzing the specific JCS Concept Plan now being presented. The Chiefs' Plan, for example, is characterized by the following:

- **U.S. losses in Phase I and Phase II** are estimated by the Chiefs to be less than 3 percent of the sorties flown. Even based on that loss percentage estimate, losses on the first wave of attacks (3799 sorties over five full days) would be in excess of 100 aircraft. Given the density of the NVN air defenses in that area, and the concurrency of the strikes, i.e., the fact the NVN air order-of-battle is not to be cleared out before the other targets are attacked, losses could be much higher. Furthermore, the loss of major US ships would have to be considered.

- **Civilian casualties in North Vietnam** would be high. Given the location of the targets in densely populated areas, and the element of surprise to be utilized, the civilian casualties would probably be substantial. Charges would be made the U.S. is killing civilians indiscriminately.

- **At risk would be increased NVN attacks through the DMZ and accentuated attacks on SVN populated areas.** While the NVA/VC forces have not literally adhered to the November 1, 1968 understanding in these areas, the violations have been well below their capability. The exposure of U.S. and GVN forces in northern I Corps could lead, in particular, to an early call by U.S. Commanders for ground reinforcements.

- **The military effectiveness of the plan is cast in doubt by the Task Group notes which have been provided from Saigon.** That Group indicated, inter alia, the following problem areas:
- The existence of sanctuary air bases in Red China. This means an air threat could continue indefinitely, possibly even with Red Chinese involvement.

- Even with the mining plan, "NVN could accommodate... by expanding their lightering facilities..."

- At present, the enemy probably has sufficient supplies stockpiled in Cambodia to support his forces in III and IV Corps at 1967-68 operating rates for several months. Therefore, unless the resupply route through Cambodia were sealed, the war in SVN could be continued.

- Sealing off Cambodia would require Cambodian tacit agreement. Blockade and mining are considered acts of war under international law. It is not clear such tacit agreement could be obtained.

- There is an implication that substantially larger requests for both air, naval, and ground forces and requests for added operating authorities would ensue. Such forces and authorities would be involved in:
  - Quarantining or blockading Cambodia.
  - Flying B-52 raids into NVN.
  - Making ground incursions into Cambodia, Laos, and NVN.

- No reference is made to costs. It is difficult to price out the JCS Concept Plan on the basis of the information provided. But a rough estimate would put the incremental annual costs at anywhere from $1.0 billion to $5.0 billion. The economic impact of such outlays is not addressed.

In addition to the implications in the Chiefs' Concept Plan as not constituted, there are the following initial considerations:

- If U.S. casualties should increase, either in actions in NVN or resultant actions in SVN, the U.S. public reaction could be devastating. It would not suffice to say that in the long-run casualties will be reduced if they increase sharply in the short-run.
Demonstrations would have to be expected, both in the U.S. and at U.S. Embassies abroad. This would be all the more probable without some NVN provocation for the U.S. adoption of the Chiefs' Plan.

Allegations would be made that the military had taken control in the U.S.

The sum total of the considerations outlined above casts grave doubt on the validity and efficacy of the JCS Concept Plan. The Chiefs add another note of doubt by taking note of the questionable weather in NVN during the winter months. Their wariness is well taken. In November 1966, we were able to fly only an average of 242 sorties per day and in November 1967 only 239 sorties per day over NVN. That is far below the sortie level indicated in the JCS Plan, which calls, for example, for 797 sorties on the first full day of operations. Succeeding winter months give equally poor flying weather over North Vietnam until about April.

But weather is a second-order question. It is noteworthy the Chiefs, while recommending the Plan be approved for continuing planning, do not

- Indicate how the Plan would lead to conclusive or decisive results, nor do the Chiefs

- Contend that the Plan would have decisive results.

Therefore, the Plan would involve the U.S. in expanded costs and risks with no clear resultant military or political benefits.

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NOV 19 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam

1. (Top Secret) As you requested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a concept plan for high intensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam. Although detailed planning is not yet complete, sufficient information is now available to provide you with an overview of the plan and initial comments concerning its implementation. It should be noted that this report is based on preliminary information and includes some modifications by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to information which has been developed by a small planning team in the field. Data contained herein will be subject to refinement as the plan is completed.

2. (Top Secret) The concept plan which has been developed emphasizes the use of surprise and concentration of effort to achieve maximum practicable psychological and military impact. This plan is divided into two phases, each of which includes various attack modules which are described in the Appendices hereto and each of approximately the same duration. Phase I is an integrated package of three attack modules which when implemented as an entity will insure optimum initial effect. Phase II consists of those modules which require an effort of greater duration and which will have an additional impact upon the enemy's will and ability to continue the war. In preparing these plans note has been taken of the fact that the period from 1 November - 31 March is the period of the Northeast Monsoon. It is characterized by low cloud cover over the target areas in North Vietnam. Weather conditions suitable for offensive air operations in North Vietnam occur from a level of less than 50% in November to less than 10% in January and February. (See Appendix G for detailed analysis of NVN weather.) These weather conditions influence the choice of specific attack options, particularly since a primary objective is to provide strong psychological shock to the enemy in the near-term.
3. (16) Phase I operations consist of three integrated attack modules utilizing concentrated air and naval effort to be conducted on approximately five full strike days, not necessarily consecutive. (See Appendix F for forces available, forces required, and damage effect criteria). These modules are designed to: neutralize the North Vietnamese Air Force; close the ports through which North Vietnam receives the bulk of its war-supporting materials; and destroy various high value economic and war supporting facilities in North Vietnam, including initial interdiction efforts against the northeast rail line.

   a. Neutralization of the NVN Air Force. Air strikes will be conducted against the NVN counter-air capability to insure the success of the strike effort. These attacks will be designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam. Targets will include active NVN airfields, aircraft, and other air defenses including those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces.

   b. Closure of NVN Ports. Aerial mining operations will be conducted in the approaches to the NVN ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha, Ben Thuy, Dong Hoi and Quang Khe. Where applicable, these minefields will be fuzed to activate approximately 72 hours later, thus permitting third-country shipping to exit the ports safely upon receipt of notification of the minefields. Immediately following initiation of air operations against North Vietnam, naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping, waterborne logistic craft and transshipment points. In addition, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire and mine reseeding operations will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict lighterage operations and maintain the minefield.

   c. Destruction of High Value Targets. Selected industrial installations, power plants, and communications facilities including marshalling yards and key bridges will be subjected to concentrated attack. This module includes key governmental and military control centers and initial attacks against the northeast rail line.

4. (16) Phase I operations will have a severe psychological impact on the North Vietnamese government in that steps are taken to isolate it from outside support. Further:
a. Destruction of the North Vietnamese air order of battle would have three interrelated functions. It would provide maximum protection for the strike force, significantly reducing combat losses which otherwise would be anticipated. It is essential to the successful attainment of the military objectives associated with this plan. Finally, the attainment of aerial superiority over North Vietnam should have a strong psychological impact of its own, as the enemy realizes that he has been disarmed in this important self-defense capability.

b. Effective closure of the NVN ports and initial interdiction of the northeast rail line would serve notice to the Hanoi leadership and its supporters that they can no longer count on the large quantities of war-supporting materials, equipment, and supplies which have been imported throughout the course of the conflict.

c. Destruction of high value economic and war-supporting facilities and installations would represent to North Vietnam a significant loss in economic worth. These facilities cannot be easily replaced under any conditions. Their destruction, in combination with the closure of the ports, should provide a strong psychological shock to the Hanoi government. The shock is further increased by the addition of certain high governmental command and control facilities to this module.

5. (Top Sec) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the employment of B-52s in selected areas would provide additional shock effect, add to the total weight of effort, and enhance round-the-clock impact.

6. (Top Sec) Probable North Vietnamese and other communist military reactions to Phase I operations are under study.

7. (Top Sec) Phase II operations, as developed in the concept plan, include additional attack modules which will further reduce North Vietnam’s military and economic resources. These modules will have an additional impact on Hanoi’s will and ability to carry on the war. They will be executed as an integrated package, subject to weather, resources, and other operational considerations.
a. Destruction of War Supporting Facilities. Air attacks will be conducted to destroy military logistic facilities, supplies, vehicles, and equipment located primarily within the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In addition, armed air reconnaissance and naval gunfire attacks will also be conducted against coastal craft and port facilities. This action will continue the isolation of North Vietnam from imports by sea.

b. Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line. Further attacks will be conducted to interdict the northeast rail line from Hanoi to Communist China. This will complement the closure of the seaports and further impede the import of war-supporting materiel into North Vietnam.

8. (TS) Boldness of action, surprise, and mass attack are key elements of the concept plan, both for shock effect and for ultimate military effectiveness. If full surprise is achieved, it will permit the early neutralization of the North Vietnamese counter-air capability and the rapid completion of attacks against the high value target list. This will reduce losses and free aircraft for other tasks, thus broadening US options for subsequent action. With regard to initial offensive operations, maximum flexibility must be accorded the field commanders to choose the day, time and sequence of the initial attack, based on short range forecasts of target weather conditions.

9. (TS) The concept also emphasizes concentration of effort in order to achieve greater psychological impact, increased long-term damage to the enemy, and reduced friendly losses. To this end, maximum available force, including the CVA presently dedicated to Korean contingencies, will be employed for as long as it takes to achieve the desired results.

10. (TS) A decision lead time of approximately 72-86 hours will be required, depending on force location at the time, in order to complete the preparatory actions necessary for initiation of Phase I operations.

11. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The Phase I operations outlined in this plan will have a strong psychological and military impact on the North Vietnamese leadership. Essential to the attainment of this
The objective is the gaining of air superiority over North Vietnam, the effective closure of the major North Vietnamese ports, and the initial interdiction of the northeast rail line.

b. Phase II operations will contribute to a reduction of the enemy's military and economic resources, but it must be emphasized that a significant reduction in the flow of materiel to their forces in South Vietnam would require a sustained campaign. Such a campaign is not envisioned in the concept of this plan at this stage. The combination of Phase I and Phase II operations will achieve meaningful military as well as psychological impact by (1) reducing the availability of imported materiel into North Vietnam, and (2) exacting attrition of North Vietnam's war-making capacity and its ability to support aggression in South Vietnam.

c. The inability to predict operational weather on a long-term basis during the period of the Northeast Monsoon, as well as the requirement to maximize the effectiveness of the attacks, will necessitate delegation of latitude and flexibility to the operational commanders as to the actual timing and sequence of attacks.

d. Certain Project 703 reductions will have an adverse impact on total force capability and some programming adjustments may be indicated. However, adequate forces can be made available to execute this plan.

12. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this concept plan for high intensity air and naval operations against North Vietnam be approved for continuing planning. It is further recommended that the knowledge of this plan be restricted to those with an absolute need to know.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. H. MOORER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
APPENDIX A

OUTLINE PLAN FOR ATTACKS AGAINST NVN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (AOB) (PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan to maximize the benefits of initial surprise by conducting attacks against the NVN AOB.

TARGETS: Targets will include active NVN airfields, aircraft, air defenses, including associated command and control facilities, and those SAM sites posing the greatest threat to the strike forces.

BACKGROUND: The bombing halt, which commenced on 1 November 1968, has permitted North Vietnam to reconstitute and expand her air defense systems and facilities. The NVN jet fighters currently based on six airfields and the located SA-2 missile firing positions are priority targets in this air campaign designed to gain and maintain air superiority over North Vietnam. This would provide maximum protection for our strike forces as well as enhance effective execution of subsequent strikes against the key targets in other modules.

TASK ORGANIZATION: US forces committed to Southeast Asia and contiguous waters are available for surprise attacks against the enemy AOB, known SA-2 missile firing locations and other air defense systems. The magnitude of the task requires full use of all Seventh Air Force, Task Force 77 and 1st Marine Air Wing operationally capable aircraft against these targets.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Strike forces will begin at H-Hour with a coordinated attack, exploiting the element of surprise, on the six airfields and known active SA-2 missile firing sites. A maximum effort will be maintained, as weather permits, in subsequent follow-on attacks to exploit the disruption and damage resulting from the initial surprise attack. The six enemy airfields which will be targeted are:

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A-1 Appendix A
(1) Hanoi/Dia Lam
(2) Phuc Yen
(3) Kep
(4) Hoa Lac
(5) Haiphong/Kien An
(6) Yen Bai

b. The weight of effort to destroy the enemy AOB and SAM positions will require the use of all the tactical air resources that are suitable for employment in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

TIMING: Timing is critical in the execution of this module since it is the key to the implementation of Phase I. The limited number of good weather days will require flexibility in the initiation of Phase I and once initiated a maximum sortie effort in order to achieve the objectives.

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APPENDIX B

OUTLINE PLAN FOR CLOSURE OF
HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX,
BEN THUY, QUANG KHE-, AND DONG HOI

(PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for the offensive aerial
mining and destructor seeding of all deep water ports in NVN,
and the air and naval gunfire interdiction of NVN coastal
shipping and small craft and port facilities. These opera-
tions will deny maritime shipping access to port facilities
and disrupt attempts to transship cargo by small craft and
barges from deep water anchorages.

MINING PLAN

TARGETS: Haiphong Port Complex, including Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha; and the supplemental mine fields at Vinh, Quang
Khe, and Dong Hoi (Annex 1).

TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Mining Forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Number CVAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA One</td>
<td>One Large Deck, Two 27-Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA Two</td>
<td>Three 27-Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO One</td>
<td>One Large Deck, One 27-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO Two</td>
<td>Two 27-Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>One Large Deck</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Support Forces:

(1) Option ALPHA One and Two: One ammunition ship
would be located in the Tonkin Gulf to transfer mines
to the CVAs.

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(2) Options BRAVO and CHARLIE: Mines would be pre-positioned on the CVAs. No supporting AE required.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. The plan is segmented into various options dependent upon the number of CVAs available and type of CVA, large deck or 27-C class, as shown under Task Organization. Option ALPHA One is recommended for execution of this plan.

b. There are a total of 15 mine fields/destructor fields. Nine are primarily deep water bottom mine fields, five are pure destructor fields, and one is a combined mine and destructor field.

c. The following table shows the weight of effort:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Type Weapon</th>
<th>Number Weapons</th>
<th>Number A/C Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA One</td>
<td>Bottom Mine (Mix)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA Two</td>
<td>Bottom Mine (Mix)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO One</td>
<td>Bottom Mine (Mix)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO Two</td>
<td>Bottom Mine (Mix)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>Bottom Mine (Mix)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destructors (MK-36/ MK-40)</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Option ALPHA One will require about 88 strike aircraft sorties from three CVAs to deliver 154 sea mines and 604 destructors. The operation would be executed in two phases: (1) Phase One - laying the sea mines and a portion of the destructors within two hours of initial launch time.
An arming delay of 72 hours on all sea mines is provided to allow third country shipping time to clear the NVN ports after announcement by the US Government that the mine fields have been planted. (2) Phase Two - seeding the remaining destructors in the channels which were left open for the exit of third nation shipping. This would be done no sooner than 48 hours after the initial seeding in Phase One since destructors have only a 24-hour arming delay.

e. This plan as a separate operation would effectively impair the logistic support that presently enters via Haiphong. By itself the mining operation would have a high psychological impact on North Vietnam leadership and the third countries now providing support to North Vietnam. Further, it would face the North Vietnamese with logistics problems of great magnitude in the development of alternative supply routes.

f. The forces assigned to Commander, Seventh Fleet are adequate to implement this plan. When implementing this and associated plans, Commander, Seventh Fleet will be released from the CVA requirement in the Sea of Japan.

TIMING:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Reaction Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA One</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA Two</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO One</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO Two</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The 86-hour reaction time is a worst case which assumes one of the three CVAs is located in Singapore. If a prealert message is received and all three CVAs are in the Tonkin Gulf, the reaction time for Option ALPHA would be 14 hours.
b. The 12-hour reaction time assumes that the designated CVAs have been preloaded with required mines. An early decision is required to load out designated CVAs.

WEATHER: It is desired to execute this plan during daylight hours, in weather conditions with a ceiling of at least 1,000 feet and with at least 5 NM visibility. Because of the limited number of A-6 aircraft available, only the main sea mine fields for Haiphong can be laid at night or in weather conditions less than the recommended minimums. Weather predictions indicate that the required minimums will exist during 80 percent of the days from 1 November-31 December.

SUPPORTING ACTIONS: Immediately following initiation of air operations against NVN, naval destroyers and cruisers will be deployed into NVN coastal waters to attack lucrative targets such as NVN coastal shipping, waterborne logistic craft and transshipment points. Armed reconnaissance and naval gunfire will be employed on a continuing basis to interdict any attempts to transship by NVN small craft from ships anchored outside minefields or from other ports.
ANNEX 1 (SUPPLEMENTAL MINE FIELDS) TO APPENDIX B

PURPOSE/CONCEPT: In order to reemphasize and to continue the US intent to enforce the seaborne logistic interdiction and harassment of North Vietnam, three supplemental mine plans are provided here.

EXECUTION: A single carrier (27-C or large deck) can execute all of the included plans on one launch. All-weather execution can be accomplished if A-6 aircraft are available.

MINE PLANS:

a. Ben Thuy Port Facility/Song Ca River.

(1) The Song Ca is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the transshipment areas associated with Vinh. The mine field consists of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Ca River.

(2) Sortie requirements: 6 A-4 or 4 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1-1/4 mile; width - variable to 2,700 feet; depth - variable to 24 feet.

b. Quang Khe Port Facility/Song Giang River.

(1) The Song Giang is one of the major inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves not only the NVN southern panhandle but the Laos infiltration routes as well. The mine field consists of 40 DST MARK 36 and 6 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the Song Giang River.

(2) Sortie requirements: 6 A-4 or 4 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1 mile; width - variable to 2,600 feet; depth - variable to 24 feet.

c. Dong Hoi Port Facility/Kien Giang River.
(1) The Kien Giang is one of the major southern inland water routes of North Vietnam and serves the DMZ area. The mine field consists of 30 DST MARK 36 and 4 MARK 50-0 acoustic mines laid just inside the mouth of the river.

(2) Sortie requirements: 4 A-4 or 3 A-6.

(3) Field dimensions: Length - 1.1 miles; width - variable to 2,100 feet; depth - variable to 16 feet.
OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST HIGH VALUE TARGETS

(PHASE I)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against high value targets in North Vietnam.

TARGETS:

a. The following list contains high value economic and war supporting facilities to be attacked in Phase I:

(1) Hanoi TPP.
(2) Uong Bi TPP.
(3) Hanoi Transformer Station.
(4) Hanoi International Radcom Transmitter.
(5) Hanoi Telephone and Telegraph Office.
(6) Haiphong Cement Plant.
(7) Hanoi Machine and Tool.
(8) Hanoi Railroad Station and Classification Yards.
(9) Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge.
(10) Gia Lam Railroad Station Yard.
(11) Yen Vien Railroad Yard.
(13) Hanoi Senior Party Training Center.
(15) Haiphong Warehouses and Docks.

(16) Xuan Mai Army Barracks and SA-2 Missile Storage.

This target list is under continuous review and will be updated as required.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Use of all Seventh Fleet, 7th Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing operationally capable aircraft which will not be utilized in the attacks against the enemy AOB or the mining operation.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Available strike forces will commence a concentrated attack against these high value targets concurrently with the attacks against the enemy AOB and the mining of the ports in the Phase I operations. As resources and weather permit, follow-on attacks will be maintained to exploit the disruption and damage resulting from the initial surprise attack.

TIMING: A minimum of 72 hours notice would be required prior to execution to ensure readiness of strike units for the Phase I operations.

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APPENDIX D

OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN WAR SUPPORT FACILITIES

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for the conduct of offensive air operations against NVN war support facilities, to include attacks against selected coastal targets and waterborne logistics craft (WBLC). (Annex 1).

TARGETS: The following targets comprise a listing of high impact war supporting targets:

   a. Haiphong Army Barracks and vehicles stored southeast of Haiphong.
   b. Vehicle park at the Cat Bi Airfield.
   c. Haiphong POL storage and handling facilities.
   d. Haiphong Naval Shipyard.
   e. Haiphong railroad/highway bridge and by-pass.
   f. Haiphong southwest highway bridge.
   g. Haiphong south-southeast highway bridge.
   h. Kien Am bridge.
   i. Coastal shipping.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Combined Seventh Fleet, 7th Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing assets which can be made available.

CONCEPT:

   a. The element of surprise will be lost after the first day of operation during which a maximum effort of sorties will be flown against NVN air capabilities and air defenses.
The strikes against NVN war supporting facilities would be executed as directed following Phase I.

b. Continuous armed reconnaissance will be conducted along the North Vietnamese Coast, using both air and surface elements, to complement the mining of Haiphong and insure isolation of North Vietnam from the sea.

TIMING: Upon implementation of Phase II when resources, weather and operational conditions permit.
ANNEX 1

NAVAL SURFACE OPERATIONS AGAINST
NORTH VIETNAM

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for naval surface ship interdiction of North Vietnamese waterborne logistics craft (WBLC) and destruction of selected military and logistic targets by naval bombardment. This operation will ensure the effects of the mining of key ports and significantly degrade the ability of the North Vietnamese to use small craft to shuttle supplies to ships anchored outside the minefields or from other ports.

TARGETS: North Vietnamese WBLCs operating along the inland and coastal waterways of North Vietnam and selected military and logistic targets in North Vietnam.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

1 Cruiser
6 Destroyers

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. For maximum effectiveness the operation should be continuous until the Vietnam War has been satisfactorily concluded; however, these operations will have a substantial psychological and military impact if conducted over a short period of time and repeated at random intervals. Not knowing when the United States might resume these attacks, the North Vietnamese would be inhibited in their plans for coastal logistics operations.

b. The forces listed under Task Organization would be supported with aircraft for spotting, reconnaissance, and target identification (12 sorties per day), Combat Air Patrol, Search and Rescue forces, Talos cruisers, and PIRAZ ships.

c. The potential threat to the naval gunfire ships are North Vietnamese aircraft, PT boats, and coastal artillery.

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The risk of significant damage to US warships or spotter aircraft is relatively low. The risk would be further minimized by conducting air strikes on the North Vietnamese air and naval bases.

d. This plan is militarily feasible and can be executed with forces assigned to Commander in Chief, Pacific. To provide the required number of ships it will be necessary to stand-down the present commitment in the Sea of Japan (TF 71). Additionally, if this operation continues over 30 days, Seventh Fleet must be augmented by 10-12 destroyers and one cruiser.

e. This interdiction plan can be conducted as a separate operation or integrated with other offensive operations to enhance the overall impact.

TIMING: Reaction time for commencing these operations, if no warning orders are issued, would be approximately 24 hours after receipt of the execute directive.

WEATHER: These operations can be conducted in all weather conditions; however, low ceilings and reduced visibility would preclude air support for spotting, reconnaissance, and target identification.
APPENDIX E

INTERDICTION OF THE NORTHEAST RAIL LINE

(PHASE II)

PURPOSE: To provide an outline plan for conducting major air strikes against the North Vietnamese northeast railroad and Highway 1A/4 by-passes.

TARGETS: NVN northeast rail LOC and Highway 1A and 4 by-passes.

BACKGROUND: North Vietnam is completely reliant upon outside sources of supply to sustain her ability to conduct military operations in SEA. The northeast rail LOC and the Highway 1A/4 by-passes which support and complement it, is one of two major transportation arteries, the other being Haiphong. Disruption of this critical artery in conjunction with the closing of major ports, will severely reduce imports and materially impair North Vietnam's capability to support both the North Vietnamese economy and operations in Southeast Asia.

TASK ORGANIZATION: US forces committed to Southeast Asia and contiguous waters. Allocation of strike effort requires full use of all operationally capable aircraft of Seventh Air Force, Task Force 77, and First Marine Air Wing.

CONCEPT:

Air attacks will commence with the implementation of Phase II. The maximum available number of strike aircraft will attack rolling stock as well as rail facilities to create movement stoppages. Attacks will continue until the required level of destruction is accomplished. Suppression of NVN air and air defenses will be required for these strike waves. Follow-on strikes will be conducted, as necessary, to prevent reconstruction or repair of facilities on the northeast rail LOC and highway by-passes and to impede traffic flow along the LOC.

TIMING: With the implementation of Phase II and when resources, weather and operational considerations permit.

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### APPENDIX F

### SORTIE DATA

(Phase I)

1. Sorties Available.
   - **a. 7th AF - Thai Based**
     - SVN Based (w/tanker augmentation) 214 123 337
   - 1st Marine Air Wing 60
   - Carrier Task Force 77 - 4 CVAs 400
   - **Total** 797

   "b. Air Force sorties are based on a 1.0 sortie rate per possessed aircraft. Marine sorties are based on estimated number of sorties which can be provided with organic KC-130 tanker support. Navy sorties are computed on a basis of 100 sorties per aircraft carrier (63 A/C X 1.6 sortie rate)."

2. Desired Damage Criteria used in computing sortie requirements:
   - **a. Bridges:** 85% probability of collapsing one span.
   - **b. Railroad Yards:** 50% probability of achieving 12% damage.
   - **c. POL storage, power plants, and communication facilities:** 50% probability of achieving 70% damage.
   - **d. Airfields:** 50% probability of achieving 30% damage to all structures; 75% probability of achieving interdiction to the runways; and 91% probability of damaging aircraft sufficiently to prevent takeoff.
e. All other facilities: 50% probability of achieving 30% damage.

3. Estimated number of sorties required for Phase I:
   
   AOB 1,822  
   Aerial Mining 120  
   High Value 1,857  
   Total 3,799

4. Application of sorties by module and number of full days (12,000 feet and 5 miles) required.

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<th>4</th>
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5. Based on climatological data in Appendix G, it is highly improbable that Phase I could be completed in five consecutive days during the Northeast Monsoon. For example, three consecutive days of favorable weather could be followed by four consecutive days of unfavorable weather before an additional period of favorable weather could be expected. Statistically then, the elapsed time required to complete Phase I would be at least nine calendar days and could be 21 days. Sound operational planning should recognize that a break in sequence of operations will cause a loss of momentum, thereby permitting reconstitution of defenses and will, as a consequence, require added sorties.
APPENDIX G

WEATHER

1. Mean number of days with the occurrence of a 6-hour period of ceiling/visibility greater than 12,000 feet/5 miles between 0700 H and 1900 H (daylight hours)

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2. Mean duration of favorable days at the indicated locations.

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3. Mean duration of unfavorable days at the indicated locations.

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