Kissinger

a. Showed great concern lest we plan to spring a completed package on the NSC without careful HK review and participation.

We reassured him: We will review our work with him about Oct. 1. We aim for an NSC meeting in December.

b. Concentrated his entire interest on employment policy, scenarios, options available to President, etc. Put aside with virtually no comment issues of declaratory policy or acquisition policy or what we communicate to our allies. I gather he feels all those questions are subsequent and subordinate to working out proper employment policy.

c. Felt President, after inauguration, should spend about two days in thorough review and consideration of nuclear employment options available to him in various plausible scenarios, and of their consequences, so that he understands these things "in his bones." Felt the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should be even more thoroughly and continuously familiar with these options and scenarios. Felt that at each decision point in the scenario they had to understand what the next decision point would be.

NFS 3.3(b)(6) OSD 3.3(b)(5)(6)

e. Said the President's strategy has been (in the Mid-East crisis, in Vietnam, etc.) to "push so many chips into the pot" that the other side will think we may be "crazy" and might really go much further.

f. Said he agreed that our strategy must be to prevent escalation. He agreed that theatre and strategic weapons must be treated together in a common policy. He agreed with all the objectives and principles John Foster recited. But he said he could not get a hold of it until we showed him what it meant concretely and how it was to be done.
h. Asked how much we could get done by October 1st.
   John Foster said
   (1) Analysis of the recovery problem,
   (2) Analysis of the practicality of the targeting called for,
   (3) Some scenarios and options analysis.