SECRET

TO : NEA - Richard Murphy

THRU : NEA - Robert A. Peck

FROM : NEA/PAB - Herbert G. Hagerty

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Pakistan Ambassador Azim,
         Monday, March 4, 3:30 p.m.

You have called in Ambassador Azim in order to deliver a
demarche on our arms notification strategy and the nuclear
issue. The purpose of this demarche is to reiterate our
non-proliferation concerns and the connection between their
restraint in the nuclear area and our ability to maintain
Congressional support for our security assistance program.
This is particularly timely in view of the renewed
Congressional attention to the Pakistani nuclear program
generated by the recent Seymour Hersh article in the New York
Times linking the GOP to the attempted smuggling of nuclear
components by a Pakistani national in the U.S. last summer. A
more lengthy treatment of this case, and broader instances of
alleged Pakistani nuclear malfeasances, will air in a 1-hour

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior
Reviewer
Hersh-written PBS documentary Tuesday night.

Attached is a copy of the Platt-McFarlane memo which contains the agreed talking points on this issue. Below are additional talking points relating to the Vaid case, to be used if Azim raises it. We discussed this case with Azim shortly after Vaid's arrest, and he categorically denied GOP involvement. Subsequently strong evidence has emerged of an official link. We are reviewing the record, and may wish to call Azim on the carpet at a later date.

Azim has told us he would also like to hear from you about your discussions on the Middle East with the Soviets in Vienna. He has already heard from you about your talks on Afghanistan, but would appreciate your comments on the Middle East portion of your discussions as well.

Talking Points

-- As you know from questioning put to Robert Peck by Congressman Solarz at the hearing on February 28, there are serious Congressional concerns over indications that Pakistani efforts to acquire components for nuclear explosive devices in the U.S. and elsewhere continues.
-- I do not wish to get into a discussion of the void case. But I want to make one point perfectly clear: activities such as this jeopardize our ability to sustain support for our security assistance relationship and raise very serious questions about the direction of the Pakistan nuclear program. This Administration very much wants to continue [our] security assistance program to Pakistan, but Congress has the ability to halt that program, and may do so if they feel that the GOP is not exercising sufficient restraint in its nuclear program.

-- Such activities must not reoccur. I ask that you convey this message as clearly and forcefully as I have presented it to you to your government.

-- We are reviewing the record on this case, in part to take into account information which has only recently come to our attention. We may wish to return to this matter again at a later date.

Attachment:

Platt-McFarlane re Scenario for Pakistan Arms Transfer Notifications.

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Clearances: NEA:RAPeck
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            S/NP:EWonder
            OES/NEP:FMcGoldrick
            INR/PMA:RUphchurch
            PM/RSA:SAoki
            PM/SAS:EPrice
            ACDA:DSloss
            L/N:RBettauer
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Scenario for Pakistan Arms Transfer Notifications

Last year, when we approved the Pakistan request for 500 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, we informed the GOP that we would prefer to await the arrival of a new Congress in 1985 before notifying Congress of the sale. We debated briefly sending a smaller number of the missiles -- below the notification threshold -- if the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier worsened significantly, but in the end none was sent, and the notification for the sale of the entire batch of 500 was prepared for transmission to the Congress in January.

Also prepared for notification to the Congress in January were notifications for the sale of additional quantities of Improved-TOW anti-tank missiles and AN/TPQ-36 radars, also long committed to the Pakistanis.

At the request of the NSC, these notifications have been held up pending further discussion of our overall strategy on arms sales to Pakistan. Also of concern to the NSC was the number of AIM-9Ls being provided, although a requirement for 500 has been validated by the JCS.

After considerable discussion, the following scenario has been developed for moving forward with our arms transfers to Pakistan taking into account the expressed concerns of all agencies involved:

(1) During the week of 25 February, Assistant Secretary Murphy will call in Pakistan Ambassador Azim to make a demarche based on the attached talking points.

(2) Later in the same week, Ambassador Kennedy, DOD Assistant Secretary Armitage, and Murphy will meet informally with members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs/Relations Committees to brief them on our overall strategic approach to South Asia, including nonproliferation, and putting into this larger context our plans for the AIM-9L and upcoming arms transfers.

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(3) Following these developments, the DOD/DSAA will be authorized to proceed with the formal notification to the Congress of our plans to sell 500 AIM-9Ls, the radars, and the TOWs to Pakistan. Because of Pakistan's concerns about continuing intrusions of Soviet/DRA aircraft across its western border, and because of the long lead time -- 24-36 months -- involved in the provision of the AIM-9Ls, we will take steps to ensure that the delivery of at least 100 of the missiles takes place as early as possible in 1985.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary