MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER
SHIRIN TAHERI-KHELIF

SUBJECT: Pakistan: The Next Steps
Breakfast Meeting Item, November 21, 1984

State has put the above item on the agenda for your breakfast meeting on November 21.

Zia's letter did not offer the kind of visible measures on safeguards that we were seeking, and his enrichment formula was ambiguously worded. Tightening this formula would be useful, though still insufficient. As long as we have no verifiable method for ensuring Pakistani compliance, our problem with the Pakistani program will remain. Discussions of the past few months have raised GOP consciousness on the necessity for movement beyond anything in the past. We need to press further to ensure serious consideration of a range of verifiable measures that span the distance between current GOP policy and our ultimate aim of full-scope safeguards. In the interim, and absent renewed Soviet pressure, we should hold off: (a) on notification to Congress in January of AIM 9L; (b) on E2C demonstration flight in January; (c) on any new system such as the Copperhead. It is far better to engage in very tough signal sending -- and even theater -- during this period, than to have to bite far harder bullets after the Congress returns.

Yaqub's meeting with Secretary Shultz on November 16 was focused on Afghanistan. However, Secretary Weinberger did tell Yaqub yesterday that we were disappointed with the response and needed more. Specifically, the following are being considered at DOD and State:

-- Going back to Zia in search of the three percent written assurance using the argument of Congressional requirements prior to notification in early January.

-- A tougher reply from the President to Zia even before the proposed Pakistani elections in February, asking for interim measures.
Delaying notification of AIM9L to Congress.

Approaching the Indians on bilateral nuclear measures, as Zia has proposed to the GOI and reiterated in his letter to the President.

Consulting key Congressional leaders in order to maintain their support of our efforts and the relationship with Pakistan.

Howard Teicher concurs.

Recommendation

That you use the talking points at Tab A.

Approve  Disapprove

I made these points at breakfast. Armacost expressed some skepticism as to whether we could get more out of Baks. I made the point that we were in a fairly good shape with the earlier 3% committed. I tried to dispel the Chinese feeling.
Talking Points for Breakfast Item on Pakistan
Wednesday, November 21, 1984

-- Yaqub's talking point inviting a dialogue provides us with a forum for further discussions. I don't think the Pakistanis yet grasp the fact that there are a variety of options more subtle than NPT that would advance us from where we are today. We need to get them a non-paper.

-- We need to pursue the dialogue until some results are forthcoming beyond the three percent written assurance.

-- We must maintain the momentum that we have currently generated to convince Zia to begin considering some visible measures even if they are not fully implemented until after the Pakistani elections in February.

-- In the interim (unless there is renewed Soviet pressure), we must withhold notification on AIM9L, E2C demonstration flights, and approval of any new system including the Copperhead. This will be critical to Zia's perception of our seriousness.

-- We may have to relent in February if our bargaining strategy doesn't show results, but for now we must appear very tough.