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    INR/PM: JSiegel
    OES/NEC: EBusick

From: PM/NESA: SAoki

Attached Q's & A's have been prepared for Robert Peck's use in classified testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, June 26. Please provide comments/clearance by 2PM today.

Thanks

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior Reviewer
SECRET

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Q. In view of incidents like the Vaid case, what steps has the Administration taken to create a central focal point for alerting US Government departments and agencies to new proliferation-significant incidents and coordinating the USG response?

A. The important thing to remember about the Vaid case is that the attempted illegal export was stopped. In this case, existing export control procedures succeeded in interdicting a nuclear-related procurement and in prosecuting and convicting the offender. We do, of course, continuously monitor our procedures to ensure that our commitment to vigorous enforcement of our export control regulations is effectively implemented, and that concerned agencies are fully aware of relevant information. We do not, however, see any necessity to create a new organization to handle cases in this area. The Subgroup on Nuclear Export Control (SNEC) already provides a mechanism for interagency coordination on export control cases, and any new body would simply overlap existing procedures.

Q. The krytron incident raises the possibility that Pakistan intends to conduct warhead testing that would make it unnecessary to actually explode an enriched uranium device to be assured that it would work. Is this a realistic thesis, and if so, what other U.S. technologies has Pakistan sought or is now seeking, either legally or illegally, that might be used in a program to develop a nuclear warhead without actually exploding a nuclear device?

A. This question raises a number of highly complex technical and intelligence issues, and I am not the best qualified person to respond. I would be happy to arrange for a classified briefing by technical experts familiar with nuclear weapons design and the Pakistani nuclear program.

With respect to the issue of U.S. technology being sought by Pakistan, the U.S. has not been a major source of either legal or illegal procurement by Pakistan's nuclear program. In large part, this is the result of our export control system, which is quite comprehensive in scope. Our intelligence indicates, however, that a number of U.S.-origin dual-use items that could be employed in nuclear weapons-related research have reached Pakistani nuclear organizations. These would include such items as computers, unclassified computer codes, oscilloscopes and other electronic test instruments, and machine tools.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Sharon Ahmad, Senior Reviewer

DECL: OADR
Q. What recent additional steps has the Administration taken to make sure that technology acquired from this country does not contribute to a Pakistani nuclear weapons program? What have we told India on this subject?

A. We are scrutinizing all potentially nuclear related exports to Pakistan very carefully. We have also undertaken, in collaboration with our allies, an overall upgrade of international export controls on nuclear items. We have recommended to the Congress that penalties for violation of export control regulations be increased. We do not believe that other changes in our procedures are necessary at this time.

We have made clear to the Indians that we would regard further steps in the direction of nuclear weapons capability by either Pakistan or India with the greatest concern. We told Prime Minister Gandhi that our efforts to convince Pakistan to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons are serious, and that, as we have stated publicly many times, our ability to provide security assistance to Pakistan is contingent on Pakistani restraint in the nuclear area. Judging from the Prime Minister’s remarks on his return to India, we have had some success in convincing him that the U.S. is neither helping nor acquiescing in a Pakistani attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

The U.S. export control system works very well as long

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