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MEETING: COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

DATE: April 25, 26, & 27, 1960

PLACE: Ramée Air Force Base, Puerto Rico

CHAIRMAN: Lieutenant General T. E. Edwards

PRESENT:

Mr. Thomas K. Finletter
Gen. H. S. Vandenberg
Gen. G. C. Kenney
Lt. Gen. R. A. Craig
Lt. Gen. B. W. Chidlaw
Lt. Gen. K. B. Wolfe
Lt. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer
Lt. Gen. N. F. Twining
Lt. Gen. C. E. LeMay
Lt. Gen. E. G. Whitehead
Lt. Gen. J. K. Cannon
Lt. Gen. E. W. Rawlins
Maj. Gen. S. E. Anderson
Maj. Gen. G. P. Saville
Maj. Gen. R. E. Nugent
Maj. Gen. F. H. Smith
Maj. Gen. W. E. Todd
Maj. Gen. C. P. Cabell
Maj. Gen. F. S. Hoag
Maj. Gen. K. G. Armstrong
Maj. Gen. T. D. White
Maj. Gen. F. A. Armstrong
Maj. Gen. R. W. Harper

Col. N. F. Parrish

Maj. Gen. R. W. Burns
Maj. Gen. O. R. Cook
Maj. Gen. C. R. Stone
Maj. Gen. D. M. Schlatter
Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter
Maj. Gen. W. E. Kempner
Maj. Gen. L. W. Johnson
Maj. Gen. K. P. McNaughton
Brig. Gen. O. S. Pickering
Brig. Gen. R. Beaum
Brig. Gen. S. Smith
Brig. Gen. H. G. Busher
Brig. Gen. C. F. Boynton
Brig. Gen. C. M. Myers
Brig. Gen. E. C. Lynch
Brig. Gen. W. C. Sweeney
Brig. Gen. J. B. Montgomery
Brig. Gen. S. D. Grubbs
Col. H. C. Pursch
Col. K. E. Compton
Col. D. D. Hallo
Col. G. A. Blakey

continued
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PRESENT: (continued)

Additional Personnel

Maj. Gen. C. A. Brandt Col. R. L. Walshon
Brig. Gen. J. F. Carroll Col. J. D. Stevenson
Col. C. P. Brown Col. G. E. Price
Col. R. W. Puryear Col. L. W. Stocking
Col. T. J. Dayharshe Col. R. C. McBride
Col. J. E. Thomas Lt. Col. W. A. Tope

Project Personnel

Col. D. A. Burchinal
Col. W. T. Kemp
Lt. Col. R. H. Marshall

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PROCEEDINGS

(Whereupon, on Tuesday, 25 April 1950, at 3:20 the Conference convened.)

GEN. EDWARDS: Gentlemen, come to order please.

General Vandenberg has a few words for us before we proceed with the agenda.

GEN. VANDENBERG: Mine will be very short, gentlemen.

All I wanted to talk about was the benefit that we can get out of this as we did last year. Those of you that were at the last one will remember the question period and the discussions and this is the time, I think, -- we are all in the family here -- to let our hair down and see what the problems are and see if we can get some of them solved.

All of the staff in Washington is intently interested in these problems. They are all here and we will take notes and what we can't fix up here we will go back to Washington and try to work them out.

The main purpose, as you know, is to get all of the people here and see what is going on in every outfit.

For the first meeting, I thought that it would be all right to come over here in uniform and make this one kind of a formal meeting. For tonight and tomorrow morning and evening, I suggest that we come in sport clothes or sport shirts, because it is pretty hot around here, and just be as comfortable as we can.

1
I hope we will all join in this discussion and pull no punches. We
don't have anything in Washington but difficulties anyway so we are
here prepared to continue to hear them. We would like to hear the
good things too.

I would like to welcome you all here and I am glad we have
such a representative gang from all of the Commands.

We have the pleasure of having our new Secretary of the
Air Force, Mr. Finletter, with us and if you people haven't met
him, I hope you will come up and say "hello" during the break
periods and tell him who you are.

GEN HALEY: The first item on our schedule is an
Intelligence presentation by General Cabell, the Director of
Intelligence.

GEN CABELL: Mr. Secretary, General Vandenberg, Mr. Chairman,
and Gentlemen: The following discussion will cover the
implications of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb, with
particular reference to the security of the United States and the
world situation. Because of the limited time at my disposal, my
remarks will be in the nature of conclusions drawn from our current
estimates.

It is estimated that the Soviet atomic stockpile will be
as follows over the next four years: By mid 1950, 10 to 20; by
mid 1951, 25 to 45; by mid 1952, 65 to 90; by mid 1953, 100 to 135,
and by mid 1954, 120 to 200.

In mid-1950, the Soviet Union will have about 100 TU-4s,
which is the Soviet B-29 type aircraft, for operational use, and
they will have sufficient aircraft, trained crews, and bases of
operation to enable them to attempt to deliver the full stockpile of
atomic bombs that are and will become available. Soviet agents also
could assemble and detonate atomic weapons brought by covert means
into the United States or carried by merchant ships or submarines.
However, the Soviets would attempt to deliver but a few bombs other
than by air.

Successful delivery of 10 to 50 atomic bombs on selected
targets in the United States could:

1. delay or reduce materially the scale of our planned
strategic atomic air offensive by attacks against elements participating
in that offensive;

2. cause great delay in projecting United States forces
and war materials overseas, and,

3. seriously impede our mobilization for war for a
considerable period.

Delivery of 50 to 125 bombs on targets could result in:

1. the prevention of the immediate launching of an
atomic air offensive;

2. serious effects to certain vital elements of the war
economy, and,

3. an intensification of the general deterring effects on
full mobilization for war.

Up to 200 atomic bombs on targets could create conditions
which might be decisive as to the capability of the United States to wage offensive war.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the total power of the Soviet Union has been and is being increased radically by the possession of atomic bombs, and that the time is fast approaching when the Soviets will possess the capability to attempt a devastating atomic attack on the United States.

We, of course, cannot expect to have exact intelligence on firm Soviet immediate, or near future intentions. But this we do feel with great assurance: The fundamental objective of the Soviet Union is the domination of the world. In analyzing that objective, a clear conclusion stands out. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world, and as the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the one nation which must be vanquished by any and all means if the Kremlin is to achieve its ultimate objective. Possession of atomic bombs, and the means to deliver them provide the Soviets with a capability to attack the United States directly and effectively. This is the first time in United States history that it has been subject to direct and effective attack. It must be expected that this capability will make the Soviet Union more fanatic and aggressive in pursuit of its objectives and, indeed, there are many signs of growing cockiness on their part.

The object of war is defined by Clausewitz as "destruction of the enemy's will to resist." Although, from the Communist point of
TOP SECRET view, the Soviets have not yet resorted to overt armed aggression; they are already waging a war -- in the absolute sense -- against the United States and its Allies. In order to win this war and attain its fundamental objective, the Soviet Union will employ not only every available so-called non-military weapon and tactic which promises success, but also coercive military force. Despite contradictory propaganda by Soviet leaders, all Soviet actions confirm the basic fact that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to use aggressive military action for the attainment of its objectives, unless such use jeopardizes seriously the major operational base of Communist imperialism.

No longer confident that this concept of the use of military force is correct despite the fact that a recent Central Intelligence Agency report presented a substantially different view. This report is now in process of revision by the CIA and its member intelligence agencies and I rather expect that the resultant new study will conform to the viewpoint which I have just expressed. At present, however, there are fundamental discrepancies between our estimate and that of CIA. The CIA report asserts that the Soviet Union hopes to achieve its objective of world domination through subversion and revolution rather than conquest, exploiting in the process wars between third powers while waiting for the inevitable downfall of capitalism. Thus, CIA not only fails to identify correctly the military character of the Soviet threat, but also fails to realize that in the present bi-polar world, Soviet opportunities to exploit
major wars between third powers no longer exist. Therefore, it
misses the cardinal point that from the Soviet viewpoint, war
must of necessity be between the United States and the Soviet Union.
It also misconstrues the function and purpose of Soviet military
power in describing it as an adjunct to international communism.
Rather, subversive and revolutionary forces are adjuncts to the
armed forces of the Soviet Union. For these and other reasons, I
have dissented with the report, as have the other military
intelligence agencies and the Department of State. However, our
dissent maintains that the Soviet Union is now preparing for a
military showdown with the United States.

The Soviet Union has a larger armed force that is required
for its defense. This large military establishment, together
with known force deployments, indicates that the armed forces are
being maintained for offensive rather than defensive purposes.
This power is already a tremendous coercive threat for the furtherance
of Soviet objectives; coupled with the growing atomic capability, it
becomes a vastly greater threat. Although the United States
possesses the greatest military potential of any single nation in
the world, the Soviet Union is winning victories in the present phase
of the war through aggressive operations supported by the coercive
threat of superior military forces in being. This is facilitated
particularly by virtue of the Soviet geographic position and
internal lines of communication in Eurasia. Thus, there continues
the Soviet campaign of infiltration, subversion, and fear, the latter
now greatly strengthened by the threat implicit in the possession by the Soviet Union of atomic weapons. In this connection, if in the event of war the Soviet Union should issue an ultimatum to the North Atlantic Treaty countries of Europe demanding under penalty of atomic attack that they submit to Soviet occupation, the threatened nations might reconsider their alignments.

With respect to numbers of atomic weapons, the United States now enjoys a wide margin of superiority over the Soviet Union but this is a wasting asset. It would be illusory to conclude that the United States will remain safe from atomic attack as long as it maintains this numerical superiority. Then the Soviets believe they have produced a sufficient quantity of atomic bombs to be seriously crippling or decisive against the United States — a number which might be considerably smaller than that which we might consider to be required for decisive action against the Soviet Union — the danger of a Soviet surprise attack against the United States will be greatly increased. Then the Soviets have attained this number, with corresponding delivery capabilities, the United States superiority in total numbers of atomic bombs will no longer be the deterrent to war in the same relative degree to which it has been in the past few years.

It is most important that any assessment of the risks inherent in the United States situation of disparity of military forces, as compared to the Soviet Union, be made with the military capabilities and the objectives of the Soviets in mind rather than
their immediate intentions. These risks are:

1. there is danger of deliberate war launched by the Soviet Union by means of a surprise attack against either Western Europe, the United States or both;

2. there is danger of war precipitated by the result of miscalculation of the anticipated reactions by either side to any given situation;

3. successful piecemeal acts of aggression by the Soviet Union may ultimately be aimed against areas so vital to the security of the United States that the latter must accept war or otherwise run a greater risk of losing the integrity of its free institutions and the American way of life;

4. there is a possibility that the peoples of the other non-Communist nations will develop such skepticism and mistrust regarding United States capability and firmness of purpose to win the current struggle, or the later conflict by armed forces, that their governments will be required to seek a status of neutrality in the war; and,

5. there is the possibility that the United States may undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union and thereafter be forced by public opinion to compromise United States basic security.

The most important Soviet considerations in making a decision to initiate war, probably would be that a surprise atomic attack would cripple seriously the United States atomic air offensive and mobilization capability; that despite the possibility of a United
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States retaliatory atomic attack, Soviet industrial mobilization and huge armament reserves would provide the Soviet Union with a continuing offensive capability; and that, generally speaking, the trading of initial atomic blows would leave the Soviet Union in a relatively much stronger military posture than the United States. The probability of war is, therefore, considerably dependent upon United States military capabilities. If these capabilities decrease, the probability of war will increase. The probability of war will decrease if our known defensive and offensive capabilities are adequate. Our defensive capabilities must be such that the Soviets would be unable to make an effective surprise attack, and thus cripple the United States mobilization potential and atomic offensive capability. Our offensive capabilities must be sufficient to enable us to destroy selected atomic targets in the Soviet Union, and, if need be, to sustain that atomic attack.

Never before in peacetime has the United States been directly subjected to such strong and relentlessly insidious opposition as today. Such a peace as the United States is experiencing is not a peace; it is, in fact, a war in which its survival is at stake. The present conflict can change to armed warfare whenever it suits the purposes and ends of the Soviet Union.

Soviet military power is offensive in character. The first line of defense of the United States must be to recognize that we are at war right now and that an all-out national effort designed to maintain permanent military and political superiority over the Soviet Union is required.

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Time is now working in favor of the Soviet Union. The most important factor in this regard is the equalization of the ratio of Soviet capability to United States capability, in the number and means of delivery of atomic weapons. The probability of war deliberately instigated by the Soviet Union will increase with progressive equalization of this ratio. It is uncertain if the rulers in the Kremlin would consider 1951, 1952, 1953, or some other date as an opportune and advantageous time to initiate deliberately an all-out offensive against the United States and its allies. However, by mid-1952 the Soviets probably will have a stockpile of nearly 100 atomic bombs. Delivery of a substantial number of those bombs on selected targets in the United States could seriously cripple our atomic-air-offensive capabilities, war mobilization efforts, and vital elements of the war economy. Therefore, mid-1952 should be considered as the latest date by which we must be prepared to meet a Soviet attack. In this connection, it must be borne in mind continually that time-wise, the surprise use of a relatively small number of bombs would be more effective than the expected use of a much larger number.

Now, for the next five minutes I would like to review the overall intelligence scores from the point of view of collection and production. First of all, let me say that we are immeasurably better off in all ways, not only as compared with our pre-war status, but as compared with the situation of two or three years ago. We know what we need, and we believe we know how to go about getting it.
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The understanding of the "why" and the "what" of intelligence is substantially broader than the before, not only within intelligence organizations themselves but within the Air Force as a whole. In this respect, I appreciate the fact that you, as commanders, are increasingly aware of the fundamental and vital role that intelligence must fulfill if our military plans and preparations are to be launched on a realistic basis.

Air Force intelligence has one really serious problem in common with all other governmental organizations. Neither ourselves nor anyone else will solve this problem overnight. The problem is the establishment of adequate, satisfactory sources of information on the Soviet Union and its Satellites. Although we are searching for, creating, and exploiting every opening in the iron curtain that we can think of, our successes leave much to be desired.

The lack of adequate information is nowhere so great as in the field of air-technical intelligence. Our information on Soviet scientific technical developments in the field of aeronautics and related fields is serious to the point of being alarming and must be overcome. At this moment, we are seriously deficient in the means to collect the necessary intelligence minimums on existing and potential Soviet air offensive and defensive capabilities, and the immediate intentions of their air forces.

To fill the gaps in our knowledge, we are using many different methods and sources within the Air Force and in other organizations. We depend upon our air attaches, air technical
liaison officers, contract intelligence sources, communications intelligence, photo and electronic reconnaissance, the intelligence activities of the overseas commands, and governmental agencies other than the Air Force. We depend heavily upon the Central Intelligence Agency whose sources are supposed to take over where ours leave off. By this, I refer to the responsibility which that organization has for the collection of intelligence by covert means.

The Air Force Security Service is another organization which possesses a tremendous potential. Not only is this true in the collection of intelligence information on a continuous basis, but it will have as one of its specific tasks the development of a capability to provide warning against aerial attack on this country or its allies. By this, of course, I refer to communications intelligence.

Another source of information which is of great value to us is project HH-2G. This program, which has been described to you commanders more than a year ago, provides for the systematic exploitation of returned German and Japanese prisoners of war. It is beginning to produce a wealth of material which is significant to air intelligence, particularly for use in Objective Folders. This is our most remunerative air intelligence project, and I wish to express our deepest appreciation to General Cannon and General Stremeyer for their support and splendid cooperation in making project HH-2G a success.

The best on-the-spot collectors of intelligence
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information have been our air attaches behind the iron curtain.
For reasons of economy the attaché systems of all the services
have recently been reduced. This action did not appreciably affect
the collection of air intelligence information on the Soviet Empire
because we were able to make the bulk of our reductions in the
posts of least importance outside the Soviet Orbit. However, we
are now being seriously affected by the Soviet influence on the
Satellite nations in requiring them to curtail the activities
of our accredited attaches. Bulgaria has forced
the departure of the entire American mission. The other Satellites
have applied pressure by several means, usually by the expedient
of refusing to renew a visa when it expires, or refusing to
permit replacements to be made for attaches whose tours are over.
We must accept the fact that if the Soviets so desire, and there is
every indication that they do, this Government may be forced to
withdraw all armed forces attaches from the Satellites within the
foreseeable future.

As each source is denied us, others must be developed.
The problem of adequate collection is difficult, and likely to
become more so, but we do not believe that it is insuperable. All
means of intelligence collection must be exploited, and no
effort must be spared in our efforts to penetrate the barriers
which have been and are being used against us.

It is clear, however, that the many reductions in means
of gathering intelligence by reasonably open methods, emphasize our

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increasing dependence upon under-cover methods. The question arises then: "Is the CIA capable of meeting this demand?" In my opinion, it is not satisfactorily ready. In spite of my full recognition of the enormity of CIA's problem, I feel that it has not yet drawn in enough men of stature and that it is still on somewhat of a country-store basis with its sights set too low. Incidentally, possibly we in Air Force Intelligence are subject to the same criticism as to inadequacy of concept. If such is the case, I should certainly expect to have that pointed out to me at this conference and otherwise.

Now, just one word about security of information. The Air Force is generally looked upon by the other services as being more of a security risk than the others. There are many extenuating circumstances which I shall not take time to discuss. The fact remains that the criticisms are too often justified, and the problem is not going to be solved by any series of regulations, but principally through a great increase in security consciousness on the part of everyone. To accomplish that, the energetic assistance of every commander is required.

Thank you.

GEN EDWARDS: General Cabell, from the Intelligence viewpoint, have you reached any conclusions with respect to this recent incident of the shooting down of this Navy plane — an indication of the Russian willingness to participate in an incident that might lead to war?
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GEN CABELL: The question was: Have we reached any conclusions as to whether or not the recent shooting down by the Soviets of the Satellite was an indication of the willingness to resort to war? As we see it now, it was certainly a probing. We think it was probably deliberately done as a probing to see what our reaction would be. I think that they felt that they did not risk a war by virtue of their shooting down that aircraft.

GEN VANDELBerg: General Cannon, would you care to comment on that or add anything to it?

GEN CANNON: I have nothing to comment other than what General Cabell has already said. The Russians are going to keep it up and they are going to go as far as they can with it. I am very strong of the opinion that the only way to quash them at all is to be firm. Any passification at all will lead to other acts; that, of course, at governmental level. From here we sit over there, it appears that the airplane was shot down in open water. Although we do not have absolute proof of that, intelligence information is coming in more and more all the time that indicates that. The course of the aircraft, of course, we know but from a time and space factor, it could have been Libya. That particular mission was not scheduled for that distance. The same airplane landed on the day previously up in that area. The day on which it was shot down was a shorter mission and indications are that it was shot down short of that place.

GEN EDWARDS: In the last several months, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have approved an outlined war plan known as OFFTACKLE.
I don't think that war plan has as yet been given general
distribution to the various commanders for use in basing your
particular operational plans.

General Anderson, the Director of Plans and Operations,
is going to present to you this morning the outline of OFFTACKLE.

GEN ANDERSON: Mr. Secretary, General Vandenberg, Mr.
Chairman, and Gentlemen: This plan known as OFFTACKLE covers the
first two years of a war beginning 1 December 1949.

In this plan, consideration has been given to the
capabilities of the United States; the estimated capabilities
of the Atlantic Pact Allies, and the latest intelligence
estimates of Soviet capabilities. These estimates have been
covered in general by General Cabell.

I would like to point out, however, that while, in writing
this plan, consideration was given to the recent atomic blast in
Russia, the results of a complete analysis and evaluation are
not yet available. When such information is made available, the
plan will have to be changed accordingly.

The overall strategic concept of OFFTACKLE provides for
the attainment of Allied national objectives through the military
defeat of the USSR brought about by a major offensive effort in
Western Eurasia and a strategic defense, on an austerity basis, in
the Far East.

Certain basic undertakings for the Allies have been
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developed. These are the minimum that the Allies must accomplish in order that the war will not be lost. These undertakings are as follows:

1. To insure the integrity of the Western Hemisphere and the Allied main support areas, and to promote and develop their warmaking capabilities.

2. To secure, maintain, and defend such bases, land and sea areas, and lines of communication as are required for the execution of the concept.

3. To stabilize, as soon as practicable, the Soviet offensives, particularly against areas vital to the Allies; all air, naval, and ground forces which can be spared from other essential tasks will be used for this purpose.

4. To conduct at the earliest practicable date a strategic air offensive against the elements of the Soviet war-making capability.

5. To initiate development of the offensive power of the Army Forces for such later operations as may be necessary for the achievement of the overall war objectives.

6. To provide essential aid to our Allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the implementation of the overall strategic concept.

7. To exploit, at the earliest practicable date, the psychological weaknesses of the USSR and its satellites by information activities and by other special operations.
The tasks developed in carrying out these basic undertakings have been divided into four distinct but interrelated series of essential operations. These are:

1. Essential defensive tasks;
2. A strategic air offensive;
3. Operations in Western Eurasia;
4. Control of essential communications.

In developing OFF-ACKLE, the plan of action for the first two years of war has been divided into three approximate time phases with operations subsequent thereto considered as being in the fourth phase.

The first phase is the period D-Day through D-plus-3 months. The first charge against Allied resources is to provide for essential defensive tasks. These tasks during all phases are to be undertaken on an austerity basis and will involve the acceptance of considerable risks.

(Chart) We have charted the defensive tasks and the forces assigned. The defensive tasks include:

- Insuring the integrity of the Western Hemisphere by measures involving all appropriate and available resources of the Western Hemisphere nations. Among these measures are:

  - The establishment of a limited air warning and communications net.
  - The provision for defense of Canada initially with limited Canadian forces.

Incidentally, throughout this presentation, the blue cards
The provision as shown on the chart of a limited number of U.S. and Canadian fighter groups and other air defense units for the air defense of critical industrial areas of these countries.

GEN VANCE: Can we leave that other chart out so we can see that at the bottom?

GEN ANDERSON: Yes, sir.

The defense of Alaska will be based on the concept of concentrating the forces available in the Fairbanks-Anchorag-Kodiak area within which are located the vital Alaskan installations.

OGL SHERILL: Available for that task in Alaska, the Air Force has 1 and 1/3 fighter groups; 1 day intercept, 1 squadron, all-weather. This chart, I might add, on OP TACKLE, indicates 1 troop carrier squadron in place by D-plus-3 months. However, the squadron is actually in place at the moment and will remain there.

GEN ANDERSON: Operations in the Far East will be defensive in character for the primary purpose of securing Japan, the Ryukyu, and the Philippines. The forces utilized will be those initially available with minor augmentations as you see here on the chart.
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COL SIBLEY: I might point out in the Far East, OFFTACKLE indicates a fighter defense for 4 day fighters, 1 all-weather, and a strategic air offensive is shown the 6th fighter group whereas the actual program in the Far East is 2 day intercepts, 1 all-weather fighter group, and 3 fighter bomb. The light bomb builds up at D-plus-3 to 1 group. That third squadron was originally scheduled to come from the regular squadrons equipped with B-45's. However, they cannot be supported in combat and the third squadron would have to be furnished by the Air National Guard.

GEN ANDERSON: Defense of the Caribbean area, including the Panama Canal and the Venezuelan oil area, will be provided in coordination with British, Venezuelan, and Dutch authorities. The air and naval bases will be established on Iceland, and the Azores as soon after D-day as possible. Pending further evaluation of the feasibility of the operation, the plan provides for two paratroop companies to be air-transported by the USAF to Iceland as soon as possible. These paratroop companies will be relieved by Marine forces.

The next task discussed is the Strategic Air Offensive. The strategic air offensive is the only means available for immediate large scale retaliation against Russia.

OFFTACKLE provides, utilizing atomic and conventional weapons to be initiated at the earliest possible date subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities. It will be aimed at the vital elements of
the Soviet war-making capacity and the retardation of Soviet advances into Eastern Europe. The selection of atomic targets and conventional target systems, including the establishment of priorities, will be under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forces for this task will be deployed as rapidly as feasible to bases in the United Kingdom and Okinawa. Operations will be initiated from these bases and from bases in the United States, staging through Alaska and the Northeast area. Bases in Iceland, North Africa, and the Middle East will be used for staging as is tactically desirable and feasible to increase the effectiveness of the strategic air offensive.

Carrier forces will supplement and support the strategic air offensive to the extent of their capabilities and as they are available.

The overall deployment of forces for this task is as shown on this chart.

(Chart)

COL SENA: I might point out two factors which are currently under process of being revised in Joint channels: One is that this chart particularly at D-plus-3 and thereafter as designed is initially infeasible. That is because when OFFTACCLE was drawn up, the medium bomb forces were based on utilization of a stock pile of approximately 1,000 stored B-29's. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently approved a paper whereby most of this stockpile of B-29's will be phased out in three annual increments.
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Thereafter, the stockpile will be approximately 182 combat B-29's in storage. The second factor is that OFFTACKLE shows no breakdown under strategic reconnaissance heavy, strategic reconnaissance medium, and weather. Weather deployment, for example, is included under these figures.

GEN. WILDERSON: The third category of tasks in OFFTACKLE are not related to operations in Western Europe.

The security of the United States and her Allies requires, with respect to continental Europe, the pursuance of a continuing policy to develop, at the earliest possible moment, the capability of holding a line covering the Western European complex, preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine. Realizing that the accomplishment of this purpose is infeasible with the forces which will be available in the period 1950-1951, this plan envisions as an alternative, either the holding, if possible, of a substantial bridgehead in Western Europe or, if this proves infeasible, the earliest practicable return to Western Europe, in order to prevent the exploitation and communication of that area with resultant long-term disastrous effects on the national interests of the United States and her Allies.

A study of the forces available indicates that even the first alternative, holding a bridgehead, appears to be beyond present Allied capabilities; therefore, pending the availability of more forces, the second alternative -- the earliest practicable return to the Continent -- will probably have to be adopted.
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Accordingly, for operations in Western Eurasia this plan includes the following basic tasks in the following order of priority:

1. Secure the United Kingdom to the degree necessary to insure its availability as a major base for all types of military operations.

2. Maintain Allied control of the Western Mediterranean-North African area, to include Tunisia. This will involve holding the Pyrenees line, if possible, or alternatively, the retention of such lesser area of the Iberian Peninsula as will secure the Western entrance to the Mediterranean.

3. The third basic task in this area is to maintain Allied control of the Cairo-Suez area in order to facilitate support, including air support, of the Turks and other friendly forces in the general vicinity, to permit the launching of strategic air attacks against targets from bases in that area, and to exploit natural resources and enemy weaknesses in the Middle East.

During the first phase, planned operations in Western Eurasia are as follows:

Initially, Allied occupation forces in Germany will be withdrawn to the line of the Rhine in accordance with the approved emergency war plans of the respective Commanders in Chief of Occupation Forces. Further defensive action will be as directed by the Allied Commander in Chief, Western Europe. Forces in Austria and Trieste will effect a coordinated withdrawal to initial...
defensive positions in northern Italy.

The first priority basic task in Western Europe is to secure the United Kingdom. The major threats to the security of the United Kingdom are attack by air and the cutting of the sea lines of communication thereto. As the British forces available for meeting the air threats are inadequate, U.S. forces, to the extent feasible, are deployed to assist in accomplishing this task.

It should be noted that the combined forces available fall considerably short of those needed. However, they are the maximum available, considering the necessity of meeting the minimum needs of other high priority tasks. Forces available for the defense of the United Kingdom are shown on the chart. (Chart)

COL SUNTEL: The AFX Force, according to OFFTACKLE, has scheduled for deployment 2 day fighter groups to leave immediately on D-Day to be in place no later than D-plus-1 to build up to 4 by D-plus-3. The light bomb groups are supposed to be in place by D-plus-2. This group would have to be furnished by the Air National Guard. Troop carriers as indicated here (indicating). The British forces available for defense of the United Kingdom -- the British Air Forces -- are indicated on this chart as numbers of aircraft. Under bombers, the number is 124; light bombers available on D-day, 16; day fighters, 148; and 40 night fighters. Transports as indicated here and some 40 photo reconnaissance aircraft.
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GEN EDWARDS: Do you know what the RAF plans are for build-up at the present time?

GEN ANDERSON: I would like to ask General Cabell.

GEN CABELL: I can't answer that question here under the build-up.

COL SENSELL: According to the information we have and which would be referred to in a later presentation, the British plan by 1953 to have approximately 460 jet interceptor aircraft in their system.

GEN ANDERSON: That, I believe, is the only major increase in their air force plans at this time.

If, as the Soviet air attack develops it is determined that additional air defense forces are required, forces from Northwest Africa and other areas will have to be redeployed to the United Kingdom even though this action might jeopardize the success of other tasks in that area.

The second priority task in Western Europe requires that operations be conducted for the purpose of maintaining Allied control of the Western Mediterranean-North African base area.

The operations planned in this area include:

Holding on the Pyrenees line if possible, or a lesser area of the Iberian Peninsula, in order to secure the western entrance of the Mediterranean and maintaining control of the Western Mediterranean and of Northwest Africa as far east as Tunisia.

The Allied course of action in regard to the Iberian
Peninsula will be largely dependent on the status of Spain and must be sufficiently flexible to provide for any contingency in this respect.

The forces indicated on the chart are deployed for the accomplishment of the overall task in this area.

(Chart)

COL SEAWELL: To be in place by D-plus-2 months the Air Force, according to OFFTACKLE, is to deploy 1 day fighter group, 1 squadron of all-weather fighters, troop carriers as indicated here, 1 and 1/3 groups and 2 squadrons of tactical reconnaissance.

As you know, in the LQ group program there is one tactical reconnaissance squadron that is presently in the Far East.

GEN JENSEN: The third priority basic task in Western Europe is to maintain control of the Cairo-Suez area. At least initially, this will be a British responsibility as the limited U.S. forces available do not permit deployment to this area during the first phase. United States naval forces operating in this area, particularly in the initial stages, will assist the British and indigenous forces in keeping open the Mediterranean line of communication and in delaying the Soviet advance across Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.

Allied operations will be undertaken from the Cairo-Suez area with the object of holding the enemy advance as far to the northeast as possible, and denying to the enemy such portions of the Middle East oil resources as cannot be retained for Allied use.
The estimated forces which the British will deploy to this area are shown in blue.

(Chart)

COL SEBELL: To be in place on D-Day, the British have approximately 100 fighters, 16 light bombers, and a few transports, and photographic. These are to be augmented as soon as possible plus Australian-New Zealand-South African aircraft to be in place by D-plus-6 months.

GEN ALDRIDGE: A summation of Allied operations in the Mediterranean area indicates that the primary objectives of these operations during Phase I and Phase II are as follows:

1. To secure the western entrance to the Mediterranean, the base area in northwest Africa, and maintain control of the Western Mediterranean.

2. To support allied forces withdrawing in a southerly direction from the Rhine, Austrian, and Trieste positions, and possibly from Italy, Greece and Turkey.

3. To support strategic air operations launched from or staged through the Mediterranean area and to supplement these operations, and, finally, to stabilize Soviet offensives in this area as early as possible.

Certain other Allied operations in the Mediterranean will be conducted to the extent practicable and consistent with the requirements for the primary objectives. These operations, not listed in order of importance, are:
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To maintain Allied control of the Eastern Mediterranean
and the Cairo-Suez area.

To conduct operations designed to maintain the orientation
of the peoples of Western Europe toward the Allied and to strengthen
their will to resist.

To support, as feasible, indigenous forces engaged in
delaying Soviet advances through Asia Minor and the Middle East, and,

To conduct limited objective operations when and as practi-
cable in furtherance of the overall task of returning to Western
Europe at the earliest practicable time.

The U.S. Naval forces deployed in the Eastern Atlantic
and the Mediterranean will principally be employed in accomplishing
the tasks established for overall operations in the Mediterranean
which I have just mentioned. In addition, these forces would
provide direct support to defense of the United Kingdom if the
situation makes this essential.

Another task of the first phase is to maintain control
of the essential lines of communication. This control
will enable us to utilize full resources, to obtain raw
materials, to hold bases, to deploy, maintain, and build up forces
overseas, and to support and conduct offensive operations at
points of our choosing.

This task will be carried out by measures which include:

Deployment of naval forces to contain or destroy enemy
naval forces and shipping;
Offensive operations, including anti-submarine warfare operations and mining, against enemy forces and bases which pose a threat to the lines of communication.

Control and routing of shipping and escort of convoys; and,

Limited fighter defenses and air early warning portions of these lines of communication within range of enemy air attack.

This task includes all of these that can be undertaken with available forces during the first phase.

This plan recognizes that it is impractical to lay down a hard and fast course of action for the overall conduct of the war. It considers that designation of tasks to be undertaken during the first three months of the war is approximately the only part of the overall plan of action that can be firmly established.

Determination of specific operations to be undertaken after D-plus-3 months must stem from the actual developments of the war and to a considerable extent upon a continued evaluation of the following factors:

1. The results of the strategic air offensive.

2. The results of the anti-submarine warfare campaign.

3. Whether the Soviets have or have not initiated all of the campaigns in the initial stages of the war as now envisaged and with what success.

4. Whether the Soviets intend to invade the Iberian Peninsula and, if so, the degree of effort they are prepared to make.

5. The military situation in the Middle East oil area and
the Allied need for Middle East oil; and, last,
Soviet weaknesses which have developed and could be
exploited.

No attempt is made in this plan to evaluate those factors
as a basis for selecting the Allied course of action for the second
phase of the war. Instead, the basic strategy and tasks undertaken
in the first phase are continued, while retaining maximum flexibility
for these operations considered necessary in furtherance of the
overall concept in regard to Western Europe.

Briefly, this plan of action requires:

Continuing the defensive tasks, continuing the strategic
air offensive, and continuing operations to maintain security of
lines of communication.

During the second phase, we mobilize at maximum speed and
move forces to Western Eurasia. Ground forces will be deployed
principally to the Northwest African area for its security and to
undertake limited objective operations in the Mediterranean.
Air and naval forces will direct efforts toward the destruction
of the overall Soviet war-making capacity, attainment of air
superiority, overcoming the submarine threat, checking the Soviet
advance, and participating in the limited objective operations
in the Mediterranean. As these operations gain success, and as
forces build up in North Africa, there should be a swing to an
offensive pattern that will accelerate in the third phase.
The third phase, which we consider to be from D-plus-12
nights to D-plus-24 months, and the fourth phase, from D-plus-24
months to the end of the war, must be presented in even more general
terms. The overall plan during these phases includes:

Continuing the essential defensive tasks, the strategic
air offensive, and maintaining control of lines of communication.
In addition, operations in Western Eurasia will be continued to
create conditions for the earliest return to Western Europe. Those
operations will include:

Building up Allied forces in Western Eurasia and developing
bases and base areas.

They include counter-air operations to attain overall air
superiority and local air supremacy over selected areas.

They include interdiction of transportation systems to
the end that the main Soviet Reserves cannot be brought to bear
early in the invasion period, and they include the continuation
of political, psychological, and unconventional warfare against
the USSR, her satellites and occupied areas. When favorable
conditions have been created and the necessary forces generated,
which the plan estimates at approximately D-plus-24 months, the
Allies will invade Western Europe, with control of the air and
the sea and the Soviet industry and transportation dislocated, the
plan envisages a condition similar to that of the last days
of Germany in 1945. The course of this campaign depends on
many conditions, now unpredictable.
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All U.S. forces available for invasion of Western Europe are shown on this chart.

(Chart)

COL SLEMILL: These forces, as you can see, are approximately:

30 U.S. Army Infantry Divisions plus 6 armored and 5 airborne with
168 anti-aircraft battalions. The Navy forces as indicated here
are notably 10 heavy carriers which are of the CV/CVB class.

U.S. Air Forces: 11 light bomb groups; 24 day fighter groups;
9 all-weather groups; 10 tactical reconnaissance groups; 10
troop carrier groups, plus 15 air control and warning groups.

GEN AHERNS: That is the maximum capability that we
believe we will have for invasion of Western Europe at D-plus-24
months.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the success and
timing of this plan depends, to a large degree, upon the
effectiveness of the strategic air offensive and the success of
our anti-submarine campaign.

At the present time the following, related to OP TACKLE,
are being developed:

1. A Joint Logistics Plan
2. Necessary guidance for the development of base areas.
3. Psychological and unconventional warfare plans.
4. Cover and deception plans.
5. A military assistance plan.
6. A civil affairs-military government plan.

7. A command plan.

8. A communications plan, and,

9. Plans covering the requirements for mobilization and allocation of transportation facilities required for the conduct of war under CRITUCK.

At the present time also, the Air Force plan stemming from CRITUCK is being coordinated in the Air Staff and upon approval by the Chief of Staff will be disseminated to the Air Force Commands. We believe this plan will be ready for dissemination when we return to Washington.

Thank you.
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GEN EDWARDS: Gentlemen, the conference is open for discussion, or any questions in clarification of General Anderson's presentation.

GEN KENNEY: Where is the air strength coming from to support the holding of the Rhine?

GEN ANDERSON: General, unless we have fighter support in England, there probably will be none in 1950 or even for the duration of this plan in the next two years. As we say, holding of the Rhine, as envisioned in this plan, is infeasible. We even think holding a bridgehead in western Europe is infeasible during the period of this plan.

GEN EDWARDS: General Cannon, you might have some comments on supporting the ground army over there.

GEN CANNON: There are not adequate air forces in Europe to support a defense of the Rhine at the present time. There is no use in sending additional air forces to Europe unless they are based west of the Rhine, which would create the necessity for bases on French soil. What air forces we have currently located in Europe are improperly disposed and would have to displace to the west of the Rhine immediately in the event of an emergency. At best they could perform only one mission from presently occupied bases. There are only three or four airfields in France which are capable of supporting modern combat aircraft.

GEN EDWARDS: General Anderson, would you comment on what plans we have or thoughts we have with the view to establishing
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base areas on the North African western half of the Continent?

GEN ANDERSON: For some months the Air Staff has been considering the establishing of a base area in Northwest Africa. In January of this year we sent a survey team to Northwest Africa with really three objects in view.

The first was to find out whether or not the French would welcome us; the second was to find out whether there was an area in which we could now pre-stock central supplies with the Frenchmen acting as safekeepers; and third, to pick a base area in which to develop airfields.

We have now processed a report based upon that survey trip. Certain actions have been approved by the Chief of Staff. Among those actions are the stockpiling of central equipment in the Casablanca area now, and a directive to the Air Staff to undertake the development of three medium bomber airfields in the Northwest African area.

This actual development will, of course, depend upon enabling legislation and then appropriations.

GEN EDWARDS: You might bring everybody here up to date on the status of our U.K. airdromes at the present time.

GEN ANDERSON: Also for some time we have tried to arrange for the building of four airfields in the midlands area of the United Kingdom for the Air Force's use. Very recently all of these arrangements have been completed and I believe the actual construction work will begin within six weeks. Now about that, General
Johnson?

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GEN JOHNSON: That is about correct. At the present time three battalions of aviation engineers.

GEN ANDERSON: We are sending over to assist with those battalion engineers. Quite recently the English have asked if those engineers can assist them in the lengthening of those fighter fields.

GEN JOHNSON: We are going to need that, incidentally, in the fighter field. That is one of the problems we have. We have told the British that if they will build the four fields for us we won't ask for anything else at the present time. There are no fighter fields over 6,000 feet besides Woodbridge and Carnaby which they had during the war.

Those fields have no facilities except runways, so our present plan is to put fighters on the 6,000-foot runways; but if they have an escort mission we have to put them over the bomber bases to top them off. There is no other plan at the present time.

I am quite concerned about the defense of the U.K. air-dromes because the British do not have a set-up for the defense of their air-dromes. General Cabell says there is a possibility of a surprise attack. The British don't feel that there is the possibility of war in the next year or so, so they will not go into defensive measures until they feel the situation is quite a bit more critical than it is at the present time.
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GEN EDWARDS: Are there any other comments, gentlemen?

GEN CANNON: I have one other comment that I might make now. If we want the hold on the Pyrenees you will have to have air support in Spain. You can’t do it on fresh air and sunshine, of which they have an abundance. I think it is most important that our Government get on more friendly terms with the Spanish Government.

I realize that that goes into high Governmental levels, but we in Europe think it is most important.

GEN VANDEBERG: I would like to just make some comments off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

GEN EDWARDS: In order that we may approximate somewhat our schedule we will terminate discussion on OFFTACKLE at the present time and General Anderson will continue with a presentation of our air defense program with plans for the defense of the Continental United States and Alaska.

GEN ANDERSON: Mr. Finletter, General Vandenberg and gentlemen, although our present meager air defense is a matter of grave concern, the necessity to attain and maintain an operational air defense system for the United States and Alaska stems principally from consideration of the air offensive which the Soviet Union will be capable of mounting by 1 July 1952.

The date 1 July 1952 is selected for particular consideration because of the critical threat which the Soviet capabilities
pose at that time, and also it is the earliest date by which
an operational air defense system can be attained in an orderly
manner.

Present intelligence establishes the following factors
in connection with Soviet capabilities to attack the United
States: First, there will be little or no warning of an enemy
air attack; second, the enemy will attempt to deliver a major
portion of his stockpile of atomic bombs in a minimum period
of time in order to achieve maximum shock effect; third, effective
attacks may be conducted under conditions of adverse weather or
darkness.

The Soviet TU-4 medium bomber is the only aircraft
in the Soviet long-range air force which could be used currently
in an atomic attack against the United States. Considering all
factors, it is anticipated that an improved TU-4 will still be the
principal vehicle for Soviet long-range operations as late as
1953.

Estimated Soviet atomic bomb stockpile and TU-4s avail-
able are as shown on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

COL DAYHARSH: From based areas at Volkel and Alskurtti
Soviet TU-4s have the combat radiuses shown by these arcs (indicat-
ing). With one refueling they can attain this line (indicating),
and with two refuelings they have this capability (indicating), and
with a one-way mission they have 4,500 combat range.
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GEN ANDERSON: It is estimated that by the middle of this year the Soviets will have from ten to twenty atomic bombs available and will have 415 TU-4s operational in their long-range air force. It is also estimated that by mid-1952 the Soviets will have from 45 to 90 atomic bombs available and 1200 TU-4s operational in their long-range air force. Further, the latest intelligence estimates indicate that the estimate of atomic bomb availability for the Soviets may be materially revised upward based upon the Fuchs leaks.

The TU-4 has performance characteristics roughly comparable to the U.S. B-29. We have shown their range and their combat radius. We have also shown an estimated Soviet stockpile of from 45 to 90 atomic bombs in 1952. Fifty of those bombs on targets in the United States could produce nearly 2 million American casualties. They could destroy Governmental machinery in Washington and very seriously disrupt our entire communications complex.

Such destruction could, of itself, seriously hamper our efforts to mobilize our armed forces and industry and, yet, the foregoing is but a small percentage of the damage that could be indicated by fifty bombs on target, for, in addition, these bombs could destroy a large percentage of the industrial capacity required to put arms into the hands of the United States armed forces after they are mobilized. If selectively placed, 50 bombs could simultaneously destroy 70 per cent of United States industry designated in our mobilization plans to produce tanks, artillery
and small arms. They could completely destroy our atomic energy industry, 30 per cent of our special steel forgings industry, and 85 per cent of facilities to produce marine boilers.

Sea communications will determine whether we can sustain allies overseas, and whether we can deploy and maintain our own forces overseas. A-bomb attacks on our major ports, the Navy's mothball fleet and major Navy yards could conceivably deny us this ability. The foregoing are but a few examples of the simultaneous destruction 50 bombs on selected targets could cause.

There is no question but that the Soviets have sufficient intelligence of U.S. industry to enable them to select these targets. Further, there is no question but that the Soviets know the location of these targets.

United States bombs on Soviet targets could certainly cripple their war effort in the same manner that Soviet bombs could cripple our own. Without question, the Soviets realize this and it is our opinion that the present intensive Soviet efforts to attain an adequate air defense system are designed to minimize the effect of a U.S. counter-attack with atomic bombs. Certainly, then, the Soviets would like to kill, at its source, our capability to counterattack. Our intelligence believes a likely Soviet allocation of A-bombs in 1952 will include 20 to 25 Atomic bombs used against the bases on which our atomic bomb-carrying planes are located.

In short, 50 bombs on target might make it impossible for the United States ever to mobilize and fight back. They might make
it impossible for us to utilize our own stockpile of atomic weapons.

I emphasize that available intelligence indicates the Soviets will have the capability for such an attack by 1 July 1952. Henceforth, this date is treated as critical. It is the time by which we must have an effective operational air defense system in being.

Our present air defense system is very small.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: This chart shows air defense units as now deployed. Twenty-four fighter squadrons, seven control centers and 28 basic radars are stationed in the United States and Alaska. Fighter units are generally deployed as groups on Government-owned airfields because of lack of funds for better positioning by squadrons.

If we had the necessary funds, we would deploy them as shown on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: This chart adds one squadron for defense of the Chicago area, one squadron for the defense of the Los Angeles area and spreads out our defenses a little bit.

Such a deployment would still leave undefended such major targets as our iron ore system in the Duluth area, the industrial complexes in the Mississippi River valley, and a critical number of the bases of our retaliatory forces. However,
this deployment would give greater air defense capability than now exists.

The presently programmed Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved aircraft control and warning system in the United States and Alaska consists of eleven control centers and 85 basic radars as depicted on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: This system was planned to meet a forecasted Russian capability in 1953 of sporadic, dispersed attacks against our resources. It did not include a coverage of areas in which certain units of our retaliatory force are located and was intended only as the basic framework for an ultimate aircraft control and warning system. This basic framework will be completed and operational by 1 July 1952.

The exposed condition of certain bases of our Strategic Air Command has become a matter of great concern in view of the probability that the Russians will have a stockpile of 45 to 90 atomic bombs, and the capability of placing them on targets of their choosing by 1952.

Two courses of action appear to us to be open. They are:

To move our bases inside the presently authorized warning system,
or to extend the warning system to include these bases.

Our studies have revealed that it would cost approximately $100,000,000 to move the bases within the warning system.

On this basis alone we would have decided in favor of extending the
system. However, there was an additional reason for such a decision: namely, to provide additional radar coverage of important industries outside of the presently authorized system.

Our recommended aircraft control and warning system includes eleven additional radars for coverage of exposed Strategic Air Command bases as shown on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN VANDENBERG: Colonel, would you put that other chart up there so we can compare them?

(Whereupon, the last two charts were displayed simultaneously.)

GEN EDWARDS: You said eleven more, didn't you?

GEN ANDERSON: Yes, sir; eleven additional.

GEN EDWARDS: Did I see 109 and 85?

GEN ANDERSON: Yes. There are eleven added specifically for coverage of SAC bases, sir. There are others added, which we will mention.

Because some of the bases are less exposed than others, we have divided this coverage of bases of the Strategic Air Command into two priorities. In the first priority eight radars immediately essential are shown in red (indicating); in the second priority three radars are shown in green (indicating). Five additional basic radars positioned on the southeastern coast would add needed warning for inland targets and combat units. Two of these are in first priority for immediate construction; three
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are in second priority.

Selective outward extension of warning is desirable in light of increasing enemy capabilities. For areas adjacent to our northeastern border, the planned Canadian aircraft control and warning system will provide additional early warning if the present expected completion date of 1957 is changed to 1952.

In the Duluth and Vancouver areas eight additional basic radars on Canadian territory are required to provide similar extension of warning. This Canadian system would provide additional early warning for the Northeast, for the Great Lakes area and the Pacific Northwest. The Canadians are being urged to accomplish this program.

The total requirement for additional radars is twenty-four for a total of 109 basic radars.

Both our eastern and western coasts have vital targets geographically exposed to attacks from seaward with minimum warning. A study of selective extension of the land-based warning systems seaward by picket ships has revealed a requirement for ten picket-ship stations, two stations each off New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, San Francisco, and Seattle.

We believe this augmented aircraft control and warning system to be technically feasible, and in consonance with the present state and rate of technological development. Its implementation would not involve excessive expenditure for hardware which is presently available. Further, this system appears to
present a proper balance between the aircraft control and warning portion of an air defense in being, and the research and development program necessary to improve the capability of the system. It affords an aircraft control and warning coverage for our most important industrial, Governmental, and population complexes, and for our retaliatory forces.

Combat units must be properly positioned and integrated with this control and warning system to provide any defense. We have calculated the requirement in terms of all-weather fighter squadrons.

I would like to explain briefly the reasoning involved in this calculation.

Since we are unable to forecast accurately the exact target complexes the USSR would select to attack, we are forced to include in our air defense coverage all of the resources vital to mobilization for war, and our retaliatory forces.

Placement of 25 atomic bombs in 1952 on our atomic forces with simultaneous delivery of as many as 65 additional bombs on political and population centers and selected industrial facilities is the scope, we believe, and the pattern of attempted atomic attack with which our air defense system must be prepared to cope. Mass attacks by large numbers of enemy airplanes on a limited area would be less productive than selective attacks by smaller, separate forces on targets such as I have just mentioned when we are using weapons with such destructive power as the
atomic bomb.

We believe our fighter units should be so positioned that a minimum of one squadron will be available against any detected attack. A fighter deployment on this basis in the United States and Alaska generates a requirement for 67 fighter squadrons, all-weather in capability, located on 53 bases as shown on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: On this chart the blue circle indicates a one-squadron deployment, the green square indicates a two-squadron deployment, and the red triangle a three-squadron deployment, for a total deployment of 67 squadrons on 53 bases.

Anti-aircraft weapons are an essential part of any over-all air defense system. The results that might be obtained by marked acceleration of the unguided rocket project and one of the surface-to-air guided missiles projects are so potentially valuable, particularly in the low-altitude band, that this acceleration is essential.

Because of the potential capability of rockets and guided missiles, we have employed, in this 1952 deployment of combat units, only seventeen automatic weapon and nineteen gun battalions in 21 local defense areas. The provision of these units is within the presently programmed capabilities of the Army.

Certain other types of units must be added to the over-all air defense capability. Radio intercept units offer the most likely
possibility of obtaining clues of enemy intention. Augmentation of 
the mobile radio squadrons of the USAF Security Service to an 
appropriate strength, and their proper positioning is being expedited 
to provide additional intelligence on the location, capabilities, 
and the intentions of the Soviet Air Force.

The Air Force now has available 24 fighter squadrons for 
deployment for air defense. Our present program calls for us to 
have 27 squadrons available by 1 July 1952. This leaves a deficit 
of 40 squadrons.

Studies of the OFFTACLE deployment led us to believe that 
four Marine and eight Navy squadrons, which are not scheduled for 
deployment until D-plus-one month, might be available for the air 
defense role. However, since we have been talking this plan over 
with the Navy, they indicate that they have other use for those 
squadrons, and we still have a deficit of 40.

We have considered the possible employment of the Air 
National Guard to meet partially the requirement for air defense 
in being prior to D-Day. The Air National Guard cannot meet this 
requirement.

We are considering their use in the post-D-Day period in 
air-ground and air transport operations, but not in air defense and 
not on D-Day. After federalization and a short period of refresher 
training, they can attain and maintain a high state of combat 
proficiency and readiness for post-D-Day operations.

The requirements stated are those existing prior to the
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attack. The peak effort of all forces possessing an air defense capability must be used to counter initial air attacks. In event of war, it is probable that the greatest demand on our air defenses, both qualitatively and quantitatively, will be made on 'H'-Hour of D-Day. It is this probability of an initial surprise attack that poses the greatest dangers, for our security now includes not losing the first campaign of the war. It includes not having our cities destroyed and our population decimated in the process of winning our first campaign.

The additional costs to the Department of Defense of our proposed air defense system are estimated to be $187,000,000 initially, with $1,067,000,000 annual recurring cost.

The Air Force recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a committee be established to determine each service's contribution to the system, to cost it more accurately than we had estimated, and to recommend actions necessary to secure its effective implementation by 1 July 1952.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to make such comments and to give their recommendations. On 21 April the Joint Strategic Plans Group reported to the Plans Committee, which has now considered their report, essentially the following:

a. The present air defense of the United States and Alaska is inadequate.

b. There should be in being by 1 July 1952 an operational
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air defense system for the United States and Alaska capable of
detering or effectively countering enemy air attacks. This
system should contain as a minimum:

(1) From the United States Army:
51 anti-aircraft gun battalions, or substituted guided
missile units. This is a 15-battalion increase in our
stated requirement, as stated in this plan.

(2) From the U. S. Navy:
25 radar picket ships, for ten stations.

(3) From the U. S. Air Force:
101 basic radar stations as opposed to the 109 we
recommended; 11 control centers, the same that we
recommended; a radio intercept system; 67 fighter
interceptor squadrons with a proviso that further study
may indicate that some of those squadrons can be
furnished from units of the Regular or Reserve Navy
or Marine Corps.

The Joint Strategic Plans Group stated our 1 July 1952
requirements to be a sound approach, in principle, to the optimum
air defense system required.

That concludes the presentation, gentlemen.

GEN EDWARDS: We will take a ten-minute break and discuss
General Anderson's presentation after the break.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
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GEN EDWARDS: The conference is now open for a discussion of General Anderson's presentation on air defense.

GEN CABELL: I would like to make one point. General Anderson referred to the fact that the estimate of the atomic bomb capabilities was subject to materially upward revision because of the Fuchs leaks. Since that consideration has been made, reconsideration has been given, and that is not borne out by the latest study.

That upward revision is only a slight one and only in the upper brackets of the stockpile.

GEN EDWARDS: General Kuter.

GEN KUTER: I understand that the use of the air bases in Newfoundland and Labrador is essential in OFFTACKLE and would certainly be essential as of 1 July 1952.

I would like to ask General Anderson what the status or consideration of air defense is of those bases.

GEN ANDERSON: We have been discussing the air defense of the Labrador-Newfoundland bases with the Canadians. We come up against a matter of national pride there. They do not want the United States to provide air defense for their country; most particularly do they not want us to put it in in peacetime; and they have budgetary troubles. I spoke of trying to get the Canadians to move forward the completion date of the little air defense we showed here from a completion date of 1957 to 1952. There is little expectation that they will be able to afford that.
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As times grow more tense, I believe we will be able to place defenses for our bases in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Now, you also spoke of Greenland, didn't you?

GEN KUTER: I would like to hear about it.

GEN ANDERSON: We haven't done a thing about that.

GEN VANDEENBERG: I think perhaps I can throw a little light on the Canadian situation.

The Chief of the Canadian Air Force is as worried about that problem as we are, and he has come down to me several times to see if I could, when these people come down here, sell them on the necessity for this air warning system in Canada.

As General Anderson said, he is faced with budgetary troubles, and also the same troubles that we are faced with in this country with this balanced force idea. They apparently got it from us, and they are having a great deal of trouble.

However, the Minister, Mr. Claxton, was down at Eglin Field in this last joint orientation course, and I got in a little work with him, as did Mr. Symington. After seeing some of the destructive effect of the bombs dropped from the B-36 and some of the firepower of the fighters, he went home, I think, a little wiser man.

Whether or not that is going to have any effect or not, I don't know, but I do know that before we can expect to get any material assistance from Canada, it will be some time in the future -- in the neighborhood of two, three, or four years; so
I think we are going to have to plan on shipping mobile stations up there and deploying our fighters up there, because we can't do it in peacetime unless we get our Government and our Defense Department to understand this problem and push our Government against theirs to see if we can't do this.

GEN EDWARDS: It might be worthwhile, General Anderson, to give a brief picture of what we are actually doing with respect to expenditure of funds, selection of sites, letting of contracts, and so on and so forth, on this radar system.

GEN ANDERSON: Do you mind if I ask General Myers to give that, sir?

GEN EDWARDS: That will be fine.

GEN MYERS: The 24 sites in the Zone of Interior, in the first phase, will all be advertised, contracts awarded this fiscal year, with a completion date of the first of July 1951 on the construction, which, of course, will give a year to the first of July 1952 to get them in operation.

The second phase, 61 sites, in the Zone of the Interior, are under design now, and will be advertised soon, with 1951 funds for the construction.

The eleven in Alaska, bids have already been opened on some of them, and others are to be opened soon, with a completion date on the construction of the first of December of 1951.

We have a requirement for approximately 39 million dollars more than the 85.5 now available to actually complete the Alaskan
and SAC portions of the basic aircraft control and warning system of 85 basic radars and a request is going to the Secretary of Defense with the request that it be transmitted to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress for this additional money.

Without that money, it is estimated that we will only be able to complete some 60-odd of the 85 sites.

GEN ANDERSON: I am not sure that that money business is absolutely straight to everybody here. We had an authorization bill which authorized 85.5 million dollars for construction of the warning and control net. We have had no appropriation against that authorization. We were given permission last year, and we did, to reallocate 50 million dollars which had been appropriated for other priority projects. We took it away from them and used it to get started on this.

Now, we are currently attempting to get the 35.5 million dollars which remains of the 85.5 authorized. We estimated that we will require 39 million beyond that if we complete this system on the date General Myers named. That increase is due to accelerating the work.

GEN MYERS: Yes, sir.

GEN ANDERSON: Almost entirely, isn't it?

GEN MYERS: Nine million dollars of it is accelerating work; another nine-million-odd is for improved barracks and the balance is just for estimating and for facilities we also forgot -- communications facilities in the Zone of the Interior and airfields
and communications in Alaska due to change in their sites.

GEN VANDENBERG: Then, is it not true that this completion date of 1952 is contingent upon our getting money this Congress?

GEN MYERS: Yes, sir; I feel it definitely is.

GEN VANDENBERG: There seems to be very little chance of that, doesn't there, General White?

GEN WHITE: The balance of the 85.5 I think we are going to get. Mr. Vinson is working on that. As to any additional authorization I am doubtful.

GEN RAWLINGS: General Anderson, then, the second phase is still not included in the program that he has just outlined?

GEN ANDERSON: No.

GEN RAWLINGS: The additional 24?

GEN ANDERSON: No.

GEN RAWLINGS: As I recall, there was an estimate of about 70 million dollars.

GEN ANDERSON: No. You see, I tried to make the point that we have a JCS authorized system. That is this one (indicating); that is the one we originally estimated would cost 85.5 million dollars.

Now, the other one is what we have presented to the Joint Chiefs as an additional requirement in light of Soviet atomic capabilities, which has not yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs.
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GEN RAWLINGS: That amounts to how many dollars, roughly?

Seventy, as I recall.

GEN ANDERSON: Seventy for the additional aircraft control and warning points.

GEN RAWLINGS: Right.

GEN ANDERSON: Yes.

GEN RAWLINGS: I would like to ask a question, General Anderson. Obviously, the early warning has a great deal to do with our capability for defense. You mentioned that we were trying to pick up more intelligence in that direction. Could you elaborate on that a little?

GEN ANDERSON: I would like General Cabell to, if he will.

GEN CABELL: Our efforts along that line are principally through the Air Force Security Service, expansion of its facilities.

GEN RAWLINGS: Is it adequate?

GEN CABELL: We think we have a good chance of accomplishing early warning -- that is, early-early warning through the augmentation of the facilities which we have already proposed.

GEN ANDERSON: What you were asking, I believe is this: Does this plan provide an adequate augmentation of the service? I think the answer, in General Cabell's opinion to that, is Yes. Is that right?

GEN CABELL: Yes.

GEN VANDENBERG: Is that the money for the Brooks Field
installation?

GEN RAWLINGS: That is a part of it, sir.

GEN CARELL: The Brooks Field installation is the center of it, General Vandenberg, but the main augmentation is in the field.

GEN EDWARDS: I don't like to curtail this discussion, gentlemen, but we are little behind schedule, so I will ask General Anderson to continue with his presentation of our capabilities plan now known as VERDANCY. It is an application to OFFTACKLE which actually shows our best estimate today as to what we can do and what will happen to our Air Force on D-plus-three, and so forth.

GEN ANDERSON: Gentlemen, this is really a study we undertook to determine the capabilities of an Air Force composed of 48 groups to fight a war against Russia, beginning 1 July 1953. It will also indicate the capabilities of an Air Force of 58 and 77 groups.

An estimate of present Russian capabilities has already been presented.

The notable difference between present and 1953 capabilities is the greatly increased Soviet atomic potential. In 1953 it is estimated the Soviets will have 1200 B-29-type aircraft in their long-range bomber force and an estimated atomic stockpile of 75 to 135 bombs. It is currently impossible to predict the extent to which the military assistance now starting
to be provided our European Allies may have enhanced their defen-
sive potentiality by 1953. It cannot be assumed, however, that
such aid will prevent the Soviets from accomplishing their ground
offensives in Europe.

The strategic concept and basic undertakings of this
study are identical to those of OFFTACKLE, which, in summary, pro-
vide for a major offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defense
in the Far East.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: The four tasks shown on this chart are
the same as those shown in OFFTACKLE: Defensive tasks, air of-
fensive, operations in Western Eurasia, and control of essential
communications.

The concept of operations and the plan of action have been
developed in four time phases, which are D-Day plus three months,
phase 1; D-plus-three to D-plus-18 months, phase 2; D-plus-18 to
D-plus-36, phase 3; and D-plus-36 to the end of the war, phase 4.

The composition of the Air Force on D-Day is as shown
on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: Four heavy bomb groups; 11 medium bomb
groups; two strategic reconnaissance groups, heavy; one strategic
reconnaissance group, medium; two weather reconnaissance groups;
one light bomb; 12 fighter interceptors; eight fighter bombers;
one tactical recon; four troop carrier, heavy; two troop carrier,
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medium, for 48 groups.

Then, in the National Guard we would have 27 fighter
groups; 1-2/3 of a light bomb group in the Reserve; and 6-2/3 of
the troop carrier in the Reserve.

The mission of the National Guard was assumed to be that
primarily of tactical aviation and support to ground forces, and
secondarily participation in air defense after D-Day.

The defensive tasks undertaken during the first phase --
D-to-D-plus-three-months -- will be on an austerity basis, and
will involve considerable risk.

The Air Control and Warning System for the air defense
of the United States will be the presently planned 75 basic radars
and ten control centers. To fully man this system for continuous
operation will require 13,000 technically qualified men to be
provided over and above the regular 48-group program, as we now
know it.

These additional troops will be obtained from Air National
Guard AC&W groups by D-plus-one month. As a result, the operation
of the control radars in the system will be considerably less
than satisfactory during the most critical period of the first
phase of war.

The fighter interceptor forces available within a 48-
group Air Force are deployed within the control area of the AC&W
system, or will be 8-2/3 groups.

(Chart shown.)
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GEN ANDERSON: That is 26 squadrons.

Although all other fighter units within the United States, including Navy units, will be used to augment these fighter units sometime after D-Day, the only available air defense fighters ready for combat operations on H-Hour of D-Day will be the 26 regular USAF squadrons.

Forces for defense of areas other than the United States, as shown on this chart, are essentially similar to those in OFF-TACKLE. The major difference is that this study indicates one fighter group now stationed in the Far East should be returned to the United States sometime before D-Day to augment U.S. air defenses.

The first phase task, Strategic Air Offensive: On D-Day, the U.S. forces indicated on this chart will be available to initiate a strategic air offensive.

(Chart shown.)

COL. SEAWELL: Those forces are four heavy bomb groups and in the medium pool building up to six deployed to the U.K. or Northwest Africa.

GEN ANDERSON: A reasonable estimate of the effect of the Soviet effort against the United States strategic air offensive units is a 30 per cent reduction of effectiveness. This percentage includes the estimated damage caused by subversive action and sabotage as well as by atomic bombardment.

During the period of this plan, intercontinental bombing
will be limited. Therefore, planning must continue for the
development of overseas bases essential for the initial atomic
offensive. U.S.-British planning is being carried out for the
development and use of bases in the United Kingdom. It must be
recognized that the United Kingdom bases may be denied to us shortly
after the outbreak of hostilities. It is requisite that bases in the
Azores, French Morocco, Labrador, Tripoli, and the Middle East be
developed to the minimum essential for the conduct of strategic
air operations for the first three months of the war.

The estimated cost to develop these additional base
facilities is approximately $108,000,000.

In 1953, the task of the strategic air units will, in
general, be of a three-fold nature: First, attack on Russian
industrial resources; second, retardation of the Russian ground
offensive; and, third, counter atomic attacks.

The plan of delivery is to dispatch the first attacks
from the Western Hemisphere, utilizing both heavy and medium
bombers; the latter, refueling on route to target. Heavy bombers
would depart bases such as Limehouse, Rapid City, Spokane, or Fair-
field-Suisun; perhaps utilize Eielson, Alaska, as an en route stag-
ing base; use Dhahran and Okinawa as post-strike staging bases
and return to the United States as soon as practicable for the
conduct of further operations.

The mediums will depart Goose Bay and Harmon, use post-
strike staging bases and assemble in the U.K. for further operations.
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until such time as these bases are denied to us. In this event, bases in the Azores and French Morocco will be used by medium bombers for completion of the atomic attack.

The medium bomb group in Okinawa will not participate in the atomic offensive but will carry out conventional operations as required, including mining.

First phase operations in Western Eurasia: During the first phase operations in Western Eurasia, Allied forces in Europe will be withdrawn to defensive positions in the same manner as indicated in OFFTACKLE. To cope with the air effort against the U.K., the British will have a well organized, but very limited air defense system, including approximately 460 jet interceptor aircraft.

No USAF forces will be available to augment British defenses during this period.

We have assumed that Spain will have become a member of the North Atlantic Pact, but military aid to Spain will have been negligible. The Soviet advance against the Iberian Peninsula will be opposed by Spanish forces and those Allied forces successfully withdrawn from Western Europe. No additional forces can be made available during this period.

Allied control of the Cairo-Suez area will be a British responsibility as in OFFTACKLE.

A summary of groups deployed and those in support for this task are shown on this chart.
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(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: Those figures are based on the best available information, including the use of reports from our operations analyst and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. Depending on the accuracy of the factors we have been given and have used, the actual situation could be better or it could be worse than depicted here.

COL SEAWELL: As we have already covered, throughout the various tasks, we shall have deployed for the first-phase operations, the four heavy bombers which operate from the United States; seven medium bombers, including the one in Okinawa in the Far East; the two heavy strategic reconnaissance groups; and the one medium.

The weather groups will be deployed on a world-wide basis. This light bomb group is the one presently deployed to the Far East. The fighter-interceptors, totalling 12, will be deployed -- two in the Far East and ten for the United States and Alaska.

The fighter bomb include the three in the Far East and the two for escort mission with SAC. We also have assumed that the two in occupation in Europe will be rendered ineffective.

GEN ANDERSON: Inasmuch as the Soviet atomic capability may be of decisive proportions in 1953, it has been necessary to make an evaluation of the completion of the exchange of atomic blows.

This evaluation indicates the following probable results:

It is believed that the Soviets will attack our population
centers and accept incidental destruction to specific industrial installations.

In addition, Soviet attack on our retaliatory forces is considered as mandatory in order to thwart, reduce, or delay our own atomic attack.

The effectiveness of our strategic striking force will be reduced approximately 30 per cent. Other armed forces in being will not be the primary targets of atomic attack but may suffer incidental losses due to proximity to priority targets.

The estimated number of bombs dispatched against U.S. manpower and industrial resources may result in casualties on the order of three to six million. Our industrial economy would be seriously reduced but would not collapse.

It can be expected that atomic attack would cause hysteria in the areas immediately affected. However, as a nation, the United States will retain the will to continue the war.

The United States atomic offensive may collapse the Soviet industrial economy. With adequate policing efforts, this collapse could possibly continue for a number of years. Stockpiles of supplies and the limited capacities of satellites and occupied countries would, in that case, be the only source of re-supply for most military resources.

In these circumstances, the Russian capabilities to wage effective warfare would be seriously reduced. Even with the use of atomic weapons on tactical targets, the Russian combatant
forces, both ground and air, will probably continue to be numerically superior to those of the Allies. However, the Soviet field forces may have been seriously retarded in their advance across Western Europe.

Should the tactical employment of atomic bombs make a major reduction in the effectiveness of the Russian armed forces, the Allies might hold, in 1953, some territory in Western Europe at D-plus-three months; but the ability to exploit any enemy weaknesses would be severely curtailed because of insufficient tactical air and insufficient ground forces.

The Soviet submarine campaign and tactical air will probably secure and develop bases in the Scandinavian Peninsula.

By the end of the first phase, the United Kingdom will probably not be a usable air base for strategic air operations.

The Soviet submarine campaign may well make the support of large overseas operations prohibitive in cost even if the forces and logistic support were available.

In the Far East, air operations of both Allies and Soviets will be of a limited, non-sustained nature as a result of preoccupation in Eurasia and because of logistic difficulties.

The second phase, D-plus-3 to D-plus-18 months: At the end of the first three months of operations, the most significant change to be noted is the drastically reduced availability for sustaining the strategic air offensive. Our deployed strategic
force will have been reduced to the equivalent of one heavy, one
medium, and 2/3 reconnaissance groups.

On the basis of the evaluation at the end of the first
phase, only limited undertakings for second-phase operations from
D-plus-3 to D-plus-18 months are open. These limited operations
are: To recuperate from the Soviet Atomic offensive and mobilize
at the fastest practicable rate; continue the defensive tasks; con-
tinue the very greatly reduced strategic air offensive; secure
the United Kingdom; secure Spain against invasion; continue to
maintain Allied control of the Cairo-Suez area with local and
British forces; and maintain control of essential lines of
communications.

We can begin to deploy some forces for counter air opera-
tions in Western Eurasia, as indicated on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

COL SEAWELL: As General Anderson previously pointed out,
during phase 1 no forces, other than tactical pro-occupation force
will be present to operate in Europe. The force deployment that
can be made to the United Kingdom and Northwest Africa, depending
on circumstances, will occur at D-plus-4, at which time we can de-
ploy four fighter bomb groups.

At D-plus-6, we can have in place two fighter intercepto-
group. Those forces would build up essentially as indicated here,
so that by the end of the phase we would have five interceptor,
four fighter bomb, one tac recon, two-and-two-thirds troop carrier
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GEN ANDERSON: I would like to emphasize that that is the total available for both the United Kingdom and Northwest Africa.

GEN EDWARDS: Does that include any National Guard groups?

GEN ANDERSON: Yes. That is where we get those, sir -- from the National Guard -- that have been federalized and have come in.

The third phase, D-plus-18 to D-plus-36 months: During the third phase of operations from D-plus-18 to D-plus-36 months, the general Allied strategy and tasks to be undertaken will be to: Continue the defensive tasks as required, conduct operations in Western Eurasia which have as their operation the reduction of effectiveness of Soviet forces and the creation of conditions that will permit the earliest practicable return in force of the Allies to Western Eurasia.

Beginning at approximately D-plus-24 months, a build-up of deployed strategic air units can be made.

COL SEAWELL: That build-up, beginning on approximately D-plus-24, should reach approximately five heavy bomb, 13 medium bomb, three heavy strat recon, and five medium strat recon by the end of the third year.

GEN ANDERSON: We have assumed that during the second phase we will have gained enough parity in the air to permit us to use the United Kingdom in this phase as a base area. Therefore,
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the U.K. will be developed and other preparations initiated for
a re-entry in force in Western Europe. If the United Kingdom has
become untenable physically or politically, the Northwest African
area will be utilized as an alternate base area.

Northwest Africa should be available to the Allies. Cer-
tain of the forces mobilized for the re-entry in force into Europe
will be deployed to the North African base area depending on the
situation in the U.K.

The air effort will be directed toward attainment of
complete air superiority, and toward reducing the effectiveness
of Soviet forces in occupied territories, particularly in Western
Europe.

As the effects of those operations become apparent, and
as Allied Forces are built up, there should be a gradual swing to
an offensive pattern of operations which will permit the creation
of conditions favorable to Allied re-entry in force into Western
Europe. Forces deployed during phase 3 are as shown on this chart
(indicating).

COL SEAYELL: I have covered most of the deployments
already—the strategic units, and on this chart (indicating) the
build-up in Western Europe—remembering all the time that the
level of forces in the Far East are supposed to remain the same.

GEN ANDERSON: The Allied course of action for the fourth
and final phase, D-plus-36 to the end of the war, will be a continua-
tion of the offensive strategy developed in phase 3. Specifically,
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this action requires a re-entry in force into Europe, defeat of the USSR, and the establishing of control over the defeated enemy.

Our studies deploy forces only to D-plus-36. Therefore, in this phase, forces are not allocated to specific operations.

Now, we have seen that with this 48-group Air Force in the phase of D-plus-4 to D-plus-21 months, we have one heavy and one medium bomb group for an offensive effort. If the strength of the Air Force is increased from 48 to 58 or 77 groups, the strategic concept, basic undertakings, and general tasks will remain essentially the same as those previously discussed.

The D-Day composition of the 58-Group Air Force is indicated on this chart (indicating). The bomber strength remains the same; heavy reconnaissance remains the same.

We have added one medium reconnaissance unit; we have added six fighter-interceptor groups, two fighter bomber groups, and one tactical reconnaissance group -- an increase of ten groups.

On the theory that at least one fighter-interceptor squadron should be in position to defend essential installations in the United States against enemy attack, the available air defense forces in this 58-group Air Force would still be 19 squadrons short of the calculated requirement of 67 fighter-interceptor squadrons for the defense of the United States and Alaska.

This calculated requirement still entails the maximum risk the United States can afford to take.

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The wider defensive coverage of vital industrial areas would cause greater attrition on enemy attackers and would otherwise interfere with his operations so as to reduce considerably the effectiveness of his attacks.

Considerably less physical destruction and fewer personnel casualties would be the result. This, in turn, would require a shorter recovery period and allow a more rapid mobilization, but it must be borne in mind that with air defense of the magnitude contemplated, serious interference will still be made with our mobilization effort.

The reconnaissance requirements for the strategic air offensive will not be fulfilled by the provision of one additional medium strategic reconnaissance group, but the amount of radar scope photography now scheduled to be done by the combat-bomber forces will be reduced.

The additional three tactical air groups will enable us to make some initial contribution to the task of retarding the Russian advance other than that which can be made by occupation forces in Germany.

A summary of deployment capability is indicated on this chart.

(Chart shown.)

COL SEWELL: As you will note, the factors we used and which were explained by the General, would indicate some advance in the build-up of strategic units resulting from the
increased defensive effort available for the United States and Alaska.

GEN ANDERSON: Gentlemen, this study has been undertaken in the full realization that if it is on the pessimistic side, it is no good for our purposes. We have shown this to all of the Air Staff and had their very critical appraisal of it. They do not believe that it is pessimistic.

In some respects -- that is, in the capability of industry to equip units -- they think it may be optimistic. I am thinking now of the part of the study I am coming to.

The study has indicated that the minimum Air Force we should have in being to successfully fight a war beginning in 1953 is 77 groups. That Air Force is composed, as indicated on the next chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: There are six heavy bombardment groups, sixteen medium bombardment groups; three strategic reconnaissance groups, heavy; three medium; two weather; still one light bomb; 24 fighter-interceptor; 12 fighter bomber; two tac reconnaissance; four troop carrier, heavy; four troop carrier, medium -- for a total of 77 groups.

We estimate that these groups would have the following capabilities:

The full fighter-interceptor group minimum requirement for air defense of the United States and Alaska could be provided. These
combat units, with a unit equipment of 75 aircraft and a level of 2.8 crews per aircraft for 24-hour alert status, together with 24 radar installations above the presently approved program, and a manning level permitting 24-hour alert status for the radar system could preserve the United States' ability to fight in the face of the estimated USSR 1953 atomic capability.

By D-plus-3 months, considerable numbers of fighter-interceptors could probably be released from air defense of the United States for deployment to help secure the United Kingdom or Northwest Africa. These groups, together with fighter-bomber units available for immediate deployment to the United Kingdom or Northwest Africa for counter air deployment, probably could provide enough air defense to retain these two areas for future military operations.

We could probably retain our defensive position in the Far East.

A strategic air offensive on the scale of that indicated for the 48-group Air Force could be delivered in approximately 33 days. More important, throughout the second phase of operations, the Air Force could retain a capability for sustained strategic air operations, utilizing conventional bombs and atomic weapons as available.

The ability to deliver a major strategic air offensive in a short period, together with the retention of an ability to sustain both strategic and tactical air units, and, therefore,
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exploit conditions created by the initial atomic offensive; might
well enable the Allies to stem the Russian advance and to retain
a position on the European Continent.

The deployment capability of this 77-Group Air Force is
indicated on this next chart.

(Chart shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: Colonel Sowell, for comparative purposes,
will you show the deployment capability of the three forces?

(Charts shown.)

GEN ANDERSON: Chart 5 indicates this is a risk you doubt
we are warranted in taking unless it is absolutely forced upon us --
the ability to have two bomber groups for our total offensive effort
of D-plus-3 months until about D-plus-24 months.

GEN VANDENBERG: What are some of the factors that you
used in arriving at those two groups?

GEN ANDERSON: Factors of attrition of force in being,
lack of stored aircraft to replace all of the attrition, the fact
that we must bring some units back to the United States to serve
as a mobilization base, and the fact that industry, starting from
such a small base, could not begin to put new aircraft into the
force to meet combat attrition until at least D-plus-18 months.

GEN EDWARDS: General Wolfe, would you like to enlarge
on that subject of the capacity of industry?

GEN WOLFE: In this study it was assumed that we were
suffering damage to the industry in the ratio, I believe, of about

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30 per cent so, therefore, it was very difficult for us to really judge the affect within the aircraft industry so we had to take a cut across all of the commodities and that was the rate that was originally used with that in OFFTACLE which was declared by all to be too optimistic so we cut that back and applied to it a 30 per cent industry factor and recovery factor.

GEN: EDWARDS: You think that is realistic?

GEN: HOLBE: As near as we can plan it within those assumptions.

GEN: KENNEY: Did you assume that any one city like Cleveland may be knocked out completely?

GEN: HOLBE: We would have to take the highly concentrated aluminum industry and apply the loss which would be essential to basic industry.

GEN: KENNEY: I was surprised that you recovered that, too.

GEN: HOLBE: It was an assumption and a guess. The other thing we had to apply was the small present available mobilization potential which we have built into the aircraft industry based on current funds. We can only build in a certain amount of acceleration, particularly, on the heavy and the medium. The radar industry is just coming into being particularly for the interceptors -- a very sensitive and highly defined industry. You know, we have been struggling since 49 to get some distribution of the industry and particularly sensitive right now is the radar.
for the fighters as well as the bombers. You would have to assume
that they would have that knowledge and we would accept considerable
losses.

GEN KENNEY: How long would it take to replace those
big prosses at Boeing and Kindelborgh if they were sabotaged?

GEN HULME: Well, the question is really answerable
in two ways. Based on the damage sustained on heavy equipment
in the German bombing, that equipment was put back into condition
in very short order. The main damage sustained was not on the
heavy equipment. When you turn to sabotage, you have an entirely
different factor to apply. Once you resort to sabotage and get
the main cylinders and the heavy structures in those items, you are
really in trouble.

GEN KENNEY: How long to make one of those?

GEN HULME: We made some estimates just recently; between
12 and 18 months.

GEN ANDERSON: Gentlemen, this completes the presentation.

GEN KENNEY: Why did you leave Iceland out? You talked
about the Azores and North Africa. Why did you leave Iceland out?

GEN ANDERSON: Primarily because our plans do not
contemplate any major operations from there. They contemplate major
operations from the other areas in the event U.K. is not available.
We made this as realistic as we could — actual operating plans.

GEN KENNEY: I was wondering if you figured the Russians
would get it first.
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GEN ANDERSON: I don't believe that entered into General Leclerc's calculations. I might let him comment on that.

GEN LECLERC: I didn't hear General Kenney's question.

GEN ANDERSON: I was wondering why you left Iceland out of the picture. If you got chased out of England, did you figure on making use of Iceland?

GEN LECLERC: We think Africa is a better area than Iceland. The air-drome areas are not developed. There is only one there. We would have to refuel. We could possibly make limited use out of it but we have more opportunity in the African area.

GEN STRATTON: Do you plan any use out of the B-29's that were given to the RAF?

GEN ANDERSON: We haven't in this plan counted on that very heavily. They would have 70 airplanes but they are not equipped to carry the atomic bomb. I was talking to their Director of Operations last Saturday. They don't quite know how they are going to use them as yet.

GEN JOHNSON: The Chief of Air Staff, Slossor, stated that they were not to be used in the land battle at the last meeting with the Western Union Chiefs. They will be used in tactical support.

GEN LECLERC: We said England would have a very well organized defense but no fighters to use in a control system.

GEN ANDERSON: They actually have those programmed to be in units by 1953 -- 160.
TOP SECRET

GEN KEPNER: I heard from your discussion that that was not adequate and we wouldn’t be able to give them any assistance on the thing. Are our fighters in any way, prepared to fit into that control system as it was in the last war in our training and concept in the possibility of an emergency deployment in that direction?

GEN ANDERSON: With the 40-Group force, we would initially deploy 2 F-80-E groups to the United Kingdom for protection of bases and for escort of bomb carriers — at least, until they get away from British territory. Now, we do have a plan to start joint training and to start operational standardization with the British. We plan to rotate a squadron of the 31st Fighter Group to the United Kingdom beginning next August. We can’t do it earlier because we don’t have wing tip tanks. We will have enough wing tip tanks to fly two groups over to Germany to replace the two groups General Cannon now has. Because of that, we can’t start this rotation until next August but we do plan it then and we plan to rotate the 31st and then the 27th and then a unit not yet selected from Continental Air Command.

GEN VANDEBING: Robb was in my office the other day and I told him we were going to be over there in August or September and suggested that he tie in that with his air defense maneuver that he is planning to use about that time. He said he would delay it until we got over there so we could get our procedures tied in together so we would know what each was doing.
TOP SECRET

GEN ANDERSON: I might as well say that I had a long conversation with the British Air Marshal, -- I think they call it the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations -- Guest, last Saturday, and what we hoped to do was bring another team headed by General Powers, and at least another team from SAC, some from COMIN, and some from our Headquarters, to Britain very shortly to start work on standardization of operational procedures insofar as they can. If we are going to operate particularly with their defense systems we have to get some standardization other than hardware on operational procedure.

GEN EDWARDS: Are there any further comments?

(No response)

GEN EDWARDS: Thank you, General Anderson.

We will proceed to the next subject on the agenda which is the Command Presentation of Continental Air Command.

GEN WITMERED: Mr. Secretary, General Vandenberg, Mr. Chairman, and Gentlemen: Our presentation will be quite brief. I do not consider this a proper occasion to discuss many documents which we now have in Air Force Headquarters for action. Continental Air Command has some very great problems incident to the Air Defense of the United States. Our remarks will be completely factual. They will summarize our inability to carry out our mission.

Before the presentation, I should like to reiterate one