I. BASIC THESIS OF BRITISH PAPER

Mr. Matthews suggested that Sir Oliver might wish to outline at the outset the main points of emphasis in the United Kingdom paper, which might then be followed by more detailed questions and discussion. Sir Oliver, agreeing that this was a useful way to proceed, reviewed the events leading to this meeting. He said that the Embassy had received the paper about two weeks ago; copies had been made available to both State and Defense looking toward a series of meetings thereon. The meetings that had been held were dual in character. A military meeting had been held between Slessor and Bradley and the meeting today was a joint politico-military meeting with participants both from the Embassy and the Department of
State. Turning to the paper itself, Sir Oliver said that while it was complex in its structure, in essence it presented an elemental fact and a strategic argument.

The elemental fact was economic. Since the war the United Kingdom had been engaged in two major efforts. One was the task of re-establishing economic health in the United Kingdom and the other was a build-up of military strength in order that the United Kingdom could play its part in dealing with the Soviet menace. These dual objectives had placed very great demands on British resources, demands which were greater than the resources available. As a result the United Kingdom Government had had to deal with recurrent crises and had been unable to reach a state of steady economic equilibrium. The United Kingdom was now concerned about removing the causes breeding these crises rather than to continue a policy of dealing with recurrent crises. The military project of £6.7 billions—now more nearly £5.3 billions as a result of inflation—was too heavy for the British Government to meet in the scheduled three years time.

Faced with the foregoing economic fact they had asked themselves whether the assumptions underlying their previous views of global strategy were in all respects correct. The strategic leg of the paper contained several elements:

1. It was the view of the British Chiefs that insufficient emphasis had been placed on the effectiveness of atomic weapons and that this deterrent should be brought into relation with more general military planning.
a. A future global war would be different from those of the past, particularly as regards the intensity of the first phase of hostilities. With the advent of atomic weapons it was thought that the first phase of war would be one of unprecedented violence and intensity, while the nature of subsequent phases appeared to be quite unpredictable.

b. The United Kingdom felt it must address itself in the first instance to the problem of meeting this first phase of hostilities both in global terms and in terms of defense of the United Kingdom. In atomic war the United Kingdom felt that its ports and sea communications would be in grave jeopardy.

a. The foregoing considerations had led them to modifications in military planning through the period 1954-56.

2. The cold war was expected to last for a long time. In the cold war period it was thought that the deterrent value of atomic weapons would become stronger from year to year. The "why not yesterday" argument will apply in even greater degree.

a. In view of the prospects of a long continued cold war period it was felt that the military build-up should be aimed toward a sustained program with greater emphasis on research and development for new weapons but without envisaging a rapid build-up of strength to a peak. Applied to NATO this involved some modification in the nature of defense.

b. Special attention needed to be paid to the effect of a long cold war period on postures in the Far and Middle East.
c. There was need to improve coordination in other parts of the world especially in the Far and Middle East to a degree comparable to that which had taken place in NATO.

In summary Sir Oliver said that a main thesis of the British analysis was that the world faced a long cold war period rather than the prospect of a hot war soon. He submitted that the strategic analysis which the British Chiefs had made stood on its own feet. It deals with consequences of the economic fact but has a wider application. If the broad strategic considerations are right they determine how best to apply total effort. It appeared to them that a lesser effort would not be less effective than greater effort previously planned.

Sir Oliver then spoke of the purpose of bringing the British paper to the attention of the participants. He thought it was a good thing when either country puts its hand to analytical appraisal of global strategy, it was useful for the two governments to discuss it and to have a frank exchange of views. He hoped that the exchange might reveal considerable agreement, but that in any event it was useful for each side to ventilate its thoughts. Certain stark economic factors were beginning to operate in the United Kingdom and it was thought important that the United States should fully understand the economic operations that would have to be undertaken, the reasons therefore, and to give advice as to how best to present to NATO the necessary consequences of the economic situation. He stressed that the United Kingdom had no wish to weaken NATO and would welcome any advice on how best to present the case. Finally, Sir Oliver
reiterated that the changes in global strategy set forth in the paper were indicated by the military argument but dictated by economic realities. To put it another way, the economic facts required that the United Kingdom do less, the military analysis suggests how this can be done without weakening the United Kingdom military posture. He hoped that the discussion would reveal the divergencies that existed between United States and United Kingdom thinking in the matter and the reasons therefor.

Air Marshal Glaser said that it should be stated in all frankness that the economic situation had triggered off the current study. He said that the economic situation was sufficiently serious so that it might not be possible even to meet the reduced requirements flowing from the present paper. The two main economic factors were these:

1. The metal using industries in the United Kingdom were unable to meet both the requisite export requirements and the earlier military requirements. The problem was to determine what portion of the capacity of these industries could safely be earmarked for rearmament without jeopardizing the build-up of exports.

2. Foreign Exchanges. The exchange situation was such as to require a retraction of overseas expenditures. Whatever the outcome might be in Egypt, for example, it will probably be necessary to bring about a redeployment in the Middle East. Such redeployment would probably bring about an increased per capita cost as regards troops involved. Even if troops stayed in Egypt they could not continue living in tents as they now did in the canal zone. As regards Germany, the cost of maintaining troops there after the conclusion of the contractuals was estimated at one hundred million pounds per year.
It was essential that the United Kingdom make a virtue of necessity. New weapons, particularly atomic, made it militarily feasible to make such necessity a virtue.

Concerning the strategic concepts in Europe, Air Marshal Slessor thought that the predominant military factor in Europe today was not the existence of 175 Russian divisions but rather the presence of United States forces and the fact that in the event of war the United States would be in it from the beginning with an all-out atomic offensive. Present NATO planning seemed to him to represent a halfway house between two military concepts—that of the 1914-18 period on the one hand and of the atomic age on the other. SHAPE plans represented a modified version of 1914-18 concepts with a resultant overemphasis on ground forces. Such overemphasis produced a "logistic nightmare" and constituted "strategic nonsense." It was the British view that the allies should go all out on atomic developments and on research and development programs for other new weapons and thereby bring about reduction in the force requirements.

II. POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT

General Bradley stated that the United States military was in agreement with certain things in the paper; however, it found many points of considerable disagreement. He listed the basic differences as follows:

1. The United States Joint Chiefs considered war to be more probable in the 1954 period than did the United Kingdom. The United States Chiefs did not agree with United Kingdom appraisal on this point. While it was recognized that the economic factor
would require certain changes in build-up. General Bradley stressed that this fact did not change one's estimate of the danger to be faced.

2. The United Kingdom gave greater weight to the effectiveness of atomic bombing in 1954 than did the United States Joint Chiefs. Atomic weapons plus methods of delivery in this period were not thought to be such as to make any great difference on force requirements for this period. The United States Chiefs had given a good deal of thought to the effect of modern weapons on military requirements but were unable to come up with the same optimistic view expressed in the British paper as far as the 1954 period was concerned. He recalled that it had been agreed in the military talks the day before to ask General Ridgway to review MG 26/1. He felt, however, that such review would not bring about any appreciable revision in the force requirements through 1954 but might reflect some such possibilities by 1956. He agreed with the thesis that it was essential to sustain strength over a long period of time. Atomic weapon production in the United States was rapidly increasing. However, the really sizeable increases resulting from recently authorized expansion programs were not due to come in for some time.

3. The United States Chiefs were concerned over the decision of the United Kingdom to go into the production of atomic weapons in the United Kingdom because of the great demands such a program would make upon materials and manpower. General Bradley stressed that such
decision was of course a United Kingdom affair in which political considerations doubtless played an important part, but he wished nevertheless to express his concern about the development.

General Bradley thought that the main points that might usefully be discussed were the following:

1. Cold war vs. hot war.
2. What new coordinating machinery should be set up if any.
3. The situation in the Middle and Far East.
4. The effect on other nations of a reduction in the United Kingdom contribution to NATO.

General Bradley mentioned that it would be necessary for the United States to put forward its requirements for 1954 funds before November of this year, preferably September.

Air Marshal Slessor said he felt there was no disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on the effect that atomic capabilities would have on force requirements by 1954. It seemed clear that there would not be enough forces in Europe by 1954 in any event. The United Kingdom thought that atomic capabilities should have some appreciable effect on force requirements by 1956. In identifying the points of disagreement, Mr. Matthews said there was no disposition on the part of the United States to question the economic leg of the analysis, namely no doubt about the need for economy. He went on, however, that the United States felt that the danger of a hot war in the near future was rather greater than did the United Kingdom. At the same time, the United States agreed that the cold war would probably be the condition of man for a long period of time. The United States felt that the United Kingdom overemphasized the effect of
the atomic offensive in the short run. While the United States agreed that both the Middle East and the southeast Asia areas were of great importance in the cold war, there seemed to be considerable divergence of view between the two countries as to what to do in the Middle East and how to prevent southeast Asia from falling into the Soviet orbit. There was also disagreement as to how China could be clipped off from the Soviet Union. While the United Kingdom paper spoke of the need to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, it was silent as to how this could be done. Finally the United States felt it would be most unwise politically for the United Kingdom to pull its troops out of Austria even though economic/military considerations might make it desirable. He thought that the solution might better lie in a scaling down of military forces there rather than a complete pull out.

Sir Oliver stressed again the broad compulsions forced upon the United Kingdom by the economic situation. In response to a question from Mr. Matthews Sir Oliver said that the United Kingdom was forced to make a reduction in projected military expenditures, not merely to stretch the expenditures out over a longer period. He went on to say he hoped that the United States would work with the United Kingdom and help in any way it could so that the danger of letting down the allies might be minimized.

III. HOT VS. COLD WAR

Sir Oliver said that the matter of evaluating the dangers of hot vs. cold war was highly subjective but also of great importance. The British view that a hot war was rather less likely than a continuation of a cold war was based on several considerations:

1. Why not yesterday? The United Kingdom was struck by the fact that if the Soviet Union were contemplating global war its chances would have been better earlier rather than now and better now than later. Western strength was increasing steadily and the
prospects therefore of successful Soviet aggression were steadily diminishing.

2. USSR haven't been doing badly. In fact they have been doing well. It seems clear that the Soviet Union was doing much too well in expanding its power and control and had consistently done so over the last 6 years. As long as it was doing well without war why should it take the risks involved?

3. The foregoing consideration was buttressed by an additional consideration, namely the risks of total war to the Soviet Union in the face of western atomic capabilities. Surely the Kremlin would appreciate the great risk to its regime which would be brought about by global war. For the first time the Soviet Union must realize that global war would bring total war to Soviet territory "swiftly, strikingly, and wounding", and the ability to bring the war to Soviet territory in this devastating way was constantly increasing as the United States increased its preponderance over the Soviet Union in atomic weapons.

4. Except for the North American continent itself the Soviet Union must consider the greatest prize to be the industrial capacity of Western Europe. Such prize, however, would be valueless if it were gained only by a war of destruction. There was now in Western Europe enough strength to prevent the Soviet Union from seizing intact the industrial complex of that area. It would be fought over and destroyed.
The foregoing considerations served as a basis for the British view that a hot war appeared less likely now than it had in the past. At the same time it must always be borne in mind that a misadventure could bring on world war. On balance, however, the advantage was swinging increasingly in the direction of the West. Sir Oliver then inquired why the United States hesitated to accept the British thesis.

Mr. Matthews said that as we progressed with building situations of strength, particularly the rearmament of Germany and Japan, it seemed to the United States to increase the likelihood that the Soviet Union might take greater risks in order to prevent the accretion of power to the West. Mr. Nitze said that he was troubled by the contrast which was being made between our 1950 estimate of the risk of war and the current estimate of the risk. In 1950 we felt that unless there were a substantial increase in Western strength we would progressively be faced with having to accept the loss of positions of very great importance to the West or with going to war from a weak and inadequately prepared posture. We had made considerable progress in improving our general defense posture in the last two years. On the other hand as we improved our ability to hold important positions such as Korea, southeast Asia, and the Middle East, the point that the USSR was doing well would no longer hold. In order to continue to hold in southeast Asia, etc., against possible communist moves we may have to take actions which might lead to an unwinding chain of events which could bring on war. We were still faced with grave risks of either having to accept defeat piecemeal without war or taking counteractions to communist moves which involved a risk of war.
Sir Oliver asked why the United States looked upon 1954 as a "hump period. Mr. Matthews responded that we looked upon 1954 as the time when the West should be over the hump of military preparation and build-up, not as a hump of greatest danger. Moreover, this hump was less of a peak than the edge of a plateau. General Bradley, agreeing with this point, set forth certain considerations which gave the United States a different view from that of the United Kingdom as to the dangers of war through 1954.

1. Soviet atomic weapon stockpile. While it was true that the Soviet Union had its first atomic weapon in 1949, they had no stockpile at that time. The Soviet Union undoubtedly felt that it could not go to global war with impunity without a sizeable stockpile of such weapons. It was the view of the United States Chiefs that such a stockpile would be in hand by 1954.

2. On the basis of other considerations of military strength, e.g., weakness of NATO forces and of military postures elsewhere in the world, the Kremlin probably reasoned that their chances of a successful global war would remain good until 1954.

3. Obsolescence of Soviet military stocks. Much of the Soviet military strength brought about by present production schedules might well reach a point of serious obsolescence by 1954. This factor while not a major one might have a bearing on a decision by the Kremlin to go to war before the value of their military build-up was overtaken by obsolescence.

Mr.Hitze said he was concerned about an implication in the British paper to the effect that war might be brought about by rash action on the
part of the United States. He stressed that in his view this was not the
danger but rather that the danger lay in the possibility that Soviet action
might be of such a grave nature as to leave the West with no alternative
but war. Reinforcing this point, General Bradley said that the United
States might be faced with a situation as the British were in the case of
Poland in 1939.

Air Marshal Slessor pointed out that paragraph 36 of the British paper
stressed the importance of maintaining an effective deterrent, the accent
being on a real deterrent, namely atomic weapons, and not so much on ground
forces.

Mr. Matthews reiterated that the United States considered the degree
of risk of a hot war through 1954 to be higher than was the case with the
United Kingdom. Mr. Nitze stressed that this difference in view sprang
in part from a greater concern on the part of the United States that the
West could not permit further losses of territory on the peripheries.

Sir Oliver, acknowledging the strength of the points which had been
made by General Bradley, said that he thought there was an additional
offsetting factor, namely that the Soviet Union no longer had the possi-
ibility of seizing the increasingly well integrated industrial potential
of Western Europe intact.

General Bradley said that Stalin had great respect for industrial
capacity and would doubtless want to knock out American industries in the
event of global war, an effect which he might well achieve by a sneak
attack with 50 atomic weapons delivered on target. Mr. Nitze said it
had been the United States objective to postpone by its rearmament program the time of greatest danger, which in the absence of such a program might have been 1951, as far as possible into the future or get entirely beyond it, but that the very actions required by the West to do this constantly carried with them the risk that the Soviet Union might consider it necessary to react forcibly.

IV. MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Matthews inquired whether Sir Oliver wished to discuss the problems of the Middle East. Sir Oliver responded that he felt it would not be useful at this meeting to go into the various complicated details of the Middle East problem.

General Bradley said that the United States Chiefs agreed with the United Kingdom on the urgent need for settlements in the Middle East and to the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization. The United States Chiefs did not agree that SACEUR should be responsible for guarding the Middle Eastern flank. It was felt that this responsibility should be placed upon a MEPO. In setting up such an organization, it would be desirable to get as many Arab States to participate as possible.

Air Marshal Glensor pointed out that the main problem in this area was to defend Turkey to prevent her from being outflanked by the Soviets. The entry of Turkey into NATO had revolutionized the defense problem. The question of how best to make Turkey secure probably could be solved in various ways.
Mr. Matthews said that the best solution seemed to lie in building military strength in the Arab countries by establishing a Middle East Defense Organization and by getting as many Arab States to join in as possible. This was the more necessary with the prospective reduction of United Kingdom forces in the area.

Air Marshal Slessor stated that the United Kingdom did not plan to reduce United Kingdom forces in the Middle East immediately, but rather after some settlement had been obtained in Egypt. It was thought that a reduction in force in the Middle East would result in a considerable saving in foreign exchange. He mentioned that one of the problems in connection with the establishment of a MEDO was the question as to whom such a body would report. General Bradley suggested that the Middle East Defense Organization should be a military committee rather than a Standing Group. Both Air Marshal Slessor and Mr. Nisan expressed agreement with this point of view.

In response to a question from Mr. Matthews, Sir Oliver explained that the chief reason for withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from the Middle East was the problem of foreign exchange. Air Marshal Slessor explained that the Middle East troops which would be pulled out would be redeployed back to the United Kingdom. The proposal for reduction of air forces in the Middle East was more nearly one of not making the previously contemplated increases rather than a reduction.

In response to a question from Mr. Byroade, Sir Oliver stated that it did not appear useful to speculate as to the position the United Kingdom would take on Middle Eastern forces in the event of no solution to the
Egypt problem. He went on to say, however, that the Middle East did appear to be an area where some reduction could take place. Reduction was vitally necessary because the United Kingdom considered its viability more important than maintenance of power in certain local areas.

V. GERMANY

In response to a question from Mr. Perkins, Air Marshal Slessor stated that the United Kingdom intended to stay in Germany. In this connection, however, Sir Oliver quoted from a recent letter he had received from Sir Roger Makins which stated that while the United Kingdom intended to stay in Germany, the means of financing such forces as remained in Germany would have to be discussed at a later date. Sir Oliver stated that the United Kingdom just did not know at this time how to manage the financing of this commitment. Air Marshal Slessor said that in his view it was most unfair that Germany should stop paying for foreign troops on her territory after June 1953, the more so since Germany's own expenses for her troops would not at that time be very high. Mr. Matthews suggested that one of the solutions might lie in using German industry for the production of armaments. Air Marshal Slessor responded that he was in favor of letting Germany make any and all armaments.

VI. SOUTHEAST ASIA

General Bradley stated that the United Kingdom and the United States still appeared to be very far apart in their evaluations of the situation in southeast Asia and what ought to be done about it. Mr. Nitze alluded to
the London talks that had been held recently in which the southeast Asia problem was raised, and Mr. Matthews inquired whether the paper had been prepared before or since these London talks. Air Marshal Glessor stated that the current paper did not take into account the views that had been exchanged in London on this area. Mr. Nimitz said that the London talks had indicated that the military should be focused on the question as to what military action would be necessary in the event of aggression in this area to cause the Chinese communists to cease their aggression. The problem to be considered, therefore, was essentially a military one; namely, what would have to be done to achieve this objective. It was felt by the American members that it would probably be necessary to go after China itself and that this question should not be barred from the military talks on political grounds. He recalled that both he and Mr. Nash had taken the position that a naval blockade and air interception of the lines of communication would probably be found to be necessary. He had understood that the United Kingdom representatives had agreed the military talks should include a discussion on the military necessity for these measures and on their military efficacy. It might be that military action would have to be extended to include efforts to force the Chinese Air Force out of the war. It was our understanding that none of these subjects would be excluded because of political considerations. Mr. Nimitz then inquired what the position was at the present time. Would it be useful to have a continuation of military talks on this problem?

Air Marshal Glessor stated that the United Kingdom had no intention of putting political obstacles in the way of a purely military evaluation
of what needed to be done in southeast Asia. From a strictly military point of view, the United Kingdom felt that the actions which the Americans had suggested in this area were not likely to be effective. Mr. Matthews inquired whether it was the United Kingdom view that military action should be confined to Indochina itself. He went on to point out that it seemed most probable to the United States that Indochina would go by default unless Chinese communist aggression were checked in China itself. Air Marshal Slessor reiterated that the United Kingdom did not feel that hitting China would prevent the loss of Indochina. This judgment was based on purely military considerations, without any political inhibitions involved. Sir Oliver stated that the British view did not mean to confine actions to Indochina alone but that the action should be localized. Such localization did not exclude interdiction of lines of supply in China. The United Kingdom, however, had the impression that the United States view was that such interdiction should extend much farther into China itself than the United Kingdom envisaged. He thought there were two areas of agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on this problem:

1. That Allied forces should cope with those Chinese areas whence support for aggression against Indochina was coming, and

2. That the Allies should stay away from those Chinese areas close to the borders of the Soviet Union.

There was disagreement as to a gray area between 1 and 2 above. Air Marshal Slessor confirmed that this was essentially the position.
Sir Oliver said the main points concerning this area of the world seemed to be as follows:

1. The question of local action versus broader action;
2. The United Kingdom view that a more articulated form of organization should be established to deal with this area;
3. That it might be necessary to introduce ground troops into Indochina;

He felt that this last problem was different from the first three mentioned. He cited the importance of public opinion on this question and pointed out that the use of atomic weapons would have grave political repercussions and that the effect throughout Asia would be most adverse. He hoped that this question might be separated from the first three points he had mentioned. Sir Oliver said that the United Kingdom was now urging the need for further military talks to think through the military considerations involved in possible action in southeast Asia. There was need for better organizational arrangements to deal with the problems of collective security. Mr. Matthews inquired as to whether such considerations should be directed to purely military factors. Sir Oliver said that while this should be the primary intention, it was clear that political considerations could not be excluded.

Referring to paragraph 55 of the British paper, General Bradley felt that the United Kingdom was not proposing an effort which would serve as much of a deterrent to the Chinese communists. By excluding attacks by atomic weapons and naval blockade, it seemed to him the British could not
hope to out-face the Chinese threat. Mr. Hitze commented that the British arguments which had been raised against the application of more power against China in the gray area mentioned by Sir Oliver seemed to be political in nature. If localized action alone was not expected to be militarily effective why wouldn't the addition of such measures as a naval blockade be indicated on purely military grounds if political grounds were excluded from consideration. To this Air Marshal Slessor responded that the amount of power put into the defense of the Southeast Asia area would depend in large measure on the scale of operations which the United States would be prepared to mount. He felt certain, for example, that the United States would not be prepared to commit any large part of SAC to this area.

Mr. Hitze pointed out that the cost in terms of attrition would probably be greater if the scale of effort were small and ineffective rather than large and effective. Air Marshal Slessor responded that the measures which the United States had suggested would not be effective.

The discussion then turned to the question of the amount of water-borne shipments of material into China. General Bradley stated that United States intelligence indicated that approximately one million tons of material was going into China per month by water. The United States Chiefs thought that denial of such imports would have a very considerable effect on the war-making abilities of Communist China. In the discussion that ensued, it appeared that United States and United Kingdom intelligence on the matter of water-borne imports was divergent and it was agreed that unless there could be agreement on the facts bearing on the problem, further military talks on this subject would prove fruitless.
However, there appeared to be general agreement that further military talks on possible action in southeast Asia would be desirable. Mr. Matthews urged that every effort be made to come to such talks on an open-minded basis with particular attention to straight military considerations, at least in the first instance. Sir Oliver, in urging that further talks be held, stressed that there was an interrelation between political and military considerations, but that strictly military considerations should be examined in the first instance. He felt that there were two background considerations which would have to be brought to bear, but their importance would be conditioned by the military conclusions that might be reached. These considerations were:

1. That the United Kingdom did not want the Allies to become all sprawled out in China, and

2. Did not want an either/or situation to develop with the Soviets over Indochina.

Mr. Nitch and Mr. Matthews stressed again that the most important aspect of the problem to be addressed was the straight military question as to how much punishment would have to be inflicted upon communist China in order to induce it to stop its aggression in Indochina.

Sir Oliver inquired whether the United States had any clear idea of how far into China it would propose to take action. Mr. Matthews said that the United States was in agreement with the United Kingdom that military action should stop some distance away from Soviet targets. By way of example, General Bradley pointed out that it was current practice to stay at least twelve miles away from Soviet targets in the Korean area. Mr. Matthews argued that from a political point of view it would be important in the event of
action against China to stay farther away from the Soviet targets. General Bradley agreed, saying that perhaps the distance in this instance might be 100 miles. It was recognized, he said, that the closer the Allies came to Soviet borders, the greater was the chance of war. On the other hand, it would have been Chinese aggression in the first instance which would have greatly increased the chance of war.

Air Marshal Slamor said that the present air power in the Far East was not sufficient to do a proper job in Korea. Air Marshal Elliot pointed out, however, that the Air Forces presently in the Korean theatre were not being used against China itself. Backing up this point, General Bradley remarked that in the Korean area material could come in at least 200 miles by rail. In the absence of authority to go after water-borne movements, the Allies were operating under a real handicap. Air Marshal Elliot said that the substance of disagreement between the two countries seemed to be that the United States wanted to go right into China, whereas the United Kingdom wished to localize action in the area of Indochina.

Mr. Nitsue again urged that the military talks should be directed solely to the question as to what force was necessary to cause Chinese communists to cease their aggression. Once these purely military conclusions were drawn, the political consequences of the required action could be assessed. Mr. Matthews inquired whether the British participants in the discussion of last November on this matter had been under any political restrictions in their analysis. Air Marshal Elliot said that they had not been, except that no action should be contemplated which would involve the Soviet Union in the war. General Bradley said that the United States Chief's thought that
a blockade of China in connection with the Indochinese situation could be made effective without blockading Port Arthur and Dairen. Mr. HITZER summed up the United States view as being that in order to do an effective job in the Indochina situation, it would be necessary to put pressure on China itself.

Mr. Oliver said he thought the discussion had reached a point where the best he could do was to report the substance of the views that had been expressed back to London with the hope that the military talks would be renewed.

VII. ORGANIZATION

Mr. Matthews said that the United States had serious reservations about setting up a Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Middle East and the Far East areas. The United States view was that there was less need for further organization than there was for better use of existing machinery. The United States was troubled that establishment of such a Combined Chiefs of Staff would create serious difficulties with other allies. Mr. Oliver said that the Soviet Union possessed a very real advantage in the cold war in that it was able to operate on internal lines. The Western powers did not have such advantage and it was the more necessary, therefore, that means be found whereby Western responses to Soviet thrusts could be made on a unitary basis. It seemed, therefore, to the United Kingdom important to bring the appropriate military advisers together for the purpose of working out concerted policy and action. Mr. Matthews said there was no question about the need to be met, but stated that existing machinery seemed to function with good effect. He cited by way of example current preoccupations.
with Yugoslavia, where continuing consultations were being held to good
effect even though no formal machinery existed.

Air Marshal Slessor said that on the military side, arrangements for
exchange of views did not seem to be as effective as in the political
sphere. He cited talks that had taken place in the past in Singapore and
elsewhere but without results. He said that perhaps the solution would lie
in developing a constant habit of consultation rather than by means of
building up a new large organization. He stressed that the Soviet menace
was a global menace affecting three principal areas of the world, namely,
NATO, southeast Asia, and Middle East. In the area where the danger seemed
the least, namely in NATO, the best organization existed. He felt that
organizations in southeast Asia and the Middle East comparable to that in
NATO should be built up. Mr. Nitze pointed out that the problems in
southeast Asia and the Middle East were essentially cold war problems in
which the political and military elements were closely interrelated. He
felt the problem was not one of perfecting additional machinery, but one
of securing agreement between divergent viewpoints. He pointed out that
there had been no lack of consultation on the problem presented by Iran,
but there had simply been no agreement as to what should be done. Air
Marshal Slessor pointed out that on the Iranian situation no military talks
had taken place. Mr. Nitze confirmed that to the best of his knowledge
that was so. He pointed out, however, that there was no reason why military
talks might not have been held and, in fact, a Slessor-type meeting might
well have been held. Air Marshal Slessor said that maybe they had been
delinquent in not raising the question in this forum.
General Bradley said that one of the chief difficulties he foresaw in setting up a Combined Chiefs of Staff was that of bringing in the French. He thought more could be accomplished by ad hoc meetings between the United States and the United Kingdom, bringing the French in as necessary. He was troubled about the repercussions that would be experienced with other countries in the event a Combined Chiefs of Staff on a trilateral basis was established. In this connection, Mr. Matthews pointed out that there were increasing difficulties in NATO itself in that various members of the organization had sought to be consulted on the method of dealing with the recent Soviet note.

Air Marshal Slessor suggested that an intensification of the "Slessor-type meetings" would appear to provide the most practicable solution. General Bradley and Mr. Matthews agreed. Sir Christopher Steel suggested that it would be useful if either side could call for a meeting as needed. Air Marshal Slessor thought that the immediate problem facing that group was to take a look at the next steps that would be required in the Middle East. General Bradley thought that this subject should be handled on a trilateral basis by bringing in the French. Mr. Matthews stated that existing machinery should be used rather than to seek to establish new machinery. In response to Adm. Fechteler's point that inasmuch as the United States had no forces in the Middle East it consequently had no interest in that area, Air Marshal Slessor pointed out this was not the controlling factor. He cited, by way of example, the fact that both countries were concerned about the situation in Indochina even though
neither country had any troops there. He reiterated that existing machinery should be used and that arrangements should be made to include the French when needed.

In discussing the use of existing machinery, Mr. Matthews pointed out that Air Marshal Elliot's function was to keep in touch with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on these matters. Air Marshal Elliot agreed and hastened to add that he had always found ready access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whenever he wished it. He pointed out that the military discussions envisaged in southeast Asia and the Middle East sprang from what were initially political problems and such talks were not designed to set out courses of military action. He felt that there was need for a group of military representatives rather than an individual. General Bradley agreed that more people were needed and that it might be desirable to set up a military committee, the representatives on which would act on instructions from this Government. He thought this solution warranted further study.

Mr. Nifene suggested that Air Marshal Elliot should be augmented by additional personnel who would bring particular expertise to discussions on different areas of the world, for example, southeast Asia and the Middle East. These people could work with our Joint Chiefs of Staff people and if important problems involving both political and military considerations arose they could be raised at a flesh-with-type meeting. General Bradley said he thought there might be something in this suggestion. He felt that any group that might be set up should be left free to give full time to the military problems presented in the various areas of the world and not be overburdened with operating responsibilities.
VIII. THE PROBLEM OF AN UTMATUM

[NOTE: At a United States-United Kingdom political/military meeting on February 5, 1952 concerning the British "stop-line" paper considerable discussion took place on the question of an ultimatum. Sir Oliver suggested: "his Government should think further about the definition of situations in which an ultimatum would be desirable and perhaps a further talk could be held when that had been done." ]

At Sir Oliver's request, Air Marshal Slessor outlined the current United Kingdom view on the question of an ultimatum. He said the United Kingdom had come to the broad conclusion that the military disadvantages were so great that, in principle, an ultimatum should not be resorted to vis-a-vis the Soviet Union unless there were a reasonable chance that it would be effective. In view of the great military disadvantages and the bearing that the circumstances prevailing at the time would have on the feasibility and desirability of such action, a decision to deliver an ultimatum should be made only at the last minute. The United Kingdom had given thought to the question whether an ultimatum might be given to a satellite or should be reserved for the main enemy. They had not been able to make up their minds on this and felt that here, also, decision would have to be reserved until a specific situation arose.