DECLARATION OF TERRY N. BURGER
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REVIEW OFFICER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I, TERRY N. BURGER, hereby declare and say:

1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I have held this position since April 5, 2004. I have held various administrative and professional positions within the CIA since October 17, 1971.

2. As IRO for the DI, I am responsible for the final review of documents containing information originated by components of the DI or that otherwise implicate DI interests when such documents are the subject of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA) or other requests for public disclosure. I also task and coordinate records searches concerning files or documents reasonably
likely to be maintained by the DI. In addition and under a written delegation of authority pursuant to section 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12958, as amended, I hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. Therefore, I am authorized to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification and declassification decisions.

3. As part of my official duties, I ensure that determinations as to the release or withholding of information related to the CIA are proper and do not jeopardize CIA interests, personnel, or facilities, and ensure that they do not jeopardize intelligence activities, sources or methods.

4. Through the course of my official duties, I have become familiar with the FOIA claim brought by Plaintiff Larry Berman (Plaintiff) against the CIA as set forth in the complaint. The statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge and upon information made available to me in my official capacity.

5. The purpose of this Declaration is to set out to the extent possible on the public record the bases for the

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CIA's response to Plaintiff's FOIA request for the
President's Daily Brief for the dates of August 6, 1965,
March 31, 1968 and April 2, 1968 (hereinafter referred to
as the "Requested PDBs")² pursuant to the FOIA. I have
carefully reviewed the Requested PDBs to determine whether
the Requested PDBs, or any part of them, could be released
to Plaintiff.

6. I have determined that the Requested PDBs would
reveal:

(a) information about the application of
intelligence sources and methods which the Director of
Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting
from unauthorized disclosure, in accordance with 50
U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(7), and which is therefore exempt
from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(3);
(b) information that is currently and properly
classified pursuant to Sections 1.4(b) and (c) of
Executive Order 12958, as amended, as its disclosure
reasonably could be expected to result in damage to
the national security and that will be exempt from
automatic declassification under § 3.3(b)(1) of that
Executive Order, and is therefore exempt from
disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(1); and
(c) information that (1) is related to the pre-
decisional deliberative process of a government
agency, the disclosure of which would cause harm to
the deliberative process, and (2) constitutes
communications with the President made in the
performance of his official duties, and is therefore
exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(5).

² All references to the Requested PDBs in this Declaration refer to the
editions of the PDB dated August 6, 1965 and April 2, 1968. Upon
investigation, the Agency has determined that no edition of the PDB was
produced on March 31, 1968.
7. I have determined that the Requested PDBs must be withheld in their entirety, as no reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of the documents exist.

8. This Declaration is divided into four parts. The first part sets forth the procedural history relating to Plaintiff's FOIA request and the CIA's administrative response thereto; the second part provides background and context on the nature of the Requested PDBs; the third part identifies and explains the FOIA exemptions claimed by the CIA; and I conclude this Declaration in part four.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9. By letter dated March 3, 2004, Plaintiff submitted to the CIA a FOIA request seeking "the President's Daily Brief (PDB) from August 5, 1965, August 8, 1965, March 31, 1968 and April 2, 1968." Plaintiff requested a waiver of search and review fees based on Plaintiff's statement that he intended to use the documents for scholarly purposes supported by the University of California and not for individual commercial use.


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3 Plaintiff does not request in his complaint that the Agency provide a PDB from August 8, 1965.
11. By letter dated April 15, 2004, the CIA stated that "the President's Daily Brief contains inherently privileged, predecisional and deliberative material for the President and also requires withholding on this basis.... Therefore, your request is denied under FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(5)." The CIA informed Plaintiff of his right to appeal this final decision to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days.

12. By letter dated May 6, 2004, Plaintiff appealed the CIA's decision to withhold the Requested PDBs to the Agency Release Panel.

13. By letter dated May 13, 2004, the CIA informed Plaintiff that his appeal had been accepted and arrangements would be made for its consideration by the appropriate members of the review panel.

14. By letter dated June 21, 2004, the CIA informed plaintiff that in accordance with regulations set forth in part 1900 of title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), the Agency Release Panel considered Plaintiff's appeal and determined that the records in question must continue to be withheld in their entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(5). Therefore, in accordance with 1900.41 of title 32 of the C.F.R., the Agency Release Panel denied Plaintiff's appeal. Finally,
the CIA informed Plaintiff of his right to seek judicial review.


II. BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF

A. Background

16. The history and development of the PDB establish that it differs substantively and intrinsically from other intelligence products created by the Directorate of Intelligence. The PDB is a unique intelligence document prepared specifically for the President of the United States and his most senior advisors to provide them with the most important current intelligence on critical issues relating to national defense and foreign policy.

17. The first incarnation of the PDB, the President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICL, pronounced “Pickle”) was formulated in response to President Kennedy’s dissatisfaction with other intelligence products that were not designed specifically to address matters of interest to the President and his most senior advisors. Because of their relatively broad distribution, these other intelligence products did not include the most highly sensitive intelligence information that the President and
his most senior advisors needed to conduct U.S. national defense and foreign policy. In contrast, the PICL was designed for the President and his top advisors. It was intended to select the most sensitive data and provide the best intelligence judgments available in order to give the President and his top advisors the most accurate, comprehensive, and timely information needed to make national defense and foreign policy decisions for the country.

18. During the Johnson administration, the PICL became the President’s Daily Brief and its format, content, and presentation were modified to reflect the needs of President Johnson and his top advisors. Over the last forty years, the PDB has continued to be revised to meet the needs of the sitting President and his top advisors, with the same objective of providing them with a unique publication: a synthesis, in a few pages, of what immediate intelligence the Central Intelligence Agency determines is critical for the President and his most senior advisors to make effective U.S. national defense and foreign policy decisions. Leadership from various parts of the CIA are involved in making decisions about what to include in the PDB to ensure that it presents information
of sufficient importance to bring to the President's attention.

19. Throughout the history of the PDB, it has been common for the President to ask follow-up questions in response to information presented in the PDB or for the President's advisors to suggest areas that should be covered in the PDB. In this way, and by responding to questions and suggestions from the President's senior advisors, the PDB has become an ongoing dialog between the President, together with his most senior advisors, and the CIA; as such it has served as a key element in Presidential deliberations on the making of U.S. national defense and foreign policy.

B. Sensitive Information in the PDB

20. Plaintiff has requested three specific editions of the PDB. Later in this Declaration, in explaining the bases of the FOIA (b)(1) exemption claimed by the CIA, I will describe damage that reasonably could be expected to result from the disclosure of the Requested PDBs. First, however, I will explain the sensitivity of this unique intelligence document. Each individual edition of the PDB contains the information deemed most important for the President and his most senior advisors to see that day. Even more important than the contents of a single edition
of the PDB, however, is the highly sensitive nature of the PDB as a series, as described in subpart C of this section, below.

21. Because of its limited distribution and the high level of decision-making conducted by the PDB's readers, the PDB can and does provide more immediate information than would be feasible to share with a wider audience. In so doing, it sets aside the basic rules of intelligence documents in that it includes within its four corners information unavailable to the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community, including a) undissemi nated raw operational information, sometimes including true names of sources and/or cryptonyms, b) sensitive operational information added to the document by the Directorate of Operations after the Directorate of Intelligence has written or edited the material in the PDB, c) information restricted at the very highest levels of human and technical source intelligence gathering, d) information from covert technical operations, and e) information from specifically developed or acquired CIA-only methods.

22. Furthermore, because the PDB must provide the most important intelligence on any given day and provide that information in only a few pages, it fuses all of the available intelligence, including what is gathered through
the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods. As a result, classified information necessarily becomes inextricably intertwined with unclassified information that is also included in PDBs.

23. The PDB also presents an absolutely unique window of insight into the nation’s critical intelligence priorities, collection platforms and turn-around time for the intelligence process. It provides a unique glimpse as to what the Intelligence Community is targeting and what the country’s decision-makers know (or do not know) and when they know it.

24. In sum, on a day-to-day basis, the PDB is the most highly selective compendium of the most important intelligence available to the U.S. Intelligence Community. As such, it is uniquely sensitive in terms of risk of identification of intelligence sources and methods, including analytical methodology. The disclosure of the specific information in any individual edition of the PDB reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to national security.

C. **Additional Sensitivity of the PDB Series**

25. Although one edition of the PDB is presented as a single document each day, the CIA regards the PDB as a series of documents through which the DCI informs the
President and other top policymakers of the most important intelligence information available about the most critical national defense and foreign policy issues over time, and which informs decisions on what topics to focus intelligence collection and analysis activities.

26. While some information in specific PDBs may appear harmless to disclose when read in isolation, such information may be very valuable as part of a "mosaic" of information gleaned from various sources, including multiple PDBs prepared over time. That is, one datum may appear harmless by itself, out of context, but one cannot determine the potential harm of a single piece of information merely by examining it out of context or even within a review of the document from which it comes. Intelligence services specialize in collecting information from many sources and drawing conclusions from all of the information gathered. Information that seems innocuous on its face can provide the pieces necessary to complete a puzzle (or a mosaic) and expose targeting strategies, gaps in intelligence capabilities, or more specifically reveal a source or an intelligence capability. The least severe result of such exposure might be the end of a source's or capability's usefulness; additional consequences may include the death or other reprisal against the source or
his family or associates, and deception against the United States by manipulation of the exposed intelligence method before the U.S. is aware of the exposure.

27. Known as the "mosaic theory," this process is a theory in name only. It is one of the primary methods employed by all intelligence services. The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, for example, is itself dedicated to collecting seemingly disparate pieces of information and assembling them into a coherent picture or foreign intelligence targets' activities and intentions.

28. The mosaic theory is particularly important in the context of the PDB. As I have previously observed in this Declaration, precautions taken to protect intelligence sources that are common in the creation of other intelligence products are not taken in the production of the PDB. The PDB contains information that is often known by only a few individuals at very high level and is often reported to the President on a real-time basis. The release of a PDB, therefore, presents an especially useful means for a foreign intelligence service, a sophisticated international terrorist organization, or other entity hostile to the United States, to dissect and analyze the information to identify specific intelligence sources and methods. For example, a hostile intelligence service may
reliably infer that a human source for information contained in the PDB is most likely one of a very few number of individuals with access to the subject information, and that the source must have provided the information very close in time to when it was reported in the PDB. Thus the nature of the PDB would allow a hostile entity to identify a source with far fewer pieces of the "mosaic" than would be needed if the information came from other intelligence products.

29. In addition to putting intelligence sources and methods at risk of exposure, disclosure of the Requested PDBs, even if heavily redacted, will begin a process of disclosing ever greater amounts of information contained in the PDB as a series. As I will explain further below, the PDB itself is an intelligence "method" as it is the means of providing the President and his closest advisors the most current, important intelligence information each day and is responsive to the interests expressed by the President and his most senior advisors. It thereby reflects not only the capabilities, accomplishments, and deficiencies of the CIA and the Intelligence Community as of a particular date, but also their decisions and judgments as to what topics are most important to have the
attention of the President and his closest advisors on that
day.

30. The decision to disclose information in the
Requested PDBs because such information appears harmless in
isolation presents the danger that the same analysis will
be applied repeatedly to individual pieces of information
subject to future disclosure requests. Indeed, if the
information in the Requested PDBs is broken down and
analyzed piecemeal in this case, it does not appear that
there will be a principled point at which to stop
disclosure of information in additional PDBs in the future
on the grounds that each piece of information appears
individually harmless. The result will be a detailed
mosaic of the most important intelligence information

\footnote{Plaintiff points out in his complaint that the Agency has previously
released portions of PDBs. The two PDBs that were included (in redacted
form) in the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks on the United States, were released pursuant to the procedures
established in Section 3.1(b) of the Executive Order that allow for the
release, in some exceptional cases, of information that should
otherwise remain classified, after the DCI, acting with specific
authorization from the President, determined that the public interest
in disclosure outweighed the damage to national security that might
reasonably be expected from the release of this particular information.
Additionally, ten issues of the PCL were released by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board, pursuant to the President John F.
note. The CIA had no authority to overrule the Board's decision.
After investigation, I have also determined that the Agency has
released PDBs on four occasions as a result of a mistake in fact as to
what the document was that was being released because it was not
identified as a PDB or as information from a PDB, and in two instances
when the individual with the authority to release the document made a
mistaken determination to do so.}
available to the U.S. government being made available to entities hostile to the United States.

III. FOIA EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED

31. I have determined that the Requested PDBs are exempt from disclosure based on three of the statute's exemptions, set forth more fully below: information protected under another statute, in this case the National Security Act's requirement that the Director protect intelligence sources and methods (exemption (b)(3)), classified information (exemption (b)(1)), and inter-agency or intra-agency information that would be protected in litigation, in this case by both the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications privilege (exemption (b)(5)). Each of these exemptions in my judgment applies to the Requested PDBs in their entirety.

A. FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

32. FOIA exemption (b)(3), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3), as amended, protects matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than the FOIA), provided that such statute:

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or

(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
33. FOIA exemption (b)(3) protects any information contained in the Requested PDBs that is also protected by Section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403-3(c)(7), as amended, which requires the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. It applies without regard to any determination whether disclosing the specific information would cause damage to the national security.\(^5\) (I will, nevertheless, discuss that potential damage in the following section in the context of the (b)(1) Exemption.)

1. **Specific Revelations of Intelligence Sources and Methods within the Requested PDBs.**

34. The Requested PDBs contain information that could, by itself or with other information, expose the existence of specific intelligence sources and methods. These include human sources, foreign liaison sources, and technical collection methods. Each of the Requested PDBs contains information specifically stating sensitive sources or methods of collection; in addition, the nature of the information contained in each of the Requested PDBs provides substantial information about its provenance to an educated reader.

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\(^5\) This is one way in which FOIA exemption (b)(3) differs from exemption (b)(1), which I discuss below, since national security classification rests on an assessment of the damage to the national security that unauthorized disclosure of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information might cause. See Executive Order 12958, as amended, § 1.2(a). Any information that is properly classified on the basis that it relates to intelligence sources and methods is, to at least the same extent, also subject to the Director's statutory obligation to protect such sources and methods.
2. The PDB is an Intelligence Method.

35. In addition to containing information about intelligence methods, which I shall also describe below, the PDB itself is an intelligence method, to be protected under the National Security Act. The PDB is part of the process by which the CIA advises the President and his most senior advisors regarding the subject areas most important to them, the CIA receives feedback concerning the intelligence priorities upon which it should focus more closely, and the President and his most senior advisors are provided the intelligence necessary to make highly sensitive determinations concerning national defense and foreign policy.

36. The daily decisions where to focus the CIA's resources and energy, from operations officers in the field to analysts at CIA headquarters, are directly affected by the PDB process of presenting analysis, discussing its implications, and receiving questions and taskings from the President and his most senior advisors. The PDB process affects the conduct of intelligence both on a daily and more long-term basis.

37. The PDB is thus no less an intelligence method than the CIA's budget, which has been held to be exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption 3 because it relates to intelligence methods, namely the allocation, transfer and funding of intelligence programs. See Aftergood v. Central Intelligence Agency, ---F.Supp.2d---, 2005 WL
29983 (C.A. No. 1-2524, February 9, 2005). Since the PDB is itself an intelligence method, it follows that any PDB information, including both the obviously classified revelations of sensitive methods and the information remaining after such specific revelations are removed, constitutes information about the application of an intelligence method.

3. The Mosaic of Information About Intelligence Sources and Methods.

38. In addition to the PDB being an intelligence method in and of itself, each edition of the PDB is a piece of a "mosaic" of information reflecting the most sensitive, as well as the mundane, intelligence sources and methods employed by the CIA and the Intelligence Community over time. I have described the nature of this mosaic earlier in this Declaration. If significant numbers of individual editions of the PDB (no matter how old) were publicly disclosed, even after redaction of the obvious revelations of specific collection methods and sources, due to regular or even sporadic disclosure (by CIA policy or court order), patterns of application of intelligence methods including those by which the U.S. sets priorities, collects intelligence, and analyzes it would emerge. The unique nature of the PDB makes disclosure of any of its contents particularly dangerous because, as I have described earlier in this Declaration, it is the only finished intelligence product that synthesizes all of the best available
intelligence on topics that the U.S. government has
determined to be the most important foreign policy issues
facing the country at a given time.

39. Any evaluation of whether a reference to a source
or a collection method that is reflected in a single
edition of the PDB should be deemed sensitive must be done
with awareness that any information released can be
analyzed in light of other information (i.e., other pieces
of the "mosaic") that might lead to the exposure of an
intelligence source or a still-secret method. As I
explained earlier in this declaration, the immediacy of the
PDB and the nature of its audience implicitly provide some
information about any human source of the information the
PDB contains. Similarly, even portions of PDBs may provide
insights to knowledgeable readers as to the CIA's
capabilities, accomplishments, methodologies, and judgments
over time. As a result, it provides a bigger piece of any
"mosaic" that a hostile entity might assemble to use
against the United States and its sources than most other
intelligence documents would provide.

40. I have determined that, as documents that reveal
specific information about the sources and methods by which
the intelligence reported in them was obtained, as an
intelligence method, and as a part of a mosaic of
information that reveals intelligence sources and methods,
the Requested PDBs must be protected from disclosure
pursuant to Section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act
and, consequently, they are protected under FOIA exemption (b)(3).

B. FOIA Exemption (b)(1)

41. FOIA Exemption (b)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order.

1. The Definition of "Specifically Authorized Under . . . an Executive Order"

42. The authority of a CIA official to classify documents is derived from a succession of Executive Orders, of which Executive Order 12958, as amended (the "Executive Order"), is the most recent. Under the criteria of § 1.1 of the Executive Order, information may be originally classified only if it:

(1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls within one or more of the categories of information set forth in § 1.4 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security that the original classification authority can identify or describe. For documents over 25 years old, the criteria for continued classification after December 31, 2006, and which we apply
in reviewing such documents for possible declassification, are found in § 3.3(b) of the Executive Order. Section 3.3(a) of the Executive Order calls for the automatic declassification of previously-classified information that is more than 25 years old after 31 December 2006 unless the information is properly exempted under § 3.3(b). As explained more fully below, information withheld from release in the Requested PDBs meets the Executive Order criteria for classification under § 1.4 and is exempt from declassification under § 3.3 and thus is properly withheld under FOIA exemption (b)(1).

2. **The Definition of Information that is "Properly Classified"**

43. Section 6.1(h) of Executive Order defines "classified national security information" or "classified information" as "information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form."

44. Under § 1.3(a)(2) of the Executive Order, the President designated the Director of Central Intelligence as an official authorized to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority. The Director has delegated such authority, under § 1.3(c)(2) of the Executive Order, to a limited number of CIA officials whom he has determined have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority. As noted above (paragraph 2), I am one such
official. I am therefore authorized to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification and declassification decisions.

45. Under the CIA's FOIA Declassification Review Program, information responsive to FOIA requests and classified under the Executive Order cited above or its predecessor Orders is reviewed to determine whether the information is currently and properly classified. Section 1.2 of the Executive Order requires the classification of information at the CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, OR TOP SECRET level, depending on whether the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage, respectively, to the national security.

46. I have reviewed the Requested PDBs and have determined that the information contained therein continues to meet the standards for classification under the Executive Order and is properly classified in that it:

   (1) comprises information that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the CIA;

   (2) falls within one or more of the following categories of information set forth in § 1.4 of the Order: foreign government information (§ 1.4(b)), and intelligence activities, sources and methods (§ 1.4(c)).
(3) If disclosed, reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security that I can identify or describe.

In addition, the contents of the Requested PDBs fall within § 3.3(b)(1) of the Executive Order, which exempts from automatic declassification after 31 December 2006 information that could be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method.

47. Finally, even text that in isolation may be considered unclassified may be classified as part of a compilation of information that is classified in the aggregate. Section 1.7(e) of the Executive Order provides:

Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. As used in this order, “compilation” means an aggregate of pre-existing unclassified items of information.

If all the information that is classified piece-by-piece for the reasons explained below were redacted out of the Requested PDBs, the information remaining would presumably, standing alone, not be classified. However, that remaining text (if there would be enough to be comprehensible) would still be part of the mosaic of information that, in the
aggregate, provides insights into the intelligence process; in hostile hands, those aggregated insights reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

48. The information contained within the Requested PDBs and being withheld in this case is properly classified TOP SECRET because the unauthorized disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

3. **Foreign Government Information**

49. The first category of Exemption (b)(1) information withheld concerns information provided to the CIA from foreign governments and through foreign intelligence liaison relationships with the CIA. The Requested PDBs contain explicit references to information provided by foreign officials as well as other information that may incorporate information from foreign liaison relationships. Disclosure of any of this information could itself, or in conjunction with other information otherwise obtained by foreign intelligence services, betray particular intelligence sources and could be exploited by third-party governments to determine what countries' representatives were talking to the United States and when they were talking to us.

50. Foreign liaison services can also be intelligence sources, since such services covertly provide the CIA with
foreign intelligence. Moreover, the establishment of relationships with foreign liaison services is also an intelligence method exempt under Exemption (b)(3) as set forth previously in this Declaration.

51. The information provided to the CIA by the intelligence services of foreign countries with which the CIA maintains a liaison relationship is provided only upon a guarantee of absolute secrecy. If this agreement were abrogated by the CIA, the results could include domestic or diplomatic difficulties for, or reprisals against, the country whose service cooperated with the United States. The impact on the liaison relationship would lead to a loss to the U.S. government of valuable foreign intelligence.

52. Any disclosure by the CIA of information that could lead to the exposure of a past or current liaison relationship could cause serious damage to the CIA's ability to maintain current relationships, even with countries other than the source of the disclosed information, or to establish new ones. The consequent loss of intelligence information for the United States Government reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Therefore, I have determined that information which could reveal the fact or the nature of CIA's liaison relationships is properly classified TOP SECRET pursuant to the criteria of Executive Order 12,958, as amended, as its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. This information is thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(1). Moreover, because foreign government information also constitutes information about intelligence sources and the application of intelligence methods, such information is exempt from declassification under Section 3.3(b)(1) of the Executive Order.

4. **Intelligence Sources**

53. The CIA collects foreign intelligence through a variety of sources, including individual human sources and relationships with other entities including foreign governments and intelligence services. Disclosure of the information at issue in this case would tend to reveal the identities of intelligence sources, both as a result of the disclosure of the specific documents requested and as part of a mosaic of information as discussed above. The exposure of such sources would undermine the CIA's ability to collect intelligence in the future, which reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave harm to national security.

54. The Requested PDBs each contain references to intelligence obtained from individual human sources and from confidential liaison relationships. The exposure of a source's relationship with the CIA could lead to embarrassment, political ruin, retribution, and for individual human sources imprisonment, torture or even
death of the source or the source's family and friends. Understandably, such sources can only be expected to furnish information to the CIA when they are assured that their relationship with the CIA will be protected from exposure. Sources must be able to rely on the total secrecy surrounding their relationship with the CIA for all time.  

55. Intelligence information that may reveal an intelligence source does not automatically lose its need for protection after a period of even thirty or forty years. Individual people may have long lives and careers, and foreign governments and intelligence services may exist in perpetuity. Also, individuals may have colleagues, family members and friends who may suffer repercussions if the fact of an individual's cooperation with the CIA ever came to light.

56. In addition, the damage to national security caused by the exposure of a source's relationship with the CIA is not limited to the impact upon that source. Disclosure of information leading to the exposure of an intelligence source, no matter how inadvertent, could cripple the CIA's ability to recruit new individuals, establish new relationships, or even to maintain current relationships with intelligence sources. Potential new

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As I have previously discussed in this Declaration, information in the Requested FDBs that does not explicitly reference identities of intelligence sources or contain information that would directly identify the sources may contribute to or complete a mosaic of information that exposes an intelligence source.
sources must be assured of the security or their relationship for all time. At the time a new source chooses to provide information to the CIA, there is no way to know how long the identity of that source will need to remain secret. If it is believed that, after a period of time, the CIA will disclose information that could potentially lead to the exposure of an intelligence source, such sources would be understandably reluctant to work with the CIA.

57. Further, while the CIA recognizes that in some circumstances there may be information provided by human sources or foreign liaison services that can be declassified, declassification decisions must be made with awareness that any information released can be analyzed in light of other information (i.e., other pieces of a "mosaic") that might lead to the exposure of an intelligence source. As I have explained, the PDB would be an especially large piece of any mosaic of intelligence information; this is the case even after the identifiable pieces of specifically source-revealing information are redacted out of a PDB. The remnants of a series of PDBs would tend to reveal source information to the educated reader that would not be apparent from a single, specific document.

58. Therefore, I have determined that unauthorized disclosure of information responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA request that could reveal intelligence sources reasonably
could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States and is therefore properly classified as TOP SECRET. Moreover, because such unauthorized disclosure could be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, the Requested PDBs are exempt from declassification under Section 3.3(b)(1) of the Executive Order. Thus, such information is currently properly classified and is coextensively exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and, as discussed previously, (b)(3).

5. **Intelligence Methods**

59. Generally, intelligence methods are the means by which, and the manner in which, an intelligence agency accomplishes its mission. Most organized professions or businesses employ methods that are common to and, in some cases, unique to that business or profession, to accomplish their goals and objectives. Certain methods used in intelligence activities imbue any resulting records with a special character that necessitates protecting the fact of their use, as well as the details of their use, from unauthorized disclosure. The release of the information in each of the Requested PDBs would disclose specific intelligence methods, including technical collection methods.
60. Intelligence methods must be protected in situations where a certain capability or technique, or the application thereof, is unknown to those individuals or entities that would otherwise take countermeasures. Secret information-collection techniques, capabilities, or technological devices are valuable from an intelligence-gathering perspective only so long as they remain unknown. Once the nature of an intelligence method or the fact of its use in a certain situation is discovered, the method may become useless.

61. Many times, the mere fact of acknowledging a specific piece of information in isolation can expose a collection method, even though the source is never mentioned. Just as disclosure of a piece of information known to only a small handful of people may make it a simple process to determine who must have provided the information to the CIA, so entities hostile to the United States may be able to deduce the method by which the CIA gathered a piece of information based upon the nature of the information itself along with other available information.

62. In addition to revealing specific intelligence methods, the Requested PDBs are part of a mosaic of PDBs that would reveal information about the application of intelligence methods even excluding any text that reveals specific methods as such. To the extent that there may be remnants of information in either individual PDB that would
not be classified standing alone, when pieced together with other information available to a foreign intelligence service the remnants would reveal information about the application of intelligence methods employed by the CIA to obtain the intelligence reported. Should multiple PDBs become publicly available over time, the pattern of information then disclosed would provide foreign intelligence services an understanding of the various intelligence methods used by the United States to gather specific kinds of information from various locations around the world, as well as an understanding of gaps in our collection, of what the United States knew and didn't know, when, and the effectiveness of the methods we have used.

63. Although the intelligence included in the requested PDBs is over 30 years old, its disclosure would reveal to educated observers information about the application of intelligence methods in use at the time of the Requested PDBs and subsequently. The effective collection, analysis and exploitation of intelligence requires the CIA to prevent disclosure of such information to foreign governments, intelligence services or other entities hostile to the United States who could use it to undermine the current collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.

64. Moreover, as I described in the previous section of this Declaration, the PDB process is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of individual editions of
the PDB would, necessarily, reveal information about the
application of an intelligence method.

65. Therefore, I have determined that the unauthorized
disclosure of the Requested PDBs would tend to reveal
specific intelligence methods and, even after redaction of
material that is classified in isolation, disclosure would
tend to reveal as part of a mosaic information about the
CIA's intelligence methods that could reasonably be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security of the United States and are therefore
properly classified as TOP SECRET. Also, because such
unauthorized disclosure could be expected to reveal the
identity of a confidential human source, or a human
intelligence source or reveal information about the
application of an intelligence source or method, the
Requested PDBs are exempt from declassification under
Section 3.3(b)(1) of the Executive Order. Thus, the
requested information is currently and properly classified
and is coextensively exempt from disclosure pursuant to
FOMA exemption (b)(1) and (b)(3).

C. FOMA Exemption (b)(5)

66. FOMA Exemption (b)(5), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), as
amended, protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency." I
have determined that the Requested PDBs are 1) inter-agency
and intra-agency documents that comprise pre-decisional,
deliberative information protected by the deliberative process privilege and 2) communications with the President in the exercise of his official duties, and thus fall with the protection of FOIA exemption (b)(5).

67. FOIA exemption (b)(5) exempts those documents normally privileged in the civil discovery context.

1. The Deliberative Process Privilege

68. The deliberative process privilege is a governmental privilege that permits the government to withhold documents or information that reflects advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations that are part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated. It allows the government to protect the internal deliberations of policymakers, recommendations, analyses, speculation and other information that is prepared in order to inform decision-making. It protects deliberative, pre-decisional information or documents used in the decision-making process as well as the candor and confidentiality that are integral to the deliberative process itself.

69. The Requested PDBs constitute deliberative documents in two respects. First, they reflect the overarching deliberative process of U.S. foreign policy decision-making. As I have previously described in this Declaration, the contents of the PDB reflect the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. government by showing what subjects are of interest to the President and when. The
Requested PDBs also expose the deliberative process of providing intelligence to the President with regard to these foreign policy priorities. Producing the PDB requires the PDB analysts and writers to comb through thousands of pieces of information in determining what must be briefed to the President. Determining what information to include is the height of the deliberative process.

70. The deliberative process privilege protects not only the analysis in the Requested PDBs, but also factual information, because the specific facts contained in the PDBs were selected and highlighted out of a wide body of other potentially relevant facts and background material. In addition, many of the facts contained in the PDB are also intertwined with CTA analysis, making it impossible to segregate specific hard facts from the analytical content of the PDB.

71. The Requested PDBs contain predecisional analysis in the area of U.S. foreign policy. By definition the PDB is meant to provide the President and his most senior advisors information upon which to base foreign policy decisions. The Requested PDBs include analysis of the political, economic, military and social conditions in a multitude of countries around the world. Clearly, the President and his advisors were engaged in foreign policy decisions with respect to these countries on an ongoing basis. Moreover, the specific countries and individuals on which the Requested PDBs reported would likely have
influenced decision-making in other areas of foreign policy not specifically mentioned in the PDB.

72. On a daily basis, various senior officials within the CIA must determine which subjects merit reporting to the President and his most senior advisors. This determination is based on the expressed requirements of the President, the content and urgency of raw intelligence, current events and foreign policy priorities of the U.S. government. On occasion, information will also be provided in the PDB that responds directly to questions from the President or one of his advisors.

73. Essentially, the PDB, as a series, is an ongoing dialogue between the President and his most senior advisors and the CIA. As the basis for this dialogue and the catalyst for foreign policy discussion and decision-making, each edition of the PDB is the quintessential pre-decisional, deliberative document. The CIA, in conjunction with the President, must determine what issues on which to report, and must determine what information to provide out of the thousands of pieces of information available on certain subjects and what information, out of all of the information available, on which to base its analysis.

74. Intelligence is not a perfect science, and the fresh intelligence and real-time analysis included in the PDB is subject to revision and even refutation over time. Timely intelligence necessarily includes judgments based upon available information that evolves as additional
information and insight emerge through further collection and through policy-makers' comments, questions, and deliberation. Disclosure of the pre-decisional policy analysis and deliberation reflected in the PDB would effectively stifle and "chill" the presentation of timely intelligence collection and analysis. Analysts and others who contribute to the decision-making process would hesitate to report information that appears at odds with previously-accepted understandings, or to voice opinions or points of view that may at first blush appear radical or "outside the box," or could be subject to misinterpretation or taken out of context by others. Their worries about such problems could lead them to refrain from providing their best judgments about what is the unvarnished truth in their analyses to policy-makers, who would then be left with an incomplete and therefore flawed foundation on which to base their ultimate decisions.

75. Those producing the PDB are producing a document meant to provide a current snapshot of intelligence about the most important areas of foreign policy in the world today. They must present their judgments and conclusions based on the best information available to the Intelligence Community at the moment. If those contributing to and producing the PDB believe that their work will be critiqued years later by those with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight and their own agenda to pursue, there is a risk that they will be less willing to offer speculative
analysis that might later be mischaracterized or proved wrong, with the eventual result that the PDB will be of less use to policymakers' deliberative processes.

76. Thus, I have determined that disclosure of any part of the Requested PDBs in response to Plaintiff's FOIA request would cause harm to the CIA's and the Government's internal deliberative process and would therefore harm U.S. policymaking generally. The Requested PDBs are therefore exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(5).

2. The Presidential Communications Privilege

77. As I have previously discussed in this Declaration, the PDB is prepared for the President and his most senior advisors to provide that intelligence which is necessary to the effective development of U.S. national security and foreign policy. As such it is a communication directly with the President used in the conduct of his official duties. Therefore, I have determined that the Requested PDBs would normally be privileged in the civil discovery context and are therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(5).

D. Segregability

78. The FOIA requires that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Following a careful review and consideration of the Requested PDBs, as distinct records and in the context
of the Requested PDBs as part of a series of intelligence documents that reflect both the development of the Intelligence Community's collection and analyses over time and the evolution of national defense and foreign policy decisions by the President and his most senior advisors. I have determined that the Requested PDBs must be protected from release in their entirety, on the basis of FOMA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(5), and that no reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of the documents exist. All of the information in the Requested PDBs is related to intelligence activities, sources and methods, foreign government information, foreign relations and activities and/or the deliberative process. Any information is so inextricably intertwined with the exempt information that release of the non-exempt information would produce little, if anything, more than fragmented, unintelligible sentences composed of isolated, meaningless words. Any intelligible information that is not properly classified as a specific item is nevertheless a part of a mosaic of PDB information such that a compilation of PDBs would tend to reveal gravely damaging insight into how the CIA conducts its intelligence business.

79. Therefore, I have determined that there is no non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated from the exempt information.
IV. Conclusion

80. I have determined for the reasons set forth above that the Requested PDBs must be protected from release because their disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause harm to the national security, to reveal intelligence sources and methods and to harm the deliberative process.

81. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 1st day of April 2005.

[Signature]

Terry N. Buroker
Information Review Officer
Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency