1. Berlin: events in the air corridors this morning.

For The President Only—Top Secret
2. Berlin air corridors: political moves

- a. At the special meeting called by the Soviets this morning in the Berlin Air Safety Center, the Soviet representative merely repeated previous Soviet statements on operation of the corridors.
- b. The USSR appears to be arguing that we cannot fly in the corridors without prior Soviet approval of each flight, and is by implication threatening to withdraw from the Berlin Air Safety Center.
- c. We see this deliberate raising of tensions, and the hints that Khrushchev may show up in Geneva next month even if Western leaders do not, as two aspects of a play designed to force an early summit.

3. Soviet-US relations: other developments

- a. In a meeting called by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday, their delegate urged that a nuclear test agreement be reached prior to the disarmament conference. He gave no indications of a change in the Soviet position.

4. French cool to disarmament conference

- Couve de Murville told Gavin Tuesday that they "very likely" would not attend.

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For The President Only—Top Secret
5. Laos

Souvanna is now definitely scheduled to arrive in Luang Prabang tomorrow afternoon. Phoumi plans to precede him there, but Boun Oum will stay away until the King—not Souvanna—invites him. There is a hint in Phoumi's remarks that he may hope to find a way of blocking Souvanna's appearance.

6. Indonesia-West
New Guinea
7. Soviets and Chinese greet twelfth anniversary of their treaty of alliance with something less than enthusiasm. In perfunctory ceremonies, the Chinese implied that Khrushchev rather than Mao was responsible for weakening of the alliance. The Soviets remarked that the USSR's great military power would be used to protect only "friendly" Socialist countries. Last year they had repeated Khrushchev's pledge of 1958 that the USSR will consider "an attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union."

8. Congo

    a. Since Adoula's return to Leopoldville, he has seemed to act with more confidence, and has publicly taken a somewhat more rigid line toward Tshombe.

9. USSR will train and equip new brigade for Ghanaian army

    Nkrumah probably will earmark this unit for the African high command being worked up by the Casablanca states, all of which are receiving some Soviet military aid. The UK will probably decide to go on training the rest of the army.

For The President Only—Top Secret
A. We do not see any great significance in Castro's relinquishment of the presidency of the National Land Reform Institute.

D. The Turkish government has begun a new series of arrests of Menderes' supporters; this will please the army but will not contribute to political stability.
Watch Committee Conclusions—14 February 1962

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

Berlin: The recent Soviet efforts to impose limitations on Allied use of the air corridors appear to stem from political rather than military motives. Such harassments can be expected to continue; however, Communist military activity does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future.

Laos: Current indications do not point to an all-out Communist offensive. The available evidence indicates that the Communists will continue their limited military pressures on Phoumi toward formation of a coalition government on Communist terms.

South Vietnam: The pattern of Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity remains unchanged.

For the President Only
DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

For The President Only—Top-Secret
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

Issued by the Central Intelligence Agency

15 October 1962
1. Yemen

   a. Skirmishing between repub-
      lican and loyalist forces over the
      weekend has not altered the situation
      very much.

   b. 

   c. Help from the outside to
      both sides goes on. Nasir has sent
      his two leading Yemeni experts to
      Sana to bolster the resolve of the
      revolutionaries to carry on. They may
      also take the opportunity to look over
      the prospects for reviving the HAD-
      Yemen Federation.

   d. Cairo now also has a sizeable
      naval force (three destroyers and a
      minesweeper) standing off Hodeida.
      Their assignment presumably is to pro-
      tect the merchantmen now making regu-
      lar deliveries of men and supplies.

   e. On Saturday, Jordan began to
      fly 150 tons of light arms to Saudi
      Arabia addressed to Hasan's forces.
      The buildup of Saudi forces in the
      border continues.

   f. The Saudis, fed up with the
      unending overflights of their territory
      by Egyptian aircraft, have obliquely
      warned Cairo to knock it off.

   For The President Only—

Approved For Release 1999/10/19 : NLK-98-004-8-1-3
2. Saudi Arabia
   Jordan
   a. King Saud, in extremely poor health and in a psychopathic state of suspicion and worry over the Yemenis, may not last much longer.

   b. Among other plots, a group of Saudi princes, anxious to pre-empt the field before pro-Nasirites make a try at taking over, are laying plans to force Saud to abdicate in favor of Faysal.

   c. King Husayn is also worried by events in Saudi Arabia. He is rushing negotiations for a mutual defense pact which, if he gets his way, will include a provision giving each country the right to send troops into the other for the purpose of maintaining local security.

3. Laos
   a. We are developing reservations about Souvanna's ability to keep things papered over much longer.

For The President Only

Approved For Release 1999/10/19: NLK-98-004-8-1-3
b. A well-placed source in Vientiane tells us that the cabinet on Friday was treated to a blustering harangue by Phoumi Vongvichit of the Pathet Lao. Vongvichit rejected the national assembly's action giving Souvanna full powers for a year, accused Souvanna of deserting to the right, and piously asserted his side would be guiltless in the event the coalition should fall apart.

c. Souvanna is said to have stuck to his guns, and threatened to publish the record of their Pathet Lao performance. General Phoumi backed him to the hilt.

d. Pathet Lao forces have taken advantage of the intramural neutralist squabble in Phong Saly province to move into areas from which they had previously been excluded.

4. Sino-Indian border

a. There has apparently been no fighting on the border since Wednesday. With both sides steadily beefing up their forces in the area, more skirmishing seems inevitable.
b. The Indians seem to have had the best of it so far, thanks perhaps to surprise. The next round may well be a different story, however.

c. The Chinese have secretly built a road to within six miles of the combat area, which puts them in considerably better shape to receive supplies and reinforcements. The Indians are almost entirely dependent on a difficult aerial resupply operation.

5. Congo

a. Tshombe gave more ground yesterday in agreeing to sign a ceasefire with Leopoldville and to let his men swear allegiance to the central government. We do not have the details yet, but follow through may depend on Adoula producing an amnesty for Katangans.

b. 

c. Leopoldville this morning announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Ghana after a two-year hiatus.
6. Venezuela
   a. It now looks as though President Betancourt has carried the day for his plan to strip certain terrorist-connected congressmen of their immunity as a preliminary to tossing them into jail.

   b. At last report, the cabinet was with him and Supreme Court approval seemed assured. His Social Christian coalition partners were also expressing willingness to go along, provided he refrained from outlawing outright the Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

7. Brazil
   a. Election results are still too inconclusive to draw any conclusions on a national scale. There do not, however, appear to have been any startling trends in any direction.

   b. In what is probably the most important race, the conservative has a slight lead over his pro-Communist opponent for governor of Pernambuco (northeast) but may well lose it in later returns.
NOTES

A. USSR - Nuclear tests The Soviets touched off two nuclear explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site over the weekend.

B. USSR - Yesterday a Soviet submarine surfaced about 175 miles south of Japan after a 24-hour surveillance by our naval forces. The submarine signalled "This is a Soviet ship. You are interfering with me in international waters," and was allowed to proceed.

C. Portugal

D. North Borneo - The British may ask to have a private talk with us later this week about the Philippine claim to North Borneo, which has them worried. We do not yet know what line London will take. The Filipinos, meanwhile, have asked us to stay on the sidelines.

E. Cuba - An Alpha-66 spokesman announced in Puerto Rico on Saturday that the organization planned two more raids this month, one against British shipping.

F. United Nations - Our delegation in New York sees straws in the wind that the Communist bloc is getting ready to propose some sort of membership in the UN for the two Germanys, Vietnams, and Koreas.

For The President Only—

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SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-76-324

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

TRANSCRIPT
PREPARED BY 14 Sept

ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 OCTOBER 1962
TOP-SECRET

Approved For Release 1999/10/19: NLK-98-004-8-2-2, 1/02
2. **USSR**

   a. Every time the Soviets announce extended range missile tests (yesterday's is the fourth such announcement), they relate them to space programs.

   b. In the past, however, the tests have turned out to be related to ICBM development, and we believe the same will be true this time. The Soviets will probably continue ICBM nose cone development testing, including tests of heavier nose cones for higher yield weapons.
c. But we do not exclude the possibility that some space-related vehicles may be tested as well, possibly including boosted re-entry to simulate conditions encountered on return from lunar missions.

d. Moscow says the tests for the next six weeks will involve "new versions of multistage carrier rockets."

e. Three Soviet range instrumentation ships are now approaching the farther of the two impact areas which will be used. By no coincidence, they are also in a position to monitor (as they have in the past) our testing at Johnston Island;

3. East Germany

   a. West German Social Democrats will be in for a bad time this week when they enter East Germany on their way to and from a meeting in West Berlin.

   b. Indications so far are that they will be subjected at least to an intensive propaganda barrage.

   Some more straunous harassment may be planned.

Approved For Release 1999/10/19: NLK-98-004-8-2-2

For The President Only—Top Secret
c. The Social Democrats have always made a point of travelling overland rather than by air corridor to meetings in West Berlin to emphasize German unity and their right to travel through East Germany.

d. The Communists apparently feel it is about time they set the record straight.

4. Congo

a. Gardiner is now somewhat encouraged by Adoula's action yesterday in agreeing to halt troop movements in north Katanga, in accepting arrangements for deposit of Katangan foreign exchange earnings, and in going ahead (next week) with the amnesty law to be followed by an oath of allegiance by top Katangan officers.

b. Barring the always-present possibility of last minute hitches, agreements on these matters were to have been signed last night, but we have no final word yet.

c. Adoula will submit the draft constitution today for consideration by assembled provisional presidents and legislative heads. Tshombe was invited by Adoula to attend, but probably will not do so. A Katangan representative will probably be there, however. This promises to be some go-around.
NOTES

A. Cuba-China. We are beginning to see some effect on the Communist bloc of our moves to hunger trade with Cuba.

B. Yugoslavia-US. Pan American has concluded an agreement with Belgrade to promote tourism in Yugoslavia. It provides not only for promotional work by Pan Am, but also for actual management by a Pan Am subsidiary of some tourist facilities.

C. Common Market-US. The Common Market countries are getting steamed up over application of "buy American" regulations in awarding defense contracts. In response to urgent pressure from Italy, Belgium and France, their trade committee will probably begin early next week to consider what can be done about it.
5. Yemen

a. We have little further interest to report on this situation.

b.

c.

d. The runways in Yemen are treacherous, and, although Soviet pilots have recently landed AN-12's there, the operation is at best tricky.
SANITIZED VERSION

THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 OCTOBER 1962
TOP-SECRET

upheld previous

Approved For Release 1999/10/19: NLK-98-004-8-3-1
1. Laos

a. The Pathet Lao continue to turn the screws on Souvanna."

b. Besides keeping up the furor over what they charge is the illegality of the National Assembly's grant of full powers to Souvanna, the Pathet Lao members of his cabinet are now suggesting that half of the cabinet should be transferred from Vientiane to Khang Khai, in the Plaine des Jarres.

c. In Bangkok, where Souvanna's talks with the Thais have gone off very well, the Laotian premier says he intends to give the North Vietnamese a bill of particulars, listing locations and units, on their forces still in Laos.
2. Yemen

a. The military position of the loyalists seems to be ebbing rapidly.

b. Republican forces, with Egyptian backing, are moving against Marib, which with Sadah was one of the two important towns held by supporters of the Imam. Resistance at Sadah has evidently all but ended.

c. Imam Badr is trying to rally a tribal force numbering some 1,500, just across the border in Saudia Arabia. He may succeed in maintaining a sputtering resistance in the north, but with his present assets, he has only a slender prospect of reversing the tide.

d. The Egyptian press service reported from Yemen yesterday that the Yemeni rebel leader had made a plea to the Soviet charge for help in foodstuffs.

3. Congo

a. A doula yesterday laid the draft of a new constitution before the assemblage of provincial chiefs in Leopoldville. No Katangan representatives were recorded as being on hand.
b. Along with the constitution, the gathering received a stern lecture from Idoula on its duties in a reunified Congo. He tossed no flowers toward Tshombe but there were no brickbats either.

C. The ceasefire has gone into effect in North Katanga, but there has been no word from Elisabethville yet on the constitution.

4. Soviet missile activity
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 
   d.
5. Yugoslav-Bloc
   a. The Yugoslavs are saying that their relations with the Russians on the ideological plane are on the mend.

   b. Belgrade believes that last month's visit by Soviet President Brezhnev has helped to pave the way toward a reconciliation between the two Communist parties. The Yugoslavs and the Russians have always seen the condition of party ties, as distinct from purely governmental dealings, as the true barometer of their relations.

   c. The Poles, pleased by the signs they see, have promptly scheduled a visit by their foreign minister to Belgrade late this month, and an invitation to Tito to visit Poland may be in the offing.
A. India - Communist China. The 5-day lull in fighting in the disputed frontier area was broken yesterday. The first word is that the Indians outscored the Chinese again. However, we are seeing signs that the Chinese are using their superior supply lines to bring up rations and reinforcements.

B. Indonesia-Bloc. In a communiqué winding up the visit of Romania's premier to Indonesia, Djakarta has become the first neutral to line itself up with the Bloc position on a German peace treaty and a West Berlin "free city."
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
23 October 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Readiness Status of Soviet Missiles in Cuba

1. CIAIC, JAMIC, and NDC, on the basis of photographic surveillance through 20 October, on 22 October concluded that:

a. The count on identified offensive missile sites stands at nine. No new sites have been identified, but the count of missiles and launchers is increasing.

b. The two MRBM sites at Sagua la Grande and sites 1 and 2 of the four MRBM sites of the San Cristobal complex are fully operational. Sites 3 and 4 have emergency operational capability.

c. The three ICBM sites are under rapid construction. One site at Guasajay will probably be fully operational by 1 December, the second and the Remedios site by 15 December. We suspect but cannot yet locate the presence of a fourth ICBM site.

d. We now have counted a total of 23 launchers and 32 missiles at the 6 MRBM sites. No IRBM launch pads have been completed and no missiles have been identified yet.

e. Activity at the more fully developed sites in the San Cristobal area indicates that at least one battery has exercised its launching equipment. A probable regimental headquarters location has been identified.

f. While we are unable to confirm the presence of nuclear warheads, photo coverage continues to reveal the construction at several sites of buildings which we suspect are for nuclear storage.
g. Of the 24 SA-2 SAM sites, 23 are now operational. The 24th appears to be operational in every sense except for the lack of missiles on the launchers.

2. Fidel Castro is to make "important declarations" in a major address scheduled for an unannounced time today. Early Cuban commentaries have referred to the US action as an "act of war" and have urged the people to remain calm and prepared to fight.

3. Commentators in Cuba have specifically denied that recent Soviet military deliveries to Cuba have included offensive weapons or that "rocket bases" are present in Cuba. One commentator showed special sensitivity over what he called the President's attempt to involve Mexico in "aggression" against Cuba by reference to Mexico City as within range of the offensive bases in Cuba.

4. The Cuban UN delegation, apparently after conferring with Security Council President Zorin, formally requested an urgent Security Council meeting "in view of the unilateral act of war" by the United States in "ordering the naval blockade of Cuba...which creates an imminent danger of war." "This unilateral and direct aggression is nothing but the culmination of a series of aggressions" committed against the government of Cuba, according to the statement.
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 OCTOBER 1962
TOP-SECRET

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MAK 76-38 Appeal
By NARA, Date 11/15/98

Additional material has been released as a result of this review.
2. Cuba

a. Our latest photography has turned up two more SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites, both in Oriente province. One of these, near the town of Cabanas, is the first site within SA-2 range of the air approaches to Guantanamo.

b. The photography also shows that one of the previously confirmed sites has now been abandoned, making the present total twenty-one.

c. Seven of the twelve sites observed on this occasion now have missiles on launcher; some of these are probably operational.
MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CUBA, OCTOBER 1962

- Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
- Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
- Support facility for processing equipment
- Airfield with MIG aircraft
- Coastal defense cruise-missile site
- Effective air defense perimeter
  (estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
3. Saudi Arabia—Yemen

   a. King Saud has named Crown Prince Faysal prime minister and
given him authority to form his own cabinet—which amounts to forced
abduction.

   b. Jordan’s King Husayn has been putting pressure on Saud to
intervene in force in Yemen before
it is too late, and Saud earlier
this week ordered reinforcements
dispatched to augment the two
Saudi brigades now in the border area.

   c. The new regime may now
reverse this, however, for the same
reason that Saud was persuaded to
step aside, i.e., to avert a revolt
against the Saudi monarchy which
could all too easily be ignited by
an adventure into Yemen.

   d. Yemeni republican forces
claim to have inflicted heavy
casualties yesterday on Saudi
forces which had infiltrated into
a tribal stronghold in northeast
Yemen. There may be something to
the claim.

For The President Only—

[5]
4. Congo

a. Adoula's government is boiling up around him, and may compel him to disavow the accords reached so far.

b. The cabinet is in virtual revolt over what it considers unwarranted liberties taken by UN officials in promoting these deals, some of which Adoula is saying privately he never saw or approved.

c. The more rabid members are demanding that Adoula issue a statement repudiating the agreements and invite the UN to leave.

d. The government radio is already deprecating as sheer propaganda Tshombé's actions under his commitment to McGehee. It is also saying the cease-fire accord is not binding on the Congo Army, which it says responds only to orders from the central government.

e. Ambassador Gullion has his finger in the dike, hoping that with the arrival of Bunche and the return of Gardiner today, some repair work can be done.

For The President Only—

[7]
a. The five members of the Soviet party presidium who normally reside outside of Moscow have been in town for the past several days; we gather from this that the leadership is putting final touches on the scenario for the party Central Committee plenum coming up in November.

b. We think Khrushchev intends the session to focus on domestic affairs, presumably including the "major reorganization" which lower-level party officials have been talking about recently.

c. We still can only speculate about what this impending reorganization might entail. The only new approach to current problems being floated publicly is the radical Libermann proposal (described in last Sunday's Times) for putting industrial enterprises on a profit rather than plan fulfillment basis.

d. This proposal by a respected Soviet economist and administrator is being tested at a number of enterprises, but we doubt that it could be widely applied very soon. (Includes INTERCEPTS)
6. Laos
   a. Souvanna plans next week to balance off his trip to Bangkok with one to Hanoi where, he says, he will pursue the matter of troop withdrawals. He intends to go on to Peiping if he can get no satisfaction in Hanoi.
   b. The matter of German recognition seems well on its way to solution with Bonn ready to recall its ambassador and establish a commercial mission. Souvanna has promised in this case not to accord diplomatic recognition to the East Germans who will also be limited to a commercial delegation.
   c. Souvanna's relations with the Pathet Lao continue to worsen.

7. Nationalist China
   a. The Nationalists have begun infiltrating small, specially trained teams into Mainland China to spark resistance movements.
   b. Profiting from earlier failures in attempts of this sort, the Nationalists this time are including recent refugees who will know their way around a little better.
   c. However, there is no evidence yet that the few teams put ashore so far are in radio contact with Taiwan.
NOTES

A. USSR  Khrushchev, according to the Yugoslavs, will be making a speech today (the 150th anniversary of Borodino) during which he will touch on foreign policy.

B. South Korea  Ambassador Berger warns that a student protest movement against the institution of national standard exams could blow up quickly into a major political crisis.

C. Finland-USSR  Kekkonen tells us that in his two and a half hour talk with Khrushchev this week, the Soviet leader did not press him on the matter of a German peace treaty, in fact, did not even bring the subject up.
US: INTELLIGENCE BOARD WATCH COMMITTEE REPORT—16 October

1. On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the US Intelligence Board again concluded that no Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

2. On Laos, the Committee noted no evidence that any more North Vietnamese troops have left Laos. It also noted serious friction within the coalition government, but saw no clear sign of early collapse of the government or of renewed hostilities.

3. The Committee also pointed to the likelihood of further serious clashes along the Sino-Indian border.

For The President Only—Top Secret