Т.т. Брежневу, Тихонову, Андропову, Громыко, Судакова,
Устинову, Пономареву, Русякову, Замятину.

Выписка из протокола № 40 заседания Политбюро ЦК КПСС
от 13 декабря 1981 года

Об информации руководства братских стран по польскому вопросу.

Утвердить проект указания совпослам в НРБ, ВНР, ГДР, МНР,
ЧССР, Республике Куба, СРВ и ЛНДР (прилагается).

СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦК

17-аг
ол
К пункту 26 прот. № 40

Секретно

СОФИЯ, БУДАПЕШТ, БЕРЛИН, УЛАН-БАТОР, ПРАГА, ГАВАНА, ХАНОЙ, ВЬЕНТЯН

СОВПОСОЛ

Копия: ВАРШАВА - СОВПОСОЛ

Посетите Т.Живкова (Я. Кадара, Э. Хонеккера, Ю. Цеденбала, Г. Гусака, Ф. Кастро, Ле Зуана, К. Фомвихана) и, сославшись на поручение ЦК КПСС, передайте следующее:

"Как друзьям известно, польское руководство ввело в стране военное положение, объявило о создании Военного Совета национального спасения и изолировало наиболее экстремистские элементы из "Солидарности", "Конфедерации независимой Польши" и других антисоциалистических групп.

Оставляет положительное впечатление Обращение В. Ярузельского к народу, в котором, на наш взгляд, правильно расставлены акценты по основным вопросам. В частности, что особенно важно, подтверждены руководящая роль ПОРП, верность ПНР союзническим обязательствам по Варшавскому Договору.

Условием успешного проведения акции польские товарищи рассматривали строгую секретность. О ней было известно лишь в узком окружении В. Ярузельского. Благодаря этому друзьям удалось заститьнуть противника врасплох, и операция пока проходит удовлетворительно.

В самый канун осуществления намеченного плана В. Ярузельский сообщил об этом в Москву. Ему передали, что советское руководство относится к такому решению польских товарищей с пониманием. При
этом мы исходим из того, что польские друзья будут решать эти вопросы внутренними силами.

По нашей предварительной оценке, действия польских друзей являются активным шагом отпора контрреволюции и отвечают в этом смысле общей линии братских стран.

В этих условиях возникает вопрос и об оказании политической и моральной поддержки польским товарищам, а также дополнительной экономической помощи. Советское руководство, как и прежде, будет действовать в польском вопросе в контакте с братскими странами.

Об исполнении телеграфируйте.
sort of harsh instructions, which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen the correct position here. The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for the Polish United Workers’ Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.

Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to “Solidarity,” the West in all likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.

USTINOVA. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We just don’t know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that even we [the Poles] don’t know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish defense minister doesn’t know what will happen and what sort of actions will be taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.

With regard to what Comrade Kulikov alleged said about the introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsibility that Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.

As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a confrontation and only if, perhaps, “Solidarity” seizes them by the throat will they come forth.

The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions not provided for by our decisions.

SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades’ speeches, we all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.

We’ve done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so. We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard their actions with understanding.

As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn’t receive it.

At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.

As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons have already been delivered. I don’t know whether we’ll be able to ship the full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.

With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it, I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.

GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.

SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of “Solidarity” and other counterrevolutionary forces.

CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.

I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:
1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo’s session on 10 December 1981.
3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.

BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?

EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.

The decree is adopted.

CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), “On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal countries,” 13 December 1981

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P40/26

TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomaev, Rusakov, Zamyatin

Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 13 December 1981
On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal countries.

To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40

Secret

SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENETANIE

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

CC: WARSAW — SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a call on T. Zhivkov (J. Kadar, E. Honecker, Yu. Tsedenbal, G. Husak, F. Castro, Li Duan, K. Phomvihane) and, referring to the CPSU CC’s instructions, transmit the following:

“As our friends know, the Polish leadership has introduced martial law in the country, announced the formation of a Military Council of National Salvation, and detained the most extremist elements of ‘Solidarity,’ the Confederation for an Independent Poland,” and other anti-socialist groups. ”

“A good impression has been created by W. Jaruzelski’s address to the people, in which, in our view, all the basic questions were given appropriate emphasis. In particular, what is especially important is that the address reaffirmed the leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of the PPR to the socialist obligations stipulated by the Warsaw Pact.”

“To ensure the success of the operation, the Polish comrades observed strict secrecy. Only a narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew about the action.11 Thanks to this our friends have succeeded in catching the enemy completely unaware, and the operation so far has been implemented satisfactorily.”

“The very essence of implementation of the projected operation, W. Jaruzelski communicated about it to Moscow.12 We informed him that the Soviet leadership looked with understanding upon the decision of the Polish comrades. In so doing we ensured that the Polish comrades would resolve these matters solely by internal means.”

“In our preliminary evaluation, the measures taken by the Polish friends are an active step to repulse counterrevolution, and in this sense they correspond with the general line of all the fraternal countries.”

“In these circumstances the question arises about offering political and moral support to the Polish friends and also about giving additional economic assistance. The Soviet leadership, as previously, will act on the Polish question in close contact with the fraternal countries.”

Confirm transmitted by telegram.

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CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 14 January 1982

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO
14 January 1982

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: Cjomraldes, Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Yu. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov

2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the PZPR CC Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People’s Republic Cde. J. Czyzek

BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that Mikhail Andreichiv [Suslov] and Andrei Andreichiv [Gromyko]’s discussions with Cde. Czyrek were useful. Western officials, especially the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure on Poland. In such circumstances, it is important to offer constant political support for our friends and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit their spirits to sink or to allow them to relinquish what they have achieved with such difficulty.

Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a month. As Jaruzelski says, the counterrevolution is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are more complicated.

After introducing relative stability in the country, the Polish comrades must now, one might say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, how to change the consciousness of the masses, etc.

The most important question is the situation in the PZPR. Our friends are trying to find a solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to disband the party or to change its name, but he can exploit martial law to carry out a sweeping purge. This might yield good results.

In general one gets the impression that the general as a political actor is very strong and is able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions. Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts more often than necessary with an eye to the West and the Church. But in the current situation such gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, hardline measures on matters of principle, one also needs flexibility and circumspection. It’s good that Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian experience in struggling against counterrevolution.

All of us clearly understand that the decisive precondition for the full stabilization of things in Poland is a revival of the economy. In Czechoslovakia after 1968 political efforts made headway precisely because the counterrevolution had a major impact on the economic sphere. In Poland just the opposite is true.

In this connection a difficult question stan before us. We already are stretched to the limit our capacity to help the Poles, and they are making still more requests. Perhaps we can do bit more, but we certainly can’t give a lot more.

Still, we must of course answer Jaruzelski’s letter, explaining in a comrade way what we can and cannot do. By all means we must precisely carry out our agreed deliveries the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the most difficult winter months.

Quite another matter are projects political prestige, which should not impose great strains on our economy. For example, we can lend assistance in building the Warsaw subway. We would meet this request, having made our participation a matter of public knowledge.

Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is not so bad. There is enough bread in the country and they must find a way to motivate the peasants, and to get them to work, arranging, as we some times say, a merger of the city and village.

The Polish leadership continues to count on help from the West. Well, in principle we can’t be against that, although, to be honest, it’s doubtful that Western countries are about to start providing material assistance to a military regime. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, which means we must be especially vigilant.

Jaruzelski is raising another question, of whether he should accept help from the Chinese. Well, why not? In the process China will be disassociating itself from the USA and its economic sanctions.

In conclusion, one might say that the Polish question will be at the center of international politics for a long time to come. That is why our Polish commission has continued to work as actively as it has been up to now.

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CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982

SPECIAL DOSSIER

INFORMATION

about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely convertible currency in 1980-1981.