Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August 17, 2003, and almost immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On September 4, 2006, he was transferred to U.S. military custody.

G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

In addition to the eight most frequently cited “thwarted” plots and terrorists captured, the Committee examined 12 other less frequently cited intelligence successes that the CIA has attributed to the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations are listed below:

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The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “our review showed that the Study failed to include examples of important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations than several of the cases the authors chose to include.” This is inaccurate. The CIA’s June 2013 Response provided three examples: the “Gulf shipping plot” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the context of the interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri), “learning important information about al-Qa’ida’s anthrax plotting and the role of Yazid Sufaat” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the context of the interrogation of KSM), and “the detention of Abu Talha al-Pakistani” (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the section on the “Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhienar Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi.”).
1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001, Attacks

(TS//REL//NF) The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided "important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as the mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001.\textsuperscript{1745} CIA Director Hayden told the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

"...it was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of key al-Qa’ida members and associates."\textsuperscript{1746}

(TS//REL//NF) On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided this information after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. On May 30, 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a now-declassified memorandum:

"Interrogations of [Abu] Zubaydah—again, once enhanced interrogation techniques were employed—furnished detailed information regarding al Qaeda’s ‘organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi’ and identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks."\textsuperscript{1747}

\textsuperscript{1745} For example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated that: "[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." See also CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA’s High-Value Terrorist Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy" drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush. See also unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program," as well as CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).

\textsuperscript{1746} CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." (See DTS #2007-1563 and DTS #2007-3158.) This testimony contradicted statements made in 2002 to the Joint Inquiry by \textsuperscript{[REDACTED]}, in which she indicated that an operative arrested in February 2002 in \textsuperscript{[REDACTED]}, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, provided "proof... that KSM was a senior al-Qa’ida terrorist planner." (See interview by the Joint Inquiry of \textsuperscript{[REDACTED]}, \textsuperscript{[REDACTED]}, [REDACTED], subject: Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM); date: 12 August 2002 (DTS #2002-4630).)

\textsuperscript{1747} Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
The OLC memorandum cited a document provided by the CIA to support the statement. The OLC memorandum further stated that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provide the U.S. government with “otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence,” that “ordinary interrogation techniques had little effect on...Zubaydah,” and that the CIA had “reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of [the OLC’s] description of the interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results.”

In November 2007, the CIA prepared a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique. The documents prepared assert that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as the “mastermind” of the September 11, 2001, attacks after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM’s role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases and was obtained prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah’s information—obtained by FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks.

The following describes information available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah:

- Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks include lengthy chronologies of the Intelligence Community’s interest in KSM prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The timelines begin in 1995, when the United States determined that KSM was linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, leading to the determination by the National Security Council’s Policy Coordination

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1748 See CIA Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, faxed to the OLC in April 2005. The “Briefing Notes” state: “Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa’ida’s organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11.” As described in detail in Volume II, this CIA document did not specifically reference the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; however, it was provided to the OLC to support the OLC’s legal analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The document included most of the same examples the CIA had previously provided as examples of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. There are no records to indicate that the CIA, in reviewing draft versions of the OLC memorandum, sought to correct the inaccurate OLC statements.


1750 “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”
Group that KSM was a top priority target for the United States. The Congressional Joint Inquiry further noted that information obtained prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks “led the CIA to see KSM as part of Bin Ladin’s organization.” There was also CIA reporting in 1998 that KSM was “very close” to UBL. On June 12, 2001, it was reported that “Khaled” was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for UBL. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the CIA presumed this “Khaled” was KSM.

- (TS//NF) On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source, described as a member of al-Qaeda, stated “the 11 September attacks had been masterminded from Kabul by three people,” to include “Shaykh Khalid,” who was related to Ramzi Yousef.

- (TS//NF) Also on September 12, 2001, a CIA officer familiar with KSM wrote a cable stating that “[o]ne of the individuals who has the capability to organize the kind of strikes we saw in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.”

- (TS//NF) On September 15, 2001, a CIA officer wrote to a number of senior CTC officers, “I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks].”

- (TS//NF) On October 16, 2001, an email from a CTC officer who had been tracking KSM since 1997, stated that although more proof was needed, “I believe KSM may have been the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks.”

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1752 Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, p. 329 (DTS #2002-5162).
1757 [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED]. Subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS...; date: September 15, 2001, at 5:04:38 AM.
1758 CIA CTC internal email from: [REDACTED]; to multiple [REDACTED]; date: October 16, 2001, at 09:34:48 AM.
(TS//NY//NF) A foreign government informed the CIA that in late December 2001, a source, provided information on the attacks of September 11, 2001, and stated, “Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, the maternal uncle of Ramzi [Yousef]... was the person who supervised the ‘final touches’ of the operation.”

(2) Other reporting prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah stated that KSM was: “one of the individuals considered the potential mastermind”; “one of the top candidates for having been involved in the planning for the 11 September attacks” and one of “the masterminds”; and “one of the leading candidates to have been a hands-on planner in the 9/11 attacks.”

2. The Identification of KSM’s “Mukhtar” Alias

The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided “important” and “vital” information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed’s (KSM) alias, “Mukhtar.” In at least one instance in November 2007, in a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique, the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as “Mukhtar” after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM’s alias, this information was provided by Abu Zubaydah to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—and while Abu Zubaydah was still in the intensive care unit of a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound incurred during his capture. Further, the information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases. Prior to the information provided by Abu Zubaydah, the CIA had intelligence, including a cable from August 28, 2001, indicating that KSM was now being called “Mukhtar.”
3. The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

(TS//RELATE/#NF) The CIA has represented that information acquired from CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, as a result of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. This CIA representation was included in President Bush’s September 6, 2006, speech on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, stated that the intelligence provided by CIA detainees “cannot be found any other place,” and that the nation’s “security depends on getting this kind of information.”\(^{1767}\) The speech included the following:

“Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa’ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th.\(^ {1768}\) For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM’s accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.”\(^ {1769}\)

(TS//RELATE/#NF) While the speech provided no additional detail on the capture of bin al-Shibh, an internal email among senior CIA personnel provided additional background for

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Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (DTS #2005-3477), p. 112.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[w]e continue to assess that Abu Zubaydah’s information was a critical piece of intelligence.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges the August 28, 2001, cable identifying KSM as “Mukhtar,” but states that CIA officers “overlooked” and “simply missed” the cable.\(^ {1767}\) See President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006. Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: “Speechwriter’s Questions on Monday”; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM.\(^ {1768}\) Italics added. As described in this summary and in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, this statement was inaccurate. Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics prior to, during, and after the utilization of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Abu Zubaydah’s inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was “uncooperative” and the CIA’s determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to become “compliant” and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding—the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next terrorist attack. At no point during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.\(^ {1769}\) Italics added. See President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006. Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: “Speechwriter’s Questions on Monday”; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM.
why the CIA included “the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh” in the president’s speech as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. After the speech, the chief of the [REDACTED] Department in CTC, [REDACTED], sent an email to the chief of CTC, [REDACTED], CTC Legal, [REDACTED], and two officers in the CIA Office of Public Affairs, among others. The email addressed press speculation that the intelligence successes attributed to CIA detainees and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the president’s speech were not accurate. Defending the accuracy of the speech, the chief of the [REDACTED] Department in CTC wrote: “The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President’s speech.” Regarding the CIA assertion that Abu Zubaydah provided information after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the chief explained:

“...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh.”

(TS//REDACTED//NF) In addition, on February 17, 2007, the deputy chief of the [REDACTED] Department in CTC, [REDACTED], testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Abu Zubaydah “led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events” that led to the capture of KSM.

1770 See email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Mark Mansfield, Paul Gimigliano, and others; subject: “Questions about Abu Zubaydah’s Identification of KSM as ‘Mukhtar’”; date: September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by Mark Mazzetti, entitled, “Questions Raised About Bush’s Primary Claims of Secret Detention System” included comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President’s speech: “Mr. Bush described the interrogation techniques used on the CIA’s prisoners as having been ‘safe, lawful and effective,’ and he asserted that torture had not been used. ...Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al-Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh’s role in the attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah’s capture. A December 2001 federal grand jury indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, said that Mr. Moussaoui had received money from Mr. bin al-Shibh and that Mr. bin al-Shibh had shared an apartment with Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the plot. A CIA spokesman said Thursday [September 7, 2006] that the agency had vetted the president’s speech and stood by its accuracy. ...[CIA] spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said in a statement... ‘Abu Zubaydah not only identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh as a 9/11 accomplice — something that had been done before — he provided information that helped lead to his capture.’ For additional news accounts on this subject, see former CIA Director Michael Hayden’s interview with the New York Times in 2009, in which former Director Hayden “disputed an article in the New York Times on Saturday [4/18/2009] that said Abu Zubaydah had revealed nothing new after being waterboarded, saying that he believed that after unspecified ‘techniques’ were used, Abu Zubaydah revealed information that led to the capture of another terrorist, Ramzi Binalshibh.” See “Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects,” New York Times, dated April 20, 2009.

1771 CIA Testimony of [REDACTED]. Transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). See also Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, “Comments to Draft IG Special Review, ‘Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program’ (2003-7123-IG),” Attachment, “Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities,” dated February 24, 2004. Pavitt states: “Abu Zubaydah - a master al-Qa’ida facilitator - was similarly arrogant and uncooperative before the lawful use of EITs. ...His information is singularly unique and valuable from an intelligence point of view, but it also has produced concrete results that have helped saved lives. His knowledge of al-Qa’ida lower-level facilitators, modus operandi and
A review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah’s reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s capture. CIA records indicate that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, when Pakistani authorities, [redacted], were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in Pakistan. 

While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh’s whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with

safehouses, which he shared with us as a result of the use of EITs, for example, played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh” (italics added).

Among other records, see CIA [redacted] (SEP 02); [redacted]; CIA [redacted] (SEP 02).

See additional information below, as well as the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining to “the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zubaydah” provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTSS 2010-2939). The CIA’s June 2013 Response includes the following: “The Study states that Abu Zubaydah ‘provided similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.’ This is incorrect. Abu Zubaydah’s unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” This assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response contains several errors: First, as described, the statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study pertains to Abu Zubaydah’s reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, not Hassan Ghul. As detailed in this summary and in other areas of the full Committee Study, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information on bin al-Shibh to FBI interrogators prior to the use and approval of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Second, as detailed in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah provided considerable information on Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. (Some of this reporting has been declassified; for example, see the 9/11 Commission Report, specifically the Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” which highlights reporting by Abu Zubaydah on Hassan Ghul that was disseminated by the CIA on June 20, 2002.) Third, in referencing information that Abu Zubaydah provided on Hassan Ghul on August 20, 2002, the CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that this was “unique information.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “Abu Zubaydah stated that if he personally needed to reach Hassan Gul, he would contact [redacted] (a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul). We provided this information to Pakistani authorities, who then interviewed [the well-known associate] and [redacted] (a specific family member of the well-known associate)—which ultimately led them to a apartment linked to Gul.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response adds that “the unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after [Abu Zubaydah] had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” CIA records indicate, however, that the information described in the CIA’s Response was not unique. Pakistani authorities had raided the home and interviewed [redacted] (the same well-known associate) more than a month earlier on July 1, 2002, based on similar reporting from a cooperating detainee in foreign government custody. The CIA had specific and detailed knowledge of this raid and the resulting interview of [redacted] (the well-known associate). Pakistani authorities remained in contact with [redacted] (the well-known associate), the primary person interviewed, who was cooperative and sent [redacted] to help Pakistani authorities identify a possible al-Qa’ida safe house—which the CIA noted was "extremely close to (if not an exact match)" for a safe house the FBI connected KSM to weeks earlier on June 18, 2002.
the bombing of the USS Cole, as well as the September 11, 2001, attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh as “al-Shiba” and “noted that he is always with” KSM.¹⁷⁷⁴ Another record of this interrogation stated that showing Abu Zubaydah the photos:

“was done to gauge his willingness to cooperate and provide details about people, the last times he saw them, where they were going, etc. He appeared to be very cooperative, provided details on people that we expected him to know, the collective groups when they departed Afghanistan, where he thinks they may now be, etc.”¹⁷⁷⁵

(ungeparated) Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2002, an FBI special agent showed Abu Zubaydah the FBI “PENNTBOM photobook”¹⁷⁷⁶ which contained photographs numbered 1-35. A cable states that Abu Zubaydah was volunteering information and was “forthcoming and respond[ing] directly to questioning.” Abu Zubaydah, who was not asked any “preparatory questions regarding these photographs,” identified photograph #31, known to the interrogators as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as a man he knew as al-Shiba, and stated al-Shiba was with KSM in Qandahar circa December 2001. Abu Zubaydah stated that al-Shiba spoke Arabic like a Yemeni and noted that al-Shiba was in the media after the September 11, 2001, attacks.¹⁷⁷⁷

(ungeparated) In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled “as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters,” as well as to discuss “the endgame” of Abu Zubaydah with officers from CIA Headquarters.¹⁷⁷⁸ As a result, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation.¹⁷⁷⁹ Abu Zubaydah spent the remainder of June 2002 and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in solitary detention without being asked any questions. During this period, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogators never returned to the detention site.¹⁷⁸⁰

(ungeparated) When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, on August 4, 2002, they immediately used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboard.¹⁷⁸¹ On August 21, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA cable noted that Abu Zubaydah

¹⁷⁷⁴ DIRECTOR (271905Z MAY 02) See the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
¹⁷⁷⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaiddah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
¹⁷⁷⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaiddah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
¹⁷⁷⁷ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
¹⁷⁷⁸ 10428 (071058Z JUN 02)
¹⁷⁷⁹ 10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
¹⁷⁸⁰ 10487 (181656Z JUN 02)
¹⁷⁸¹ 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: “Re: So it begins.”; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM.
was shown several photographs and “immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al-Shibh.”\textsuperscript{1782} Abu Zubaydah described bin al-Shibh as having “very dark, almost African looking” skin and noted that he first met bin al-Shibh after the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar, but added that he “did not have in-depth conversations with him.”\textsuperscript{1783} A cable stated that, after being shown the photograph of bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that he was told bin al-Shibh stayed at the same safe house that KSM “had established for the pilots and others destined to be involved in the 9/11 attacks.”\textsuperscript{1784} An accompanying intelligence cable stated that Abu Zubaydah informed interrogators that he did not know—and did not ask—whether bin al-Shibh had been involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but did state that he believed that bin al-Shibh was “one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.”\textsuperscript{1785}

(TS//\redline\NOFORN) The information Abu Zubaydah provided while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was described by CIA interrogators as “significant new details.”\textsuperscript{1786} However, the information provided by Abu Zubaydah was similar to information Abu Zubaydah provided prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or was otherwise already known to the CIA. CIA records indicate that as early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was identified as an associate of the September 11, 2001, hijackers who attempted to obtain flight training in Florida.\textsuperscript{1787} A July 27, 2002, cable from the CIA’s ALEC Station provided “background information” on bin al-Shibh and stated that he was “suspected of being the original ‘20th hijacker,’ whose participation in the 11 September attacks was thwarted by his inability to obtain a visa to enter the United States.”\textsuperscript{1788} Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also identified as “a member of the Hamburg cell that included hijacker Mohammed Atta,”\textsuperscript{1789} and bin al-Shibh was featured in one of “five suicide testimonial videos found in December 2001 at the residence of former UBL [Usama bin Ladin] lieutenant Mohammad Atef in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{1790}

(TS//\redline\NOFORN) None of the above information resulted in Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s capture. As detailed below, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, targeting Hassan Ghul.\textsuperscript{1791}

(TS//\redline\NOFORN) Prior to Abu Zubaydah’s capture, the CIA considered Hassan Ghul a “First Priority Raid Target,” based on reporting that:

1782 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 10656 (211349Z AUG 02)
1783 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 10656 (211349Z AUG 02)
1784 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 10656 (211349Z AUG 02)
1785 DIRECTOR 261338Z AUG 02
1786 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 10656 (211349Z AUG 02)
1787 ALEC (222324Z SEP 01); 92557 (13SEP01)
1788 ALEC (270133Z JUL 02)
1789 ALEC (270132Z JUL 02). See also 97470 (281317Z MAR 02) ("In November 1998, [Muhammad] Atta, [Ramzi] Binalshibh, and [Said] Bahaji moved into the 54 Marienstrasse apartment in Hamburg that became the hub of the Hamburg cell.").
1790 ALEC (270133Z JUL 02). See also 62533 (information from a foreign government concerning the al-Qa’ida suicide operatives portrayed on videotapes found in Afghanistan).
1791 ALEC (292345Z AUG 02); ALEC (111545Z SEP 02)
“Ghul has been a major support player within the al-Qa’ida network and has assisted al-Qa’ida and Mujahadin operatives by facilitating their travel. He is a senior aide to Abu Zubaydah who was heavily involved in fund raising for a terrorist operation in spring 2001.”

Additional reporting noted that Hassan Ghul’s phone number had been linked to a terrorist operative who “was ready to conduct a ‘surgical operation’ at any time,” while other reporting indicated that Hassan Ghul was working on a “program” believed to be related to terrorist activity.

According to CIA cables, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa’ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa’ida members, including Hamza Rabii’a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa’ida fundraising efforts. During this same period, the CIA continued to receive additional intelligence on Ghul from foreign governments, including that Ghul was responsible for facilitating the movement of Saudi fighters through Pakistan. As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and was not asked any questions for 47 days.

In early July 2002, Pakistani authorities and the CIA were continuing their efforts to locate and capture Hassan Ghul. A detainee in Pakistani custody, [blueacted information to Pakistani authorities on Hassan Ghul, [the detainee in Pakistani custody] had been arrested with [blueacted in [blueacted on May 1, 2002, during [blueacted government raids on multiple residences thought to be associated with al-Qa’ida. During interviews with Pakistani authorities concerning how to locate and capture Hassan Ghul, [blueacted [the detainee in Pakistani custody] identified [blueacted [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] and the location of the [blueacted [well-known associate’s] home.

On July 1, 2002, seeking to capture Hassan Ghul, Pakistani authorities [blueacted raided the home of [blueacted [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. When the raid occurred, present at the home
was [the well-known associate], [and family members of the well-known associate]. A providing details on the raid states that “[the well-known associate] was interviewed on the spot and was fully cooperative with [Pakistani authorities].” [the well-known associate] stated that he had not seen Hassan Ghul or since June 3, 2002, but that he believed they were still in Karachi. According to [the well-known associate], he had already informed Pakistani authorities that Hassan Ghul was an al-Qa’ida member. According to a cable [the well-known associate] stated that, as a result of his reporting on Ghul to Pakistani officials, he received “a death threat from Hassan Ghul,” causing Ghul to “cease coming to the [the well-known associate’s] house.”

(TS/#1 UNCLASSIFIED //NF) CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities continued to interview the [the well-known associate] in an effort to acquire information and capture Hassan Ghul. A CIA cable dated July 1, 2002, states that the Pakistani government “is keying on any information which could get us closer to bagging [Hassan] Ghul,” specifically “through ongoing interviews of [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].” According to the cable, during one of the interviews, [the well-known associate] told Pakistani authorities about an address where Hassan Ghul used to reside circa December 2001. [the well-known associate] sent [the well-known associate] with the Pakistani officers to identify the home. The CIA officers wrote that the location “is extremely close to (if not an exact match)” to a location where KSM once resided, according to a June 18, 2002, report from the FBI. The identified home was raided, but found empty. The CIA wrote “we are hitting the right places [safe houses], albeit at the wrong time. Our efforts have got us closer than ever to at least Hassan Ghul.” During the meetings between the Pakistani authorities and [the well-known associate], [the well-known associate] provided the Pakistani authorities with a copy of a “reportedly belonging to Hassan Ghul.” In the same cable, the CIA reported that [the well-known associate] had “approached the police for assistance in retrieving [the specific family member of the well-known associate].”

(TS/#1 UNCLASSIFIED //NF) On July 1, 2002, CTC officers at CIA Headquarters wrote that they were reading the cables from the CIA, noting they were “particularly interested in the interview of raid target [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], who admitted [the well-known associate] to his knowledge of Ghul’s involvement in al-Qa’ida activities.” The cable stated:

“[the well-known associate] claims his contact with Ghul stopped approximately one month ago, when he reported Ghul to the Pakistani authorities. However, given [his close

See references to prior acquisition of passport in 12151 (301107Z AUG 02).
association] to one of our high interest targets, request [REDACTED] initiate technical surveillance of [REDACTED] [the well-known associate’s] telephone... to determine if they may yield any information on Ghul’s current whereabouts.\footnote{1807}

CIA records do not indicate if “technical surveillance” of [REDACTED] [the well-known associate’s] telephone was conducted.\footnote{1808}

\textit{(TS/\textbf{REDACTED}/NF)} According to CIA records, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa’ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa’ida members, including Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa’ida fundraising efforts.\footnote{1809} As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and therefore was not questioned on the July 2002 raids on [REDACTED] [the well-known associate’s] home or the information acquired from the interviews of [REDACTED] [the well-known associate] conducted by Pakistani authorities.\footnote{1810} On August 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation, CIA interrogators entered his cell and immediately began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard.\footnote{1811} As he had before the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, when asked questions, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide intelligence, including on Hassan Ghul. On August 20, 2002—while still being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—Abu Zubaydah was asked specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. There are no records indicating that Abu Zubaydah had previously been asked this question. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative reporting: that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through [REDACTED] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].\footnote{1812} There are no CIA records indicating that Abu Zubaydah provided information on the location of [REDACTED] [the well-known

\footnote{1807}{ALEC}}

\footnote{1808}{As noted throughout this Study, CIA produced more than six million pages of material, including records detailing the interrogation of CIA detainees, as well as disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement-derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to the terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in this Study that is within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Committee for this Study.}}
Nine days after Abu Zubaydah referenced [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], on August 29, 2002, CIA Headquarters asked [the well-known associate] for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul.

The next day, August 30, 2002, [informed CIA Headquarters that Pakistani authorities were “in contact with the [the well-known associate],” but that [would nonetheless ask the Pakistani authorities to question [the well-known associate] again about Hassan Ghul’s location. On August 31, 2002, [relied that Pakistani authorities and ] believed it was possible that [the well-known associate] was not being fully truthful in his interviews with Pakistani authorities. On September 3, 2002, [reported that Pakistani authorities had re-interviewed [the well-known associate] an unknown number of times, and that the Pakistani authorities noted that at times [the well-known associate] contradicted himself. Approximately one week later, on September 9, 2002, Pakistani authorities returned again to [the well-known associate’s] home and interviewed [a specific family member of the well-known associate], who had recently returned to [the well-known associate’s home].

The CIA’s June 2013 Response highlights the following statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study: “It is possible that the sourcing for CIA claims that ‘as a result of the use of EITs’ Abu Zubaydah provided information that ‘played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh,’ are related to Abu Zubaydah’s information indicating that Hassan Ghul could be located through [the well-known associate].” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “It is true that Abu Zubaydah provided no information specifically on Bin al-Shibh’s whereabouts, but as the Study explicitly acknowledges, he did provide information on another al-Qa’ida facilitator that prompted Pakistani action that netted Bin al-Shibh.” The Committee could find no CIA records of the CIA ever making this claim externally, or internally within the CIA, prior to the CIA’s June 2013 Response. Rather, as described, the CIA claimed both before and after the President’s September 2006 speech that Abu Zubaydah provided information related to bin al-Shibh that resulted in bin al-Shibh’s capture. In an email from [to [member of the well-known associate],] dated September 7, 2006, states: “…AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added into other information—helped us track him.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that the information Abu Zubaydah provided—that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]—was “unique information” and that bin al-Shibh’s “capture would not have occurred” “without Abu Zubaydah’s information,” which was collected “after he had been subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.” As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, the statement provided by Abu Zubaydah was not unique, but corroborative of information already collected and acted upon by government authorities.

While it is unclear from CIA records how Pakistani authorities learned [the specific family member of the well-known associate] had returned home, [the well-known associate] had sought the help of Pakistani authorities in retrieving [the specific family member of the well-known associate]. Further, the CIA in early July 2002 had requested “technical surveillance” of [the well-known associate’s] telephone, and CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities were maintaining regular contact with [the well-known associate] after the initial July 2002 raid.
In interviews with Pakistani authorities, [the specific family member of the well-known associate] was cooperative and told the Pakistani authorities where Hassan Ghul’s last apartment was located. Based on the information provided on Ghul’s apartment, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid, but found the apartment empty.

Pakistani authorities then located and interviewed [a third individual at the apartment complex]. From the interview [of the third individual], Pakistani authorities learned that while Hassan Ghul had vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex. Based on this information, Pakistani authorities placed the complex under surveillance and waited for Hassan Ghul to return. On September 10, 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two individuals believed to be Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex. A CIA cable noted that “Ghul had returned to the apartment to ,” however, he got more than he bargained for. Another CIA cable stated:

“Interestingly, he denies being Hassan Ghul – claiming Hassan Ghul is someone else. While are fairly certain we do in fact have Hassan Ghul in custody, we would like to make every effort to verify.”

By September 11, 2002, it was determined that an individual named Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, and his driver were arrested, not Hassan Ghul. Abu Badr’s driver, Muhammad Madni, was immediately cooperative and told the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a “major al-Qa’ida [facilitator].” He then proceeded to provide Pakistani authorities with information about al-Qa’ida-affiliated residences and safe houses in Karachi.

Based on the information provided by Muhammad Madni, Pakistani authorities conducted raids in Karachi over the next two days. Raids of the initial sites resulted in the recovery of “a number of modified electrical switch type mechanisms, modified circuit and ‘game’ boards and other miscellaneous wires with alligator clips and battery attachments.” On September 11, 2002, additional raids resulted in

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1819 12249 (091259Z SEP 02) 12249 (091259Z SEP 02) 12249 (091259Z SEP 02) 12251 (SEP 02); CIA (SEP 02) 12251 (SEP 02); CIA (SEP 02) 12254 (100510Z SEP 02) 33363 (111226Z SEP 02) 12251 (SEP 02); CIA (SEP 02) 12251 (SEP 02) ALEC (111552Z SEP 02). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, provided the information on the “safe houses in Karachi.” This is inaccurate. Multiple CIA records state this information was provided by Abu Badr’s driver, Muhammad Madni, who was cooperating with Pakistani authorities and providing information for the raids.

1828 ALEC (101749Z SEP 02)
the arrest of 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh. According to CIA records, bin al-Shibh initially identified himself as ‘Umar Muhammad ‘Abdullah ba-‘Amr, aka “Abu ‘Ubyadah,” but the CIA noted:

“This individual strongly resembled pictures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. When asked if he was videotaped in al-Qa’ida videos, he answered yes.”

Shortly thereafter the CIA confirmed Ramzi bin al-Shibh was the individual in Pakistani custody.

Hassan Ghul was ultimately captured by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, on January 1, 2004. Hassan Ghul’s capture was unrelated to any reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM)

On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech based on information provided by the CIA, and vetted by the CIA, that included the following statement:

“Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa’ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM’s accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.”

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Italicics added. President George W. Bush, Speech on the CIA’s Terrorist Detention Program, (September 6, 2006). See also CIA officer’s February 14, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in which he stated that Abu Zubaydah “really pointed us towards Khalid Shaykh Mohammed and how to find him,” adding “[h]e led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events.” See transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).
(TS/NOFORN) Contrary to CIA representations, there are no CIA records to support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in the “planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” CIA records clearly describe how the capture of KSM was attributable to a unilateral CIA asset (“ASSET X”) who gained access to KSM through [REDACTED], with whom the CIA asset had prior independent connections. ASSET X’s possible access to KSM through [REDACTED] was apparent to the CIA as early as the fall of 2001, prior to his formal recruitment. The CIA had multiple opportunities to exploit ASSET X’s access to KSM’s [REDACTED] in 2001, and in 2002, after he was recruited, but did not. In February-March 2003, ASSET X led the CIA directly to KSM. The contemporaneous documentary record of this narrative is supported by numerous after-action interviews conducted by the CIA’s Oral History Program. As the CIA officer who “handled” ASSET X and who was directly involved in the capture of KSM stated, “[t]he op[eration] was a HUMINT op pretty much from start to finish.”

(TS/NOFORN) Within days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, CTC officers suspected KSM of playing a key role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Shortly thereafter, CTC officers also noted the “striking similarities” between the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by KSM’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, [REDACTED]. On September 26, 2001, the CIA’s ALEC Station issued a cable on KSM and Ramzi Yousef that described extensive derogatory information on [REDACTED]. The CIA officer who drafted the September 26, 2001,
cable wrote in an email that [REDACTED] were “associated with terrorists,” and that [REDACTED] “probably is a close associate of KSM.” In a separate email, the CIA officer wrote that, “at a minimum, we should go after [REDACTED].” Both emails were sent to CIA officers who, a few days later, would consider ASSET X, a potential CIA source whose access to KSM through [REDACTED] was readily apparent.

(TS//REL TO AF) ASSET X came to the CIA’s attention in the spring of 2001. However, CIA officers did not meet with ASSET X until after the September 11, 2001, attacks. On September 28, 2001, ALEC Station sent a cable [REDACTED], noting that “[g]iven the events of 11 September… [w]e are very interested in exploring whatever information [ASSET X] may have with regard to terrorist plans by [UBL].” The CIA held its first meeting with ASSET X on [REDACTED], 2001, at which time ASSET X indicated that he knew [REDACTED]. The cable describing the first meeting states that “[ASSET X’s] knowledge appears to check out and demonstrates some degree of access/knowledge [REDACTED].” On [REDACTED], 2001, the cable describing the first meeting with ASSET X was forwarded by the drafter of the September 26, 2001, cable on the derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] to a number of CTC officers in an email with the subject line: “Re: [ASSET X] Information Re
The following day, the cable was forwarded again to CTC officers with the subject line: “Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.”

On 2001, ASSET X held its second meeting with CIA officers, who described ASSET X as “very willing to clandestinely assist the USG as directed.” At the same meeting, ASSET X identified a photograph—asked if ASSET X “can dig into the KSM’s contacts to locate KSM through . . . the same approach that would lead the CIA to KSM more than 15 months later. ASSET X also argued for “a more aggressive and proactive approach . . . .” but was eventually convinced by CIA officers to . . . instead. After ALEC Station rejected the CIA case officer’s recommended financial compensation for ASSET X, ASSET X declined to work with the CIA as a CIA source. Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had the potential to develop information on KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to reestablish contact with ASSET X. During this time, the CIA continued to collect

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1846 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [REDACTED]

1847 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1848 See also 66193. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “detainees gave us the critical information on KSM’s . . . .” This is inaccurate. As detailed, ASSET X’s potential access to KSM through . . . was apparent to the CIA in 2001, prior to any CIA detainee reporting.

1849 See also 66446, 66487.

1850 DIRECTOR

1851 ASSET X’s proposal—presaged the 2003 operation. See 66530 (01).

1852 ASSET X considered the CIA’s initial offer of $ to be insufficient $66586. CIA officers in . . . urged that ASSET X be offered $66586 (01). See also 66660, 66661, 66881.

1853 continued to stress that ASSET X was a “financial risk worth taking.” (See 67522. ALEC Station remained interested in ASSET X, but continued to oppose the compensation package proposed by See also 68918, WHDC 68881.

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TOP-SECRET/#NOFORN
intelligence on KSM’s [REDACTED], and sought other opportunities to gain access to KSM through [REDACTED]. In July 2002, a detainee in foreign government custody provided extensive information on KSM’s [REDACTED] and confirmed that KSM was “very close” to [REDACTED] who “should know how to contact KSM.”

When the CIA finally located and met again with ASSET X on 2002, ASSET X stated that “he could locate KSM within a few weeks,” and was “willing to travel [REDACTED] to locate [REDACTED].” ASSET X was recruited as a source by the CIA, but, despite his offer to track KSM’s [REDACTED], ASSET X was dispatched by the CIA to [REDACTED].

See CIA [REDACTED], disseminated as [REDACTED].

CIA officers proposed recontacting a 1995 asset with possible access to KSM through [REDACTED]. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: 22002, at 06:49:13 PM.) The email was resent, on 22002, to additional addressees. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: 22002, at 3:46:13 PM.) At this point, the nefarious activities of KSM’s [REDACTED] were of significant interest to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. KSM’s [REDACTED] terrorism were briefed to the President and were the subject of a direct tasking by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. See ALEC [REDACTED] (DETAINEE S).

The detainee was [REDACTED] 66193 31225 31140 31049 31088 31221 31339 31424 2773 2778 2770 31495 1062 37701 1107 10090 1088 481096 2812 37701 41495.

At this time, the CIA offered a compensation package that was increased from the CIA’s previous offer.

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. During this time period, ASSET X reported that he had made contact with KSM’s [REDACTED]. (See 10084 10090 1088 2812 481096 ) Also during this period, CIA officers continued to note that ASSET X had offered to locate KSM’s [REDACTED] (See 2812).

See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: another for the highlights; date: 22002, at 4:14:24 PM.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN
By the time ASSET X returned to 2002, ASSET X was handled by a new CIA officer who was unfamiliar with ASSET X’s potential utility in tracking KSM. Seeking guidance on how to proceed with ASSET X, the new CIA case officer sent several cables to CIA Headquarters, which he later described as disappearing into a “black hole.” According to an interview of a CIA officer involved in the operation, the cables were being sent to a special compartment at CIA Headquarters which had been previously used by the team. With the dispersal of that CIA team, however, the compartment was idle and no one at CIA Headquarters was receiving and reading the cables being sent to the special compartment. When the CIA case officer received no response to the cables he was sending to CIA Headquarters, he made preparations to terminate the CIA’s relationship with ASSET X. According to interviews, in 2002, the CIA officer was visiting Pakistan. This visiting CIA officer overheard the discussion between the chief of Base and the CIA case officer concerning the CIA’s termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. The discussion included names that ASSET X had been discussing with the case officer—names that the visiting officer recognized. The visiting CIA officer interceded and recommended that the CIA Base delay the termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. At the next meeting, ASSET X again demonstrated that he had direct access to KSM’s contacts. As a result, the CIA decided not to terminate ASSET X’s work as a CIA source.
(TS//SSCI//NF) Shortly thereafter, in 2003, ASSET X traveled on his own volition, and without prior discussion with the CIA, to [redacted], and a face-to-face meeting with KSM. When ASSET X later informed CIA officers about his trip, direct access to KSM

1869 The internal debate within the CIA continued, however, with the [redacted], and ASSET X and his CIA handlers urging the CIA to delay action and wait for an opportunity for ASSET X to locate KSM. ALEC Station initially supported immediate action to capture any KSM associate ASSET X could lead them to, before reversing its position on February 18, 2003. The next day, ASSET X arrived in Islamabad [redacted], where he was surprised to find KSM.

CIA to understand the value of the access [ASSET X] had to [redacted].” This is also inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, the value of ASSET X’s access to KSM’s [redacted] was apparent to the CIA in 2001. (5) The CIA states that the visiting CIA officer who intervened to forestall the termination of ASSET X did so because, having been [redacted], he was familiar with DETAINEE R’s reporting on KSM’s [redacted]. This representation omits the fact that the visiting CIA officer was a member of the team that handled ASSET X while ASSET X [redacted]. That team received information concerning ASSET X’s stated access to KSM through [redacted]. The information was provided to the team prior to the capture of DETAINEE R. (See 2778 [redacted].) (6) The CIA asserts that DETAINEE R’s reporting “helped CIA to redirect [ASSET X] in an effort to locate KSM.” This is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, ASSET X had been indicating that he had access to KSM through [redacted] since 2001 and, as detailed, contacted KSM’s [redacted] on his own. CIA records indicate that the detainees who provided corroborating information about KSM’s [redacted] DETAINEE S and DETAINEE R, were in foreign government custody at the time they provided the information. DETAINEE R would later be rendered to CIA custody and approved for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, although there are no CIA records indicating that he was subjected to the techniques.

DIR [redacted]; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 30 November 2004. See [REDACTED] 41034 [REDACTED].

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; DIRECTOR [REDACTED]
ASSET X sent a text message to his CIA handler stating:

"I M W KSM." 1872

ASSET X contacted the CIA and conveyed what had just occurred. 1875

In an interview with the CIA’s Oral History Program, the CIA case officer described what happened:

"We went around, you know, [ASSET X] turns around to me and says, look I don’t know, I guess I’m nervous. I said, ‘Look brother there are twenty five million frigging reasons why you need to find [REDACTED].’ That’s what the reward was. He looks at me and says, ‘I understand. I understand.’" 1877

Shortly thereafter, ASSET X found [REDACTED] and, in the early morning hours of March 1, 2003, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid and captured KSM. 1878 On March 1, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody. 1879

1872 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1873 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 82076; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1874 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 82076.
1875 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 82076.
1876 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
1877 See 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); 41351 82076; 41490 82076; 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
5. *The Capture of Majid Khan*

(TS/NOFORN) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee KSM led to the capture of Majid Khan. These representations were inaccurate.

(TS/NOFORN) In multiple interviews with the CIA Office of Inspector General, CIA officers stated that “information from KSM led to the capture of [Majid] Kahn [sic],” and that “KSM gave us Majid Khan.”1880 The deputy chief of ALEC Station and former KSM debriefer represented that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Majid Khan, an operative who could get into the U.S. easily.”1881 The draft OIG Special Review repeated the representations of and others, stating that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks against U.S. water reservoirs.”1882 On February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt submitted the CIA’s formal response to the draft Inspector General Special Review. Pavitt’s submission represented that Majid Khan was in custody “because of the information we were able lawfully to obtain from KSM.”1883 The final, and now declassified, CIA Inspector General Special Review states that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks...”1884 In its analysis of the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC relied on passages of the Inspector General’s Special Review that included this inaccurate representation.1885

(TS/NOFORN) On July 29, 2003, CIA leadership met with select members of the National Security Council to obtain reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA stated that “detainees subject[ed] to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved

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1880 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 5, 2003. [REDACTED], Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al-Qa’ida Department; date: 28 July 2003; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.

1881 [REDACTED], Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.


lives.” briefing slides provided by the CIA stated that “major threat” information was acquired, providing the “Identification of... the Majid Khan Family” by KSM as an example. The same slides were used, at least in part, for subsequent briefings. On September 16, 2003, a briefing was conducted for Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the content of which was described as “virtually identical” to the July 29, 2003, briefing. The slides were also used in an October 7, 2003, briefing for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.

CIA records indicate that Majid Khan was identified and located prior to any reporting from KSM. There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from KSM—or any other CIA detainee—played any role in the identification and capture of Majid Khan.

On January 10, 2003, the FBI’s Baltimore Field Office opened a full field international terrorism investigation on the email account “BobDesi(@)hotmail.com.” According to FBI investigative records, the investigation was “predicated upon information received through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning” a known al-Qa’ida email account that was already “under FISA coverage.” Six days later, on January 16, 2003, open source research related to the “BobDesi” email account “revealed a personal website


1887 The CIA’s June 2003 Response states that “CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General (IG) that led to a one time misrepresentation of this case in the IG’s 2004 Special Review.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response adds that, “[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the ‘Findings and Conclusions’ section of the Study, a ‘repeatedly represented’ or ‘frequently cited’ example of the effectiveness of CIA’s enhanced interrogation program.” The CIA’s June 2013 assertion that this was a “one-time misrepresentation” is inaccurate. As described, the inaccurate information was provided numerous times to the Inspector General, in multiple interviews and in the CIA’s official response to the draft Special Review. Afterwards, the CIA relied on the section of the Special Review that included the inaccurate information on the capture of Majid Khan in obtaining legal approval for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from the Department of Justice. This information was also provided by the CIA to the CIA’s Blue Ribbon Panel for their review of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA also included the inaccurate representation about the identification of Majid Khan and his family to the National Security Council principals on multiple occasions. Further, as noted, the inaccurate information in the CIA OIG Special Review was declassified and has been used in multiple open source articles and books, often as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA program.


1889 Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097).

1890 For additional details, see Volumes II and Volume III.

1891 See FBI 302 on FBI case file [redacted] and 88793 [redacted].
for the user, Majid Khan.” In February 2003, was tracking Majid Khan’s Internet activity and was confident he was located at his brother’s house in Karachi, Pakistan. On March 4, 2003, ALEC Station noted that activity on an al-Qa’ida email account—associated with Khallad bin Attash—that was in contact with Majid Khan, had been dormant. ALEC Station recommended that move to capture Majid Khan in the hope that Majid Khan could lead CIA officers to Khallad bin Attash. The following morning, March 5, 2003, officers from Pakistan carried out a raid on Majid Khan’s brother’s house, detaining Majid Khan.

(TS/REL) On March 15, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station presented an email to CIA Headquarters noting that she had read the reporting from Majid Khan’s foreign government interrogations and was requesting photographs of Majid Khan and his associates to use in the KSM interrogations. CIA Headquarters provided the photographs the same day. On March 17, 2003, KSM was shown the photograph of Majid Khan and discussed the person he stated he knew as “Yusif,” for the first time.

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

(TS/REL) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate.

(U) In the September 6, 2006, speech, acknowledging the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated:

“This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information.”

The speech continued:

“These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of information from this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided

1893 ALEC - (160141Z JAN 03)
1894 - 13571 (260330Z FEB 03)
1895 ALEC - (040329Z MAR 03)
1896 - 13658 (050318Z MAR 03); - 13659 (050459Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (050459Z MAR 03).
1897 Memorandum for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED]; OFFICE: [REDACTED]; DETENTION SITE BLUE; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.
1898 ALEC Station sent DETENTION SITE BLUE photographs for use with KSM and other detainees. They included Majid Khan, Muhammad Khan, Sohail Munir, Iyman Faris, Majid Khan’s cousin (Mansour), Fayyaz Kauran, Aydinbelge, Khalid Jamil, and Aafia Siddiqui. See ALEC - (152212Z MAR 03).
1899 - 10865 (171648Z MAR 03); - 10886 (182219Z MAR 03); - 10870 (172017Z MAR 03)
information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.\footnote{1900 See “CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,” drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program.” In October 2007 CIA officers discussed a section of the President’s speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, related to Camp Lemonier. Addressing the section of the speech that states, “[t]errorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti,” a senior CIA officer highlighted that the plotting had not been stopped, but in fact was ongoing. The officer wrote: “I have attached the cable from Gulled that was used to source the Sept ’06 speech as well as a later cable from a different detainee affirming that as of mid-2004, AQ members in Somalia were still intent on attacking Camp Lemonier... As of 2004, the second detainee indicates that AQ was still working on attacking the base.” The CIA officer explained that the “reasoning behind validation of the language in the speech—and remember, we can argue about whether or not ‘planning’ consitutes [sic] a ‘plot’ and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security.” (See email from: \text{[redacted]} to: \text{[redacted]}; subject: “More on Camp Lemonier”; date: October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM). The President’s reference to Camp Lemonier in the context of “this vital program” came immediately after the passage of the speech referencing the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM and immediately before statements about the thwarting of the Karachi and Heathrow Airport plots, both of which have been explicitly attributed by the CIA to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The disruption of the Camp Lemonier plotting was also referenced as an intelligence success in the context of the March 2008 presidential veto of legislation that would have effectively banned the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. See “Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill,” \textit{The New York Times}, dated March 8, 2008, which states, the “main reason this program has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures... limiting the CIA’s interrogation methods to those in the Army field manual would be dangerous.”}{1901} Similarly, in a prepared briefing for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, on October 30, 2007, the CIA represented that the CIA could not conduct its detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because “interrogations conducted on US military installations must comply with the Army Field Manual.” The CIA presentation stated that the CIA program was “critical to [the CIA’s] ability
to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack,” that “[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way,” that the CIA program “is in no way comparable to the detainee programs run by our military,” and that the CIA used information derived from the program “to disrupt terrorist plots—\textit{including against our military.}”\textsuperscript{1902} The CIA presentation then stated:

“[A CIA detainee] informed us\textsuperscript{1903} of an operation underway to attack the U.S. military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this plot helped us to prevent the attack.”\textsuperscript{1904}

\textbf{(TS/\\textsuperscript{2}NF)} A review of CIA records found that: (1) the detainee to whom the CIA’s representations refer—Guleed (variant, Gouled) Hassan Dourad—was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the CIA was aware of and reported on the terrorist threat to Camp Lemonier prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees;\textsuperscript{1905} (3) Guleed provided corroborative reporting on the threat prior to being transferred to CIA custody; and (4) contrary to CIA representations, the plotting did not “stop” because of information acquired from CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007.\textsuperscript{1906}

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\textsuperscript{1902} Emphasis in original. \textit{See CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, “DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition and Detention Programs” and attachments.}

\textsuperscript{1903} The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “We did not represent that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, or that it was disrupted based solely on information from detainees in CIA custody.” The CIA’s October 30, 2007, talking points for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, make no reference to the CIA receiving intelligence on the Camp Lemonier plotting from other intelligence sources prior to CIA detainee reporting. Nor do the talking points indicate that the CIA detainee initially provided information on the plotting prior to being transferred to CIA custody. In addition, as described, an Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program from September 6, 2006, states that “the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal” and that “al-Qaeda facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed” that he had been sent to “case the US Marine base Camp Lemonier.”

\textsuperscript{1904} \textit{See CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, “DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition and Detention Programs” and attachments.} The talking points further state that the “Presidentially-mandated detention program is critical to our ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack.” The attachment to the document, labeled “points from CTC,” further asserts that while CIA rendition activities “did yield intelligence, it did not do so in a timely, efficient, and thorough way, raising unacceptable risks,” and that the CIA “experience has shown that exclusive control by CIA, in a Agency designed, built, and managed facility, allows us complete oversight and control over all aspects of detention, to include conditions of confinement, approved interrogation activities, humane standards, medical treatment, detainee engagement, security, hygiene, and infrastructure.” The document references a U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations bill providing a reduction in funding for the Covert Action CT Program and states: “Had the mark been directed against the rendition and detention programs specifically, the CIA would have recommended a Presidential veto. In its appeal, CIA detailed the impact of a $8 million cut to the CA CT Program. The Agency also made it clear that it would continue the rendition and detention program because of the high value of these activities.”

\textsuperscript{1905} \textit{See aforementioned CIA representations that: (1) “This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information,” and (2) “Most, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way.” As noted, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed.}

\textsuperscript{1906} \textit{See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.}
(TSH//**//NF) On March 4, 2004, Guleed was captured in Djibouti based on information obtained from a foreign government and a CIA source.\(^{1907}\) Prior to entering CIA custody, Guleed was confronted with information acquired from signals intelligence, and he confirmed that he was the Camp Lemonier for a potential terrorist attack.\(^{1908}\) CIA sought to render Guleed to CIA custody in order to question Guleed about senior al-Qa’ida East Africa members Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. A CIA cable states:

"Guleed represents the closest we have come to an individual with first hand, face-to-face knowledge of Abu Talha [al-Sudani] and Nabhan, and our hope is that Guleed will provide key intelligence necessary for the capture of these senior al-Qa’ida members."\(^{1909}\)

\(^{1907}\) HEADQUAR 3131 (041624Z MAR 04); HEADQUAR 041935Z MAR 04). See also 15623.

\(^{1908}\) 93364 (January 8, 2008).

\(^{1909}\) 93364 (January 8, 2008).

\(^{1910}\) HEADQUAR 1329. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “In March 2004, based [on] information from a clandestine source-detained and rendered to CIA custody the primary facilitator for al-Qa’ida’s Camp Lemonier plot, Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who had casing the Camp on behalf of al-Qa’ida. Guleed provided details about the plot and al-Qa’ida’s Somali support network, which drove CIA’s targeting efforts.” As described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, Guleed confirmed intelligence reporting already collected on his casing of Camp Lemonier prior to being rendered to CIA custody. See reference to material on recorded interrogations of Guleed Hassan Dourad in the cable, 93364 (January 8, 2008).

\(^{1911}\) 1573 (160217Z MAR 04), later reissued as CIA (021549Z APR 04)/ and used to support the president’s speech on September 6, 2006.

\(^{1912}\) 1543

\(^{1907}\) 1573 (160217Z MAR 04), later reissued as CIA (021549Z APR 04)/ and used to support the president’s speech on September 6, 2006.
raised the necessary funds via the bank robbery operation," and that he [Guleed] was not informed of the operational plan."

Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided, thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier: and CIA records indicate that attack planning against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed’s capture in March 2004, to include a time period beyond the president’s September 6, 2006, speech. In March 2005, the CIA sought approval to render an associate of Guleed whom the CIA stated was “planning terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in East Africa, particularly against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.” In October 2005, a cable stated, “a body of reporting indicates that East Africa al-Qa’ida network operations are currently planning attacks on U.S. interests in the region, particularly... the U.S. military base Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.” In April 2007, the continued terrorist threat reporting against Camp Lemonier resulted in a request for the Camp to further “alter their security practices.”

In October 2007, in light of the ongoing threat reporting related to Camp Lemonier, CIA officer [redacted] attempted to explain the CIA-validated statement in the president’s September 6, 2006, speech that “[t]errorists held in CIA custody” “helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.”

The CIA’s June 2013 Response links the “disrupt[ion]” of the Camp Lemonier plotting to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program via the arrest of KSM, stating: “According to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), his arrest in March 2003 (which we note in Example 12 resulted in part from information provided by Ramzi Bin al-Shibh) prevented him from transferring 30,000 euros from al-Qa’ida in Pakistan to al-Qa’ida in East Africa leaders, some of whom were plotting the Camp Lemonier attack. Funding shortages were cited repeatedly by detainees and in [redacted] as a reason for the Camp Lemonier plot’s delays.” Prior to the CIA’s June 2013 Response, there were no CIA records attributing the delay or disruption of the plotting to the capture or detention of KSM. While a body of intelligence reporting indicated that funding shortages contributed to delays in the targeting of Camp Lemonier, no CIA intelligence records were identified that cite any deficit of expected funds resulting from KSM’s capture. As detailed in this Study, KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Intelligence reporting indicates that Abu Talha al-Sudani sent Guleed to case the security at Camp Lemonier more than six months later, in September 2003. In early March 2004, the CIA reported that [redacted] revealed that Abu Talha and Guleed were working together in search of funding necessary to carry out planned operations.” In late March 2004, after Guleed’s detention, several associates were detained after an attack on a German aid delegation, which was suspected of being an attempt to kidnap individuals for ransom. A cable reporting this information stated that [redacted] indicated Abu Talha continues to press forward on plans to target Western interests in Djibouti.” Several days later, CIA officers surmised that the kidnapping attempt was likely an attempt “by Abu Talha to raise the operational funds for his plan to attack Camp Lemonier.” (See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting referenced in HEADQUARTERS (101768Z MAR 04) and connected to [redacted]; ALEC (221212Z MAR 04); and ALEC (29253Z MAR 04).) As detailed in the section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), the capture of KSM did not result from information provided by Ramzi bin al-Shibh.

Draft cable in an email from: [redacted] to [redacted] and [redacted]; subject: “DDO Approval to render Somali Jihadist and al-Qa’ida facilitator Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohammad to [CIA] control;” date: May 11, 2005, at 5:42:50 PM.

See “CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,” drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as
who was involved in vetting of the speech, wrote to a CIA colleague tracking the ongoing threats to Camp Lemonier that:

"The reasoning behind [the CIA] validation of the language in the speech--and remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' constisitutes [sic] a 'plot' and about whether anything is ever disrupted--was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security."  

(TS//REL) A review of CIA records, however, found no indication that CIA detainee reporting from Guleed, or any other CIA detainee, alerted the CIA or the U.S. military to increased terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier. To the contrary, CIA records indicate that the CIA was in possession of substantial threat reporting demonstrating that Camp Lemonier in Djibouti was being targeted by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida affiliated extremists prior to the detention of Guleed on March 4, 2004. For example, on January 28, 2003, a foreign government report disseminated by the CIA stated that al-Qa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier." On March 10, 2003, a "Terrorist Advisory" was issued, which stated that "U.S. forces stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti... could be targeted." Similar reporting continued through 2003, and by the end of the year, the CIA had coverage indicating that Guleed and other identified operatives were being

an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program."

199 See email from: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and others; subject: "More on Camp Lemonier"; October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM. In a reply email, a CIA officer wrote that Guleed’s statement was only “that the plan was suspended while Abu Talha tried to acquire the necessary funds,” and continued, “I don’t want anyone to walk away from this thinking that the POTUS speech from 2006 is the only language/view we are allowed to hold, especially since most of all of us were not involved in the original coordination” of the President’s September 6, 2006, speech. See email from: [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Camp Lemonier"; date: October 24, 2007, at 1:22:44 PM.

200 [REDACTED] 1313 (041624Z MAR 04)

201 See January 28, 2003, CIA Presidential Daily Brief, entitled, “Al-Qa’ida Planning Attack in Djibouti.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed, but argues that the threat reporting provided to the President on January 28, 2003, had “no relation to [al-Sudani’s] plot,” and was “later recalled after being revealed to be a fabrication.” The CIA did not provide a date for the recall. The reporting, which indicated al-Qa’ida operatives were planning “to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier,” would later be corroborated by other intelligence reporting, including by Guleed in his description of al-Sudani’s plotting. See intelligence chronology in Volume II.

202 CIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED] (110056Z MAR 03). See also [REDACTED] 17366 (121355Z MAR 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that the March 2003 reporting was “an analytical assessment that Djibouti was a potential target given its US Military presence,” was “not based on specific intelligence,” and was analysis related to “a different al-Qa’ida cell.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also disputes the relevance of the May 2003 reporting that al-Qa’ida affiliates were “waiting for the right time to carry out large-scale attacks, possibly involving suicide bombers, against a U.S. military base or U.S. naval ship in or near Djibouti.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that this threat reporting “was later found to be unrelated.” Notwithstanding these assertions, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed.

203 ALEC [REDACTED] (021828Z OCT 03)
directed by Abu Talha al-Sudani to target Camp Lemonier. By the end of December 2003, Djiboutian authorities confirmed that Guleed had cased Camp Lemonier and that Guleed appeared to have "formulate[d] a complete targeting package, which included an escape route." It was this reporting that led to capture Guleed on March 4, 2004.

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources

In addition to CIA claims that information produced during or after the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the disruption of terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists, the CIA also represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset.

The CIA repeatedly represented to policymakers that information acquired after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques helped to "validate" CIA sources. For example, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided testimony to the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

"Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, in one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing or fabricating some or all [of] the details in his report."

Similarly, in January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book for a planned three-hour briefing of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama's national security staff. Included in the materials was a document that stated, "[k]ey intelligence [was] collected from HVD interrogations after applying [the CIA's enhanced] interrogation techniques." After this statement, the CIA provided examples, including that the "most significant reporting" acquired from CIA detainee Janat Gul after applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was information that helped the CIA "validate a CIA asset."

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1924 Referenced in HEADQUARTERS (101756Z MAR 04) and connected to.

See also CIA WASHINGTON DC (302034Z DEC 03) / SERIAL:
1925 CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program" (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005, and was broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005, as an Intelligence Assessment. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.

1928 Italics in original. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Expected participants.
"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul’s most significant reporting helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al-Qa’ida’s chief of finance, Shaykh Sa’id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied. Gul’s reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA [REDACTED] the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting.”\(^{1929}\)

\(^{1929}\) The CIA representation that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced information that allowed the CIA to identify the reporting of a CIA asset as fabricated lacked critical contextual information. The CIA representations did not describe how the CIA asset’s reporting was already doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. Nor did the CIA representations acknowledge that the asset’s fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the techniques in the first place. The CIA concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al-Qa’ida figure and did not possess threat information, but this conclusion was not included in CIA representations.

\(^{1930}\) In March 2004, the CIA received reporting from a CIA asset, “ASSET Y,”\(^{1930}\) that Janat Gul was planning with senior al-Qa’ida leaders to conduct attacks inside the United States. The attacks were reportedly planned to occur prior to the U.S. elections in November 2004.\(^{1931}\) ASSET Y, who cited Janat Gul as the source of the information, stated that Gul was going to facilitate a meeting between Abu Faraj al-Libi and ASSET Y in support of the operation.\(^{1932}\) As noted, CIA officers expressed doubts about ASSET Y’s reporting at the
time it was received. A senior CIA officer, who formerly served as chief of the Bin Laden Unit, raised questions about the reliability of the asset’s reporting on March 3, 2004, stating that the reporting was “vague” and “worthless in terms of actionable intelligence,” and that al-Qaeda “loses nothing” by disclosing the information. He further stated that, given an al-Qaeda statement emphasizing a lack of desire to strike before the U.S. election, and al-Qaeda’s knowledge that “threat reporting causes panic in Washington” and “leaks soon after it is received,” the report “would be an easy way [for al-Qaeda] to test” ASSET Y’s. ALEC Station officer expressed similar doubts about the source’s reporting in response to the email.

(TS/ //REDACTED//NF) Less than three months later, Janat Gul was captured on June 1, 2004. On June 1, 2004, CIA’s proposed that Gul be rendered to CIA custody, citing ASSET Y’s reporting. During this period, however, the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques had been suspended by the CIA director. On June 29, 2004, a draft memorandum from DCI Tenet to National Security Adviser Rice sought special approval from the National Security Council Principals Committee to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul to learn more about the threat reporting from ASSET Y. The memorandum referenced ASSET Y’s reporting and stated that if the CIA could use the techniques, “the Agency would be in an optimum position to obtain from Gul critical intelligence necessary to save American lives by disrupting the pre-election plot, locating senior al-Qaeda leaders still at large, and learning how Usama Bin Laden communicates with his operatives.” The memorandum further stated that “[g]iven the magnitude of the danger posed by

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1933 Email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?: date: March 3, 2004, at 06:55 AM.
1934 Email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?: date: March 3, 2004, at 06:55 AM. The email references a March 17, 2004, al-Qaeda statement. Speaking of a second source providing threat reporting, noted that “i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset]”
1935 Email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?: date: March 3, 2004, at 06:55 AM. The email references a March 17, 2004, al-Qaeda statement. Speaking of a second source providing threat reporting, noted that “i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset]”
1936 Email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?: date: March 3, 2004, at 06:55 AM. The email references a March 17, 2004, al-Qaeda statement. Speaking of a second source providing threat reporting, noted that “i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset]”
1937 emails 3633 (04), which states “Gul is the source of [ASSET Y’s] pre-election threat information. This information forms a substantial part of the USG’s current pre-election threat assessment. Station believes that if Gul has pre-election threat information, we must exploit him using our best resources. Those resources do not exist in . Station has interrogated many al-Qaeda members in and while we have been successful at times, our best information is obtained when the detainee is interrogated in a CIA controlled facility ((DETENTION SITE COBALT) or blacksite).”
1939 Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques, attached to email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John Rizzo, and [REDACTED]; subject: Draft Documents for Friday’s NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004.
the pre-election plot, and [Janat] Gul’s almost certain knowledge of any intelligence about that plot, I request the fastest possible resolution of the above issues.\footnote{Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques, attached to email from: \[REDACTED]\; to: John Moseman, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskovitz, Scott Muller, John Rizzo, \[REDACTED] and \[REDACTED]; subject: Draft Documents for Friday’s NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004.}

\footnote{(TS//\[REDACTED]/NF) On July 2, 2004, the day that CIA Headquarters approved the rendition of Janat Gul to CIA custody,\footnote{The CIA briefing slides further asserted that \[REDACTED] debriefings of Janat Gul by \[REDACTED] [foreign government] officials were “not working.” (See CIA briefing slides, CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004). National Security Advisor Rice later stated in a letter to the CIA Director that “CIA briefers informed us that Gul likely has information about pre-election terror plots against the United States as a result of Gul’s close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.” See June 7, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.} the CIA represented to select members of the National Security Council that Janat Gul was one of the “most senior radical Islamic facilitators in Pakistan,” and noted that he was “assessed by a key source on [the] pre-election plot to be involved in or [to] have information on the plot.”\footnote{According to handwritten notes of the briefing, CIA briefers described Janat Gul as “senior AQ” and a “key facilitator” with “proximity” to a suspected pre-election plot. Committee records indicate that CIA briefers told the chairman and vice chairman that, given the pre-election threat, it was “incumbent” on the CIA to “review [the] need for EITs,” following the suspension of “EITs.” (See handwritten notes of Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024 pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121)).} On July 15, 2004, based on the reporting of ASSET Y, the CIA represented to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee that Janat Gul was associated with a pre-election plot to conduct an attack in the United States.\footnote{July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller re Principals Meeting relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004.} On July 20, 2004, select National Security Council principals met again, and according to CIA records, agreed that, “[g]iven the current threat and risk of delay, CIA was authorized and directed to utilize the techniques with Janat Gul as necessary.”\footnote{Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). Attorney General Ashcroft, who attended the July 2, 2004, meeting, had opined earlier on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to Janat Gul. See letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to General Counsel Muller, July 7, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Security Advisor Rice in the White House Situation Room, Friday 2 July re Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence re Janat Gul; Memorandum from Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED] to Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], re standard interrogation techniques – DOJ limits, July 2, 2004.} On July 22, 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft approved the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul based on ASSET Y’s reporting.\footnote{TOP-SECRET/JR799/NOFORN Page 345 of 499

On August 19, 2004, CIA personnel wrote that the interrogation “team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information.” On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul “may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know.” The interrogators added that the interrogation “team maintains a degree of caution in some areas, as many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qa’ida are derived from single source reporting,” a reference to the CIA source, ASSET Y.

That same day, August 25, 2004, the CIA’s associate general counsel provided a letter to the DOJ seeking approval to use additional CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul: dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and the abdominal slap. The letter asserted that Janat Gul had information concerning “imminent threats to the United States” and “information that might assist in locating senior al-Qaeda operatives whose removal from the battlefield could severely disrupt planned terrorist attacks against the United States.” The letter stated:

“In addition, CIA understands that before his capture, Gul had been working to facilitate a direct meeting between the CIA source reporting on the pre-election threat [ASSET Y] and Abu Faraj himself; Gul had arranged a previous meeting between [ASSET Y] and al-Qaeda finance chief Shaykh Sa’id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed.”

The letter from the CIA’s associate general counsel asserted that Janat Gul’s “resistance increases when questioned about matters that may connect him to al-Qaeda or evidence he has direct knowledge of operational terrorist activities.” The letter stated that the CIA sought approval to add four enhanced interrogation techniques to Janat Gul’s

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1512 (04); 1497 (04); 1512 (04); 1521 (04); 1497 (04); 1530 (04); 1519 (04); 1537 (04). See Volume II and III for additional information.

1574 (04). Notwithstanding this assessment, on August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul “is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States or other nations,” that “the use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information,” and that CIA Headquarters was therefore approving the resumed use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul. See HEADQUARTERS (04).


1952 August 25, 2004 Letter from [Name], Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DT#2009-1809, Tab 10).
interrogation plan “in order to reduce markedly Gul’s strong resistance posture and provide an opportunity for the interrogation team to obtain his cooperation.”\textsuperscript{1953} On August 26, 2004, Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel Rizzo that the use of the four additional enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or U.S. treaty obligations. Levin’s letter stated that “[w]e understand that [Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information concerning an imminent terrorist threat to the United States.”\textsuperscript{1954}

(TS//\ LàmécI\NF) On August 27, 2004, Gul’s CIA interrogators reported that “in terms of overt indications of resistance, [Gul’s] overall resistance is currently judged to be minimal.”\textsuperscript{1955} Nonetheless, on August 31, 2004, the CIA interrogators asked CIA Headquarters to approve an extension of all CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.\textsuperscript{1956} The CIA’s associate general counsel objected, writing:

“In the end, its [sic] going to be an operational call. I just want to be sure that the record is clear that we’re not acting precipitously and are taking into consideration everything we’re learning about this guy. We open ourselves up to possible criminal liability if we misuse the interrogation techniques. I reflect again on the cable or cables from the interrogation team that opines that physical EITs (facial slap, walling, etc.) do not work on him. I would strongly encourage, then, HQS not to approval [sic] the use of physical interrogation techniques because if they don’t work, then our motives are questionable. If our motives might be questioned, then we get ourselves in trouble.”\textsuperscript{1957}

(TS//\ LàmécI\NF) Despite these concerns, on September 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters released a cable extending approval for sleep deprivation for 30 days. CIA records indicate, however, that Gul was not subjected to sleep deprivation, or any other enhanced interrogation technique, following this approval.\textsuperscript{1958}

(TS//\ LàmécI\NF) On September 7, 2004, more than a month after Janat Gul was rendered to CIA custody, a CIA officer who had observed the interrogations of Gul prepared a memorandum for the leadership of the CIA’s Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group, stating:

“The definition of an HVD has probably become blurred over the past year as [CIA] began to render a higher number of MVDs [medium value detainees], but [Janat Gul] would not be considered an HVD when compared to Abu

\textsuperscript{1953} August 25, 2004 Letter from \textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textyen}}\textsuperscript{Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).}

\textsuperscript{1954} Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6).

\textsuperscript{1955} 1631 (271859Z AUG 04)

\textsuperscript{1956} 1650 (3116202Z AUG 04)

\textsuperscript{1957} See email from: \textsuperscript{\textyen} to: \textsuperscript{\textyen} [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: “Req to extend authorization to use EITs”; date: September 1, 2004.

\textsuperscript{1958} HEADQUARTERS \textsuperscript{\textyen} (032155Z SEP 04)
Zubaydah, KSM, and similar level HVDs. [Janat Gul] should likewise not be considered an operational planner or even an operator. It is very likely that [Janat Gul] came into contact with operational information, but we lack credible information that ties him to pre-election threat information or direct operational planning against the United States, at home or abroad. Likewise, we lack any substantive information that connects [Janat Gul] to UBL, Zawahir, and Abu Faraj Al-Libi.”

(TS/NOFOR) On September 16, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that Janat Gul’s reporting directly contradicted information from ASSET Y from March 2004, and stated that, “[m]uch of our derogatory information on [Gul] came from [ASSET Y] reporting, as did much of our pre-election threat information.”

(TS/NOFOR) On September 17, 2004, following the reports about the discrepancies between the comments made by Janat Gul and ASSET Y, as well as similar denials from Sharif al-Masri, who was in foreign government custody, the CIA undertook a counterintelligence review of ASSET Y to assess the validity of ASSET Y’s reporting.

(TS/NOFOR) On October 1, 2004, and October 15, 2004, CIA officers provided a deceptively assessment of ASSET Y. That assessment indicated that ASSET Y was deceptive in response to questions regarding his alleged meeting with a senior al-Qa’ida official, Shaykh Sa’id, at which ASSET Y claimed to have learned about the pre-election threat. ASSET Y then admitted to having fabricated the information about the meeting.

(TS/NOFOR) Despite the recantation of reporting from ASSET Y, officers from the CIA’s ALEC Station continued to assess that Janat Gul “was one of the highest-ranking facilitators in Pakistan with long-standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa’ida” and other groups. This assessment was not shared by CIA personnel involved in Gul’s interrogation. On November 10, 2004, the CIA’s chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the CIA detention site hosting Gul, wrote that the words used by ALEC Station to describe Janat Gul:

1959 Rather than a “high value detainee,” the memo characterized Janat Gul as a “senior facilitator.” The CIA officer concluded that Gul was likely “not directly involved in operational planning and operations.” See September 7, 2004, CIA Document EYES ONLY – [redacted], written by [redacted].

1960 [redacted] 1706 (161749Z SEP 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “Janat Gul’s claim that [ASSET Y] never met the al-Qa’ida finance chief—who [ASSET Y] said told him about the pre-election threat—was vital to CIA’s assessment and handling of the case. CIA officers assessed Gul was cooperating during his interrogations by that time, leading CIA to [redacted] [ASSET Y] on the meeting and the plot, which he ultimately recanted.” As described earlier, CIA records indicate that Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats against the United States homeland, which had been reported by ASSET Y, prior to the use of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. At the time, Gul’s denial was deemed a “strong resistance posture” by the CIA. See [redacted] 1497 (1104); [redacted] 1411 (04); 4267 (04). The cable states: “After deception on the question of meeting Sa’id, [ASSET Y] quickly confessed to [CIA officer] that he had fabricated his meeting and blamed pressure from his handling [CIA] officer to produce leads as the catalyst for his lies.” ASSET Y continued to assert that he discussed the pre-election threat with Janat Gul, who, as noted, had denied to CIA interrogators that he had any knowledge of imminent threats to the United States.

1963 [redacted] (92126Z NOV 04)
"...fly in the face of what is now a rather long history of debriefings which, I would assert, paint a very different picture of him. While [Janat Gul] was certainly a facilitator, describing him as 'highest-ranking' gives him a stature which is undeserved, overblown and misleading. Stating that he had 'long standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong. To put it simply, [Janat Gul] is not the man we thought he was. While he no doubt had associations and interactions with people of interest, [Janat Gul] is not the pivotal figure our pre-detention descriptions of him suggest. We do a disservice to ourselves, the mission and even [Janat Gul] by allowing misperceptions of this man to persist."\textsuperscript{1964}

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On April 6, 2005, as the OLC approached completion of its analysis of the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC asked the CIA about the interrogation of Gul using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically, “what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and] did it help anything…?” The CIA did not immediately respond to this request and the CIA’s Associate General Counsel of OLC personnel had “taken to calling [him] daily” for information.

On April 14, 2005, a CIA officer emailed talking points stating that:

“Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul’s most significant reporting helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al-Qa’ida’s chief of finance, Shaykh Sa’id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied.

Gul’s reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA validated the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting.”

On May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a formal memorandum that included a discussion of the legality of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul. Citing information provided in the CIA’s August 25, 2004, letter, the OLC memorandum stated:

“You asked for our advice concerning these interrogation techniques in connection with their use on a specific high value al Qaeda detainee named Janat Gul. You informed us that the CIA believed Gul had information about al Qaeda’s plans to launch an attack within the United States. According to CIA’s information, Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and had arranged meetings between an associate and al Qaeda’s finance chief to discuss such an attack. … Our conclusions depend on these assessments.”

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1968 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 6, 2005.
1969 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 12, 2005; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 14, 2005.
1970 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: response to no. 5 request from [REDACTED]: OTA’s Detainee Reporting Brief; date: April 14, 2005.
1972 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of
On May 30, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum concluding that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees did not violate Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture.\textsuperscript{1973} In the memorandum, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury used the example of Janat Gul as a detainee who was “representative of the high value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or might be, used.”\textsuperscript{1974}

Citing information from the CIA’s August 25, 2004, letter, Bradbury wrote:

“the CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the pre-election threat to the United States... Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and intelligence indicated that ‘Gul had arranged a... meeting between [a source] and al-Qa’ida finance chief Shaykh Sa’id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed.’”\textsuperscript{1975}

As noted, the CIA had represented that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary for Janat Gul to provide information on an imminent threat to the United States, the pre-election threat. As further noted, Gul did not provide this information and records indicate that the threat was based on fabricated CIA source reporting. When the OLC requested the results of using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul, the CIA represented that “Gul has provided information that has helped the CIA with validating one of its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat.” This information was included in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, which also stated that Gul’s information “contradicted the asset’s contention that Gul met with Shaykh Sa’id,” and that, “[a]lthough with Gul’s assertions, the CIA challenged the asset, who then admitted that he had lied about the meeting.”\textsuperscript{1976} There are no indications in the memorandum that the CIA informed...

\textsuperscript{18} U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value Al Qaeda Detainee.

\textsuperscript{1973} Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.

\textsuperscript{1974} Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.

\textsuperscript{1975} Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The OLC memorandum also cited an “Undated CIA Memo, ‘Janat Gul’ (‘Janat Gul Memo’).” The OLC also relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul’s interrogations “greatly increased the CIA’s understanding of our enemy and its plans.”

\textsuperscript{1976} Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of...
the OLC that CIA officers had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election threat and had determined that Gul was "not the man we thought he was." As noted, after the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, the CIA continued to represent that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques allowed the CIA to validate sources.

8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzair and Saifullah Paracha

(TS//NOFORN) The CIA represented that information obtained through the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the identification and/or arrest of Uzair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations include inaccurate information and omit significant material information—specifically a body of intelligence reporting acquired prior to CIA detainee reporting that linked the Parachas to al-Qa’ida-related activities.

(TS//NOFORN) CIA representations also credit the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with the identification of a plot to smuggle explosives into the United States involving the Parachas. CIA records indicate that the plotting was denied by the supposed participants, and that at least one senior CIA counterterrorism official questioned the plausibility of the explosives smuggling plot given the relative ease of acquiring explosive material in the United States.

(TS//NOFORN) The CIA provided information to the CIA Office of Inspector General that “EITTs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes,” and stated that the CIA OIG Special Review should have come to the “conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives.” The CIA further represented to the OIG that KSM

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United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1977 The OLC relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul had information, but that he withheld it. In describing the interrogation process, the OLC stated that Janat Gul’s resistance increased as questioning moved to his “knowledge of operational terrorist activities.” The OLC also wrote that “Gul apparently feigned memory problems (which CIA psychologists ruled out through intelligence and memory tests) in order to avoid answering questions.” The OLC further conveyed that the CIA believes that Janat Gul continues to downplay his knowledge.” See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

1978 As described elsewhere, on April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this memorandum and others.

1979 Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

1980 See details in the intelligence chronology in Volume II.

“provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Uzair Paracha, a smuggler,”1982 and that

“as a result of the lawful use of EITs”;

“KSM identified a mechanism for al-Qa’ida to smuggle explosives into the US via a Pakistani businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material to the US. The businessman had agreed to use this method to help al-Qa’ida smuggle explosives for follow-on attacks to 9/11.”1983

(SHSR//NF) Similarly, on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a select group of National Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking policy reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA briefing materials state that “the use of the [CIA interrogation] techniques has produced significant results,” and warned that “termination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” The CIA conveyed that “[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted,” and under a briefing slide entitled “RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO,” represented that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques led to the “identification” of Saifullah Paracha.1984

(TSHR//NF) A widely disseminated CIA Intelligence Assessment, entitled “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” that was described in internal CIA emails as being “put together using past assessments” and initially intended for the White House only, with “marching orders” to “throw everything in it,”1985 states:

“Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding... operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots... KSM’s revelation in March 2003

1982 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. These representations were included in the final, and now declassified Special Review of the Inspector General, which states that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to use to smuggle explosives in New York.” (See CIA Inspector General Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 – October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004). The statements in the Special Review regarding the purported effectiveness of the program, including the reference to the Parachas, were cited by the Office of Legal Counsel in its analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10-11, citing IG Special Review, pp. 85-91.

1983 Email from: [REDACTED] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.


1985 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: multiple addresses; subject: “Draft of IA on ‘Detainee Reporting Pivotal to the War on Terrorism’”; date: May 16, 2005, at 2:08 PM.
that he was plotting with Sayf al-Rahman Paracha—who also used the name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha’s business ties in the United States.”

CIA representations related to the “identification” of the Parachas and/or the arrest of Uzair Paracha—as well as the identification of an explosives smuggling plot—omit significant information acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Specifically, prior to KSM’s reporting, the Intelligence Community had already collected and acted upon significant information related to the Paracha family’s connections to al-Qa’ida and international terrorism:

- Information on Saifullah Paracha was found in documents seized during a March 28, 2002, raid against al-Qa’ida targets associated with Hassan Ghul, which resulted in the capture of Abu Zubaydah. The documents identified “Saifullah Piracha” (the spelling found in the document seized during the raid) and phone numbers, which would be associated with his Karachi-based business, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd, as early as April 2002. An address associated with the business was also identified.

- The name “Saifullah Piracha” was provided to Pakistani officials by the CIA in December 2002. The CIA wrote: “Information below leads us to believe that the following individual and phone numbers may have a connection to al-Qa’ida and international terrorism.... We request your assistance in investigating this individual to determine if he is involved in terrorist activity.” The request included three phone numbers found in the documents seized on March 28, 2002, one of which was associated with Saifullah Paracha’s Karachi-based company, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd.

- In April 2002, the FBI opened an investigation on another at a New York-based business associated with Saifullah Paracha. During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed an employer at a New York address and acquired additional information on the business and the Parachas. business card, identifying him as an employee of International Merchandise Limited, was found among documents seized during the April 2002 Karachi raid.

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1986 Italics added. CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET/NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.

1987 DIRECTOR (221835Z APR 02); ALEC (222235Z DEC 02); DIRECTOR (221835Z APR 02)

1988 ALEC (222235Z DEC 02)

1989 FBI WASHINGTON DC (271623Z MAR 03); ALEC (191630Z MAY 03) (cables explaining previous FBI investigative action on Paracha). On March 28, 2003, the FBI would return to the same employer and the same address, leading to the apprehension of Uzair Paracha, who would voluntarily provide significant reporting to the FBI.
• Months later, financial documents seized during the September 11, 2002, raids that resulted in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh identified an email address attributed to International Merchandise Pvt Ltd., with the same contact—Saifullah A. Paracha—as well as the same address and phone number as the business identified after the March 2002 raid.1990

• Based on the information obtained during the September 2002 raids, the CIA informed the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Treasury that they suspected “Saifullah Paracha” was engaged in terrorist financing activities, specifically for al-Qa’ida. The cable included detailed information on Saifullah Paracha and International Merchandise Pvt Ltd in Karachi, and noted the CIA’s ongoing interest in, and analysis of, the information.1991

• FBI investigative activity of terrorism subject Jyman Faris found that Faris was linked to Paracha Imports via his Ohio-based housemates.1992

• Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided reporting that “Uzhaire” ran the New York branch of his father’s Karachi-based import-export business. According to the reporting, Uzhaire was assisting Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi in their efforts to resettle Majid Khan in the United States for terrorism-related purposes. Khan provided a detailed physical description of both Uzhaire and his father.1993

(TS//M//NF) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March 1, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.1994 A CIA interrogation report from March 24, 2003, states that during the afternoon, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, for failing to provide information on operations in the United States and for having “lied about poison and biological warfare programs.”1995 That evening, KSM’s interrogators received reports on information being provided by Majid Khan,1996 who was in foreign government custody and being interviewed by FBI special agents and foreign government officers. The information included details on a U.S.-based individual associated with al-Qa’ida named Uzhaire. According to Khan, this Uzhaire ran the New York branch of his...
father's Karachi-based import-export business. CIA cables describe KSM as being “boxed in” by reporting from Majid Khan before providing the following information on the Parachas and a smuggling plot:

- KSM corroborated reporting from Majid Khan that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Uzhair Paracha for assistance in resettling Majid Khan in the United States.
- KSM stated that he was close to Uzhair’s father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, who provided assistance through his business and by helping to find safe houses in Karachi.
- KSM claimed that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Sayf al-Rahman Paracha with a plan to use Sayf al-Rahman Paracha’s textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. KSM stated that Paracha agreed to this plan and was arranging the details with Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan at the time of his (KSM’s) capture. A later CIA cable provided additional background, stating: “KSM did not volunteer [the explosives plot] information on Paracha. He provided this reporting only when confronted with details on his role and other information on the plot, which had been provided by detainee Majid Khan,” who was in foreign government custody.

According to CIA records, on March 28, 2003, at a FBI field office, Uzhair Paracha provided significant information to interviewing FBI special agents on his father’s links to al-Qa’ida and his own efforts to assist Majid Khan’s reentry to the United States. Uzhair denied knowing anything about an explosives smuggling plot.

On April 29, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was detained by Pakistani authorities as a result of reporting unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Records indicate Ammar al-Baluchi provided significant information prior to being transferred to CIA custody. On May , 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was rendered to CIA custody and

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1997 [Redacted]
1998 [Redacted]
1999 [Redacted]
2000 [Redacted]
2001 [Redacted]
2002 [Redacted]
2003 [Redacted]
2004 [Redacted]
immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA stopped using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ammar al-Baluchi on May 20, 2003. A June 18, 2003, cable states that Ammar al-Baluchi denied that he and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. Ammar al-Baluchi stated he only asked Sayf al-Rahman Paracha questions and made inquiries about how explosives shipping could be done. Ammar al-Baluchi maintained that he did not take any action based on the discussion.

(TS//RED/NUFOR) On July 5, 2003, Saifullah Paracha was detained in Bagram, in an operation orchestrated by the FBI. Shortly thereafter, Saifullah Paracha was rendered to U.S. military custody at Bagram Air Force Base. At Bagram, Saifullah Paracha was questioned by an FBI special agent. A CIA cable from July 17, 2003, relays that Saifullah Paracha stated that Ammar al-Baluchi had asked if he knew a forwarding agent who could ship garments and “materials” to Europe, which Saifullah Paracha inferred were either explosives or chemicals. Paracha stated he had no information to provide to Ammar al-Baluchi on this topic and that no further action was taken on the matter.

(TS//RED/NUFOR) With regards to the explosives smuggling reporting, a senior CIA counterterrorism official commented:

“again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why ‘smuggle’ in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to

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2005 Ammar al-Baluchi was detained in Pakistan on April 29, 2003, and transferred to CIA custody on May 3, 2003. See [REDACTED] 14259; 38402; 45028; 14282; [REDACTED] 38323; [REDACTED] 38389. For additional details, see detainee review for Ammar al-Baluchi in Volume III.
2006 DIRECTOR [REDACTED] (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as [REDACTED] 39239 (301600Z MAY 03).
2007 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM. (See interview of by Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003). The CIA originally sought to take direct custody of Saifullah Paracha. On May 6, 2003, CTC’s chief of operations, [REDACTED], sent an email to [REDACTED] CTC Legal, [REDACTED], and CTC attorney [REDACTED] with a proposal for the CIA to detain Saifullah Paracha and interrogate him using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, writing: “we MUST have paracha arrested without delay and transferred to cia custody for interrogation using enhanced measures. i understand that paracha’s us person status makes this difficult, but this is dynamite and we have to move forward with alacrity. what do you need to do that? what do we need to do that?” See CIA document for: [REDACTED]; date: 6 May 2003. According to CIA records noted above, Saifullah Paracha’s eventual capture and rendition to U.S. military custody was complicated by [REDACTED]. According to emails within CTC Legal, Paracha was “...”
2009 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM.
2010 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM.
2011 13588 (171505Z JUL 03)
9. **Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar**

(TS/NOFORNS//NF) The CIA made repeated claims that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in “key intelligence” from Abu Zubaydah and KSM on an operative named Jaffar al-Tayyar, later identified as Adnan el-Shukrijumah. These CIA representations frequently asserted that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in an FBI investigation that prompted al-Tayyar to flee the United States. These representations were inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Jaffar al-Tayyar departed the United States in May 2001.

(TS/NOFORNS//NF) CIA representations also omitted key contextual facts, including that: (1) the Intelligence Community was interested in the Florida-based Adnan el-Shukrijumah prior to the detention of the CIA’s first detainee; (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in

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2012 Email from: [Redacted]; to: [Redacted]; [Redacted]; [Redacted]; [Redacted]; subject: see highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.

2013 Also known as (aka) Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el-Shukrijumah, Jafar al-Tayyar, and Abu Jafar al-Tayer. Spelling used throughout the Committee Study reflects, to the extent possible, the spelling found within intelligence records.

2014 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from [Redacted]. Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.” See also CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET/NOFORN level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. See also CIA graphic attachment to several CIA briefings on the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, entitled, “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).” See also CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, “Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-18FEB.2009.”

2015 The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “there were cases in which we either made a factual error or used imprecise language, but these mistakes were not central to our representations and none invalidates our assessment that detainee reporting provided key intelligence on this important terrorist.” As one of two examples, the CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that the “[CIA] incorrectly stated al-Tayyar fled the United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time.” The Committee found that this inaccurate statement was central to the CIA’s representations. The CIA asserted that “Jafar al-Tayyar” fled the United States because of KSM’s reporting after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the context of representations that the use of the techniques “has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West.”

May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; 2017 (3) CIA personnel distrusted KSM’s reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar—stating that KSM fabricated information and had inserted al-Tayyar “into practically every story, each time with a different role”; 2018 (4) other CIA detainee reporting differed from KSM’s reporting in significant ways; 2019 and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not identify al-Tayyar’s true name and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided al-Tayyar’s true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah. 2020 Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM the characterization of al-Tayyar as the “next Mohammed Atta,” despite clarifications from KSM to the contrary. 2021

(TS//[REDACTED]/NF) For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum with the subject line, “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” the CIA responded to a request from the Office of Legal Counsel “for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value].” Under a section entitled, “Results,” the CIA stated:

“CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence

2017 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III and
2018 [REDACTED] (182140Z MAR 03); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Reissue/Correction: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar—If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception Capacities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.
2019 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION: CT: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operational Threat,” 22 December 2005; 42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar—If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception Capacities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.
2020 CIA “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. For KSM’s inability to identify name, see 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10787 (130716Z MAR 03); 10863 (171028Z MAR 03). For example, November 6, 2006, talking points prepared for a briefing with the President stated that “KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta.” See CIA document entitled, “DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007,” dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was “sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting.”
collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques.\textsuperscript{2022}

(TS//\redacted) The CIA then listed “Jafaar al-Tayyar” as one of 11 examples, stating:

“Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa’ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar’s family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar’s true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States, and we are actively pursuing his capture.

(TS//\redacted) In January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book—and CIA Director Hayden produced his own prepared remarks—for a three-hour briefing on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama’s national security staff.\textsuperscript{2024} Included in the materials was a document entitled, “Key Impacts,” which states:

“\textbf{Results:} CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:}\textsuperscript{2025}

\textsuperscript{2022} Emphasis in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from \redacted, Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

\textsuperscript{2023} CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from \redacted, Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

\textsuperscript{2024} CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009.” Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, “D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 – 11:30 a.m.” The briefing book includes the previously mentioned “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. Expected participants included “Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brenan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel,” as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and Legal, [REDACTED].

\textsuperscript{2025} Emphasis in original.
... Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa’ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar’s family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar’s true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States. and we are actively pursuing his capture.

(TS//RED//NF) Prior to receiving information from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the U.S. Intelligence Community was interested in Adnan el-Shukrijumah. According to CIA and open source records, the FBI interviewed the parents of Adnan el-Shukrijumah several times between September 2001 and October 2002 concerning their son and his suspected contact with a known extremist. The family provided no significant information on their son, except to alert the FBI that he had departed the United States circa May 2001.

(TS//RED//NF) CIA representations that Jaffar al-Tayyar fled the United States in 2003 in response to an investigation prompted by reporting from KSM were incongruent with CIA records at the time of the representations, which indicated that al-Tayyar had already relocated to Pakistan. In March 2003, when Jose Padilla identified Jaffar al-Tayyar as Adnan al-Shukrijumah, he stated that he had last seen al-Tayyar at a KSM safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan, in March 2002. Other reporting indicated al-Tayyar’s presence in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, as well. For example, KSM consistently reported that al-Tayyar was not in the United States and noted during a 2004 interrogation that al-Tayyar “would not return to the United States because

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2026 The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “In some of the early representations, we incorrectly stated al-Tayyar fled the United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time” (italics added). As noted, this representation was made by the CIA as late as January 2009, to President-elect Obama’s national security team.


2029 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] (REDACTED); cc: [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; subject: Padilla Breaks; date: May 1, 2003, at 08:51 AM; CIA “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM; ALEC (210218Z MAR 03).
his name was known to U.S. authorities. Further,  

(TS/NOFORN) On May 20, 2002, prior to the initiation of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—and while being questioned by FBI special agents—CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided information on “Abu Jafar al-Tayyar” in the context of discussing associates of KSM. Abu Zubaydah provided a detailed description of “Abu Jafar al-Tayyar” and stated that he was an English speaker who had studied in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated that he first met “Abu Jafar al-Tayyar” in Birmal, Afghanistan, circa January 2002, and that “Abu Jafar al-Tayyar” was at that time seeking to travel to Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah repeated that “Abu Jafar al-Tayyar” spoke “very good English” and was “short and stocky with black hair and dark skin.”

(TS/NOFORN) On September 11, 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in Karachi, Pakistan. During the capture operation, a letter referencing Jaffar al-Tayyur was seized. According to a translation of the letter, it stated “tell an unidentified pilot named Jaffar that he should be ready for travel.” Shortly after his capture, bin al-Shibh was rendered to foreign government custody. In November 2002, while still in foreign government custody, bin al-Shibh was questioned on “Jaffar the Pilot” and provided a physical description of “Jaffar.”
(TS//NOFORN) On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. A notebook associated with KSM retrieved during the capture operation included the name “Jafar al-TAYYAR.” After his capture, KSM was rendered to CIA custody, and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

(TS//NOFORN) On March 7, 2003, CIA Headquarters sent information on Jaffar al-Tayyar to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLUE, where KSM was located, for use in the interrogation of KSM. The documents included the following:

- a “targeting study” on Jaffar al-Tayyar completed by the CIA in January 2003;
- a letter from KSM to bin al-Shibh referencing “Jafar the Pilot” and indicating that “Jafar” “ought to prepare himself” to smuggle himself from Mexico into an unspecified country;
- a letter from Jaffar al-Tayyar to Ramzi bin al-Shibh asking for clarification of KSM’s letter; and
- additional background and reporting information on Jaffar al-Tayyar.

(TS//NOFORN) The requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to the detention site included numerous specific questions, relying on the information already known about Jaffar al-Tayyar.

(TS//NOFORN) According to CIA records, on March 9, 2003—while KSM was being interrogated using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, but before he was subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique—the CIA interrogation team used two letters referencing al-Tayyar as the “interrogation vehicle” to elicit information from KSM on Jaffar al-Tayyar. CIA cables state that KSM did not provide—and claimed not to know—Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name. However, KSM stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar’s father lived in Florida and was named “Shukri Sheridi.” This information was not accurate. Open source reporting indicates that Jaffar al-Tayyar’s father’s true name was “Gulshair El Shukrijumah.”

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2038 April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat reporting, entitled “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies.”
2039 See KSM detainee review in Volume III.
2040 ALEC [072215Z MAR 03]
2041 ALEC [110209Z JAN 03]
2042 ALEC [072215Z MAR 03]
2043 ALEC [072215Z MAR 03]. For more on the letters that were seized during the September 11, 2002, raids in Pakistan, and Abu Zubaydah’s reporting, see ALEC [172117Z SEP 02]; [110154Z JAN 03]; DIRECTOR [10092 (211031Z APR 02)]; [10022 (121216Z APR 02)]; [10321 (231427Z MAY 02)]; [10740 (92308Z MAR 03)], Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining “to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zubaydah” and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
2044 ALEC [10741 (100917Z MAR 03)]; ALEC [10741 (100917Z MAR 03)]; ALEC [10740 (092308Z MAR 03)], disseminated as such.
2045 ALEC [10741 (100917Z MAR 03)]; ALEC [10741 (100917Z MAR 03)]; ALEC [10740 (092308Z MAR 03)], disseminated as such.
2046 Among other open source news reports, see “Father denies son linked to terror,” St. Petersburg Times, published March 22, 2003.
Over the course of the next two weeks, during the period when KSM was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—including the waterboard—KSM referred to Jaffar al-Tayyar as being engaged in multiple terrorist operations. As a result, the CIA’s detention site began describing Jaffar as the “all-purpose” al-Tayyar whom KSM had “woven… into practically every story, each time with a different role.” CIA records confirm that KSM made numerous statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar’s terrorist plotting that were deemed not to be credible by CIA personnel, including, but not limited to, statements that:

- al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plotting with Jose Padilla;
- al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plots against Heathrow Airport;
- al-Tayyar was involved in terrorist plotting with Majid Khan, and
- al-Tayyar was engaged in an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter.

On March 12, 2003, when KSM was confronted with a page in his notebook about al-Tayyar, KSM stated that he “considered al-Tayyar to be the ‘next ‘emir’ for an attack against the US, in the same role that Muhammad Atta had for 11 September.” On March 16, 2003, KSM stated that the only comparison between Atta and al-Tayyar was their education and experience in the West.

An email exchange the afternoon of March 18, 2003, between CIA personnel expressed the views of interrogators and officers at CIA Headquarters with regard to KSM and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The email from KSM debriefer stated:

“we’ve finally gotten [KSM] to admit that al-Tayyar is meant for a plan in the US, but I’m still not sure he’s fessing up as to what Jafar’s role/plan really is. Today he’s working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day
before Padilla – you get the point. Anyway, I’m still worried he might be misleading us on Jafar.”

(TS//----------/NF) An officer from CIA Headquarters responded, “I agree... KSM is yanking our chain about Jafar... really trying hard to throw us off course... suggesting whatever Jafar really is up to must be baaaad [sic].” The officer noted that “[a]lthough the name is Jafar’s true name,” and relayed that KSM’s use of “another Abu name... Abu Arif... doesn’t get us far.”

When KSM was confronted with the reporting he had provided on Jaffar al-Tayyar, KSM claimed that he had been forced to lie about al-Tayyar because of the pressure he was under from his CIA interrogators, who had been subjecting KSM to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques since his rendition to CIA custody.

(TS//----------/NF) Additional CIA records from this period indicate that, while KSM claimed not to know Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name, KSM suggested that Jose Padilla, then in U.S. military custody, would know his name. According to CIA records, the “FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Jose Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qaeda operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar al-Tayyar’s true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah.”

(TS//----------/NF) In March 2003, a senior CTC officer noted differences between KSM’s reporting and reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh. In April 2003, an Intelligence Community assessment concluded, based on comments from other detainees—including those not in CIA custody—that “[i]t seemed obvious that KSM was lying with regard to Jaffar al-Tayyar.”

In July 2003, after Ammar al-Baluchi stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was not suited to be an operative and was “not doing much of anything,” the deputy chairman of the Community Counterterrorism Board warned:

“If [KSM] has pulled off focusing us on a person who is actually no threat, it would mean that our interrogation techniques have not/not broken down his resistance to any appreciable extent—and that we will have to doubt even more strongly anything he says.”

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2055 Note for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: [DETENTION SITE BLUE]; Subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 08:16:07 PM.
2056 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 03:49:33 PM.
2057 Email from: [REDACTED]; subject: [REDACTED]; date: March 18, 2003, at 10:09:02 (201037Z MAR 03); 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03); 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as [REDACTED].
2058 CIA “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting” faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47 AM.
2059 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [REDACTED]; date: March 21, 2003, at 10:47 AM.
2060 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION; CT: COMMENTS OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON IMMINENT THREATS TO U.S. TARGETS IN THAILAND, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM.
In December 2005, an NCTC Red Team report, entitled “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operational Threat,” highlighted the possibility that the information provided by KSM on al-Tayyar’s capabilities and terrorist plotting was simply “deception.” The report described a large body of other detainee reporting—from Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, ‘Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, and Ammar al-Baluchi—consisting of largely dismissive statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar’s capabilities and role in al-Qa’ida.

10. The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri

The CIA represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that “as a result of the lawful use of EITs,” KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrest of terrorists including… Saleh Almarri, a sleeper operative in New York.” This information was included in the final version of the OIG’s May 2004 Special Review under the heading, “Effectiveness.” This CIA representation is inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Saleh al-Marri was arrested in December 2001.

The inaccurate statements about al-Marri to the OIG began with the July 16, 2003, OIG interview of Deputy Chief of ALEC Station and

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS… Ammar al-Baluchi’s Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar—If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM.

National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, “Ja’far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa’ida Operational Threat,” 22 December 2005. While NCTC’s “mainline analytic group” disagreed with the Red Team’s analytical conclusions, records do not indicate that the Red Team’s account of the contrary detainee reporting was challenged. Draft MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel; SUBJECT: [REDACTED].


Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; and CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review – Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.


Information on ALI SALEH M K AL-MARRI, provided by the FBI to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-1819).

On July 16, 2003, informed the OIG that KSM’s information “helped lead to the arrest of” al-Marri. (See Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003). Two days later, wrote an email with information intended for CIA leadership that stated, accurately, that al-Marri “had been detained on a material witness warrant based on information linking him to the 911 financier Hasawi.” (See email from: , to: , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM).
were repeated in DDO Pavitt’s formal response to the draft OIG Special Review. The inaccurate statements were then included in the final May 2004 Special Review. The “Effectiveness” section of the Special Review was used repeatedly as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including in CIA representations to the Department of Justice. The passage in the OIG Special Review that includes the inaccurate CIA representation that KSM provided information helping to lead to the arrest of al-Marri was referenced in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The portion of the Special Review discussing al-Marri has been declassified, as has the OLC memorandum.

The CIA also represented, in Pavitt’s formal response to the OIG, that prior to reporting from KSM, the CIA possessed “no concrete information” on al-Marri.

2009 The January 2004 draft OIG Special Review included the inaccurate information provided by [REDACTED] that KSM “provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almery, a sleeper operative in New York.” (See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG) January 2004). CTC’s response to the draft Special Review was likewise prepared by [REDACTED], who wrote: “KSM also identified a photograph of a suspicious student in New York whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qaeda, but against whom we had no concrete information.” After describing KSM’s reporting, Pavitt wrote, “[t]his student is now being held on a material witness warrant.” (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.) DDO Pavitt’s formal response to the OIG draft Special Review included this representation, adding that the information was provided “as a result of the lawful use of EITs.” Pavitt’s memo to the OIG did not acknowledge that the “student now being held on a material witness warrant” had been arrested more than a year prior to the capture of KSM. Nor did it correct the inaccurate information in the OIG’s draft Special Review that KSM’s information “helped lead to the arrest” of al-Marri. See memorandum for Inspector General from James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.


2011 In its May 30, 2005, memorandum, the OLC wrote, “we understand that interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence,” and “[w]e understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydah and others... has yielded critical information” (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing IG Special Review at 86, 90-91.

2012 The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General (IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG’s 2004 Special Review.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the ‘Findings and Conclusions’ section of the Study, a ‘repeatedly represented’ or ‘frequently cited’ example of the effectiveness of CIA’s interrogation program.” The Committee found that, in addition to the multiple representations to the CIA OIG, the inaccurate information in the final OIG Special Review was, as noted above, provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice to support the Department’s analysis of the lawfulness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The OIG Special Review was also relied upon by the Blue Ribbon Panel evaluating the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and later was cited in multiple open source articles and books, often in the context of the “effectiveness” of the CIA program.

2013 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program” (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004;
This representation is incongruent with CIA records. CIA records indicate that prior to the CIA’s detention of KSM, the CIA possessed significant information on al-Marri, who was arrested after making attempts to contact a telephone number associated with al-Qaeda member and suspected 9/11 facilitator, Mustafa al-Hawsawi.\textsuperscript{2074} CIA records indicate that al-Marri had suspicious information on his computer upon his arrest,\textsuperscript{2075} that al-Marri’s brother had travelled to Afghanistan in 2001 to join in jihad against the United States,\textsuperscript{2076} and that al-Marri was directly associated with KSM, as well as with al-Hawsawi.\textsuperscript{2077}

\textbf{(TS//NF)} The FBI also had extensive records on al-Marri. On March 26, 2002, a year before any reporting from KSM, the FBI provided the Committee with biographical and derogatory information on al-Marri, including al-Marri’s links to Mustafa al-Hawsawi, suspicious information found on al-Marri’s computer, and al-Marri’s connections to other extremists.\textsuperscript{2078}

\textbf{11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan}

\textbf{(TS//NF)} In the context of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented to policymakers over several years that “key intelligence” was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques that revealed Shkai, Pakistan, to be “a major al-Qaeda hub in the tribal areas,” and resulted in “tactical intelligence [redacted] in Shkai, Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{2079} These CIA

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attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA’s Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.

\textsuperscript{2074} ALEC [redacted] (292319Z APR 03)

\textsuperscript{2075} The laptop contained files and Internet bookmarks associated with suspicious chemicals and chemical distributors, as well as computer programs typically used by hackers. See WASHINGTON [redacted] (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC [redacted] (292319Z APR 03).

\textsuperscript{2076} CIA WASHINGTON DC [redacted] (260018Z MAR 03)

\textsuperscript{2077} Prior to the capture of KSM, Abd al-Rahim Ghalam Rabbani told the FBI that al-Marri had called KSM and had been seen with KSM at an al-Qaeda guesthouse. In addition, email accounts found on a computer seized during the raid that captured KSM revealed links to accounts associated with al-Marri. See ALEC [redacted] (292319Z APR 03); WASHINGTON [redacted] (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC [redacted] (031759Z MAR 03); ALEC [redacted] (052341Z MAR 03).

\textsuperscript{2078} The FBI information included that al-Marri’s brother “traveled to Afghanistan in 1997-1998 to train in Bin Laden camps.” It also indicated that al-Marri’s computer revealed bookmarks to websites associated with religious extremism and various criminal activities, as well as hacking tools (See FBI document on Ali Saleh MK Al-Marri, provided to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-1819)). Despite the extensive derogatory information on al-Marri in the possession of both the CIA and FBI, the CIA’s June 2013 Response repeats previous CIA representations that prior to KSM’s reporting, the CIA had “no concrete information” on al-Marri. The CIA’s June 2013 Response also states that the previously obtained information was “fragmentary,” and that while the CIA and FBI were aware of al-Marri’s links to al-Qaeda and “strongly suspected him of having a nefarious objective,” “both agencies... lacked detailed reporting to confirm these suspicions....”

\textsuperscript{2079} Among other documents, see: (1) CIA memorandum to “National Security Advisor,” from “Director of Central Intelligence,” Subject: “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” included in email from: [redacted] to: [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted]; subject: “paper on value of interrogation techniques”; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached “information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques,” (2) CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from [redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” (3) CIA Talking Points entitled, “Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of
representations were based on the CIA’s experience with one CIA detainee, Hassan Ghul. While CIA records indicate that Hassan Ghul did provide information on Shkai, Pakistan, a review of CIA records found that: (1) the vast majority of this information, including the identities, activities, and locations of senior al-Qa’ida operatives in Shkai, was provided prior to Hassan Ghul being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) CIA’s ... assessed that Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques contained sufficient detail to press the Pakistani ... and (3) the CIA assessed that the information provided by Ghul corroborated earlier reporting that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa’ida’s command and control center after the group’s 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.

(TS/NOFORN) As an example of one of the CIA’s representations on Shkai, Pakistan, and the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, on March 2, 2005, the CIA responded to a request from the OLC “for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value].” The resulting CIA memorandum, with the subject line “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” included the following under the heading, “Results”:

“CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques.”

(TS/NOFORN) The CIA then listed “Shkai, Pakistan” as an example, stating:

“Shkai, Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa’ida hub in the tribal areas. Through use of ... during the Ghul...
interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in Shkai. This intelligence was provided

(TS//NF) The CIA representation that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligence related to Shkai, Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and 2009.

(TS//NF) Hassan Ghul was captured on January 1, 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by 2004 then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody on January 1, 2004. Hassan Ghul spent two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT before being transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK on January 1, 2004. Prior to his capture, the CIA assessed that Ghul possessed substantial knowledge of al-Qa’ida facilities and procedures in Wana and Shkai, Pakistan.

(TS//NF) During Hassan Ghul’s two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA interrogators did not use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul. Instead, CIA cables state that upon his arrival at the CIA detention site, Hassan Ghul was “examined, and
placed in a cell, given adequate clothing, bedding, water and a waste bucket.\textsuperscript{2008} During this two-day period (January 13, 2004, and January 15, 2004),\textsuperscript{2009} Ghul provided information for at least 21 intelligence reports.\textsuperscript{2010} As detailed below, Ghul’s reporting on Shkai, Pakistan, and al-Qa’ida operatives who resided in or visited Shkai, was included in at least 16 of these intelligence reports.\textsuperscript{2011} The reports included information on the locations, movements, and operational security and training of senior al-Qa’ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as the visits of leaders and operatives to the area. The information provided by Ghul included details on various groups operating in Shkai, Pakistan, and conflicts among the groups. Hassan Ghul also identified and decoded phone numbers and email addresses contained in a notebook seized with him, some of which were associated with Shkai-based operatives.\textsuperscript{2012}

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\textsuperscript{2008} Hassan Ghul described the origins of al-Qa’ida’s presence in Shkai, including how Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi became the original group’s military commander and its al-Qa’ida representative.\textsuperscript{2009} He discussed tensions between al-Hadi and others in Shkai, the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA OIG, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, “He sang like a tweeting bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.” See December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department.

\textsuperscript{2009} Hassan Ghul also described the roles of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kanadi, aka Ahmed Sai’d al-Khadr, and Abu Hamza al-Jawfi.\textsuperscript{2010}
mediating role of Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the role of Khalid Habib. Hassan Ghul explained how he moved to Shkai due to concerns about Abu Musa’b al-Baluchi’s contacts with [redacted], how he traveled to Shkai to make contact with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and how Abu Faraj mediated between Gul and Hamza Rabi’a. Ghul stated that he last saw Abu Faraj in the summer of 2003, when Ghul was seeking Abu Faraj’s assistance in moving money from Saudi Arabia to deliver to al-Hadi for support of their community in Shkai.

(TS//REL) According to Hassan Ghul, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi moved periodically among various houses within the village, including that of Abu Hussein and [redacted], whom he described as “senior media people for al-Qa’ida.” Elaborating on al-Hadi’s location, Hassan Ghul described the importance of both a madrassa and a guesthouse in Shkai known as the “bachelor house,” where unaccompanied men stayed. Ghul stated that he last saw al-Hadi in December 2003 when al-Hadi came to the “bachelor house” to visit with other Arabs. Ghul also identified other permanent and transient residents of the “bachelor house.” He stated that al-Hadi, who he believed was seeking another safehouse in Shkai at which to hold meetings, had approximately 40 to 50 men under his command. Hassan Ghul also identified a phone number used to contact al-Hadi.  

Hassan Ghul stated that Abu Faraj was with his associate, Mansur Khan, aka Hassan. Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi and Abu Faraj al-Libi included discussion of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti’s links to UBL. According to Ghul, during his time in Shkai in 2003, al-Hadi would periodically receive brief handwritten messages from UBL via Abu Faraj, which he would share with their group. Ghul stated that this did not necessarily mean that Abu Faraj knew the location of UBL, but rather that he had a window into UBL’s courier network. It was at this point that Hassan Ghul described the role of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and his connections to UBL.  

Hassan Ghul identified Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu’awiyya al-Baluchi, a Kurd named Qassam al-Suri, Usama al-Filistini, and Khalat al-Uzbeki as living in the “bachelor house.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “After being subjected to enhanced techniques, [Hassan Ghul] provided more granular information.” According to the CIA Response, it was in this context that Hassan Ghul identified the “bachelor house,” where he had met al-Hadi, and where “several unmarried men associated with al-Qa’ida” lived, including [redacted]. A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul provided this information prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.  

Hassan Ghul identified a phone number in his phone book that he said had been provided to him by Hamza al-Jawfi to pass messages to al-Hadi in emergencies. The phone number was under the name Baba Jan, aka Ida Khan. Ghul also identified a number for Major, aka Ridwan, aka Bilal, who, he said, brought equipment to Pakistan.
(TS/.../NF) According to Hassan Ghul, as of December 2003, approximately
60 Arab males and between 150 and 200 Turkic/Uzbek males were living in Shkai, along with a
"significant population" of Baluchis who assisted the Arabs and Uzbeks.2101 Ghul described al-
Qa'ida training, including an electronics course taught in the fall of 2003 by Abu Bakr al-Suri at
the house of Hamza Rabi'a where, he believed, individuals were being trained for an ongoing
operation.2102 Ghul discerned from the training and Rabi’a’s statements that al-Qa’ida operatives
in Shkai were involved in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf.2103 Ghul stated Hamza Rabi’a was also likely planning operations into Afghanistan,
but had no specifics.2104

(TS/.../NF) Hassan Ghul elaborated on numerous other al-Qa’ida operatives he
said resided in or visited Shkai, Pakistan, including Shaikh Sa’id al-Masri,2105 Sharif al-Masri,2106

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2101 [Redacted] 1655 JAN 04)
2102 [Redacted] 1654 JAN 04; [Redacted] 1655 JAN 04).
2103 [Redacted] 1665 JAN 04.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that Hassan Ghul reported that Hamza
Rabi’a “was using facilities in Shkai to train operatives for attacks outside Pakistan,” without noting Ghul’s
reporting, prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, on Rabi’a’s training of operatives.
2104 Ghul explained that he was in Shkai following a previous assassination attempt, in early December 2003, when
there was “frequent talk among the brothers” about who might have been responsible. When Ghul asked around,
“there was a lot of talk” that Rabi’a was involved in planning a subsequent operation. Rabi’a’s statement that there
would be an unspecified operation soon, combined with the training conducted by Rabi’a and al-Suri, led Ghul to
believe that the second assassination attempt was conducted by al-Qa’ida. See [Redacted] 1656
JAN 04).
2105 [Redacted] 1654 JAN 04).
2106 [Redacted] 1679 JAN 04).
Abu Maryam, Janat Gul, Khalil Deek, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Firas, and others.

(TS//[NF]) Finally, Hassan Ghul described his interactions with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, which also related to al-Qa‘ida figures in Shkai, in particular Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi. Ghul described al-Zarqawi’s request to al-Hadi for money, explosive experts, and provided details of his own trip to Iraq on behalf of al-Hadi. Hassan

2107 Hassan Ghul was asked about Tariq Mahmoud, whom he thought might be Abu Maryam, a British citizen of Pakistani descent whom Ghul met in Pakistan. According to Ghul, Maryam had been inside Afghanistan and had participated in training in Shkai, but was apprehended in Islamabad. (See JAN 04). Ghul identified a phone number for Abu Maryam. See JAN 04.

2108 Hassan Ghul stated that he last saw Janat Gul in December 2003 in Shkai, when Janat Gul was delivering three Arabs who had come from Iran. Janat Gul came to the “bachelor house” accompanied by Khalat. Ghul also described a discussion from September/October 2003 at Hamza al-Jawfi’s house in Shkai with al-Hadi and Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman BM in which Janat Gul claimed to know Russians who could provide anti-aircraft missiles. Gul asked for money, but al-Hadi was reluctant to make the commitment and did not want to work with Gul. According to Hassan Ghul, Janat Gul left and subsequent conversations revealed that Janat Gul likely made the story up. Hassan Ghul provided a phone number for Janat Gul. See JAN 04; JAN 04.

2109 Hassan Ghul also discussed Abu Bilal al-Suri, aka Shafiq, who was the father-in-law of Khalil Deek, aka Joseph Jacob Adams, aka Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman BM, aka Abu Ayad al-Rifistini. While Ghul did not know where Abu Bilal was located, he had recently seen Abu Bilal’s son preparing a residence in Shkai. See JAN 04.

2110 Hassan Ghul stated that he knew Talha al-Pakistani, aka Suleiman, peripherally, through KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi. Ghul last saw Talha in Shkai around October/November 2003 at the residence of Hamza Rabi’a with a group that was undertaking unspecified training. Ghul stated that he was not sure if Talha was a participant or simply an observer. See JAN 04.

2111 Hassan Ghul was shown photos of individuals apprehended by on 16 October 2003 and identified one as a Yemeni named Firas, “a well-trained fighter and experienced killer, who was known to be an excellent shot.” Ghul reported that, when he first arrived in Shkai, Firas was living there. Prior to hearing about Firas’ arrest, Ghul’s understanding was that Firas was in Angorada with Khalid Habib, which Ghul characterized as the “front line.” The other photo identified by Ghul was that of an Algerian named Abu Maryam, whom helped “hide out” in Shkai. See JAN 04.

2112 For Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Abu Ummama, aka Abu Ibrahim al-Masri, see JAN 04.

2113 Director, disseminated as 54194, JAN 04.

2114 Hassan Ghul stated that in the late summer of 2003, al-Zarqawi made the request through Laay Muhammad Haji Bakr al-Sauq (aka Abu Hamza al-Suri, aka Abu Muhammad al-Turki, aka Ala' al-Din), but that al-Hadi had not wanted to assist. According to Ghul, al-Hadi had previously sent Abdullah al-Kurdi to Iraq, but al-Kurdi did not want to engage in any activities and was rumored to be “soft.” This led al-Hadi to send Ghul to Iraq to speak with al-Zarqawi regarding the possibility of select al-Qa‘ida members traveling to Iraq to fight. According to the cable, “Ghul claimed that the Arabs in Waziristan were tired, and wanted change,” and that Ghul “was tasked to both discuss this issue with Zarqawi, and to recon the route.” (See 1644 JAN 04.) Ghul also describe the roles of Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu‘awiyya al-Baluchi, and Wasim aka Ammar aka Little Ammar aka Ammar Choto, in facilitating Ghul’s trip out of Pakistan, as well as his exact route. Ghul identified Yusif’s phone number in his notebook and described how Yusif had come to Shkai to gain al-Hadi’s approval for a plan to kidnap Iranian VIPs to gain the release of senior al-Qa‘ida Management Council members in Iranian custody. (See 1690 JAN 04.)
Ghul identified four email addresses for contacting al-Zarqawi directly,\textsuperscript{2115} and described a phone code he would use to communicate with al-Zarqawi.\textsuperscript{2116} Ghul also described his conversations with al-Zarqawi, interpreted the notes he had taken of the last of his conversations with al-Zarqawi, identified operatives whom al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi agreed to send to Iraq,\textsuperscript{2117} and discussed strategic differences between al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi related to Iraq.\textsuperscript{2118}

(TS//NOFORN) On January \textsuperscript{2119} 2004, after two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, during which Hassan Ghul provided the aforementioned information about al-Qa’ida activities in Shkai and other matters, Ghul was transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK.\textsuperscript{2119} Ghul was immediately, and for the first time, subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. He was “shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position.”\textsuperscript{2120} According to a CIA cable, Hassan Ghul provided no new information during this period and was immediately placed in standing sleep deprivation with his hands above his head, with plans to lower his hands after two hours.\textsuperscript{2121} In their request to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, CIA detention site personnel wrote:

“The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul’s] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift...”

\textsuperscript{2115} The notes, which Ghul intended to use to brief Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, had been seized during Ghul’s capture. The topics included al-Zarqawi’s willingness to provide missiles to al-Hadi, al-Zarqawi’s offer to provide al-Hadi with an unspecified chemical weapon agent, al-Zarqawi’s request to al-Hadi for walkie talkies, and al-Zarqawi’s willingness to work out any disagreements with al-Hadi. According to Ghul, al-Zarqawi responded positively to al-Hadi’s offer of al-Qa’ida personnel and discussed a number of specific, named individuals, including Khatal al-Uzbeki and a Palestinian named Usama al-Zargari. Al-Zarqawi requested that al-Hadi facilitate the travel of an operative who could assist in training inexperienced operatives in proper operational security. Al-Zarqawi also identified a Jordanian explosives expert named ‘Abd al-Badi, an Algerian explosives expert named al-Sur, and Munther, a Moroccan religious scholar who was a close friend of al-Zarqawi. Ghul identified another operative, Abu Aisha, who explained to him that al-Zarqawi’s reference to chemical weapons was likely a reference to a chemical agent affixed to howitzer shells. See 1646 1645 JAN 04) 1657 1656 1655 54194 54195 JAN 04) JAN 04); 1650 JAN 04), disseminated as 1651 1650 JAN 04), See also 1652 JAN 04), for Ghul’s reporting on al-Zarqawi’s plots in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{2119} According to Hassan Ghul, al-Zarqawi told Ghul in January 2004 that he intended to assassinate senior Shi’ite scholars, attack Shi’ite gatherings with explosives, and foment civil war in Iraq. Ghul stated that Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was opposed to any operations in Iraq that would promote bloodshed among Muslims, and had counseled al-Zarqawi against undertaking such operations. Using Ghul as an envoy, al-Hadi had inquired with al-Zarqawi about whether he (al-Hadi) should travel to Iraq, but al-Zarqawi had responded that this was not a good idea, as operations in Iraq were far different than those al-Hadi was conducting in Afghanistan. See 1651 1650 JAN 04), See also 1652 JAN 04), for Ghul’s reporting on al-Zarqawi’s plots in Iraq.
Hassan Ghul’s paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increased [sic] measures may limit the team’s capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.”

CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Hassan Ghul in order to “sufficiently shift [Ghul’s] paradigm of what he can expect from the interrogation process, and to increase base’s capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner.” CIA records do not indicate that information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capture of any al-Qa’ida leaders. After his arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, Ghul was asked to identify locations on  and line drawings of Shkai provided to him, for the first time, by interrogators.

Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was compiled by the CIA for passage to the Pakistani government. On January 28, 2004,  issued a cable stating that the information on Shkai provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with reporting unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, “moved Shkai to the forefront” and that “[a]s a result, Station is currently revising its Shkai  and that hemorrhage.” On January 29, 2004, ALEC Station proposed that  initiate a discussion with the Pakistanis on “possible Arabs in Shkai,” and concurred with a tear-line that requests that Pakistan

2122 1285 JAN 04)
2123 HEADQUARTERS JAN 04). On DDO Pavitt expressed his personal congratulations to the interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT, who elicited information from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Pavitt’s message stated: “In the short time Ghul was at your location, [interrogators] made excellent progress and generated what appears to be a great amount of highly interesting information and leads. This is exactly the type of effort with a detainee that will win the war against al-Qa’ida. With the intelligence Station has obtained from Ghul, we will be able to do much damage to the enemy.” See DIRECTOR JAN 04).
2124 Many of the questions for Hassan Ghul for more specific locational information were about sites Ghul had mentioned or described during his interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. (See HEADQUARTERS JAN 04), 1299 JAN 04), 20352 JAN 04), 20401 JAN 04), ALEC JAN 04), ALEC JAN 04), 20353 JAN 04), 20401 JAN 04), JAN 04), FEB 04), ALEC JAN 04), ALEC FEB 04)). See also email from: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HG on Shkai. Please provide comments/requirements; date: , at 1:11:01 PM; and attachments.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that while Hassan Ghul provided “some detail about the activities and general whereabouts of al-Qa’ida members in Shkai” prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, only afterwards did he “provide[ ] more granular information when, for example, he sat down with experts and pointed to specific locations where he met some of the senior al-Qa’ida members we were trying to find.” A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul was not provided the opportunity to identify specific locations on  and line drawings until he was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2125 The cable noted that “[b]efore Ghul’s capture, the Shkai valley had already been an area of focus  ” The cable detailed Hassan Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, including extensive information on Shkai from local sources, the locations in Shkai  and exact geolocational coordinates for numerous sites in Shkai. See 60245 JAN 04).
“undertake to verify” the presence of “a large number of Arabs” in Shkai “as soon as possible.”2126

(TS//[REDACTED]//NF) On January 31, 2004, CIA’s [REDACTED] drafted a cable with an extensive “tear-line” for Pakistan, much of it related to Shkai. The cable from [REDACTED] referenced nine cables describing Hassan Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques,2127 and no cables describing Ghul’s reporting after the use of the techniques.2128 The cable from [REDACTED] then stated that “Station sees the type of information coming from [Hassan Ghul’s] interrogations as perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action against [REDACTED] associates of Hassan Ghul in Pakistan, [REDACTED], and other terrorist [REDACTED] in Pakistan.” The tear-line for Pakistan included extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.2129 On February 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters requested that the tear-line be passed to the Pakistanis, but deferred to [REDACTED] on the portions dealing with Shkai.2130 As CIA’s [REDACTED] informed CIA Headquarters on February 9, 2004, it intended to hold the information on Shkai until the DCI’s visit to Pakistan the following day. As Station noted, “this tearline will prove critical...”2131 In the meantime and afterwards, additional tear-lines were prepared for the Pakistanis that were based primarily on reporting from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with Ghul’s subsequent reporting, and information from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.2132

2126 ALEC (290157Z JAN 04)
2127 1680 (FEB 04)
2128 1647 (JAN 04)
2129 1647 (JAN 04)
2130 1647 (JAN 04)
2131 1647 (JAN 04)
2132 1647 (JAN 04)

The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “CIA continues to assess that the information derived from Hassan Gul after the commencement of enhanced techniques provided new and unique insight into al-Qa’ida’s presence and operations in Shkai, Pakistan.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also defends past CIA representations that “after these techniques were used, Gul provided ‘detailed tactical intelligence,’ that ‘differed significantly in granularity and operational...’ from what he provided before enhanced techniques.” The CIA’s Response then states that “[a]s a result of his information, we were able to make a persuasive case...” A review of CIA records found that the CIA had previously determined that the information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was the “perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action.”2133 HEADQUAR (032357Z FEB 04)
2134 2742 (09040Z FEB 04)
2135 60796 (05160Z FEB 04); ALEC (*** FEB 04); DIRECTOR (** FEB 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[s]enior US officials during the winter and spring of 2004 presented the Agency’s analysis of Gul’s debriefings and other intelligence about Shkai...” As support, the CIA Response cites two cables that relied heavily on information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information from unrelated sources. (See ALEC (*** FEB 04); DIRECTOR (** FEB 04)).
In July 2004, the CIA assessed that “al-Qa’ida operatives are continuing with their activities and waiting for the situation to normalize in the tribal areas.” In particular, “[al-Qa’ida’s senior operatives who were in Shkai before the military’s offensive remained in South Waziristan as of mid-June [2004].”\footnote{Directorate of Intelligence, Al-Qa’ida’s Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable, 21 July 2004 (DTS #2004-3240).} Later, in December 2005, a CIA detainee profile of Hassan Ghul assessed that the information provided by Ghul confirmed earlier reporting in CIA’s possession that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa’ida’s command and control center after the group’s 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.\footnote{Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.} Hassan Ghul was questioned, and later released.\footnote{Congressional Notification (DTS #2012-3802).}

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation

Shortly after the raid on the Usama bin Laden (UBL) compound on May 1, 2011, which resulted in UBL’s death, CIA officials described the role of reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation—and in some cases connected the reporting to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.\footnote{In addition to classified representations to the Committee, shortly after the operation targeting UBL on May 1, 2011, there were media reports indicating that the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program had produced “the lead information” that led to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the UBL compound, and/or the overall operation that led to UBL’s death. In an interview with Time Magazine, published May 4, 2011, Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA chief of CTC, stated that: “Information provided by KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi about bin Laden’s courier was the lead information that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden’s] compound and the operation that led to his death.” See “Ex-CIA Counterterror Chief: ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Led U.S. to bin Laden,” Time Magazine, May 4, 2011 (italics added). Former CIA Director Michael Hayden stated that: “What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites.” In another interview, Hayden stated: “...the lead information I referred to a few minutes ago did come from CIA detainees, against whom enhanced interrogation techniques have been used” (italics added). See Transcript from Scott Hennen Show, dated May 3, 2011, with former CIA Director Michael Hayden; and interview with Fareed Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria GPS, CNN, May 8, 2011. See also “The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden,” by Michael Mukasey, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2011. Former Attorney General Mukasey wrote: “Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information—including eventually the nickname of a trusted courier of bin Laden.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response confirms information in the Committee Study, stating: “Even after undergoing enhanced techniques, KSM lied about Abu Ahmad, and Abu Faraj denied knowing him.” The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Laden,” (DTS #2012-3826) compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, indicates that the CIA sought to publicly attribute the UBL operation to detainee reporting months prior to the execution of the operation. Under the heading, “The Public Roll-Off,” the “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Laden” document explains that the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs was “formally brought into the [UBL] operation in late March 2011.” The document states that the “material OPA prepared for release” was intended to “describe the...}}
the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate and incongruent with CIA records.

(TS//REL//NF) CIA records indicate that: (1) the CIA had extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti), the UBL facilitator whose identification and tracking led to the identification of UBL’s compound and the operation that resulted in UBL’s death, prior to and independent of information from CIA detainees; (2) the most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee was provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; and (3) CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques withheld and fabricated information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.

(TS//REL//NF) Within days of the raid on UBL’s compound, CIA officials represented that CIA detainees provided the “tipoff” information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. A review of CIA records found that the initial intelligence obtained, as well as the

hunt and the operation,” among other matters. The document details how, prior to the operation, “agreed-upon language” was developed for three “vital points,” the first of which was “the critical nature of detainee reporting in identifying Bin Ladin’s courier.”

2138 CIA documents and cables use various spellings, most frequently “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” and “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.” To the extent possible, the Study uses the spelling referenced in the CIA document being discussed.

2139 Testimony from the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 4, 2011. In testimony, CIA Director Leon Panetta referenced CIA “interviews” with 12 CIA detainees, and stated that “I want to be able to get back to you with specifics...But clearly the tipoff on the couriers came from those interviews.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA has never represented that information acquired through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu Ahmad.” Former CIA Director Michael Hayden provided similar public statements. See transcript of Scott Hennen talk-radio show, dated May 3, 2011. Hayden: “What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites. And let me just leave it at that” (italics added).

information the CIA identified as the most critical—or the most valuable—on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,\textsuperscript{2141} was not related to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.\textsuperscript{2142}

\textbf{(TS/\textsuperscript{1}PR//NF)} The CIA did not receive any information from CIA detainees on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until 2003. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, the CIA was actively targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s close links to UBL. CIA records indicate that prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA had collected:

- \textbf{Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Telephonic Activity:} A phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was under U.S. government intelligence collection as early as January 1, 2002.\textsuperscript{2143} In March 2002, this phone number would be found in Abu Zubaydah’s address book under the heading “Abu Ahmad K.”\textsuperscript{2144} In April 2002, the same phone number was found to be in contact with UBL family members.\textsuperscript{2145} In June 2002, a person using the identified phone number and believed at the time to be “al-Kuwaiti” called a number

\textsuperscript{2141} The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study “incorrectly characterizes the intelligence we had on Abu Ahmad before acquiring information on him from detainees in CIA custody as ‘critical.’” This is incorrect. The Committee uses the CIA’s own definition of what information was important and critical, as conveyed to the Committee by the CIA. In documents and testimony to the Committee, the CIA highlighted specific information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA viewed as especially valuable or critical to the identification and tracking of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, in May 4, 2011, CIA testimony, a CIA officer explained how “a couple of early detainees” “identified” Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL. The CIA officer stated: “I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don’t have his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin.” As detailed in this summary, CIA records confirm that Riyadh the Facilitator provided information in 2002 closely linking al-Kuwaiti to UBL, but these records confirm that this information was acquired prior to Riyadh the Facilitator being rendered to CIA custody (the transfer occurred more than a year later, in January 2004). Abu Zubaydah provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied knowing the name. As an additional example, see CIA documents and charts provided to the Committee (DTS #2011-2004) and described in this summary, in which the CIA ascribes value to specific intelligence acquired on al-Kuwaiti.

\textsuperscript{2142} In other words, the information the CIA cited was acquired from a detainee not in CIA custody, obtained from a CIA detainee who was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, obtained from a CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or acquired from a source unrelated to detainee reporting. As described, the information contained herein is based on a review of CIA Detention and Interrogation Program records. Although the CIA has produced more than six million pages of material associated with CIA detainees and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the Committee did not have direct access to other, more traditional intelligence records, to include reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign government assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of collection. Based on the information found in the CIA detainee-related documents, it is likely there is significant intelligence on “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” acquired from a variety of intelligence collection platforms that the Committee did not have access to for this review.

\textsuperscript{2143} CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for phone number #. A CIA document provided to the Committee on October 25, 2013, (DTS #2013-3152), states that the CIA was collecting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s phone (#) as early as November 2001, and that it was collection from this time that was used to make voice comparisons to later collection targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.

\textsuperscript{2144} CIA (032031Z APR 02)

\textsuperscript{2145} CIA (102158Z APR 02)
associated with KSM. All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.

- **Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Email Communications:** In July 2002, the CIA had obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. As early as August 24, 2002, the CIA was collecting and tracking al-Kuwaiti’s email activity. A cable from that day states that an email account associated with KSM “intermediary Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” remained active in Karachi. On September 17, 2002, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s email address from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government. The detainee reported that al-Kuwaiti shared an email address with Ammar al-Baluchi, and that al-Kuwaiti was “coordinating martyrdom operations.” When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.

- **A Body of Intelligence Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Involvement in Operational Attack Planning with KSM—including Targeting of the United States:** On June 10, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was engaged in operational attack planning with KSM. On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government corroborating information that al-Kuwaiti was close with KSM, as well as reporting that al-Kuwaiti worked on “secret operations” with KSM prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. By August 9, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a third detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was supporting KSM’s operational attack planning targeting the United States. By October 20, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a fourth detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that a known terrorist—Hassan Ghul—“received funding and instructions primarily from Abu Ahmad, a close associate of KSM.”

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2146 Included in several cables and repeated in ALEC [REDACTED] (JUL 02).
2147 [REDACTED] 31049 (JUL 02). The CIA’s June 2013 Response downplays the importance of the email address and phone numbers collected on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating that the accounts were later discontinued by Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and were “never linked” to bin Laden’s known locations. However, on October 25, 2013, the CIA (DTS #2013-3152) acknowledged that the “voice cuts” from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were acquired during this period (2001-2002) from the [REDACTED] phone number cited in the Committee Study. According to CIA records, in February 2009 and September 2009, the voice samples collected from the Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti [REDACTED] phone number (under collection in 2002) were compared to voice samples collected against [REDACTED], which led the Intelligence Community to assess that [REDACTED], who was geolocated to a specific area of Pakistan, was likely Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In August 2010, Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was located and tracked to the UBL compound. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.
2148 ALEC [REDACTED] (240057Z AUG 02). [REDACTED] 64883 (171346Z SEP 02). This information was repeated in ALEC [REDACTED] (302244Z SEP 02).
2150 ALEC [REDACTED] (102239Z MAR 03)
2151 [REDACTED] 19448 (101509Z JUN 02)
2152 CICOM [REDACTED] (251833Z JUN 02)
2153 [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC [REDACTED] (092204Z AUG 02)
2154 [REDACTED] (202142Z OCT 02)
information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.

- **Significant Corroborative Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Age, Physical Description, and Family—Including Information the CIA Would Later Cite As Pivotal:** In September 2001, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s family that the CIA would later cite as pivotal in identifying al-Kuwaiti’s true name.2155 From January 2002 through October 2002, the CIA received significant corroborative reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s age, physical appearance, and family from detainees held in the custody of foreign governments and the U.S. military.2156 All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.

- **Multiple Reports on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Close Association with UBL and His Frequent Travel to See UBL.**2157 As early as April 2002, CIA had signals intelligence linking a phone number associated with al-Kuwaiti with UBL’s family, specifically al-Qa’ida member Sa’ad Bin Ladin.2158 On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that “Abu Ahmad” was one of three al-Qa’ida associated individuals—to include Sa’ad bin Ladin and KSM—who visited him. The detainee—Richa al-Najjar—was a former UBL caretaker.2159 On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government—Riyadh the Facilitator—suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for UBL. Riyadh the Facilitator

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2155 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, specifically [REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001). See also foreign government reporting from September 27, 2002, describing information from a detainee who was not in CIA custody (CIA [REDACTED] (271730Z SEP 02)). That reporting is also highlighted in a CIA document, entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” dated May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2004). The document highlights that “Detainee Abdallah Falah al-Dusari provided what he thought was a partial true name for Abu Ahmad—Habib al-Rahman—whom [CIA] ultimately identified as one of Abu Ahmad’s deceased brothers. However, this partial true name for his brother eventually helped [CIA] map out Abu Ahmad’s entire family, including the true name of Abu Ahmad himself.” The CIA document did not identify that Abdallah Falah al-Dusari was not a CIA detainee. In June 2002, the CIA also obtained another alias for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—‘Hamad al-Kuwaiti’—that included a component of his true name. This information was provided by a foreign government and was unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. See DIRECTOR [REDACTED] (251833Z JUN 02).

2156 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 63211 (30 JAN 2002); DIRECTOR [REDACTED] (251833Z JUN 02); [REDACTED] July 25, 2002; DIRECTOR [REDACTED] (221240Z AUG 02); CIA [REDACTED] (271730Z SEP 02); DIRECTOR [REDACTED] (171819Z OCT 02).

2157 In testimony on May 4, 2011, the CIA informed the Committee that “From the beginning, CIA focused on the inner circle around bin Laden, the people that were around him, as a way to try and go after bin Laden.” See DTS #2011-2049.

2158 CIA [REDACTED] (102158Z APR 02). Sa’ad bin Ladin was a known senior al-Qa’ida member and had been associated with individuals engaged in operational planning targeting the United States. See, for example, ALEC [REDACTED] (062040Z MAR 02) for his association with KSM operative Masran bin Arshad, who was involved in KSM’s “Second Wave” plotting. Phone number(s) associated with Sa’ad bin Ladin were under intelligence collection and resulted in the identification of other al-Qa’ida targets. See [REDACTED] 293363 (051121Z JUN 02) and [REDACTED] 285184, as well as [REDACTED] 20306 (241945Z JAN 04).

2159 [REDACTED] 11515, June 5, 2002. As detailed in this summary and in Volume III, Richa al-Najjar was later rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
highlighted that al-Kuwaiti was “actively working in secret locations in Karachi, but traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Laden.”

Months earlier the CIA disseminated signals intelligence indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Riyadh the Facilitator were in phone contact with each other. In August 2002, another detainee in the custody of a foreign government with known links to al-Kuwaiti—Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili—reported that al-Kuwaiti “was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Laden.” All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.

Within a day of the UBL operation, the CIA began providing classified briefings to Congress on the overall operation and the intelligence that led to the raid and UBL’s death. On May 2, 2011, CIA officials, including CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, briefed the Committee. A second briefing occurred on May 4, 2011, when CIA Director Leon Panetta and other CIA officials briefed both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these briefings indicated that CIA detainee information—and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—played a substantial role in developing intelligence that led to the UBL operation. The testimony contained significant inaccurate information.

For example, in the May 2, 2011, briefing, the CIA informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that:

“However, there remained one primary line of investigation that was proving the most difficult to run to ground, and that was the case of a courier named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Abu Ahmed had totally dropped off our radar in about the 2002-2003 time frame after several detainees in our custody had highlighted him as a key facilitator for bin Ladin.”

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2160 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004. CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The referenced information was provided while Riyadh the Facilitator was in foreign government custody.

2161 CIA (102158Z APR 02)

2162 DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02)

2163 DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili never entered the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

2164 The CIA’s June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes the extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti listed in the text of this summary (as well as additional reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in the intelligence chronology in Volume II), describing this intelligence as “insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other Bin Ladin associates” before crediting CIA detainees with providing “additional information” that “put [the previously collected reporting] into context.” While the Committee could find no internal CIA records to support the assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response, as detailed, the most detailed and accurate intelligence collected from a CIA detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and his unique links to UBL was from Hassan Ghul, and was acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul.

2165 A series of public statements by members of Congress linking the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program and the UBL operation appeared in the media during the time of the congressional briefings. The statements reflect the inaccurate briefings provided by the CIA.

2166 Italics added. CIA testimony of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing on May 2, 2011 (DTS #2011-1941).
The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As described, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Al-Kuwaiti was identified as early as 2002 as an al-Qa’ida member engaged in operational planning who “traveled frequently” to see UBL. No CIA detainee provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. While CIA detainees eventually did provide some information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign partners. The most accurate CIA detainee-related intelligence was obtained in early 2004, from a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. That detainee—Hassan Ghul—listed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL stated “it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti].” and described al-Kuwaiti as UBL’s “closest assistant,” who “likely handled all of UBL’s needs.” The detainee further relayed that he believed “UBL’s security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.”

In the May 4, 2011, briefing, CIA Director Leon Panetta provided the following statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (which mirrored similar statements by a “senior administration official” in a White House Press Briefing from May 2, 2011):

"The detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us that there were individuals that provided direct support to bin Ladin... and one of those identified was a courier who had the nickname Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. That was back in 2002."

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2167 See intelligence chronology in Volume II.
2168 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC [240057Z AUG 02]; CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for a phone number # [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 65902 (000950Z AUG 02); ALEC [092204Z AUG 02]; [REDACTED] 60777 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR [221240Z AUG 02]; and DIRECTOR [251833Z JUN 02].
2169 See HEADQUARTERS [201277Z JAN 04] and intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.
2170 [REDACTED] [201277Z JAN 04]
2171 HEADQUARTERS [1679] [201277Z JAN 04]
2172 HEADQUARTERS [1679] [201277Z JAN 04]
2173 HEADQUARTERS [1679] [201277Z JAN 04]
2174 HEADQUARTERS [1679] [201277Z JAN 04]. UBL was eventually located in a home with a family in Pakistan with minimal security.
2176 Italics added. Testimony of CIA Director Panetta, transcript of the May 4, 2011, briefing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (DTS #2011-2049).
(TS//REL//NF) As previously detailed, no CIA detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. As such, for the statement to be accurate, it can only be a reference to detainees in foreign government custody who provided information in 2002. As noted, prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—to include al-Kuwaiti’s phone number and email address. Further, prior to 2003, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was “one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin” and “traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Ladin.”

(TS//REL//NF) In the same May 4, 2011, briefing, a CIA officer elaborated on the previously provided statements and provided additional detail on how “a couple of early detainees” “identify[d]” Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL:

“I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don’t have his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin.”

(TS//REL//NF) This testimony is inaccurate. There are no CIA records of Abu Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. The first reference to Abu Zubaydah

2177 As described in this summary, the CIA provided documents to the Committee indicating that individuals detained in 2002 provided “Tier One” information—linking “Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.” The document did not state when the information was provided, or when the detainee entered CIA custody. Internal CIA records indicate that no CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. See CIA six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which lists 12 detainees in “CIA Custody” (DTS #2011-2004).

2178 CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for [REDACTED] phone number (240057Z AUG 02).

2179 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC (092204Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02).

2180 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02).

2181 Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011. (See DTS #2011-2049.) As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA provided additional information to the Committee on May 5, 2011, that listed Riyadh the Facilitator as a detainee in “CIA custody,” who was “detained February 2002,” and provided the referenced information. The CIA document omitted that Riyadh the Facilitator was not in CIA custody when he provided the referenced information in June 2002. Riyadh the Facilitator was not rendered to CIA custody until January 2004. See Volume III and DTS #2011-2004.

2182 The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not address the Committee Study finding that Abu Zubaydah did not provide reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. However, on October 25, 2013, the CIA responded in writing that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study was correct, and confirmed that the “first report from Abu Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was in 2003.” (See DTS #2013-3152.) As described in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, on June 13, 2002, the CIA’s ALEC Station sent a cable requesting that Abu Zubaydah he questioned regarding his knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, whom the CIA believed was then in Pakistan. Despite this request, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until this time. (See ALEC (130117Z JUN 02).) Days later, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, without any questioning or contact. On August 4, 2002, the CIA resumed contact and immediately began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboard. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied
providing information related to al-Kuwaiti is on July 7, 2003, when Abu Zubaydah denied
knowing the name.\footnote{1283} CIA records indicate that the information in 2002 that the CIA has
represented as the initial lead information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not obtained from the
CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, but was collected by the CIA from other
intelligence sources, including from detainees in foreign government custody. Riyadh the
Facilitator provided substantial information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, including
information suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier, as al-Kuwaiti reportedly
“traveled frequently” to see UBL.\footnote{2184} Consistent with the testimony, CIA records indicate that
the information provided by Riyadh the Facilitator was important information; however, Riyadh
the Facilitator was not in CIA custody in 2002, but was in the custody of a foreign
government.\footnote{2185} Riyadh the Facilitator was not transferred to CIA custody until January
1, 2004.\footnote{2186} As noted, in 2002, the CIA received additional reporting from another detainee in the
custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili, that “Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” was “one of a
few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”\footnote{2187}

\begin{quote}
(TS/\underline{\text{NEW}}) At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, “I guess we’re
trying to get at here, or certainly I am, was any of this information obtained through [enhanced]
interrogation measures?” A CIA officer replied:

“Senator, these individuals were in our program and were subject to some
form of enhanced interrogation. Because of the time involved and the
relationship to the information and the fact that I’m not a specialist on that
program, I would ask that you allow us to come back to you with some
detail.”\footnote{2188}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
(TS/\underline{\text{NEW}}) The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As
is detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, the vast majority of the intelligence
knowing the name. (See \underline{\text{12236}} (072032Z JUL 03).) As is detailed in the intelligence chronology in
Volume II, on April 3, 2002, the CIA sent a cable stating that on page 8 of a 27-page address book found with Abu
Zubaydah, there was the name “Abu Ahmad K.” with a phone number that was found to be already under U.S.
intelligence collection. See CIA \underline{\text{12236}} (032031Z APR 02).
\footnote{1283} \underline{\text{12236}} (072032Z JUL 03)
\footnote{2184} DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02)
\footnote{2185} Riyadh the Facilitator, aka Sharqawi Ali Abu al-Haji, was captured on February 7, 2002. (See 10480 (1700Z FEB 02).) Al-Haji was transferred to \underline{\text{1591}} custody on February 1, 2002. (See 18265 (1700Z FEB 02).) On January 1, 2004, al-Haji was rendered to CIA custody. (See 1591 (2100Z JAN 04).) Al-Haji was transferred to U.S. military custody on May 1, 2004. (See 2335 1591 (2100Z JAN 04).) Documents provided to the Committee on “detainee
reporting” related to the UBL operation (incorrectly) indicate that Riyadh the Facilitator was in CIA custody. See
\footnote{2186} DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili never entered the CIA’s Detention and
Interrogation Program.
\footnote{2187} Italicics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049). The CIA
subsequently provided the Committee with a letter dated May 5, 2011, which included a document entitled,
“Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled,
“Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed CIA
document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.”
\end{quote}
acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and the most accurate information acquired from a CIA detainee was provided prior to the CIA subjecting the detainee to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a large body of intelligence reporting—provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally unreliable information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti throughout their detention.

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2190 On May 5, 2004, the CIA provided several documents to the Committee, including a chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” described in this summary. For additional details, see intelligence chronology in Volume II.

2190 Below are specific details on the reporting of Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Khalid bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Faraj al-Libi related to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: 1) Abu Zubaydah was captured on March 28, 2002, with a 27-page address book that included a phone number for “Abu Ahmad K.,” which matched a mobile phone number that was already under intelligence collection by the U.S. Intelligence Community. (As early as July 2002, the CIA associated the phone number with al-Kuwaiti.) As detailed in the Study, Abu Zubaydah provided significant intelligence, primarily to FBI special agents, from the time of his capture on March 28, 2002, through June 18, 2002, when he was placed in isolation for 47 days. On June 13, 2002, less than a week before he was placed in isolation, CIA Headquarters requested that interrogators ask Abu Zubaydah about his knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who was believed to be in Pakistan, according to the request from CIA Headquarters. There were no CIA records indicating that the interrogators asked Abu Zubaydah about al-Kuwaiti. Instead, as described, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation beginning on June 18, 2002, with FBI and CIA interrogators departing the detention site. The FBI did not return. On August 4, 2002, CIA interrogators reestablished contact with Abu Zubaydah and immediately began to subject Abu Zubaydah to the non-stop use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques for 17 days, which included at least 83 applications of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied knowing the name. On April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the name “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.” In August 2005, Abu Zubaydah speculated on an individual the CIA stated might be “identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani,” but Abu Zubaydah stated the person in question was not close with UBL. 2) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, during a raid in Pakistan. An email address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop that was assessed to be associated with KSM. Once rendered to CIA custody on March 1, 2003, KSM was immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, which continued through March 25, 2003, and included at least 183 applications of the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique. On March 5, 2003, KSM provided information concerning a senior al-Qa’ida member named “Abu Khalid,” whom KSM later called “Abu Ahmad al-Baluchi.” The information KSM provided could not be corroborated by other intelligence collected by the CIA, and KSM provided no further information on the individual. On May 5, 2003, KSM provided his first information on an individual named “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” when he was confronted with reporting from a detainee not in CIA custody, Masran bin Arshad. KSM confirmed bin Arshad’s reporting regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, specifically that bin Arshad was originally tasked by KSM to get money from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan. KSM further relayed that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Hassan Gul helping to move families from Afghanistan to Pakistan. On May 22, 2003, KSM was specifically asked about a UBL courier named Abu Ahmad. KSM again described a courier for UBL whose name was Abu Ahmad-baluchi, but noted that this Abu Ahmad was more interested in earning money than in serving al-Qa’ida. According to KSM, Abu Ahmad was working with Hassan Gul in April or May 2002, but speculated that Abu Ahmad was in Iran as of early March 2003. In July 2003, KSM stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Abu Zubaydah’s group prior to September 2001 and later with Abu Sulayman al-Jaza’iri. In September 2003, KSM was confronted with reporting from another detainee in foreign government custody on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. KSM confirmed that he had told Hambali to work with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as he transited Pakistan, but KSM downplayed al-Kuwaiti’s importance, claiming to have contacted Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti only three to four times when he was in Peshawar and stating that Abu Ahmad worked “primarily with lower level members” and appeared to have a higher status than he actually had in al-Qa’ida because KSM relied on al-Kuwaiti for travel facilitation. In January 2004, based on statements made by Hassan Gul—provided prior to the
use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—that it was “well known” that UBL was always with al-Kuwaiti, CIA Headquarters asked CIA interrogators to reengage KSM on the relationship between al-Kuwaiti and UBL, noting the “serious disconnect" between Ghul’s reporting linking UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and KSM’s “pithy” description of al-Kuwaiti. CIA Headquarters wrote that unlike Hassan Ghul, KSM had made “no reference to a link between Abu Ahmad and al-Qa’ida’s two top leaders" and that KSM “has some explaining to do about Abu Ahmad and his support to UBL and Zawahiri.” On May 31, 2004, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was “not very senior, nor was he wanted,” noting that al-Kuwaiti could move about freely, and might be in Peshawar. In August 2005, KSM stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL. Instead, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focused on family after he married in 2002.

3) Khalil bin Attash was arrested with Ammar al-Baluchi in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 16, 2003, he was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 2003, and then again from July 18, 2003, to July 29, 2003. On June 30, 2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was admired among the men. On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a facilitation role in al-Qa’ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In January 2004, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa’ida operations, and that al-Kuwaiti was settling down with his wife in the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead focused on family after he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, but rather focused on family life. 4) Ammar al-Baluchi was arrested with Khalid bin Attash in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his arrest, Ammar al-Baluchi was cooperative and provided information on a number of topics while in foreign government custody, including information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to CIA custody on May 16, 2003. After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar al-Baluchi to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17, 2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, al-Baluchi stated he fabricated information while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques the previous day, but in response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that a brother of al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that there were rumors that al-Kuwaiti was a courier. In January 2004, al-Baluchi retracted previous reporting, stating that al-Kuwaiti was never a courier and would not have direct contact with UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri because “unlike someone like Abu Faraj, [al-Kuwaiti] was too young and didn’t have much experience or credentials to be in that position.” In May 2004, al-Baluchi stated that al-Kuwaiti may have worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 5) Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured in Pakistan on May 2, 2005. On May 1, 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody. Abu Faraj al-Libi was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 28, 2005, to June 2, 2005, and again from June 17, 2005, to June 28, 2005. It was not until July 12, 2005, that CIA Headquarters sent a set of “Tier Three Requirements Regarding Abu Ahmad Al-Kuwaiti” to the detention site holding Abu Faraj al-Libi. Prior to this, interrogators had focused their questioning of Abu Faraj on operational plans, as well as information on senior al-Qa’ida leadership, primarily Hamza Rabia and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. On July 13, 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi denied knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or any of his aliases. On July 15, 2005, CIA Headquarters noted they did not believe Abu Faraj was being truthful and requested debriefers confront Abu Faraj again regarding his relationship with al-Kuwaiti. CIA records indicate that CIA debriefers did not respond to this request. On August 12, 2005, having received no response to its previous request, CIA Headquarters again asked Abu Faraj’s debriefers to readdress the issue of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. CIA analysts noted that they “found Faraj’s] denials of even recognizing his name difficult to believe,” and suggested that “one possible reason why [Faraj] lied about not recognizing Abu Ahmad’s name] is [an attempt] to protect him — leading us to request that base readdress this issue with [Faraj] on a priority basis.” Two days later, on August 14, 2005, after being questioned again about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, Abu Faraj al-Libi “swore to God” that he did not know al-Kuwaiti, or anybody who went by any of his aliases, insisting he would never forget anybody who worked for him. Abu Faraj did suggest, however, that an “Abd al-Pakistani] had worked with Marwan al-Jabbar to care for families in the Lahore, Pakistan, area, but said he (Abu Faraj) had no relationship with this al-Pakistani. On August 17, 2005, CIA Headquarters requested that debriefers reengage certain detainees on the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In response, KSM and Khalid bin Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that they had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL. KSM and Khalid bin Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focused on family after he married in 2002. However, Ammar al-Baluchi indicated that al-Kuwaiti worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi in 2002. A September 1, 2005,
At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, “of the people that you talked about as detainees that were interrogated, which of those were waterboarded and did they provide unique intelligence in order to make this whole mission possible?” CIA Director Panetta responded:

“I want to be able to get back to you with specifics, but right now we think there were about 12 detainees that were interviewed, and about three of them were probably subject to the waterboarding process. Now what came from those interviews, how important was it, I really do want to stress the fact that we had a lot of streams of intelligence here that kind of tipped us off there, but we had imagery, we had assets on the ground, we had information that came from a number of directions in order to piece this together. But clearly the tipoff on the couriers came from those interviews.”

As previously detailed, the “tipoff” on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA detainee reporting. The CIA was already targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and collecting intelligence on at least one phone number and email address associated with al-Kuwaiti in 2002. No CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, and prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was “one of a few close

CIA report states that Abu Faraj al-Libi identified an “Abu ‘Abd al Khaliq Jan,” as his “go-between with Bin Ladin since mid-2003,” but there was no other CIA reporting to support this assertion. In May 2007, a CIA targeting study concluded that the reporting from KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi was “not credible,” and “their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad’s importance or deny knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information on UBL or his close associates.” A September 28, 2007, CIA report concluded that “Abu Faraj was probably the last detainee to maintain contact with UBL—possibly through Abu Ahmad,” but noted that “Abu Faraj vehemently denied any knowledge of Abu Ahmad.” See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.

For a listing of the 12 detainees, see CIA’s six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which lists 12 detainees, all of whom are listed as being in “CIA Custody” (DTS #2011-2004).

CIA records indicate that none of the three CIA detainees known to have been subjected by the CIA to the waterboard interrogation technique provided unique intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. To the contrary, there is significant evidence that two of the three detainees—Abu Zubaydah and KSM—failed to provide accurate information likely known to them about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and fabricated information to protect al-Kuwaiti. The third CIA detainee known to have been subjected to the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.

The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA has never represented that information acquired through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu Ahmad.”

CIA testimony from CIA Director Panetta, and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049).

CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for phone number #2: ALEC (240057Z AUG 02).
associates of Usama bin Laden" and "traveled frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Laden." The day after the classified briefing, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided the Committee with a six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which accompanied a one-page document compiled by the CIA's CTC, entitled "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti." In total, the CIA chart identifies 25 "mid-value and high-value detainees" who "discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's long-time membership in al-Qaeda and his historic role as courier for Usama Bin Laden." The 25 detainees are divided into two categories. The chart prominently lists 12 detainees—all identified as having been in CIA custody—"who linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," which the CIA labeled as the most important, "Tier 1" information. The document states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) CIA detainees providing "Tier 1" information were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that of those nine detainees, two (29: 20 percent) were subjected to the CIA's waterboarding interrogation technique. The chart then includes a list of 13 detainees "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2" information. The CIA document states that four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) "Tier 2" detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) "CIA detainees" were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

On October 3, 2012, the CIA provided the Committee with a document entitled, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin," completed in September 2012 by the

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2197 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA record ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for unredacted telephone number #201; ALEC [redacted] (240057Z AUG 02); [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC [redacted] (092204Z AUG 02); [REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR [redacted] (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR [redacted] (251833Z JUN 02).

2198 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR [redacted] (251833Z JUN 02). As described above, Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004, but CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The referenced information was provided in June 2002, while Riyadh the Facilitator was not in U.S. custody, but in the custody of a foreign government.

2199 Senator McCain and other members requested information on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the UBL operation at the previous day's hearing and the CIA committed to provide additional information to the members. Senator McCain: "I'm also interested in this whole issue of the 'enhanced interrogation,' what role it played. Those who want to justify torture seem to have grabbed hold of this as some justification for our gross violation of the Geneva Conventions to which we are signatory. I'd be very interested in having that issue clarified. I think it's really important." See transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTIS #2011-2049).

2200 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTIS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." The CIA's September 2012 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Laden," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (See DTIS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: "In sum, 25 detainees provided information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qaeda membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Laden. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), although of the 13 only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded" (italics added). As described, the information in this CIA "lessons" report is inaccurate.
CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. The CIA Lessons Learned document states, “[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin.” The CIA document then states that 16 of the 25 detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody, and that “[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs),” before noting that “only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded.”

(TSH#[Menace]#NF) A review of CIA records found that these CIA documents contained inaccurate information and omitted important and material facts.

- **The May 5, 2011, CIA chart represents that all 12 detainees (12/12: 100 percent) providing “Tier 1” intelligence—information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin” were detainees in CIA custody.** A review of CIA records found that the CIA document omitted the fact that five of the 12 listed detainees (5/12: 41 percent) provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody. In addition, other detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” but were not included in the CIA list. For example, the first detainee-related information identified in CIA records indicating a close relationship between UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired in July 2002, from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili (Zubair). According to CIA records, Zubair provided a detailed physical description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, information on Abu Ahmad’s family, his close connection to KSM, and that “Abu Ahmad was a one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.” This information would be used to question other detainees, but was omitted in the CIA’s “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” chart.

- **The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) “CIA detainees” providing “Tier 1” intelligence were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.** A review of CIA records found that of the nine detainees the CIA identified as having been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and providing “Tier 1” information on links between Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and UBL, five of the 9 (5/9: 55 percent) provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being

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2201 Italics added. “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).

2202 The CIA document identified “Tier 1” intelligence as information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” but inaccurately included CIA detainees under the “Tier 1” detainee reporting list who did not provide information linking “Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.” For example, the CIA identified Abu Zubaydah and KSM as providing “Tier 1” intelligence that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” despite both detainees denying any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL.

2203 Riyadh the Facilitator (information on June 30, 2002 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody January 1, 2004), Ammar al-Baluchi (information on May 6, 2003 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody May 1, 2003), Ahmed Ghailani (information on August 1, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 1, 2004), Sharif al-Masri (information on September 16, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 1, 2004), and Muhammad Rahim (information on July 2, 2007 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody July 1, 2007). There are reports that a sixth detainee, Hassan Chul, also provided extensive information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.

2204 DIRECTOR

(221240Z AUG 02)
subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.2205 This information was omitted from the CIA document. Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, three were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques.2206 All three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.2207 The fourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, to include the waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as “speculative.”2208 These relevant details were omitted from the CIA documents.2209

- The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that of the 13 detainees “who provided general information on Abu Ahmad,” labeled as “Tier 2” information, four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.2210 A review of CIA records found the CIA document omitted that two of the four (2/4: 50 percent) “CIA detainees” who were described as subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody, and therefore prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.2211 Finally, there were additional detainees in

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2206 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
2207 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: “…with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, these are key bin Laden facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no role.” CIA records indicate Khalid bin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti serving as a courier for UBL.
2210 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.” The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence (DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: “In sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)...” (italics added). As described, the information in this CIA “Lessons Learned” report is inaccurate.
2211 Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, who was detained in May 2002, first provided intelligence on al-Kuwaiti on June 4/5 2002, and was subsequently transferred to CIA custody on June 1, 2002; and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced
foreign government custody “who provided general information on Abu Ahmad” that were not included in the list of 13 detainees. For example, in January 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government who provided a physical description of a Kuwaiti named Abu Ahmad who attended a terrorist training camp.2212

- The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document states that “[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin.” This is incorrect. As described, additional detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including 2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti “was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”2213

- The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that 16 of the 25 (16/25: 65 percent) detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody. This is incorrect. At least seven of the 16 detainees (7/16: 45 percent) that the CIA listed as detainees in CIA custody provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody.2214

- The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that “[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs).”2215 This is incorrect. Seven of the 13 detainees that the CIA listed as having been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.2216 Of the remaining six detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, five were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques.2217 (Of the five detainees, three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.2218 The

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2212 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including 63211 (30 JAN 2002).
2213 DIRECTOR (222140Z AUG 02)
2214 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting from Riyadh the Facilitator, Ammar al-Baluchi, Ahmad Ghaialani, Sharif al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, and Hambali. As detailed, a former CIA officer stated publicly that Hassan Ghul provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody.
2215 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).
2217 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, Abu Yasin al-Jaza’iri, Samir al-Barq, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
2218 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: “...with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no role.” CIA records indicate Khalid bin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several
remaining two provided limited, non-unique, corroborative reporting.\textsuperscript{2219} The sixth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that, as noted, was described by CIA officers at the time as "speculative."\textsuperscript{2220}

- \textit{The October 3, 2012, “Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin” document also states that “only two [detainees] (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave false information about Abu Ahmad…”}\textsuperscript{2221} \textit{The CIA’s May 5, 2011, Chart, “Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” states that Abu Zubaydah and KSM provided “Tier 1” intelligence that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.” CIA records indicate that both detainees denied any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. CIA records further indicate that Abu Zubaydah and KSM, who were both subjected to the CIA’s waterboarded interrogation technique, withheld information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti:

  - Abu Zubaydah: “Abu Ahmad K.” and a phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on page 8 of a 27-page address book captured with Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002. In July 2003, Abu Zubaydah stated that he was not familiar with the name Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or the description provided to him by CIA officers. In April 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the name “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.”\textsuperscript{2222} According to a CIA cable, in August 2005, Abu Zubaydah provided information on “an individual whose name he did not know, but who might be identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani.” According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah speculated that this individual knew UBL and al-Zawahiri, but did not think their relationship would be close. Days later a CIA cable elaborated that Abu Zubaydah had speculated on a family of brothers from Karachi that may have included Abu Ahmad.\textsuperscript{2223}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{2219} Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri provided corroborative information in July 2003 that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was associated with KSM, was best known in Karachi, and appeared to be Pakistani. (See DIRECTOR \ldots \textsuperscript{(111632Z JUL 03)}) Samir al-Barq provided information in September 2003 that al-Kuwaiti had provided al-Barq with $1000 to obtain a house in Karachi that al-Qa’ida could use for a biological weapons lab. (See \ldots \textsuperscript{47409 (191324Z NOV 03), as well as the detainee review of Samir al-Barq in Volume III that details al-Barq’s various statements on al-Qa’ida’s ambition to establish a biological weapons program.) Neither of these reports is cited in CIA records as providing unique or new information. In October 2003, both detainees denied having any information on the use of Abbottabad as a safe haven for al-Qa’ida. See \ldots \textsuperscript{10172 (160821Z OCT 03); 48444 (240942Z OCT 03).}
\textsuperscript{2220} DIRECTOR \ldots \textsuperscript{(8/25/2005). On July 7, 2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” and denied knowing the name.}
\textsuperscript{2221} “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).
\textsuperscript{2222} In addition to “Abu Ahmad K.” being included in Abu Zubaydah’s address book, there was additional reporting indicating that Abu Ahmad had some knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, on October 12, 2004, another CIA detainee explained how he met al-Kuwaiti at a guesthouse that was operated by Ibn Shaykh al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah in 1997. See intelligence chronology in Volume II.
\textsuperscript{2223} See DIRECTOR \ldots \textsuperscript{(252024Z AUG 05) and the intelligence chronology in Volume II.}
KSM: When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. As detailed in this review, KSM first acknowledged Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in May 2003, after being confronted with reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from a detainee who was not in CIA custody. KSM provided various reports on Abu Ahmad that the CIA described as “pithy.” In August 2005, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL. In May 2007, the CIA reported that the denials of KSM and another detainee, combined with conflicting reporting from other detainees, added to the CIA’s belief that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a significant figure.

(TS//REL//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) The CIA detainee who provided the most accurate “Tier 1” information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL, Hassan Ghul, provided the information prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Hassan Ghul was captured on January 15, 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by [REDACTED], then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January 16, 2004. From January 16, 2004, to January 26, 2004, Hassan Ghul was questioned by the CIA at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During this period the CIA disseminated 21 intelligence reports based on Ghul’s reporting. A CIA officer told the CIA Office of Inspector General that...
that Hassan Ghul “opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.”

During the January 2004 to January 2004 sessions, Ghul was questioned on the location of UBL. According to a cable, Ghul speculated that “UBL was likely living in Peshawar area,” and that “it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti].”

Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL’s “closest assistant” and listed him as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL. Ghul further speculated that:

“UBL’s security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a House with a family somewhere in Pakistan. Ghul commented that after UBL’s bodyguard entourage was apprehended entering Pakistan following the fall of Afghanistan, UBL likely has maintained a small security signature of circa one or two persons. Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL’s needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi].”

The next day, January 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK. Upon arrival, Ghul was “shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall” with “his hands above his head” for forty minutes. The CIA interrogators at the detention site immediately requested permission to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul, writing that, during the forty minutes, Ghul did not provide any new information, did not show the fear that was typical of other recent captures, and “was somewhat arrogant and self important.” The CIA interrogators wrote that they “judged” that Ghul “has the expectation that in U.S. hands, his treatment will not be severe.”

The request to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques further stated:

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2229 See December 2, 2004, CIA Office of Inspector General with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, in which a CIA officer involved with the interrogations of Hassan Ghul, states: “He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.”

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“The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul’s] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul’s] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increased [sic] measures may limit the team’s capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.”

CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day, stating that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques would “increase base’s capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner.” During and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided no other information of substance on al-Kuwaiti. Hassan Ghul was later released. The fact
that Hassan Ghul provided the detailed information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL prior
to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was omitted from CIA documents and
testimony.\textsuperscript{2242}

\textbf{(TS/\textsuperscript{$\#\text{NF}$})} While CIA documents and testimony highlighted reporting that the
CIA claimed was obtained from CIA detainees—and in some cases from CIA detainees
subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—the CIA internally noted that
reporting from CIA detainees—specifically CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced
interrogation techniques—was insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable.

\textbf{(TS/\textsuperscript{$\#\text{NF}$})} A September 1, 2005, CIA report on the search for UBL states:

\begin{quote}
"Bin Ladin Couriers: Low-level couriers who wittingly or unwittingly facilitate
communications between Bin Ladin and his gatekeepers remain largely
invisible to us until a detainee reveals them.\textsuperscript{2243} Even then, \textit{detainees provide
few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are
creating fictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves of direct
knowledge about Bin Ladin.} We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti—an alleged courier between Bin Ladin and KSM—and
Abu ‘Abd al Khaleq Jan, who[m] Abu Faraj identified as his go-between with
Bin Ladin since mid-2003, in order to get one step closer to Bin Ladin."\textsuperscript{2244}
\end{quote}

\textbf{(TS/\textsuperscript{$\#\text{NF}$})} A May 20, 2007, CIA “targeting study” for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
states:

\begin{quote}
"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) described Abu Ahmad as a relatively
minor figure and Abu Faraj al-Libi denied all knowledge of Abu Ahmad.
\textit{Station assesses that KSM and Abu Faraj’s reporting is not credible on this
topic, and their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad’s importance or deny
knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information
on UBL or his close associates. These denials, combined with reporting from
other detainees}\textsuperscript{2245} indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and
Abu Faraj, add to our belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or
facilitator.\textsuperscript{2246}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{2242} See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document
entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart
entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). \textit{See also} a similar, but less detailed
CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.”

\textsuperscript{2243} Significant information was acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti independent of CIA detainees. \textit{See intelligence
chronology in Volume II.}

\textsuperscript{2244} Italicized. CIA analysis entitled, “Overcoming Challenges To Capturing Usama Bin Ladin, 1 September 2005.” CIA records indicate that Abu Faraj al-Libi fabricated information relating to “‘Abd al Khaleq Jan.”

\textsuperscript{2245} Italicized.\textsuperscript{5594 (201039Z MAY 07). Reporting from CIA detainees Ammar al-Baluchi and
Khallad bin Attash—both subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—included similar inaccurate
Additional CIA documents contrasted the lack of intelligence obtained from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with the value of intelligence obtained from other sources. A November 23, 2007, CIA intelligence product, “Al-Qa’ida Watch,” with the title, “Possible Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” details how a:

“review of 2002 debriefings of a [foreign government] detainee who claimed to have traveled in 2000 from Kuwait to Afghanistan with an ‘Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’ provided the breakthrough leading to the likely identification of Habib al-Rahman as Abu Ahmad. The [foreign government] subsequently informed [the CIA] that Habib al-Rahman currently is living in Pakistan, probably in the greater Peshawar area—according to our analysis of a body of reporting.”

This CIA intelligence product highlighted how reporting from Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and denied knowing Abu Ahmad, differed from that of Hassan Ghul, who—prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—stated that “Bin Ladin was always with Abu Ahmad,” and that Abu Ahmad had delivered a message to senior al-Qa’ida leaders in late 2003, “probably through Abu Faraj.” The document further states that KSM “has consistently maintained that Abu Ahmad ‘retired’ from al-Qa’ida work in 2002.” The CIA document states that the CIA will be working with and the government, as well as utilizing a database

information. Khalid bin Attash was arrested with Ammar al-Baluchi in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 1, 2003, bin Attash was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 2003, and then again from July 18, 2003, to July 29, 2003. On June 30, 2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was admired among the men. On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a facilitation role in al-Qa’ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In January 2004, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa’ida operations, and that al-Kuwaiti was settling down with his wife in the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead focused on family after he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, but rather focused on family life. Ammar al-Baluchi was arrested with Khalid bin Attash in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his arrest in Pakistan, Ammar al-Baluchi was cooperative and provided information on a number of topics to foreign government interrogators, including information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to CIA custody on May 1, 2003. After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar al-Baluchi to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17, 2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, al-Baluchi admitted to fabricating information while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques the previous day, and in response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that a brother of al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that there were rumors that al-Kuwaiti was a courier. In early 2004, al-Baluchi acknowledged that al-Kuwaiti may have worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi, but stated that al-Kuwaiti was never a courier and would not have direct contact with UBL. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and detainee reviews of Khalid bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi for additional information.

of [redacted] to follow-up on an individual traveling within Pakistan with a similar name and date of birth.\textsuperscript{248}

\textit{(TS/\redacted/NF)} CIA cable records from early 2008 highlight how the discovery and exploitation of phone numbers associated with al-Kuwaiti\redacted had been critical in collecting intelligence and locating the target,\textsuperscript{249} and state:

"...debriefings of the senior most detainees who were involved in caring for bin Ladin have produced little locational information, and it is the final nugget that detainees hold on to in debriefings (over threat info and even Zawahiri LOCINT) given their loyalty to the al-Qa’ida leader. We assess that Abu Ahmad would likely be in the same category as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi, so we advocate building as much of a targeting picture of where and when Habib/Abu Ahmad travels to flesh out current leads to bin Ladin."\textsuperscript{250}

\textit{(TS/\redacted/NF)} On May 1, 2008, a CIA Headquarters cable entitled, “targeting efforts against suspected UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” documents that the CIA had a number of collection platforms established to collect intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in order to locate UBL. The cable closes by stating:

"although we want to refrain from addressing endgame strategies, HQS judges that detaining Habib should be a last resort, since we have had no/no success in eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Ladin’s location from any detainees."\textsuperscript{251}

\textit{(TS/\redacted/NF)} While the aforementioned CIA assessments highlight the unreliability of reporting from senior al-Qa’ida leaders in CIA custody, specifically “that KSM and Abu Faraj’s reporting” was assessed to be “not credible”—and that their denials “add[ed] to [the CIA’s] belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator,”\textsuperscript{252} the CIA assessments also highlight that “reporting from other detainees indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and Abu Faraj” was useful.\textsuperscript{253} As documented, the initial detainee-related information linking Abu Ahmad to UBL and KSM did not come from CIA detainees, but from detainees who were not in CIA custody.\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{249} 3808 (211420Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS (232217Z JAN 08); 9044 (240740Z JAN 08); 5568 (081633Z FEB 08)
\textsuperscript{250} Italics added. 9044 (240740Z JAN 08).
\textsuperscript{251} HEADQUARTERS (011334Z MAY 08)
\textsuperscript{252} 5594 (201039Z MAY 07)
\textsuperscript{253} 5594 (201039Z MAY 07)
\textsuperscript{254} See information in Volume II intelligence chronology for additional details.