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the Telcons
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Document
1: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 26 May 1973
Source: Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation
Transcripts (Telcons), Box 28, May 1973-June 1973 [hereafter box
and file citations only]
Before leaving for New York, Ambassador Dobrynin does not forget
to congratulate his colleague and personal friend on his birthday,
offering to sing "Happy Birthday" for Kissinger one day
in advance. Kissinger asks for a favor: to keep the "KGB guys
from running loose" in his neighborhood because the evening
before he had run into five agents just as he "brought a girl
home."
Document
2: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 23 August 1973
Source: Box 28, July 1973-September 1973
Dobrynin congratulates Kissinger on his nomination to the position
of Secretary of State and passes on to him the high praise of the
confidential channel from Brezhnev and Gromyko. Kissinger speculates
that he was appointed a member of the Politburo and calls Dobrynin
"not just a colleague, but a personal friend"
Document
3: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 9 October 1973
Source: Box 28, October 1973
Kissinger tells Dobrynin that he had gotten a report from Jordan
suggesting that the Soviet charge was encouraging "all Arab
states" to "enter battle" with Israel. According
to Kissinger's information, the "King considers this a Soviet
request for him to send his army into action." Dobrynin reacts
in disbelief and promises to check on the story.
Document
4: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 10 October 1973
Source: Box 28, October 1973
Kissinger informs Dobrynin confidentially about a "major domestic
crisis" [resignation of Spiro Agnew] and suggests that there
might be a delay in negotiating a cease-fire resolution. Kissinger
asks Dobrynin to ask Moscow's Arab "friends" to refrain
from any rash steps until the end of the day, jokingly saying that
"they crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson
River." Kissinger emphasizes that this is "not a delaying
tactic."
Document
5: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 24 October 1973 9:45 a.m.
Source: Box 28, October 1973
Kissinger informs Dobrynin that "the madmen in the Middle
East" violated the cease-fire agreement. He promises to find
out who the violators were and to put pressure on the Israelis,
who were encircling Egypt's Third Army. Stressing that the U.S.
is not playing any games with the Soviet Union, Kissinger assures
Dobrynin that he wants to keep the lines of communication open.
However, in the evening of the same day, after Brezhnev sends an
ambiguous letter that Kissinger interprets as a threat of Soviet
unilateral action. Later that night at a White House meeting Kissinger
puts U.S. military forces on alert without warning the Soviets.
That move angers Brezhnev and the Politburo; they see it as a "credibility
crisis" in U.S.-Soviet efforts to bring a peaceful settlement
to the crisis.
Document
6: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 24 October 1973 10:10 a.m.
Source: Box 28, October 1973
Kissinger informs Dobrynin that a U.S. military attaché
will be sent to the Israeli Army to ensure "that they are not
taking offensive actions" and promises to make "the most
violent presentations to the Israelis" to stop their actions
against the Third Army.
Document
7: General Alexander Haig/Ambassador Dobrynin, 26 October 1973
Source: Box 28, October 1973
In an angry talk with Haig, Dobrynin emotionally recounts U.S.
moves that undermined Soviet-American cooperation in the Middle
East. What triggered the conversation was President Nixon's remarks
in a press conference where he compared the Brezhnev letter and
the U.S. military reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis (which the
transcriber erroneously recorded as the "human crisis").
Dobrynin explains that the Politburo "is very much upset …
because they consider that you created … an artificial crisis
without consulting or warning the Soviet side." The Politburo
especially resented the implication that as a result of the U.S.
actions they were made to look like "weaker partners …
against braver United States."
Document
8: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 29 October 1973
Source: Box 28, October 1973
Kissinger informs Dobrynin apologetically about "our heroes
at Defense" announcing a dispatch of an aircraft carrier to
the Indian Ocean; there will be an immediate retraction of the announcement.
Dobrynin informs Kissinger that the Soviet military is 100% under
control of the political leadership, as opposed to the U.S. military.
Kissinger responds that it is only 90% under control in the U.S.
Dobrynin responded that the remaining 10 percent is on Moscow's
side!
Document
9: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 1 November 1973
Source: Box 28, November 1973-December 1973
Dobrynin and Kissinger discuss the composition of the U.N. peace-keeping
force to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces near the Suez Canal.
Then they start trading countries back and forth as if they were
chess pieces controlled by superpowers.
Document
10:
Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 12 July 1974
Source: Box 28, January 1974-August 1974
Dobrynin and Kissinger talk after a long break in the conversations
and go over the European Security Conference and the progress of
SALT negotiations. Kissinger asks Dobrynin to "cooperate a
little bit on Basket III," the provisions on human rights and
freedom of movement. Dobrynin emphasizes the importance of the Conference
to the Soviet Union, and the confidential nature of the exchanges
on this subject saying that "Gromyko … will keep this
close to his heart. It is a project that he likes very much."
Document
11: Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin, 25 May 1973
Source: Box 28, May 1973-June 1973
On a lighter note, Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss a subject that
comes up very often during the conversations in the "back channel."
Dobrynin notes that Kissinger was seen with an attractive young
woman previously pictured in the Playboy calendar. Kissinger
calls Dobrynin a "dirty old man" and expresses his "hope
she isn't a nice girl."