Exclusive for Adms Felt, Dennison and Smith from Burke.

Part I. Subject is general plan action NSTL/SIOP discussions Omaha 1-2 Dec.

1. Objectives. We are faced with fact that SecDef will approve NSTL/SIOP in one form or another by 1 Jan 1961. It would be preferable to have this first NSTL/SIOP approved contingent upon incorporation of changes that preliminary spot checks show to be necessary and war gaming to prove validity. I doubt if this can be sold. As best alternative, propose to advocate approval of NSTL/SIOP with provisos that:

(a) JCS review NSTAP and develop more realistic damage criteria, clarify guidance reassurance of delivery at BRL, and size of NSTL. (b) JCS analyze and review plan to insure all aspects of plan are sound. (c) Plan be war gamed under JCS control, and that following these steps guidance be given to Director Joint Strategic Target Planning and that he be directed to come up with a new and revised NSTL/SIOP six months after receipt of such revised guidance.

2. Our approach should be that this NSTL/SIOP is a good first effort but many areas such as damage criteria, point system, assurance levels, constraints need further

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examination as does JCS guidance to DSTD and compressed time-scale for NSTL/SIOP development and thus hasty planning make revisions and refinements essential.

Part II.

3. My views are as expressed in my 060403Z plus additions as follows:

4. (1) On application of weather/darkness factor. Suggest CINC PAC be the one to broach this subject followed by CINCLANT statement of his views on this subject. I will take the position that imposition of weather factor is legitimate but that as far as darkness factor is concerned carrier non-all-weather attacks should be programmed on flexible TOTs. However, reliability of various weapons systems is determined by mathematical formula with factors in formula developed from experience or expected physical conditions. It will be most difficult to object to their formula or their factors unless we can actually disprove their validity or supply other more valid formulae or factors. We have not been able to develop any new mathematical approach and the pseudo mathematical approach used to get the NSTL and SIOP assigned to Omaha in the first place had an impelling fascination for SecDef and was the principal reason for his decision.
(2) Assurance levels. Suggest CINCLANT broach this subject with assist
from CINCPAC and Army if we can obtain their support. SACEUR may address this subject.
Suggest Smith obtain Norstad's views. CNO will cite examples of what appears to be
excessive assurance, i.e., Moscow X wpns, Stalingrad X wpns, Kaliningrad X wpns, 202
DGZ with 97% assurance, and draw attention to comparison with President's action on
2009.

(3) Size of NSTL - Number of targets and DGZ being generated in Omaha are
constantly being changed and therefore specific analysis is most difficult. Note that
in last few days JSTPS has reduced size of list somewhat. Believe now, on further
consideration, figures cited in Part II A 1, my 060403Z may be too high. ONI
preliminary estimates target list approximately 500 DGZs will get enemy nuclear
delivery forces, major military and governmental controls and urban industrial targets
to 2009 level. This compares with 750 DGZs for JSTPS minimum NSTL for same categories
of targets. Suggest CINCLANT address this one. CNO will cite ONI figures above in
support of position NSTL may be too large and complete NSTL (not quote minimum NSTL
unquote) exceeds guidance in NSTAP.

B. Other points for discussion.

(1) Constraints. This of particular concern to SACEUR, CINCPAC and Army.
Suggest Smith endeavor stimulate Norstad and Palmer concern this subject. Will prime Army. CNO will be prepared to cite figures on contamination at selected locations based on DASA analyses now being run. Will also raise questions of effects of Soviet bomb fall-out and suggest world-wide contamination be considered. Comments on high percentage of surface burst weapons in plan will be useful.

(2) Joint Intelligence. Under present conditions intelligence support for targeting effort is joint more in name than in fact. CNO will make pitch for joint target intelligence support group in Washington area directly under JCS as opposed to executive agent type arrangement now attempting job but constantly diverted by unilateral pressures and interests. Will try to obtain Army support for this. Contributions by CINCLANT and CINCPAC will be helpful.

(3) Distribution of Plan. CINCPAC is probably best one to address this initially. CNO position is that JCS, CINCs and Service Chiefs must have complete plan. (DJSTPS 191540 pasep to you indicates he will try to fragment plan so that of CINCs, only CINCSAC will have complete plan).

(4) War Gaming. CNO will talk to this item. Expect to be told that SAC has capability now to war game SIOP and nobody else has. Will have outline plan
available how war game can be conducted in Washington under JCS. We can expect Army support for JCS war gaming. Paper setting up JCS War Games Control Group now before JCS. AF bucking. Hope get resolved prior 1 Dec meeting but doubt if possible.

(5) Command and Control. This is a hot subject in JCS now. I think it would be best not to initiate discussion of this at Omaha on basis that it is a subject for JCS resolution. Air Force may bring up and we think it mandatory that firm control be retained and exercised by JCS. Will attempt to prime Lemnitzer and Decker on this approach.

(6) Damage Criteria. CNO will bring up this subject with recommendation criteria should be examined carefully by JCS and JCS guidance be examined and possibly modified. Intend raise question if fire or radiation effects considered in plan (they are not). May be able get Kistiakowsky and other service support on this one.

(7) Individual Target Effort. CNO will raise question validity high level of effort required hit some targets for example Kharkov where bombers must fly over more than 1500 miles of Russian territory and must be supported by extensive corridor/roll back effort. Few if any targets indispensable to plan.
(8) Base Survivability. Suggest CINCPAC raise this subject. CNO position is that a clear picture of base survivability is essential to the development of a realistic plan - different bases have different degree of vulnerability - "across the board solution is not good enough - mobile bases survive longest - this whole subject needs to be war gamed or at least carefully examined.

(9) Alert Force/Follow-on Force. Latest info from Omaha is about 780 aircraft and missiles in alert force which appears adequate do the job on an NSTL of reasonable size. Some follow-on force necessary but programming of all available forces may be too rigid and makes no provision for contingencies and a residual atomic attack capability which ordinary military prudence would indicate essential. This of concern to all but could be highly important to SACEUR and Army. Suggest Smith discuss with Norstad. Will attempt get Decker support.

(10) Bonus effect of misses. CNO will comment on fact that misses will kill a lot of Russians and Chinese even if specified objective is missed, therefore, misses should not be given a zero in the box score of damage achieved.

(11) Reliability Factors of Own and Enemy Weapon Systems. Suggest CINCJLAN bring this up with assist from CINCPAC. CNO position is that it is
unrealistic and leads to inflated force requirements to plan solely on the basis of worst situation for our own forces and the best for the enemy.

(12) Alfa and Bravo Point Systems. Suggest CINCPAC address this subject. CNO position is that system for development of Alfa and Bravo points needs detailed examination. Further that systems are not now compatible for development of optimum mix. Omega points (arbitrary mix of Alfa and Bravo points) also questionable.

(13) SIOP. Copy received in OPNAV, 19 November now under study. Will forward comments soonest.

Part III.

Consider recommendation to SecDef that new NSTL/SIOP be developed earliest should be based on:

(a) NSTL unnecessarily large.
(b) Damage criteria are excessively high.
(c) Assurances excessive - force requirements inflated.
(d) Constraints criteria probably cannot be observed if damage and assurance criteria are both kept high.
(e) Independent war gaming necessary to assess validity of plan.
Part IV.

For your info:

(1) At 23 November briefing of JCS by Power I intend to comment on but not pursue:

(a) Target list appears excessively large - does it conform to guidance?

(b) Assumptions at BML appears excessively large.

(c) Plan does not appear to conform to constraints criteria.

By merely noting these I hope to forestall Power taking the position at 1 Dec meeting that JCS silence at his 23 Nov briefing indicated acquiescence and by not elaborating reduce likelihood Power reorienting 1 Dec briefing and obscuring points to which I object.

(2) Understand General Palmer will represent Norstad at Omaha meeting.

(3) We may have more later.