NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/STIP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/165
b. J.C.S. 2056/191
c. J.C.S. 2056/194-3205 (17 Aug 61)

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, CSAM 19-61, dated 17 January 1961, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and STIP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/STIP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOOM,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.

JCS 2056/204

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ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED GUIDANCE (U)

CSAM 19-61

17 January 1961

1. Action* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving NSTL/SIOP 62 provides that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning shall recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff areas to be investigated for possible changes in developing NSTL/SIOP-62.

2. Pursuant to that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I consider the following areas to require further investigation:

   a. Basic Policy Guidance:
      (1) Determination of the essential general war task for strategic nuclear delivery forces. The basic objective of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. SIOP-62 reflects an initial strike capability of the forces made available. The task against which this capability has been applied remains to be defined; i.e., no task is stated except that which committed forces can accomplish.

      (2) Specific objectives. Preliminary damage assessment reveals that although the general levels prescribed in the NSTAP have been attained, the targets selected do not provide for full neutralization

   * See Decision On J.C.S. 2056/194

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of any resource system. Yet it is evident that within the
over-all level of damage there is marked redundancy of
damage in terms of the end effect on the economic and
control system. The selection of more precise objectives
should more effectively neutralize the war-making and
political potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc at the same
or a lesser level of effort.

(3) Damage criteria. The over-all level of damage
and population casualties appear to exceed that which is
required even though no account is taken of thermal or
radiation effects. Damage criteria specified in NSTAP
deal only with severe damage. Yet lesser but significant
damage may in many cases contribute equally to attainment
of the over-all objective.

(4) Assurance at FRL. NSTAP prescribes assurance
de-livery at each bomb release line of the necessary
weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to
targets on the NSTL. SIOP-62 provides a variable scale
of assurance averaging over .8 The assurance method,
compounding the probability associated with individual
weapons carriers assigned to a target to attain an
assurance that the target is struck, produces an
expectancy that a large proportion of targets will be
struck with multiple weapons. It is not clear that
coupling delivery assurance and damage probability for
individual targets is the optimum method by which a
realistic and reasonable level of assured damage may be
prescribed. Consideration also is needed of the feasibility
and desirability of providing the higher levels of assurance which may be necessary through the use of alternate target assignment and reporting or post-strike reconnaissance procedures to guide commitment of follow-on forces.

(5) Initiative/Retaliation. NSTAP requires the SIOP** to be prepared in consideration of the several ways in which hostilities may be initiated. Yet except for missiles, there is no provision for alteration of the target system or target priority between the circumstances of pre-emption and retaliation. Target priorities, particularly for the alert force which may be the only force launched, appear to be optimum for neither circumstance.

b. Constraints. The SIOP conforms to the prescribed constraints criteria. However, the methodology employed for computation of expected dose of residual radiation from fallout does not consider seasonal wind variations and multiple weapon probability. Further, it has not yet been possible to consider additive effects due to employment of weapons outside the SIOP. The range of probability of adverse effects on other concurrent military operations due to fallout from SIOP and other weapons has not been considered.

Both the method for computation of expected dose and the tolerance levels for the several monitoring points require close review.

c. Organization of the JSTPS. The current organization of the JSTPS reflects the necessity which existed in September 1960 to rely on the experience of SAC headquarters personnel

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* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/165
** J.C.S. 2056/191
and the existing organization of Headquarters, SAC for preparation of the initial NSTL/SIOP in the limited time available. This necessity no longer exists. The permanent organization of the JSTPS should be that best calculated to fulfill the requirements of the JCS and to this end should provide for equitable representation among the services, particularly at the policy level.

4. Relation of SIOP to Other Planning Documents. Although the SIOP is a significant component of the JCS guidance for commanders, it fails to bear a logical relationship to other primary planning documents, notably JSCP, in the planning cycle. The due date of May 1962 for SIOP-63 provides insufficient time for commanders to incorporate it into their plans prepared in support of JSCP-63. Neither does the May date provide sufficient time for SIOP preparation subsequent to provision of over-all strategic guidance in SIOP-63.

3. I recommend:

a. That the foregoing comments be forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration in the development of the plan of action with respect to the NSTAP.

b. That the Director, Joint Staff prepare, for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a time-phased program for actions in support of NSTL/SIOP-63.