MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Visit to JSTPS, 4 February 1961

1. The following Department of Defense personnel were briefed by JSTPS on Saturday, 4 February 1961:

   Mr. McNamara
   Mr. Gilpatrick
   General Lemnitzer
   Dr. York
   Dr. Stern
   B/General Seawell
   B/General Brown

At the request of General Lemnitzer, the number of personnel in the audience was held to the minimum. The personnel in attendance were 12 in all, consisting of:

   General Thomas S. Power
   Lt General Griswold
   Vice Admiral Parker
   Major General Blanchard
   Major General Wheless
   Major General Eisenhart
   Brig General Spivy
   Brig General Smith
   Col Crumm
   Col Hines
   Col Philpott
   Capt Miller

Briefing officers were present only for that portion of time they were actively briefing.

2. The briefing commenced at 0945 and was completed at 1935, CST. During this time many questions were asked by the visitors. An effort has been made to indicate below the general context of the questions as well as the answers given to the questions.

   Q - McNamara - What kind of a target list did you have prior to the inception of the DSTP. Is the weight of effort essentially the same as that which was available when individual commands prepared their own plan?

   A - It was pointed out that it would be very difficult to compare the target list, inasmuch as individual commands compiled their own.
from the basic intelligence sources available. With regard to the weight of effort, it is not possible to answer this directly at this time inasmuch as a comparison of this nature has not been compiled.

Q - McNamara - Was the consideration of a Strategic Command discussed within the basic 18 questions?

A - Yes.

Q - McNamara - Are there still two target lists?

A - No, there is one target list which will be discussed in detail at a later time.

Q - McNamara - What is the affect on force composition of changing of assurance or probability from that which was received in the Directive.

A - The greatest affect on forces is realized by changing the degree of damage rather than the percentage of probability and by changing the amount of assurance desired at the BRL.

A - Dr. York - If 90% ground probability of severe damage was changed to 70%, only about 1/2 the force would be required. If it was raised to 99% twice the force would be necessary.

Q - McNamara - Is shock, resulting from detonation of nuclear weapons, considered in the determination of specific VN's (target toughness) for a given target.

A - No.

Q - McNamara - Recognizing that the DBL isn't considered and assuming that 4 weapon systems are programmed for attack against a specific DGZ, how many of the four weapons could we expect to fall in the USSR?

(Note: Considerable discussion ensued with regard to this probability; no specific answer was given. However, the impression was left with Mr. McNamara that in this case "it would probably be about two of the four weapons."

Q - McNamara - If part of the force is lost and only alert aircraft get off, what number or percentage of the Urban/Industrial areas on the target list would be under attack?

(Note: This question was left unanswered. If it had been answered, the answer should have been -- of the 151 Urban/Industrial targets, approximately 130 are brought under attack by the alert force.
Q - McNamara - When do we put up airborne alert?

(Note: A period of discussion followed and General Lemnitzer stated we could put up airborne alert as required by the world situation. The impression was that at such time as a period of tension is reached an airborne alert could be placed in the air. Mr. McNamara and General Power both agreed that probably this would be the one time when it would not be possible to place the airborne alert force in the air. Mr. McNamara said he thought this would be considered a provocative act on the part of the U.S. Further discussion ensued with regard to the requirement for achieving 1/16 capability as soon as possible and ultimately going to 1/4 of the SAC B-52 force. It was pointed out that the support and logistical requirements for placing 1/8 of the B-52s on airborne alert will be available and on the shelves by 1 April - 1 May 1961.

Q - McNamara - Where did the two hour period come from in defining alert forces for carriers and submarines?

A - The two hour figure for carriers and submarines was an arbitrary time period recommended to the Policy Committee in order to get on with the planning of the alert forces. The rationals involved, it was pointed out, does have a connotation of relative survivability. However, the period was purely arbitrary and was selected for a planning basis only.

Q - McNamara - With regard to constraints, how do we control fallout and stay within the JCS constraint policy?

A - By going to smaller weapons and by changing from surface to air bursts. It was pointed out that this causes the use of tactics which will be less than optimum.

Q - McNamara - Recognizing that SAC has requested a specific number of KC-135 Squadrons by 1964 and realizing that there will probably be a slippage in this program, could the tankers effectively be utilized if they were not available in 1965.

A - No direct answer, however, much discussion.

Q - McNamara - It would seem that 2 target lists would be necessary - one for an initiative type situation and one for retaliation.

A - As the alert force grows and gets large enough it is possible to expand its targets from just the military and government controls. An optimum-mix system becomes possible when the alert force is large enough.
SECRET

Q - McNamara - Have you applied your procedures to Hiroshima?

A - Smith - Yes. 3 DGZs of 80 KT each.

Q - McNamara - If 4000 planes are sent at 1000 targets with 93% assurance, how many weapons would go off?

A - York - About 2 1/2 per DGZ.

MEMORANDUM FOR: J035

Subject: FOIA Request (93-24) - Briefings on SIOP-62

1. Reference is made to the attached FOIA request (93-24) (Encl B).

2. Review of the responsive record to this request has been accomplished by knowledgeable personnel. Although the overall classification of this document is SECRET, the determination has been made that this data may now be declassified. The document will be declassified by this office as the OCA for this information and released in its entirety.

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