NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

References:

a. JCS 2056/155
b. JCS 2056/194
c. JCS 2101/339 – 2071 (57)

The enclosed memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, serial 00531961, dated 8 February 1951, is referred to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in Paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to JCS 2056/194.

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Joint Secretariat
ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

0003B1961  8 February 1961

1. JCS 2056/194 contains Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of the NSTL/SIOP-62 and invites continued review directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. Recommendations were requested from each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Director, Strategic Target Planning.

2. The Commandant of the Marine Corps considers that the following area requires further investigation and possible action:

   a. Flexibility

      (1) NSC 5904/1 provides policy guidance for the United States in the event of war. Section A of this document indicates one of the objectives in the event of general war to be the reduction of "the capabilities of the [USSR and Communist China] to the point where they have lost their will and ability to wage war against the United States and its allies. However, another objective stresses restraint by stating, "So far as consistent with the above objectives to avoid destruction and casualties in all countries not..."
involved in the war." Paragraph 7 of this section, which is footnoted to indicate the paragraph to be the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the objectives, provides that "The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR -- and as necessary in Communist China, -- to attain the above objectives. The USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary. (NOTE: It is assumed that the peoples of the Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against those countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.)"

(2) In spite of these provisions for flexibility in NSC 5904/1,* the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy,** which is referenced in the original terms of reference for General Power,*** makes no such distinction among the [USSR, Communist China and apparently dictates that the NSFS/SIOP provide for the attack of a single list of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets].

(3) It is noted that a certain amount of flexibility has been written into JCS SIOP-62. The Procedures for [Execution provide for the withholding of "strikes scheduled against Sino-Soviet Bloc countries as required" except that strikes against certain defensive targets in the Bloc countries "are not subject to being withheld unless directed by JCS prior to E-Hour." It is apparent, however, that no

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* Enclosure to J-8 2101/339
** Enclosure "A" to JCS 2056/165
*** Enclosure "C" to JCS 2056/165

Enclosure

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provision is made for withholding strikes nor for a routine withholding of strikes against defensive targets.

(4) It is believed that greater flexibility should be provided within the NSTL/SIOP, and that such flexibility could be provided within the framework of NSC 5904/1. Specifically, precise provisions should be made for a routine withholding of strikes against targets in the

Such additional flexibility could be in consonance with NSC 5904/1, since the SIOP would still contain alternatives for the attack of targets throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc to achieve the maximum national objectives, if required.

3. It is recommended that the Joint Staff be directed to examine our National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy in connection with NSC 5904/1* to determine how the NSTL/SIOP may be revised to provide for the desired flexibility, and what revision of the NSAP is required.

4. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified and specified commands.

5. In consonance with the provisions of JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers in NATO activities.

* Enclosure to JCS 2101/339