MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE
for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING (U)
Reference: JCS 2056/208-2200 (Aug 60) des 9
OSAM 85-61

16 March 1961

1. I have reviewed the extract* from the memorandum for the
President from the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960, in which
Dr. Kistiakowsky reported to the President on the methodology
employed in the preparation of the NIJ and SIOP.

2. In view of Dr. Kistiakowsky's position at the time of
authorship, his comments could have significant impact on
strategic planning. It would appear that they merit special
attention in that they were brought to the attention of the
Secretary of Defense at the request of the President.

3. I have recommended that Dr. Kistiakowsky's memorandum be
forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for
detailed study insofar as it relates to SIOP. Such action
would respond to the expressed** wishes of the Secretary of
Defense, and would assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their
own study of the memorandum.

4. Insofar as it relates to Study 2009, I believe that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff should comment directly to the Secretary
of Defense. In this connection there are statements in

* Annex to JCS 2056/208
** Enclosure to JCS 2056/208

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MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE
for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING (U)
Reference: JCS 2056/208-2203 (Aug 61) 16 March 1961

1. I have reviewed the extract* from the memorandum for the
President from the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960, in which
Dr. Kistiakowsky reported to the President on the methodology
employed in the preparation of the N3TL and SIOP.

2. In view of Dr. Kistiakowsky's position at the time of
authorship, his comments could have significant impact on
strategic planning. It would appear that they merit special
attention in that they were brought to the attention of the
Secretary of Defense at the request of the President.

3. I have recommended that Dr. Kistiakowsky's memorandum be
forwarded to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for
detailed study insofar as it relates to SIOP. Such action
would respond to the expressed** wishes of the Secretary of
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the report with regard to Study 2009 which are not substantiated in that Study. I consider that these should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

5. In the Enclosure hereto is a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which advises him of our action in response to his request,* and points out discrepancies in the report with regard to Study 2009.

6. It is recommended that:

   a. The memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

   b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

   c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers in NATO activities.

   d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

* Enclosure to JCS 2055/208
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Strategic Target Planning (U)

1. On 20 January 1961, the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum from the then Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. Kistiakowsky. This memorandum comprised a report to the President on the methodology employed in the preparation of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). It was the suggestion of Mr. Gates that the report be studied, both by the Director of Strategic Target Planning and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In compliance with the desires of the former Secretary of Defense, and in order to facilitate their own assessment of the Kistiakowsky report as it relates to SIOP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are forwarding the report to the Director of Strategic Target Planning for comment. You will be advised if further action is indicated.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the references to Study 2009 in the report are misleading. In order to preclude misunderstanding regarding comparison between SIOP-62 and Study 2009, the following comments are pertinent:

   a. The report states: "A comparison of the present SIOP for the alert force with the plans worked out in the '2009 Study' is informative. The latter used [blacked out] in the USSR. The SIOP for the alert force alone uses some [blacked out] in the Sino-Soviet Bloc."
b. Actually, Study 2009 reflects considerably more than [Redacted] in the alert force. Study 2009 considers weapon and force requirements for each of a number of situations and assumptions, such as using aircraft only, missiles only, combinations of the two, 75% assurance of weapon delivery, 90% assurance, and various conditions of warning or alert. For example, in the case of an alert force consisting of aircraft only [Redacted], and assuming 75% assurance of delivery, the number of weapons in the alert force as reflected in the Study 2009 is [Redacted]. This very closely approximates the [Redacted] in the initial STOR-62 alert force. This has been confirmed by a recent comparison of Study 2009 and STOR alert forces, conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

c. As quoted above, the report states that Study 2009 used these alert weapons against [Redacted]. Actually, the figure [Redacted].

d. The "Estimate of Damage" reflected in Study 2009 shows that [Redacted] of the USSR, rather than [Redacted] respectively, as shown above in the quote from the Kistiakowsky report. Of more importance, even the lower figures in the Study 2009 were based on the admittedly unrealistic assumption that 100% of the weapons programmed for each DAZ would arrive at the bomb release line. In view of this the figures were qualified in Study 2009 as follows: "The expected damage would be somewhat less depending on the programmed assurance of delivering a weapon to each bomb release line."
4. Since the Essential National Task defined by the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy includes the requirement to attain damage levels as specified in Study 2009, that Study is a criterion for formulation of the NSTL/STIP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the comments of Dr. Kistiakowsky are misleading, as illustrated above, in that they imply that SIOP-62 is not in conformance with Study 2009. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that SIOP-62 does conform to this criterion and that Dr. Kistiakowsky's report is erroneous in this respect.