MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

1. As agreed at their last meeting with you on 15 June 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared the enclosed paper which delineates more clearly their different views on the above subject, particularly in the areas of Policy, Selection of Targets, and Planning and Coordination.

2. You will note that Enclosure "A", on Policy, is merely an outline. Inasmuch as a draft policy is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration, it is felt that it would be inappropriate to burden this paper with other than an outline at this time.

3. It is requested that the Secretary of Defense read this paper prior to meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Thursday, 30 June 1960, in order that he may be aware of the various views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subjects covered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment (26 pages)
SECRET

ENCLOSURE "A"

POLICY

1. General. A basic policy is needed to translate the guidance of Study 2009 and the President's decision thereon into pertinent and sufficiently complete instructions to commanders of unified and specified commands and to provide guidance for the selection of targets for the NSTL.

2. Outline of Policy.
   a. Purpose.
   b. Concept.
   c. Intent.
   d. Objectives.
   e. Strike priorities.
   f. Supporting targets.
   g. Damage Criteria.
   h. Assurance.

* In accordance with Secretary of Defense discussion on 15 June 1969, Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for establishing this policy.
SELECTION OF TARGETS

1. General. A basic method or procedure is required to provide for the selection of targets which are to be included on the NSTL regardless of the agency which prepares the list. The following paragraphs discuss the basic considerations and explain various methods of accomplishment of the preparation of the NSTL by different agencies.

2. Preparation, Coordination, and Approval of the NSTL.
   a. Policy Guidance.
      (1) The agency designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the NSTL will prepare that list in consonance with the policy guidance to be developed from the outline in Enclosure "A" hereto.
      (2) The following is an appropriate directive to the agency designated to prepare the NSTL:

      "In consonance with the policy set forth in________________________,* select a minimum number of targets for inclusion in the National Strategic Target List (NSTL).

      "The list of targets selected will be submitted in such a manner as to indicate the proportions of the various elements of the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential which are at risk in each target selected. These targets should be grouped geographically to

* Will refer to JCS Targeting Policy now outlined in Enclosure "A" hereto.
facilitate target analyses and attack as complexes. Targets, the attack of which is necessary primarily for defense suppression and to facilitate penetration of friendly forces, will not be included in the STIL.

"In the accomplishment of this task, you are authorized to request assistance as may be necessary from the Military Services and from commands and agencies responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

b. Basic Inputs

(1) The basic intelligence data required for the selection of a list of targets is contained in the Target Data Inventory (TDI). The TDI contains all known essential information concerning targets of significance which are known to be within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The TDI is published by the Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC), which organization is within the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, is jointly manned and operates under the terms of "The Joint Targeting Arrangement," and for joint matters is under the monitorship of the J-2 in compliance with a directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among others, the Services, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff are holders of the TDI.

(2) Source material for the TDI is received from all intelligence agencies within the government. The AFIC further evaluates the intelligence data received, and translates this evaluated data into a standardized format (TDI) suitable for preliminary target selection purposes.

(3) In addition to the TDI, the agency selected to prepare the target list should have access to the
Information contained in the Optimum-Mix Target List of Study 2009.

c. Preparation, Review and Coordination.

(1) The initial step in the preparation of a NSTL is the selection of a list of targets from the TDI by operations and plans personnel, assisted and advised by intelligence personnel.

Air Force View

Upon completion of the selection of a tentative list of targets, it is evaluated, reviewed and translated into a final recommended NSTL in light of operational and planning considerations. The evaluation includes verification that the list will achieve the prescribed percent damage levels to the basic strengths of the enemy.

(2) Review and evaluation of the NSTL, prior to its consideration and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be by appropriate directorates of the Joint Staff. The NSTL would be processed through established channels and would be subject to Service coordination and review prior to being presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.
a. Procedure for Keeping NSTL up-to-date.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

The NSTL would be subjected to a major review each year by the designated agency and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in sufficient time for changes to be reflected in the instructions to the appropriate commander(s) in the JSCP. In addition, the NSTL should be kept under continuous review and changes made in the light of current intelligence. The specific details of accomplishing this task will vary somewhat depending on which agency is assigned the task. However, variations in procedures are not expected to be significant.

Air Force View

The guidance upon which the NSTL is based would be reviewed and approved annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrently with their review and approval of the basic JSCP. The NSTL itself would be subject to day-to-day updating according to procedures established by the responsible agency in light of changing intelligence and other factors; however, any deviation from the prescribed damage levels of basic enemy strength would require approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Agency to Prepare NSTL. The information to be presented here will deal with the method and capability for accomplishment of the preparation of the NSTL. It should be pointed out that the methods of accomplishment stated herein are representative only and do not necessarily state the exact method which either of the three agencies under discussion would follow if assigned the task. Further, there may be additional steps in the procedures outlined or certain of the procedures could be accomplished concurrently.
TOP-SECRET

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

(1) Capability of Accomplishment. There are three elements associated with the capability of any agency to accomplish the selections of targets to be included on the NSTL. These are:

(a) Intelligence Information - As explained in paragraph 2 b (1) and (2) above, the basic intelligence input is the Target Data Inventory (TDI). The TDI would be available to the agency selected to prepare the target list.

(b) Availability of Facilities and Equipment - The agency selected to prepare the target list should have, or have access to electronic computing machines to facilitate the selection and analysis of targets. In addition, the designated agency should have secure working spaces and the necessary reproduction equipment.

Air Force View

(1) Capability of Accomplishment. There are four elements associated with the capability of any agency to accomplish the selections of targets to be included on the NSTL. These are:

(a) Intelligence Information - As explained in paragraph 1 b (1) and (2) above, the basic intelligence input is the Target Data Inventory (TDI).

(b) Operational Information - As indicated in paragraph 1 c above, planning and operational considerations must be applied to target selection. Among other considerations, this must include the capabilities and limitations of delivery forces and weapons, and operational procedures and techniques.

Enclosure "B"
Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Air Force View

(c) Availability of Facilities and Equipment -
The agency selected to prepare the target list must have immediately available electronic computing machines of considerable capacity and the trained computer personnel to facilitate the selection and continuing analysis of targets due to the dynamic nature of targeting.

(c) Personnel - The personnel talents required are experience in intelligence, plans, and operations.

(2) Accomplishment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a directive to the Director, Joint Staff, charging him with the responsibility of preparing the NSTL. (See paragraph 2 a above.)

(b) The Director, J-3, assisted by J-5 and J-2, prepares a list of targets utilizing the TDI, the "Optimum-Mix" Target List from Study 2009 and such assistance and coordination as is necessary from the Services, the unified and specified commands, and other appropriate agencies.

(c) The Director, J-5, in coordination with the Director, J-3, reviews and evaluates the list of targets from a plans and operations point of view.
this point, machine evaluations as appropriate will be made utilizing the facilities of an agency such as DASA or AFIC.

(d) The Director, J-3, coordinates the target list with the Services within established procedures and submits the target list to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

(e) The capability exists within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish this task without augmentation through the effective utilization of existing agencies such as AFIC, DASA, etc.

Air Force View

(a) Without major augmentation and reorganization within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the capability does not exist even with the effective utilization of existing external agencies.

3. Accomplishment by the Strategic Air Command.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a directive to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, charging him with the responsibility of preparing the NSTL. (See paragraph 2 g above).

(b) The SAC staff, with the participation of Intelligence, Operations, and Plans personnel, prepares a list of targets utilizing the TDI, the guidance in Enclosure "A" and such assistance and coordination as is considered necessary from the Services, the unified commands, and other appropriate agencies.

(c) The list of targets is reviewed and evaluated by appropriate SAC staff directorates from a planning and operational point of view. Machine evaluation as
appropriate will be made utilizing SAC equipment and facilities.

(d) The target list is processed in normal staff procedure, approved by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) The appropriate Joint Staff directorates review and evaluate the target list as submitted by CINCSAC.

(f) The Director, J-3, coordinates the target list with the Services within established procedures and submits the target list to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval.

(g) The capability exists within the Strategic Air Command to accomplish this task utilizing existing resources.

(h) Accomplishment by a Unified Strategic Command. Since such a command is not now in existence, specific details are not available. However, the method of accomplishment would be similar to that outlined for CINCSAC in paragraph 2 g (3) above.
ENVELOPE "C"

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

1. General.

a. Regardless of the echelon of command involved, a definitive method is necessary to translate the attack of the targets of the NSTL into an effective national effort.

b. The discussions which follow are developed within the context of:

(1) Prior establishment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of basic policy along the lines of Enclosure "A", and

(2) Approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of an NSTL prepared by a selected agency in consonance with the policy outlined in Enclosure "A" and assignment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a designated agency, of these targets to the appropriate commander(s) for attack.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

a. (1) It should be noted that, in the past, many of the substantive divergencies and conflicts which have arisen have concerned such matters as:

(a) Which targets should be attacked?

(b) Who should attack the targets?

(c) The damage levels and assurance levels (i.e., the extent of desired duplication on targets to produce the desired effect).

(d) Priorities.

Air Force View

Delete
(2) Under the preconditions set out in subparagraph b above, the primary substantive basis for divergence relative to attack of targets on the NSTL till have been resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, in this context, the effectiveness of the planning and coordination system can be measured against the remaining areas of potential conflict which concern primarily operational matters such as routes, timing and other details.

2. Terminology (definitions, etc.) - See Appendix.

3. Types of Plans

   a. Several kinds of plans are necessary to the full and coordinated execution of military operations; however, the type of plans of particular pertinence to this discussion are those which relate to air or missile delivered attack of specified targets or target complexes (i.e., plans for strategic bombardment). While the basic purpose of plans at the various echelons of command is fundamentally the same, the detailed content necessary to the plans at each echelon vary widely depending upon the assigned responsibilities.

   b. Relating plans specifically to the attack of targets of the NSTL, appropriate plans must be developed by each echelon of command to effectively pair up the forces available to that echelon with the targets to be attacked by
those forces along with the guidance needed to provide effective coordination among the next subordinate echelons.

2. The following types of plans are pertinent:

(1) Strategic Plans - "A plan for the over-all conduct of a war." (Example - JSCP)

A strategic plan such as JSCP furnishes strategic guidance to include:

Basic Undertakings
Strategic Concept

Tasks for Subordinate Commanders

In addition, the annexes provide more detailed guidance on various aspects of operations. In particular, the Atomic Annex to JSCP contains general policy and other additional details on this policy, guidance on targeting, damage criteria, and fallout constraints. In addition, it provides detailed allocations of atomic weapons to commanders. At such time as a definitive NSTL is approved, target assignment to the appropriate commander(s) for attack will be included. Such guidance as is necessary to insure effective coordination of the operations of subordinate commands (as envisaged in UNAAF - JCS Pub #2) is also included. This may include such matters as:
Guidance relative to submission of plans for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Establishment of areas of responsibility. Appointing a coordinating authority.

(2) Operations Plan - "A plan for the accomplishment of an operation, a series of operations, or a phase of a campaign. It may be based on stated assumptions and cover a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is the form of directive employed by high echelons of command to permit subordinate commanders to prepare their supporting plans or orders."

(Example - CINCPAC OPPLAN 100-1 or SAC Basic War Plan)

An operations plan (such as SAC Basic War Plan) includes such guidance (taken from JCSF) to the subordinate command as may be pertinent to them. In addition, it includes the mission of the command as a whole and delineates the tasks of the subordinate commands. Among other things, it includes:
Strategic concept of the command.
Operational and tactical concept of the command.
Pertinent coordinating instructions.
Execution instructions.
Pertinent target assignment information.
The various annexes contain such information as:
Staging bases.
Specific guidance relative to atomic operations.
Airlift.
Support targets.
Aircraft evacuation.

(3) Operations Order - A directive to conduct an operation (Example - SAC Operations Order 50-61).

SAC OPORD 50-61, in general, contains information common to orders of all types. Specifically, it includes guidance relative to:
SAC command structure.
General instructions for subordinate units.
Pertinent coordinating instructions.
Operational concepts and other data to permit detailed
planning by task organization commanders, such as target assignment.

Annexes include details on such matters as:

- Priorities.
- Tactics.
- Timing.
- ECM.
- Emergency minimums.
- Post-strike bases.
- Corridors.
- Electronic Reconnaissance.
- Special instructions on atomic weapons.
- Fuzing data.

(4) Single Integrated Operational Plan -

**Army-Navy-Marine Corps View**

This term is not specifically defined in Joint Publication #1. It has been used in conjunction with deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to planning for the attack of the targets of the NSTL. It would, in substance, be the same as an Operation Plan defined above. The addition of the adjectives "single" and "integrated" connote

**Air Force View**

This term is not specifically defined in Joint Publication #1. It has been used in conjunction with deliberations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to planning for the attack of the National Strategic Target List. It would constitute the single plan for the attack of all targets on the NSTL and would provide for the scheduled and controlled
that the various operations plans of the commands taking part in the attack of the targets of the NSTL are dovetailed together into a single plan covering the entire operation. Such a plan would be prepared by a Unified Strategic Command if one were established. In fact, the JSCP is a plan which, at the national level, integrates military operations by specifying the missions, tasks and operational responsibilities of the commanders of unified and specified commands. Among other things, the JSCP would provide the commanders with policy guidance and the NSTL with assignment of targets to the appropriate commander(s). Commanders would prepare implementing operational plans and coordinate them as directed prior to submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Joint Staff would review these plans to insure complete integration of operational effort. Final commitment of all effective forces against these targets on the basis of one integrated action designed to achieve prompt and decisive results. In essence, this is a detailed integrated strike plan based on the following principles:

(a) Execution cannot be dependent on coordination after war starts.

(b) Mutual support of attacking forces.

(c) Elimination of interference and possible self destruction.

(d) Maximum effectiveness, achieved through unity of the strategic effort.
approval of the commanders' individual operational plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would effectively combine these individual plans into an integrated national-level operational plan.

4. Considerations Relating to Translation of Policy and NSTI into Appropriate Plans.

a. Nature of Tasks. The primary task under discussion is nuclear bombardment, by aircraft or missile, of strategic targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The effective accomplishment of this task is of prime importance to the war effort and the nation. Consequently, direction to include definitive guidance from the National level, is an essential pre-requisite to its success.

b. Types of Plans Required.

**Army-Navy-Marine Corps View**

For a task of the type envisaged here, the normal types of plans, modified appropriately, are adequate. The essential new requirement for this task is a higher degree of centralized planning than is normally the case. Accordingly, the plans at all echelons must prescribe more precise detail than is usual to assure fully coordinated, decentralized execution by all subordinate echelons.

**Air Force View**

For a task of the type envisaged here, some modification of existing plans is necessary. The essential new requirements, for this task are clearer, more definitive guidance and a higher degree of centralized detailed planning than is normally the case. Accordingly, the plans at all operational echelons must prescribe more precise detail than is usual to assure fully
integrated plans yet retaining decentralized execution by all subordinate echelons.

a. Type of Coordination Required. At each echelon of command, the elements of coordination are different depending upon the responsibilities which repose at that level. For example, at the National level, there is full responsibility for assuring effective attack of targets on the NSTL. Therefore, specific guidance must be generated by that level to assure unmistakable understanding on the part of subordinate commanders of their part in this undertaking. The necessary guidance should be incorporated in the JSCP. At the other extreme, at the level of the aircraft crew, complete and definitive detailed instructions must be prepared in advance, covering every aspect of mating man, machine - weapon and target which is susceptible to pre-planning.

d. Special Considerations. The special considerations associated with this type of operation are twofold:

(1) Criticality of the time factor in terms of reaction to warning or hostile attack as well as the potential strategic effect which can accrue in a limited time at the very outset of war.

(2) The unprecedented magnitude of the effect which can be obtained by a successful attack with nuclear weapons against the targets of the NSTL.

These factors must be given prime consideration in all plans at all levels.

5. Methods and Procedures Required to Keep Plans Current and to Assure Most Effective Execution. In the light of the criticality of the time factor discussed above and the volume of detail which must be incorporated in plans, methods and procedures are necessary which can accomplish the many unavoidable changes in a
rapid manner. Automation is needed to assist the operating levels in this respect to assure optimum readiness for action under all conditions.

6. Alternative Methods and Capabilities for Accomplishing Planning and Coordination Relative to Attack of the Targets of the NSTL.

   a. In recent discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the following alternative approaches to accomplishing the above:

      (1) By the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff).
      (2) By the Strategic Air Command as agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
      (3) By establishment of a Unified Strategic Command.
      (4) By Unified and Specified Commands.

Air Force View

   b. The ultimate purpose to be achieved is assurance that a sound, integrated effective plan exists to employ the available capable forces of the United States in a national effort designed to destroy or neutralize as appropriate the targets on the approved NSTL.

   a. Comments relative to roles and responsibilities under the various alternatives follow:
(1) By the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff).

**Army-Navy-Marine Corps View**

Under this alternative, planning and coordination would be carried out in much the same manner as now applies but with certain significant differences. First, an approved policy covering the essential aspects of the NSTL together with criteria and guidance relative to weight of attack against it will exist. Secondly, an approved NSTL will exist. Within this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff, are capable of providing the strategic direction and coordination which is necessary from the National level. To accomplish this, the JSCP and its Annexes will need to incorporate detailed guidance to commanders. Specifically, it would include, among other things:

(a) Essential features of the approved policy such as assurance, damage criteria, strike priorities, supporting targets, etc.

**Air Force View**

An approved policy covering the essential aspects of the NSTL together with criteria and guidance for the destruction of the basic enemy strengths will exist. For this alternative to be considered, it must be assumed that the NSTL would also be prepared by the Joint Staff. Within this context, the Joint Staff is not capable of developing a single integrated operations plan for attack of the NSTL and cannot become so without major augmentation and reorganization.

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Enclosure "C"
(b) Assignment of targets of the NSTL to the appropriate commander(s).

c) Coordination instructions to subordinate commanders.

d) Allocation of weapons to commanders.

e) Fallout constraints.

(f) Provisions for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the plans of commanders of the unified and specified commands.

Within the context of the JSCP guidance, the commanders of unified and specified commands would develop plans for accomplishment of their portion of the attack of targets of the NSTL as well as for the attack of such other targets as may be necessary to the accomplishment of their theater mission, thus insuring an integrated effective national effort.

(2) By the Strategic Air Command as Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View

Under this approach, it is assumed that, within the policy guidance of the JSCP, CINCSAC would be designated as the coordinating authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See definition of coordinating authority in the Appendix hereto). As such, the entire NSTL would be furnished him and he would write and promulgate and operational plan

Air Force View

Under this approach, CINCSAC would be designated "Strategic Targeting Authority", (to be defined in the Appendix) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is presumed that as such the responsibility for preparing the NSTL and Single Integrated Operations Plans is assigned to CINCSAC. In this capacity, the Strategic Targeting
in coordination with other interested commanders. The responsibility here would be limited, in that the power of resolution would be at the next echelon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under this situation, command authority would be retained by the individual commanders. After approval of the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be implemented by the commanders at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is considered that CINCSAC does have the capability to carry out effectively this type of planning and coordinating function. In this case, as in all of the others which follow, the Joint Staff would accomplish the normal functions of staff review on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) By Establishment of a Unified Strategic Command.
Under this concept, within the policy guidance of the JCS, the responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing the attack on all of the targets of the NSTR would be assigned to that command, subject to review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as is now done for plans of all unified and specified commands. Initially, at

Enclosure "C"
least, such a command would have two component commands -
Naval and Air Force. The command could develop the
capabilities, utilizing existing available resources of
CINCSAC, to carry out effectively the assigned responsi-
bility.

(4) By the Unified and Specified Commands.

Army-Navy-Marine Corps View
The assigned responsibilities
and functions of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Staff, and the commanders of
unified and specified commands
would be identical with that
set out in paragraph (1)
above.

Air Force View
The development of an
integrated operations plan
as the result of collating
individual plans from the
unified and specified
commanders increases the
complexity, further diffuses
the responsibility and would
be a variation of the method
outlined in paragraph (1)
above.

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Enclosure "C"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>A plan for the overall conduct of a war.</td>
<td>JCS Pub 1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
<td>A plan for the accomplishment of an operation, a series of operations, or a phase of a campaign. It may be based on stated assumptions and cover a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is the form of directive employed by high echelons of command to permit subordinate commanders to prepare their supporting plans or orders. See operation order.</td>
<td>JCS Pub 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>An air attack on a single objective.</td>
<td>JCS Pub 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Air Warfare</td>
<td>Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material stockpiles, power systems,</td>
<td>JCS Pub 1</td>
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* Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage
Strategic Mission

A mission directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity and his will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw materials, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and other such target systems.

As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range, rather than immediate, effect on the enemy and his military forces.

Coordinating Authority

A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more forces of the same Service. He has
the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority.