Cho

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRGE: PROG 10/10/83 · APPRV: AMB: JDNEGROPONTE

DRFTD: AMB: JDNEGROPONTE: CLEAR: : GOL

DISTR: AMB(2) DCM POL

RUBEZP RUBESJ RUBESN RUBERT DE RUBETG #1050/71 284 *** HHHH ZNY CCCCC ZZE

VZCZCTGI * * . * .

1115597 005 53 IM AMEMEASSY MEGUCIGALPA

TO RUEBO / SECSTATE WASHDO 7646

INFO RUESBO / AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1 48

RE RUEEC RUESEG RUEHCV RUEHGT RUESMO RUEEME

RUBHOV / ANDMBASSY CARACAS 1554

RUZHGT / AMEMBASSI GUATEMALA 1157 HUESMG / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 5413

AUREM: / A "EMBASSY MEXICO 1890 -RUEHZP / AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8848

RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 8767

RUEHSN / AMEMBASSI SAN SALVADOR 9642

SECTION 21 OF * TEGUCIGALPA 11050

Inor

DECAPTIONED

3.0. 12353: TACL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OAS, UNSC, XL, EO SUBJECT: MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN WICE FOREIGN MINISTER

OF OCKOL

- EVII RE TEXT

HHHR

SUMMARY: COLOMBIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LONDONO. SAYS HE FAVORS SIMULTANEOUS, COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTA-TION OF CONTADORA OBJECTIVES. HE VISUALIZES ONE TREATY WITH NUMEROUS SEPARATE ANNEXES. HE ALSO FAVORS EARLY TALLS BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS (WITH CONTADORA IN BACKGROUND, FACILITATIVE ROLE). AND HE ADVOCATES FACT-FINDING MISSION BY CONTADORA GROUP TO HONDURAS/
NICARAGUA BORDER AS "INCENTIVE" TO NICARAGUA TO STAY IN TALAS. THIS LATTER SUGGESTION IS TROUBLESOME. END SUMMART.

HHHH 3. I CALLED ON COLOMBIAN VIJE FOREIGN MINISTER JULIO DE LONTONO PAREDES AT COLOMBIAN EMBASSY IN TEGUCIGALPA MORNING OCTOBER SEVEN TO DISCUSS CONTADORA PROCESS FROM LOCAL PERSPECTIVE. I HAD FIRST MET LONDONG IN 1979 IN BOGOTA AT A NEGOTIATION CONCERNING MASTERN PACIFIC TUNA.

1. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THE OFFECTIVES AGREED IN THE CONTADORA DOCUMENT WERE VERY NICE BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THE REAL ISSUE HAD NOT YET BEEN JOINTO. MICARAGUA, WELLE AGREEING THAT SOME OF THE ISSUES WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MULTILATERAL TRUATMENT, STILL PLACES FIRST PRIORITY ON BILATERAL

MENH SCROER AGS EEAENTS VITH COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS. THE CORE FOUR, ON THE OTHER HAND (ESPECIALLY HONDURAS), HAD REEN STRESSING THE CO PREHENSIVE REGIONAL APPROACE. IN CTEAR JORIS, THEY FAVORED SIMULT NEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF PAR AGERED OBJECTIVES. THE ISSUE OF TIMING OF -ETATE EET VI DESSENDIN TON SAL MOITATH MALITY

EMCYCIGALPA 11 150/1

Release () Excise () Deny (V)


THE CALL

MENT OF DEJECTIVES: AND INDEED IT WAS WORDED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE LIABLE TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT DIFFERENT PARTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED AT DIFFERENT TIMES. THIS IMPRESSION WAS STRENGTHENED BY SOME RECENT STATEMENTS (BY THE PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMONG - OTHERS) THAT THEST OBJECTIVES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN ONE COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT. . - .

5. LONDONO REPLIED AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, HE SAID THAT HIHH THE NEXT PROCEDURAL STEPS IN CONTADORA HAD NOT BEEN VORKED OUT. HE DID SAY THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS LEENLY INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS AND THAT LONDONO HIMSELF PLANNED TO CONTINUE TO MOVITOR IT PERSONALLY ON HIS BEHALF. THINKING OUT LOUD, LONDONO SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY VISUALIZED ONE COMPREHENSIVE TREATY GOVERNING PRACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA BUT WITH SEPARATE ANNEXES ADDRESSING THE SEPARATE ISSUES. LONDONO AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH FAVORED BY NICARAGUA AND THE "SIMULTANEOUS" APPROACH FAVORED BY THE CORE FOUR; BUT, IN ANY EVENT, LONDONO HIMSELF FAVORED AND WOULD ADVOCATE NHHH TER LATTER.

- 6. ASSESSING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING MOOD, LONDONO SAID HE FELT THAT THE MOMENTUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SEIZED AND THAT IT BEHOOVED THE CORE FOUR TO MOVE QUICALY TO NEGOTEATE WITH NICARAGUA. HE THOUGHT THE NICARAGUANS WERE UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BUT THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE AFTER THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON THE OSJECTIVES HAD WORN OFF. (I CONCEALED MY SKEPTICISM; BUT STRESSED IMPORTANCE THAT THIS BE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN CENTRAL AMERICANS WITH CONTADORA AND OTHERS ONLY PLAYING HIM FACILITATIVE OR SUPPORTIVE ROLE. LONDONG AGREED WITH THIS.)
 - LONDONO DID RAISE ONE ITEM WEICH COULD GIVE. HONDURANS SERIOUS PROBLEMS. AT ONE POINT HE SAID HE THOUGHT CONTADORA MOMENTUM COULD BE MAINTAINED IF NICARAGUA WERE GIVEN "INCENTIVE" TO STAY IN PROCESS BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ALLOWING CONTADORA GROUP TO INSPECT HONDURAS BORDER. I RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY BT #1050

NNNN HEEH




TEGUCIGALPA 11000/1

HHHH

IND OF "STYP-BY-STIP" APPROACH LONDURAS WOULD REJECT EICAUSE IT WOULD ADDRESS PRIMARY ISSUE OF CONCERN TO NICARAGUA (E.G., CONTRAS) WITHOUT ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CONCERN TO FONDURAS (E.G., CUBAN ADVISORS, BUILD-UP IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS, FMLN REAR AREAS, ETC.). I AS LED IF. CONTADORA GROUP WERE PREPARED TO INSIST ON VISITING CUBAN ADVISORS AND FMLN AREAS IN NICARAGUA AS WELL. HE SAID THEY WERE AND THAT HAD BEEN INTENT OF HIS ARMARIS IN THE FIRST PLACE. (IF REALLY SO, IT WASN'T CLEAR WHY HE AT FIRST CHARACTERIZED IDEA AS AN INCENTIVE" TO NICARAGUA.)

S. COMMENT: LONDONO SEEMED SINCERT IN HIS EXPRESSIONS OF COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMULTANEOUS AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS NOTION OF AN EARLY CONTADORA FACT-FINDING TOUR TO THE HONDURAS/NICARAGUA BORDER WAS TROUBLESOME AND SEEMED A PLOY BENEFICIAL TO NICARAGUAN INTERESTS. NEGROPONTE BT

NKKR



TEGUCIGALPA 11050/2

HER

<u>(</u>

HWHH

HUMB

١,

HHH

· ;.

HHE

HEHE