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Authority	NND 730069
By	AB NARA Date 7/15/85

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 730069

By EAC NARS, Date 6/12/74

29 June 1945

SUBJECT: Timing of Proposed Demand for Japanese Surrender.

1. In his memorandum, Mr. Stimson envisions that the proclamation to Japan inviting surrender would be issued some time prior to OLYMPIC.
2. It would seem that there are 5 possible times to consider for the issuance of this document.
 - a. Immediately.
 - b. Just prior to the peak of the bombardment program.
 - c. In connection with Russia's entry into the war.
 - d. Some weeks prior to OLYMPIC.
 - e. After OLYMPIC.
3. As for issuing the proclamation immediately, the G-2 Japanese Specialists are inclined to think that the bombardment program is already so far along in its current phase that we have probably missed the best opportunity of demanding surrender until by redeployment and commitment of additional bombardment aviation we enter a more drastic phase of this part of our campaign. It is also true that with the end of the Okinawa campaign and the mopping up on Luzon and Mindanao, we are not immediately in position to capitalize on acceptance to such a demand. Our forces must be concentrated, rested, re-equipped and brought up to strength. Further, the redeployment program is not sufficiently far advanced to give us in the Pacific the strength necessary to garrison all strategic positions in Japan. As a matter of fact, it is also true that Japanese propaganda indicates that the loss of Okinawa has brought about at least a temporary strengthening in the political and military power of the Japanese home islands to resist invasion.
4. U. S. Military power in the Pacific will again begin to increase its impact on Japan rapidly as installations and bases are completed and

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 air forces ~~state~~ operating from Okinawa, troops are rested and re-equipped and redeployment gets well underway. It is estimated that toward the end of August we would be in a position to capitalize on Japanese surrender and have the means to move immediately into strategic areas in Japan for occupational purposes. British forces will have completed their Burma campaign and will mount their operation against Port Swettenham - Dickson about the same time. Wedemeyer, becoming stronger in the south through withdrawal of Japanese troops, will be on the up-surge with his Chinese forces ready to start their campaign against Canton - HongKong. He estimates that he will start his advance from the Liuchow - Nanning Area about 1 September and it is certain that quite a big play can be made for this campaign.

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 5. It would seem then that sometime toward the end of August or early September, just before the bombardment program reaches its peak (8 additional VHB groups will be deployed in Okinawa in mid-September) would be a good time to issue this declaration. It takes some time for negotiations to be completed. Witness the affair Wolfe in northern Italy. If the declaration is issued at this time, it may be close to the target date for OLYMPIC before decision is likely. This brings up the question of the effect of this business on the OLYMPIC operation. It is believed unsound to tie in such a declaration with a planned operation in that to do so would prejudice the security of that operation in the event the Japanese refuse the demand. However, if the declaration is issued some weeks prior to OLYMPIC (which will give time for the yeast to work) it would be better than issuing it at such a time that the Japanese will tie in the threat of immediate invasion and use it as a defensive propaganda weapon to build up the people against such an invasion. After OLYMPIC would have some advantages in that the Japanese could anticipate subsequent landings but such anticipation while working in our favor for the acceptance of the demand would not prejudice the target date for CORONET.

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6. It is believed the best time would be immediately after Russia's entry into the war particularly if this event coincided with our build-up in the Pacific both air and ground and the approaching peak of the bombardment operations. Time for negotiations would be available here because of the likelihood that the Japanese will obtain initial successes in operations against the Russian forces in the Far East. G-2 estimates that the Japanese will have the capability of isolating (though not reducing) the Vladivostok area. However, as the Russians begin to roll, say some 30 days after the initial attack, the Japanese might think more carefully of the surrender demand. It would be very desirable if by prior agreement, perhaps arising from the next conference, the proclamation could be tied in with Russian entry into the war. If this date could be about 15 August to 1 September and if surrender were accepted, the Allies would be in the best military position to exploit the situation. It is recommended, therefore, that the demand for issuance of this proclamation be set for planning purposes some time late in August or early in September with the proviso that in the event an agreement as to Soviet entry into the war can be reached with Marshal Stalin then a definite date be fixed to tie in with such entry.