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No. 1233 - 10 August 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT Office of A. C. of S., G-2

By Auth. Date Initials A. C. of S., G-2 10 August 1945 C. W. C.

"MAGIC"-DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY

NOTE: No one, without express permission from the proper authorities, may disseminate the information reported in this Summary or communicate it to any other person.

Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.

The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.

<u>MILITARY</u>

1. English text of Japan's surrender offer: (JBB)

Early today (Greenwich time) the Japanese Foreign

Ministry instructed its representatives in Stockholm

and Berne to transmit Japan's surrender offer to the

four principal belligerent countries, stating that it

was sending an English, as well as a Japanese, text.

The English text, which for some reason was not transmitted

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until several hours later has now been received; it corresponds in every particular to the English version broadcast by Domei this morning. The essential sentence reads as follows:

"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."

2. Surrender message conveyed to Swedish (JBB) Foreign Minister: Japanese Minister Okamoto has reported that he delivered the Japanese surrender offer to the Swedish Foreign Minister for transmission to the Soviet and British Governments at 11:45 a.m. today (Stockholm time). Okamoto stated that he had not yet received the promised English text from Tokyo, but that "since this matter permits not a moment's delay" he had delivered a provisional translation of the Japanese version.

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3. Japanese report of Russian military oppra- (2)
tions in Manchukuo: Yesterday afternoon Japanese Ambassador Yamada in Hsinking sent the following "extremely urgent" message to Tokyo:

- a. "At about 2 p.m. on the 9th, parachute troops were dropped by 12 Soviet planes in the vicinity of Wu-cha-kou /on the railroad close to the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuoan frontier at about 46.50 N, 120.15 E/ and Pal-lang /on the same rail-road at about 47.10 N, 120.10 E/. We greatly distrust the underground units of both Manchukuoan and Mongolian factions."
- b. "Manchukucan police officials discovered that officers of a presumably Chinese? nationalistic group and certain other persons met in Mukden on the night of the 5th and discussed plans for mustering a force composed of 500 coolies, antiaircraft defense units, etc., and then attacking the Japanese forces stationed in that city. Tien, the ring-leader of the plot, and 11 other persons were arrested."
 - c. "Public order is being maintained."

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An earlier message from Yamada is also available describing Russia's opening ground and air operations in Manchukuo; it is in general accord with the first Russian communique on the subject.

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POLITICAL

1. Vinogradov's reaction to Berlin decisions: (200491 WMM)

A 7 August report from French Ambassador Maugras in

Ankara includes the following:

"I was struck during a long conversation with my Soviet colleague /Ambassador Vinogradoy/ by his excited tone . . . The /Berlin/ Conference must be considered in Moscow as a great success for him to draw so much confidence from it.

"For the first time I heard him say that his Government could not allow the satisfactions which it expects from Turkey to be delayed very long. And when I mentioned the risk of an armed reaction on the part of Turkey he replied:
'Not if the Big Three are in agreement.'"

2. French comment on Bevin's appointment: On (200645 JPS)
28 July-two days after the announcement of the British
election results--French Ambassador Massigli in London
reported the following to Paris:

"Yesterday Churchill expressed to me his conviction that nothing would be changed in British foreign policy, and the press today opportunely recalls that several times in the

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last month Mr. Bevin has stated publicly that foreign policy should be placed above party conflicts.

"Mr. Eden, who had just been visited by his successor, praised him highly to me this morning. He assured me that he had found himself in agreement with /Bevin/ in the councils of the Coalition Government and that he had absolutely no doubt about the continuity of British foreign policy.

"As far as we are concerned, I have always found in the new Foreign Secretary a clarity of thought and an expressive frankness which allow those with whom he speaks to form an excellent

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idea of the position he is taking. The fact remains, however, that Mr. Bevin lacks a general knowledge of the files, and, in the course of the past weeks, he has not been preparing himself for his position since—according to information from a very good source—he himself had not foreseen the victory of his party."

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ECONOMIC

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1. France-Soviet economic relations: As previously noted, on 20 July Foreign Minister Bidault advised Ambassador Catroux in Moscow that the negotiation of a France-Soviet commercial agreement might take place in two or three months (DS 26 July 45). In a message of 7 August, Catroux has now reported the following:

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me that the Soviet authorities are ready to start commercial negotiations with us right away. They would, however, reserve for a later date /consideration of the /French/ plans for economic cooperation in Eastern European countries is being studied at the present time, but countries other than France and Russia are also concerned in this study."

^{*}On 4 August Catroux had reported asking Vice Commissar Dekanozov to confirm the information furnished by Ambassador Bogomolov in Paris with respect to "the general approval supposedly given by the Soviet Government to the French plan for economic cooperation in the reconstruction of the sastern countries". Dekanozov had apparently stated that he was "not conversant" with the matter, but had shown some interest.

[&]quot;MIS has no information about the nature of the French

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· MISCELLANEOUS

1. More French reports on Berlin Conference:
On 4 August French Ambassador Massigli in London sent
the following to the French Foreign Ministry:

(200578 200711 JPS CCG)

"I am sending you a summary of the impressions on the Potsdam Conference gathered at the Foreign Office by my associates and myself.

"The discussions were extremely laborious, to say the least, and the solution of most of the Questions will have to be sought by the Council of Foreign Ministers—the establishment of which represents the most notable, if not the only, progress made during the meeting.

"The British delegation, as usual, found Marshal Stalin more accommodating than his staff; this explains why the British are rather reserved in their evaluation of those few results which were obtained. After Yalta it was necessary to lower one's tone; will it not be so after Potsdam?

"President Truman revealed himself to be a /precise/ man, and, unlike his predecessor, unwilling to leave certain questions unsettled. Mr. Byrnes, on the other hand, was rather diffuse.

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"The British Government is pinning its hopes on the Council of Foreign Ministers. No proposal seems to have been put forward regarding the program of the September meeting. In the view of the Foreign Office, however, the Italian question should be the first one broached."

A message of 8 August from Ambassador Catroux in Moscow includes the following:

"I found British Ambassador Kerr extremely reserved concerning the issues which the Berlin communique did not mention. He gave me only his general impression; it was distinctly optimistic (and ordinarily he is not optimistic where the Soviets are concerned).

"According to Ambassador Kerr, the Conference took place in an atmosphere of cordial understanding. The new Foreign Secretary Ærnest Bevin made a great impression on Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov; he knew how to speak to them appropriately.


"'For the first time,' concluded the Ambassador, 'I returned to Moscow with confidence."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

CARTER W. CLARKE

Brigadier General, GSC Deputy Chief, MIS

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SUPPLEMENT TO DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY. 10 AUGUST 1945

At 0710 2 on 10 August (six hours after sending the surrender offer to Berne and Stockholm) Foreign Winister Togo Filed the following circular massage for transmission to the Japanese Mission in Shookholm and presumably elsewhere:

"The Soviet Advandar to Tokyo came to see me on the 10th saying that he soted on instructions from his Government; he rend to me a statement concorning the Soviet Union's endorsement of the Potsdam Declaration and the existence of a state of way with Japan. (This statement was the same as the one made to Ambassador Dato by Molotov, as broadquat over the redic.)

"I send in reply: "It is very strange that the Soviet Union should declare the existence of a state of war without replying to our request for its good offices in restoring pante.

"The Ambausedon replied that the position of the Soviet Union was clearly set forth in the Government's declaration, etc.

"I then informed the Ambanascor of the contents of the Importal Government's note, given in my ciroular 640 Mapanese version of surrender offer, and presented him with a copy of the English text, saying that we had siready erranged to have the note

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transmitted to the Soviet Sovernment through the Swedish Government, but that we desired him also to transmit it to his Government, if he had no objections.

"I said elso: Your Excellency is vell exerof the position of the Japanese Moyal Family: You
know that the position of the Experor in Japan is
indivisible from the Japanese people. Our understanding of the meaning of the Potedam Declaration
on this point is ---- (fee words uncertain). Ascordingly, I believe there will be no difficulty
about the Covernments of the Volted Nations agreeing to this.

"The Ambassador said that he had no authority to receive our proposal, but that he would agree to send it on, on his personal responsibility and on condition that there was no difficulty about transmitting it to his dovernment."

Supplement Ho. S to Diplomatic Summary,

At 1055 Z, on 10 August, Foreign Minister Togo sent the following message to the Japanese Ministers in Switzerland and Sweden:

"With reference to my circular Anstructing the two Ministers to convey Jepan's surrender offer to the Swiss and Swedish Covernments.

the deverment to which you are accredited were made with the Inglish version of the surrender offer. Therefore, I should like you to bendle it as the legal test. He are bandling the Jay-aness version as the translation and are correct. Ing it to conform to the English version.

These takes take whatever steps may be necessary in accordance with this.