Washington D.C. October 16, 2005 - Today, the Colombia
Documentation Project proudly announces the first in a series
of articles to be published in collaboration with Semana,
Colombia's leading news magazine. The column, which will
appear monthly on Semana.com,
is the result of a mutual desire to publish and disseminate in
Colombia declassified information now emerging from United States
files about the major issues in the U.S.-Colombia relationship,
including the drug war, security assistance programs, human rights
and impunity.
The first column, published here in English
and in Spanish
at Semana.com, reveals new information about the hidden history
of collaboration between Colombain security forces and their paramilitary
allies, offering a unique and intimate perspective on the institutional
pressures that encouraged cooperation with paramilitary atrocities.
Each month, the National Security Archive will simultaneously
publish an English-language version of the article along with
scanned images of the documents cited in the
column. Watch this space for upcoming articles or sign
up to receive the National Security Archive's free email update
every time the website is updated with new material.
Paramilitaries
as Proxies
Declassified evidence on the Colombian army's anti-guerrilla
"allies"
by Michael Evans, director, Colombia documentation project
The question of the Colombian military's complicity with paramilitary
atrocities will probably not be addressed by the National Commission
on Reparation and Reconciliation, which convened last week to
sort through the legal and compensatory issues involved in the
deactivation of the country's right-wing militias. The law governing
the demobilization process provides sweeping amnesty for most
paramilitary members and requires little more than good faith
and modest reparations payments from those guilty of more serious
"crimes against humanity." The Justice and Peace Unit
of the Attorney General's office-which operates alongside the
commission-has only 60 days to prepare cases, and even those found
guilty of serious charges can expect to serve relatively light
sentences. The measure also does not compel paramilitary commanders
to provide information about the operations and financing of their
organizations-what President Álvaro Uribe calls "a
balance between justice and peace."
Fortunately, recently declassified U.S. documents, including
the first-hand accounts of senior Colombian army officers, are
beginning to lift the veil of secrecy. Obtained under the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive, these
records provide important new details about military involvement
in paramilitary attacks and offer a unique and intimate perspective
on the institutional pressures that encouraged a wide range of
cooperation with paramilitary forces-from the tacit acquiescence
of senior commanders to the direct participation of field officers
and their troops.
One case sure to be examined by the commission concerns the infamous
series of paramilitary massacres in and around the towns of La
Gabarra and Tibú in the summer of 1999. Paramilitaries
from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) moved into
the lucrative coca growing region in May 1999 to "cleanse"
guerrilla influence from the area, killing some 150 people in
more than a dozen attacks over that next three months. In most
cases, local military forces simply did not react to the paramilitary
incursions.
In the midst of this brutal offensive, the Colombian vice president's
office "privately reported" to the U.S. embassy that
Colombian army soldiers "had donned AUC armbands and participated
directly" in one of the massacres. "The string of mass
killings since May without security force response is appalling,"
U.S. Ambassador Curtis Kamman reported
in a cable to Washington. "How did seven massacres occur
without interference under the noses of several hundred security
force members?"
The ambassador soon had an answer. In November, a U.S. embassy
officer interviewed Colombian army Col. Víctor Hugo Matamoros,
the commander of the 5th Mechanized Brigade in nearby Cúcuta.
Matamoros was subsequently investigated but later released on
charges that he had fomented the groups responsible for the La
Gabarra killings. Matamoros offered a "surprisingly frank"
explanation for why his troops did not intervene in paramilitary
attacks:
"Look, I have 100 kilometers of oil pipeline to protect,
as well as several bridges and the National Police… Plus,
there are guerrillas to fight… If you have so many tasks
to do with so few resources, and you're faced with two illegal
armed groups, one of which (guerrillas) is shooting at you and
the other (paramilitaries) is shooting at them, you obviously
fight the guerrillas first, then worry about paramilitaries."
"The local army unit refuses to combat area paramilitaries,"
the embassy officer wrote
in his trip report. "He is convinced that doing so before
the guerrillas are defeated would not make military sense."
The colonel's acquiescent approach to paramilitarism should not
have surprised anyone at the embassy. Other documents said much
the same. "All indications are that paramilitarism has continued
to grow…and the government has done little to confront them,"
the State Department's Andean desk officer reported
in January 1999. "Security forces did not intervene during
19 separate attacks in which 143 civilians were killed over four
days in January."
In February, a U.S. military
official said that security forces had "not actively
persecuted" the paramilitaries because they saw them as "allies
in the fight against guerrillas, their common enemy." The
CIA's Senior Executive
Intelligence Brief for September 16, 1999 offered a similarly
bleak assessment, finding that local military commanders "do
not challenge paramilitary groups operating in their areas because
they see the insurgents as the common foe."
Under pressure to clean up its human rights record and humbled
by an increasingly effective guerrilla force, the Colombian military
had begun to shift more and more of its dirty work to paramilitary
groups. Thus, even as military violations declined, a State
Department report titled "Colombia: A Violent Backdrop"
found that "the military's frustration with its inability
to defeat the guerrillas has contributed to a jump in paramilitary
violations." The result was "decreased military aggressiveness
in the field, and at least tacit support for paramilitaries, which
liquidate suspected guerrillas and sympathizers without legal
concerns."
The documents describe a firmly entrenched pattern of abuse in
the Colombian military, less a specific policy than an institutional
culture. A "cashiered" colonel from the Colombian army's
notorious 17th Brigade confided
to a U.S. military attaché that there was a "body
count syndrome" among army forces that tended "to fuel
human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying
to get their quota to impress superiors." That mindset had
produced what the official characterized as "a cavalier,
or at least passive, approach" among military officers when
it came to "allowing paramilitaries to serve as proxies for
the Colar [Colombian army] in contributing to the guerrilla body
count."
Cooperation with paramilitary groups was implied, according to
the colonel. Abuses were tacitly condoned by the expectations
of senior military leaders who sheltered themselves behind a wall
of plausible deniability. Former Fourth Brigade commanders Harold
Bedoya and Jorge Enrique Mora "looked the other way,"
he said, and "never allowed themselves to become directly
involved in encouraging or supporting paramilitary activities."
The once (Bedoya) and future (Mora) armed forces commanders simply
"turned their backs to what was happening and felt the Colar
[Colombian army] should in no way be blamed for any resulting
human rights atrocities committed."
The generals just might get their wish. The lenient terms of
surrender and the strict time limit imposed on investigations
of paramilitary crimes ensure that they will uncover little new
information on the critical role that Colombian military officers
have played in fomenting the groups, thwarting what might otherwise
have been an opportunity to use the demobilization process to
gather valuable information on the underpinnings of paramilitarism
in Colombia. Unless an effort is made to explore this history
of collaboration, it is unlikely that Colombians will know either
justice or peace.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1
1997 December 24
Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind
Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report,
Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency declassification release under
FOIA, June 2003
There is a "body count syndrome" in the Colombian army's
counterinsurgency strategy that "tends to fuel human rights
abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their
quota to impress superiors," according to a recently-retired
Colombian army colonel and reported in this Intelligence Information
Report. This approach is in part responsible for commanders "allowing
the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the [Colombian army]
in contributing to the guerrilla body count."
The 17th Brigade in Urabá had been cooperating with paramilitaries
"for a number of years," according to the colonel, but
it "had gotten much worse" under the command of Gen.
Rito Alejo del Río Rojas, who was later indicted but ultimately
acquitted of collusion with paramilitaries by the Prosecutor General's
office in May 2003.
The officer was also critical of several high-level military
commanders, including Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora, who would later
serve as armed forces commander. Mora had a clean public reputation,
according to the officer, but was "probably was one of those
who looked the other way" with respect to collaboration with
paramilitaries. Former armed forces commander Gen. Harold Bedoya
"fell into the same category," in that both officers
"never allowed themselves to become directly involved in
encouraging or supporting paramilitary activities, but they turned
their backs to what was happening and felt the [Colombian army]
should in no way be blamed for any resulting human rights atrocities
committed."
The colonel is also concerned about "the potential direction"
of the Colombian army if another general, Iván Ramírez
Quintero, abuses his new position as army inspector general. The
officer is convinced that Ramírez "has gone far beyond
the passive phase with paramilitaries and is actively supporting
them." Ramírez, the so-called "godfather of Colombian
army intelligence" who later admitted to having a close working
relationship with the CIA, had his U.S. visa revoked in 1998 and
was then named as Colombia's military attaché to Chile.
Document 2
1998 January 06
Colombia: A Violent Backdrop
State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence
Assessment, Confidential, 4 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Panel declassification release
under FOIA, July 11, 2002
Colombia's conflict is at a "strategic stalemate,"
according to this State Department intelligence analysis. Persistently
high levels of violence and human rights violations are likely
to expand "in the face of military ineffectiveness."
WHile the military's record may have improved on paper, in practice
many Colombian military officers "turn a blind eye to paramilitary
activities in their areas of responsibility." Frustration
with the inability to effectively confront the guerrillas "has
contributed to a jump in paramilitary violations,…decreased
military aggressiveness in the field, and at least tacit support
for paramilitaries, which liquidate suspected guerrillas and sympathizers
without legal concerns."
Document
3
1999 January 25
Official Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA/AND Director
Chicola and DRL DAS Gerson
State Department cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Panel declassification release
under FOIA, May 5, 2004
In a brief summary for Ambassador Curtis Kamman, State Department
officials Phil Chicola (Office of Andean Affairs) and Leslie Gerson
(Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) provide their "view
of the military/paramilitary situation in Colombia." While
much of the document has been excised, it is clear that they are
concerned about "the appointment to key positions" of
generals credibly accused of ties with paramilitaries, including
generals Fernando Millán, Rito Alejo del Río, and
Rafael Hernández López. "All indications,"
they conclude, "are that paramilitarism has continued to
grow during the Pastrana administration." They add that the
government has done little to confront paramilitaries, citing
reports that "state security forces did not intervene during
19 separate attacks in which 143 civilians were killed over four
days in January."
Document
4
1999 February 23
FARC Guerrilla Commanders and Paramilitary Group Members Comment
on Their Organizations and Activities
Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report,
Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency declassification release under
FOIA, October 2002
This brief and heavily-censored analysis of Colombian guerrilla
and paramilitary groups-U.S. military intelligence sources finds
that Colombian security forces "have not actively persecuted
paramilitary group members because they see them as allies in
the fight against the guerrillas, their common enemy."
Document
5
1999 July 29
Paramilitaries Massacre as Many as 50 in Norte de Santander
U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, classification excised, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA,
May 15, 2002
In the midst of a series of brutal paramilitary massacres in
and around the towns of La Gabarra and Tibú in the summer
of 1999, the Colombian vice president's office "privately
reported" to the U.S. embassy that Colombian army soldiers
"had donned AUC armbands and participated directly"
in one of the massacres. AUC forces moved into the lucrative coca
growing region in May 1999 to "cleanse" guerrilla influence
in the area, killing some 150 people in more than a dozen attacks
over that next three months. In most cases, local military forces
simply did not react to the paramilitary incursions. "The
string of mass killings since May without security force response
is appalling," U.S. Ambassador Curtis Kamman reports in this
cable to Washington. "How did seven massacres occur without
interference under the noses of several hundred security force
members?"
Document
6
1999 September 16
[Armed Groups Filling Power Vacuum in Rural Areas]
CIA, Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA, August 2004
The CIA's daily Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
finds that local Colombian military commanders "do not challenge
paramilitary groups operating in their areas because they see
the insurgents as the common foe."
Document
7
1999 November 15
Visit to Cucuta, on Colombian-Venezuelan Border
U.S. Embassy Bogotá, cable, Confidential, 10 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA,
January 3, 2005
During a visit to the volatile department of Norte de Santander,
Colonel Víctor Hugo Matamoros, a local army commander,
tells a U.S. Embassy officer that his troops are not pursuing
paramilitary groups:
"Look, I have 100 kilometers of oil pipeline to protect,
as well as several bridges and the National Police… Plus,
there are guerrillas to fight… If you have so many tasks
to do with so few resources, and you're faced with two illegal
armed groups, one of which (guerrillas) is shooting at you and
the other (paramilitaries) is shooting at them, you obviously
fight the guerrillas first, then worry about the paramilitaries."
The visit followed a series of some 15 paramilitary massacres
in and around the Norte de Santander towns of La Gabarra and Tibú
during May-September 1999 that left as many as 145 dead. At the
time, Matamoros was under investigation by the Prosecutor General's
Human Rights Unit for organizing paramilitary groups from 1997-1999
and specifically in connection to the La Gabarra massacres. He
was later absolved of these charges.
"Matamoros was surprisingly frank with [the U.S. Embassy
official] about his intention not to fight paramilitaries,"
according to the document. "He is convinced that doing so
before the guerrillas are defeated would not make military sense."