MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
The Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for September 20, 1978
Policy Review Committee (Space) Meeting

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions from the
September 20, 1978 PRC (Space) Meeting. This Summary
should be held very closely.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
September 20, 1978

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Time and Place: 9:30-11:30 a.m., Room 305, OEBB

Subject: Space - Part 1 (9:30-10:00 a.m.) "Fact of" Reconnaissance Discussion
         Part 2 (10:00-11:30 a.m.) Civil Space Policy

Participants:

State
Lucy Benson, Under Sec for Sec Asst, Science & Tech
Thomas Pickering, Dep Under Sec for Sec Asst, Science & Technology - Designee
David Gompert, Dep Dir, Bur of Politico-Mil Affairs**
Defense
Stanley Resor, Under Sec for Policy
Adm Daniel Murphy, Dep Under Sec for Policy
JCS
LtGen William Y. Smith, Asst to the Chairman
CIA

ACDA
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep Director
James Timbie, Strategic Affairs Division Chief
NASA
Robert A. Frosch
David Williamson, Asst for Spec Projects
Agriculture
Howard Hjort, director of Economics*
Harold L. Stickland, Remote Sensing Coordinator*
Commerce
Richard Frank, Admin, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin*
George Benson, Assoc Admin, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin*

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Policy Review Committee met to review several issues requiring decisions and to endorse or comment on recommendations of the interagency working group.

PART I

The Chairman summarized the historical background associated with "fact of" reconnaissance from space, noting that PD/NSC-37 downgraded classification of space reconnaissance to "Confidential." The issue to be decided was declassification of the "fact of" photoreconnaissance from space vs. continued classification.

State and ACDA both strongly endorsed the need to declassify—arguing that this will be essential to attain public support for SALT II. State feels that imagery should not be declassified. ACDA, however, supported further study of this issue.

CIA, NASA, OSD, JCS, and the NSC all expressed the view that to attain fully useful value in declassifying the "fact of"—the further step of selectively declassifying imagery and information from space reconnaissance was essential. OSD and the JCS felt that further careful study of the imagery declassification issue was still required. On the other hand, OMB and NASA supported the NSC view that it is desirable to declassify the fact of now, that we can develop implementation plans to protect those products and capabilities that need protecting, and that we could complete the necessary efforts in the near future—rather than continue to study—as we have done for at least the last five years. CIA concluded that the Kampiles case could have some impact on this subject; i.e., the courts forcing acknowledgement of the "fact of" if successful prosecution is to be obtained. State and ACDA expressed the view that any political utility associated with acknowledgment would be lost under such circumstances.

The Chairman summarized that the majority supported declassification of the "fact of" now and that as a next step an implementation plan for selective declassification of imagery and attributed information from space reconnaissance would be developed.

He asked that for the "fact of," State develop a political plan for consultation with Congress, Allies and the Soviets—resolving international legal considerations, that ACDA prepare appropriate Q's and A's, and that the DCI develop a security plan working with Defense to protect technology operations and products. These action plans are to be...
provided to the PRC within two weeks. The next step on declassification of imagery will follow within the near future.

**PART 2**

The Chairman outlined the first issue, the need for endorsement of an overarching civil space policy proposal composed of three broad tenents.

There was generally interagency consensus that the broad policies outlined were appropriate and emphasized that they should be stated very positively as the Chairman had.

Regarding the second issue, "Should we establish an operational civil earth resources remote sensing system based on the experience derived from LANDSAT?" there were three options: Option 1—Defeat a decision at this time; Option 2—Guarantee the continuation of LANDSAT-type remote sensing data; and Option 3—Commit now to an eventual operational LANDSAT-type remote sensing satellite system.

OMB, Defense, and JCS recommended Option 1 on the belief that many users are still unwilling to commit to LANDSAT data. State, Commerce, and Interior recommended Option 3 since domestic and international users are presently exploiting LANDSAT effectively. The Domestic Policy Staff supported Option 3 but reserved final recommendation until budget time. The majority of other agencies recommended Option 2 which guarantees data for a fixed period of time. NASA stated that, in fact, LANDSAT is presently an operational system both internationally and domestically. The Chairman concluded that there was seemingly convergence around Option 2 with language variances toward 1 and 3; that in accordance with PD-37 private sector participation in remote sensing and potential availability of declassified reconnaissance imagery must be taken into account in any final decision.

In the communications satellite area the following issues were covered: (1) What role should the Federal government play in actively stimulating communications research and development, and (2) should the government facilitate public service satellite systems for domestic use as well as international assistance programs? On R&D all recommended that NASA could undertake carefully-selected communications technology R&D projects in competition with other items in the budget process.

There was disagreement on public service systems. Three options were considered: Option 1—Continue to rely on
the common carriers and public consortium; Option 2—Designate a lead agency—Commerce (NTIA) to assist in market aggregation; and Option 3—Specify and underwrite the development of a first generation public service satellite system.

OMB recommended Option 1 believing this was not a technological problem but one of needs. NASA agreed but argued that we should examine the needs for social service, recommending Option 2. All other agencies with the exception of Agriculture, AID, and Interior recommended Option 2. AID and Interior supported Option 3.

On technology sharing, strategy to utilize the Shuttle, possibility of declassifying intelligence imagery, space science and planetary exploration goals, there was interagency consensus. With respect to large scale ocean observation proposals, Commerce, NASA, and Defense will be making their proposal in the normal budgetary process and if necessary, the PRC(Space) will address any policy implications.

Based on the decisions reached at the meeting, the Chairman stated that a memorandum to the President and draft Presidential policy statement will be prepared and circulated for interagency comment prior to submission to the President. He emphasized that rapid turn around—two days—may be necessary.