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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-343-63
29 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 February 1963, in which he requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their views on the steps which might be applied in order to persuade or compel Communist China to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement.
2. The acts of persuasion, pressure, or coercion which might be applied in an effort to gain CHICOM acceptance of a nuclear test ban or arms control treaty run a wide gamut within the diplomatic, political, economic, and military spheres. The United States should seek the cooperation of other nations in any of the actions listed in paragraph 5 below. The courses of action involving direct application of force should not be resorted to until all other actions have been exhausted. If direct action is required, the United States should consider the effects not only on the CHICOMs but also on the Sino-Soviet relationship.
3. Although the position of the USSR in specific cases cannot be predetermined with any degree of assurance, the Soviets might be expected to cooperate in the indirect or nonviolent actions listed in paragraph 5 below. They might not participate or intervene where mild economic and military pressures are applied but probably would intervene if the integrity of China or the general cause of Communism were threatened.
4. Although current intelligence estimates indicate that the CHICOMs are not expected to have a significant military nuclear capability until after 1970, they conceivably could detonate a nuclear device by 1963-64. The United States and the USSR have a common interest in insuring that

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China does not attain a nuclear capability. It should be noted that, even if the CHICOMs are forced to agree to a nuclear test ban treaty, there could be no expectation of their continued adherence to such a treaty.

5. The following actions have been considered as steps that might be taken to persuade or coerce Communist China into accepting the terms of a nuclear test ban, or other arms control agreement, but would not assure CHICOM adherence. The details of each are discussed in the Appendix.

a. Indirect actions could include the following:

- (1) Coordinate diplomatic action on as wide a scale as possible to try to convince the CHICOMs that it is in their national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control arrangement.
- (2) Intensify propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.
- (3) Encourage other countries to sever diplomatic relations with the CHICOMs.
- (4) Encourage other countries to place an embargo on all trade with the CHICOMs including denial of the use of foreign bottoms.

b. Direct actions could include the following:

- (1) Conduct overt aerial reconnaissance flights over Communist China.
- (2) Support infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China, and by South Koreans against North Korea.
- (3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.
- (4) Support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China.
- (5) Support South Korean invasion of North Korea.
- (6) Conduct small scale conventional air attacks against CHICOMs nuclear or other facilities.

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(7) Deliver a tactical nuclear weapon on a selected CHICOM target.

Active Soviet support of these proposed actions would of course render them far more effective than unilateral US action or than multilateral action without Soviet overt participation.

6. The measure or measures selected to compel agreement would have to be determined on the basis of the circumstances at the time. Many of the actions above are obviously acts of war, should be initiated only after all other means have been exhausted, and then only after full and careful consideration of the implications of such action at the time. The advisability of the United States carrying out limited maritime control measures, full blockade, or other military actions would have to be considered in the light of its other world-wide commitments at the time.

7. The United States has sufficient naval power to impose an effective blockade against Communist China which would exert serious economic pressure on the CHICOMs. Allied and/or USSR assistance would be desirable but not mandatory. The United States also has the capability of destroying either by conventional or nuclear air attack the identified CHICOM atomic energy facilities.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best means of effectively bringing about Chinese adherence to a nuclear test ban treaty lies in joint US/Soviet measures, since the Soviets are in the better position to exercise the leverage on Communist China. They recognize the difficulties inherent in such a cooperative approach but believe this has the major potential for success.

9. The CHICOMs are capable of responding to any actions taken against them in a variety of ways ranging from propaganda, psychological warfare, and threats up to and including overt military aggression in many geographical locations as indicated in the Appendix. Under most circumstances, the United States has the military forces and capability to counter quickly any military action which may be initiated by the CHICOMs. This assumes timely decisions by the United States and a determination to use requisite force as may be required by the situation.

10. In summary, the foregoing list of actions is illustrative of the various actions which could be taken to bring about CHICOM adherence

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to a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement. In every case joint US/USSR action would make the measures more effective. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that it is unrealistic to use overt military force to obtain CHICOM acceptance of any agreement. As noted previously, there is no guarantee that the actions listed would assure continued CHICOM adherence to any such agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

signed

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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APPENDIX

CHINESE COMMUNIST VULNERABILITY

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APPENDIX

CHINESE COMMUNIST VULNERABILITY

1. Background

a. Negotiations with the USSR have been under way for some months in an attempt to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban, or on some other form of international arms control. Despite an apparent lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union in reaching an agreement, these negotiations are continuing and there is the possibility that ultimately some agreement may be reached. An important factor in Moscow's lack of interest may be preoccupation with the Chinese Communist problem. Moscow may feel that no accord (test ban, Germany/Berlin, risk of war measures, etc.) is in prospect with the West which would not aggravate its relation with the Chinese Communists.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have cited the necessity for bringing the Chinese Communists into any international arms control agreement. It would be desirable to achieve this before the Chinese attain even a limited military nuclear capability. The attainment by the Chinese Communists of even a limited nuclear capability would present serious military and political problems to the United States and the Free World, and perhaps under some conditions the Soviet Union. A nuclear armed China would pose the following threats to the Free World: (1) The direct use of nuclear weapons against US bases or Asian countries; (2) the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt

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nonnuclear military operations and support for insurgency; 1
and (3) political and propaganda exploitation of its nuclear 2
capability to capitalize upon and to create opportunities 3
for achieving Chinese Communist objectives. 4

c. These objectives are contrary to US objectives in 5
the Far East, and directly or indirectly impinge upon 6
US interests in the area. The Chinese basic objectives are: 7
(1) achievement of great power status and recognition of 8
Peiping as the sole voice of China in world affairs; 9
(2) achievement of total hegemony in Asia; and (3) 10
stimulation of the Communist movement and the enhance- 11
ment of Peiping's role therein. China will continue to 12
try to draw the Communist parties of Asia, Africa, and 13
Latin America into its sphere of influence. Despite the 14
threat posed to US interests, China is afflicted with 15
serious vulnerabilities which are subject to exploitation 16
both by the United States and by the Soviet Union. 17

2. Assumptions. In considering the measures that might be 18
taken to persuade or coerce Communist China into accepting a 19
nuclear test ban or other disarmament agreement, it must be 20
assumed that other nuclear capable countries or major powers 21
have accepted the agreement and will respect it. In addition, 22
two alternative assumptions have been established by the 23
Assistant Secretary of Defense as follows: 24

a. The United States takes actions without active Soviet 25
cooperation but also without Soviet intervention on behalf 26
of the Communist Chinese. 27

b. The United States and the Soviet Union cooperate in 28
a joint application of such actions. 29

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3. CHICOM Political Vulnerabilities

a. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. The continuation of the Sino-Soviet dispute constitutes an important vulnerability to the position of Communist China. This is true especially in view of China's dependence on the USSR for certain critical supplies and for protection under the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Any appearance of common interests or possibly common action between the Soviets and the West against Communist China would be felt especially by Peiping. Within the Communist movement elsewhere in Asia, the existence or potential development of Moscow-oriented elements represents a weakness in Communist China's position.

b. Attitudes of Non-Chinese Asiatics Towards the Chinese. Many Orientals tend to dislike the Chinese people and to resent the extent of Communist China's influence in Asia. This is reflected in resentment toward the overseas Chinese and toward Peiping's policies.

c. World Reaction to Communist Chinese Aggression. China's pursuance of policy goals by military aggression (Korea, Tibet, and India) has generated opposition in world opinion. This reaction is a burden on Peiping. Although Chinese aggression causes resentment, it nevertheless also gives rise to fear of China and a tendency to yield to the "wave of the future."

d. The Existence of the Chinese Government on Taiwan. The existence of a rival Chinese regime which claims to be the true government of China weakens Communist China's claim to great power status. The Government of the Republic of

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China also siphons off much of the support which could
otherwise accrue to Peiping, particularly among the
overseas Chinese.

e. Communist China's Aspirations to World Prominence
and UN Membership. The Chinese Communist regime has aspir-
ations not only to be the leading power in Asia, but also
one of the great powers in the world. Its aspirations
are blocked by the US and the USSR. For some time now
they have pressured Moscow to support their admission to
the UN. China appears to be sensitive to its absense
from the mainstream of world affairs.

f. Effect of Internal Conditions on Communist China's
Image Abroad. Exploitation of unfavorable developments
within Communist China will have a corrosive effect on
China's image abroad.

g. Vulnerability of Communist Parties in Non-Communist
Countries. The value of Communist parties abroad as
vehicles for Chinese foreign policies is limited by their
need to support unpopular Chinese courses of action. This
is particularly true in newer countries where nationalism
is a strong force. Factionalism related to the Sino-
Soviet dispute is another source of weakness in some
Communist parties.

h. Nationalism in Asia. Asian nationalist governments,
within the limitation imposed by size, manpower, and material
resources can be important obstacles to Chinese Communist
expansion. Anticomunist countries, such as Malaya and

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Thailand, with Western assistance have been able to maintain their national identities and stem the tide of CHICOM expansion, and at the same time to serve as examples for other governments wishing to resist Communist inroads.

1. Possible UN Action Against Communist China. A UN resolution against the Chinese Communists could serve to exert moral pressure and also could provide a basis for international action against China.

j. Chinese Colonies Abroad. Sections of the Free World in which there are large Chinese populations (e.g., Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) show a marked contrast to conditions in Communist China, and could be used to propagandize communist inefficiency and low living standards. They also could serve as areas of refuge and as bases for anticommunist activity projected into China.

k. Possible Differences Within the Regime. Reported differences between the Liu-shao-chi and Chou-en-lai factions within the regime and the possible decline of Mao-tse-tung offer areas of possible exploitation.

1. Albania. The Soviets and the Chinese both have used Albania as a means of philosophically attacking each other. Albania has lined itself solidly behind the Chinese Communists and against the Soviets. The fact that Communist China has committed its prestige to the support of Albania in order to gain a political foothold in the Communist world of Eastern Europe represents a CHICOM vulnerability vis-a-vis Albania. If, for any reason, the CHICOMs should not be able to continue their support of

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Albania, Chinese prestige and influence in the Sino-Soviet 1
dispute, in the international Communist movement, and in the 2
foreign policy field would be markedly lowered. 3

4. CHICOM Economic Vulnerabilities 4

a. Agriculture. Communist China is experiencing a 5
serious food shortage. Poor crops in successive years 6
have resulted in wide-spread malnutrition and discontent 7
among the populace. Only one-tenth of her chemical 8
fertilizer requirements are produced locally. Communist 9
China has been obliged to allocate scarce foreign 10
exchange to purchase large quantities of grain, sugar, 11
and cooking oils from the Free World, yet, for reasons of 12
prestige, she has exported precious grain to Algeria, 13
Yemen, Ceylon, and Albania. 14

b. Industry. Communist China is heavily dependent on the 15
Soviet Union for basic plants, machinery, and industrial 16
technicians to support her industrial production. Soviet 17
withdrawal of support during the past few years has had 18
serious effect on Communist China's industrial output. 19
Practically all segments of industry, with the possible 20
exception of coal and iron ore, are suffering for want of 21
machinery and raw materials. Most of China's industry is 22
concentrated in the Northeast. 23

c. Foreign Trade. With the decrease in Sino-Soviet 24
trade (\$1.7 billion in 1960 to \$.9 billion in 1961), 25
Communist China has been looking to other sources, notably 26
Japan, to fulfill her requirements for capital goods and 27
markets. Approximately 80 per cent of Communist China's 28
foreign trade is carried in Free World bottoms. 29

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d. Petroleum. China produces only about half (12,900 metric tons per day) of her petroleum requirements. She imports about 8,200 metric tons per day by rail from the Soviet Union and some 1,400 tons per day by sea. Petroleum stockpiles are concentrated in eastern ports. Three transloading points at Chining, Man-chou-li, and Sui-fen-ho on the Trans-Siberian Railroad constitute serious bottlenecks. Although the bulk of Chinese industry is geared to coal rather than oil, the war machine is highly dependent on petroleum.

e. Transportation. Aside from an extensive railroad complex in Manchuria, transportation in Communist China is quite vulnerable. Only one railroad connects Communist China with the Soviet Union, the principal logistics base. North-to-South railroads are relatively few and are vulnerable to sabotage and interdiction. Rolling stock is old and in short supply and is dependent to a large degree on foreign sources for replacement. Motor roads are generally of non-permanent construction and are subject to flooding, washouts, and land slides. The inland waterway system which carries a substantial portion of the commerce is the least vulnerable segment of the transportation system. Air transportation is dependent on foreign sources for replacements and spare parts.

5. CHICOM Military Vulnerabilities. Modernization of the armed forces has been retarded by cutbacks in heavy industry, the sudden departure of Soviet technicians and advisers, and the virtual cessation of Soviet military assistance. Maintenance and supply problems are growing as equipment deteriorates. The military budget has been cut back and military construction has been reduced by one-half

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over the past year. Inadequate POL distribution and 1
shortages of other supplies have reduced flight training 2
for the air forces, underway training for the Navy, 3
and field maneuvers for the Army. The mass use of infantry 4
tactics so widely used by the CHICOMS makes their Army 5
especially vulnerable to weapons with a high-kill ratio and 6
to chemical, biological and radiological warfare. Without 7
outside logistic support, the Chinese armed forces would soon 8
be severely restricted. Although military personnel are 9
better cared for than most, there have been reports of 10
malnutrition even in the armed forces. Serious discontent 11
has been reported among armed forces personnel because of 12
the problems of their families at home. 13

6. CHICOM Psychological - Sociological Vulnerabilities 14

a. The Family. Communism is basically foreign and repugnant 15
to the traditional family unit civilization of China. Funda- 16
mental antipathy to absolute Communism was demonstrated in 17
the resistance to the communes program. 18

b. Peasants. Continued privation and malnutrition, 19
despite relaxation of some controls and institution of 20
various incentive measures, continues to generate bitterness. 21
Resentment, however, is directed more toward local party 22
officials and displaced urban dwellers than toward the regime. 23

c. Urban Populations. Unemployment or the prospect of 24
unemployment and evacuation to rural areas has contributed 25
to basic economic fears and discontent. Thus far, these 26
have been reflected in increased individual and family 27
efforts to overcome their problems rather than efforts to 28

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take collective action. Among professional and intellectual
classes, there is some evidence of restlessness and
declining respect for authority but they remain a captive
group, fearful of further loss of livelihood or more
drastic punishment.

d. Youth. Drastic reductions in both educational and
employment opportunities and the back-to-the-farm move-
ment have led to a growing demoralization of students and
youth.

e. Minorities. Nationalism and strong religious beliefs
among the minority peoples remain a potentially explosive
force, particularly in southern and western China.
Efforts by the regime to achieve rapid acculturation and
socialization have resulted in growing antipathy for the
regime and instances of armed resistance. Followers of the
Dalai Lama in India constitute a significant dissident group.

f. Cadres. Party workers in the lower and middle
echelons who have borne the brunt of widespread popular
resentment have also been made scapegoats for the failures
of the regime by the higher party echelons. This has
resulted in a growing loss of purpose and dedication to
the regime's programs with a concomitant rise in administra-
tive confusion and ineffectiveness and growing corruption
among minor officials.

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a. Although current intelligence estimates indicate that the Chinese Communists are not expected to have a significant military nuclear capability until after 1970, the CHICOMs could conceivably detonate a nuclear device by 1963-64. This assumes that the current schism with the USSR persists. If the Soviets decided to aid the CHICOMs, they could attain a nuclear capability much sooner.

b. Chinese Communist nuclear activities are located as follows:

2 small cyclotrons and 1 small reactor	Institute of Atomic Energy miles Southwest of Peiping	20
1 small research reactor	On railroad 18 miles north on Canton	12
1 Separation Plant	Changsha	13
1 Missile Propulsion Vertical test stand	13 miles West Southwest of Peiping	14
Missile Test Range	Shuangcheng Tzu	15
Probable gaseous diffusion plant	Lanchou	16

No plutonium production reactor has been identified.

c. These activities are vulnerable to sabotage as well as to overt aircraft attack.

8. Courses of Action Available to Induce Chinese Communist Adherence to an Arms Control Agreement

a. There are a number of actions that the United States might take either singly or in conjunction with other countries including the USSR for the purpose of persuading or compelling the Chinese Communists to give assent to a nuclear test ban or other disarmament agreement. These actions may be divided conveniently into indirect

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and direct actions. They vary greatly in their degree of effectiveness and in the amount of provocation they might be expected to produce. However, unless there is a reversal in current CHICOM policy, these actions do not provide assurance that any Chinese agreement would be honored.

b. Indirect actions include the following:

(1) Coordinate diplomatic action on as wide a scale as possible to try to convince the CHICOMs that it is in their national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control arrangement.

(2) Intensify propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.

(3) Encourage other countries to sever diplomatic relations with the CHICOMs.

(4) Encourage other countries to place an embargo on all trade with the CHICOMs including denial of the use of foreign bottoms.

c. Direct actions include the following:

(1) Conduct overt aerial reconnaissance flights over Communist China.

(2) Support infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China and by South Koreans against North Korea.

(3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.

(4) Support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China.

(5) Support South Korean invasion of North Korea.

(6) Conduct small scale conventional air attacks against CHICOM nuclear or other facilities.

(7) Deliver a tactical nuclear weapon on a selected CHICOM target.

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9. Diplomatic Measures to Persuade the CHICOMs that their 1
National Interests Demand Acceptance of the Treaty. The United 2
States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist 3
Republics (the three principal powers involved in negotiating 4
a nuclear test ban agreement) might be required to respond to 5
a line of action designed to convince the Chinese Communists 6
that it is in the Chinese national interest to accept the 7
terms of a nuclear test ban. With or without Soviet cooperation, 8
the United States and the United Kingdom might be faced with 9
proposals to undertake courses of action that might include: 10

a. Introduction of a resolution in the United Nations 11
General Assembly calling on the CHICOMs to accept the terms 12
of the nuclear test ban, and directing a committee composed 13
of representatives of several appropriate countries to 14
approach the Chinese Communists with a view to obtaining 15
their adherence to the treaty. 16

b. Increased trade with Japan and other countries 17
currently reluctant to trade with Communist China. 18

c. Making available US agricultural surpluses to help 19
meet China's food shortages. 20

d. Assisting in providing China with an international 21
airline. 22

e. Reducing China's isolation by encouraging countries 23
to establish diplomatic relations. 24

f. Offering China membership in international 25
organizations. 26

Pros 27

- Would involve no risk. 28
- Would utilize UN action. 29

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- Would align world opinion in support of US/ 1
UK objectives. 2
- Would leave the way open for other nations 3
to accept more aggressive courses of action 4
in the event the Chinese showed themselves 5
unwilling to listen to reason. 6
- Would derogate from possible CHICOM claim 7
that they had no free choice in the matter, 8
and that the "world atomic club" was ganging 9
up on China to destroy it. 10

Cons

- Would provide rewards to CHICOMs but would 12
not change over-all CHICOMs aims. 13
- Would not insure continued adherence. 14
- Would provide CHICOM regime with respect- 15
ability and legality. 16
- Would aid CHICOMs economically. 17
- Would perpetuate CHICOM regime. 18
- Would aid CHICOMs in allocation of their 19
resources particularly in strengthening 20
their military. 21
- Would complicate present US policy toward 22
The Republic of China. 23

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Effect would be much enhanced, especially 25
in view of the CHICOM/USSR dispute. 26

10. Intensify Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Efforts 27

The image of Communist China as an aggressive power refusing 28
to support an agreement which will help preserve the peace 29

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of the world could be exploited fully. This could be effective within uncommitted countries of the world and especially those in the Far East, and would be effective particularly once China had rejected a reasonable approach.

Pros

- Would involve no risk.
- Would put CHICOMs on the defensive.
- Would be received favorably by uncommitted countries.

Cons

- Would not have any immediate effect and would not be an effective deterrent.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would enhance the effect greatly.

11. Encourage Other Countries to Sever Diplomatic Relations With the CHICOMs. Suspension or severance of diplomatic relations on a large scale could heighten China's isolation and complicate its relations with the outside world.

Pros

- Would heighten CHICOM isolation.
- Would involve no risk to the United States.
- Would increase CHICOM difficulties.

Cons

- Would complicate Free World communications with China.
- Would have very little effect.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would strengthen the action greatly.

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12. Encourage Other Countries to Place an Embargo on all Trade with the CHICOMs Including Denial of the Use of Foreign Bottoms. The effectiveness of this action would be directly dependent upon the cooperation of the countries involved. It could be significant if it were fully supported. The CHICOMs depend on Free World bottoms to carry 80 percent of their trade.

Pros

- Would involve no risk to the United States.
- Would have a significant effect if supported fully.

Cons

- Probably would not be supported fully and, therefore, be limited in effectiveness.

Effect of Joint USSR Action

- Would significantly increase effectiveness of the action, particularly if all USSR trade were discontinued.

13. Overt Aerial Reconnaissance Over Communist China. Overt aerial reconnaissance would serve to emphasize the US presence and readiness to take action. Such flights could serve to provoke the CHICOMs and probably result in some counteraction. A by-product of this action could be increased intelligence gathering.

Pros

- Would serve to emphasize the presence and determination of the United States.
- Would increase photographic coverage available for intelligence.

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- Could provoke counter sweeps against US forces or friendly countries.
- Would expose US aircraft to attack and losses could be expected.
- Would have no significant coercive effect.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would provide overt evidence of Soviet disapproval of CHICOM attitude and emphasize that Soviets were making a significant reapproachment to West which would threaten isolation of China.

14. Support of Infiltration, Subversion, and Sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China and by South Koreans Against North Korea. Support of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage against both Communist China and North Korea could exert pressure on the Communists with minimum risk to the United States. These activities are now going on to a limited extent but with US encouragement and support they would be increased and made more effective. Sabotage could be channeled into the areas which would most affect the CHICOM nuclear capability. Interdiction of vulnerable transportation facilities and sabotage of industrial plants could also be very effective if done on a large scale. The Chinese Nationalists are ideally suited by race and language to infiltrate along the China coast and through the countries on China's southern flank or to be airdropped into the heart of Communist China. They might be

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given some support by mainland sympathizers although these
are scattered and probably not organized. The same reasoning
would apply to South Koreans infiltrating North Korea. These
actions could be made quite effective but would require a
considerable time before the impact would be felt.

Pros

- Would involve little risk to the United States.
- Would have an appreciable long range effect.

Cons

- Would take a considerable length of time to become effective
- Would accept risk of CHICOM retaliation.

Effect of US/USSR combined Action

- USSR encouragement of Chinese Nationalists would strengthen action. The USSR would not be expected to support South Korean action against North Korea or Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese Communists.

15. Conduct Increasingly Severe Maritime Control Measures
up to and Including Blockade

a. General

(1) The United States, together with its Allies (and possibly under some circumstances with the help of the USSR), is capable of applying serious economic pressure against Communist China, should that nation refuse

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to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban agreement or 1
other arms control arrangements. There are various 2
measures which can be applied, either singly or in 3
concert, to sharply restrict the flow of surface 4
traffic in and out of Chinese Communist ports. Once 5
(a) a UN resolution has been approved calling on 6
Peiping to accept the test ban agreement or other arms 7
control arrangements; (b) once the United Nations has 8
approved an approach to Peiping designed to persuade the 9
Chinese Communists to accept the treaty; and (c) once the 10
Chinese have definitively rejected this approach, then 11
the way will have been paved for joint diplomatic/ 12
military action to restrict and/or control trans-ocean 13
shipping into Chinese ports. 14

(2) All measures that comprise action at sea against 15
commerce, communication, and military movements can be 16
classed as maritime control measures. These range 17
widely from the one extreme of the classic blockade, 18
which has developed legal standing and specifications but 19
which is historically an act of war, to the other end of 20
the spectrum whereby minor harassing actions are conducted. 21
All maritime control measures are to some degree unfriendly 22
acts. Most of these measures have no acknowledged legal 23
precedent or accepted standing. But many can be justified 24
to a degree legally, as a limited response to a specific 25
situation. The degree of belligerency of action can be 26
adjusted to the needs of the situation, but it should be 27
anticipated that limited actions will probably produce 28
limited effects. 29

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b. Limited Maritime Measures

(1) The first step would be to reach an agreement on an embargo of all trade with China with those nations seeking to gain China's acceptance of the terms of a nuclear test ban agreement or other arms control agreements. The USSR and its Eastern European satellites might agree to cut off trade with Peiping, but might not state their intentions to do so publicly. If agreement were reached by the overwhelming majority of UN members to restrict or to sever trade relations with China, the area of police action required by units of the US fleet in Chinese or nearby waters would be sharply reduced. If Japan and the Philippines were sympathetic and cooperated in the action the naval task would be rendered that much easier, since it is obvious the greater the perimeter the more ships and aircraft would be needed.

(2) Although it is within the capability of the US Navy to carry out the type of action envisaged here, care would have to be taken to insure that such operations would not prevent the Navy's carrying out its commitments elsewhere in the world. In this connection, the use of Naval forces of Allies would not only provide additional resources but additional psychological impact as well.

(3) Along the Chinese coast there is a considerable flow of coastwise junk traffic. This traffic would be most difficult to control since it would require a great many ships and aircraft to operate within easy range of the Chinese mainland, thus exposing them to

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Chinese counteraction. In such circumstances the risk of escalation would be great since the obvious answer to this hazard is to bomb out the enemy's airfields. To move the policing forces beyond the CHICOM air umbrella would weaken the effectiveness of the forces employed.

(4) It is likely that during the period that would be required to make these measures effective some form of direct Chinese retaliation will take place. In the light of the vociferous CHICOM criticism of the Soviet failure to act aggressively in the instance of the Cuban quarantine, it is most reasonable to expect that the imposition of restrictions to maritime movements in support of Chinese Government requirements will evoke retaliation in some form by the Chinese. This retaliation may take the form of submarine and/or aircraft attacks against US ships, and possibly shelling of US ships by coastal artillery.

(5) The Republic of China might take advantage of the presence of US warships in the area to create incidents leading to an invasion attempt on the mainland. However, such action would require full military support from the United States with land, sea, and air forces being committed from CONUS.

(6) It is estimated that this proposed action would have a most serious effect ultimately on the economy of Communist China. It would also have a seriously adverse impact on China's foreign exchange balance. A considerable period of time, however, would be required

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before Peiping would feel the full effects of such
action. Soviet cooperation would be required in the
matter of halting the shipment of POL and other impor-
tant items by rail. Soviet agreement on this point
might not be difficult to obtain since the USSR is
already severely restricting, or in some instances
cutting off completely, trade in strategic goods to
China. However, it is most unlikely that the USSR
would collaborate openly with its naval forces in con-
trolling shipping into Chinese ports. If it were to
do so, depending on the extent of cooperation, the task
of the US naval units in this action would be corre-
spondingly reduced.

Pros

- Would provide, in the long run, means for
considerable pressure against China,
complicating seriously its agricultural,
industrial, and military problems.
- Probably would provide, depending on the degree
of Soviet cooperation or non-interference, a
degree of dissidence or outright sympathy for
Communist China within the Soviet Bloc which
might exacerbate Sino-Soviet differences.

Cons

- Would not have an immediate effect on Chinese
Communist viability.
- Would involve the risk of retaliation and,
possibly, escalation.

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- Probably would produce a counter-productive
reaction among the Chinese people who might
blame the West for worsening their already
serious plight.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- It is highly unlikely that the USSR would
use its own forces to assist in controlling
ship traffic into Chinese ports. It might,
however, cooperate to the extent of taking
action to curtail sea and rail traffic from
the Bloc, and possibly also to the extent of
supplying intelligence on the movements of
ships suspected of being headed for Chinese
ports.

c. Full Blockade of the Coast of China

(1) A sea blockade of Communist China offers another
means of coercive action.

(2) The United States would have sufficient naval power
to impose an effective blockade against Communist China.
However, Allied assistance would be highly desirable.

Pros

- Would retard China's timetable as far as
attainment of status as a world power is
concerned.
- Would have an important but still limited
effect on the Chinese economy, since the
Chinese probably would expand into other
areas in Asia.

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Cons

- Would be an act of war with retaliation
escalation likely. 1 2
- Would be costly in the expenditure of
resources. 3 4
- Would have an unfavorable world impact,
particularly if foodstuff, medicine, and
other essentials were precluded from
entry into China. 5 6 7 8
- Might have an undesirable effect on our
Allies. 9 10

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Soviet cooperation or non-interference
in a blockade of China is most unlikely. 12 13
- In fact, since a blockade is an act of
war, the action may have counterproductive
effect on Soviet/CHICOM relations. If
the USSR did assist, the blockade would
be more effective and fewer US forces
would be involved. 14 15 16 17 18 19

16. Support of a Chinese Nationalist Invasion of Mainland
China. 20 21

a. It has long been a policy of the United States not
to support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland
China. In the face of CHICOM refusal to respect a nuclear
test ban or cooperate in a disarmament agreement to which
the rest of the world was adhering, a reversal of this
policy might be justified. 22 23 24 25 26 27

b. This action could quickly result in either the CHICOMs
accepting the agreement or in the start of a major war. 28 29

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The United States would have to be prepared to support the
CHINAs fully in launching an amphibious assault and
sustaining their operations on the mainland. It would
probably become necessary to resort to the use of nuclear
weapons to insure an outcome on terms favorable to the
United States.

Pros

- Would have great coercive and diversionary effect.
- Would result in elimination of CHICOM regime if followed to a successful conclusion.

Cons

- Would risk starting a major war.
- Would probably make the use of nuclear weapons necessary.
- Would require major US military commitments.
- Would expose United States to world criticism.
- Would risk antagonizing US Allies.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would greatly increase coercive effect but Soviet support is unlikely. CHICOMs would be much more likely to acquiesce and avoid a war which could only result in certain defeat.

17. Support of South Korean Invasion of North Korea

- a. This action would be an immediate challenge to the CHICOMs since they would be faced with a threat to their own territory. The presence of US ground forces in South Korea makes this course of action particularly risky since the United States would be immediately involved. This

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course could be justified as a United Nations action to
enforce a previous UN resolution involving the peace and
security of the world.

b. The CHICOMS would be faced with a quick decision
either to acquiesce or actively fight again in Korea.
The United States would have to be prepared to support
fully the war which might result. The use of nuclear
weapons probably would be required to prevent defeat.

Pros

- Would probably be under UN auspices.
- Would exert great pressures on CHICOMS.
- Would possibly result in the overthrow
of the Communist regime in North Korea.

Cons

- Would involve risk of escalation.
- Would immediately involve US militarily.
- Would possibly require the use of nuclear
weapons.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Joint Action by the United States and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
is most improbable.

18. Small Scale Conventional Air Attacks Against CHICOM

Nuclear or other Facilities

a. US forces are capable of conducting air attacks against
all areas of mainland China. The nuclear facilities in
Communist China are vulnerable to air attacks. It would
be possible to eliminate any CHICOM nuclear capability by
such attacks, provided target locations are known. It
also would be possible to curtail their aircraft or other
armament production by such means.

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b. There would be risk not only of retaliation but
also of escalation if such raids were conducted. The
US aircraft involved would be subject to attack and US
bases in the Far East might also be attacked in
retaliation. The United States would also be subject to
criticism for such action even though it might be
justified as necessary to preserve a nuclear test ban
or other disarmament agreement.

Pros

- Would be convincing proof of US determination.
- Would permit flexible action to reduce the
CHICOM capability exactly as desired.

Cons

- Would invite retaliation and escalation.
- Would be difficult to justify to world
opinion.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would greatly increase the coercive effect
and could well be the difference between
escalation and quick acquiescence by the
CHICOMs.
- USSR cooperation or participation is highly
unlikely.

19. Delivery of a Tactical Nuclear Weapon on a Selected
CHICOM Target

a. US forces can deliver a tactical nuclear weapon to
any designated target in China. Any CHICOM nuclear
facility could be effectively demolished.

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b. This is a most drastic action. It introduces use 1
of nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945. The risk of 2
escalation would be severe. On the other hand, the effect 3
would certainly be dramatic and might well result in quick 4
CHICOM capitulation. World opinion holds a revulsion toward 5
nuclear weapons and the United States would be heavily 6
criticized. 7

Pros 8

- Would reduce CHICOM capability. 9
- Would be dramatic proof of US determination. 10
- Would have immediate positive effect 11
in forcing quick acquiescence. 12

Cons 13

- Would invite retaliation and escalation. 14
- Would expose United States to strong 15
criticism from world opinion. 16

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action 17

- Would exclude nuclear retaliation against 18
the United States or its Allies. However, 19
USSR cooperation is most unlikely. 20

20. Cooperation Between US and USSR 21

a. In all the actions which have been discussed in 22
preceding paragraphs it has been assumed that the USSR 23
would not intervene on the part of Communist China. It 24
is unlikely that the USSR would maintain such a policy 25
of non-interference in the face of the more provocative 26
overt actions. This would certainly have to be considered 27
fully before any such actions were implemented. 28

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b. In every action contemplated, Soviet positive support 1
would make the action more effective toward the ultimate 2
goal of coercing the CHICOMs to respect any agreement reached. 3
Active Soviet support particularly in the overt military 4
actions would place the CHICOMs in the position of having to 5
oppose militarily both the United States and the Union of 6
Soviet Socialist Republics. Even the aggressive CHICOMs 7
would take a second look at this prospect and the chances 8
for a peaceful, quick settlement would be greatly enhanced. 9
The degree of Soviet participation would not have to be more 10
than a token contribution to accomplish this. If the Soviet 11
were unwilling to commit forces to assist actively their 12
outspoken support of the actions and condemnation of the 13
CHICOMs would lend powerful and effective support. On the 14
other hand, Soviet withdrawal of all military and economic 15
support would seriously affect CHICOM capability for any 16
sustained military operations. 17

c. Soviet suspension of all trade with the CHICOMs 18
would be necessary to enforce an effective blockade. If 19
done on a voluntary basis it would be even more effective. 20
Another Soviet action that would provide over-all support 21
would be for the USSR to break diplomatic relations with 22
the CHICOMs. 23

21. Possible Chinese Communist Retaliatory Measures 24

a. Against Indirect Actions. In response to indirect 25
US actions it is most likely that Communist China would 26
respond indirectly limiting its actions to the fields of 27
propaganda and vilification of the United States and other 28
measures. Peiping would accuse the United States of using 29
smaller and weaker nations for her own ends. Certainly 30

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the United States would be branded as a meddler in the
internal affairs of those nations having diplomatic
relations with Peiping as well as those involved in trade
with the Chinese Communists.

b. Against Direct Actions. The Chinese Communists have
a broad field from which to choose action in response
to direct US moves. These actions range from propaganda,
psychological warfare and threats up to and including
overt military aggression taken singly or in a variety
of conjunctions in many geographical locations. The
following are well within Chinese Communist capabilities:

(1) Interfere with fishing fleets of nations such
as Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, South
Vietnam, and the Philippines.

(2) Eliminate Hong Kong as a British holding. This
action could be accomplished by several means, e.g.,
Fifth Column takeover, uncontrollable disorders, or
outright military operations. It is relevant that some
of Hong Kong's municipal water supply comes from inside
Red China and could be cut at will.

(3) Step up insurgency and subversion in Southeast
Asia.

(4) Renew the Offshore Island artillery bombardment.

(5) Military operations including air offensive
against US overflights, blockading forces and invasion
efforts.

(6) Although the Chinese Communist Navy has not
demonstrated combat capability against modern forces,
the PT and submarine fleet would be problems with
which a blockade effort would have to contend.

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(7) Initiate overt military aggression against
Mainland countries allied to the West or supporting
US efforts.

c. The above actions could be applied in a number of
different areas. Among these are the following:

(1) South Korea. The Chinese Communists could, using
the North Koreans, exert pressure on South Korea
by creating border incidents. They could also in-
stiguate another invasion and participate actively
as they did before.

(2) Taiwan. The Offshore Islands are always an
objective for renewed Chinese Communist action. If
provoked far enough they could also mount raids on Taiwan
proper and the Pescadores and force US participation
in defense of the area.

(3) India. Tension on the Sino-Indian border could
be heightened and could result ultimately in a CHICOM
invasion of India. Even if China did not invade India,
sabre rattling, seizure of more strategic high ground,
invasion of Sikkim, Bhutan, and/or Nepal could do
enormous damage to India economically and militarily.
The United States probably would be forced to contribute
vast quantities of material to support India
and even to participate actively with forces.

(4) South Vietnam. The insurgency situation in South
Vietnam could be used by the CHICOMs to their advantage.
The present military actions could be increased and
expanded, which would require major increases in US
support, including commitment of large numbers of
US forces.

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(5) Cambodia and Laos. These "neutral" countries 1
are fertile areas for the CHICOMs to increase infiltra- 2
tion and subversive activities. They could take over 3
these countries by military action without difficulty 4
if they desired. 5

(6) Burma and Thailand. These two countries are 6
also exposed and could be targets for CHICOM aggression 7
from the north. They would be in a difficult position 8
if Laos and Cambodia were taken over by the CHICOMs. 9
The United States would be put in the position of having 10
to prevent a CHICOM take-over of these countries. 11

22. US Capability to Counter Chinese Communist Military 12
Retaliatory Measures. Under most circumstances, the United 13
States has the military forces and the capability to quickly 14
counter any military action which may be initiated by the 15
Chinese Communists. This assumes timely decisions by US 16
authorities and a determination to use requisite force as 17
may be required by the situation. This would probably include 18
use of tactical nuclear weapons. Deployment of augmentation 19
forces to locations in the Pacific on a timely basis could 20
have a deterring effect on CHICOM retaliatory measures. 21