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USSR: Wartime Management and Relocation Practices in the Union Republics (U)

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USSR: WARTIME MANAGEMENT AND RELOCATION PRACTICES IN THE UNION REPUBLICS (U)

DDB-2260-10-83

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PREFACE

~~(C)~~ This report is one of a continuing series of publications designed to fulfill the requirements set forth in the Target Intelligence Production Plan (TIPP) Objective 1, *Soviet Military/Political Leadership and Control.*

~~(C)~~ Related developments in this project have been reported in the following documents:

- DIAPPR, *USSR: Wartime Management Relocation Facilities for Economic Ministries* (U), DIAIAPPR 142-80, 27 August 1980 ~~(TS)~~.
- DIR, USSR: *Military Wartime Command Posts at Dual-Purpose Facilities — Convenience or Concealment* (U), DDB-2260-5-81-SAO, July 1981 ~~(TS[redacted])~~. (b)(3) 10 USC 424
- DIR, *USSR: Ministry of the Coal Industry Civil Defense Program: Emphasis on Command and Control* ~~(C)~~, DDB-2260-7-81-SAO, December 1981 ~~(TS[redacted])~~. (b)(3) 10 USC 424
- DIR, *USSR: The Transition from Peace to War at Military District/Oblast Level — Study of Civil Defense Command Entities* (U), DDB-2260-6-82-SAO, May 1982 ~~(TS[redacted])~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 424

(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) Contributions to this report were made by [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424

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

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SUMMARY

(U) The 15 union republics of the Soviet Union reflect the multinational character of the country and provide the administrative framework through which the central government exerts its authority over peoples of different national and linguistic backgrounds. Since the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, these republics have also been given greater responsibility for management of important areas of the economic infrastructure. These functions are exercised through union republic and republic ministries.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Republic civil defense staffs, composed largely of personnel whose origins reflect the dominant nationality, are responsible for translating the directives of the USSR Civil Defense Staff into programs designed to create a viable wartime management system. These peacetime responsibilities include manpower assignments, resource allocation, technical training and exercises, shelter construction, evacuation and relocation planning, inspections, and public indoctrination. The most critical of these responsibilities is the support of the services and formations of civil defense staffs throughout the republic. In all cases, the assignments of personnel and the allocation of resources are carried out by the appropriate ministry in response to directives by the republic staff. This support must continue in wartime and will be of vital importance in the poststrike period.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Hardened urban command posts and exurban relocation/C^3 facilities have been created to permit republic civil defense staffs and ministries to function in wartime. Republic civil defense staffs utilize single-purpose exurban command posts which are permanently staffed by civil defense communications units; other republic organizations will occupy dual-purpose complexes.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Under the Soviet wartime management system, the military district assumes responsibility for all civil defense operations within its jurisdiction, integrating them with active defense measures as required by the military situation. To accomplish this, military districts normally operate directly through *oblast* civil defense staffs. As a result, the operational role of republic civil defense staffs will vary in wartime. For example, the five republics without *oblasts*[2] will function operationally as *oblasts* in relation to the military districts in which they are located. In case of those republics with subordinate *oblasts,* the responsible military district will exercise command directly to the *oblast* level. The RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR are the only republics with more than one military district within their borders and may have developed civil defense zonal staffs to interact with military district headquarters. All republics will continue to provide technical and administrative assistance to their territorial staffs, services, and formations. Modifications to these arrangements could occur as a consequence of closer cooperation between civil defense staffs and republic military commissariats.

~~(S)~~ The limited operational role of the republic civil defense staff should not be interpreted as minimizing the vital contribution made by the republics and their ministries to the development of the civil defense capability of the republic in peacetime, nor should it detract from the importance the Soviets attach to the continuity of republic Communist Parties and governments. This will be especially critical during the postattack period, when survival of the Soviet state may depend on its ability to control the minority nationalities. Therefore, the Soviet Union will continue to expand and improve the relocation/C^3 facilities required by republic leaders to insure their continuity and stability. Emphasis will be placed on the dual-purpose mode, which will greatly increase the number of sites available for relocation/C^3.

[1] ~~(S)~~ As used in this study, a "single-purpose" relocation/C^3 facility is one which is designed and constructed solely to serve a wartime function. "Dual-purpose" facilities provide recreational, health, or other services in peacetime in addition to their wartime command and control functions.

[2] (U) Armenian, Azerbaydzhan, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian SSRs.

1. INTRODUCTION

(S) There is no indication that the Soviets have slowed the pace of their civil defense efforts. The planning, training of personnel, and establishment and upgrading of relocation/C³ facilities designed to insure the political and economic survival and recovery of the state continue to receive a high priority among Soviet war preparedness measures. Recent intelligence research has contributed significantly to both an understanding of the Soviet wartime management system and identification of installations slated to serve as relocation/C³ sites.

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(S) This report examines the extensive contributions of the Soviet union republics to the development in peacetime of the wartime management system, considers their relationships in wartime to the operational role of the military districts, and analyzes the importance of the continuity and stability of the union republic system to postwar recovery. The appendixes outline what has been learned about each republic's relocation posture. For the purposes of this discussion, those elements at the republic level which would warrant top priority for "leadership protection" are senior Communist Party officials; the secretariats and central committees of republic parties; republic civil defense staffs; and councils of ministers to include both union republic and republic ministries and state committees, their staffs, and support personnel.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

a. Territorial Administration

(U) The USSR's second echelon of government consists of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) which were incorporated in increments from 1920 to 1940. Each republic is a reflection of its ethnic and historic past, and current boundaries generally follow the trace of nationality groupings. Densities of the ethnic groups which lend their names to the republics range from 36 percent in the Kazakh SSR to 89.7 percent in the Armenian SSR.[3] Echelons directly subordinate to republics include 122 *oblasts*, 20 autonomous republics (ASSR), 6 *krays*, and 3 autonomous *oblasts* (AO), all of which are considered administrative equivalents. There is no standard pattern to their structure within a given republic. Five republics (Armenian SSR, Estonian SSR, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, and Moldavian SSR) do not have any *oblast*-level administrative divisions, while all the territory of the following 6 is subdivided: Belorussian SSR (6 *oblasts*), Kazakh SSR (19 *oblasts*), Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (6 *krays*, 16 ASSRs, 49 *oblasts*), Turkmen SSR (5 *oblasts*), Ukrainian SSR (25 *oblasts*), and Uzbek SSR (1 ASSR, 12 *oblasts*). The remaining four republics are unique in that only a portion of their territory is under an *oblast*-level administrative jurisdiction, with the remainder under the direct control of the republic. Configured in this manner are the Azerbaydzhan SSR (one ASSR, one AO), Georgian SSR (two ASSRs, one AO), Kirgiz SSR (three *oblasts*), and Tadzhik SSR (three *oblasts*, one AO).

(U) Despite the provisions of the Soviet constitution, which grants the republics the right to withdraw from the union and conduct their own foreign affairs, exercise of any form of autonomy in external matters has never been permitted. The central government, implementing the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), retains control of all aspects of international trade and finance and diplomatic relations. On the local level, however, the 1977 Constitution of the USSR charges the republics with many important functions. Delegated to them is the coordinating and supervisory responsibility for "enterprises, institutions, and organizations of union subordination." Individual republic constitutions define this task to include management of housing and municipal utilities, public catering, housing construction, "amenities" of the cities and settlements, railroad construction and transport, public education, health care, sports, republic scientific and cultural organizations, and communications.

[3] (U) 1979 census data of the USSR Central Statistical Administration.

b. Economic Organization

(U) Economic and administrative control in the republics is exercised through ministries, committees, and administrations which are responsible to either the republic or to both the republic and the national government. The latter are known as union republic ministries and state committees and are subordinate to both the council of ministers of the republic and the corresponding ministry/state committee at the national level. All decisions made at the republic level are subject to the approval of the national counterpart. The majority of union republic ministries/state committees represent enterprises in the fields of light industry, food production/processing, public services, utilities, and building construction.[4] The second type of ministry/committee/administration is subordinate only to the republic council of ministers. The number and type of these republic organizations varies from republic to republic, but they are concerned primarily with functions such as social security, consumer services, forestry, and local industry.[5]

c. Civil Defense Responsibilities in Peacetime

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The Soviet civil defense network is the medium through which the wartime management system is implemented. Since 1971, the USSR Civil Defense Staff has been directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. Its internal structure and function resemble that of the main directorates of the ministry. This staff supervises the civil defense program and sets the standards which all subordinate civil defense staffs must meet.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Civil defense is organized along functional and territorial lines (figure 1). The Chief of Civil Defense for each republic is the chairman of the council of ministers. Execution of the program is the responsibility of the civil defense staffs which are organized at republic, *oblast*, city, urban *rayon*, and rural *rayon* levels and manned by a mixture of active duty and reserve military personnel and civilians. The territorial staffs are the main operating bodies for civil defense within their jurisdiction and interface with the local government to insure cooperation and coordination in civil defense matters. Functional civil defense staffs are found in each of the union republic and republic ministries and state committees. They correlate civil defense plans with the periodic plans of the ministries and monitor the status of the civil defense plans of subordinate enterprises. At all levels, civil defense plans are coordinated with mobilization plans through Second Directorates and Departments.



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Figure 1. (U) Organization of Civil Defense Within a Republic

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ At the base of both the territorial and functional chains of command are the civil defense formations of individual factories, schools, public services, and economic enterprises under the control of the director of the installation in his capacity as chief of civil defense. The day-to-day management of the civil defense program is handled by the chief of the civil defense staff. The civil defense formations are designed primarily to conduct postwar recovery operations and are assigned to one of the civil defense services created by their organizations (see paragraph on Resource Management and Allocation).

[4] (U) NFAC, CR 81-10155, *USSR Council of Ministers* (U), April 1981, identifies ministries and state committees by type.

[5] (U) NFAC, CR 82-15920, *Directory of Soviet Officials: Republic Organizations* (U), December 1982

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~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Chief of the Civil Defense Staff of a republic is usually a general officer. Many of the other positions on the staff are also held by senior military officers. Another characteristic of the composition of the republic civil defense staff is its ethnic makeup. Consistent with the official Soviet policy of assigning local nationals to leadership positions with high visibility, the civil defense staffs of the 14 non-Russian republics have a high percentage of locals, including those in the position of Chief of the Civil Defense Staff in each republic.

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~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ *Resource Management and Allocation. Recovery* plans will be implemented by civil defense services organized within each republic by the civil defense staffs of *oblasts*, cities, urban and rural *rayons*, economic installations, government agencies, educational institutions, and scientific research institutes. Each of the services created by these organizations will in turn control formations made up of specialists in its functional area. The composition of each service will be tailored to meet local conditions or special requirements, but the following basic services can be expected to be formed:

- Communications.
- Public order.
- Fire fighting.
- Medical.
- Engineering.
- Communal-technical.
- Animal and plant life protection.
- Transport.

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- Power.
- Provisions and supplies.
- Technical.
- Material-technical supply.[6]

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The resources required to man and equip the civil defense services must be drawn from the factories, plants, institutes, and public services in the local area, which are subordinate to a ministry or state committee. Union republic and republic ministries must approve all personnel assignments and diversions of their resources to the civil defense services which they are required to support (see table 1). As a result, conflicts of interest and jurisdictional disputes can occur. Consider the following examples.

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In the Ukrainian SSR, economic and administrative affairs are controlled by 35 ministries, 14 state committees, 4 committees without ministerial status, and 6 administrations. The creation of some civil defense services will be a relatively easy matter wherever the functions of the given ministry are divided along the same territorial lines found within the republic. This is true in the case of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health, a union republic ministry, which has

Table 1

Ministerial Support of Civil Defense Services (U)

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Probable Supporting Ministry/State Committee*	Communications	Maintaining Public Order	Fire Fighting	Medical	Engineering	Communal-Technical	Animal/Plant Life Protection	Transport	Power	Provisions and Supplies	Technical	Material-Technical Supply
Agriculture							X			X		
Communications	X											
Construction**					X							X
Consumer Services						X						
Fish Industry							X			X		
Food Industry							X			X		
Forestry							X					
Health				X			X			X		X
Highway Construction and Maintenance					X			X		X		X
Internal Affairs (MVD)		X	X									
Meat/Dairy Industry							X			X		
Municipal Services		X	X		X	X		X			X	
Motor Transport								X			X	
Power/Electrification									X	X		
Procurement										X		
River Fleet Administration								X				
Trade										X		X
State Construction Affairs					X							X
State Material and Technical Supply					X							X
State Planning					X	X		X	X	X	X	X
State Security (KGB)		X										
State Supply and Sale of Petroleum Products						X			X		X	X
State Television and Radio Broadcasting	X	X										

* (U) This list represents only selected ministerial organizations. The numbers and types of ministries/state committees vary from republic to republic.

** (U) The engineering service will be formed from a number of construction ministries to include Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Construction Materials, Industrial Construction, Rural Construction, and Highway Construction and Maintenance

[6] (U) A description of each service can be found in P.T. Yegorov, I.A. Shlyakhov, and N.I. Alabin, *Civil Defense*, trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 12-5.

set up 25 *Oblast* Departments of Health, 1 in each of the 25 *oblasts* of the republic, from which the medical civil defense services would be formed. Another favorable factor in this case is the involvement of primarily only one ministry in Kiev. The situation is much more complex when more than one ministry is involved in forming a civil defense service and where territorial jurisdictions are not as well defined.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Jurisdictional disputes would arise in the case of the engineering services of the Ukrainian SSR's *oblasts*, where assets may be drawn from as many as six different ministries (i.e., the Ministries of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, the Construction Materials Industry, Industrial Construction, Installation and Special Construction Work, Rural Construction, and Highway Construction and Maintenance) and administrative matters could involve three state committees (i.e., the State Committees for Construction Affairs, Material and Technical Supply, and the State Planning Committee). Many of the construction and repair trusts subordinate to these ministries perform work in more than one *oblast*. Allocation of resources to civil defense services would therefore require arbitration by higher authorities, i.e., ministerial and republic civil defense staffs.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Another example of the need for coordinated efforts in poststrike recovery operations was reported in the Latvian SSR. Each spring, the Latvian Trust for Energy Construction, subordinate to the Power and Heating System of the Latvian SSR *(Latvenergo)*, held a civil defense command post exercise. The trust was never told, however, how many men and what equipment would be available to it to effect poststrike repairs. The trust assumed that 20 to 30 percent of its personnel would be used for security and 70 percent would be allocated to the military. Another problem which surfaced during these exercises was the question of jurisdiction over damaged power plants and sections of the power grid which belonged to ministerial organizations other than *Latvenergo*. This recurring problem reportedly was never solved between 1965 and 1980. Finding solutions now to potential problems during hostilities is probably the most important task of the republic civil defense staff.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Another peacetime management function of the republic civil defense staff is categorization, which is the process of prioritizing population centers and industrial areas for civil defense funding appropriations. The 1961 Soviet resolution on civil defense tasked the councils of ministers of the union republics, in cooperation with the USSR Civil Defense Staff and the national ministries, with categorizing economic installations. The categorization of populated areas was the responsibility of the USSR Council of Ministers, based upon the recommendations of their republic counterparts. The latter were also charged with budgetary responsibilities for their civil defense programs.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ *Technical Training and Exercises.* Three types of civil defense training are provided. The first and most widespread is the general knowledge, basic civil defense training given to the public. In accordance with the standards established by the USSR Civil Defense Staff, the chief of the civil defense staff of each school, factory, plant, institute, etc., is responsible for training all his personnel in minimum skills such as nuclear weapons effects, collective and individual means of defense, warning signals, and first aid. The union republic Ministries of Education and Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, in cooperation with the republic civil defense staff, provide guidance and assistance to the schools in setting up their programs. Other ministries work in a similar manner in developing training programs in their subordinate installations. The second type of training is given to personnel who make up the civil defense formations of each installation. These formations, which are organized in peacetime, receive specialized training in the areas of chemical and radiological reconnaissance, communications, decontamination, and various service support functions. The republic civil defense staff is responsible for insuring that both the general and specialized training is conducted and its content is in accordance with national directives. The third type of training is conducted by the republic staff for supervisory personnel responsible for civil defense measures at their places of employment.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Civil defense exercises are conducted at all levels of administration within a republic and at each individual installation. The republic civil defense staff conducts a republic-wide exercise periodically (intervals vary from republic to republic) and sponsors republic-wide competitions between civil defense teams. Another form of exercise is the organized response to fires, major accidents, and natural disasters, which provide the most realistic training scenarios for operating under postnuclear strike conditions.

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~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ *Inspections.* As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the ultimate responsibility for a workable wartime management system within a given republic rests with the republic staff, which conducts a comprehensive program of inspections to maintain the requisite level of proficiency and insure compliance with national standards. The inspection program covers shelter construction, civil defense classes and exercises, relocation and evacuation planning, and civil defense competitions.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ *Public Indoctrination.* The public relations task of the republic civil defense staff goes beyond routine classes on general civil defense knowledge. In preparing their country for the "repulsion of aggression,"[8] the Soviets include the morale and psychological readiness of the general population. Despite this doctrinal emphasis, intelligence reporting continues to indicate that the civil defense program is met with widespread apathy. The average Soviet citizen, particularly one who is not directly involved in the program, considers the threat of nuclear war remote, and installation directors are often reluctant to allow key employees to attend classes. The quality of the instruction itself is generally low, evacuation exercises are often poorly supported and not taken seriously, and training records are sometimes falsified.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ There are several ways in which the republic civil defense staff can counteract perfunctoriness in the civil defense program. One of the best forms of motivation is a thorough inspection program with harsh penalties (e.g., relieving a factory manager) for noncompliance. In conjunction with its exercise program, the republic sponsors "socialist competitions" between civil defense teams. The Soviet policy of assigning local nationals to leadership and managerial positions also works to the advantage of the civil defense effort. It is much easier for a member of a civil defense staff to elicit support and cooperation from a local government official or plant manager when both are of the same nationality and speak the same language.

3. WARTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

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b. The Republic's Role

~~(C)~~ Five factors must be examined when analyzing the role of the republic in the Soviet wartime management system:

[7] (U) All union ministries are represented only at the national level and are primarily responsible for heavy and defense related industry.
[8] (U) Sokolovskiy, V.D., *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed., ed. Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 306-35.
[9] (U) *Oblast* is used here to represent the administrative-territorial echelons immediately subordinate to a republic.
[10] (U) See *USSR: The Transition from Peace to War at Military District/Oblast Level – Study of Civil Defense Command Entities* (U), DDB-2260-6-82-SAO, May 1982 (TSCW).

• Geographic distribution of the republics among the 16 military districts.

• Internal organization of the republics.

• Role of the republic civil defense staffs.

• Role of the union republic and republic ministerial civil defense staffs.

• The special case of the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR.

(U) *Geographic Distribution Among Military Districts.* The present 16 military districts are not territorially organized to correspond with the boundaries of the republic (see figure 4). Only in the Belorussian SSR do the boundaries of the Belorussian MD and the republic coincide. Geographically related republics provide the basis for four military district groupings. The Baltic MD is formed by the three Baltic republics. The Transcaucasus MD encompasses the Armenian, Azerbaydzhan, and Georgian SSRs and is located along the Turkish and Iranian borders. The Turkestan MD includes the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs and borders Iran and Afghanistan. The Central Asian MD is comprised of the Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Tadzhik SSRs and is adjacent to the Afghan and Chinese borders. The territory of the remaining republics contains multiple military districts. Three military districts divide the Ukrainian SSR and eight military districts are found within the borders of the RSFSR. The Odessa MD is unique in that it includes not only part of the Ukraine, but also all of the Moldavian SSR.

(U) The geographic distribution of the republics is in sharp contrast to the boundary matchup between *oblasts* and military districts which, as stated previously, always coincides. A good example is the Ukrainian SSR. The Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa MDs divide the republic into three parts, yet in each case *oblast* boundary integrity has been maintained. The Carpathian and Kiev MDs each encompass 10 *oblasts* while the Odessa MD contains 5 (plus the Moldavian SSR).

(U) *Internal Organization.* The internal administrative-territorial organization of the republics does not follow a standard pattern (see paragraph 2a.).

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Figure 4. (U) Union Republic and Military District Boundaries

The Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldavian SSRs do not have any *oblast*-level subdivisions. Another four republics are subdivided at the *oblast* level, but not all of their territory is similarly subordinated. In the Georgian SSR, for example, small portions of the republic fall under the administration of two ASSRs and one AO, but the majority of the land is under the direct control of the republic government. In addition to the capital city of Tbilisi, 8 other large cities are under direct republic administration and another 33 are controlled through the *rayons* directly subordinate to the republic. The Azerbaydzhan, Kirgiz, and Tadzhik SSRs are organized in a similar manner. The remaining republics are entirely subdivided at the *oblast* level.

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~~(C)~~ *Ministerial Civil Defense Staffs.* The civil defense staffs of each individual installation within the Soviet Union are responsible to the appropriate ministerial staff at either the national (all union) or republic (union republic and republic) level. The councils of ministers of the 15 republics consist of 798 ministries, state committees, and administrations, an average of 53 per republic. Approximately half of these can be expected to manage personnel and materiel resource allocation for civil defense services (table 1). Ministerial management would be especially important in some of the more vital civil defense services as the course of the war dictates shifting priorities from one location to another or reinforcing areas where the degree of destruction exceeds the capabilities of the local civil defense assets.

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Perhaps the most critical civil defense service is engineering, whose tasks include the construction of emergency blast and fallout shelters and clearing access routes through zones of destruction. The engineering service will be drawn primarily from the enterprises of a republic's construction ministries. In Odessa, Ukrainian SSR, for example, the major responsibility for the civil defense operations of the engineering service belongs to the Combine *Odespromstroy* [11] and its subordinate trusts and construction administrations. Through the mid-1970s, the chief of the Odessa Civil Defense Engineering Service was the director of *Odespromstroy*. Its construction administrations were responsible for prestrike emergency shelter construction and had plans for the conduct of poststrike recovery operations. They were augmented, however, by construction organizations from other ministries. For example, another trust which was heavily involved in the work of the Engineering Service was *Chernomorsantekhmontazh,* [12] subordinate to the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work. Its heating and air conditioning specialists were responsible for the installation of ventilation and air filtration systems in most of the civil defense shelters and command posts in the Odessa *Oblast*. Many of these individual enterprises and trusts are not organized by *oblast;* instead they function on a republic-wide basis. Any jurisdictional disputes arising from this situation would be arbitrated initially by the ministerial civil defense staff. If disputes arose between ministries competing for the same assets, the republic civil defense staff, in the person of the appropriate civil defense service chief, would arbitrate. The republic civil defense staff would also provide technical and administrative assistance as required. Some of the key ministers may be collocated with the civil defense staff and may also serve as chiefs of one of the civil defense services. For example, the Minister of Communications would serve as the Chief of the Communications Service of the republic civil defense staff, the Minister of Health would become the Chief of the Medical Service, and the Minister of Agriculture would take charge of the Animal and Plant Life Protection Service.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

c. Types of Leadership Protection and Relocation/C³ Facilities.

~~(S)~~ The exact dimensions of the wartime role of each Soviet republic will depend, as indicated above, on many factors. It is clear, however, from

[11] (U) Odessa Industrial Construction.
[12] (U) Black Sea Industrial-Sanitary Installation.

the extensive leadership protection and relocation facilities which have been reported at the republic level, that they have been given the capability to operate in a nuclear environment and to survive as territorial and ethnic entities in the postwar period. Republican relocation/C^3 facilities can be categorized by their location in relation to built-up areas, the nature and function of their physical features, and the identification and mission of the using organization. These characteristics will now be examined.

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

duction Equipment for Agriculture. This committee reportedly consisted of 34 elements and was considered an important repair and supply unit for the military during war. The ministry's alternate headquarters was to accommodate 400 people from the Project and Design Technology Bureau, 200 from the Computer Information Center, and an unidentified number from the republic supply base and various headquarters elements. There were also 26 Regional Directorates throughout the Latvian SSR, subordinate to the state committee, which would be expected to have relocation requirements. Obviously, even a relatively small ministry would require multiple relocation sites to effectively manage at the local level. The cost effectiveness of dual-purpose facilities makes them invaluable in this role. For ex-

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The requirements in table 2 refer only to the ministerial headquarters staffs and do not take into account the relocation needs of their subordinate directorates and enterprises. It is evident that ministerial agencies will require multiple relocation facilities for the use of the ministry staff and its subordinate organizations. Consider, for example, the relocation needs of the Latvian SSR State Committee for the Supply of Pro-

c. The Role of the Military Commissariat.[18]

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Another factor which has a direct impact on the republic's wartime role is the degree of involvement of the military commissariats *(voyenkomaty)* in civil defense and economic mobilization. The primary mission of the *voyenkomaty* in peacetime is conscription and reservist training; their wartime mission is to mobilize manpower and materiel. Similar to civil defense staffs, the *voyenkomaty* are organized territorially and function both as territorial organs of the USSR Ministry of Defense and as departments of the councils of ministers of union republics and ASSRs and the executive committees of *oblast, rayon,* and city councils. The *voyenkomaty* also resemble the civil defense system in that they are operationally responsible to the military districts in which they are located. Again, as in the case of the civil defense structure, the *oblast voyenkomat* is the major operational interface with the military district, except for those republics which have no *oblasts.*

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In the past several years, much has been done to expand cooperation between civil defense staffs and *voyenkomaty* and achieve closer integration of their wartime operations. These actions are intended to insure that the operations of both civil defense staffs and *voyenkomaty* are synchronized as readiness levels are increased. There are, in fact, some indications that the *voyenkomaty* will take the lead in many aspects of this relationship. For example, the *voyenkomat* in Bendary, Moldavian SSR, reportedly had direct control in civil defense matters over those enterprises which were to remain in production in wartime. Another report revealed that an experiment was held in 1978 which involved the "dismantling" of the republic civil defense headquarters of the Baltic republics, in particular that of the Lithuanian SSR, and assigning their functions to each republic's *voyenkomat* and its subordinate offices. The experiment was apparently successful and there were rumors of applying it to the other republics, but whether this actually happened is not known.

4. IMPLICATIONS

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Critical to the successful functioning of the Soviet wartime management system is the need for a structure that is organized and exercised in peacetime and can rapidly effect a smooth transition to wartime operations. To insure the efficient operation of the wartime management system, personnel must be trained, plans prepared, logistic and technical problems solved, and an indoctrination/propaganda campaign conducted. In this regard, the republic civil defense staff performs an essential function since it is chiefly responsible for preparing civil defense elements for their wartime missions. The predominant local nationality makeup of the staff facilitates coordination and cooperation with local leadership elements, who are also appointed from the indigenous population.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Once the transition to a wartime mode has occurred, however, the significance of the republic civil defense staff as an echelon in the chain of command is dependent upon the internal territorial structure of the republic and its geographic relationship with the relevant military district. In the Estonian SSR, for example,

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(S/NOFORN) A detailed discussion of the Soviet nationality question is beyond the scope of this report, but the extensive civil defense structure created in each republic implies firm Soviet determination to insure the continuity of their multinational federal system. Soviet leaders are aware, however, of current ethnic animosities, demographic trends, and nationalist aspirations which could destabilize critical border areas. They also realize

[18] (U) *Soviet Military Commissariats: Organizations and Capabilities* (U), DDB-2680-127-82-SAO, February 1982 (TSCW).

that nuclear conflict could exaccerbate these ten-

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

5. CONCLUSIONS

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Republic party and government agencies can be expected to continue to prepare and refine plans for wartime relocation to include the construction and upgrading of exurban facilities. More than one alternate command post per agency may be established. Rest, recreation, and health facilities will be used in the dual-purpose role, providing a large number of potential relocation sites. According to the latest Soviet statistics, 15,741 sanatoriums and rest facilities were operational in 1980, and 50,000 pioneer camps were open in the summer of 1981.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The following republic civil defense staffs will be directly responsible in operational matters to their respective military districts within the wartime management system: the Armenian, Azerbaydzhan, Estonian, Georgian, Kirgiz, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, and Tadzhik SSRs. The civil defense staffs of the Belorussian, Kazakh, Turkmen, Ukrainian, and Uzbek SSRs, and the RSFSR will provide technical and administrative assistance to their respective military district headquarters and to *oblast* and ministerial civil defense staffs. In the case of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, coordination with multiple military districts may be accomplished through the use of civil defense zones.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The civil defense services formed from a republic's ministerial assets are essential to the conduct of postwar recovery operations throughout the governmental and economic infrastructure of the republic. Unless ministerial civil defense staffs are able to continue their support to vital local services, the latter would encounter problems which could not be resolved solely by the wartime military district. For this reason, republic-level government and economic organizations have made preparations, through the creation of extensive relocation/C^3 facilities, to insure their continuity under nuclear attack and the survivability of the republic structure as a key element of the Soviet state.

Appendix B

Azerbaydzhan SSR (U)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The relocation/C^3 site for the civil defense staff of the Azerbaydzhan SSR has not been located. Open source literature has identified several rest, recreation, and health facilities belonging to ministerial agencies of the republic, but none of these potential dual-purpose sites have been confirmed on imagery.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Both the Estonian SSR Civil Defense Staff and an unspecified number of government officials from Tallin would relocate to the military-manned bunker in the event of an emergency. This command post was manned on a constant alert status by personnel of the *ZAS* section. The adjacent bunker contained a civilian manned civil defense communications center, which was believed to be configured similar to the military communications center. The mission of the civilian center paralleled that of its military counterpart and reportedly housed an alternate central telephone exchange. It was also to be used as an alternate command post by government officials from Tallin.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The relocation/C^3 facility for the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs *(MVD)* has been identified near the village of ARDU (59-06N 025-22E), approximately 50 kilometers southeast of Tallin. This site (BE 0153-06375) is unique because, unlike other ministerial relocation sites at the national level, all of which have been located at dual-purpose sites, this facility appears to be single-purpose (figure 14). The presence of the reservoir, however, may indicate some type of recreational purpose. A hardened, one-story basement was constructed beneath the large building. This site is reportedly connected to Tallin by an underground cable.



Figure 14. ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Relocation Site, Ardu.

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