



UNAMIR - KINUAR

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TO: ANNAN/JONAH; UNATIONS
NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH; UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 2 FEBRUARY 1993

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SECURITY SITUATION AND REQUEST FOR
COMMENCEMENT OF DETERRENT OPERATIONS AIMED AT THE
RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS

MIR-256

1. The purpose of this memo is to provide you with an update on the security situation and to seek your approval to commence deterrent operations, in co-ordination with the RGF, RPF and the Gendarmerie, aimed at the recovery of illegal weapons throughout the country, and in particular, the Kigali weapons secure area (KWSA).
2. The present security situation is deteriorating on a daily basis, as the political impasse in the establishment of the BBTG continues. Tension is mounting and many groups seem to be directing their activities to violent attacks on ethnic and political opponents. Since my last report, we have seen increasingly violent demonstrations, nightly grenade attacks, assassination attempts, political and ethnic killings, and we are receiving more and more reliable and confirmed information that the armed militias of the parties are stockpiling and may possibly be preparing to distribute arms to their supporters. If this distribution takes place, it will worsen the security situation even further and create a significant danger to the safety and security of UN military and civilian personnel and the population at large.
3. You would recall, that following your instructions, I had met with the President of the Republic and informed him of the illegal distribution of arms. He denied knowledge of any illegal arms being distributed and stock piling and promised to investigate the matter. As of date, he has not reported to us his findings nor any action he may have taken in this regard. We also met with leaders of political parties who denied the possession or distribution of any illegal arms to their supporters. These party leaders urged UNAMIR to proceed with the recovery of illegal arms throughout the country, so as to ensure a peaceful and secure environment.
4. The deterioration of the present security situation, has been compounded by a noticeable deterioration of the psychological attitude of the RPF security forces in Kigali. This is no doubt due to the claustrophobic condition of being confined to an "island fortress". They are clearly displaying a siege or "in prison" mentality. They have on several recent occasions, especially on the 26 and 27 January 1994, overreacted to situations (i.e. firing an unjustified warning shot from the CND, breaking out or forcing their way out of the complex unescorted through the main gate, firing their weapons in the air while forcing their way through a road block etc.), have displayed considerable but uncalled for frustration (threatening UNMOs due to a delayed escort, etc.), have openly and knowingly violated the rules of the KWSA (i.e. entering Kigali Sector Headquarters with weapons during a joint meeting on 27 January 1994) and by their comments to the use of arms (i.e. General Kagame to General Dallaire on 21 January 1994 that if the present political impasse is not settled soon "they will have to sort things out once and for all").

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5. For their part the RGF have demonstrated signs of preparing for a conflict. They attempted to resupply mortar ammunition by chartered aircraft on 21 January 1994 and have not been able to produce the supporting documentation that this was a pre-peace agreement order, leading us to believe they are stockpiling ammunition. The Chief of Staff of the Army was formally told by the FC that any other aircraft landing in Rwanda with war material on board will not be permitted to off-load and will be ordered to leave the country immediately. There has been noticeable movement of troops as reported by our UNMOs from the Southern Sector to the area north of the KWSA, which indicated reinforcement of blocking positions north of Kigali. They have also requested, but have been refused permission to reinforce Kigali with elite commando troops from the Ruhengeri Sector under the excuse that they have resupply problems in the north and thus want to concentrate troops closer to the supply depots of Kigali. All of these indicators point to RGF preparations or posturing that could be analyzed as possible preparations for resumption of hostilities.

6. Should the present Kigali defensive concentration posture of UNAMIR be maintained, the security situation will deteriorate even further. We can expect more frequent and more violent demonstrations, more grenade and armed attacks on ethnic and political groups, more assassinations and quite possibly outright attacks on UNAMIR installations and personnel, as was done on the home of the SRSG. This may result in UN casualties and will certainly even further force us on the defensive as we will be compelled to spread our precious few resources on defending UN property and personnel. When this situation develops, UNAMIR will have lost credibility as a means of bringing peace to Rwanda and we will risk moving into a "peacemaking" mode in order to restore the situation. We will also have few if any resources left to conduct deterrence operations as our troops will be confined to defensive tasks to protect UN personnel and facilities. If this happens, we will have lost the initiative to influence the security situation and thus will not be able to fulfil requirements of our mandate.

7. The present situation demands determined and selective deterrent operations, to show the parties, the leadership, the media and the general population that UNAMIR is doing all within its ability to carry out its mandate. It is in effect the only way we can demonstrate a credible capability to the parties apart from the very passive posture that we now hold in Kigali. These operations will be conducted with the co-operation, of the RGF and more specifically the Gendarmerie, and the RPF Forces in their respective areas. In addition, we will require an adequately resource public information campaign to include international media coverage, to operate a UNAMIR radio station and to conduct a local public information campaign by leaflet and possibly newspaper to explain UNAMIR operations.

8. Our military targets will be confirmed arms caches and individuals who are known to have illegal weapons in their possessions. Delay in acting against these elements, may result in the distribution of arms to individuals which will only complicate our operations, endanger UN personnel and facilities and will not result in the large public relations coup that confiscating caches of arms will demonstrate to the public. These deterrence operations would be conducted not only to fulfil the requirements of our mandate in recovering illegal arms, but they will also ultimately ensure the safety and continued operation of UN personnel and facilities in Rwanda.

9. Each day of delay in authorizing deterrent arms recovery operations will result in an ever deteriorating security situation and may if the arms continue to be distributed result in an inability of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate in all respects. We therefore, seek your guidance and approval for us to commence deterrent arms recovery operations.

10. Regards.