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HISTORY OF NAVY HUMINT (Human Source Intelligence)
1973

NOTE: Because of the sensitive nature of the operations described herein, and the fact that the mere existence of a HUMINT capability within Navy is classified Secret No Foreign Dissemination, the true title of the Navy HUMINT organization will not be revealed. It will be referred to only as "The Activity".

Summary. In 1973, the Activity substantially increased production of intelligence reports, while maintaining quality at a high level. A total of 8077 hard copy and electrically transmitted intelligence reports were issued. Production of DOD IIRs (Intelligence Information Reports) rose by nearly 800 over the 1972 figure, and approximately three-fourths of the reports evaluated were considered by intelligence analysts to be of great or moderate value. Field units, based in the United States, the Caribbean, Europe and Asia, and targetted against maritime developments in the Communist Bloc and other nations of interest, continued to perform the full spectrum of HUMINT (human source intelligence) tasks. A new unit was established in London during the year and an office in Miami was closed.

All operations were centrally controlled from the Washington headquarters of the Activity which provided administrative, disbursing, supply and communciations support to field units. Units were responsive to both National and Theater level tasking.

1. —(S/NFD) Production. A total of 8077 intelligence reports were produced by the Activity during 1973. Included were 4061 DOD IIRs and 4016 other hard copy and electrically transmitted spot and summary reports. The CY-73 IIR total exceeded 1972 production by 788 reports. Based on analyst evaluations of approximately one-quarter of the IIRs, 72 percent were of great or moderate value, 93 percent contained intelligence being reported for the first time, and 87 percent contained valid information. High interest information collected by field units was transmitted immediately via Activity head-quarters to COMNAVINTCOM, other Washington area commands and appropriate authorities abroad. Several notable intelligence collection achievements are listed in the following paragraphs,

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AND METHODS INVOLVED

but much of the information acquired from Activity sources consisted of basic intelligence such as port and harbor data, information concerning foreign merchant ships, and routine naval order of battle reporting. For example, approximately thirty-six percent of all merchant ships coded by NISC are coded on the basis of information provided by the Activity. NISC merchant shipping publications credited the Activity with identifying and describing approximately 350 previously uncoded merchant ships during the past twelve months. According to NOSIC, 10 to 15 percent of all MSL reporting is generated by the Activity. During the past year, the Activity issued 1727 MSL reports concering the movements of Communist Bloc and Bloc associated merchant ships.

2. -(S/NFD) Achievements.



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AND METHODS INVOLVED

(6) Maritime surveillance. Units located at two key maritime choke points in the European area obtained detailed intelligence on Communist warship and merchant ship movements. During the year, the units transmitted 2232 intelligence reports, recorded transits by 20,700 ships and produced more than 40,000 photographic negatives. The first high quality, ground level photographs of the new Soviet Mod-KILDIN DDGS and KARA CLGMP were obtained by one of the surveillance units. During the

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recent war in the Middle East, the Director of Intelligence for USEUCOM said, "The clear, concise, timely reporting (by the field unit) has been of great value in assessing the threat, activities and intentions of the Soviets and the Arabian nations."

- (7) Translations. One field unit in Europe issued thirty-seven IIRs during CY-73 based on reviews and subsequent translations of thousands of Communist Bloc maritime publications. The reports consisted of lengthy and detailed analyses of Communist naval activities including quarterly summaries of developments in the East German and Polish shipbuilding industries. A DIA evaluation described one of the summaries as "another installment in a long series of excellent reports." The unit also provided reporting on naval engagements during the recent Middle East war. An analyst commented, "This outstanding report contains information not previously reported to DIA. (The report) will be extemely helpful in a review of the Syrian Navy's participation in the 1973 War."
- d. Indian Ocean. The Activity published 390 IIRs on the Indian Ocean area during the past year and field units in CONUS, Europe and Asia participated in the collection effort. A unit which commenced operations in the Persian Gulf in late 1972 produced 222 hard copy and electrically transmitted intelligence reports in CY-73. The principal targets of the unit's reporting were Soviet and Iraqi naval activities in the Persian Gulf and seaborne arms shipments to Iraq.
 - e. Pacific and the Far East.

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