1.

2. SUMMARY: IN ANSWER TO REF A, THERE ARE PROS AND CONS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REGARDING A UN INTERPOSITIONAL FORCE IN RWANDA, REFERRED TO IN THE (PENDING) ARUSHA ACCORD AS A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF). PROBABLY, THE BEST WAY FORWARD WHILE BE TO DEVISE AN IMAGINATIVE WAY FOR THE UN TO HELP THE OAU UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PART OF THE PEACEKEEPING TASK, ALLOWING THE OAU TO TAP INTO UN EXPERTISE, BUT AVOIDING PAYING FOR THE PKO THROUGH
HISTORY

3. This cable will discuss the second stage of multilateral action in Rwanda. As DoD and State will recall, the mandate and operating principles for the first stage—a border monitoring group—was negotiated by representatives of DoD/OSD/ISA, JCS, and State’s AF and IO bureaus with a high level French delegation in New York June 11 (Ref B). Once the USG and French had reached a convergence of views, the French presented a text to the Security Council, which was taken up in informal consultations (Ref C) and adopted (Ref D).

4. The second stage of multilateral action in Rwanda cannot be thoroughly analyzed until an agreement between the parties to the conflict is finalized and signed at Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accord may be signed by the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as early as July 15. Reportedly, the Accord will call for the UN to send a neutral international force (NIF) to interpose itself in the 70-mile wide buffer zone between the two forces’ front lines. This will create the atmosphere of stability which will enable the almost one million displaced persons to return safely to their homes. The OAU is currently in the buffer zone with a neutral monitoring and observing group (NMOG), which by all accounts is not/not doing a very good job.

PRD-13

5. The proposed NIF (although not fully fleshed out) seems to go a long way towards fulfilling the criteria in PRD-13. A) The threat to international order includes international aggression by rebel forces located across the border in Uganda and a humanitarian
DISASTER INVOLVING ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. B) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE PRESENCE OF OAU FORCES IN RWANDA, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 846 ESTABLISHING A BORDER MONITORING GROUP, AND THE TANZANIAN-FACILITATED PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA WHICH ARE OBSERVED BY SEVERAL CONCERNED COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE U.S. C) THE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, WHICH SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORD, SEEM TO BE...

6. (U) THE SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY, ARE WILLING TO ACCEDE TO THE ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR A UN-LED NIF. THEY SAY THERE IS A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR THE UN TO HELP BRING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS WHEN ASKED. THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE BOTH PARTIES ACTUALLY SEEM TO BE DISPLAYING THE WILL TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND MOVE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AS OPPOSED TO OTHER AREAS...
SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

(E.G. ANGOLA, BOSNIA, GEORGIA) WHERE THE GOODWILL OF THE
PROTAGONISTS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN
HOLDING FOR QUITE SOME TIME. UN PEACEKEEPERS IN RWANDA
WOULD HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF EFFECTIVELY

7. (U) FINANCIALY, THE SECRETARIAT REALIZES IT WILL
COST LESS TO PUT A PKO IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED TIME
ALLOWING THE POPULATION TO RETURN TO ITS VILLAGES, THAN
TO PAY FOR THE FEEDING AND UPEKEEP OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE
IN REFUGEE CAMPS.
8. SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A UN ROLE, THIS POINT OF VIEW CITES THE POOR JOB THE OAU HAS BEEN DOING TO DATE. THE OAU HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN PROPOSING CONCRETE WAYS TO SHORE UP ITS OPERATION, DESPITE A VISIT BY A SECONDED OFFICER FROM UN DPKO. THERE ARE COMPLAINTS THAT THE OAU IS INEXPERIENCED, CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT, LACKING IN FUNDS, ETC. THE UN HAS THE EXPERTISE TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI EXPRESSED THIS POINT OF VIEW TO THE PERMREPS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE U.S. IN THE SPRING. OF THE P-5, THE FRENCH ARE MOSTLY STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF HAVING A UN-LED PKO, SINCE THEY ARE STAUNCHLY AGAINST THE OAU, WHICH IS ALSO OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE GOR.

CON

9. ARGUING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, RUSSIA AND THE UK ARE LEARY OF UNDERWRITING ANOTHER COSTLY PKO. BOTH HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MERITS OF THE FORCE, ONLY WITH THE FINANCING. HOWEVER,

PRD-13 DISCUSSES THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN POTENTIALLY MAKE TO PEACEKEEPING ONCE THEY ENHANCE THEIR COMPETENCE AND EXPERIENCE. BY HANDING THE RWANDA NIF TO THE UN, THE OAU LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ON THE GROUND HOW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE. FAILURE TO LEARN QUICKLY, OF COURSE, RUNS THE RISK OF DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

IMAGINATIVE ALTERNATIVES NEEDED

11. IF THE UN AND THE OAU CAN FIND A WAY TO RUN AN
OPERATION JOINTLY, MUCH LIKE THE OAS AND UN HAVE DONE IN HAITI, THERE MAY BE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING SUCH AN OPERATION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WHO HAVE THE KEENEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RWANDA, HAVE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE, BUT SHOULD BE PRESSED TO DO SO. OTHERS SUCH AS THE SCANDINAVIANS MAY BE WILING TO CONTRIBUTE. AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENTS WITH PRIOR UN PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE COULD BE SOUGHT, AND PLACED UNDER SOME TYPE OF JOINT COMMAND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE UN’S PRIOR EXPERIENCE. MILITARY OFFICERS FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE RECRUITED BY THE UN AND SECONDED TO THE RWANDA OPERATION. ANY OR ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD GO AGAINST PRECEDENT FOR UN PKO’S, AND WOULD REQUIRE IMAGINATIVE INNOVATIONS.