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1. CONFIDENTIAL – ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: OFFICERS FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE COMMISSION FOR DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING PRESENTED EMBOFF AND OSD/ISA REP WITH A CONCISE LIST OF SIX AREAS IN WHICH THE GOR WILL REQUIRE FINANCIAL AND/OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. THEY INCLUDE: ORGANIZATION OF CANTONEMENT SITES, REPOSESSION OF ARMS ILLEGALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF CIVILIANS, DEMINING OPERATIONS, PAYMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION
BONUSES, TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS, AND PROVISION OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SOLDIERS NEEDING NO FURTHER EDUCATION/TRAINING. EACH AREA WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL, AND INFORMAL IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS WERE EXCHANGED, BUT NO PROMISES WERE MADE OTHER THAN TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. OSD/ISA REP. LTC. HARVIN AND ECONOFF MET WITH LTC. NDENGEYINKA, TECHNICAL AFFAIRS COUNSELLOR TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND MAJ. (GENDARMERIE) BAVUGAMENSHI, PRESIDENT OF THE GOR'S COMMISSION FOR DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING, ON JULY 16 TO DISCUSS DEMOBILIZATION ISSUES. THE TWO GOR OFFICERS WERE PREPARED WITH A LIST OF 6 AREAS IN WHICH THE GOR WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL AND/OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION OF SOME 30,000 GOR AND RPF TROOPS ONCE A PEACE ACCORD IS SIGNED.

CANTONEMENT SITE ORGANIZATION:

4. THE MILITARY PROTOCOLS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD PROVIDE FOR THE CREATION OF CANTONEMENT SITES WHERE GOR AND RPF SOLDIERS WILL BE SCREENED FOR EITHER CONTINUED ARMED FORCES DUTY OR DEMOBILIZATION. WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GOR WILL USE ALREADY ESTABLISHED MILITARY CAMPS, NEW SITES MAY HAVE TO BE CREATED FOR THE RPF, EITHER IN THE DMZ OR IN THEIR OCCUPIED ZONE. SHELTER, WATER, AND SANITATION WILL BE NEEDED.

5. LTC. HARVIN NOTED THAT CANTONEMENT SITES NEED NOT, AND SHOULD NOT, BE TOO LUXURIOUS, CITING THE EXAMPLE OF ANGOLA WHERE SOLDIERS BECAME QUASI-PERMANENTLY INSTALLED IN THE SITES. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT SOLDIERS NOT BE KEPT IN CANTONEMENT TOO LONG: THESE SHOULD BE WAY STATIONS FOR SMALL NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS AT A TIME, WHO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN TO THEM NEXT BEFORE THEY ARRIVE IN CANTONEMENT. LASTLY, HE NOTED THAT BOTH GOR AND RPF SOLDIERS SHOULD BE TREATED EQUALLY, MEANING THAT THE GOR SHOULD NOT BE IN WELL EQUIPPED MILITARY CAMPS WHILE THE RPF LIVES A SPARTAN TENT CAMP LIFE.
DISARMING CIVILIANS:
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6. GOR OFFICERS STATED THAT THERE ARE UNKNOWN NUMBERS OF RIFLES, PISTOLS AND HAND GRENADES ILLEGALLY IN CIVILIAN HANDS, EITHER PURCHASED FROM CONFIDENTIAL

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ARMY DESERTERS, PICKED UP ON THE BATTLE FIELD, OR OBTAINED FROM ZAIRE. THE GOR IS CONSIDERING THE BEST SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM TO BE A GOVERNMENT BUY-UP OF THESE ARMS, WHICH WILL REQUIRE DONOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

DEMINING OPERATIONS:
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7. GOR OFFICERS ADMITTED THAT THE EXTENT OF MINING IN THE COMBAT AREAS IS UNKNOWN, BUT WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED. LTC. HARVIN NOTED THAT DEMINING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CIVILIAN OPERATION, IN THAT A) DEMINING

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 CASY-00 DOE-00
EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19
L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01
PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00 /064W

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OF LARGE AREAS OF FARMING LAND IS NOT THE SAME AS DEMINING A GIVEN PATH THROUGH WHICH TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPS, AND B) IT IS USUALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY CONTRACTING WITH A CIVILIAN FIRM. IN ANY CASE, ALL AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE AN EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION.

DEMOBILIZATION BONUSES:

8. THE GOR OFFICERS REGRETTED THE FACT THAT THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID TO EACH DEMOBILIZED SOLDIER HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ARUSHA MILITARY PROTOCOLS. SOLDIERS TO CORPORAL ARE TO RECEIVE RF 100 K (DOLS 715); TO STAFF SERGEANT, RF 200 K (DOLS 1,430); TO ADJUTANT (WARRANT OFFICER), RF 300 K (DOLS 2,145); TO CAPTAIN, RF 400 K (DOLS 2,860), AND MAJOR AND ABOVE, RF 500 K (DOLS 3,575).

9. LTC. HARVIN AGREED THAT SETTING THE AMOUNTS IN STONE WAS UNFORTUNATE. HOWEVER, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GOR CONSIDER RELEASING THE FUNDS TO A GIVEN
SOLDIER IN TRENCHES, WITH EACH SUCCESSIVE PAYMENT CONTINGENT UPON THE SOLDIER FULFILLING OBLIGATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, A SERGEANT MIGHT RECEIVE RF 75 K ON DEPARTURE FROM CANTONEMENT, AND RF 125 K ON COMPLETION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL. SHOULD HE DROP OUT OF SCHOOL, OR BE ARRESTED FOR A CRIME, HIS BONUS IS FORFEITED. THOSE SOLDIERS WHO DO NOT REQUIRE FURTHER EDUCATION OR TRAINING -- MOST LIKELY ONLY COMMISSIONED OFFICERS -- COULD RECEIVE THEIR BONUS IN A LUMP SUM, ALLOWING A SMALL CAPITAL BASE FOR SOME KIND OF ENTREPRENEURIAL

ACTIVITY. BUT AGAIN, ALL AGREED THAT THE FUNDS NEEDED WILL BE SIGNIFICANT, AND MUST COME FROM SOMEWHERE.

DEMOBILIZATION TRAINING:

10. MOST DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS, WHATEVER THEIR RANK, WILL REQUIRE SOME KIND OF TRAINING OR EDUCATION, EVEN IF ONLY TO COMPLETE A PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION OR TO LEARN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE. THE RWANDAN PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND TECHNICAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS ARE INADEQUATE FOR THE CURRENT SCHOOL AGE POPULATION, LET ALONE A SUDDEN INFLUX OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS. ECONOFF NOTED THAT EMBASSY HAD DEVOTED 85 PERCENT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL SELF HELP FUND FOR AFRICA TO SCHOOL RENOVATION AND CONSTRUCTION THIS YEAR, SPECIFICALLY TO BEGIN ADDRESSING THIS PROBLEM, AND THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

EMPLOYMENT:

11. THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF SOLDIERS, SUCH AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, WHO ARE ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND EDUCATED TO ENTER THE JOB MARKET DIRECTLY. THE PUBLIC SECTOR WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ABSORB THEM -- THE TERMS OF RWANDA'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM ALLOWS THE GOR TO HIRE ONLY ONE NEW CIVIL SERVANT FOR
12. THE GOR OFFICERS THOUGHT THAT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION COULD BE REQUIRING NEW DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO FAVOR QUALIFIED DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AS CANDIDATES FOR EMPLOYMENT. LTC. HARVIN STATED THAT WHILE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS WERE NOTHING NEW, SOMEONE'S OX WILL BE GORED IN THE PROCESS. HE SUGGESTED THAT ANY SUCH PROGRAM BE CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND THAT A DEFINITE TIME LIMIT BE SET ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. HE NOTED THAT

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CIVILIAN FIRMS INVOLVED IN DEMINING PROGRAMS OFTEN HIRE LOCAL PERSONNEL, AND THAT THIS COULD PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME LIMITED, SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT TO QUALIFIED MILITARY ENGINEERS AND LABOR.

13. ANOTHER OPTION DISCUSSED WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES. PART OF THE FUND WOULD BE USED TO PAY FOR TECHNICAL ADVICE; THE REST FOR LOANS. LTC. HARVIN NOTED THAT THE LOANS WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY ADMINISTERED, TO MAKE SURE THAT PROJECTS WERE FEASIBLE AND APPROPRIATELY DISTRIBUTED GEOGRAPHICALLY.

COMMENT:
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14. THE GOR’S INTERMINISTERIAL DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING COMMISSION WAS SET UP UNDER THE MINISTRY OF PLAN, AND PRESIDED OVER BY MAJOR BAVUGAMENSHI. IT BEGAN MEETING IN APRIL, 1992; FROM AMONG THE DONOR COMMUNITY ONLY THE USG WAS REPRESENTED IN ITS MEETINGS, AND ONLY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE’S REPRESENTATIVES WORKED SERIOUSLY THROUGHOUT. ITS MANDATE WAS TO DEVELOP PRELIMINARY IDEAS AND PLANS OF ACTION FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS.

15. WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE GOR OFFICERS’ PREPARATION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THORNY ISSUES. THE OFFICERS WERE NOT HAPPY WITH MANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA MILITARY PROTOCOLS, BUT CONFIDENTIAL
STATED THAT, AS THESE PROTOCOLS DEFINED THEIR MISSION, THEIR DUTY WAS TO DETERMINE HOW TO ACCOMPLISH IT.

16. THE COST OF DEMOBILIZATION WILL BE HIGH, BUT IS AS YET UNKNOWN. EVEN BASE LINE DATA, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF RPF SOLDIERS TO BE DEMOBILIZED, THEIR EDUCATION LEVELS, ETC. ARE UNKNOWN. CONSIDERABLE PLANNING, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED IF THE GOR IS NOT TO SIMPLY HAND OUT CASH PAYMENTS AND SEND SOLDIERS OFF TO AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN THE HILLS.

17. EMBASSY APPRECIATED LTC. HARVIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THIS DISCUSSION AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO SHARE WITH US AND WITH RWANDAN INTERLOCUTORS THE VAST EXPERIENCE HE HAS HAD WITH OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHERE SIMILAR ISSUES AND PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH. HARVIN'S VISIT WAS VALUABLE TO THIS MISSION ON DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING, PEACEKEEPING CONSIDERATIONS, AND IN DEMONSTRATING A CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE IMPORTANT MILITARY SECTOR OF THE CHANGING RWANDAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. END COMMENT.

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