1. SUMMARY. PHASE ONE OF UNAMIR'S OPERATIONS INCLUDE CREATING A WEAPONS SECURE AREA WITHIN A 10 KILOMETER PERIMETER AROUND KIGALI BY DECEMBER 20 IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE RPF TO BE ESCORTED TO TOWN BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. UWAMIR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN LOOKS GOOD ON PAPER BUT
THE PLAN'S DETAILS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED.
COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, SHORTAGES OF MEN AND MATERIEL
PERSIST. THE GOR AND RPF STILL HAVE NOT REACHED AN
AGREEMENT AS TO WHERE THE RPF WILL BE HOUSED IN KIGALI,
NOR HAS THE GOVERNMENT WORKED ON PLANS FOR PROVIDING
TRANSPORTATION FOR THE RPF TRANSFER OR FOOD FOR THE RPF
BATTALION ONCE THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED.
UNAMIR BELIEVES UNDP'S DEMOBILIZATION PLAN COULD
THREATEN THE SUCCESS OF PHASES TWO AND THREE OF UNAMIR'S
MISSION, UNLESS THE TRAINING PERIOD IS LENGTHENED. END
SUMMARY.

3. UNAMIR INVITED ALL CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN
RWANDA TO ATTEND A OPERATIONAL/SECURITY BRIEFING AT THE
AMAHORO HOTEL ON MONDAY, 13 DECEMBER (SEE REFTEL). THE
BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED AGAIN TO ALL EMBASSY SECURITY AND
CONSULAR PERSONNEL ON FRIDAY, 17 DECEMBER. THE
OPERATIONAL PLAN OUTLINED BELOW IS WHAT WAS PROVIDED BY
UNAMIR'S GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS AT THESE BRIEFINGS.
ASSESSMENTS OF HOW THE PLAN IS BEING IMPLEMENTED WERE
GIVEN TO ECONOFF BY LTCOL ISLAM NAZRUL, THE UNAMIR CHIEF

UNAMIR'S DIVIDES ITS MISSION INTO FOUR PHASES

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OF STAFF/CHIEF OF OPERATIONS AND LTCOL Ephrem
RWABALINDA, THE GOR LIAISON OFFICER WITH UNAMIR, IN
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS OUTSIDE THIS PUBLIC FORUM.

4. AS OUTLINED KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER, COL. MARCHAL,
UNAMIR SEES ITS ROLE IN RWANDA DIVIDED INTO FOUR
DISTINCT PHASES:

PHASE 1 - (OCT- DEC/1993)
OPERATION "SAFE CITY"
INSTALLATION OF TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT (TG)

PHASE 2 - (JAN - MAR/1994)
SECURITY FOR TG
PREPARATION FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND
FORCE INTEGRATION

PHASE 3 - (APR-DEC/1994).
SECURITY FOR TG
DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS
FORCE INTEGRATION PROCESS

PHASE 4 - (JAN-OCT/1995)
PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS

UNAMIR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN UNDER PHASE ONE

5. IN COMPLETING ITS MISSION UNDER PHASE 1, UNAMIR HAS
DRAWN A 10 KILOMETER PERIMETER AROUND KIGALI AND CALLED
THIS AREA THE "KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE AREA (KWSA)" IN WHICH
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 20, ALL MILITARY WEAPONS ARE SUPPOSED
TO BE UNDER DIRECT UN CONTROL (SEE REFTEL). WITHIN THIS
KWSA, TWO BATTALIONS OF 400 PEACEKEEPERS EACH AND 78
MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY
MATTERS. CURRENTLY, THE BANGLADESHI BATTALION (RUTBAT),
BASED OUT OF RUTONGO) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NORTHERN
HALF OF THE KWSA. MOST OF THE CITY OF KIGALI AND THE
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE KWSA, INCLUDING THE AIRPORT AND
UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS, IS IN THE BELGIAN BATTALION'S

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6. COL LEROIT IS THE SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER. THE FORMER FRENCH NOROIT DETACHMENT'S HEADQUARTERS IS NOW LEROIT'S. IN HIS BRIEFING TO WESTERN MISSION'S ON DECEMBER 17, HE EXPLAINED THAT KIGALI PROPER HAD BEEN SUBDIVIDED INTO THREE SUBSECTORS WITH THREE SEPARATE DETACHMENTS BASED AT THE AIRPORT TO THE EAST, AT THE ETO JOHN BOSCO - A VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL TO THE SOUTH (KIMIHURURA), AND AT A BELGIAN COOPERATION BUILDING TO THE WEST.

7. FROM EACH OF THESE THREE BASES, SEVERAL ROVING PATROLS WOULD PATROL WITHIN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSURE THAT THERE WERE NO VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) AGREEMENT SIGNED ON DECEMBER 17.
17 BY BOTH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND RPF. THE SOP SETS
THE RULES FOR BOTH SIDES' MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE KWSA,
EFFECTIVE 8:00 A.M. DECEMBER 20 AND UPON RPF ARRIVAL IN
KIGALI.

RULES OF CONDUCT WITHIN THE KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE ZONE

8. NEITHER SIDE WILL MOVE AROUND THE CITY WITHOUT UN
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. NEITHER SIDE WILL MAINTAIN STATIC
CHECKPOINTS OR ROADBLOCKS ANYWHERE IN THE CITY. THERE
WILL ALSO BE NO MOVEMENTS OF 10 SOLDIERS OR MORE, UNLESS
WITH A UN ESCORT. (THE RPF WITH ITS STANDARD 5 MAN
PATROL, HAS AGREED TO CONFORM WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR A

MOBILE AND STATIC UNAMIR PATROLS TO MONITOR KWSA

9. ACCORDING TO LTCOL. NAZRUL, THE UNAMIR OPERATIONS
OFFICER, UNAMIR WILL HAVE BOTH MOBILE AND STATIC PATROLS
THROUGHOUT THE CITY. EACH MOBILE PATROL GROUP WILL BE
COMPRISED OF SIX MEN AND THREE VEHICLES, WITH 2 MEN PER
VEHICLE ROTATING WITHIN THEIR GROUP ON 8 HOUR SHIFTS.
STATIC PATROLS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT MAIN TRAVEL
ARTERIES AND AT STRATEGIC POINTS OF ACCESS FROM MILITARY
AND GENDARMERIE FACILITIES AND WHEREVER THE RPF IS FINALLY
HOUSED.

10. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL BE ROVING THE CITY AND
MONITORING THE AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS STOCKPILES TO
INSURE THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED RELEASES OF WEAPONS AND
MUNITIONS OCCUR. THESE OBSERVERS, THOUGH UNARMED, WILL
BE ESCORTED BY PEACEKEEPERS TO REDUCE OBSERVERS' VULNERABILITY. THE PEACEKEEPERS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE
THAT THEY MAY FIRE IF ANYONE THREATENS SERIOUS BODILY
HARM TO THEM OR THE OBSERVERS. (NOTE: COL. NAZRUL
EXPLAINED THAT THE UN MAY NOT RETURN FIRE IF SOMEONE
11. COL. MARCHAL, THE KWSA COMMANDER, NOTED THAT UNAMIR WAS NOT INSTALLED TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THE GENDARMERY OR THE POLICE. UNAMIR WOULD ONLY WORK WITH THEM TO ASSURE THAT THEY RESPONDED TO CALLS IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER AND THAT WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS WERE PROPERLY USED WHEN RESPONDING. COL. MARCHAL ADDED THAT ANY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF LOCAL RWANDAN AUTHORITIES WOULD ALSO BE UNDER DIRECT UN SUPERVISION; THAT IS ALL LOCAL PATROLS WITH WEAPONS WOULD ALWAYS HAVE A UN ESCORT.

UNAMIR’S APPROACH TO ILLEGAL WEAPONS CACHES IN KIGALI
12. IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF WEAPONS CACHES, COL. MARCHAL AND COL. NAZRUL BOTH AGREED THAT THEY WERE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT WEAPONS HAD BEEN CACHED BY BOTH THE GOR AND RPF AS WELL AS BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THESE WEAPONS CACHES, UNAMIR WOULD BE GATHERING INTELLIGENCE AS TO WHERE WEAPONS CACHES WERE BEING MAINTAINED. WHEN DEEMED APPROPRIATE, UNAMIR WOULD ACT ON INFORMATION RECEIVED BY CORDONING OFF AN AREA AND SEARCHING THROUGH BOTH CIVILIAN RESIDENCES AND MILITARY/GOVERNMENT/COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

13. COL. NAZRUL COMMENTED THAT UNAMIR’S BIGGEST CONCERN WAS NOT THE WEAPONS HELD BY THE MILITARY OR GENDARMERY BUT THOSE IN CIVILIAN HANDS. UNAMIR WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOME OF THE YOUTH GROUPS WITH WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY THE INTERAHAMWE, THE YOUTH GROUP OF THE FORMTR SINGLE PARTY, THE MRND. THE GOVERNMENT HAD SENT OUT A CIRCULAR TO ALL MILITARY COMMANDS AND PREFECTURES ASKING THAT ALL WEAPONS BE TURNED IN; BUT FEW WEAPONS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED. THE BLACK MARKET IN GRENADES ALSO CONTINUES TO BOOM, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT’S RECENT EFFORTS TO BUY BACK GRENADES.
GOOD ON PAPER BUT IS UNAMIR’S OPERATIONAL PLAN WORKING?

14. THE PLAN ON PAPER (PRESENTED IN MILITARY STYLE BY UNAMIR OFFICERS WITH SLIDE PROJECTIONS AND GRID MAPS) LOOKS MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR MEETING MISSION OBJECTIVES. AS OF DECEMBER 20 - THE DAY ESTABLISHED AS THE START OF

15. LOGISTICALLY, COL LEROIT ADMITTED THAT HIS THREE SUBSECTOR COMMANDERS STILL DID NOT HAVE TELEPHONES TO COMMUNICATE WITH ONE ANOTHER, NOR DID COL LEROIT HAVE ANY NUMBER TO GIVE OUT TO THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FOR TELEPHONING FOR ASSISTANCE OR SECURITY INFORMATION. THE ONLY NUMBER AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME IS THE NOROIT’S PREVIOUS DETACHMENT NUMBER AND THE NUMBERS TO THE AMAHORO HOTEL, UNAMIR’S HEADQUARTERS.

16. COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH PATROLS IN THE DMZ ARE ALSO ALMOST NON-EXISTENT. WHEN ASKED IF UNAMIR COULD PROVIDE BASIC SECURITY INFORMATION ON THE DMZ TO THE PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN THE AREA, COL. MARCHAL REPLIED THAT IT WAS OFTEN A DAY OR TWO BEFORE UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS ITSELF HAD UP TO DATE INFORMATION FROM THE PATROLS.

UNAMIR SHORTAGE OF MEN AND MATERIEL CONTINUES

17. COL. NAZRUL TOLD ECONOFF THAT AS FOR MEN AND EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR WAS ALSO STILL LACKING. AS LATE AS CHRISTMAS DAY (THE DAY BEFORE THE RPF’S EXPECTED ARRIVAL TO TOWN), 200 BANGLADESHI TROOPS WOULD BE ARRIVING IN KIGALI TO BRING CONTINGENT NUMBERS UP TO 1225. THESE TROOPS WILL NOT HAVE ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF RWANDA OR ITS TERRAIN. THE UN FORCE WAS ALSO SUPPOSED TO HAVE 78 OBSERVERS AND ONLY 4B HAVE ARRIVED. THIS HAS POSED
PROBLEMS, SINCE 10 OBSERVERS FROM THE DMZ HAD TO BE PULLED TO MONITOR DISTURBANCES ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER WITH BURUNDI (PREVIOUSLY NOT ENVISIONED AS PART OF UNAMIR'S TACTICAL PLAN).

18. AS FOR EQUIPMENT, ONLY 2 OF 5 HELICOPTERS HAVE ARRIVED TO DO THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS OF KIGALI AND THE DMZ. UNAMIR WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE 3 COMPANIES OF PEACEKEEPERS AS MOBILE PATROLS AND 1 COMPANY OF PEACEKEEPERS IN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. NONE OF THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS HAS ARRIVED AND ONLY 1/3 TO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
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1/2 OF THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF JEEPS HAVE ARRIVED,
MEANING MANY OBSERVERS ARE WITHOUT THE GROUND
TRANSPORTATION NEEDED TO MONITOR AND PATROL THE AREA.

19. COL NAZRUL BELIEVED THAT ALL THE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS
OF GETTING EQUIPMENT AND MEN TO KIGALI WERE DIRECTLY
LINKED TO DIFFICULTIES THE COMMAND WAS HAVING WITH
BUDGET QUESTIONS HANDLED OUT OF NEW YORK. ACCORDING TO
NAZRUL, SINCE THIS MISSION IS NOT A HIGH PROFILE ONE, UN
NEW YORK IS NOT GIVING UNAMIR’S BUDGET DIFFICULTIES
QUICK ATTENTION. FOR NAZRUL, MORE ATTENTION SEEMED TO BE
GIVEN TO OPERATIONS GETTING THE PUBLICITY, NAMELY
SOMALIA AND YUGOSLAVIA.

OPERATION SAFE CITY HASN’T NECESSARILY MADE THE CITY SAFE

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20. ON THE OPERATIONS SIDE, THE LINKS SUPPOSED TO BE
ESTABLISHED WITH THE GENDARMES AND POLICE HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED. OVER THE WEEKEND OF DECEMBER 18
AND 19, POST’S SECURITY OFFICER (PSO) WAS CONTACTED BY
AN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE NEEDING ASSISTANCE IN GIKONDO. THE
EMPLOYEE’S FAMILY AND HOUSE HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY MEMBERS
OF THE LOCAL MRND YOUTH GROUP, INTERAHAMWE. WHEN EFFORTS
TO CONTACT THE GENDARMES BY PSO YIELDED NO RESULT, PSO
CALLED UNAMIR FOR ASSISTANCE. UNAMIR ADMITTED THAT THEY
HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT AT THAT TIME WITH THE GENDARME
DETACHMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GIKONDO AREA; INSTEAD
THEY CONTACTED MEMBERS OF COL. NYDINDILIMANA’S (THE HEAD
OF THE GENDARMERY) STAFF FOR ASSISTANCE.

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21. AND, ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE MISSION HAVE SEEN NUMEROUS PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE CITY, IT IS UNCLEAR AS TO WHAT EFFECT THEY ARE HAVING ON THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS PROCESS GO FORWARD. THE INTERAMAMWE, FOR EXAMPLE, RELEASED A COMMUNIQUE DECEMBER 20 STATING THAT THEY WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING THEIR VERSION OF THE "FINAL SOLUTION", DESIGNATING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 20-24 AS THE "WEEK OF DEATH" FOR ALL TUTSI'S, AND BY IMPLICATION RPF SUPPORTERS. THESE TYPES OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION CONTINUE TO KEEP ALL RWANDANS UNEASY ABOUT THE RPF'S EXPECTED ARRIVAL IN TOWN, DESPITE UNAMIR'S CLAIM THAT KIGALI IS NOW SECURED AND DESIGNATED A WEAPONS SAFE AREA.

FINAL PLANS FOR OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR STILL IN LIMBO

22. UNAMIR HAS CALLED THE OPERATION TO BRING THE RPF TO TOWN "OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR". THE PLAN IS TO BRING THE RPF TO KIGALI VIA BYUMBA IN TWO TRANCES, UNDER BELGIAN PEACEKEEPER ESCORT ON DECEMBER 26 AND 27. (NOTE. THESE DATES ARE NOT ANNOUNCED TO THE PUBLIC. END NOTE) YET, WHETHER THAT DAY HOLDS FIRM IS UNCERTAIN. AS OF DECEMBER 21, THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT AS TO WHERE THE RPF WILL BE HOUSED IN KIGALI. PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PASSED BACK AND FORTH, WITH NO AGREEMENT. THE GOR REJECTED HOUSING THE RPF AT THE PRESIDENTIAL VILLAS, 200 KILOMETERS FROM THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. THE RPF REJECTED CAMP KAMI, SEVEN KILOMETERS OUTSIDE OF KIGALI. THE OAU REPRESENTATIVE TOLD CHARGE THAT THE RPF FEARS POSSIBLE LAND MINES ON THE DIRT ROAD TO THE REMOTE CAMP KAMI.
23. CHOOSING THE SITE, UNFORTUNATELY, IS ONLY THE FIRST OF SEVERAL LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RPF’S COMING TO TOWN THAT STILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH ONLY A WEEK BEFORE THE PLANNED TRANSFER. FOR EXAMPLE,
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SINCE THE SITE FOR THE RPF AND ITS BATTALION IS STILL UNCERTAIN, NO ADVANCE PLANNING HAS BEEN DONE AT ANY SITE TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE SANITATION FACILITIES FOR THE MEN.

24. WHEN ASKED WHAT MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IS GOING TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE RPF FOR THE TRANSFER (SINCE THE ARUSHA ACCORDS STATE THAT THE GOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION) THE GOR’S MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER, COL. EPHEREM RWABALINDA, SAID THAT THE GOR WOULD MAKE 5 BUSES AVAILABLE. 5 BUSES CLEARLY IS NOT ENOUGH TO TRANSFER 300 PLUS MEN IF THE TRANSFER IS DONE IN TWO TRAMCHES. UNAMIR’S OWN VEHICLE SHORTAGE MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR UNAMIR TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION.


26. ACCORDING TO COL. NAZRUL, WITHOUT THE LOGISTICAL DETAILS FINALIZED, UNAMIR CANNOT ADEQUATELY PLAN FOR SECURITY UPON RPF ARRIVAL. UNAMIR NEEDS AT LEAST SOME

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LEAD TIME TO MAP OUT ITS PATROLLING AREAS DEPENDING ON THE FINAL SITE CHOSEN TO HOUSE THE RPF. THE GOR MAY BE
ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR BUT UNAMIR CANNOT REACT BY THE TWELFTH HOUR TO ASSURE THAT OPERATIONS GO SMOOTHLY.

MAIN CONCERN IS POLITICS, NOT SECURITY SITUATION


FOUR MONTHS TRAINING NOT ENOUGH FOR DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS

28. LOOKING AHEAD TO PHASE 2 AND 3 OF UNAMIR’S MISSION,

COL. NAZRUL SAID THAT MANY OF THE BANGLADESHI OFFICERS, WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE FROM CAMBODIA, WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEMOBILIZATION PLANS BEING DEVELOPED BY THE GOR AND THE RPF UNDER UNDP AUSPICES. COL NAZRUL SAID THE UNDP’S PROPOSAL TO GIVE FOUR MONTHS OF TRAINING TO THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO TEACH THEM A VALUABLE SKILL THAT WOULD EARN THEM A LIVING. FOUR MONTHS TIME FROM DEMOBILIZATION BEGINNING IN APRIL WOULD ALSO NOT BE ENOUGH TIME FOR THE ECONOMY TO ABSORB AND PROVIDE JOBS FOR THOSE DEMOBILIZED.

29. UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE APPEALED TO DIPLOMATS AT HIS 13 DECEMBER BRIEFING AS WELL ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF
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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 LAB-04 L-03
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02
PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 RPE-01 /045W

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P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5362
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO

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SUPPORTING A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS LONGER THAN THE 4 MONTH PROGRAM CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY UNDP. SINCE THEN, THE GOR, RPF, AND UNDP HAVE AGREED ON A PROGRAM PROVIDING 5 MONTHS OF TRAINING FOR INTEGRATION INTO CIVILIAN LIFE AND 6-8 MONTHS OF TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS.

30. UNAMIR IS WORRIED ABOUT FUNDING AVAILABILITY AND PROGRAM DETAILS WHICH, IF NOT WORKED OUT, COULD SPELL PROBLEMS FOR THE WHOLE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS SCHEDULED FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF UNAMIR’S OPERATION. DISGRUNTLED DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WHO CANNOT EARN A LIVING ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY WITH THE TRAINING THEY ARE GIVEN COULD TURN TO BANDITRY AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. UNAMIR’S OPERATION SAFE CITY, THEN, COULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE. SECURITY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS OUTSIDE THE DMZ AND KIGALI COULD ALSO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR UNAMIR.

COMMENT

31. UNAMIR OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH WELL CONCEIVED, ARE PROVING DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A JANUARY 5 DEADLINE FOR SHOWING PROGRESS, BOTH THE RPF AND GOR APPEAR TO BE WAITING TO THE LAST MINUTE TO FINALIZE DETAILS. UNAMIR CLEARLY DOES NOT WANT TO OPERATE ON THE GOR-RPF’S SCHEDULE AND GENERAL DALLAIRE IS PUSHING TO GET THE

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR. WITHOUT CRUCIAL DETAILS WORKED OUT AS TO THE LOGISTICS OF BRINGING THE RPF TO TOWN, HOWEVER, DALLAIRE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP EVERYTHING ON TRACK WITHOUT SOME COST TO THE INTEGRITY OF HIS OPERATIONAL PLAN. LEADER