1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD US HIS
DELEGATION HAD NOT FOUND THE NICARAGUAN MODEL FOR MILITARY INTEGRATION VERY APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE AND THAT THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR OTHER MODELS. THE RWANDANS CLEARLY FEARED DESTABILIZATION FROM THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ARE CLINGING TO THE UNREALISTIC HOPE THAT THE RPF WILL ACCEPT LATER INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMY ON THE BASIS OF ATTRITION. HOWEVER, THE GOR HASN'T YET COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THE RPF WILL PROBABLY NOT ACCEPT A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RWANDANS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN LARGER NUMBERS AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

THE NICARAGUAN TRIP

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3. PASSING THROUGH WASHINGTON AFTER A WEEK-LONG VISIT TO NICARAGUA, RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE JAMES GASANA ASKED TO MEET WITH AF/RA MILITARY ADVISER LTC MARLEY ON NOVEMBER 3.

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14. LTC LAURENT RUTAYISIRE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATION, BUT AMBASSADOR UWIMANA, THE THIRD MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION, ONLY SAT IN BRIEFLY. THE DELEGATION DID NOT FIND THE NICARAGUAN DEMOBILIZATION MODEL APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY FOUND IT "IDEOLOGICAL" RATHER THAN "ETHNIC," FOCUSED ON THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AIMED AT ELECTIONS RATHER THAN POWER SHARING. MARLEY SUGGESTED ZIMBABWE'S PLAN MIGHT BE MORE APPLICABLE. WE LATER LEARNED THAT THE GOR MAY AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR UWIMANA TO VISIT EL SALVADOR SINCE ITS MODEL MIGHT BE MORE RELEVANT TO THAT OF RWANDA. UWIMANA IS AWARE THAT THE ZIMBABWE PLAN INTEGRATES THE ARMY, BUT DOESN'T KNOW IF THE MINISTER WILL TRAVEL THERE OR NOT.

INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION

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4. THE DELEGATION EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATING THE RPA INTO THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZATION. IN THEIR VIEW, A "DISPROPORTIONATELY" HIGH PERCENTAGE OF RPA SOLDIERS WOULD UPSET THE ETHNIC BALANCE AND LEAD TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY, THEY
FEAR THAT SIMULTANEOUS INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WOULD DESTABILIZE FURTHER THE ECONOMY BY SENDING LARGE NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS INTO UNEMPLOYMENT. THEY BELIEVE THE RPF SHOULD BE REPATRIATED INTO SOCIETY FIRST, WITH DEMOBILIZATION OF THE FAR SECOND, AND INTEGRATION OF THE RPA INTO THE ARMY THIRD AS VACANCIES APPEAR THROUGH ATTRITION. MARLEY POINTED OUT THAT THE RPF COULD NEVER CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCEPT SUCH AN UNREALISTIC SOLUTION. THE ORDER OF SOLUTIONS REQUIRES EITHER A) INTEGRATION OF ALL FORCES FOLLOWED BY RATIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OR B) DEMOBILIZATION OF A PART OF BOTH FORCES, INTEGRATION OF THE REMAINDER, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OF THE COMBINED FORCES LATER.

5. GASANA AND RUTAYISIRE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF SECURITY IS THE REAL ISSUE FOR THE RPF THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, RATHER THAN THE ARMY WHICH SHOULD BECOME AN APOLITICAL FORCE FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE. MARLEY RESPONDED THAT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES MUST BOTH BE ADDRESSED. (COMMENT. TO ENSURE SOCIAL STABILITY, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO INTEGRATE ALL THREE FORCES, BUT FOR FACILITY OF TRANSITION IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMPROMISE IN SEVERAL AREAS. THE RPF COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FOCUS ON OBTAINING HIGHER PERCENTAGES IN THE THE ARMY AND THE POLICE AND NOT INTEGRATE INTO THE GENDARMERIE. END COMMENT)

6. MARLEY EMPHASIZED THAT WHATEVER MECHANISM IS DEVELOPED FOR THE LONG TERM MUST ENGENDER CONFIDENCE IN THE SHORT TERM. AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE, THE RWANDANS ALSO INSISTED THAT THE RPF MUST BE REALISTIC IN ITS DEMANDS. SPEAKING BLUNTLY, THEY NOTED THAT THE RPF, AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SUFFER IF THE MECHANISM WERE TO BREAK DOWN.

7. TURNING TO PERCENTAGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY, THE RWANDANS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF RPF PARTICIPATION AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVELS, BUT CONFIDENTIAL

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INSISTED THAT THE PERCENTAGES AT LOWER LEVELS SHOULD BE KEPT SMALLER. MARLEY AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE RPF TO INITIALLY ACCEPT 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY FOR THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION. HE SUGGESTED THEY CONSIDER THE ZIMBABWE SOLUTION. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD INVOLVE INTEGRATING FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE RELATIVE NUMBERS EACH GROUP HAS AT THE TIME OF INTEGRATION AND ALLOWING PERCENTAGES TO SLIP DOWNWARDS ON THE BASIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS OVER TIME. END COMMENT.)

8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, GASANA INVITED MARLEY TO VISIT KIGALI AFTER THE NEXT ROUND OF ARUSHA TALKS, AND PERHAPS THEN TRAVEL TO RPF-HELD TERRITORY TO VISIT RPF COMMANDERS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER DAVE RAWSON OR AMBASSADOR FLATEN WOULD BE THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR AT THE NEXT ROUND, MARLEY NOTED THAT SINCE THE TIMING IS UNCLEAR, NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE.

COMMENT
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9. THE MINISTER AND DIRECTOR GENERAL SEEMED SERIOUS ABOUT SOLVING THE INTEGRATION QUESTIONS, BUT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION THE RPF MIGHT DEMAND AT ARUSHA. THE RWANDAN MILITARY HAS YET TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO GIVE THE RPF MORE THAN 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE CLEARLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (PERHAPS ON A 50/50 BASIS) AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES.
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