

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

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FROM:	BONN	C01519/BON	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON		Priority
CC:	NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Priority
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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

Your U52172 poses the hard questions, most of which cannot as yet be answered until further information on objectives and tasks is provided by the French. The German Foreign Office considers that this is something which France has to deliver on to its partners. They are for this reason cautious towards the initiative and there is no question of German participation. However, at the end of the day and for political reasons, Germany will probably fall in behind the French.

Action

For your information - your C52172 refers.

Report

We spoke to Timmermann, Rwanda desk officer in the German Foreign Office. Germany, like others in the WEU, had "welcomed" the French initiative, just as they welcomed any idea which could assist in improving the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. That being said, they, like others, were cautious.

2 The major problem was that the overall objectives of the French initiative were unclear. One could not, for example, determine whether this was the right strategy to pressure the

parties to negotiate a ceasefire (if that was France's objective). Neither could one yet assess whether intervention might have the effect of encouraging the RGF to continue fighting. Certainly the declared position of the RPF, as evidenced by their letter to the UN Secretary-General opposing the proposed intervention, could significantly complicate the position of UNAMIR and affect its future viability. The Foreign Office had no new information on the situation on the ground as they were working on the same media reports that you are.

3 Timmermann thought it was now up to the French to provide significantly more details on its initiative, particularly to persuade other countries of its value. During the discussions in the WEU, members had not opposed the initiative, but only Italy had come forward with an offer of assistance. The German Foreign Office considered that the WEU was not the appropriate body to take this action further. Rather any action should be taken under a UN umbrella, especially as a Chapter VII operation appeared to be contemplated. The TOR, objectives, and mandate of any intervention force needed to be discussed and agreed in the UNSC. Countries should not go it alone.

4 We asked about the option of speeding-up the deployment of the additional UNAMIR troops, as well as the possible German contribution. Timmermann agreed that the French were using the slow deployment of UNAMIR as one of the main reasons for their initiative. However, he did not wish to be drawn on whether a faster deployment was possible. On a possible German contribution to UNAMIR, there was still talk of the offer to provide relief flights for the civilian population, "circumstances permitting". But in reality it was very uncertain whether this would come off. The issue had caused considerable disagreement within the Federal Government. The environment was just too insecure and domestic political considerations too great for a contribution at this time. There was, of course, no question of German participation in the proposed French intervention.

Comment

5 While Germany was cautious, we were told that at the end of the day, they would not oppose the French initiative and would support an agreed UNSC resolution which sought to improve the situation in Rwanda. We assess that bilateral political considerations are a major influencing factor. Timmermann thought that the initiative arose because of enormous domestic political pressure in France to take concrete action to assist the humanitarian situation in Rwanda and that this was what was driving the French. This domestic pressure is likely to lead France to exerting pressure on its international partners.

End Message