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United States Department of State



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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
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DECL: OADR

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EAP - Winston Lord
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Seoul, November 8-10, 1994: Scope Paper

I. SETTING

U.S. and DPRK signature of the Agreed Framework moved the effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue from the negotiation to the implementation phase. Getting the agreement required a demanding and exhausting collaboration with the ROK,

[REDACTED]

Nevertheless, the October 21 agreement with North Korea was a good outcome, far better than anyone thought possible in June. Your visit can help encourage the ROK to set aside wariness and recognize the good outcome of our effort, and the strength of our relationship which made this possible.

At the same time, you will need to convey our sober conviction that the real work of implementing the agreement lies ahead, and that we will hold North Korea to its commitments. Stress that we will continue to cooperate closely in the implementation stage,

[REDACTED]

A no-illusions message that we are already working on the challenges ahead will bolster Seoul's confidence and help dissipate Korean ambivalence about the agreement. A key role will be played by the National Assembly, which will be called upon repeatedly in the years ahead to vote funds for the LWR project -- ultimately the ROK will pay \$3 billion or more. Your visit also presents opportunities to urge members of the Assembly to support the agreement and work with us to implement it.

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- 2 -

You should highlight publicly how valuable the Agreed Framework is to the ROK. President Kim Young Sam, Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo and other leaders have accepted that it serves the ROK's long-term interests, but they are still pressured by the persistence of doubt among the South Korean people.

We want the Korean public and media to recognize that our sometimes difficult collaboration on this issue has tested the mettle of our relationship, and has proven it to be strong and productive.

The Korean people are also ambivalent about our trade relations, seeing us as both the patron that brought them their present affluence and -- despite our open market -- the tough trade negotiator whose insistence on access to their markets somehow threatens that affluence. In this context, an important message to convey is that the Uruguay Round agreement, like the Geneva achievement, is testimony to a maturing partnership and a shared longer view of our common interests. It will also be important to remind Korean leaders that progress on trade issues, especially automobiles and agricultural products, is necessary.

A note of caution: to sustain a positive ambience and not give Koreans reason to fall into a zero-sum view of our relations, it would be prudent to avoid some themes that play well in Washington, but not in Seoul. Thus you will want to highlight Seoul's leadership role, rather than praise it for committing to the lion's share of the LWR funding for North Korea.

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Affirm that our successful collaboration on the Agreed Framework has strengthened our bilateral relationship.
- o At the same time, reaffirm the basic continuity and constancy of that relationship.

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- 3 -

- o Dispel misgivings about the Geneva Agreement.
- o Reassure that our commitment to ROK security remains firm.
- o Seek support for our positions on trade issues.

III. STRATEGY

Affirm that our successful collaboration on the Agreed Framework has strengthened our bilateral relationship.


- o Cite our success in Geneva as a cooperative achievement without precedent, and affirm that we will continue this teamwork in implementing the agreement.
- o Your meetings with ROKG and National Assembly leaders will be an opportunity to place this positive emphasis on our relationship as one that works well. In your public remarks you can also develop this theme.

At the same time, reaffirm the basic continuity and constancy of our friendship with Seoul.

- o South Koreans have two fears: that we will now be friendly with the North to the South's detriment, and that we will relax our guard against the North Korean military threat. Korean leaders and the Korean public want to be reassured that the Geneva Agreement will not diminish our relationship or lead us to take an equidistant policy toward the two Koreas.
- o Your theme that our friendship is stronger than ever is the antidote, along with specific assurances that we will move forward with the North only in unison with the South.

Dispel misgivings about the Geneva Agreement.

- o Assure Korean leaders that while Korea's financial commitment is large, this agreement initiates the process that will remove the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula. Korea's contributions are also a prudent investment in the future of all of Korea.



- o Beyond that, the agreement lays a foundation for real South-North dialogue and cooperation that can ultimately resolve what Koreans all regard as the fundamental tragedy of their people: the division of their country.

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- 4 -

- o Point out that we stuck to our principles and met our objectives with the North. The agreement is premised not on trust, but performance.

Reassure Korea that our commitment to ROK security remains firm.

- o Anxious about the changes that the Geneva Agreement will bring, Koreans want reassurance that we will continue to guarantee Korea's security. You can state categorically that we do not have any plans to reduce our troops.
- o An unqualified assurance that our security commitment is firm can allay fears and lead Koreans to rise to the tasks ahead: real dialogue with the North, and real progress on trade issues.

Seek support for our position on trade issues.

- o Many Koreans fear that the Uruguay Round will hurt their economy. You can stress that the key to prosperity in both of our countries lies in expanding world trade. We will be better equipped to deal with the inevitable structural stresses when our economies are growing strongly.
- o It will be important to remind Korean leaders that we need to make progress on bilateral trade issues as well, especially automobiles and agricultural issues.

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