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~~TOP SECRET~~

ITEMS SPECIFIED IN THE SPECIAL APPENDIX  
FILED ON JUNE 21, 1971 WITH THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

- I. Portions of Exhibits 7 and 7A the disclosure of which would present increased risks to the safety of U.S. forces

VOL IV. B. 3, Chronology, pages 1-23;  
VOL IV. C. 5, Chronology, pages 11-33;  
VOL IV. C. 6, Chronology, pages i-xviii -  
Detailed chronology of step-by-step  
development of the advisory buildup in SVN,  
1961-67; buildup of US forces, Mar-Jul 1965;  
and US ground strategy and force developments,  
1965-67, providing insight into US decision  
making process and reaction times.

Section I, Item 3



# UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

## 1945 - 1967

IV. B. 3.

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-67

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-67CHRONOLOGY

21 Jul 54	Geneva Cease-fire Accord	Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnam at 17th parallel; limited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (342).
22 Sep 54	Memo, JCS for SecDef, Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina.	U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVN.
11 Oct 54	Letter, J. F. Dulles (Sec State) to C. E. Wilson (SecDef)	Only small U.S. training forces to RVN to promote internal stability.
19 Oct 54	Memo, JCS for SecDef, Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina.	Opposed U.S. training RVN army. Risk not worth the gamble.
22 Oct 54	Msg, State to Saigon 1679	Set in motion "crash program" to improve RVN forces.
26 Oct 54	Memo, SecDef to JCS	JCS to prepare long-range program to improve RVN forces.
17 Nov 54	Memo, JCS for SecDef, Indochina.	Development of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not forthcoming.
20 Jan 55	Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins for SecState, Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council	Vietnam might be "saved" with U.S. aid; would be "lost" without it.
21 Jan 55	Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Military Program in South-east Asia.	Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in RVN: present program, advice with <u>leverage</u> , U.S. forces, or withdrawal.

24 Oct 55 -  
31 Aug 60

9 Dec 55

Memo for SecDef,  
Raising U.S. Military  
Personnel Ceiling in  
MAAG Vietnam

Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams,  
Chief of MAAG to Vietnam.

MAAG needed twice the current  
342 personnel to train RVNAF.

16 Dec 55

Memo, Director CIA from  
SecState

TERM also to serve as cover  
for intelligence gathering.

1959

Report, The President's  
Committee to Study the  
United States Military  
Assistance Program

Emphasized need for promoting  
internal security, coined term  
"mirror imaging."

7 Jun 59

Msg, State-Defense-ICA-  
CAS to Saigon 28

Forbids advisors to participate  
in combat.

27 Feb 60

Msg, Saigon to State 2525

Abolished TERM but added equal  
number of spaces to MAAG,  
Vietnam, increasing it from  
342 to 685.

10 Jun 60

U.S. Army Command &  
General Staff College,  
Study on Army Aspects of  
the Military Assistance  
Program in Vietnam

Prepared for Gen. Lionel C.  
McGarr, described Viet Cong  
strategy but deprecated ARVN  
participation in pacification.

1 Sep 60 -  
5 Mar 62

Lt Gen Lionel C. McGarr, Chief  
of MAAG to Vietnam.

4 Jan 61

Counter Insurgency Plan  
for South Vietnam (CIP),  
enclosure to msg, Saigon  
to State 276

Blueprint for RVNAF reorganiza-  
tion, containing Gen McGarr's  
recommendations for integrating  
ARVN and CG/SDC in a common chain  
of command to promote internal  
security.

17 Jan 61

Memo, General Lansdale  
for SecDef, Vietnam

Proposed extra-bureaucratic  
advisory effort carried out by  
specially selected and qualified  
personnel.

15 Mar 61 - 1 Aug 63		Frederick E. Koltting, Ambassador to South Vietnam .
28 Mar 61	NIE 50-61, Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia	Report that VC controlled most of countryside.
12 Apr 61	Memo, Walt W. Rostow to the President	Suggested appointment of Presidential Agent to oversee Vietnam programs in Washington.
19 Apr 61	Memo, Gen. Lansdale to SecDef, <u>Vietnam</u>	Proposed creation of inter- departmental task force on Vietnam.
20 Apr 61	Memo, SecDef for DepSecDef	McNamara asked Gilpatric for program to "prevent communist domination" of Vietnam, in response to Lansdale proposal.
27 Apr 61	Memo, DepSecDef for President, Program of Action for Vietnam	Recommended expanded U.S. effort in Vietnam, MAAG increase of 100, MAAG takeover of CG/SDC, U.S. advisors in field operations, creation of Presidential Task Force. Foreshadowed later decision.
1 May 61	Memo, R. I. Gilpatric for Presidential Task Force	Recommended augmenting MAAG by 2 training commands (1600 each) and deploy 400 Special Forces (increasing MAAG from 685 to 2285). Marked shift to con- ventional approach.
3 May 61	Memo, State Department to members of Task Force on Vietnam	Recommended revision of Gilpatric task force, proposed interdepart- mental task force under State leadership.
11 May 61	NSAM 52	Recorded President's decision to increase U.S. forces slightly and re-emphasized U.S. commitment.
15 May 61	Msg. Saigon to State 1743	Recorded Diem's refusal of U.S. combat troops on bilateral treaty.

18 May 61	Memo BG Lansdale for DepSecDef, <u>Vietnam</u>	Recorded Diem's acceptance of U.S. forces for training but not for fighting.
23 May 61	Memo, Vice President Johnson for President Kennedy	Report from Johnson's trip to Vietnam that "deeds must replace words."
27 May 61	Letter from President to each American Ambassador abroad. (See Memo, President for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 29 May 1961, "Responsibilities of Chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions," <u>Federal Register</u> , Vol. 26 Nr 22, 17 Nov 1961, p.10749 (F.R. Doc. 61-11012)).	Set forth coordinating authority for ambassadors.
9 Jun 61	Letter, President Diem to President Kennedy	Proposed 100,000 increase in RVNAF and corresponding expansion of MAAG.
15 Sep 61	MAAG, Vietnam, Geographically Phased National Level Plan for Counterinsurgency	Suggested operational sequence of priority areas for coordinated counterinsurgency effort under single chain of command.
1 Oct 61	Msg, Saigon to State 421	Diem asked for bilateral defense treaty with U.S.
Oct 61	JCSM 717-61	JCS proposal to send 20,000 U.S. combat troops to central highlands.
5 Oct 61	DF, Distribution Division, DCSPER, DA to Multiple Addressees, Improvement of Personnel Continuity and Effectiveness in Short Tour Overseas Areas.	OSD decision to increase tour of duty to 30 months with dependents, 18 without, instead of 24 and 12. Never put into effect.
10 Oct 61	SWIE 10-3-61, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam	Examined proposal for U.S. troop intervention.

11 Oct 61	Study, Concept of Intervention in South Vietnam, n.d., discussed at NSC meeting, 11 Oct 61	Proposed sending U.S. combat troops.
11 Oct 61	Memo for Record Roswell Gilpatric	Recorded decision to send Taylor to Vietnam and outlined alternatives to be considered.
25 Oct 61	Msg, Saigon to State	Diem's assurance that he favored deployment of U.S. troops.
25 Oct 61	Msg, Saigon 537, General Taylor to White House, State, Defense, JCS; Msg, Baguio 005, 1 Nov 61, Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor	Proposed sending 6-8000 troops under guise of "flood relief."
1 Nov 61	State Dept, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-3, 1 Nov 61, Communist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam	Reported increased VC activity in first half 1961: 500 assassinations, 1000 kidnappings, 1500 RVNAF KIA.
3 Nov 61	Report on General Taylor's Mission to South Vietnam.	Discussed VC strategy and threat and the weaknesses of the Diem regime. Proposed shift in U.S. effort "from advice to limited partnership."
14 Nov 61	Msg, State to Saigon 619	Recorded U.S. expectation of sharing in GVN decision-making.
22 Nov 61	NSAM 111, First Phase of Vietnam Program	Outlines U.S. actions and expected improvements in GVN.
22 Nov 61 25 Nov 61	Msg, Saigon to State 687; Msg, Saigon to State 708.	Ambassador Nolting reported that Diem refused to bow to U.S. pressure.
Dec 61	Msg, State to Saigon 693	Dropped insistence on explicit U.S. influence on GVN decisions, but assumed such influence as by-product of close partnership.

16 Jan 62	Hq, CINCPAC, Record of Second Secretary of Defense Conference	Recorded decisions of Honolulu Conference: establish battalion advisory teams, province advisors, CG/SDC training.
13 Feb 62 - 1 Aug 64		Gen. Paul D. Harkins, COMUSMACV
23 Jul 62	Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference	McNamara plan for phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, based on optimistic 1962 expectations.
1 Aug 63 - 1 Jul 64		Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam.
2 Oct 63	White House Statement	Announcement by President Kennedy of U.S. hopes for planned phased withdrawal of troops.
1 Nov 63		Diem overthrown by military coup d'etat.
1 Nov 63 - 16 Aug 64	Military Revolutionary Council	Duong Van Minh, Chief of State and Chairman, Military Revolutionary Council.
26 Nov 63	NSAM 273	Reaffirmed and continued Kennedy administration policies in Vietnam; placed emphasis on Mekong Delta; maintained military assistance at least as great as to Diem; reiterated plans for troop withdrawal; proposed no new programs nor increased U.S. assistance; authorized operations up to 50 km. within Laos.
7 Mar 64	Briefing Paper, Establishment of Critical District Advisory Teams (C), Briefing Book for McNaughton, Saigon [May 1964]	MACV extended U.S. advisory effort to district level in 13 key districts around Saigon.



17 Mar 64	NSAM 203, Implementation of South Vietnam Programs	The situation in Vietnam had deteriorated and was grave; VC controlled much of country; North Vietnamese support of V.C. had increased; RVNAF should be increased by 50,000; contingency plans for operations in Laos and Cambodia and overt retaliation against DRV should be developed; however, no major increase of U.S. advisory effort was called for.
17 Apr 64	Memo, DIA for SecDef, Status of the Vietnamese Hamlet Survey	Aerial photo reconnaissance revealed far fewer fortified hamlets than province officials claimed.
22 Apr 64	Memo, DepSecDef for CJCS	Secretary insisted that he personally approve every manpower space for MACV.
May 64	Briefing Book, Miscellaneous Messages, Status Reports, and Recommendations for Secretary McNamara, n.d.	Reported great instability in province governments, decline in GVN controlled population, increase in VC control; important provinces were in "critical condition."
12 May 64	Draft Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. S. B. Berry, Jr., Mil. Asst. to SecDef, n.d., <u>U.S. Embassy Briefing, Saigon.</u>	USOM 25% understrength, half this shortage in rural affairs staff.
12-13 May 64	McNamara trip to Saigon	Situation appeared critical.
22 May 64	Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV 6448, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.	COMUSMACV asked to study encadrement of CG/SDC with U.S. teams similar to White Star teams in Laos. JCS was examining alternative advisor expansions (1,000, 2,000, 3,000).
23 May 64	Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230418Z, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps	MACV opposed to "flooding" RVII with U.S. personnel; preferred build-up on selective basis, challenged "encadrement."

25 May 64	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps	JCS plan for 6 Mobile Training Teams in each province and training center, 70 advisors to each critical province, increase of 1000 personnel.
27 May 64	Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 4259, 270045Z.	Gen. Harkins disputed the value of U.S. conducted training for CG/SDC and of Mobile Training Teams; proposed advisors be used at district level for operations; accepted 1000 man increase.
27 May 64	Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270805Z, Vietnamese CG and SDC	CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV and outlined specific advisory build-up recommended: 956 personnel by end CY 65.
27 May 64	Msg, White House to Saigon (Personal for Gen. Paul Harkins)	Gen. Harkins requested to return to U.S.
28 May 64	Msg, Saigon to State 2338	USOM desire for gradual, not rapid, build-up; need for effective local administration and security.
30 May 64	JCSM-464-64, Pilot Program for Provision of Advisory Assistance to Paramilitary Forces in Seven Provinces	One of two JCS proposals submitted to McNamara outlining pilot program for advisory build-up: teams in 49 districts over 6 month period, 300 advisors.
30 May 64	JCSM-465-64, U.S. Advisory Assistance to the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.	Second proposal - Broader advisory increase program: 1000 personnel for all 239 districts over 1-1½ years.
30 May 64	JCSM-466-64, Provision of U.S. Advisors to Company Level Within Vietnamese Regular Ground Forces	JCS opposed extending U.S. advisors to company level, because of increased casualties, language problems, ARVN opposition.

1 Jun 64	Honolulu Conference	
25 Jun 64	Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MAC 7325380, Extension of U.S. Advisory Assistance	Elaborated decision of Honolulu conference to expand advisory effort to district level, and to increase battalion-level advisory groups to make company level advisory teams available.
1 Jul 64 - 31 Jul 65		Maxwell Taylor, Ambassador to South Vietnam.
17 Jul 64	Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ-316180, Support Requirements for Extension of U.S. Advisory Program.	COMUSMACV reached 4200 personnel in addition to 926 battalion and district advisors - "the straw that broke the camel's back" of the overburdened support base.
28 Jul 64	Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MACJ1 7044, Personnel Augmentation.	COMUSMACV requested 4200 personnel by 1 Dec 64 and remainder of 4772 total increase by 1 Feb 65.
Jul 64	Hop Tac	Idea for Hop Tac; special combined US/GVN effort to secure critical area round Saigon, proposed by Amb. Lodge at Honolulu Conference.
1 Aug 64 - 30 Jun 68		Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of MACV.
2 Aug 64	Tonkin Gulf Incident	U.S.S. Maddox allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.
4 Aug 64	JCSM-665-64, Additional Support in RVN on Accelerated Basis	McNamara wanted additional men provided more quickly than Westmoreland's plan.
5 Aug 64	Tonkin Gulf Resolution	Congress passed joint resolution supporting "all necessary action" to protect U.S. forces and assist Vietnam.
7 Aug 64	Memo, SecDef for CJCS, Additional Support for Republic of Vietnam on an Accelerated Basis.	McNamara directed that accelerated deployment be completed by end of September.

11 Aug 64	Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ3 7738, Additional Support for RVN	Westmoreland replied that he could not absorb build-up in time requested by McNamara.
15 Aug 64	Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF et al, JCS 7953, Additional Support in RVN.	McNamara cancelled accelerated deployment, services instructed to deploy personnel in accordance with Westmoreland's initial recommendations.
16 Aug 64 - 26 Oct 64	Khanh coup.	Nguyen Khanh, President, Head of State and Chief, Revolutionary Military Council (30 Jan 64 to 26 Oct 64, 27 Jan 65 to 21 Feb 65).
12 Sep 64	Hop Tac	Hop Tac launched with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province. Mission aborted following day by coup.
4 Nov 64 - 11 Jun 65		Phan Klac Suu, Chief of State
Dec 64		Crisis between Amb. Taylor and Gen. Khanh resulted from Taylor's attempt to use U.S. decision to begin bombing DRV as lever to get GVN reform. Taylor abandoned further attempts at leverage.
Dec 64	"Troika sign-off" for piasters abolished	USOM Director Killen decided to abandon joint sign-off for release of piaster funds for pacification - important leverage tool.
23 Jan 65		McNamara approved RVNAF force increase proposal for MAP support. New strength authorizations: 275,058 Regular Forces, 137,187 RF and 185,000 PF. (Alternative 1).
7 Feb 65		FLAMING DART reprisal attacks against DRV launched.

22 Feb 65		Gen. Westmoreland recommended sending two Marine Battalion Landing Teams to DaNang for base security.
26 Feb 65		ROLLING THUNDER, sustained bombing of DRV, initiated.
26 Feb 65		Decision to send Marines to DaNang made in Washington.
6 Mar 65		Marines went ashore at DaNang.
16 Mar 65	JCS message 0936	Gen. H. K. Johnson returned from trip to Vietnam with recommendation for deployment of U.S. combat force and creation of joint command.
20 Mar 65		Westmoreland requested authorization to implement Alternative 2 RVNAF strength increase (greater than alternative 1 by 15,000).
21 Mar 65	COMUSMACV message 1566	Westmoreland opposed any formal merging of commands, preferred informal cooperation.
26 Mar 65	MACV "Commander's Estimate of the Situation"	As a strategy alternative, Westmoreland rejected proposal for accelerated RVNAF build-up as insufficient to prevent VC victory.
1-2 Apr 65		Washington strategy conference with Brig Gen De Puy, Amb. Taylor.
6 Apr 65	NSAM 328	President approved dispatch of two more battalions and an air wing and authorized their employment for active combat missions.
12 Apr 65	MACV Command History 1965	McNamara approved JCS recommendation for RVNAF expansion of 17,200. 160 additional U.S. advisors approved.
15 Apr 65	Defense Department message 009164, Joint State/Defense Message	Defense Department sought to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduced in provinces to improve civil administration. Amb. Taylor's opposition killed proposal.

15 Apr 65	Department of State message 2332	McGeorge Bundy informed Amb. Taylor that President wanted to try "encadrement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese."
15 Apr 65	DOD message 151233Z	DOD requested COMUSMACV's opinion about feasibility of encadrement of U.S. officers in ARVN divisions to improve effectiveness.
18 Apr 65	Honolulu Conference, MACV Command History	Based on study by Gen. Throckmorton, encadrement proposals were rejected because of language problem, expanded support requirement, and adverse effects on South Vietnamese morale.
Apr 65	MACV Command History 1965	Westmoreland suggested joint MACV-JGS staff. Gen. Thieu and Gen. Minh were opposed.
3 May 65	Hop Tac pacification	Corps commanders for I, II, IV Corps presented Hop Tac plans for their zones, each to extend "oil blot" pacification from its headquarters city. (By end of 1965 became scheme for National Priority Areas.)
11 May 65		Viet Cong attacked and overran Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory compound in the city.
14 May 65	JCS message 142228Z	McNamara authorized creation of formal combined command in Vietnam and coordinating MACV-JGS staff.
21 May 65	COMUSMACV message <u>Combined Command</u> ; JCS message 240603Z	Westmoreland recommended against proposed combined command because of Thieu's and Ky's opposition.
26 May 65	CINCPAC msg to JCS 3027, 260332Z	CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's opposition to combined command because of fears of Vietnamese hostility.

late May 65

VC force ambushed and decimated ARVN 51st Regiment and 2 battalions near Ba Gia, west of Quang Ngai City.

Jun 65                      Origin of CAP

Several Marines assigned to work with local PF near Phu Bai, I Corps.

7 Jun 65                      MACV message to CINCPAC and JCS 19118

Moratorium on RVNAF build-up required because trainees needed as fillers in existing units to replace heavy casualties. Westmoreland requested 44 additional U.S. battalions; reported severe ARVN deterioration.

19 Jun 65 -  
present.

Nguyen Van Thieu, Chief of State and Chairman, National Leadership Council, 20 Jun 65 to 9 Nov 67, elected President 31 Oct 67.

Jun 65

Viet Cong attacked Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai with more than two regiments.

25 Jun 65

VC Central Highlands offensive began, district headquarters at Tou Morong, Kontum Province, was overrun.

26 Jun 65                      MACV Military Report, 19-26 June

MACV noted 5 ARVN regiments and 9 battalions combat ineffective.

Jul 65

18 US/FW combat maneuver battalions were in Vietnam.

Jul 65                      MACV Command History, 1965

11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be disorganized to provide fillers for line units due to heavy casualties.

7 Jul 65

Six district capitals had been abandoned or overrun.

20 Jul 65	SecDef Memorandum for the President	McNamara urged U.S. to lay down terms for continuing assistance before introduction of more forces; suggested exercise leverage through control of rice policy.
25 Jul 65	Saigon message 266	Amb. Taylor did not want to appear to impose conditions for increased aid.
28 Jul 65		President announced expanded U.S. effort and increased troop commitment to Vietnam.
7 Aug 65	MACV Command History 1965.	CG III MAF designated as Senior Advisor to ARVN I CTZ Commander.
Sep 65	Lodge Ambassador	Lodge returned to Vietnam for second term as ambassador. Term of office: 31 Jul 65 - Apr 67.
Sep 65		COMUSMACV evaluated 3-month experiment with "single manager" teams in 3 provinces, found it partially successful but scrapped the idea.
1 Oct 65	MACV Command History, 1965.	MACV created separate contingency fund for each subsector advisor for urgent projects, in attempt to overcome delays in Vietnamese pacification system.
16 Oct 65 18 Oct 65	State Dept msg 1039 Saigon msg 1324	USOM sought to restore troika sign-off but State Dept. opposed this idea. The attempt was abandoned.
21 Oct 65		Commander of HQ Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) designated as II CTZ Senior Advisor. (At insistence of ARVN Corps commanders, who felt they would suffer loss of prestige if advised by less than Senior U.S. officer in corps.)



3 Nov 65	SecDef Draft Memorandum for the President	McNamara recorded impatience with GVN, recommended giving larger role to advisors at province and district level.
5 Nov 65	MACV Command History	Westmoreland recommended increased RVNAF force levels for FY 66 and FY 67, to limit of available manpower.
Nov 65	CAP Program	Agreement between I Corps Commander and CG III MAF permitting integration of Marine squads into PF platoons in DaNang area to form Combined Action Platoon (CAP): Marine Rifle Squad (14) and PF Platoon (32-38).
28 Nov 65		McNamara trip to Saigon, approves RVNAF force increase recommendation.
15 Dec 65	Lodge memorandum for Gen. Lansdale; MACV Command History	Lodge specified that GVN pacification effort was primarily civilian, consequently on U.S. side the two civilian agencies, USAID and CAS, should be generating support agencies.
8-11 Jan 66	Warrenton Conference Report	Members of Saigon Mission, Vietnam Coordinating Committee and other senior officials met at Warrenton, Virginia, to review pacification problem. It foreshadowed a redirection of advisory effort toward pacification.
Jan 66	MACV Analysis of RVNAF for CY 66	At Mission Council meeting, Amb. Lodge expressed concern that the number of U.S. advisors not smother the Vietnamese at all levels.
4 Feb 66	State to Saigon 2252	U.S. requested Honolulu meeting with Thieu, Ky to express concern about pacification, economic problems, GVN lack of popular support.

6-8 Feb 66	Honolulu Conference	LBJ concern about the "other war," Thieu and Ky made pledges of increased pacification, promised elections. Amb. William Porter was assigned responsibility for civil support of RD.
28 Feb 66	Mission Council Minutes, Feb 28, 1966	Porter described his understanding of his duties to Mission Council: coordinating effort for all civil aspects of revolutionary development, through the Mission Liaison Group.
Feb 66		MACV subsector pacification contingency fund abandoned after 4-month trial period due to opposition of GVN RD Minister Thang; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on U.S.
Mar 66	PROVN Study Summary Statement, Mar 66	Program for Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) completed for internal army use. Revealed lack of coordination among U.S. agencies in pacification.
23 Apr 66	Saigon to State 4160, Apr 23, 1966; 4200, Apr 26; 4435, May 7; 5546, June 15	Lodge reviewed prospects for introduction of U.S. leverage in Buddhist "Struggle Movement"; desired to bring dissidents under GVN control, but saw no way to achieve decisive results. Recommended to Washington that a sign-off system be reinstated to reduce corruption and increase U.S. influence at lower levels.
Jul 66		Stepped-up pacification effort: Operation Lam Son, combined RD "Search and Seal" operations with U.S. 1st Infantry Division and ARVN 5th Division in Binh Duong. U.S. 25th Division "adopted" districts in Han Nghia Province.

Jul 66

"Roles and Missions" Study Group began work for Amb. Porter. Completed in August. Recommendations for support for a reemphasis on pacification.

Sep 66

McNamara proposed that responsibility for sole management of pacification be assigned to COMUSMACV, who would have a Deputy to command all pacification activities. AID, CIA, USIA opposed such reorganization; Komer and JCS concurred.

29 Sep 66

Komer, "Memorandum for Secretary McNamara"

Komer stressed that unified management of pacification was needed.

23-25 Oct 66

Manila Conference

At Manila Conference Thieu and Ky formally accepted commitment of ARVN to support RD, and "National Reconciliation" program to attract VC back to government was announced.

Oct 66

McNamara trip to Saigon. Ky agreed to shift in combat missions for U.S. and RVNAF forces: U.S. to conduct large-scale offensive operations, RVNAF to provide security to RD.

7 Nov 66

MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1967 (AB 142)

Spelled out new division of labor between U.S. and RVNAF. JGS agreed to keep 53 ARVN battalions (50% of ARVN combat units) assigned to support RD.

7 Nov 66

Memorandum, Amb. Lodge for the Secretary of State, SecDef and Komer; message, Saigon 11125, Nov. 17.

Lodge defined terms of reference for what was established as the Office of Civil Operations (OCO).

8 Dec 66

MACV msg 52414 to  
CINCPAC

Westmoreland reported to CINCPAC on poor quality and performance of ARVN. First 10 months of 1966, the number of ARVN maneuver battalions with minimally acceptable operational strength fluctuated from 31 to 78 of total of 121 organized units.

17 Dec 66

W. W. Rostow, Memorandum to Secretary of Defense and Acting Secretary of State, draft NSAM attached

Pacification listed as third strategic objective and five programs concerned with pacification were outlined, heralding re-emphasis on pacification in 1967.

27 Dec 66

JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-792-66, line-in, line-out revised draft NSAM attached.

JCS replied to Rostow's draft after consulting CINCPAC; stiffening and making more specific U.S. commitment to war, introducing term "revolutionary development," eliminated references to "national reconciliation" for ex-VC, and watered down commitment to constitutional-electoral efforts underway.

9 Jan 67

MACV msg 00949

In Dec 1966 a 12-officer team from each ARVN had undergone training on RD support so that each might instruct its division on the new duties. The division training programs began in Jan 67.

18 Jan 67

MACV msg 02149 to  
CINCPAC from MACCORDS

MACV described new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to CINCPAC.

20 Jan 67

ASD(ISA) John T. McNaughton Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Draft NSAM on "Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam;" McNaughton's line-in, line-out revised draft and the JCS revision attached.

McNaughton draft for Vietnam strategic guidelines incorporated most JCS recommendations, emphasized security, anti-infrastructure and intelligence in support of R/D, pushed "National Reconciliation."

24 Jan 67

MACV msg 02916, Westmoreland sends

Westmoreland stated that the effectiveness of RVMAF must be increased and that its image must be improved.

28 Jan 67	Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance letter to W. W. Rostow	Vance sent McNaughton version to Rostow as Defense Department reply to his memorandum. No NSAM was ever promulgated.
Feb 68	"Pacification Slowdown" Southeast Asia Analysis Report, Feb 68, OASD(SA) SEA Programs Directorate	OASD(SA) reported that pacification effort in 1967 had failed.
18 Mar 67	MACV msg 09101, Westmoreland sends	Westmoreland cabled CINCPAC requesting an "optimum force" increase of 4-2/3 divisions (201,250 men) or as a "minimum essential force", 2-1/3 divisions (100,000 men). No major expansion of RVNAF called for: 6,307 more spaces for ARVN, 50,000 more RF/PF.
20-21 Mar 67	Guam Conference	President Johnson met with Thieu and Ky in Guam. They presented draft constitution and agreed to a proclamation on National Reconciliation.  Johnson decided to transfer control of pacification to MACV and send Robert Komer to head new operation in Saigon.
25 Mar 67	Embassy Saigon msg 21226, Eyes Only for the President from Lodge	Lodge stressed importance of RVNAF for MACV success, praised Abrams as man to oversee RVNAF improvement.
Mar 67		Gen. Creighton Abrams became Westmoreland deputy and assumed responsibility for U.S. advisory effort to RVNAF.
1 Apr 67		New South Vietnamese Constitution promulgated.

24 Apr 67	R. W. Komer Memorandum for the President	Komer asserted that decisive contest lay in pacification in the South, rejected Westmoreland's request for additional 200,000 troops, proposed methods to improve RVNAF and pacification, suggested increased pressure on GVN for reforms.
1 May 67		New Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, arrived in Saigon.
7 May 67	MACV msg 15064	Reported Jan. decision to make a unit by unit effectiveness evaluation and to cut off support for superfluous or below standard units. Resulted in several warnings but no suspension of support. Also reported RVNAF desertions were won for Jan-Feb 1967 from Jan-Feb 1966.
9 May 67	NSAM 362	Komer's appointment as single manager for pacification announced internally.
12 May 67	Embassy Saigon Airgram 622, Subject: Revolutionary Development	Gloomy account of progress of RD in first three months of 1967.
13 May 67	Ambassador Bunker statements to the press in Saigon, May 13, 1967	Announcement of transfer of OCO to MACV, Bunker stressed combined civil-military nature of pacification.
15 May 67	Embassy Saigon msg. 25839	First meeting of Komer with Ky. Ky declined to place GVN RD efforts under JGS.
28 May 67	State Department msg DTG 092304Z; MACV Dir 10-12, 28 May 1967.	MACV issued directive with instructions on new RD organizational arrangements.
May 67	JCSM-530-67, Subject: Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Force Level, 28 Sep 67 (a review of the year's actions).	McNamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RVNAF to prevent further inflation in Vietnam and to arrest some of the balance of payments flow of U.S. spending.

14 Jun 67

Amb. R. W. Komer, Memorandum for General W. C. Westmoreland, Subject: Organization for Attack on V.C. Infrastructure

Komer recommended consolidation, under his direction, of U.S. anti-infrastructure intelligence effort. Desired unified GVN/US, civil/military "management structure targeted on infrastructure." ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) structure was developed.

14 Jun 67

Embassy Saigon msg 28095, For the President from Bunker

Bunker described MACV actions underway to improve RVNAF: improving leadership, better pay, improving command structure and equipment of RF/PF training, integrated US/RVNAF operations, reviews.

17 Jun 67

MACCORDS, Project Take-off, prepared by the ACoFS, CORDS; Headquarters MACV

Project TAKEOFF contained analysis of reasons for part failure, appraisal of current situation, and recommendations for future emphasis in RD; suggested increased use of U.S. leverage and control.

4 Jul 67

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memo for the SecDef, Subj: Improvement in RVNAF Force Effectiveness

Enthoven claimed that primary reason for RVNAF ineffectiveness was the quantity and quality of leadership and recommended that the Secretary query MACV on leadership problems.

13 Jul 67

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Fallout for SecDef Trip to South Vietnam (TS-SENS-EYES ONLY for Dr. Heyman); and OASD(SA) General Purpose Forces, W.K. Brehm; Memo for the Record, Subj: SEA Deployments, Jul 14, 1967

In Saigon, McNamara gave planning authorization for U.S. augmentation up to 525,000 spaces, and civilianization of 10,000 additional spaces to fulfill Westmoreland's lower force alternative.

14 Aug 67

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memo for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5

New U.S. force level of 525,000 promulgated as Deployment Program #5.

30 Aug 67	DASD(SA) Memo for the SecDef	Amb. Komer complained that the CORDS advisory element's actual strength was seriously below authorization due to bureaucratic delays.
31 Aug 67	Dept of State Msg 30023	Study of leverage by Hans Heymann and Lt Col Volney Warner recommended increased use.
7 Sep 66	COMUSMACV Memo for Ambassador Lodge	Westmoreland disagreed with Roles and Missions Study Group recommendation to remove division from chain of command below CTZ level and strengthening role of Province Chief.
15 Sep 67	JCSM 505-67, Subj: U.S. Forces Deployments Vietnam (Refined Troop List)	JCS submitted final detailed troop list for Program #5. Contained 2,577 additional advisors and 666 Special Forces to perform advisor-like functions.
16 Sep 67	Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress, MACV-J341	First published Review and Analysis for RVNAF appeared: long catalogue of RVNAF deficiencies.
19 Sep 67	Embassy Saigon msg 7113	Komer replied to recommendation for increased use of U.S. leverage that it must be done discreetly. Proposed comprehensive system of country-wide leverage was never adopted.
28 Sep 67	JCSM-530-67, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force Level	JCS forwarded with endorsement the MACV-CINCPAC recommendation on FY 68 RVNAF force increases: total increase of 63,586; 47,839 for RF/PF and 15,747 for regular forces. MACV requested further increase of 78,204 for FY 1969.
7 Oct 67	SecDef Memo for CJCS, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force Level, and attached OASD(SA) memo for the SecDef, 5 Oct 67	McNamara approved the requested FY 68 augmentations for RVNAF, against the wishes of Enthoven, who would have authorized only half as many.



26 Oct 67

"Information on MATs (Mobile Advisory Teams) and MALTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams)," 8 May 1968, working paper prepared by the ACoFS MA, MACV

MACV conference on RF/PF, convened to study problems of RF/PF expansion and to plan for expansion of advisory effort, recommended complete reorientation of advisory concept for RF/PF, establishment of Mobile Advisory Teams to be used on a rotating basis.


15 Dec 67

Westmoreland approved new RF/PF advisory system: MATs and MALTs, to be phased in during 1968.

31 Jan 68

Tet Offensive

VC/NVA initiate massive attacks on population centers throughout Vietnam during Lunar New Year (Tet) holiday period.



# UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

## 1945 - 1967

IV. C. 5.

PHASE I IN THE BUILD-UP OF U.S. FORCES

THE DEBATE

MARCH - JULY 1965

CHRONOLOGY OF BUILD-UP ACTIVITY

<u>Date 1965</u>	<u>Document or Event</u>	<u>Agency &amp; Action</u>	<u>Number of Maneuver Battalions Physically in Vietnam</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
11 Feb	JCSM 100-65	JCS recommended in conjunction with program for the 1st eight weeks of air activity against NVN the collatoral action of landing one MEB at Da Nang for security of the air base.		
20 Feb	JCSM 121-65	JCS reiterated CINCPAC recommendation to land MEB at Da Nang. Presence of the Marines would serve to deter VC/DRV action against the base and would enhance readiness posture for other contingencies.		
22 Feb	MACV 220743Z	Westmoreland recommended landing of 2/3 of MEB to secure base and installations at Da Nang.		
22 Feb	Embtel 2699	Taylor concurred in MACV's request to the extent of 1/3 MEB for security but warned against further foreign troop deployments.		
23 Feb	MACV 231230Z	Westmoreland backed down to 1/3 MEB with proviso that more could follow after 1st battalion was in place.		

US/FW: U.S. and Free World Maneuver Battalions in SVN

MAF: Marine Amphibious Force

MEB: Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force

BLT: Battalion Landing Team

SIF: Special Landing Force

24 Feb	CINCPAC 240315Z	<u>Sharp</u> recommended 2/3 MEB for security at Da Nang.	
24 Feb	JCSM 130-65	<u>JCS</u> recommended 2/3 MEB for security.	Appr. 25 Feb
26 Feb	Deptel 1840	<u>State</u> told <u>Ambassador</u> 2/3 MEB approved for landing contingent on GVN approval. /Dep SecDef approval on 25 Feb./ Remaining elements of MEB deferred.	
28 Feb	Embtel 2789	<u>Taylor</u> told <u>State</u> he'd get GVN approval for 2 BLTs to land at Da Nang. He said that should be all we send and that they would eventually be relieved by Viet forces.	
2 Mar	Deptel 6166	<u>McNaughton</u> told <u>Taylor</u> that it would be desirable to substitute 173d Airborne for the Marines at Da Nang.	
2 Mar	Embtel 1954	<u>Taylor</u> supported <u>Westmoreland</u> in opposing substitution of 173d.	
3 Mar	CINCPAC 030230Z	<u>CINCPAC</u> opposed attempted substitution citing seven OPLANS calling for Marines into Da Nang.	
4 Mar	JCSM 121-65	<u>JCS</u> recommended deployment of entire MEB to Da Nang, one Army Bde to Thailand, reconstitution of MEB in WestPac, and alert of III MEF (-) and 25 Inf Div as insurance in support of deterrence deployments.	
4 Mar	JCSM 144-65	<u>JCS</u> urged <u>SecDef</u> to reconsider deferred funds for Chu Lai airstrip. Facility was needed to "prepare for a wide variety of courses of action."	Appr. by SecDef 18 Mar 65

6 Mar	Press Release	DOD said U.S. at request of GVN will put 2 BLTs at Da Nang for security.	
7 Mar	JCS 070001Z	JCS ordered CINCPAC to commence landing Marines and build up to two battalions ashore.	
8 Mar		3500 Marines landed at Da Nang.	2 US/FW
14 Mar	CSA Memo for SecDef & JCS	Gen Johnson recommended 21 separate measures for increased support of the GVN. Measures merely were increases in the same vein as previous steps. He also proposed deployment of up to a full U.S. division for security of various bases with the concomitant release of Viet troops from security mission for combat. The U.S. Division could go either to coastal enclaves and Saigon or into the II Corps highlands. Finally, Johnson proposed a four-division force comprised of U.S. and SEATO troops along the DMZ and into Laos to contain NVN infiltration of men and supplies.	Pres. appr 21 pts. 15 Mar & again on 1 Apr; deferred the rest.
15 Mar	JCS met w/Pres.	President urged the JCS to come up with measures to "kill more VC"; he approved most of Gen Johnson's recommendations.	
17 Mar	"Strength of VC Military Forces in SVN"	Joint CIA, DIA, State Memo showing VC Order of Battle (confirmed) as follows:  37,000 Regular Forces 100,000 ± Irregulars and Militia  Confirmed strength up 33% over 1964.  5 Regimental Hq 50 Battalions 145 Separate Companies 35 Separate Platoons	

17. Mar MACV 170747Z

Westmoreland recommended landing one Marine BLT at Phu Bai, near Hue, to secure airfield there and enable thereby movement of helicopters from congested area at Da Nang to Phu Bai. Recommended a 4th BLT within a month.

18 Mar Embtel 3003

Taylor supported Westmoreland's Phu Bai request above and went on to discuss pro's and con's of introduction of U.S. Division without offering a recommendation.

19 Mar CINCPAC  
192207Z

Sharp recommended to JCS that remainder of MEB be landed within a month and one BLT at Phu Bai be landed ASAP.

20 Mar JCSM 204-65

JCS proposed sending 2 US and 1 ROK division to SVN for active operations against VC. Marines to I CTZ could be had quickly in concert with US/ contingency plans for DRV/Chicom aggression. (A portion of this proposal could have been construed as a deterrent measure to Chicom aggression.) All forces were to engage in offensive operations with or without centralized command structure. Location for ROK Div not specified, but Army Div was to go to II CTZ highlands to release ARVN battalions for operations along the coast. The JCS proposed resupplying it by air until Rte 19 could be opened. This recommendation considered by the JCS to be an essential component of the broader program to put pressure on the DRV/VC

25 Mar JCSM 216-65

JCS reiterated CINCPAC's recommendation that 1 BLT and remaining MEB elements be landed at Da Nang and one BLT be landed at Phu Bai -- all to improve security situation.

Appr. by  
Pres. 1 Apr  
& in NSAM  
328 6 Apr.

26 Mar "Commander's Estimate of The Situation in SVN"

Westmoreland predicted that air activity would not bear fruit in the next six months, and in the interim, RVNAF needed 3d country reinforcements to enable it to offset VC/DRV build-up and enjoy favorable force ratios while permitting an "orderly" build-up of its own forces. MACV wanted the equivalent of two divisions by June '65 and possibly more thereafter if bombing failed. Westmoreland proposed deploying Marines as described in JCSM 216-65, an Army brigade in Bien Hoa/Vung Tau, and an Army division to the II CTZ highlands with a couple of battalions to protect coastal bases. The mission of these forces was to be defense of vital installations and defeat of VC efforts to control Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh region.

27 Mar Embtel 3120

Taylor told State that if U.S. forces were to come in for combat, he favored offensive enclave - mobile reaction concept of employment rather than territorial clear and hold in highlands or defensive enclave.

29 Mar SecDef & JCS met with Amb Taylor

JCS three division plan presented to Taylor. The latter inclined to disfavor it because too many troops were involved, the need wasn't manifest, and the Viets would probably resent it. SecDef was inclined to favor the proposal but desired more information in reference to the Taylor qualifications.

1-2 Apr NSC meetings  
with Amb Taylor  
present

President Johnson decided to send two more Marine battalions to Da Nang and Phu Bai and to alter the mission of U.S. combat forces "to permit their more active use" under conditions to be established by the Secy of State in consultation with SecDef. He also approved 18 to 20,000 man increase in U.S. forces to fill out existing units and provide needed logistic personnel. (All of these changes were to be contingent on GVN concurrence.) A slowly ascending tempo in response to rises in enemy rates of activity was approved for the Rolling Thunder program. The President agreed to overtures to GOA, GNZ, and to ROK, seeking combat support from them.

NSAM 328  
6 Apr

2 Apr CIA Director  
Memo to  
SecDef &  
others

McCone said present level of RT not hurting DRV enough to make them quit. He warned against putting more U.S. troops into SVN for combat operations, since that would merely encourage the USSR and China to support the DRV/VC at minimum risk. He predicted covert infiltration of PAVN and the U.S. getting mired down in a war it could not win.

2 Apr JCSM 238-65

JCS asked SecDef to clear the decks of "all administrative impediments that hamper us in the prosecution of this war." Specifically, they asked for: increases in funds, a separate MAP for SEA, improved communications systems, quicker response to CINCPAC's requests, exemption of SEA from balance of payments goals, authority to extend military terms of service and to consult with Congress on the use of Reserves, relaxation of civilian



		and military manpower ceilings, and a substantial increase in military air transport in and out of SVN.	
4 Apr	CINCPAC 042058Z (For Taylor)	<u>Taylor</u> told <u>State</u> that in absence of further guidance, he will tell GVN that Marine mission is now mobile counterinsurgency, plus reserve, in support of ARVN up to 50 miles of base.	
5 Apr	SecDef Memo to CJCS	<u>McNamara</u> told <u>Wheeler</u> that he understood the JCS to be planning for the earliest practicable introduction of 2-3 Div into SVN.	
8 Apr	JCSM 265-65	JCS recommended RVNAF build-up be accelerated through an additional 17,247 MAP-supported spaces plus 160 advisors.	SecDef appr. 12 Apr
9-10 Apr	Planning Conference in Honolulu	<u>PACOM</u> and <u>JCS</u> representatives recommended deployment of 173d Airborne Brigade to Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for security of the installations there and an Army brigade to Qui Nhon/Nha Trang to prepare for the later introduction of a division. They also recommended that the 173d be replaced by a CONUS brigade ASAP. They treated the two Marine BLTs of NSAM 328 as approved and described as "in planning" the remainder of the JCS's three-division force (III MEF (-), ROK Div, and U.S. Army Div). They recommended that I MEF be deployed to WEST-PAC to improve readiness posture.	
11-14 Apr		Two Marine BLTs land at Phu Bai and Da Nang.	4 US/FW
11 Apr	MACV 110825Z	<u>Westmoreland</u> told <u>CINCPAC</u> that he still wanted a U.S. division in the highlands, even though it was apparent Washington was	

not of a mind to approve it. He also reaffirmed the need for an Army brigade in the Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area for security, to strengthen the eastern flank of the Hop Tac area, and to act as a mobile reserve in case needed in the highlands. To forestall political difficulty, Westmoreland said he'd like to see a joint staff with the RVNAF and an International Military Assistance Force under U.S. hegemony in the Da Nang area.

12 Apr Meeting,  
SecDef &  
JCS

McNamara agreed with JCS that Marines' "Enclave" build-up plan would be adopted. Concept was to initially provide base security and then phase into combat operations from logistically supportable base areas. The logistics base extant at that juncture was recognized to be inadequate.

12 Apr Embtel 3372

Taylor told State that with the 18 to 20,000 man increase in support forces authorized by NSAM 328, "some preliminary work in anticipation of the arrival of additional U.S. forces" could be accomplished but that for "significant progress toward the establishment of a logistic base to support additional forces," about 5000 more engineers would be required. He went on to say that despite studies dealing with ambitious plans for reinforcement, he hoped that "they do not interfere with essential work in preparation for less ambitious but more probable deployments." He indicated favorable disposition toward the establishment

of brigade-sized enclaves at Qui Nhon and Bien Hoa/Vung Tau "if the Marines demonstrate effectiveness..."

13 Apr

McNamara approved deployment of 173d Airborne to Bien Hoa/Vung Tau subject to GVN concurrence (with Presidential sanction).

14 Apr JCS 140050Z

JCS asked CINCPAC to deploy the 173d to SVN as soon after GVN concurrence as possible. Their mission would be to initially secure Bien Hoa/Vung Tau and then phase into counterinsurgency operations.

14 Apr Embtel 3373

Taylor surprised at decision to deploy the 173d. He requested a hold.

Embtel 3374

Taylor & Westmoreland both embarrassed at amount of heavy equipment, not appropriate for counterinsurgency, brought ashore in Da Nang by Marines.

Embtel 3384

Taylor advised Washington to keep additional U.S. forces out of SVN, perhaps just offshore, until need for them is incontrovertible.

15 Apr JCSM 281-65

JCS replied to Taylor's traffic of the previous day. They said the 173d was needed for security of air operations and logistic bases and for subsequent phasing into counterinsurgency operations. They added that the security of existing or proposed bases at Chu Lai, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang required a battalion each. They added that to deploy the Marines without their full complement of equipment would be imprudent. They (the Marines) were now prepared to meet any contingency.

15 Apr Deftel 9164

McNaughton told Saigon that "highest authority" felt situation in SVN was deteriorating, and proposed seven actions to help remedy the situation, including: (1) encadrement of U.S. troops in ARVN units either 50 U.S. to each of 10 ARVN battalions or combined operations of 3 U.S. and 3 ARVN battalions; (2) a brigade force into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for security and subsequent combat operations; (3) battalions into coastal enclaves for further experimentation with U.S. forces in counterinsurgency role; (4) application of U.S. recruiting techniques in RVN; (5) expansion of MEDCAP; (6) pilot experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S. civil affairs personnel integrated into gov't structure; and (7) provision of food directly to RVNAF troops.

17 Apr Embtel 3419  
& 3421

Taylor told McGeorge Bundy that 7-point program plus all visiting firemen were rocking the boat and asked for respite.

17 Apr Embtel 3423

Taylor sent to Washington the kind of guidance he felt he should have received in order to carry out all that Washington had proposed in the past week.

17 Apr JCSM 288-65

JCS proposed sending one Marine BLT to Chu Lai to secure the CB's constructing the air-strip there.

17 Apr JCS 171847Z

JCS described to CINCPAC the concept for U.S. combat units deploying to SEA as assistance

in arresting the deteriorating situation against the VC and as an assurance that the U.S. would be ready to counter overt DRV or Chicom action should such occur.

20 Apr Honolulu Conference

McNamara, McNaughton, W. Bundy, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp and Westmoreland reached concensus that: (1) the DRV was unlikely to quit in the next six months and probably would only give up because of VC "pain" in the South rather than bomb damage in the North; (2) RT was about right but wouldn't do the job alone; (3) best strategy would be to break the DRV/VC will by effectively denying them victory and bringing about negotiations through the enemy's impotence. They proposed establishing four brigade-sized enclaves, in addition to Da Nang - Hue/Phu Bai, at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau (3 Army battalions plus 1 GOA battalion); Chu Lai (3 BLTs plus 3 Marine TFS); Qui Nhon (3 Army battalions); and Quang Ngai (3 ROK battalions). Added on to the 4 USMC BLTs (33,000 U.S. troops) and 2000 ROK troops already in Vietnam, the total was to be 82,000 U.S. and 7250 3d country troops. Mentioned for possible later deployment were: a U.S. Air-mobile Division, a Corps Hq, an ROK Div (-), and the remainder of the III MEF (2 battalions). It was agreed that ARVN and U.S. units would be "brigaded" for operations, that the U.S. would try single managers of U.S. effort in 3 provinces as an experiment, that MEDCAP would be expanded, and that a study of fringe benefits for RVNAF would be undertaken.

21 Apr SecDef Memo for The President

McNamara sent the Honolulu recommendations to the President essentially as described above.

21 Apr	CIA Memo to SecDef & others	<u>McCone</u> said the communists still saw the tide going their way.. They would see in the Honolulu expansions of U.S. involvement the acceptance by the U.S. of a greater commitment, but they would assume U.S. was reluctant to widen the war. The DRV and Chicoms might reinforce with men and equipment, but would not intervene.	
21 Apr	CIA-DIA Memo "An Assessment of Present VC Military Capabilities"	The presence in Kontum Province since February 1965 of one regiment of the 325th PAVN Division confirmed. As of late 1964 the supply of repatriated southerners infiltrated back from NVN had dried up and NVN volunteers were coming down the trail.	
22 Apr	Deptel 2397	<u>Unger</u> told <u>Taylor</u> that if Quat agrees to the Honolulu program, the U.S. intention was not to announce the whole thing at once "but rather to announce individual deployments at appropriate times."	
23 Apr	CINCPAC 230423Z	<u>Sharp</u> recommended replacing the 173d, if it deployed, with a CONUS brigade.	
23 Apr	Embtel 2391	<u>Taylor</u> told <u>State</u> that Quat was extremely reluctant to discuss foreign reinforcements. Taylor feared GVN reaction.	
30 Apr	Deftel 1097	Saigon informed by <u>McNaughton</u> that the 173d and 3 BLTs to Chu Lai approved for deployment at Ambassador's call.	
30 Apr	JCSM 321-65	JCS as a result of Honolulu and subsequent discussions recommended a detailed program to deploy 48,000 U.S. and 5250 Free World troops to SVN. The forces included two Army brigades, one MEB, an ROK Regt. Combat Team, and an ANZAC battalion. They were to bolster GVN forces during their continued build-up, secure bases and installations, conduct combat operations in	173d & MEB appr. 30 Apr

coordination with the RVNAF, and prepare for the later introduction of an airmobile division to the central plateau, the remainder of III MEF to the Da Nang area, and the remainder of an ROK division to Quang Ngai.

5 May ISA Memo to  
Dep SecDef

McNaughton informed Vance that a portion of the force package listed as "approved" by the JCS in JCSM 321-65 was in fact a part of the not-yet sanctioned three-division plan.

5 May

Main body of 173d Airborne Brigade arrived at Vung Tau.

6 US/FW

7 May

Marines began landing at Chu Lai

9 US/FW

7 May CINCPAC  
072130Z

Sharp reminded JCS that he wanted to reconstitute WESTPAC reserve after deployment of 173d and additional Marines.

Move-  
ment  
of  
I MAF  
to  
WESTPAC  
appr.  
by  
SecDef  
15 May.

8 May MACV 15182

Westmoreland with Taylor concurrence forwarded concept of operations by U.S./allied ground combat forces in support of RVNAF:

Stage I - Security of base area (extended TAOR out to light artillery range).

Stage II - Deep patrolling and offensive operations (with RVNAF coordination and movement out of TAORs).

Stage III - Search and destroy plus reserve reaction operations. Westmoreland saw the U.S. role in the Vietnam war evolving through four phases

Phase I - Securing and improving coastal enclaves

Phase II - Operations from the enclaves

24 May	Embtel 3855	<u>Taylor</u> told <u>State</u> that joint command structure was repugnant to Viets and should not be raised at that time. Problem of command needed to be sorted out, however, prior to input of large numbers of U.S. forces.	
24 May	MACV 17292	<u>Westmoreland</u> told <u>CINCPAC</u> that despite SecDef approval of joint planning staff, the Viets were cool to the idea.	
27 May	JCSM 417-65	<u>JCS</u> recommended approval of 2369 MAP supported spaces for RVNAF to organize a tenth division using assets of three existing regiments.	Appr. by SecDef 4 Jun
June		1st battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, closed RVN in early June and joined the 173d at Vung Tau.	10 US/FW
5 June	Embtel 4074	<u>Mission Intelligence Committee</u> with concurrence of <u>Taylor</u> , <u>Johnson</u> , and <u>Westmoreland</u> told <u>State</u> that a series of recent AFVN defeats raised the possibility of collapse. To meet a shortage of ARVN reserves, U.S. ground troops would probably have to be committed to action.	
7 June	MACV 19118 070335Z	<u>Westmoreland</u> told <u>CINCPAC</u> that a summer offensive was under way to destroy GVN forces and isolate and attack district and province towns. The enemy had yet to realize his full potential, and RVNAF's capability to cope was in grave doubt. RVNAF build-up was halted because of recent losses. No choice but to reinforce with additional US/3d country forces as rapidly as possible. <u>Westmoreland</u> asked that all forces then in the planning stages be approved for deployment, plus he identified more forces (9 maneuver battalions in a division (-) and one MEB)	



which might be required later and for which planning should begin. He asked that the 173d be held in SVN until the Airmobile Division was operational.

7 June CINCPAC  
072325Z

Sharp supported Westmoreland's request for more troops but added that he felt the airmobile division should go to Qui Nhon rather than inland and should operate in Binh Dinh instead of up in the highlands. He felt 600 to 800 tons of aerial resupply for the division if it went to the highlands was asking too much of air facilities. He also felt the ROK division should go to Quang Ngai rather than to Qui Nhon, where it would be unproductive, or to Cam Ranh as Westmoreland had suggested.

8 June Press  
Conference

McCloskey, State Dept Press Officer, told the press that U.S. troops would be made available to fight alongside Viet forces when and if necessary.

9 June White House  
Press  
Release

Statement released which said that there had been no recent change in mission of U.S. combat units. They would help the Viets if help was requested and COMUSMACV felt U.S. troops were required.

11 June CINCPAC  
112210Z

Sharp elaborated on his earlier objections to airmobile division going into highlands and clarified his views on employment of the ROKs in either Quang Ngai, Nha Trang, or the Delta.

11 June JCSM 457-65

JCS, after discussing MACV and CINCPAC requests with Taylor, recommended that the airmobile division go to Qui Nhon, and recommended everything else that Westmoreland had requested. Total strengths recommended were:  
U.S. - 116,793; FW - 19,750.

11 June JCS 112347Z

JCS told Sharp that somewhat less than MACV's 19118 was close to being approved as an alternative. Force described amounted to one additional Army brigade instead of the airmobile division. JCS wanted to know where Westmoreland would put the brigade were it to be approved.

13 June MACV 131515Z

Westmoreland objected to Taylor's questioning of the seriousness of the situation and pointed out that to date ARVN had lost 5 battalions and the end was not in sight. He justified his request for troops by Corps area and asked for a free hand in maneuvering units. He included his concept for the employment of ROK and ARVN troops.

15 June

McNamara gave the green light for planning to deploy the airmobile division to SVN by 1 September.

16 June Press Conference

McNamara announced deployments to SVN that would bring U.S. strength there to between 70,000 and 75,000 men. 20,000 of these would be combat troops and more would be sent if necessary. He said U.S. troops were needed because the RVNAF to VC force ratio of less than 4 to 1 was too low to enable the GVN to cope with the threat. Total U.S. Bns after deployments would be 15.

17 June Embtel 4220

Taylor confirmed to State the seriousness of the military situation in SVN. GVN had to either give up outlying outposts or face being ambushed trying to reinforce them.

18 June White House Memo to SecDef

McGeorge Bundy passed on to McNamara the President's concern that "we find more dramatic and effective action in SVN..."

18 June	JCSM 482-65	<p>JCS further refined recommended troop list showing the airmobile division to deploy by 1 September 1965 along with its support and the brigade of the 101st airborne division to return to CONUS when the airmobile division was operational. Total strength recommended was:</p> <p>U.S. - 120,839; FW - 19,750</p>
22 June	<p>Unsigned Memo to SecDef</p>	<p>McNamara told that the President could wait until 10 July to approve the deployment of the airmobile division if SecDef is immediately given the go-ahead for readiness preparation. The question of removal of the two Army brigades was to be reconsidered in August.</p>
22 June	JCS 2400	<p>JCS told CINCPAC and Westmoreland that a force of 44 battalions was being considered for deployment to Vietnam. The Chairman wished to know if that would be enough to convince the DRV/VC they could not win.</p>
23 June	<p>Deptels 3078 &amp; 3079</p>	<p>Approval for landing of one Marine BLT at Qui Nhon for security and an additional BLT at Da Nang sent to Saigon.</p>
24 June	MACV 3320	<p>Westmoreland told CINCPAC and the JCS that there was no assurance the DRV/VC would change their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next 6 months. The 44 battalions, however, should be enough to prevent collapse and establish a favorable balance of power by year's end.</p>
26 June	<p>Memo, SecArmy to SecDef</p>	<p>Resor told McNamara that Air Cav Div must have its movement directive by 8 July at the latest in order to meet its readiness deadlines. Security would be impossible after issuing the directive.</p>

26 June Deptel 3057

W. Bundy told Taylor that Westmoreland could commit U.S. troops to combat "in any situation in which the use of such troops is required by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."

26 June ISA Memo of Conversation w/Dep Amb.

On 25 June Alexis Johnson told McNaughton that in many respects the situation in SVN was no worse than the previous year. Even if it were, large numbers of foreign troops could do no more than hold a few enclaves. The Vietnamese feared massive inputs of foreign troops would degrade their control over the country.

1 July Memo for The President

Ball of State described the Vietnam war as one the U.S. cannot win regardless of effort. Rather than have the U.S. pour its resources down the drain in the wrong place, he recommended that U.S. force levels be held to 15 battalions and 72,000 men announced by SecDef in June. The combat role of the U.S. forces should be restricted to base security and reserve in support of ARVN. As rapidly as possible and in full realization of the diplomatic losses which might be incurred, the U.S. should exit from Vietnam and thereby cut its losses.

1 July Memo for The President

W. Bundy of State proposed a "middle way" to the President which would avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions request and also the Ball withdrawal proposal, both of which were undesirable. Bundy offered further experimentation with U.S. troops from coastal enclaves.

The numbers would be held to planned deployments of 18 battalions and 85,000 men. The airmobile division and the 1st Infantry Division would be got ready but not deployed. Furious diplomatic activity concomitantly should find a gracious exit for the U.S.

1 July		One Marine BLT landed at Qui Nhon to strengthen security there.	11 US/FW
2 July	JCSM 515-65	Pursuant to their meeting with <u>SecDef</u> on 28 June, the <u>JCS</u> forwarded a program for the deployment of "such additional forces at this time as are required to insure that the VC/DRV cannot win in SVN at their present level of commitment." Concurrently, the <u>JCS</u> recommended expansion of the air activity against NVN as an indispensable part of the overall program. Total U.S. strength at completion of these deployments was to be 175,000.	
6 July		One Marine BLT landed at Da Nang to strengthen the defenses there.	12 US/FW
7 July	Deftel 5319	<u>McNamara</u> informed <u>Westmoreland</u> that the purpose of the forthcoming visit to Saigon scheduled for 16-20 July was to "get your recommendations for forces to year's end and beyond."	
10 July	Deftel 5582	<u>McNaughton</u> told <u>Taylor</u> that it had been decided to deploy 10,400 logistic and support troops by 15 August to support current force levels and to receive the airmobile division, if deployed. GVN concurrence sought.	


11 July	Embtel 108	Estimate of the situation prepared by the <u>Mission Intelligence Committee</u> reaffirmed the need for U.S./3d country forces to stem the tide then flowing against the RVNAF.	
12 July		2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division arrived in Vietnam	15 US/FW
16-20 July	Conference in Saigon	<u>McNamara</u> and <u>Wheeler</u> met with <u>Westmoreland</u> and <u>Taylor</u> , heard presentation of COMUSMACV's concept for operations in SVN. The 44 battalions were to be the Phase I of the build-up and were enough to prevent defeat. In order to move to Phase II and seize the initiative, Westmoreland told SecDef he'd require a further 24 battalions in 1966.	
17 July	NMCC 172042Z	<u>Vance</u> told <u>McNamara</u> that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 U.S. battalions and that he was favorably disposed to the call-up of reserves and extension of tours of active duty personnel.	
28 July	Presidential Press Conference	<u>The President</u> told <u>the press</u> that he had ordered the airmobile division and other units to SVN. Strength after these deployments would be 125,000 and more would be sent if required. He also said he'd decided not to call up reserve at that juncture.	
29 July		1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division arrived in Vietnam.	18 US/FW
30 July	JCSM 590-65	Annex showed 34 battalions and 193,587 men as planned for deployment to RVN.	
14-15 Aug		Marine BLTs landed at Chu Lai and Da Nang. Coupled with the SLF BLT, they brought USMC maneuver strength in RVN to 12 battalions, 9 from III MAF and 3 from I MAF.	21 US/FW

28 Sept		1st Air Cavalry Division closed in RVN and assumed responsibility for its TAOR.	29 US/FW
7 Oct		Remainder of the 1st Infantry Division closed in RVN.	35 US/FW
8 Nov		A full division of ROK forces closed into RVN.	44 US/FW
10 Nov	JCSM 811-65	After numerous adjustments in required support for Phase I deployments, the JCS proposed a final ceiling of 219,000 on that portion of the build-up and then addressed on-going Phase II proposals.	
31 Dec		Phase I U.S. strength in RVN at year's end was 184,314.	

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b. Ba Gia signaled to some the signs of imminent ARVN collapse.	
c. Westmoreland's 19118 of 7 June said the RVNAF had had it and were going under.	





# UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

## 1945 - 1967

IV.C.6. (a)

U.S. GROUND STRATEGY  
AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS  
1965--1967

VOLUME I

U.S. GROUND STRATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS1965 -- 1967CHRONOLOGY

13 Jun 65 VS.	Memo from McGeorge Bundy to SecDef.	Bundy passes on President's desires that "we find more dramatic and effective action in South Vietnam."
1 Jul 65 ✓	Draft Memo for the President	SecDef recommends 44 battalions (34 U.S.) to Vietnam in next few months. Says Westmoreland is not sure about requirements for 1966.
2 Jul 65 ✓	Memo for General Goodpaster from ASD (ISA) McNaughton	Secy McNaughton suggests questions to be addressed by JCS study on assurance of winning the war.
7 Jul 65	SecDef message to Saigon 072352Z Jul 65	SecDef gives Westmoreland questions he will want answered on his trip - includes probable requirements for additional forces in 1966.
12 Jul 65 ✓	Memo for the Record, Subj: 63 Battalion Plan	SecDef memorandum for the record calls for building up the armed forces by 63 battalions.
14 Jul 65 ✓	Intensification of the Military Operations in Vietnam - Concept and Appraisal	JCS study on concept and appraisal of assurance of winning goes to SecDef.
16-20 Jul 65.		SecDef in Saigon, receives Westmoreland's requirements.
17 Jul 65 ✓	Message from Secy Vance to SecDef McNamara 072042Z Jul 65	Vance informs McNamara that President has approved 34 Battalion Plan and will try to push through reserve call-up. ✓
20 Jul 65 ✓	Memo for the President, Subj: Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam	SecDef recommends 34 U.S. battalions to SVN in 1965 (Phase I) with possible need for 100,000 additional troops in 1966 (Phase II).
22 Jul 65	MACV message 220625Z Jul 65	MACV recommends 101,712 personnel and 27 battalions for Phase II.

28 Jul 65	Presidential News Conference	President announces build-up in Vietnam; no reserve call-up.
30 Jul 65	JCSM-590-65	JCS figures show total strength after Phase II to be 61 maneuver battalions and 293,287 personnel. ✓
27 Aug 65	JCSM 652-65	JCS recommend their concept for Vietnam. Concept envisions seizing initiative in Phase II. ✓
3 Nov 65	Draft Presidential Memo	SecDef recommends proceeding with Phase II (now 28 additional battalions and 125,000 personnel) in conjunction with ROLLING THUNDER in an effort to force DRV/VC toward an acceptable solution. ✓
10 Nov 65	JCSM 811-65	JCS refine concept for Vietnam, recommend Phase II force requirements and estimate probable results at the end of Phase II.
14 Nov 65		Battle of Ia Drang Valley begins.
17 Nov 65	MACV 40748 to DIA	General Westmoreland reports that PAVN infiltration has been greater than previously estimated.
23 Nov 65	COMUSMACV 41485 to CINCPAC	General Westmoreland analyzes implications of increased infiltration for his Phase II requirements. Begins planning on Phase IIA (add-on).
23 Nov 65	SecDef 4539-65 to Saigon	SecDef outlines questions to be asked of Westmoreland during his trip to Saigon on 28-30 November.
28-30 Nov 65		Secretary of Defense in Saigon.
30 Nov 65	Draft Memo for the President	SecDef states that original Phase II increment is not enough to seize the initiative, recommends an increase of 40 US battalions during Phase II.
7 Dec 65	Memo for the President	SecDef recommends a total of 74 U.S. battalions and 400,000 personnel by the end of 1966; warns that an additional 200,000 may be necessary in 1967.

3 Dec 65	SecDef Multi-Addressee Memo	SecDef disseminates tables showing Phase IIA deployments, bringing U.S. strength to 75 battalions and 367,800 by December 1966, 393,000 personnel by June 1967.
16 Dec 65	CINCPAC Letter Ser: 000473	CINCPAC sends revised requirements for Phase IIA, desires 75 battalions and 443,000 by December 1966.
1 Jan 66		173rd Airborne Brigade begins Operation MARAUDER in Hau Nghia Province near Cambodia border.
8 Jan 66		173rd Airborne Brigade units and 1st US Infantry Division launch Operation GRIMP in Hau Nghia and Binh Tuong Provinces.
15 Jan 66	Memo for SecDef	Guidelines for assumptions on availability of forces for SE Asia. Case 3 assumes availability of CONUS forces and activations only. Case 2 adds drawdowns from overseas areas. Case 1 further adds callup of selected reserve units and extension of terms of service.
19 Jan 66		1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, begins Operation VAN BUREN, in Phu Yen Province.
24 Jan 66		3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, launches Operation MASHER/WHITE WING near Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province.
24 Jan 66	Memo for the President	SecDef estimates U.S. strength at end of 1966 at 75 battalions and 367,800 troops.
28 Jan 66		U.S. Marine Corps units launch DOUBLE EAGLE in Quang Ngai Province.
7-9 Feb 66		Honolulu Conference with Ky and President Johnson.
12 Feb 66	CINCPAC 3010 Ser: 00055	CINCPAC forwards revised version of requirements for SE Asia, and deployment plans under the assumptions of Cases, 1, 2, and 3.

17 Feb 66 SecDef Multi-Addressee  
Memo, Subj: SE Asia  
Planning Assumptions

SecDef directs Military Departments and the JCS to study possible ways of meeting Case I deployment schedule without calling reserves or extending tours of duty.

21 Feb 66

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, begins Operation HARRISON, in Phu Yen Province.

1 Mar 66

JCSM 130-66

JCS reply they cannot meet Case I deployment schedule without calling up reserves. Recommend stretch out of deployment into 1967.

7 Mar 66

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and 173d Airborne Division launch Operation SILVER CITY, a 17-day search and destroy operation in the Bien Duong and Long Khanh Provincial border area.

9 Mar 66

Estimated NVA regiment overwhelms Aseau Special Forces camp at Thua Thien Province.

10 Mar 66

SecDef Memo to CJCS

SecDef directs planning on the basis of Case I schedule without call-up of reserves or extension of terms of service.

10 Mar 66

GVN National Leadership Committee votes to remove Lt Gen Thi from his post as I Corps Commander. Demonstrations protesting Thi's ouster signalled the start of long political turbulence.

19 Mar 66

USMC units launch Operation TEXAS in Quang Ngai Province.

4 Apr 66

JCSM 218-66

JCS reply to SecDef giving a program reflecting the Services "current estimate of their capabilities to provide forces required... (and meeting) as closely as feasible the program for South Vietnam prescribed" by the SecDef on 10 March.

11 Apr 66	SecDef Multi-Addressee Memo; Subj: SE Asia Deployment Plan	SecDef approves Deployment Plan recommended by JCS in JCSM 218-66.
12 Apr 66	SecDef Memo for CJCS	SecDef requests an explanation of differences between JCSM 218-66 and the Case I Deployment Plan.
24 Apr 66		Elements of 1st Infantry Division launch Operation BIRMINGHAM. The 24-search and destroy operation involving the deepest friendly penetration in 5 years into War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province.
10 May 66		Elements of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, launch Operation PAUL REVERE, an 82-day border screening area control operation in Pleiku Province.
16 May 66		Elements of 1st Cavalry Division launch 22-day Operation CRAZY HORSE in Binh Dinh Province.
2 Jun 66		Elements of 1st Infantry Division begin Operation EL PASO II. 41-search and destroy operation in Binh Long Province.
2 Jun 66		1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, launches Operation HAWKOPHE, a 19-search and destroy operation in Kontum Province.
10 Jun 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Report on Deployments to SEA	ASD Enthoven reports that a large number of adjustments to deployment plan have been proposed by the Army.
13 Jun 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Deployments to SE Asia	Enthoven explains major bookkeeping changes in deployment schedules.
18 Jun 66	CINCPAC 3010 Ser: 000255	CINCPAC's CY 66 and CY 67 requirements based upon a concept which now emphasizes restricting access to the land borders of RVN and increased efforts in the highlands and along the western RVN border. CINCPAC envisions a rise to 90 maneuver battalions and 542,588 personnel by end of CY 67.

28 Jun 66	President's Memo for SecDef	Requests SecDef and JCS to see if any more acceleration of deployment is possible.
30 Jun 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: SE Asia Deployment Plan	Revised version of 10 April plan indicates acceleration of deployment of 2 brigades of the 9th Division to December 1966, and deployment of 196th Infantry Brigade in August 1966.
2 Jul 66	SecDef Multi-Addressee Memo, Subj: SE Asia Deployment Plan	Revised 10 April Plan, now named "Program #3," is published.
7 Jul 66		USMC units launch Operation HASTINGS, a 27-day search and destroy operation against the 324B NVA Division south of the DMZ.
✓ 8 Jul 66	JCSM 450-66, Subj: CINCPAC Calendar Year Deployments	JCS report that further acceleration is unlikely.
15 Jul 66	SecDef Memo for the President, Subj: Schedule of Deployments to South Vietnam	✓ SecDef reports to the President on the acceleration achieved since the beginning of the year.
16 Jul 66		Operation DECK HOUSE in eastern Quang Tri Province is conducted in support of HASTINGS.
1 Aug 66		1st Cavalry Division units launch 25-day search and destroy operation, PAUL REVERE II in Pleiku.
3 Aug 66	SAIGON 2564	Lodge quotes Westmoreland as agreeing with him on urgent desirability of hitting pacification hard while other things are going well.
5 Aug 66	JCSM 506-66	JCS forwards CINCPAC's requirements for CY 66 and 67. Recommend that almost all of them be accepted.
5 Aug 66	SecDef Memo to CJCS	SecDef directs JCS to evaluate CINCPAC's requirements and also Issue Papers referred for SecDef by Systems Analysis.

8 Aug 66 SAIGON 2931 to

Secy of State

Lodge reports an upsurge of enemy infiltration thru the DMZ and passes on Westmoreland's KANZUS recommendation. ✓

10 Aug 66

MACV 27578

Westmoreland passes on his evaluation of the requirements forwarded by CINCPAC. "I cannot justify a reduction in requirements submitted."

10 Aug 66

SAIGON 3129

Lodge points out the need for making a strong effort now to make sure "the smell of victory" is in the air. He reemphasizes the need for pacification. X

17 Aug 66

SAIGON 3670

Porter in Saigon informs Komer of anti-inflationary measures and points out possible problem areas, including US military piaster budget.

23 Aug 66

CINCPAC sends MACV its draft strategy for 1966 and 1967. The proposed strategy emphasizes pacification and nation building.

24 Aug 66

Interagency Roles and Missions Study Group Final Report

Roles and Missions Study Group report points out need for pacification. Makes several recommendations to improve pacification effort.

26 Aug 66

MACV 29797

Westmoreland in cable to CINCPAC describes his concept of operations for the rest of the year. He describes his strategy during the period 1 May to 1 November 1966 that of containing the enemy through offensive tactical operations; describes his strategy for 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967 as increasing momentum of operations in a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary development. He visualizes that significant numbers of US/PW maneuver battalions will be involved in pacification. In addition to emphasizing pacification, Westmoreland emphasizes need to fight against enemy main forces.



31 Aug 66	SAIGON 4923	Lodge points out efforts being taken in Saigon to emphasize pacification. He begins to express reservations on need for more troops.
2 Sep 66	SecDef Memo for CJCS	SecDef asks CJCS to explore carefully all desirable tradeoffs between piaster funding of GVN and US armed forces in SVN.
7 Sep 66	JCS 1975 to CINCPAC	JCS informs CINCPAC of Jason Plan for aerial supported anti-infiltration barrier.
11 Sep 66		GVN elections.
13 Sep 66	Cite Unknown	CINCPAC comments on anti-infiltration barrier proposed by Jason study. Doubts practicality of scheme.
13 Sep 66	MACV 41191 to CINCPAC	Westmoreland discusses build-up in Quang Tri Province. Requests authority to use B-52 strikes.
13 Sep 66		1st Cavalry Division launches 40-day search and destroy Operation THAYER I in Binh Dinh Province.
14 Sep 66		196th Infantry Brigade begins 72-day search and destroy Operation ATTLEBORO in Tay Ninh Province, which grows into largest operation of war to date. Other US units involved included all three brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, and 1 battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.
15 Sep 66	SAIGON 6100	Embassy gives their latest data on inflation in SVN; forecast a 44.1 billion piaster inflationary gap in CY 67.
16 Sep 66	MACV 41676	Westmoreland discusses <u>Slam</u> concept designed to impede enemy infiltration thru Laos.
20 Sep 66	MACV 8212	Westmoreland conveys his concern over <u>enemy forces in sanctuaries to Admiral Sharp.</u>

22 Sep 66	CM-1774-66	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tells SecDef that <u>piaster costs per man of US forces are several times those of GVN forces.</u> However, he does not see any piaster advantages from feasible exchanges.
23 Sep 66	State 53541 to Saigon	State calls news of size of inflationary gap in Saigon's 15 September message very disturbing.
24 Sep 66	MACV 8371 to Sharp and Wheeler	Westmoreland reviews VC/NVA's recent campaign and assesses the effectiveness of US campaigns. Does not mention pacification.
24 Sep 66	JCSM 613-66	JCS forward their final evaluation of CINCPAC's 18 June submission and the results of their evaluation of the SecDef's Issue Papers, from 5 August.
29 Sep 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef	Enthoven tells SecDef he is reviewing JCSM-613-66 and forwards some new deployment Issue Papers to Secretary of Defense.
1 Oct 66	SAIGON 7332	Lodge, in a message to Rusk, McNamara and Komer, sets forth his proposal on piaster ceilings. <u>Sets a piaster ceiling of 42 billion on military spending in South Vietnam.</u>
2 Oct 66	MACV 43926	MACV recommends to CINCPAC and JCS deployment of Caltrop for operational tests ASAP.
5 Oct 66	MACV 44378	Westmoreland submits his reclama to Lodge's proposal for a piaster budget ceiling.
5 Oct 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef	Dr. Enthoven analyzes Lodge's message of 1 Oct for SecDef. Points out differences in spending associated with different deployments small relative to other uncertainties. Terms Lodge's estimates on holding inflation down optimistic.
6 Oct 66	SecDef Memo for CJCS	SecDef forwards another set of deployment Issue Papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7 Oct 66 JCSM-616-66

Joint Chiefs of Staff forward their evaluation of world-wide military posture and the effects which deployments to SVN will have upon same.

10 Oct 66

the 3rd US Marine Division assumes control of Operation PRAIRIE in Quang Tri Province. This is the first Division-controlled operation in I CTZ.

14 Oct 66 Draft Presidential Memo, Trip Report, Actions Recommended for Vietnam

SecDef recommends force levels stabilize at 470,000, that US stabilize ROLLING THUNDER, deploy a barrier and gird itself for a long haul.

14 Oct 66 JCSM-672-66

Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their comments on SecDef's memorandum for the President. Do not agree with 470,000-man limitation. Are doubtful on feasibility of the barrier, reserve judgment until they receive detailed programs being prepared by CINCPAC.

18 Oct 66

Elements of 4th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, launch 7<sup>1/2</sup>-day Operation PAUL REVERE IV, in Pleiku Province.

20 Oct 66 CINCPAC 3010  
Ser: 000438

CINCPAC forwards results of the Honolulu Planning Conference. Recommend a build-up to 91 maneuver battalions and 493,969 personnel by end of CY 67. Total strength after filling out will be 94 battalions and 555,741 personnel.

23 Oct 66 CINCPAC Ser:  
000455

CINCPAC forwards three alternative deployment plans and their associated piaster costs.

23-25 Oct 66

Manila Conference

26 Oct 66 ASD(ISA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: "McNaughton in Manila"

McNaughton gives his report of conversations with Westmoreland on force levels and ROLLING THUNDER. Says Westmoreland is thinking of an end-CY 67 strength of 480,000.

4 Nov 66	JCSM 702-66, "Deployment of Forces to Meet CY-67 Requirements"	Joint Chiefs of Staff forward report of Honolulu Planning Conference.
7 Nov 66	AB 142, Combined Campaign Plan, 1967	MACV and RVNAF JGS set forth campaign plan for 1967. Plan emphasizes pacification.
9 Nov 66	ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef	<u>Enthoven outlines his "Program 4," bringing strength to 87 battalions and 469,000 troops by June 1968.</u>
11 Nov 66	SecDef Memo for CJCS, "Deployments to SEA"	SecDef responds to JCS recommendations in JCSM 702-66, and sets forth guidelines for Program 4 essentially as recommended by Enthoven.
17 Nov 66	Draft Presidential Memo, "Recommended FY 67 SEA Supplemental Appropriation"	SecDef sets forth in some detail his reasoning behind the deployment plan now called "Program 4."
18 Nov 66	SecDef Memo for Secys of Military Departments, C/JCS, Asst Secys of Def	Transmits tables of deployments which were authorized on 11 November 1966.
2 Dec 66	JCSM 739-66, "Deployments to SEA and other PACOM Areas"	JCS asked direct substitution of units to provide "balanced forces".
9 Dec 66	Memo for CJCS from Sec Def, Subj: "Deployments to SEA and other PACOM Areas"	<u>Approves direct substitution within 470,000 man ceiling.</u>
22 Dec 66	DCPG memo for SecDef, Subj: "Plan for Increased Anti-Infiltration Capability for SEA"	Established intent and guidance for planning barrier concept.
2 Jan 67	COMUSMACV OC610	MACV's year-end assessment of enemy situation and strategy.
8 Jan 67		Operation CEDAR FALLS. Begins longest operation of war to date in terms of forces employed.

21 Feb 67	Memo from DepSecDef to Under Sec State, Subj: "Military Action Programs for SEA"	Forwarded DOD input to analysis of alternative strategies prepared for the President. Incorporated various separate proposals made by JCS over past two months.
22 Feb 67	JCSM 97-67, Subj: MACV Practice Nine Requirements Plan	JCS forwards and comments on MACV manpower and logistics requirements to implement barrier plan. Recommends plan not be approved.
22 Feb 67	CM-2134-67, "PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan, dated 26 Jan 1967"	CJCS forwards his dissent to JCSM 97-67. Recommends implementation of plan.
18 Mar 67	COMUSMACV message 09101	MACV analysis of current force requirements submitted to CINCPAC. "Optimum force" of 4-2/3 divisions; "minimum essential force" of 2-1/3 divisions.
20-21 Mar 67		Guam Conference. Bunker, Locke, Komer introduced to Vietnamese leaders.
24 Mar 67	JCS message 59881	Requested CINCPAC/MACV detailed analysis and justification for additional forces.
28 Mar 67	COMUSMACV 10311	Forwarded MACV detailed justification and planning calculations to JCS.
7 Apr 67		Task Force OREGON formed, posted to Quang Ngai Province.
14 Apr 67	JCSM-208-67, Subj: Marine Corps Reinforcement of I Corps Tactical Zone	Proposed 2 brigades from 9th MAB be stationed off Vietnamese coast to be committed when required by COMUSMACV, remainder of MAB placed on 15-day call in Okinawa.
20 Apr 67	JCSM-218-67	Formally reported to SecDef the MACV force requirements.
25-27 Apr 67		General Westmoreland returns to US, consults with President.
1 May 67	OASD(ISA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Increase of SEA forces	Detailed analysis of MACV force request. Recommended against adding more US combat forces.

9 May 1967	NSAM 362	All pacification efforts placed under MACV. Komer named Deputy for Pacification to COMUSMACV.
19 May 1967	Draft Memorandum for President, Subject: Future Actions in Vietnam	ASD(ISA) reviews situation in Vietnam, analyzes alternative military courses of action, argues against force level increases, proposes strategy of "slow progress."
20 May 1967	JCSM 286-67, "Operations Against North Vietnam"	<u>JCS seriously concerned at the prospective introduction by the USSR into NVN of new weapons. Proposed neutralization of Hanoi-Haiphong complex by attacking all elements of the import system of NVN, "shouldering out" foreign shipping, mining port.</u>
20 May 1967	JCSM 288-67, "US Worldwide Military Posture"	JCS recommend selective callup of reserves so US could more effectively fulfill worldwide commitments.
23 May 1967	Memo for CJCS, Subject: Combat Service Support Staffing in SVN	SecDef requested JCS to prepare detailed study analyzing in depth CSS staffing levels in SVN.
24 May 1967	CM 2278-67, "Alternative Courses of Action"	JCS reply to 26 April memo by DepSecDef. Concluded that (a) force levels recommended in JCSM 218-67 should be deployed; (b) a more effective air/naval campaign against NVN should be conducted as recommended in JCSM 218-67.
29 May 1967	CM 2381-67, Future Actions in Vietnam	Identifies certain factual corrections and annotations in COMUSMACV 18 March "minimum essential force" request.
1 June 1967	JCSM 306-67, Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam	JCS reply to 19 May DPM, expressed strong objections to basic orientation as well as specific recommendations and objectives. Saw "alarming pattern" which suggested a major realignment of US objectives and intentions in SEA, recommended that DPM "not be considered further."
2 June 1967	JCSM-312-67, Air Operations Against NVN	JCS response to SecDef memo of 20 May. Concluded that original recommendation of 20 May represented the most effective way to prosecute air/naval campaign against NVN.

2 June 1967	Note, Wm. P. Bundy to Mr. McNaughton	Comments on 19 May DPM. Expressed general agreement with basic objectives as stated in DPM, but agreed with JCS that DPM displayed a negative turn to our strategy and commitment in SVN.
8 June 1967	Memorandum for Under SecDef (sic) Vance from UnderSecState Katzenbach, Subject: Preliminary Comments on DOD Draft of 19 May.	Comments on 19 May DPM. Recommended increase of 30,000 men in small increments over 18 months, get GVN more fully involved and effective, concentrate bombing LOCs in the north.
12 June 1967	ASD(ISA) Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Alternative Military Actions Against NVN	Revised DPM incorporated views of JCS, CIA, State. Opposed JCS program, recommended concentrating bulk of bombing on infiltration routes south of 20th parallel, skirted question of ground force increase.
13 June 1967	Memo for CJCS from SecDef, Subj: Increased Use of Civilians for US Troop Support (C)	Requested JCS to determine which logistical requirements could be met by increased use of SVN civilians for US troop support.
5 July 1967	Memo for SecDef from ASD(SA), subject: Current Estimate of Additional Deployment Capability	Update of original estimate of what Army could provide. Approx. 3-2/3 DE could be provided to MACV by 31 Dec 68 without calling reserves.
7-8 July 1967		SecDef in SVN receives MACV justification.
13 July 1967	Memo for Record, Subj: Fallout from SecDef Trip to SVN	ASD(ISA) memo for the record indicates decision in Saigon to increase forces to 525,000 limit.
13 July 1967	Memo for SecDef from Richard C. Steadman, DASD, Subject: Additional Third Country Forces for Vietnam	Provided series of letters to Manila countries making clear the need for additional forces.
14 July 1967	Memo for Record, Subj: SEA Deployments	ASD(SA) outlined the decisions made in Saigon and directed work priorities and assignments, for OASD(SA) to flesh out the 525,000 troop limit.

20 July 1967	JCSM 416-67, Subject: US Force Deployments - Vietnam	JCS provide detailed troop list within 525,000 ceiling. Reaffirmed force requirements as set forth in JCSM 283-67.
26 July 1967	Memo from DepSecDef to CJCS, Subj: Operations Against NVN	Comments on JCSM 286-67.
22 Jul - 5 Aug 1967		General Taylor, Mr. Clifford tour troop contributing countries, seek additional third-country forces.
14 Aug 1967	ASD(SA) Memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASDs, Subject: SEA Deployment Program #5	Formally approved forces for deployment in Program 5. Established civilianization scheduled; approved additional 5 destroyers for gunfire support.
9 Sept 1967	DJCSM 1113-67, Subj: Examination of Speed-Up in Program 5 Deployments	Joint Staff examined possible actions to speed up Program 5 deployments.
12 Sept 1967	CM 2640-67	Joint Staff requested by President to indicate actions which would increase pressure on NVN.
15 Sept 1967	JCSM-505-67	JCS forward refined troop list for Program 5.
16 Sept 1967	SecArmy Memo for Sec-Def, Subject: Deployment Schedule for 101st Airborne Division (-)	Div(-) could be deployed to close in VN prior to Christmas.
22 Sept 1967	SecDef Memo for Sec-Army, Subj: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-).	Approves accelerated deployment of 101st Airborne Div(-).
28 Sept 1967	MACV message 31998	MACV plan for reorienting in-country forces.
4 Oct 1967	SecDef Memo for the President	SecDef indicated actions taken on MACV recommendations contained in message 31998.
5 Oct 1967	SecDef memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASDs, Subject: FY 68 U.S. Force Deployments, Vietnam.	SecDef approves force deployments listed in JCSM 505-67.



16 Oct 1967	SecArmy memo for SecDef, Subj: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-)	SecArmy indicates that remainder of 101st Airborne Division can be accelerated to close in Vietnam by 20 December 1967.
17 Oct 1967	JCSM-555-67	JCS forward to President through SecDef their reply to questions raised on 12 September.
21 Oct 1967	SecDef memo for Sec- Army, Subject: Deploy- ment of the 101st Division (-)	SecDef approves accelerated deploy- ment of remainder of 101st Airborne Division.
31 Oct 1967	SecArmy memo for Sec- Def, Subject: Deployment of 11th Infantry Brigade.	SecArmy indicates that Brigade could be deployed on or about 10 December.
6 Nov 1967	SecDef memo for SecArmy, Subject: Deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade.	SecDef approves early deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade.
7 Nov 1967	CM-2743-67	CJCS directs Joint Staff to explore what further foreshortening of deploy- ment dates could be accomplished.
10 Nov 1967	CM-2752-67	CJCS directs Joint Staff to recom- mend military operations in SEA for next four months.
21 Nov 1967	DJSM-1409-71	Joint Staff reply to CJCS request of 7 Nov to explore foreshortening of deployment dates.
27 Nov 1967	JCSM-663-67	JCS provide SecDef their recommenda- tions for conduct of military opera- tions in SEA over next four months.
22 Dec 1967	ASD(ISA) memo to CJCS.	Forwards SecDef and SecState comments on JCSM 663-67.
26 Jan 1968	MACV message 61742	COMUSMACV year-end assessment.
31 Jan 1968		TEP offensive begins.
12 Feb 1968	JCSM-91-68	JCS examine plans for emergency aug- mentation of MACV, recommended deploy- ment of reinforcements be deferred.

13 Feb 1968	JCS Message 9926	Directs deployment of brigade task force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN.
13 Feb 1968	JCS Message 9929	Directs deployment of one Marine regimental landing team to SVN.
13 Feb 1968	JCSM-96-68	JCS forward to SecDef recommendations for actions to be taken relative to callup of reserves.
23-26 Feb 68		CJCS visit to SVN.
27 Feb 1968	Report of CJCS on Situation in SVN and MACV Force Requirements	CJCS reports on his trip to SVN and furnishes MACV Program 6 force requirements.
1 Mar 1968		Clark Clifford sworn in as Secretary of Defense.
4 Mar 1968	Draft Memorandum for the President	Forwards recommendations of SecDef Working Group to the President.
8 Mar 1968	CM-3098-68	JCS forward COMUSMACV comments on DFM.
11-12 Mar 68		SecState testifies before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
14 Mar 1968	DepSecDef memo for CJCS; Subject: SEA Deployments	DepSecDef informs CJCS of Presidential decision to deploy 30,000 additional troops.
14 Mar 1968	SecArmy memo to SecDef	SecArmy indicated requirement for 13,500 additional men to support emergency reinforcement.
16 Mar 1968	ASD(SA) Memo for Record	Summarizes decision to deploy 43,500 additional troops and plans for reserve call-up.
22 Mar 1968		Gen. Westmoreland to be new Chief of Staff of the Army.
23 Mar 1968	OASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Program #6 Summary Tables (Tentative)	Forwarded to SecDef for approval Program 6, based on manpower ceiling of 579,000.

26-27 Mar 68  
26-27 Mar 68

General Abrams in Washington, confers with President.

30 Mar 1968 Dept of State msg 139431

Announces Presidential decision to US Ambassadors in troop contributing countries.

31 Mar 1968 Remarks of President to the Nation

President announces partial bombing halt, deployment of 13,500 additional troops.

3 Apr 1968 White House Press Release

Hanoi declares readiness to meet. U.S. accepts.

4 Apr 1968 DepSecDef memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASD's, Subj: SEA Deployment Program #6

DepSecDef establishes Program #6, placed new ceiling of 549,500 on U.S. forces in SVM.