THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST

PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD HAVE

CONSIDERING THAT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO LIMIT ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WOULD LEAD TO A DECREASE IN THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF WAR INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,



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2. WITHIN THE AREA REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF PARAGRAPH I OF THIS ARTICLE, A PARTY MAY DEPLOY NO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED FIXED

FOOTNOTE ARTICLE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

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ABM LAUNCHERS AND ONE HUNDRED ABM-INTERCEPTOR MISSILES LOCATED ON OR IN THE VICINITY OF ABM LAUNCHERS; MAY DEPLOY ABM RADARS AT NO MORE THAN FOUR MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEXES; AND MAY RETAIN THOSE MECHANICAL-SCAN, DISH-TYPE ABM RADARS WHICH WERE OPERATIONAL AS OF JULY 1. 1971.

- 3. WITHIN THE TOTAL OF THE AREAS REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH (B) OF PARAGRAPH I OF THIS ARTICLE, A PARTY MAY DEPLOY NO MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS AND TWO HUNDRED ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES LOCATED ON OR IN THE VICINITY OF ABM LAUNCHERS, AND MAY DEPLOY ABM RADARS AT NO MORE THAN FOUR MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEXES.
- 4. A MODERN ABM RADAR COMPLEX IS A CIRCULAR AREA OF NO MORE THAN THREE KILOMETERS IN DIAMETER WITHIN WHICH ARE DEPLOYED ANY ABM RADAR OR COMPONENTS THEREOF, WHICH FIRST BECAME OPERATIONAL AFTER JULY 1, 1971, OR ANY PHASED-ARRAY ABM RADAR OR COMPONENTS THEREOF. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTEL

BEGIN BRACKETS 1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS LISTED IN ARTICLE II OF THIS AGREEMENT AT A DISTANCE **EXCEEDING**

TWO HUNDRED KILOMETERS FROM THE CENTER OF THE NATIONAL CAPITALS. WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MOSCOW RESPECTIVELY.

2. WITHIN THE AREA DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH I OF THIS ARTICLE, EACH PARTY SHALL NOT DEPLOY MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ABM LAUNCHERS AND

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ALSO SHALL NOT DEPLOY MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ABMS AT SITES. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

BEGIN BRACKETS ABM SYSTEMS IN THE U.S. AND THE USSR WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL CAPITALS. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WOULD RETAIN

ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS AT ONE OF ITS ICBM BASES WHERE THEIR CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN STARTED, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION COULD DEPLOY ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS. THE QUANTITATIVE AND GEOGRAPHIC ABM LIMITATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL CAPITALS REMAIN AS PROVIDED IN THE USSR PROPOSAL OF MARCH 19. 1971.

AS FOR ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS INTENDED FOR THE DEFENSE OF ICBM SILOS, SHOULD THE U.S. SIDE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH SUCH AN APPROACH, THE CRITERIA OF ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED, PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS USED FOR THE DEFENSE OF ICBM SILOS COULD NOT BE USED FOR CREATING AN ABM DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE COUNTRY. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE?

ARTICLE IV

THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE III SHALL NOT APPLY TO ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS USED FOR DEVELOPMENT OR TESTING, AND LOCATED WITHIN CURRENT OR ADDITIONALLY AGREED TEST RANGES. EACH PARTY MAY HAVE NO MORE THAN FIFTEEN FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS AT THESE TEST RANGES.

FOOTNOTE! ARTICLE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

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ARTICLE V

- 1. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY SEA-BASED, AIR-BASED, SPACE-BASED, OR MOBILE LAND-BASED ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS.
- 2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY
 ABM LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING MORE THAN ONE ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILE
 AT A TIME FROM EACH LAUNCHER, NOR TO MODIFY DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS TO
 PROVIDE THEM WITH SUCH A CAPABILITY, NOR TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY
 AUTOMATIC OR SEMI-AUTOMATIC OR OTHER SIMILAR SYSTEMS FOR RAPID RELOAD
 OF ABM LAUNCHERS.

BEGIN BRACKETS 3. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEMS USING

DEVICES OTHER THAN ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES, ABM LAUNCHERS, OR ABM RADARS TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF THESE COMPONENTS. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

ARTICLÈ VI

TO ENHANCE ASSURANCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS PROVIDED BY THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE:

(A) NOT TO GIVE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS, OR RADARS, OTHER THAN ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES, ABM LAUNCHERS, OR ABM RADARS, CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR THEIR ELEMETS IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY, AND NOT TO TEST THEM IN AN ABM MODE;

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(B) NOT TO GIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY-WARNING RADARS CAPABILITIES OF PERFORMING AN ABM ROLE, NOT TO TEST THEM IN AN ABM MODE, AND ALSO NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH RADARS IN THE FUTURE EXCEPT AT LOCATIONS ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORIES AND ORIENTED OUTWARD; AND

BEGIN BRACKETS (C) NOT TO DEPLOY WITHOUT PRIOR MUTUAL AGREEMENT PHASED-

ARRAY RADARS HAVING A PRODUCT OF POWER (IN WATTS) AND APERTURE (IN SQUARE METERS) GREATER THAN ONE MILLION, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE III AND IN SUBPARAGRAPH (B) ABOVE. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

ARTICLE VII

SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS MAY BE CARRIED OUT.

ARTICLE VIII

ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS OR OUTSIDE THE AREAS SPECIFIED IN THIS AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS PROHIBITED BY THIS AGREEMENT, SHALL BE DESTROYED OR DISMANTLED UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES WITHIN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME.

FOOTNOTE: SUBPARAGRAPH PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE.

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ARTICLE IX

TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO DEPLOY OUTSIDE ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS

LIMITED BY THIS AGREEMENT, BEGIN BRACKETS NOT TO RENDER TO OTHER STATES TECHNICAL OR OTHER ASSISTANCE IN THE CREATION OF SUCH MEANS, NOT TO ENCOURAGE OR INDUCE ANY STATES OTHERWISE TO ACQUIRE SUCH MEANS END BRACKETS. FOOTNOTE!

ARTICLE X

THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO ASSUME ANY INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE XI

BEGIN BRACKETS IN ADDITION TO AGREEING UPON A SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMEN.

ON CERTAIN MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE2 THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS SEGIN BRACKETS FOR MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE2 BEGIN BRACKETS ON LIMITING END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE1 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ARTICLE XII

1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL, BEGIN BRACKETS OPERATING OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED

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FOOTNOTE 2 WORDING PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE.



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PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE! BEGIN BRACKETS; EMPLOYMENT OF THESE MEANS SHALL NOT VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE2 BEGIN BRACKETS TO PERMIT FULL RELIANCE ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, CERTAIN COROLLARY LIMITATIONS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES ARE INCLUDED IN THIS AGREEMENT. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

- 2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER PARTY OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.
- 3. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE BEGIN BRACKETS FOR ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE2 SPECIAL CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THIS OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES.

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ARTICLE XIII

- 1. TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH PROMPTLY A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIOR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THEY WILL:
- (A) CONSIDER QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS;

FOOTNOTE WORDING PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE.

FOOT NOTES WORDING PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

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(B) PROVIDE ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS SUCH INFORMATION AS EITHER PARTY CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED, BEGIN BRACKETS INCLUDING THE OFFERING OF SELECTIVE DIRECT OBSERVATION IN ORDER TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS; END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

(C) CONSIDER QUESTIONS INVOLVING UNINTENDED INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION;

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- (D) CONSIDER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT;
- (E) AGREE UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS IN CASES PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT;
- (F) CONSIDER, AS APPROPRIATE, POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT;
- (G) CONSIDER, AS APPROPRIATE, PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER MEASURES AIMED AT LIMITING STRATEGIC BEGIN BRACKETS DEFENSIVE END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE2 ARMS.
- 2. THE PARTIES THROUGH CONSULTATION SHALL ESTABLISH, AND MAY AMEND AS APPROPRIATE, THE REGULATIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE

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FOOTNOTE2
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COMMISSION GOVERNING PROCEDURES, COMPOSITION AND OTHER RELEVANT MATTERS.

ARTICLE XIV

1. THE PARTIES MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THIS AGREEMENT. AGREED AMENDMENTS SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

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BEGIN BRACKETS 2. ---- YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT,

AND AT ---- YEAR INTERVALS THEREAFTER, THE PARTIES SHALL TOGETHER CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT, END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE:

ARTICLE XV -

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION.

2. EACH PARTY SHALL, IN EXERCISING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS AGREEMENT IF IT DECIDES THAT EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS RELATED TO THE SUBJECT NATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT HAVE JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS. IT SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF ITS DECISION TO THE OTHER PARTY SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT. SUCH NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS THE NOTIFYING PARTY REGARDS AS HAVING JEOPARDIZED

ITS SUPREME INTERESTS.

FOOTNOTE: PARAGRAPH PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE.

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BEGIN BRACKETS 3. IF THE PARTIES HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHIN A PERIOD OF --- YEARS FROM THE DATE THIS AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE, EITHER PARTY

MAY, AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER UNTIL SUCH AGREEMENT IS REACHED, GIVE NOT ICE TO THE OTHER PARTY OF ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW, WHICH WITHDRAWAL SHALL BE EFFECTIVE SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE SUCH NOTICE IS GIVEN. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTE!

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ARTICLE XVI

1. BEGIN BRACKETS THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE ON WHICH EACH PARTY SHALL HAVE INFORMED THE OTHER PARTY BY WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTES

1. BEGIN BRACKETS THIS TREATY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES OF EACH PARTY. THE TREATY SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DAY OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, WHICH SHALL TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. END BRACKETS FOOTNOTES

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2. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REGISTERED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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