Today, The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists published an article, "Nixon's
Nuclear Ploy,'' by National Security Archive senior analyst William
Burr and Miami University historian Jeffrey Kimball,(1)
that discloses for the first time one of the Nixon administration's
most secret military operations. During October 1969, President
Richard Nixon ordered the Pentagon to undertake secretly a series
of military measures designed to put U.S. nuclear forces on a
higher state of readiness. For nearly three weeks, U.S. nuclear
bombers were on higher alert, while U.S. air defense forces, tactical
aircraft, and nuclear missile submarines in the Pacific took measures
to raise their combat readiness. Moreover, U.S. destroyers, cruisers,
and aircraft carriers were engaged in a variety of maneuvers in
the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Sea
of Japan. These measures were officially known as the "Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Readiness Test." Although they were
executed secretly so that the public in the United States and
allies would not notice them, they were supposed to be detectable,
but not alarming, to the leadership of the Soviet Union and its
intelligence services.
The U.S. commanders-in-chief (CINCs)--of the Strike, Strategic
Air, and Continental Air Defense Commands, and of U.S. forces
in Alaska, the Atlantic, in Europe, in the Pacific, and elsewhere--who
presided over the alert and readiness measures did not know why
Nixon had ordered them. Indeed, they could only guess about the
purpose because Pentagon officials could not or would not give
them any information. Indeed, the Pentagon demanded strict secrecy
for the readiness test and enjoined public affairs officials throughout
the military services to avoid any comment in the event of leaks.
They could only say, "we do not comment on readiness tests."
It was not until the early 1980s that any information on these
events reached the mass media, when Seymour Hersh published The
Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (Summit
Books, 1983).
Even after Hersh's book, the full scope of the readiness and
the reasons behind it remained obscure and classified. Newly declassified
documents confirm what Strategic Air Command officers suspected,
that Vietnam War concerns were behind Nixon's decision. As White
House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman recorded in his diary on 17
October 1969, as the readiness test was underway, Kissinger had
told him that "he has all sorts of signal-type activity going
around the world to try to jar Soviets + NVN [North Vietnam]."
[See Document 8] Irritated by Soviet military
assistance to North Vietnam, Nixon was testing his "madman
theory" by ratcheting up the readiness level of nuclear forces.
If his military moves made Moscow concerned enough, Nixon apparently
believed, the Soviets might use their leverage to induce Hanoi
to be more cooperative in the Paris peace talks.
This compilation suggests the variety of material used to prepare
these articles. Years before either of the authors understood
the purpose of the JCS Readiness Test, the Air Force release was
declassified documents that suggested that a significant military
operation had taken place in October 1969. (For example, see Document
11). But it was difficult to describe the full scope of the
readiness test without access to a file --entitled "381 World-Wide
Increased Readiness Posture"(2) -- in the
records of JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler held at the National Archives
in the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218). The Archive
filed a Freedom of Information Act request for this file in 1994,
but it was not declassified until August 2002, eight years later.(3)
With the availability of this file and documents from the Nixon
papers at the National Archives, it finally became possible to
interpret the White House decisions that led to the readiness
test and the Pentagon's efforts to carry out presidential orders.
"Nixon's Nuclear Ploy" elucidates the intersection
between Vietnam diplomacy, the "madman theory," and
nuclear operations during October 1969. The article in The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists draws upon a longer, fully-sourced and
footnoted essay, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War
Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October
1969," that will appear in the January 2003 issue of Cold
War History.
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation
between President Richard Nixon and General Charles de Gaulle,
Paris, 28 February 1969
Source: National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA), Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security
Council Files (NSCF), box 1023. Memcon - The President and General
De Gaulle 2/28-3/2/69
Richard Nixon admired French president Charles de Gaulle and
made a point of meeting with him privately, with only translators
present, when he made his first presidential visit to Europe
in late February-early March 1969. During three lengthy conversations,
Nixon discussed the Vietnam negotiations and made it clear that
he expected Soviet help on Vietnam if there was to be any progress
in a detente with Moscow. Rightly or wrongly, Nixon believed
that Moscow was in a position to help because, he told the General,
the Soviets had "great influence on the North Vietnamese"
and supplied them with "85 percent of their weapons."
Serving as translator and notetaker was the linguistically skilled
General Vernon Walters, the U.S. Defense Attaché in Paris,
who would later help arrange Kissinger's secret meetings with
Chinese and North Vietnamese diplomats.
Document 2: Memorandum from Al
Haig to Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum from Secretary Laird
Enclosing Preliminary Draft of Potential Military Actions re Vietnam,"
2 March 1969, enclosing a memorandum from Secretary of Defense
Laird to Kissinger, 21 February 1969, and report [excerpts] from
Joint Staff, Top Secret/Sensitive, with Kissinger's Memo Reply
to Laird, 3 March 1969
Source: NSCF, box 1007, Haig Vietnam Files, Vol.
1 (Jan - March 1969)
During the first weeks of the new Republican administration,
Nixon, national security assistant Kissinger, JCS chairman Wheeler,
and defense secretary Melvin Laird discussed possible military
actions to make gains in the Vietnam negotiations. Laird's memorandum
to Kissinger notes that in late January, they had discussed
"potential military actions which might jar the NorthVietnamese
into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks." Laird
sent Kissinger a Joint Staff paper that reviewed possible options,
including "technical escalation," a plan for the feigned
nuclear escalation against North Vietnam. In the reply to Laird,
Kissinger asked for actions with a "lower profile"
and less risk on the grounds that "actual or feigned military
action" might produce "international and domestic
turbulence."
Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation
between Presidents Nicolae Ceaucescu and Richard Nixon, 3 August
1969, Bucharest, Romania, Top Secret/Sensitive/Nodis
Source: NSCF, box 1023, MemCons--The President
and President Ceaucéscu, August 2-August 3, 1969
During the summer and early fall of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger
tried to signal North Vietnam that if they did not cooperate
at Paris, the United States would punish them with massive bombing
raids. After a trip to Asia in late July and early August 1969,
Nixon stopped in Romania, partly to "needle" the Soviets
by showing them that he would deal with East European countries
whether they liked it or not (and they did not).(4)
Nixon also used the meetings to make carefully modulated threats
to North Vietnam. During discussions with President Ceaucescu,
Nixon said that "I don't make idle threats" and that
the Vietnamese were "making a grave mistake if they think
they can wait us out." Recognizing that Bucharest had its
own channels to Hanoi, undoubtedly Nixon expected Ceaucescu
to pass the message on to North Vietnam.
Document 4: Memorandum from Henry
A. Kissinger for the President, "Conversation with Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin," 1 October 1969, enclosing memorandum
of conversation between Dobrynin and Kissinger, 27 September 1969,
Top Secret Sensitive
Source: NSCF, box 489, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969
(Part II)
Beginning in early 1969, Nixon and Kissinger established a
confidential "back channel" to Moscow through ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin. During their many conversations, Kissinger
would push for more assistance from Moscow on Vietnam, while
Dobrynin would consistently object to Kissinger's efforts to
link Vietnam with progress in other areas such as arms control
and the Middle East. During this meeting in late September,
Kissinger took a prearranged phone call from Nixon, who wanted
Dobrynin to know that the "train had just left the station
and was heading down the tracks." In other words, without
Soviet cooperation on Vietnam, a dangerously uncontrollable
situation could arise.
Document 5: Cable from JCS Chairman
Wheeler to General Holloway, CINCSAC et al., 10 October 1969,
Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109,
"381 World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (October 69)",
released under FOIA
After Nixon ordered the Pentagon to take military readiness
measures, Laird's military assistant, General Robert Pursley
and the Joint Staff, developed specific plans that met White
House criteria for actions that the Soviets would notice without
alarming them. By 10 October 1969, a few days after Nixon's
decision, the Pentagon had an action plan for implementation
by the CINCs. To notify them about the ongoing planning, Wheeler
informed the CINCs about a decision by "higher authority"
to "test our military readiness.... to respond to possible
confrontation by the Soviet Union." No one had a confrontation
in mind, and references to "confrontation" were quickly
dropped but the cable spelled out the main lines of action on
which the CINCs could receive instructions, such as stand-downs,
alert measures, and radio silence. Significantly, Wheeler asked
the CINCs to suggest further actions that were compatible with
the goals of the operation.
Document 6: Point Paper for the
Chairman, JCS for a Meeting with the President, "Plan for
US Military Readiness," circa 10 October 1969, Top Secret/Sensitive
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109,
"381 World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (October 69)",
released under FOIA
A briefing paper prepared for a meeting with President Nixon
broadly outlined actions for implementation around the world
by the specified and unified (geographic) military commands.
Besides standing down training flights, commands would implement
Emission Controls (EMCON, or communications silence) and "reinstate
degraded alert sorties," military terminology for increasing
forces on ground alert.
Document 7: Cable from CINCPAC
to JCS, "Military Readiness," 12 October 1969, Top Secret/Eyes
Only, excised copy
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109,
"381 World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (October 69)",
released under FOIA
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral John McCain (father of
the Arizona senator) responded to Chairman Wheeler's message
with a number of suggested actions for testing U.S. military
readiness. The Pacific Command and the Department of Energy
excised nuclear-related suggestions (the deletions are under
appeal), but various suggestions survived the review process,
e.g., measures to increase the readiness posture of Pacific
fleet units, intensify intelligence activities, prosecute submarine
contacts, and increase the readiness of air defense units. McCain
discussed the possibility of intensifying PARPRO (peacetime
application of reconnaissance programs) activities against the
Soviets, he advised against it partly because of the "increased
risk to PARPRO aircraft." Pentagon planners had also discussed
the possibility of increasing reconnaissance flights on the
Soviet periphery but ruled against that option because of the
risks of incidents.
Document 8: Diary Entry, Friday,
17 October, H. R. Haldeman Diary
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project.
Special Files. Hand-written Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins
Haldeman
This entry was declassified in the mid-90s but too late for
publication in the CD version of Haldeman's diaries.(5)
Consequently, an important clue about Nixon and Kissinger's
thinking about the readiness test (and well as Kissinger's optimism
that Dobrynin's request for a meeting with Nixon signified a
"big break" on Vietnam) languished in relative obscurity
for a number of years. Until other material became available
from the Nixon NSC files this past spring, this was the only
document that disclosed Nixon's intent in ordering the readiness
test.
Document 9: Cable from JCS to CINCPAC,
"Increased Readiness Posture," 17 October 1969, Top
Secret/Noforn, excised copy
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109, "381 World-Wide Increased
Readiness Posture (October 69)", released under FOIA
The same day that Kissinger confided in Haldeman about the
readiness test, Wheeler sent a series of cables to the CINCs
instructing them on measures that they would take during the
next phase of activity. Some drew directly on Admiral McCain's
suggestions cited in document 7 such as increasing readiness
of conventionally armed tactical and air defense aicraft"
and increasing surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North
Vietnam. One specifically nuclear-related measure survived the
security reviewers: maintaining "maximum feasible SSBNs
at sea", that is, deploying as many Polaris nuclear missile
submarines at sea as possible.
Document 10: Memorandum to Secretary
of Defense from JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler, "US Military
Readiness Tests - Worldwide," 22 October 1969, Top Secret/Noforn/Sensitive
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109,
"381 World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (October 69)",
released under FOIA
Throughout the course of the readiness test, the Pentagon high
command and the White House were interested in whether Soviet
intelligence had detected any of the military measures. Unless
Moscow noticed unusual patterns in U.S. military activity around
the world, the readiness test would not make the Soviets think
twice, which is what Nixon wanted them to do. During the readiness
test, CINCSTRIKE (Commander-in-Chief, Strike Command)--an ancestor
of today's Central Command--had sent MIDEASTFOR (Middle East
Force) ships into the Gulf of Aden (part of the MEAFSA, or Middle
East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara, region).
As indicated in Wheeler's report the Soviet navy has noticed
the movement of U.S. ships in the Gulf of Aden. In light of
the Soviet reaction, and presumably to ensure that the Soviets
kept on noticing, the Joint Chiefs recommended continuing the
naval exercise.
Document 11: Cable from Strategic
Air Command Headquarters to 12 Air Division et al., "Increased
Readiness Posture," 23 October 1969, Top Secret
Source: Air Force 1995 FOIA Release
CINCSAC, General Bruce Holloway, also came up with suggestions
to increase the readiness level of U.S. military forces in ways
that presumably would be visible to Soviet observers. Typifying
the technical and organizational complexity of military action,
this message to SAC commanders in the field ordered them to
prepare selected aircraft for "maintenance generation"
and airborne alert. The former meant that aircraft would be
on the "highest state of maintenance readiness": while
not in "cocked" ground alert posture with crews on
board, the bombers would have nuclear weapons on board and would
be otherwise ready to fly. For the airborne alert mission, codenamed
"Giant Lance," aircraft from the 92nd strategic aerospace
wing would fly nuclear-armed airborne alerts in the "Eilson
East SEAGA orbit" with "implementation hour"
beginning late in the day on 26 October. In other words, they
would be flying in an orbit over Eastern Alaska, not far from
Eilson air base. The Eilson East orbit was one of a number of
"orbits" (Northern Pacific, Western Alaska, Eastern
Atlantic, etc.) in which alerted bomber and tanker aircraft
could fly in the SEAGA--Selective Employment of Air and Ground
Alert--program. SAC had established SEAGA in the late 1960s
to give policymakers various nuclear alert options during a
politico-military crisis.
Document 12: Cable from JCS to
all Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, "Increased
Readiness Posture," 28 October 1969, Top Secret
Source: NARA, Record Group 218. Records of the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler Papers, box 109,
"381 World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (October 69)",
released under FOIA
With this message, the JCS ordered the CINCs to end the readiness
test early in the morning of 30 October and to restore units
to normal operating status. Thus, ended a military operation
that would remain secret until the early 1980s.
Notes
1. Author of the prize-winning Nixon's Vietnam War (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998), Kimball recently completed
a book entitled Smoking Guns and Puzzle Pieces: Secret Files
and Tapes About the Vietnam War and Triangular Diplomacy, 1969-1975,
which will be published by the University
Press of Kansas.
2. In the old War Department decimal filing system, 381 refers
to military plans and planning.
3. Administrative problems explained part of the delay; unfortunately,
the Archive's request was folded into a very large request for
Wheeler files made by another individual.
4. See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 2nd edition
(Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 83-84.
5. Harry Robbins Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the
Nixon White House (Santa Monica, CA : Sony Imagesoft, 1994).