Double
Dealing: Mexico's Foreign Policy Toward Cuba
by
Kate Doyle
The historic relationship between Mexico
and Fidel Castro's Cuba is the stuff of legend - a legend that
both nations have promoted tirelessly since 1959.
In the years after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, despite
intense pressure from Washington, Mexico proved a staunch ally
to Cuba. In 1960, López Mateos demonstrated his backing
for the new government by inviting Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós
to Mexico for a state visit. In 1961, the Mexican government led
the charge in the United Nations to protest the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Mexico repeatedly opposed the imposition of economic sanctions
by the Organization of American States (OAS) against Cuba; and
in 1964, became the only OAS member to reject the U.S-led charge
to break diplomatic ties with Havana.
Over the decades that followed, Cuba found that it could count
on its Mexican friends for support in a hostile hemisphere. After
all, Mexico's affinity for Havana was directly connected to its
own revolutionary legacy.
So the legend goes, anyway.
But newly declassified records from the United States suggest
that the legendary independence in Mexico's approach to Cuba may
be more folklore than fact. The documents, at the U.S. National
Archives and the presidential library of Lyndon Baines Johnson
in Austin, Texas, tell a far more complex tale of the real history
of U.S.-Mexican-Cuban relations than the official story might
have us believe.
This historic alliance has already been challenged by the dramatic
deterioration of Mexican-Cuban relations under the administration
of President Vicente Fox. First came Fox's clumsy effort in April
of last year to orchestrate Castro's exit from the Monterrey economic
summit before the arrival of President George Bush; then Mexico
joined the majority at the United Nations to censure Cuba for
its dismal human rights record. These moves have prompted cries
of outrage that Fox has destroyed a proud tradition of friendship
with Cuba founded in defiance of American pressure at the height
of the cold war.
During the cold war, Mexico's foreign policy appeared to take
an independent track, particularly in Latin America. Despite official
Mexico's evident distaste for communism and low tolerance for
dissent at home, Mexican governments refused to toe the U.S. ideological
line in the hemisphere. Not only did Mexico preserve diplomatic
relations with Castro's Cuba, but it offered safe haven for political
exiles from throughout the region, and led the Contadora group
of nations attempting to curtail U.S. intervention in Central
America in the 1980s, in the face of overwhelming and public U.S.
disapproval.
In the case of Cuba, the declassified documents offer new evidence
that U.S. tolerance of Mexico's intransigence was based upon a
secret and highly sensitive compact made between Mexican heads
of state and their counterparts in Washington. The documents illustrate
the ways in which Mexico managed a dangerous diplomatic dance:
maintaining a public stance of support for the Castro regime while
secretly conceding much more to U.S. pressure than has been acknowledged
by analysts.
The Cuban revolution - and Washington's virulent reaction to
it - presented a direct challenge to Mexico's Estrada Doctrine.
The López Mateos government did not hesitate to join the
rest of Latin America in decrying Cuba's role in the missile crisis
of 1962. But it was faced with a more complicated diplomatic dilemma
in 1964, when the United States helped force a vote in the OAS
to sever relations with the Castro regime over reported aggressions
against Venezuela's government. Mexico's decision not to break
with Cuba has often been cited as an example of its independent
foreign policy. In fact, there is evidence that Mexico's desire
to preserve its autonomy on the question of Cuba coincided nicely
with the needs of the United States to maintain some influence
over Castro - and to spy on the country.
Four months after the July 1964 OAS meeting, President Johnson
was preparing to greet Díaz Ordaz for his first visit to
the United States as the new president-elect of Mexico. In a taped
telephone conversation between LBJ, speaking from his ranch in
central Texas, and the powerful Senator Richard Russell, Democrat
from Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Johnson
sought the senator's reaction to Mexico's decision to maintain
ties with Cuba. "What do you think I ought to tell Díaz
Ordaz about Mexico being the only country that didn't condemn
Cuba?," asked the President.
Russell responded angrily. "I'd just tell him that you judged
it as being very unfortunate, and that it was a great burden on
a good neighbor policy -- that he, as well as all his predecesssors
and all the others, knew that you want the United States to be
an extraordinarly good friend to Mexico, but that the state of
public opinion in the United States was such that you just couldn't
go all out there for him. Well, I don't know whether you ought
to be quite that strong. Yes, I think I would. The state of public
opinion in this country -- on account of not being able to understand
Mexico's attitude -- made it very difficult for you. And that
very frankly you couldn't understand their attitude either."
Minutes later, Johnson took a phone call from his secretary of
state, Dean Rusk. As they chatted about world affairs, the conversation
turned to Mexico.
Rusk: "[Díaz] Ordaz is coming in, when, around
noon?"
LBJ: "Yeah. About twelve o' clock."
Rusk: "Right. Well, I hope you have a good visit with him."
LBJ: "What do we say to him about Cuba?"
Where Senator Russell had responded to LBJ with conventional Washington
wisdom on what he perceived as Mexico's betrayal of a special relationship
with the United States, Secretary of State Rusk was sanguine.
He cautioned the President against complaining about Mexico's
decision: "Oh, I would not play that up very much. The background
on that is that during our Foreign Ministers meeting in late July,
a number of us - Brazil and others - talked about the practical
desireability of having one Latin American embassy there if possible.
[. . .] And so the hemisphere is fairly relaxed about the Mexicans
staying on there for a time. I would emphasize to him the importance
of his taking all the steps necessary not to permit the Cubans
to use Mexico as a channel for money or agents or for travel of
students to Cuba for training and things of that sort. And then
tell him that we hope that he will review the whole Cuban situation
and his own relations with the hemisphere and with Latin America.
But I wouldn't press him unduly to break relations."
LBJ: "All right, that's good."
Rusk's revelation is confirmed in a secret cable sent to Washington
three years later by the U.S. embassy's chargé Henry Dearborn.
In May 1967 a small guerrilla force headed by a Cuban army officer
was captured in the Venezuelan state of Miranda. Venezuela responded
with outrage, calling on the hemisphere to condemn Cuba's actions.
Reacting to an appeal by the Venezuelan government to prod Mexico
to break relations with Cuba, Dearborn cabled the State Department:
"I have been informed since recent arrival this post that
GOM [Government of Mexico] has informal understanding with U.S.
at highest levels to maintain relations with Cuba so one OAS country
can have foot in door which might be helpful. We have no documentation
on this here but if true we might not wish leave impression with
GOV [Government of Venezuela] we are willing to push GOM even
from behind." In other words, the United States would refuse
to pressure Mexico overtly or covertly to cut its ties with Cuba
because of the opportunity it offered the U.S. for manipulating
Mexico's presence there.
Furthermore, it is evident from the declassified documents that
the United States regularly gathered intelligence on Cuba's internal
political, economic and social developments directly from Mexico's
ambassadors to Havana.
Ambassador Fernando Pámanes Escobedo offers a case in
point. On June 2, 1967, a U.S. embassy officer, Francis S. Sherry
III, sat down with Pámanes while the ambassador was in
Mexico for consultations with the SRE. According to the U.S. embassy's
secret memorandum of the conversation - which was reviewed and
cleared by the CIA station chief in Mexico City, Winston Scott
[footnote] - Pámanes briefed
Sherry on a wide range of highly sensitive topics. They included
the effects of Cuba's economic woes on its citizens and the resultant
popular discontent, Cuban military matters, the deteriorating
state of Cuban-Soviet relations, and information on Cubans seeking
asylum in the Mexican embassy.
Here is Sherry's account of Pámanes Escobedo's description
of a recent Cuban army deployment: "Pámanes estimated
that more than 30 thousand troops were freed for defensive duties
along the southern coast by placing guards and militia-men on
alert status. This type of partial mobilization allowed Castro
to further the grip of the regime on the people although the Cubans
also appeared genuinely apprehensive of possible Venezuelan reprisals
backed by the United States. Without mentioning his name, Pámanes
said he was told by a Cuban official speaking privately that the
Cubans foresaw the possibility that the Venezuelans might bomb
or shell Cuban installations or attempt limited commando raids
along the Cuban coast." One can only wonder how the unnamed
Cuban official would have reacted if he had known his conversation
would be repeated to a U.S. embassy officer.
The Mexican ambassador also reported a suspicious-looking Soviet
ship cargo. "During one of his travels to the port of Mariel
in April 1967," wrote the U.S. embassy, "Pámanes
observed the unloading of an unidentified Soviet ship from a distance
which included large, long boxes which he felt probably contained
small to medium-size ground to air missiles. Four to six were
being loaded on trailers of about 30-ton capacity each. Pámanes
spotted 8 such trailers which were hauled away under strong escort.
This is the only unloading of missiles observed by Ambassador
Pámanes since his arrival in Cuba."
The memorandum sent to the State Department by Deputy Chief of
Mission Henry Dearborn in an airgram on June 10, came with a note
from Dearborn which read, "The fact of Mr. Sherry's meeting
with Ambassador Pámanes and the attached memorandum should
be given maximum security protection."
It is a measure of the memo's importance that a copy was sent
to the White House several days later, with a cover memo from
Walt Rostow, LBJ's National Security Advisor, that read, "Mr.
President: This first-hand account of the situation inside Cuba
[DELETED] has some interesting insights. W.W. Rostow."
Just three months later, the embassy had its first conversation
with the newly appointed Mexican ambassador to Cuba, Miguel Covián
Pérez, to discuss, among other issues, an ongoing conflict
with Havana over the repatriation of American citizens. Although
Covián warned in the meeting that "it is important
from the outset that he is exclusively GOM ambassador to Cuba
and not 'unofficial representative of the U.S.,'" he agreed
to communicate Cuban developments to the U.S. embassy, not only
through his reports to Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores,
but also through "informal and unofficial contacts"
with then-federal deputy Alfonso Martínez Domínguez.
In public, Mexico repeatedly emphasized its sovereign right
to craft foreign policies free of influence from its giant neighbor
to the north. But in private meetings with their counterparts,
Mexican presidents took great pains to assure the United States
of their underlying support for U.S. objectives in Cuba and elsewhere.
In a briefing memo sent to President Johnson on February 18,
1964, just before an encounter with López Mateos, Secretary
Rusk pointed out that, "At times his foreign policy has been
too independent - for example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural
relations with Communist China. But when fundamental issues
are at stake we have usually found him understanding and willing
to be helpful
" by controlling the travel of
"Castro agents" to and from Mexico, for example (emphasis
in the original).
Later that year, López's successor Díaz Ordaz reiterated
the assurance. "The United States could be absolutely sure
that when the chips were really down, Mexico would be unequivocally
by its side," Díaz told Johnson as they talked about
Mexico's stance on Cuba. The president went on to say that a completely
compliant Mexico, which never disagreed with U.S. policy whatever
the views of its citizens, would be useless to the United States.
"There was a considerable advantage when the issues at stake
were not great if Mexico could continue to demonstrate its political
independence and divergence on relatively minor issues."
The NSC advisor who signed off on the memo of that conversation
warned the White House that its distribution should be limited:
"If it should get out to the public it could really hurt
Díaz Ordaz."
The new documentary evidence uncovered about Mexican-Cuban relations
does not necessarily imply that Mexico's policy toward Cuba is
and always has been a lie- rather, that Mexican leaders may have
crafted a skillfully negotiated independence in the face of intense
U.S. pressure.
But the declassified records do offer a clearer picture of the
double game that Mexico played for decades in its relationship
with Cuba. On the one hand, it promoted an image of itself of
a courageous and independent leader, ever ready to take the side
of the beleaguered island nation - however unpopular that made
Mexico in the eyes of its most powerful ally. On the other, the
Mexican government back channeled intelligence and assurances
to U.S. officials in an effort to ingratiate itself and win favor
in delicate bilateral negotiations with the United States over
issues it deemed more important. Viewed in this light, Mexico's
recent decision to join the United Nations in condemning Cuba's
human rights record does represents something new. It was the
first time that Mexico ignored its own propaganda to craft an
honest policy - a policy with a single face, shaped not by public
duplicity but by the secret diplomacy of the past.
Note
- Jefferson Morley, "The Spy Who Loved Him," The
Washington Post, March 17, 1996, p.F01.
U.S. Documents
Document 1
February 15, 1964
U.S.-Mexican Cooperation on Cuba
Department of State, secret talking points and background paper
[Extract]
In preparation for a bilateral meeting between President Lyndon
B. Johnson and Mexico's outgoing President Adolfo López
Mateos, the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
drafted a set of talking points and briefing papers covering issues
the two leaders might discuss. These extracts concerning Cuba
provide a mixed picture of Mexico's policy toward Havana. On the
one hand, Washington continued to have concerns about Mexico's
relations with the Cuban government, and believed that upcoming
presidential elections made it unlikely that Mexico would change
its position in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the
State Department's analysts acknowledged that Mexico had taken
"unpublicized measures" against Cuba and "has cooperated
with us against Castro in ways which do not draw public attention."
[Note: Almost forty years after the talking points included here
were drafted for President Johnson, they remain classified. The
National Security Archive has appealed their denial and awaits
a response from the State Department. ]
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
CO-Mexico, "Briefing Book - López Mateos visit, 2/20-2/22/64"
Document 2
February 18, 1964
Your Meeting with President López Mateos
Secretary of State, secret memorandum and background paper
Just days prior to the meeting between López Mateos and
the newly-inaugurated U.S. president, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk gives LBJ background information and talking points on Mexico.
Despite the public disagreements with the Mexican government over
its policy on Cuba in recent years, Rusk describes U.S.-Mexican
relations as being at an "all-time high." Indeed, while
he states that Mexico's foreign policy under López Mateos
has at times been "too independent," Rusk nevertheless
concedes that López Mateos has supported U.S. objectives
when "fundamental issues are at stake." The attached
"Major Points of Interest" adds that the Mexicans have
helped control "Castro/Communism," but that "Mexico
is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation and we have
carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican control measures."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
CO-Mexico, "López Mateos Visit, 2/20-2/22/64"
Document 3
November 5, 1964
Mexico and Relations with Cuba
Department of State, confidential background paper
In anticipation of the visit of Mexican President-elect Gustavo
Díaz Ordaz to the LBJ ranch in Stonewall, Texas, the Department
of State drafts a short paper on Mexican relations with Cuba.
The document offers the conventional Washington view of Mexico's
intransigence over the Cuba question - particularly regarding
its decision to stand alone among the nations of the Organization
of American States in maintaining diplomatic and economic ties
with Havana. The paper expresses the hope that the new Mexican
president will reconsider his country's Cuba policy.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, "Díaz Ordaz visit, 1964"
Document 4 (MP3 format)
November 12, 1964
[Telephone Conversation between LBJ and Richard Russell]
White House, unclassified tape recording
Preparing to greet Díaz Ordaz in Texas, President Lyndon
Johnson speaks by phone with Senator Richard Russell (D-GA). In
a segment of the taped conversation which opens with a discussion
of domestic political affairs, LBJ asks the senator for his opinion
of the Mexican decision to maintain diplomatic relations with
Cuba. Russell believes the move represents a betrayal of Mexico's
long-standing friendship with the United States.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library
Recordings of Telephone Conversations-White House Series
Tape WH6411.18: Richard Russell, 8:55 a.m., PNO 6341
Document 5 (MP3 format)
November 12, 1964
[Telephone Conversation between LBJ and Dean Rusk]
White House, unclassified tape recording
President Johnson talks by telephone with Secretary of State
Dean Rusk. After discussing developments in Vietnam and a U.S.
delegation to the inauguration of President-elect Gustavo Díaz
Ordaz in Mexico in December, LBJ asks Rusk what he ought to say
during his upcoming meeting with Díaz about Mexico's vote
to maintain relations with Cuba during the OAS ministerial meeting
in July. The secretary advises Johnson to avoid making a fuss
about the vote, and suggests that Mexico's official standing in
Havana may prove convenient to the United States and the hemisphere.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library
Recordings of Telephone Conversations-White House Series
Tape WH6411.18: Dean Rusk, 9:40 a.m., PNO 6342
Document 6
November 23, 1964
President Johnson's Conversation with President-elect Díaz
Ordaz
Department of State, confidential memorandum of conversation
Following meetings on November 13 and 14 between President Johnson
and President-elect Díaz Ordaz in Texas, memoranda of conversation
are drafted for distribution to appropriate U.S. government offices.
Part Two of the memoranda relates a conversation between LBJ,
Díaz Ordaz and Mexican Foreign Secretary Antonio Carrillo
Flores while riding in an automobile together. In response to
Johnson's questions, Díaz Ordaz tells the U.S. president
that Mexicans are disenchanted with the undemocratic behavior
of Fidel Castro, but that his country's policy of non-intervention
and doubts about Venezuela's claims of Cuban aggression led to
the recent OAS vote. Díaz goes on to assure LBJ that despite
Mexico's occasional divergence from U.S.-supported policies, his
government was ever ready to back Washington in matters of great
importance, as it did during the missile crisis in 1962 - in short,
that "Mexico's interests in a show-down would be parallel
to ours." Díaz argues the benefits of policy differences
between the United States and Mexico: "While divergence on
relatively unimportant matters might at time create temporary
discomfiture they also demonstrated that the American States did
in fact enjoy independence."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
CO-Mexico, "Díaz Ordaz visit, 1964"
Document 7
Circa June 1967
[Guerrilla Problem in Latin America]
[Department of State], secret intelligence report
The State Department assesses the status of guerrilla movements
around the hemisphere, including in Venezuela - called "Cuba's
primary target for subversion in Latin America" - and in
Mexico, "well known as a focal point for Cuban/Soviet machinations."
The report claims that guerrilla training missions and arms supplies
are funneled through the Mexican capital via the Cuban Embassy
and cites documents linking this route to 4,000 arms recently
smuggled to Guatemalan guerrillas.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
Intelligence File, "Guerrilla Problem in Latin America"
Document 8
June 10, 1967
Conversation between Embassy Officer and Mexican Ambassador
to Cuba
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret airgram
A memorandum concerning a conversation held June 2 between Mexican
Ambassador to Cuba Fernando Pámanes Escobedo and U.S. consular
officer Francis Sherry is forwarded to the White House. The conversation
amounts to an intelligence debriefing of Amb. Pámanes,
as he describes mounting discontent inside Cuba due to chronic
food shortages and "bad public administration," details
of Cuban troop movements, his observations about the arrival of
what appear to Soviet ground-to-air missiles, and other sensitive
matters. On the cover note to the State Department, Deputy Chief
of Mission Henry Dearborn warns that "Mr. Sherry's meeting
with Ambassador Pámanes and the attached memorandum should
be given maximum security protection." As noted on the bottom
of the memo, the document was reviewed and cleared by CIA station
chief, Winston Scott, before being passed to Washington.
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59
CFPF 67-69, POL Cuba-A
Source of attached memo from Walt Rostow to President Johnson:
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Cuba, "Vol. II, Bowdler File"
Document 9
June 28, 1967
[Informal understanding on Cuba]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
The U.S. deputy chief of mission in Mexico, Henry Dearborn, cables
Washington for advice on how to respond to a recent request from
the Venezuelan government to pressure Mexico into severing ties
with Cuba. Dearborn explains that he has been told that the Mexican
government has an "informal understanding with US at highest
levels to maintain relations with Cuba so one OAS country can
have foot in door which might sometime be helpful." He is
reluctant to act on Venezuela's behalf, as a consequence, and
seeks the State Department's guidance.
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59
CFPF 67-69, POL Cuba-A
Document 10
September 7, 1967
[Change of Mexican Ambassadors in Havana]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Report of a private meeting between U.S. Ambassador Tony Freeman
and newly appointed Mexican ambassador to Cuba, Miguel Covián
Pérez, held in the home of federal deputy Alfonso Martínez
Domínguez. The document provides additional evidence that
Mexico's diplomats in Havana regularly provided information about
developments inside Cuba to the U.S. government. In this meeting,
Covián warns that it is "important to establish from
outset that he is exclusively GOM [Government of Mexico] Ambassador
to Cuba and not 'Unofficial Representative of U.S.'" He agrees,
however, to convey to Amb. Freeman all developments on an issue
of importance to the Americans - that is, the repatriation of
U.S. citizens seeking to leave Cuba - through the Foreign Relations
Secretariat and through "informal and unofficial contact"
with Martínez Domínguez. Freeman concludes by warning
the State Department to take Mexico's assistance into consideration
during the upcoming OAS ministerial meeting: "I trust Department
will have this in mind while pressing Mexico to adopt tougher
attitude toward Venezuelan resolution, and will understand should
GOM decide it must abstain on the res[olution] which specifically
condemns Cuba
and calls for sanctions."
[Attached to the cable is a cover memo from White House special
adviser on Latin America, William Bowdler, to National Security
Adviser Walt Rostow advising him of the conversation.]
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
CO-Mexico, "Memos and Misc. Vol.III, 3/67-11/67 (2 of 3)"
Document 11
September 18, 1967
[Repatriation of American Citizens now being held in Cuba]
Department of State, secret eyes only memorandum
According to this highly classified memorandum from the State
Department, the former Mexican ambassador to Cuba, Fernando Pámanes
Escobedo, was replaced by Miguel Covián Pérez due
to corruption and the Cuban government's consequent refusal to
deal with him.
Barbara M. Watson, a senior officer in the Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, reports on confidential contacts she has
had with an individual regarding efforts to repatriate American
citizens stranded in Havana. At Watson's request, the individual
asked Fidel Castro why the Cuban government refused to permit
U.S. citizens to continue leaving the country after two plane
loads had successfully left in late 1966. The informant returned
to Washington with the news that Castro was ready to allow repatriation
to begin again. Castro's "primary reason for the stoppage
of airlifts," according to Watson's source, was the Cuban
government's disgust with the man serving as liaison for Havana
and Washington on the issue: Mexican Ambassador Pámanes
Escobedo. Although names in the document have been excised, it
is clear from the text that the conduct of Pámanes - whom
Castro refers to as a "bad sort" - prompted the termination
of the airlifts. "[DELETED: Pámanes] was, reportedly,
found to be selling departure permits and was also said to be
indulging in black-marketeering. When Castro learned of this,
he refused to have anything to do with [DELETED: Pámanes];
as a result, his effectiveness on behalf of his own government
and ours was terminated."
The report was forwarded to President Johnson by his national
security adviser, Walt Rostow.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security
Files
CO-Cuba, "Vol. III, Bowdler File [2 of 2]"
Mexican documents
Document 1
Circa March 1965
Pliego de Instrucciones
[Instructions]
Mexican Foreign Relations Secretariat
Instructions from the Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE)
for the new ambassador to Cuba, General Fernando Pámanes
Escobedo, to prepare him for his mission in Havana.
The 23-page document moves from the general to the specific,
beginning with an overview of Mexico's record in foreign affairs.
Turning to Cuba, the SRE reviews Cuban history and reiterates
Mexico's guiding principles of self-determination and non-intervention,
advising that, "our representatives must keep themselves
at the margins of events that occur in the internal political
life of the countries where they are accredited, without damaging
their ability to observe and report on them in great detail
"
Several pages are dedicated to the "Cuban Question,"
summarizing developments since the Cuban revolution and the evolution
of Mexico's position and policies toward Cuba. The document examines
the recent decision by the OAS member states to sever diplomatic
ties with Havana. Characterizing the move as a "coercive
measure against Cuba," the SRE explains that Mexico rejected
the OAS decision and now remains the only Latin American country
with an embassy in the country.
Finally, in a section devoted to "Informes Políticos"
[Political Reports], the SRE reminds the new ambassador that he
must submit to Mexico City regular reports on the political situation
inside Cuba, paying special attention to "events, declarations
or pronouncements that will help the Secretariat understand the
development of Cuba's foreign policy, particularly with respect
to questions debated in the Organization of American States, as
well as those which refer to the peculiar situation in which Cuba
finds itself on account of its enmity with the United States and
its close ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other
countries of the socialist bloc, third world or unaligned."
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 13411 - Cuba, Pliego de Instrucciones de Cuba
Document 2
March 29, 1967
Llamamiento del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas a la juventud
cubana para que se aliste en ellas
[Call by the Minister of the Armed Forces to Cuba's youth urging
them to enlist]
Mexican Embassy in Havana, report no. 317
Prompted by the publication of an armed forces communiqué
signed by the Vice Minister of Defense instead of Defense Minister
Raúl Castro, Ambassador Pámanes conveys to Mexico
City the many rumors circulating in Havana over the whereabouts
of Fidel's brother. According to Pámanes, members of the
foreign diplomatic corps are speculating about a putative rift
between Cuba and the Soviet Union that has allegedly prompted
an emergency trip by Raúl Castro to Moscow. Pámenes
complains that he cannot vouch for the truth of such rumors, given
the fact that the "complex machinery of the Cuban Government
and Communist Party, aimed at creating a closed society, does
not permit one to obtain normal information." The Mexican
official suggests that his government is more likely to find accurate
information on the question by reading the foreign press than
he is from inside Cuba.
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 3056-1, Informes Políticos-Embajada de
México en Cuba
Document 3
April 12, 1967
Versión sobre las actividades actuales del Ministro
de las Fuerzas Armadas de Cuba, Comandante Raúl Castro
[One version of the current activities of the Minister of the
Armed Forces, Commander Raúl Castro]
Mexican Embassy in Havana, Reserved report no. 399
Ambassador Pámanes Escobedo reports the latest theory
on the whereabouts of Raúl Castro. Most of the socialist
bloc diplomats, writes Pámanes, believe Raúl to
be in Havana preparing for his imminent promotion to Vice Premier
of the country. In his new post, Castro would not only coordinate
the activities of the government and the Communist Party, but
would take over as Cuba's leader if something happened to Fidel.
The ambassador points out that in the event that Raúl replaces
his brother, "the political orientation of Cuba would not
move one inch, though . . . given his personal characteristics
as a hard, radical and severe man, he might try to resolve the
island's problems through the application of tough and inflexible
measures." Finally, the Ambassador notes that considering
the important role Raúl has played in fomenting guerrilla
movements in Latin America, he and others in the diplomatic corps
take a special interest in gathering more precise information
about Commandante Raúl Castro. "Naturally, such information
is difficult to obtain, due to the well-known features of stealth
and secrecy that always surround the activities of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and Prime Minister Castro."
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 3056-1, Informes Políticos-Embajada de
México en Cuba
Document 4
May 10, 1967
Semana de Solidaridad con los pueblos latinoamericanos
[Week of Solidarity with the Latin American people]
Mexican Embassy in Havana, report no. 469
Ambassador Pámanes reports to Mexico City on the closing
ceremonies of the Week of Solidarity with Latin America, during
which Guatemalan Renato Jiménez spoke on the obligation
of all Latin Americans to take up arms and head to the mountains
to launch the revolutionary struggle. Pámanes believes
that Jiménez is being trained in Cuba to return to Guatemala
and lead the "insurrectionary movement" there. "This
ceremony," argues Pámanes, "puts into relief
once again the fact that elements are being prepared in Cuba so
that they will return to their countries and lead the struggle
against their own governments."
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 3056-1, Informes Políticos-Embajada de
México en Cuba
Document 5
May 12, 1967
Discurso del Primer Ministro Fidel Castro en el poblado de
Guane, el 29 de abril de 1967
[Speech given by Fidel Castro to the town of Guane on April 29,
1967]
Mexican Embassy in Cuba, report no. 478
Fidel Castro gives a speech in which he claims to be working
to turn the island into a world-class producer of citrus fruits.
Ambassador Pámanes cautions against taking such promises
too seriously. He notes that government propaganda rarely offers
an accurate description of reality in Cuba, and points to the
current shortage of fruits and vegetables as an example of the
true situation - a shortage that stems either from inadequate
production methods or from the export of the majority of produce
to socialist bloc countries.
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 3056-1, Informes Políticos-Embajada de
México en Cuba
Document 6
July 4, 1967
Visita a Cuba del Premier Ministro Soviético Alexei
Kosiguin (del 26 al 30 de junio de 1967)
[Visit to Cuba of Soviet First Minister Alexei Kosygin (From 26-30
of June 1967)]
Mexican Embassy in Havana, Confidential report no. 559
Ambassador Pámanes Escobedo reports to Mexico City on
the surprise visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to Havana
at the end of June. Pámanes once again describes the great
secrecy surrounding political events in Cuba, complaining that
there is no information beyond the rumors coursing through the
streets. He notes, however, that the cold reception given the
Soviet Premier by the government and the "tense formality"
observed at a photo opportunity has aroused suspicions among the
diplomatic corps of both Western and Eastern bloc countries that
Kosygin is in Cuba to reprimand Castro. Wondering what could be
the cause of such obviously strained relations, Pámanes
passes on the perception among the diplomatic corps that the Soviets
consider Fidel Castro too extreme on a number of issues, including
his support of subversive movements in Latin America, his crackdown
on dissidents in Cuba, and his position on Vietnam and other Third
World movements.
Source: Archivo de Concentraciones, Mexican
Foreign Relations Secretariat
File folder: 3056-1, Informes Políticos-Embajada de
México en Cuba