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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

Monday, January 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting on U.S. Strategy for  
South West Asia and Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS

State  
Under Secretary for Political  
Affairs, David Newsom  
Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders

Defense  
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor  
Mr. Robert Murray

JCS  
Chairman, General David Jones  
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA  
Director Stansfield Turner

Energy  
Secretary Charles Duncan

White House  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

NSC  
Colonel William E. Odom  
Colonel Leslie Denend  
Henry Owen  
Thomas Thornton  
Robert Hunter  
Fritz Ermarth

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with an overview of what is happening and what is at stake in the region. The results of this meeting, he said, are to provide a basis for a National Security Council meeting with the President later this week. We must deal with the continued deterioration of the U.S. position in the region. Whatever the Soviet motives for their actions in Afghanistan, they have created an objective threat and a dynamic development in the area as serious for our security and vital interests as Soviet actions in Greece in 1947. We must provide the President with a basis for responding adequately to this change, specifically what we should do about Pakistan and about the larger Persian Gulf region. The President believes that there will be lasting strategic consequences. He

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Review on January 14, 2000  
Extended by Z. Brzezinski  
Reason for Extension: NSC

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By J. Saunders, National Security Council

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wants to reaffirm that there will be no zig-zag in U.S.-Soviet relations on our side. No warm up is to be expected soon. The mistake in 1968 after the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was, in the President's view, to ease up on Moscow too early.

The President spoke with Aga Shahi over the weekend and reaffirmed our commitment to the agreement of 1959. The problem is how to define the U.S. commitment under the agreement. If there is major Soviet aggression, the U.S. will respond within the limits of our Constitutional authority. The U.S. will not, however, become involved in border skirmishes. We want our support to help Pakistan to take a firm stand against Soviet forces in the region even if they are faced by a Moscow/Kabul/New Delhi axis. In that case, the U.S. will develop a U.S./Saudi Arabian/PRC/Pakistan/ and eventually Iran axis as a counter.

Dr. Brzezinski next declared that the task before us is how to translate this basic stand by the President into:

-- effective military relations with Pakistan and other countries in the region;

-- economic assistance to Pakistan in a way that supports our broader purposes;

-- a regional web of political relations to counter effectively the threat created by Soviet moves in Afghanistan.

We cannot duplicate NATO in this region; a more eclectic mix of bilateral, multilateral, and informal arrangements must suffice.

There was a brief discussion of the implications of Dr. Brzezinski's framing of the overall context and the tasks to be accomplished. State asked if the U.S. guarantee to Pakistan against aggression was for only a Soviet attack or also an Indian attack, adding that this would be a major problem in our relations with India if it included both. Defense insisted that it must include both because the Pakistanis cannot shift forces between their western and eastern frontiers to meet the Soviet aggression without a guarantee in the east as well as against the Soviets in the west. State accepted this argument by Dr. Brzezinski and Defense that sooner or later we would have to face up to Pakistan's security problem with India. Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. commitment was only against a threat from the north. Dr. Brzezinski asked at this point if there were disagreements with his analysis of the situation because it carries a number of assumptions which are key for further decisions. No dissenting views were expressed. Defense strongly supported the analysis. State added that we must include the nuclear issue within this policy context. State also pointed out that we must anticipate the criticism that we are merely restoring a "cold war alliance" with the rebuttal that

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such an alliance is inadequate for the contemporary political and military realities in the region. Dr. Brzezinski accepted both points, especially that we have in mind something more than a cold war alliance as we build a new regional security system.

The meeting next turned to specific issues for decision.

I. Military Assistance to Pakistan

In discussion of the fighter aircraft issue, Graham Claytor reported that the Pakistanis did not request specific U.S. aircraft but rather asked the United States to provide what is necessary for them to defend themselves against the new Soviet threat which includes MIG-23s and MIG-25s. There was discussion of the value of A-7 fighters for close air support along the western borders, the extent to which helicopter gunships could perform the same mission, and whether the A-7s were meant for an air defense role also.

General Jones agreed that helicopters would be useful but added that A-7s would provide much greater air ground capability. All agreed that we should encourage the Pakistanis to use the French Mirage fighter for the larger air defense problem against the Soviet Union.

Tasking: State was asked to:

1. determine whether the Mirages will in fact suffice to meet the threat;
2. clarify with the French their willingness to provide Mirages;
3. with Defense, consider A-7s for Pakistan, about 30.

II. Bases, Political Assurances to Host Nations, and Increased RDF

Bases. Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of a base in Pakistan. General Jones said "facilities" ("bases" have a poor political connotation, it was observed) for air and naval deployments to Pakistan would be a significant advantage. Others pointed out that such U.S. facilities in Pakistan would drive India into closer cooperation with Moscow against Pakistan. Most all agreed that this is possible, but there were differing views on whether we should take the step and the risks it involves. Dr. Brzezinski added that we should consider it but not over load our relations with India by taking the step now.

Tasking: State and Defense will develop a paper on U.S. military "facilities" in Pakistan, describing their purpose, possible Indian reaction, and what those reactions would entail for the United States.

Military Consortium for Pakistan: State reported that George Vest and Peter Constable will be going to Europe for discussions

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about British, French, and Saudi Arabian participation in the military consortium. Dr. Brzezinski added that the Japanese should also be asked to participate. Newsom and others were less enthusiastic about bringing the Japanese in. It would be a new step for them. Newsom and Owen suggested we emphasize greater Japanese economic aid to Pakistan in forms that will release Pakistan domestic funds for military purposes. There was some question about the Japanese laws permitting financing of direct military aid to Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski argued that the Japanese have greater interests in the area than the U.S. Thirty years after the war, when they are economically powerful, surely they can contribute to the security of the Persian Gulf. We should raise the issue with them even if they do not accept our proposal.

Tasking: State will check what the Japanese law permits. Defense will produce a paper outlining a specific division of labor among the members of the military consortium, integrating each country's contribution to meet the overall Pakistani military needs in the most efficient fashion possible.

Political Assurances to Host Nations: Defense made clear that the technical survey teams can proceed to Oman and Somalia without providing their hosts with "political assurances" on what the U.S. will give for the bases. Work is presently under way to produce a military-economic aid package for each host country with appropriate "political assurances."

Tasking: State will provide a paper which sets forth the assurances for each country, the form in which the assurances should be given, and what consultations with Congress are appropriate.

Diego Garcia: It was recommended that we expand the runways and the storage facilities on Diego Garcia. Conservationists may lobby against this construction. When Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we actually need this expansion in light of acquisition of bases in Oman and Somalia, State and Defense pointed out that it is much better to have a larger number of small bases to absorb minor setbacks--if we must abandon some bases in the future.

Tasking: None.

Improved RDF Capabilities: General Jones made a presentation at this point in which he pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian Gulf:

-- Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development.

-- Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed.

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-- Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 days.

-- Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days.

-- One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed.

General Jones outlined our options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat by early spring this year:

1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We do not have sustaining power for the two there at present.

2. Tactical air power projected into Egyptian and Jordanian basis can improve our air projection capability. We should also request that the Saudis "over build" their air fields, something we can do privately with no political costs, but something which will greatly enhance their capability to support "fly in" of U.S. fighter formations.

3. Prepositioning of heavy equipment and supplies backed up by a significant increase in our sealift capability can give us a much larger and earlier force projection capability into the region. To achieve this in the next two to three months, General Jones proposes the following package:

a. Purchase two RO/RO ships which will hold the prepositioned equipment for one mechanized brigade and ground support equipment for three fighter squadrons.

b. Lease three cargo ships to be prepositioned with dry cargo supplies, ammunition, water, and fuels.

c. Followup supply from the U.S. can be moved through the Suez Canal in 11 days by SL-7 class sea-land ships. General Jones proposed to lease a fleet of eight SL-7s, six of which would be kept in use and two of which would be under conversion to a RO/RO capability.

d. The overall costs for this package is estimated at \$450 million.

The advantages of this proposal are:

-- The deployment time for getting heavy ground forces through the region would be cut from roughly 25/28 days to 5/8 days through prepositioning.

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-- For the first time we would have a followup sealift supply capability in the SL-7s which travel at 33 knots, a difficult speed for an enemy to locate and intercept.

-- This capability could be exercised for demonstrations in the region by late spring or early summer.

Tasking: Defense is to submit the proposal in detail to OMB and have the results available for the NSC meeting.

Exercises. Dr. Brzezinski insisted that we need ground force exercises in the area soon in order to improve the local sense of confidence about American commitment to the region. General Jones agreed that he could speed up the deployment of two Marine units, one from the Eastern Mediterranean and one from the Pacific to exercise in Oman and Somalia by March. Airlift of ground forces from the United States would be extremely expensive. General Jones prefers not to take that step but rather only exercise the Marines now. General Jones argued that more importantly, if we purchase the two RO/RO, which are ready for immediate delivery and loading, we can use them for exercises in March or April, exercises that will have a much greater psychological effect for a lesser cost than projecting airborne units with no armor from the U.S.

Tasking: State will give us a paper by Thursday on the political effects that exercises would have. Defense will provide a paper recommending specific exercises.

### III. Security Consultations with India and Pakistan

There was debate about the sequence and timing of the upcoming missions to Pakistan and India. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the Clifford mission to New Delhi would find the climate all the more hostile if at the same time the Christopher mission is in Pakistan. He argued that it is better to have the mission to India completed in advance so that we can take the results into consideration in preparing the Christopher mission for Pakistan. State agreed to reconsider and suggested that the Clifford mission might best depart on January 20, at the same time that the Defense military technical mission goes to Pakistan to discuss details of military assistance. Five days later the Christopher "political" mission can go to Pakistan, providing a decent interval to take into account the results of the Clifford mission.

### IV. Consultations with North Yemen

The danger of an imminent union between North and South Yemen was discussed. An NSC working group recommended that we pursue a two-track strategy, U.S. demarches to President Salih in North Yemen and a Saudi Arabian demarche to Salih. Most argued this is an unpromising course of action. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that we should consider a much more fundamental political change in South Yemen. It

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is clear that U.S. interests in the area could be greatly damaged by a union of South and North Yemen. Egypt and Jordan interests would be similarly hurt, not to speak of Saudi Arabia's concern. We should, therefore, consider a joint action to bring about a fundamental political change in South Yemen. A discussion followed on Saudi capabilities to do this, which were judged wholly inadequate, and the difficulties of getting Egyptian and Jordanian cooperation.

Tasking: State and CIA are to consult on preparing a high level mission to North Yemen to make Salih aware of the depths of our opposition to a union of the two Yemens. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that Frank Carlucci might be an appropriate person to head such a mission. A NSC-chaired working group will prepare a paper on the Yemen problem.

V. Refugees

The discussion next turned to ways to provide refugee aid other than through the UNHCR. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that citizens from the Soviet bloc may be officials in the UNHCR. They could use their positions to make it difficult for refugee camps to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. State argued that it is U.S. policy to avoid bilateral transfers of funds for refugees. Others pointed out that this is not always our policy. We do make bilateral contributions to certain countries in Africa.

Tasking: State will examine the alternative ways of supporting refugees in Pakistan other than through the UNHCR so that the UNHCR cannot, if it chooses, interfere seriously with refugee camps supporting the insurgency.

VI. ASEAN, the PRC, and non-Friendly Countries Support for U.S. Policy

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the possibility of getting ASEAN countries to help us reduce India's resistance to our policy toward Pakistan. Most believe ASEAN is unlikely to help. Dr. Brzezinski mentioned that some non-friendly states, might change their policies toward the U.S. in the region in light of the recent Soviet actions. State suggested that relaxing our sanctions on Mozambique might produce a change in that country's policy toward us. It was agreed that we should send messages to a group of non-friendly states, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Syria, and Iraq.

Tasking: State will produce for the next SCC a list of Presidential messages or demarches to ASEAN, some African countries, and non-friendly countries for consideration in light of the above discussion.

VII. The PLO and Mid East Peace Process

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that it is very important to accelerate the peace process in light of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Would a public statement by the President on this matter be useful at this time? State and others pointed out the old dilemma that if we want progress for the PLO, then we do not talk about it. If there

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is a lot of public support for the PLO, it might prevent progress in the negotiations by frightening Israel. Newsom pointed out that we might get the Israelis to back down on some of their recent actions in the East Bank.

VIII. A Public Communique on Aid to Pakistan

State offered a public U.S. statement to be released on what we have offered in the way of aid to Pakistan. This was prepared in response to an earlier tasking. It was agreed that events have changed the circumstances so that such a statement is inappropriate.

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## MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO

January 17, 1980 (excerpt)

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P.,  
Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F.,  
Chernenko, K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V.,  
Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I.

### 8. Re: The Issue of the Situation in Afghanistan

BREZHNEV. You remember, Comrades, that several months ago in relation to events in Afghanistan we tasked a Commission made up of Comrades Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to inform the Politburo, and if necessary, to prepare corresponding documents and submit them to the Politburo.

I will say that that Commission did its work well. Most recently a whole range of resolutions were accepted and corresponding measures were accomplished.

It seems to me that the situation in Afghanistan is still far from the time when it will not require everyday observation and the acceptance of corresponding operational measures. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not necessary to create any sort of new commission; instead, we will assign the very same Commission to continue its work in the same spirit as it conducted it up until now.

Will there be any objections to that proposal? No.

Then we will consider that the Politburo Commission will act, with its former membership.

GROMYKO. In the leadership of Afghanistan, a consolidation of forces is going on. The often appeal to us for advice. We give it. They make proclamations. There are no essential changes in the military situation. But it also has not worsened. This is a very important element. The Army supports the leadership of Afghanistan.

The international situation around Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worse. The ruckus, which has unfolded particularly broadly in the USA, has also assumed a somewhat weakened form. In NATO there is no unity regarding measures toward the Soviet Union. In any case the Western countries -- in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and other countries -- did not follow the Americans, are not in agreement with the sanctions which the USA is applying.

The General Assembly session ended. Many delegates spoke over the three days. But it is necessary to say, that of the 104 delegations which voted for the resolution, many voted without soul, 48 countries abstained and voted against. That is a full one third. In such a way, the Americans managed to lump together the reactionary regimes and to force them to vote for the resolution.

I think that there will be some kind of momentum in the American press, and in the press of other countries. But at the same time, countries like Argentina and Brazil do not agree with the the Americans, for example, on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. Canada too.

BREZHNEV. Vance came out against the participation of the USA in the Olympic Games.

GROMYKO. Yes, Vance, it's true, did express such a thought unofficially. But on all types of measures the English are very complacent. Giscard d'Estaing sent a message. It is better. An Islamic conference is meeting in Islamabad. K. Babrak appealed to us for advice, whether he should go to the conference. We advised him that it is best not to go outside the borders of the country.

ANDROPOV. In the last ten days in Afghanistan all the organs of party and state leadership were created; even a procurator was named. The Afghan leaders have started more bravely to [missing one or more lines. --trans]. There is one great difficulty in their work -- there are many various groups. Despite it all, the difference between the Parcham and the Khalk is still noticeable. Of course, it is necessary to carefully follow the state of affairs in the party and achieve, in accord with our recommendation, unity. They considered the letter of the CC CPSU in the Politburo and at the CC NDPA plenum, and they prepared corresponding directives for the primary party organizations.

The tribes play a big role there. It is very important to win them over to the party's side. Three very imposing tribes announced their support for the Babrak regime. Babrak is doing great work regarding the strengthening of unity. In particular, there are definite shifts in relation to work with religious officials.

USTINOV reports in detail the military situation in various areas of Afghan territory; he says: overall, the military situation is basically satisfactory, there are now significantly fewer hotbeds of resistance by the rebels.

PONOMAREV speaks about the type of measures which have been taken regarding the creation of the party and the strengthening of unity. He reports that yesterday a group of our

advisers consisting of 16 people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the head of it, was sent to Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal listens very attentively to the advice of our comrades. The leadership of the party now has a backbone.

BREZHNEV. There is a proposal to take into consideration the information of Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev on this issue.

Task Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue their work on the review and preparation of materials connected with the situation in Afghanistan. Submit to the Politburo issues which require a decision.

ALL. Agreed.