On June 9, 1995, an unprecedented public discussion was held at the UN University in Tokyo, Japan. Sponsored by and with funding from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Japan-United States Friendship Commission, and organized by the Japanese Association for American Studies, the Yomiuri Shimbun and the National Security Archive, this symposium brought together Japanese and American scholars, former and current officials to discuss the subject of public access to government information. As was brought out in these discussion, this topic is of prime importance to the establishment and future of democracy in Japan, as it is proving to be elsewhere in the world. The day-long symposium saw the presentation of remarks by the panelists on the history of public access to government information in the United States, a right embodied in the Freedom of Information Act and related legislation providing for the declassification of official documents, the manner in which the public and scholars make use of access to official records in the U.S. for research and study, and the problems surrounding efforts to institute a similar system of official record-keeping, declassification and public access to government documents in Japan. From the ensuing discussion among the panelists and the subsequent questions from the audience, it is clear that the Japanese themselves view securing greater access to their government's official documents as key to the goals of political reform, government accountability, greater understanding of Tokyo's policies both at home and abroad, and a more prominent role for Japan in world affairs.
There are signs that this meeting might have some impact upon the debate in Japan over increased government openness. Even as the symposium was taking place, hearings were being held before the Administrative Reform Committee's Subcommittee on disclosure of government information, whose origins and work were described by Tazuaki Tanaka during the symposium. During these hearings, copies of the declassified documents distributed at the symposium were presented to the Subcommittee as evidence of the types and extent of official information which is accessible through FOIA in the United States. In addition, informal discussions among the symposium panelists indicated that some Japanese officials have a serious interest in the ideas presented by the American panelists, and in examining the models provided by the U.S. experience in implementing FOIA and related declassification policies. Yet, as Professor Makoto Iokibe emphasized in his closing remarks, it will take the combined efforts of government officials and an interested public to bring about what can only be described as historic changes in Japanese government attitudes and policies regarding public access to official information. It is hoped that the symposium made a contribution towards promoting and supporting such public interest and engagement in Japan.
Thomas Blanton led off the discussion by addressing three themes:
Mr. Blanton noted that James Madison, one of the authors of the American Constitution, made this point clear when he wrote, "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." And as Mr. Blanton further noted, this concept is not alien to Japan, for among the imperial oaths uttered by the new Japanese emperor in 1868 at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration was the following: "Open deliberation shall be carried out, and all affairs of state shall be disposed of in conformity to public opinion." A key problem for Japan, though, as Mr. Blanton pointed out, will be to overcome the long-standing distinction between public opinion politics, or seiron seiji, and hidden politics, or ura seiji, a distinction which parallels the well-known divide between tatamae and honne (appearance and reality) in Japanese discourse.
Turning to the manner in which freedom of information has come to be embodied in law and practice, Mr. Blanton underlined the fact that this has usually happened not because of some sudden conversion to the political principles discussed earlier, but because of competition for political power. This competition has been between parliaments and administrations, competition between ruling and opposition parties, competition between present and prior regimes, competition between bribe-takers and muck-rakers. To illustrate this fact, Mr. Blanton gave examples of the manner in which freedom of information was enacted into law in Sweden (home of the first freedom of information law, passed in 1766), the United States, Canada, Hungary, Germany and South Africa. In each case, partisan politics, bureaucratic maneuverings or historic changes in the ruling regimes (conditions which many see in present-day Japan) played a key motivation in bringing about the adoption of laws to ensure public access to formerly secret official records.
The Canadian, Hungarian and German cases further serve to illustrate another important aspect of freedom of information laws, the need to view the rights of access to official records and the right of personal privacy as complementary rights, not opposing principles which must be somehow balanced. As Mr. Blanton explained, personal privacy cannot exist without openness in government, because a closed government is free to invade personal privacy without accountability. And likewise, true openness in government cannot exist without privacy protection, because a government which exposes everything it knows about its citizens also abuses its power. The Hungarian and German cases present the most acute examples of the difficulties in addressing these points in legislation and policy, as the societies in both countries sought to bring to account, and some would argue wreck revenge upon, those who participated in their former Communist regimes. Hungary has balanced the scales in favor of control of the records of the former regime, a situation which Mr. Blanton argued has only served to buttress state power over individuals in the name of privacy rights, without securing greater openness. Germany has taken another route, seeking to protect privacy rights on a sliding scale based upon a person's complicity in the workings of the former East German government. That is similar to the principle underlying American libel law - the higher the official or societal rank of a person, the less privacy protection in terms of libel. Finally, in South Africa the government and judiciary is still working out how to implement what is arguable the strongest guarantee of the right to freedom of information found in the world.
Mr. Blanton ended his remarks with a discussion of the origins and experience of the National Security Archive in making use of U.S. FOIA and related laws to secure public access to key documents on U.S. foreign policy and national security policy. Founded in 1985, the Archive's mission is to promote the timely release of formerly classified U.S. records so that scholars, journalists and the public can have a better understanding of the manner in which the U.S. government makes and carries out policies which are vitally important to the welfare of people not just in America, but throughout the world. The Archive was born during a period of serious reversals in government openness, as the Reagan administration reversed a trend dating back to Eisenhower of reductions in the amount of official secrecy.
Confronting a government under which secrets could be almost immortal, a group of journalists, including Scott Armstrong of the Washington Post, Raymond Bonner of the New York Times and Fred Kaplan of the Boston Globe, decided to pool their existing personal archives of documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to start a central repository which would be open to all researchers. Bringing together a staff of experienced journalists, historians and policy-analysts, and drawing upon an Advisory Board of leading academics and former policy-makers, the Archive has grown to be the largest non-governmental repository of declassified U.S. records. Building upon the original collection of documents donated by Armstrong and his colleagues, the Archive began a series of projects to create collections of declassified documents on key issues and episodes in U.S. foreign policy that can be purchased by research libraries and institutions around the world. Past and current projects range from the nuclear arms race to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. intelligence community, South Africa, Iran, Afghanistan and, to name one of our most recent, Japan.
The Archive's efforts, which rarely involve filing a lawsuit, have resulted in the release of truly historic documents, Mr. Blanton said. These include the letters exchanged by President Kennedy and Soviet leader Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the diaries of Oliver North during the Iran-Contra scandal, and e-mail messages from the White House during the 1980s and 1990s. In the latter case, it did require a lawsuit in which the Archive joined to prevent the White House from destroying the computer tapes of this e-mail, leading to the loss forever of these potentially critical historical records.
Finally, Mr. Blanton noted that the Archive has begun assisting in the organizing of conferences to bring together scholars and former officials to discuss key events in the history of U.S. foreign policy in light of the information found in the newly declassified documents. These conferences have also served as a spur to the release of official records by other governments, as in Russia and Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most surprising such release occurred during a recent meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. In this way, the Archive tries to promote greater openness and transparency in government not just in the U.S., but throughout the world.
Clifford Sloan next provided an insider's view of the two Executive Orders dealing with the declassification of U.S. records which President Clinton recently signed. Echoing Thomas Blanton, Mr. Sloan said that his many experiences in government service had convinced him that a commitment to the principle of public access to government information is vitally important in a democratic society. These experiences had also convinced Mr. Sloan that making access to government information a reality, rather than simply a lofty rhetorical aspiration, required two kinds of actions. First, it required a structure of rules and procedures which provide public access to government information, and second it required leadership and commitment by government officials in respecting the importance of public access to government information.
Mr. Sloan pointed out that in recent years, there had been considerable discussion in the U.S. about whether far too much information was being kept classified. The end of the Cold War provided the spur to a reevaluation of U.S. policies regarding official secrecy, with an eye towards securing greater openness while at the same time safeguarding information which would truly compromise national security if released. President Clinton addressed these issues with two Executive Orders which significantly reform official U.S. secrecy policy. In November, 1994 he signed an order automatically declassifying almost forty-four million pages of classified documents, half of which date from World War II and earlier, and half from the post-World War II era. The significance of this order was that it mandated the opening of these entire categories of documents, without individual review of every line of every document, a procedure which if required would have taken years.
The second Order, signed in April, 1995, effects an overall reform of the existing secrecy and declassification policy in the U.S. Under this Order, all existing records more than twenty-five years old are subject to automatic declassification, unless appropriate government officials demonstrate that particular information falls within one of nine specific exceptions, concerning such topics as intelligence sources, current weapons systems and other issues whose release would pose a clear threat of damage to U.S. national security and defense. There is also a requirement that the declassification review of all the records twenty-five years old or more be completed within five years.
Second, Mr. Sloan reported, the Order establishes new policies regarding newly classified material, designed to insure that fewer documents are unnecessarily classified, and that officials wishing to classify information must detail the damage to national security that would result from disclosure. Furthermore, information which is properly classified is to be assigned a date for declassification, not to be more than ten years after the information is classified, again subject to specific exceptions. Under the new Order, the objective is to create new safeguards against unwarranted classification of information, and sanctions can be imposed against government employees who violate this principle. The Order also permits government officials to determine that the public interest in disclosure can outweigh the need for continued secrecy, even before the ten-year period has expired.
As Mr. Sloan stressed, the essence of this new policy is a balance between the public's right to know and the strictly limited need to keep certain information classified for a set period of time in order to protect national security. Simply issuing the new Order is not sufficient, however, for it will also take dedicated leadership within the U.S. government to insure that both the letter and the spirit of the new policy is implemented throughout the government. No order or policy will cover all possible issues which will confront officials in implementing the Executive Order, and officials will have to exercise creativity and initiative in addressing the concrete problems which arise. Such creativity and initiative have already been demonstrated by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary regarding the release of long-secret information on radiation experiments in the 1950s, an initiative which President Clinton quickly endorsed and supported with the appointment of a high-level investigatory commission.
Mr. Sloan ended by underlining three important benefits that freedom of information brings:
· Ensuring public access to government information is an important statement that in a democratic society the government belongs to the people.
· Ensuring public access to government information serves the goal of accountability.
· Public access to government information serves the goals of knowledge and understanding.
Professor Jun Iio in his remarks focused on the following issue: In Japan, what elements are lacking in the discussion about freedom of information? Turning first to the way in which this concept is viewed in Japan, Prof. Iio remarks established three points:
· The Japanese people's expectations of their government are not high enough. Complacency, a focus upon results, and a lack of interest in the policy-making process characterize the Japanese public in general
· There has been progress in attaining freedom of information in Japan, primarily among local governments, but there is still a basic lack of interest at the national level.
· There is a need to identify what information should be subject to a Japanese Freedom of Information law.
Expanding on the latter point, Prof. Iio stressed that it is not sufficient merely to have documents dealing with the final policy decisions of the government. There is a great need as well for documents which shed light on the policy-making process, allowing scholars and the public to understand how and why the government reached a particular policy decision. There is an additional problem here, however: whereas in the U.S. there are a variety of pre-decisional documents produced which help illustrate the policy-making process, in Japan documentation tends to concentrate on giving expression to the final consensus reached within the government. There is a serious lack of written documentation on the policy-making process in Japan. For this reason, Prof. Iio argued, it is very important to establish document systems which will provide for the creation of such a written record.
In addition, there is a great need to change official attitudes regarding the documents which are produced in the government, Prof. Iio noted. In the U.S., such documents are seen as official and thus the property of the government. In Japan, there is a bureaucratic practice under which officials tend to view the records which they and their office produce as personal documents. When the person leaves office, the documents tend to leave with them, leaving behind no institutional history for subsequent policy-makers or any official archive for later scholars. So, the system to insure creation of documents must be joined with a document-control system to secure the retention and preservation of official documents. Without such a system, freedom of information in Japan would have little real significance.
Prof. Iio concluded his remarks by outlining the significance and importance to Japan of freedom of information. For scholars, it would mean securing access to records which are essential for their research. For government officials, freedom of information can assist them in obtaining a better understanding of public interests and needs. For the country, access to official records will allow the necessary evaluation of official policies and actions which are necessary for any effort to improve the operations of the government. For the Japanese public, freedom of information will serve to foster and support the necessary greater interest in the workings of their own government. For the world, greater access to Japanese official records will help to demystify the operations of the Japanese government and place Japan's dealings with other nations in the international sphere on a more realistic basis, with less room for misunderstanding and miscalculation. In this way, freedom of information can contribute to the further internationalization of Japan and its efforts to play a stronger and more positive role on the world stage.
Dr. Chalmers Johnson's comments focused upon the need for greater openness regarding a subject which has lately been of great interest in the United States and Japan: U.S., and particularly CIA, efforts to influence and shape Japanese politics during the Cold War, and the impact these efforts had upon the evolution of the postwar Japanese political system and its deep problems. In particular, Dr. Johnson pointed to the following issues:
· U.S. covert assistance to the LDP during the 1950s and 1960s.
· The role played by Kodama Yoshio and other Japanese in working with the CIA.
· The allegations made by former U.S. Assistant Attorney General Norbert Schlei concerning the so-called "M-Fund," which Schlei says was created during the occupation to influence Japanese politics and continued to grow in size and influence down through the Tanaka years and beyond.
The questions surrounding these matters, and more recent events, such as the Lockheed case, are viewed as ancient history by most Japanese and Americans, Dr. Johnson noted. A full airing of these questions, while possibly embarrassing to some deceased Americans and some descendants of former Japanese politicians, would have no real harmful effect upon U.S. national security, Johnson argued. It would, however, serve to shed important new light upon the roots of the one-party Japanese political system and its seemingly endemic corruption and the resistance of this system to real reform. These issues came to prominence recently with the fight over publication of the Department of State's Foreign Relations of the U.S. volume on U.S.-Japanese relations during the Kennedy administration. The State Department historians found ample information regarding CIA covert aid to the LDP, but the CIA refused to sanction its release.
Regarding these and related questions, Dr. Johnson said he wanted to underline the fact that, whatever the U.S. might have believed was necessary to prosecute the Cold War, now that this conflict was over, it could not longer be used to justify ignorance about the Cold War's costs and unintended consequences. As he and other scholars are increasingly coming to appreciate in the U.S., one unintended consequence of U.S. clandestine policies to combat communist influence in Japan as well as in Italy was to sacrifice, to a degree, the political systems of both countries. The result is considerable political chaos. For this reason, Dr. Johnson strongly supported all efforts to secure greater access to official records in the U.S. and Japan so that their peoples may better grasp the roots of the contemporary problems confronting democracy in each nation that their own governments helped to create.
Mr. Motoo Shiina's remarks echoed and expanded upon those of Prof. Iio regarding the need for greater public knowledge about how the Japanese government debates policy questions and reaches decisions. Pointing to the current Diet debate over the official resolution to mark the fifty-year anniversary of the end of World War II, Mr. Shiina noted that the top priority was not the substance of the statement, but ensuring that the final document did nothing to undermine the current Japanese government.
In the past, the government has often pointed to outside pressures, orgaiatsu, to explain why it was taking certain actions. To break through this pattern, Mr. Shiina argued, the public must have greater access to official information which will allow it to weigh and pass judgment upon the alternatives which must have been debated before the government made its decisions. Knowing that this information will be made public will be a spur to officials to evaluate their options more carefully, and it is hoped, avoid mistakes and errors in policy-making. This prospect of public knowledge will also serve to promote greater government responsibility, Mr. Shiina asserted.
Under the 1955 political system and the long-time monopoly of the LDP. there was a tendency for government announcements to come down from on high as something akin to a statement from the gods, Mr. Shiina noted.. Explanations were few, and the public was expected to accept government decisions without question. If a question was put to the government, the usual response was to create an Advisory Council under the Prime Minister whose inner deliberations would be secret. A final report would emerge in time, but nothing would be done to address the problems posed by the original questions. Similar secrecy surrounds the workings of the Diet. This situation can only change, Mr. Shiina argued, if the public secures the right to request and obtain more information from the government.
Mr. Shinju Fukukawa joined the other panelists in agreeing that it was a very opportune time to hold the present symposium, given the current great interest in the Japanese government in the issue of freedom of information. Securing greater freedom of information is crucial if there is to be greater transparency surrounding the workings of the Japanese government and the policy options which it is considering. Still, echoing other speakers, Mr. Fukukawa also had to admit there was a serious lack of public interest in much of what the government does. He rooted this apathetic attitude in the workings of the 1955 political system, in which the government and the bureaucracy maintained a tight wall of secrecy between its inner deliberations and the public. Under this earlier political system, government officials would listen from time to time to what the people had to say, and would present policy options and recommendations to the elected officials, who trusted the judgment of the bureaucracy. The objective was to avoid conflict and deadlock, and to achieve consensus upon policies which the Diet would pass after due discussion among the interested parties. Inasmuch as information about the policy-making process could make the bureaucracy and elected officials open to public criticism, there was an interest in maintaining secrecy about the workings of the Japanese government.
Now, however, given the changes in Japanese politics and the history of political scandals surrounding the 1955 system, Fukukawa agreed it was time to review this relation-ship between the government and the people, and the issue of increasing the amount of official information that should be available to the public. This should be part of an overall reassessment which examines what is expected of the government and political parties, and what role the public should play in assisting the government to carry out its proper responsibilities. In conducting this reassessment, Fukukawa suggested, the experience of other nations, such as the U.K. and Germany, should be looked at for lessons.
Looking ahead over the next few years, Fukukawa called for continued discussions on this new framework for government-public relations, and he listed four expectations that he believed should serve to guide these discussions:
· There should be impartiality, neutrality, efficiency and transparency in the execution of government responsibilities.
· There should be competition in the formulation of policy options, with more involvement of interested groups outside the government.
· There should be greater openness in Japanese relations with the rest of the world, in line with the movement toward increased coordination of Japanese policies with other countries and the progressive internationalization of policy issues.
· The government should take the initiative in creating an information system which will promote the electronic dissemination of information
In all of these areas, increased freedom of information will be critical to the exchange of views and expertise required for the proper framing of policy issues, debate upon options, and the coordination of efforts to address global problems such as population growth, environmental protection, and AIDS, for example. In doing this, there will be the need to protect privacy rights and corporate confidentiality, for example, as Mr. Sloan discussed in his remarks. There will be inevitable tensions among the interests of the public and the government, but Mr. Fukukawa concluded by asserting that new policy ideas are needed, and in the search for these, increased freedom of information will play an important role.
Following Mr. Fukukawa's statement, there was a brief exchange of questions and an-sawers among the panelists to clarify and expand on the morning's discussion. Among the main points to come out of this exchange were -
· Renewed emphasis upon the closed nature of Japanese government decision-making
· The need for a system to ensure creation of a written record of policy-making in the Japanese government.
· The great value of a free press in working for government accountability and openness, and the obstacles the Japanese press club system create for such a role.
· The need to increase participation by the public and by non-governmental expert groups in Japanese policy debates
· The importance of a strong and vigorous legislative role
in holding hearings on government policy issues.
The speakers on the afternoon panel were the following: Dr. Robert A. Wampler, Director of the National Security Archive U.S.-Japan Special Documentation Project; Professor Melvyn Leffler of the University of Virginia; Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University;; Mr. Koichi Yotsuya, Manager for the Declassification Section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Professor Takashi Mikuriya of Tokyo Metropolitan University; and Mr. Hiroshi Miyake, a lawyer very active in the issues of public access to information.
Dr. Robert Wampler led off the discussion by describing the origins and work of the National Security Archive's U.S.-Japan Special Documentation Project, which he directs. The Project aims to create a comprehensive collection of declassified official U.S. documents on U.S.-Japanese relations since 1960 for the use of scholars, journalists and other researchers. Interest in this project was spurred by the growing attention given to U.S.-Japanese relations over the past 15 years, and the growing debate over the security and economic aspects of this relationship. Through his explanation of how the project is seeking release of the relevant documents, Dr. Wampler demonstrated the key roles played by U.S. legislation and rules mandating the preservation of U.S. official records and governing the declassification review of these documents.
As described by Dr. Wampler, the effort to locate and secure U.S. official records falls into the following steps:
· Research in the U.S. National Archives and Presidential Libraries to locate currently declassified documents and information on still-classified records.
· Research at the U.S. National Records Center to identify key records of U.S. agencies which have been retired for storage prior to transfer to the National Archives.
· Based upon the information obtained in the prior steps, and drawing upon resources such as newspapers, secondary works and memoirs, the drafting of declassification requests to secure review and release of documents.
Research in the U.S. National Archives and the Presidential Libraries ranging from Eisenhower to Carter have produced documents on a wide range of subjects, including revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 and the ensuing political crisis in Tokyo; the full spectrum of political, military and economic relations during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; the emergence of economic tensions in the late 1960s and 1970s; trade negotiations in the 1980s; and planning papers for the Reagan-Nakasone summit in 1987. Making use of the information found on withdrawal forms in these archival collections, declassification requests have been filed on specific documents of interest.
The universe of classified documents is further delineated by research in the files of the National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. Here are found extensive inventories of the retired records of all U.S. agencies which provide important information on the nature and location of crucial U.S. diplomatic and military records. created by the State, Defense, Commerce and Treasury Departments, the National Security Council, and other federal agencies. Based upon the information found in these inventories, as well as information gleaned from public sources (newspapers, secondary works, memoirs, etc.) the U.S.-Japan Project has filed hundreds of FOIA requests and has already obtained released of hundreds of pages of documents dating from the 1960s through the 1980s. Examples of these documents were made available to the symposium for examination, and Dr. Wampler provided a brief background on each document. Most interesting among these documents were reports on U.S.-Japanese trade negotiations during the Reagan administration which provided fascinating details on the statements made by the Japanese negotiators, information which is still unavailable in Japan.
Dr. Wampler emphasized that requests for declassification are not assured of positive responses. Often the researcher must file appeals of decisions to deny release in whole or in part of documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act. These appeals must address the specific reasons provided by the government for denial of release, establish the public interest in the subject at issue, and provide detailed supporting details on the amount of information which is already public on the subject.
To augment its effort to gather a collection of key documents on U.S.-Japanese relations, the U.S.-Japan Project also plans to organize a series of oral history interviews with former U.S. officials who played key roles in the making of U.S. policy toward Japan. Once a substantial body of declassified records and interviews have been obtained, the Project will organize workshops and conferences to bring together U.S. and Japanese scholars, and former officials to exchange views and new interpretations of key events in the U.S.-Japan relationship based upon this new body of evidence. This series of meetings will begin in March, 1996 with a workshop on U.S.-Japanese Relations during the Nixon/Ford-Sato/Tanaka Era.
In closing, Dr. Wampler stressed the fact that the subject of the current symposium is central to the success of such a wide-ranging research effort, for without access to Japanese records, any scholarship and analysis will have to be one-sided, based solely upon evidence found in American archives. To this end, the National Security Archive was supporting efforts within Japan to secure greater access to official Japanese records of historical importance, as well as a parallel program of oral history interviews with former Japanese officials. It was only through such complimentary efforts in Japan and the U.S., he concluded, that we can achieve a better understanding of the history of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Such understanding was crucial not only for the advancement of scholarly understanding, but as underscored in the morning discussion, it was essential for the larger goal of ensuring government accountability to the people it serves, as well as public support for the policies pursued by the government.
Mr. Koichi Yotsuya of the Foreign Ministry's Declassification Section spoke next about his Ministry's program to declassify Japanese diplomatic records. Expressing the hope that his listeners will take a positive view of the work of his office, he noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated its declassification program twenty years ago, the first among Japanese ministries to do so. In this time, he said, nearly 430 thousands pages of documents have been released. In conducting its reviews, the Foreign Ministry is guided by a thirty-year rule regarding the date after which a document is subject to declassification. Documents may be kept closed after thirty years if their release would cause harm under one or more of three categories:
· Harm to Japan's national security and interests
· Harm to Japanese diplomatic relations with other countries
· Harm to current Japanese negotiations with other countries.
Documents which have been released can be viewed by the public at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive located in Tokyo. Mr. Yotsuya acknowledged the criticisms made of his Ministry that it is increasingly exempting documents from release, that at times the decisions on release seem arbitrary, or guided more by a desire to avoid embarrassment. He admitted that within MOFA, there is a minority which is opposed to the release of documents, but argued that the majority supports the work of his section. Yotsuya said he believed that on balance, the diplomacy of Japan will stand up to scrutiny once the records have been released.
Still, Mr. Yotsuya stressed there were growing problems with the review program's ability to keep pace with the thirty-year rule, centering on the immense amount of documentation to be examined and the lack of manpower to conduct the reviews. So, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks to respond to public demands for greater openness regarding Japanese diplomatic records, it is constrained by limited resources. The problem with insufficient resources is compounded by the current public push for reducing the size of government and the amount of government spending.
Speaking strictly personally, not as an official of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Yoysuya suggested two possible steps to address this problem.:
· A more precise focus upon the materials to be reviewed, with an emphasis upon the quality of material released, not the quantity.
· Establishment of a date certain after which all documents denied release after thirty years could be released without further review.
If these reforms were adopted, Mr. Yotsuya explained, it would allow the reviewers to focus upon records which are of the most historical importance, making the best use of their limited resources. The first reform could also be complemented by establishment of a process whereby after documents had been denied release, an inventory of the classified material would be made public so that requests could be made for new reviews of the withheld materials. Such an inventory could be made available within a set period of time, perhaps ten years, after the initial denial of release. In all reviews, interests of national security and privacy rights would have to be taken into account, but would have less saliency as the documents were older in date.
Mr. Tazuaki Tanaka, Director-General of the Japanese government's Management Coordination Agency and Executive Director of the Administrative Reform Committee, continued the discussion of Japanese government policies on information access by describing the work of his Administrative Reform Committee. Mr. Tanaka prefaced his remarks by noting that in Japan it is commonplace to blame bureaucrats for all the ills of government, and for that reason he was initially hesitant to take part in the symposium. He decided, however, to come in the spirit of trying to learn more about how others are dealing with the problems of information access, and to explain Japanese government activities in this sphere.
Mr. Tanaka began by outlining the history of Japanese government activities regarding the question of increased public access to official information. The earliest step was taken in 1980, with the issuance of the Japanese Cabinet understanding on government information, which noted, "...the need for proper and efficient management of administration and at the same time endeavor to facilitate improved and expanded access to information." Pursuant to this understanding, the government was instructed to establish a facility in every ministry and agency for public examination of official documents; to establish procedures for the review, release and cataloging of formerly classified records; to promote public awareness of these steps to increase access to official information; and finally to conduct a comprehensive review of document management in conjunction with formulation of common standards for public access and a study into legislation to insure such access in line with the situation in Japan.
The next important step was the creation of the working group to study ways to increase public access to government information and procedures for document management. This study group, under the Ad Hoc Commission for Administrative Reform, created in March 1981, submitted five findings in its final recommendation, made in March 1983:
· The current status of public access to government information in Japan is inadequate
· Administrative measures to establish the means to examine official records, and to formulate standards for public access, should be provided.
· There should be further study into establishment of an information disclosure system
· The government information public access system should secure more fair and democratic administration.
· Efforts should be made to promote more institutional measures, such as legal steps for the protection of personal and private information.
Based on this final recommendation the Japanese government has sought to take steps to implement these recommendations, both on an administrative and on a legislative basis. To develop further this work, another study group of jurists and other legal experts was established under Mr. Tanaka's Agency to investigate the mechanisms most suited to Japanese conditions to advance public access to information. This group issued an interim report in September 1990 which identified the following issues:
· The need to adjust and coordinate existing information disclosure provisions (such as found on the municipal level) with any new national system for public access to government information.
· The need for guidelines governing the handling of diplomatic, defense, business,
police and personal information, among other special categories.(1)
· The need to provide a clear judicial system to handle appeals of decisions not to release information.
· The need for a proper system for governmental document management and control.
These are all steps which will require legislative steps to implement. To promote greater openness through administrative steps, a liaison committee for public access to information was set up in December 1991. This committee agreed that common standards should be established to govern ministry responses to public requests for access to official information. Such a standard has been devised at the Cabinet level, and is being implemented as an administrative measure. As such, this means the Japanese public does not yet have a legal right to public disclosure of government information. Finally, the government is pursuing studies into measures to assure fair and transparent administrative procedures in the implementation of greater public access to information.
In summary, since the 1983 recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Admin-istrative reform, the Japanese government has engaged in a prolonged period of study into the questions surrounding expanded public access to information. (During this same period, 40 prefectural governments and 224 municipalities have established ordinances for disclosure of information.) Japanese government deliberations entered a new phase in February 1994 when the government issued its general outline of administrative reform, which laid out an overall policy agreed at Cabinet level and which as one of its goals called for a full-fledged study to establish a system for public disclosure of government information.
When the Japanese Diet in 1994 passed the bill the establish the Administrative Reform Committee to oversee this general task of reform, the bill was amended to provide expressly that the Committee should devote attention to establishing a law to provide for public access to government information. In addition, the bill set a deadline of two years for drafting such a law and obtaining comments upon it. This aspect of the Administrative Reform Committee's work has received enthusiastic support from succeeding administrations (Hosakawa, Hata) and the various reform parties which have come to the fore since 1993.(2) The Administrative Reform Committee began its work in December 1994, and pursuant to a Cabinet order, a subcommittee on disclosure of government information was established in March 1995. (Mr. Fukukawa, who spoke during the Morning Session, is a member of this subcommittee). Since March, eleven meetings of the subcommittee have been held, one of them the same day as this symposium. Currently, the subcommittee is discussing the regulations and laws governing public access to information in other countries, the existing municipal ordinances governing information in Japan, and hearing the views of concerned institutions and experts. Beyond this, the subcommittee will be taking up the full range of problems surrounding public access to government information identified by the earlier study groups. In closing, Mr. Tanaka stressed the need to establish a consensus among the Japanese people upon the many issues relating to greater government openness as a necessary prerequisite to the creation of laws and institutions to expand public access to official information.
Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University started the discussion phase of the afternoon session by providing the historian's perspective upon the need for public access to official records in order to understand better events in the past. As a diplomatic and international historian, Iriye was sympathetic to the claims of "national security" as a reason to keep more contemporary documents classified. Still, he argued, with the passage of one, two or three decades, it must be recognized that the definitions of national interest which mandated classification in the past very likely do not hold now, and so national security should not be used as an excuse to keep these historical documents closed.
Looking at the broad sweep of historic changes which have come in the wake of the end of the Cold War, Prof. Iriye stressed that in this new period information power will be of increasing importance to nations. Gauged by this yardstick, the United States was clearly an "information superpower," given the relatively much greater openness and ease of access to information official and otherwise found there. Those who would accuse the U.S. of using this information in an "imperialistic" fashion to guide or control scholarship must be prepared to make available their own documents. On this point, relative to the U.S., Prof. Iriye argued, Japan now suffers an "information deficit," as Japanese citizens must often rely upon information found in the U.S. to understand policies and actions taken by their own government. In some ways, Japan is in danger of falling behind Russia and even China when it comes to releasing documents relating to the recent past. The history of U.S.-Japanese relations is being written in many cases of the basis of American documents, producing a one-sided perception of the past.
This is not an ideal situation for Japan, especially if the government wishes its people to be able to participate fully in the intellectual and cultural exchanges that Prof. Iriye sees as the heart of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Japan must move now to address this problem, if it is to be an equal partner of the U.S. in all respects. Until now, as some of the previous speakers have shown, the initiative in this regard has been taken by the government. Prof. Iriye argued that the time has come for non-governmental, public groups, akin to the National Security Archive in the U.S., to become organized and press this issue in Japanese society.
Professor Melvyn Leffler continued the discussion with his remarks on the history and work of the U.S. Department of State's Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), upon which he serves. The HAC, created by an act of Congress in 1991, is charged with specific oversight functions, backed by this legislative mandate, regarding the Foreign Relations of the United States series of edited volumes of diplomatic documents. The Committee was born in response to a controversy over the Foreign Relations series with regard to the hesitation of U.S. government officials to declassify early Cold War records. This controversy came to a head with the refusal to release documents relating to the CIA's role in the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, a role long acknowledged in the personal accounts of former Eisenhower administration officials. Spurred by the resignation in protest by the chairman of the then-existing advisory committee, professional organizations such as the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History found Congressional allies in Senators such as Claiborne Pell, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jesse Helms (the current chairman) who had his own personal reasons for wishing to expose what he believed was the mismanagement of U.S. diplomacy by the State Department. The changing international climate, marked by the fall of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, also helped to overcome presidential apathy about the issue, resulting in passage of the bill establishing the present HAC in 1991.
The 1991 legislation stipulated that the Foreign Relations series,
shall be a thorough, accurate and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions, including the facts which contrib- uted to the formulation of policies and the records which illustrated alter- native views to the policy position ultimately adopted.
It also mandated that all government agencies involved in the making of foreign policy must cooperate in publication of the series, making their records available to the State Department historians preparing the different volumes. Should the State Department or other agencies object to the release of certain documents chosen for inclusion in the series, the State Department's Historical Office could appeal this decision, and the appeal would be heard initially by the newly-created HAC.
Looking beyond the documents chosen for the Foreign Relations series, the 1991 law also said that all State Department records should be declassified not later than 30 years after they were created, with certain specific exemptions relating to documents originating in foreign governments; records whose release would compromise weapons technology or cryptology; documents that would reveal intelligence sources and methods; records that would impede current diplomatic negotiations or impair U.S. national security; or records pertaining to internal State Department personnel matters.
The HAC was given the general responsibility of overseeing implementation of the 1991 law. It was obligated to inform the Secretary of State if it found that any records were being, in its view, unjustifiably withheld from declassification by the State Department, and to make recommendations for resolving the issue. It is authorized to review State Department declassification guidelines and procedures, and to review documents kept closed after 30 years to ensure there was reason for the continued secrecy. To carry out these functions, the HAC members have the right to examine all classified documents pertaining to U.S. foreign relations, originating both in the State Department and in other agencies, and can receive security clearances to this end. Any determinations that records were being unjustifiably withheld either from publication in the Foreign Relations series or from declassification after 30 years must be reported to the Secretary of State and to Congress.
The HAC is composed of nine historians, political scientists, archivists, lawyers and other social scientists who have a record of substantial research relating to U.S. foreign relations. They are appointed by the Secretary of State, who draws upon nominations made by the major professional associations. The HAC meets at least four times a year, where its members reviews the documents which have been denied release for the Foreign Relations series. If the Committee agrees the documents must be included to secure a comprehensive and accurate record of U.S. diplomacy, it urges the State Department Historical Office to appeal the denial by the originating agency. The Committee will at times meet with the officials who made the initial decision denying release to discuss the reasons for this action and to explain why the documents are of historical importance. In the end, if such discussions do not result in release of the documents, the HAC will write to high-level officials in the State Department setting out the reasons for declassification and requesting intervention in behalf of release. If the documents still are not released, the Committee has the option of recommending the relevant Foreign Relations volume not be published, or be printed with an explanation that the record is incomplete.
The quarterly meetings are also devoted to reviewing progress in the ongoing declassification of documents that are at least 30 years old. Again, the members can examine the records being withheld from release and discuss the decisions with the official reviewers. On the basis of this review, the HAC can make written recommendations to address any problems it finds in the declassification process.
On balance, Prof. Leffler judged, the HAC has played a positive role. It has brought to light the need to revise or reinterpret archaic State Department declassification review guidelines, for example. More importantly, it has been a force for streamlining the declassification process and establishing clear priorities within this process to promote the expeditious review and release of records. It has also served as an important forum for bringing together declassification officials within the U.S. government who otherwise would rarely exchange views on their common concerns, thus helping to create a basis for reviewing methods and reaching a consensus on shared goals. This has been of real importance in forging greater cooperation between the historical offices of the State Department and the CIA.
Much of the effectiveness of the HAC derives from its statutory basis. This provides important leverage when dealing with bureaucrats who naturally resent and resist efforts by outside experts to interfere in their duties. The duty to report any problems found in complying with the 1991 law gives the Committee the power of exposure, which is its only true power. Yet this power and the HAC's statutory responsibilities must be exercised with due regard for building constructive relationships with those bureaucrats whose work it oversees, Prof. Leffler warned. There is a fine line to be walked between being coopted by officials, and a confrontational stance which prevents any true dialogue. The Committee thus must be seen as committed to the release of officials records and as sensitive to the legitimate concerns and responsibilities of officials with respect to U.S. diplomacy and security.
To date, the relatively short record of the HAC is mixed and final results are not clear, as might be expected. Reforms have been made in the review of records 30 years old or older, but State has resisted proposals for automatic release of most of its documents. This means the review process is still lengthy. Publication of the Foreign Relations series has accelerated, but continued progress is not guaranteed. Still, Prof. Leffler concluded, without the 1991 law and the HAC, the struggle for greater openness would have been much for formidable.
Professor Takashi Mikuriya continued the discussion by speaking of his experiences as a Japanese historian who has done work in the U.S. and Japan. As he underlined in an anecdote from his time as a student at Harvard, it is difficult for Japanese scholars to criticize American research for undue reliance upon U.S. sources when there are no Japanese sources to provide the Japanese perspective upon issues and events.
Prof. Mikuriya echoed remarks made in the morning session when he emphasized the lack of any procedure within the Japanese government which would produce the type of documentary record of decision-making that one finds in the U.S. This is one shortcoming which must be addressed before scholars can have any hope of being able to research and understand Japanese policy-making. Another problem which must be overcome is the reluctance of Japanese bureaucrats to turning over documents to the Japanese national archives, a reluctance rooted in strong distrust of any agency outside their own. A similar danger which must be guarded against is the possibility that, when faced with the prospect of eventual release of documents recording their actions, bureaucrats will prepare less-detailed records. A fourth problem is to ensure that the records which are created are preserved, and not lost through accident or other means. As an example of this danger, Prof. Mikuriya pointed to the loss of some Tokyo municipal records when a metropolitan office was moved, and noted that this should be guarded against when the national government is moved from Tokyo.
Finally, Prof. Mikuriya stated his support for a rule which would stipulate the release of officials records after a certain period of time, such as thirty years. He argued that the government should not be overly fearful that past mistakes or failures, as all governments fall prey to these. As the release of the records of the Japanese House of Lords from the wartime period revealed, often there are no great crimes or scandals revealed when these records are released, and what comes to light is evidence of good government as well as bad.
Mr. Hiroshi Miyake closed out the panel discussion with remarks about his experience as a lawyer in attempting to secure government information in the U.S. and Japan. He starkly contrasted the ease and low cost with which he, a Japanese national, could obtain information from U.S. agencies such as the Department of the Interior or the FDA, with the difficulties he faced in trying to obtain similar information in Japan. A similar situation was found in pursuing research at the U.S. National Archives, which was remarkably open to foreign researchers.
Turning to the legal situation in Japan regarding access to official information, Mr. Miyake stressed that the central need is for a national Freedom of Information Act which establishes the right to ask for the release of information, and to appeal denials of such requests. The existing procedures were quite limited, he stated, pointing to the fact that the public could only examine official documents at certain counters at agencies, and could not make copies of these documents. This national law must establish a set period of time after which documents should be released, with minimal and precise exemptions. There must be good inventories of government records to assist researchers in their work, and the system should be user-friendly in terms of locating and making copies of official records. There should be a vigorous system of non-governmental oversight exercised by an independent review board of the system. These, Mr. Miyake concluded, are the key elements of a Japanese freedom of information system.
Following Mr. Miyake's remarks, the panel members exchanged questions, after which the floor was opened to the audience for comments and questions. During the exchange among the panel members, the discussion centered primarily on the importance of establishing bodies that include outside (i.e., non-governmental) experts to advise the government regarding and to oversee the proper functioning of official declassification review systems, and the role existing U.S. advisory and oversight bodies can play as possible models for Japan. The Japanese participants were particularly interested in learning more about the manner in which U.S. advisory and oversight committees were organized and dealt with the problems of security, confidentiality, scope, etc., which surround their work.
During the audience question and answer period, discussion touched on the following subjects:
· Information to be obtained from diaries and memoirs by former Japanese officials.
· Access to official Japanese records at the libraries established for former Japanese Prime Ministers such as Miki, and at other archives such as the National Diet Library.
· The U.S. Presidential Libraries and the records these archives hold.
· The manner in which greater official openness can promote greater respect for government and its officials, as well as reveal past mistakes.
· The need for greater documentation of Japanese "administrative guidance."
· Overcoming bureaucratic resistance to greater openness.
Professor Iokibe closed out the symposium by noting one relevant
theme throughout the day's discussion - what was being discussed was nothing
less than effecting a revolution in Japanese public policy, albeit a peaceful
revolution. There is a long tradition of Japanese public cooperation with
the government, but now it must be accepted that the government has been
entrusted with power by the people and has a mandate to serve the people.
As part of fulfilling this mandate, and to support a broad-based civic
society, more information must be provided the Japanese people so that
they might better assess and debate official policies. To prepare the legislation
necessary to institutionalize such greater openness will be a historic
change. The U.S. example shows that it is possible to pursue solutions
to the many complex questions surrounding the implementation of such a
policy of openness. The international trend is toward greater freedom of
information, Prof. Iokibe recalled. The Japanese public must become energized
to actively support the work of officials and experts who seek to advance
this objective in Japan. That such public support, both domestically and
internationally, is essential is the true significance and relevance of
today's symposium, Prof. Iokibe noted in ending the meeting.
(2) The work of the Administrative Reform Committee is carried out in closed sessions, with no press or media representatives included, but all meetings are followed by press conferences and, within a few days, extensive reports on the discussion, without attribution to individual committee members. Mr. Tanaka argued in support of this mask of anonymity, holding that this protects the committee members, who are dealing with sensitive issues, from harassment and efforts at intimidation or pressure.