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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACTION MEMORANDUM

*AME
PCW
MSV*

March 22, 1977

TO: The Director

THROUGH: ACDA/NTB - Thomas D. Davies *TMD*

FROM: ACDA/NTB - Robert S. Rochlin *RR*

SUBJECT: CTB Discussions in Moscow

Attached, as you requested, are suggested talking points on the comprehensive nuclear test ban issues for use in the Moscow discussions. These were drafted on the assumption that there will be Presidential instructions consistent with the approach taken. I have also attached draft material for a communique which would be appropriate if the talks go well.

Tactical Suggestions

1. Moratorium. If the President authorizes the delegation to pursue a moratorium, this should probably be one of the first orders of business, because Soviet willingness to go along would be a strong indication of flexibility on such issues as PNE's and Chinese/French participation. However, while a moratorium should be discussed in Moscow, any agreement reached should not be announced there, either in a joint communique or even in parallel statements, since any explicit or even implicit agreement with the Soviets could require Congressional approval under the ACDA act. It would be better for the President to announce, after the visit, that to facilitate negotiation of a multilateral treaty he intended to suspend testing for a year. Brezhnev would make a parallel statement in Moscow.

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2. Starting formal negotiations. If the Soviets are not insistent on French and Chinese participation before a CTB would take effect, we should seek agreement in Moscow on the start of trilateral CTB discussions in the near future. (The British have officially indicated their desire to participate from the outset.) Such negotiations would have the objective of reaching agreement on a statement of principles on which a multilateral CTB treaty could be based. Once such agreement was reached (hopefully before the start of the CCD summer session in July), the principles would be jointly tabled at the CCD as the basis for multilateral negotiations on a treaty text.

cc: Mr. Sloss
Mr. Stearman
Mr. Newhouse
Mr. Earle

Concurrence: IR - Mr. Stearman *WJ*

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Draft Talking Points on CTB for Moscow Discussions

- As a key measure to curb nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. favors conclusion as early as possible of a multilateral treaty which prohibits all nuclear explosions.
- We believe such a treaty should not require Chinese or French adherence for entry into force, since their early adherence is highly unlikely. Of course, the treaty would remain open for adherence by all states, and we should continue to seek Chinese and French adherence. We note that Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed a similar view to Ambassador Stoessel a year ago.*
- We propose that initial discussions among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S. begin around May 1 in Geneva on the main elements a CTB treaty should contain. When agreement has been reached on such elements, we propose that a treaty text be worked out multilaterally in the CCD, so as to encourage the widest possible international support for and adherence to the treaty.

* On April 12, 1976, Gromyko told Stoessel that, although some countries will not participate, it would still be beneficial if the two main nuclear powers could agree to end all tests. Without it, there is no example for other countries to follow. Such an accord would draw attention to the problem and would encourage others to follow suit. (Moscow 5682)

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- We believe it would facilitate the CTB treaty negotiations, and contribute to our non-proliferation objectives, if there were a mutual suspension of all nuclear explosions while the negotiations are in progress. This could be accomplished through parallel announcements by each country of its intention to refrain from conducting any explosions for a 12-month period. (This suspension could be extended later if additional time were needed to complete the CCD negotiations.)
- We know of no way to preclude the acquisition of significant military information in the course of a PNE program. We therefore believe it will be necessary to ban PNE's under a CTB. In our view, this approach would also be essential to achieve the non-proliferation objectives of a CTB. It would underline the indistinguishability of PNE's and weapon tests, and discourage indigenous PNE development by NPT holdouts.

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-- Verification of a CTB will be a very important matter, and we would welcome Soviet views on how compliance can best be assured. This subject and others will require detailed discussion when we begin the CTB negotiations.

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Draft CTB Statement for Moscow Communique

The two sides recognized the important contribution that a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear explosions could make to international peace and security, and particularly to curbing the further development of nuclear weapons and to preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities. Accordingly, they agreed to begin discussions at an early date aimed at reaching agreement on principles that would provide a basis for negotiation of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

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