

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
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AIRGRAM

DEF 18-8 US
R/MR
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A-511 ~~SECRET~~ COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON AUG 30 AM 8 20

INFO; Department of Defense WASHINGTON

This document consists of 3 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION COPY NO. 1
Number of copies, Series BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy, LONDON

DATE: August 28, 1964
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

FOIA(b)1 AF
 Retain Class'n Change classify to
 With concurrence of [initials]
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3
PPG/HDR by [initials] 2/16/95
DEF 39-38

REF : Embtel 957; Embtel 818

1. Enclosed for the Department's information is a copy of the Foreign Office letter approving in principle the concept of an exchange of notes to provide for US-UK cooperation in the detection of nuclear explosions.

2. In a discussion with the reporting officer on the proposed Washington technical talks, the Foreign Office representative, Mr. H. B. Shepherd (Atomic Energy-Disarmament Department), indicated that the U.K. would probably send two people from London to assist British Embassy and British Defense Staff personnel in the discussions. Mr. Shepherd stressed the need to have such discussions before the end of the second week in September since after that period it would be extremely awkward for the British to deal with the problem. He anticipates that after the middle of September the key people in London who would be concerned with this matter would not be available due to other commitments. The technical discussions, in Mr. Shepherd's judgment, should not take more than several days. In response to the reporting officer's query as to the need for such talks in light of the discussions that have already taken place, Mr. Shepherd replies that the U.K. feels it essential that there be a complete understanding at the technical level before any exchange of notes is undertaken.

[Redacted]

3. The reporting officer suggested to Mr. Shepherd that considerable time could be saved if the draft exchange of notes could be considered

Declassified
Authority 24716
By: Pam Jabucke Date:
10-14-2010

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Drafted by: PM:GSNewman:lrj# Contents and Classification Approved by: PM - George S. Newman

Clearances: File for C.A. Freshman R/PM 11/10/64

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while technical discussions were being held in Washington. He pointed out that the subjects to be treated during these discussions are not likely to affect the substantive contents of the note. Mr. Shephere replied that the U.K. considers it necessary to wait for the completion of the Washington discussions before moving on to formal consideration of the draft notes. (COMMENT: While Shepherd indicated that the Foreign Office did not wish to consider the draft on a formal basis, the reporting officer gained the impression that he would be willing to go over a draft note with an Embassy officer on an informal basis.)

4. Mr. Shepherd stated that he had been instructed to call to the Embassy's attention the reference in the last paragraph of his letter concerning consultation in the event of a breach of the Test Ban Treaty. He commented that his superiors placed a great deal of importance on expressing this requirement formally in the proposed note although he recognized that in the past there has been a good deal of informal consultation. The reporting officer stated that he would inform Washington of Foreign Office views.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: The Embassy recommends:

- a. that a draft exchange of notes be made available for informal discussion with the Foreign Office; and
- b. that it be advised of the U.S. position on the British proposal calling for consultation in the event of a Test Ban Treaty violation.

For the Ambassador:

George S. Newman
George S. Newman

Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs

Enclosure: Copy of letter from H. B. Shepherd on Monitoring the Test Ban Treaty.

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~~SECRET~~Enclosure to A London
-511Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
August 26, 1964

(IAN 1015/11/G)

Dear Mr. Newman,

Monitoring the Test Ban Treaty

We welcome, in principle, the approach made in your letter to me of August 7, 1964. As a result of the negotiation and conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty we too have been considering what we might do to make a significant contribution to the monitoring of that treaty. We have been planning on the basis of establishing and operating about five monitoring stations, subject to budgetary considerations, and we have mentioned a contribution on this scale in the informal talks with technical representatives in the United States, to which you refer in your letter.

We have studied your proposals carefully in relation to our own considerations and we welcome your suggestion that we should proceed to negotiate a formal exchange of Notes covering this work. But it seems to us that the next essential stage is a round of technical discussions conducted by the appropriate technical representatives from each side to ensure a common understanding about such matters as the locations to be selected for the British stations, problems arising in the installation of these stations, compatibility of instrumental techniques to be deployed, training operators, reporting and co-ordination of evaluation of data, and also security classification issues. These discussions would be based on the previous informal conversations and the detailed proposals in your letter. We suggest that these discussions, like the previous informal conversations, might take place in Washington and we could be ready for talks there about the second week in September, if the U.S. Government agree.

On completion of these technical discussions we hope that the drafting and formal exchange of Notes between Governments could be completed fairly rapidly, incorporating such political points as may be necessary. One that seems to us important would be to provide for consultation, at political level, in the event of a breach of the Test Ban Treaty being reported by the monitoring network. We accept in principle that it may be desirable to have stations in Colonial and Commonwealth territories; [redacted] ready, if asked to do so and subject to local political conditions prevailing at the time, [redacted]

/s/ H.B. Shepherd

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED