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<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)</th>
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<td>1. Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee</td>
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2007

00001
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT: "Family Jewels"

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to forward for your personal review summaries of activities conducted either by or under the sponsorship of the Office of Security in the past which in my opinion conflict with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.

2. These activities cover the period from March 1959 to date and represent as accurate a record as is available in our files. Those activities which took place prior to the date of my appointment as Director of Security on 1 July 1964 have been developed to a certain extent through the recollection of the senior people in this Office who were involved or who had knowledge of the activities at the time they occurred.

3. I have gone back to March 1959 because I believe that the activities occurring since that time still have a viable "flap potential" in that many of the people involved, both Agency and non-Agency are still alive and through their knowledge of the activity represent a possible potential threat or embarrassment to the Agency. I would be glad to provide clarification or an explanation of any of these activities if desired. You have my assurance that unless otherwise stated each of these activities was approved by higher authority--the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director-Comptroller, or the Deputy Director for Support.

Attachments

SECRET
EYES ONLY

00003

SECRET
EYES ONLY
SECRET
EYES ONLY
Attachment A

"FAMILY JEWELS"

1. 

2. Johnny Roselli -- The use of a member of the Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro.

3. Project MOCKINGBIRD -- During the period from 12 March 1963 to 15 June 1963, this Office installed telephone taps on two Washington-based newsmen who were suspected of disclosing classified information obtained from a variety of governmental and congressional sources.

4. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko -- A KGB defector who from the period 13 August 1965 to 27 October 1967 was confined in a specially constructed "jail" at He was literally confined in a cell using bars with nothing but a cot in it for this period.

5. Various Surveillance and Support Activities -- These are briefly summarized and range from the surveillance of newsmen to the provision of specialized support of local police officials in the Metropolitan area. I believe that each one is self-explanatory and, therefore, no further comment is needed here.

6. Equipment Support to Local Police -- Attached is a list provided me by the Director of Logistics (he will simply report these items in his report) which we have provided local police in the Metropolitan D. C. area over the past four or five years on indefinite loan. During the period when the Agency's installations in this area appeared to be a target of dissident elements

SECRET
EYES ONLY

00005
a conscious decision was made by the Agency to utilize the services of local police to repel invaders in case of riot or dissension as opposed to utilization of our GSA guards, who are not trained in this type of activity. This equipment has been issued over the years to local police, principally Fairfax and Arlington County Police Departments. I do not believe that this is totally illegal under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, but I am including it since I am sure that it would be considered as such in light of the recent congressional fuss over our police training activities.

7. Audio Countermeasures Support to the United States Secret Service

8. Test of Specialized Equipment in Miami Immediately Prior to the Political Convention There
SUBJECT: Johnny Roselli

1. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

2. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was made privy to the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, was briefed, but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the JM浪潮 officials. Certain TSD and Communications personnel participated in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of the mission.

3. Robert A. Maheu, a cleared source of the Office of Security, was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entree into the gangster elements as the first step toward accomplishing the desired goal.

4. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through clients, but was given to understand that he was a high-ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled all of the ice-making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.

5. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew Maheu as a personal relations executive handling domestic and foreign accounts, and tell him that he had recently been retained by a client who represented several international business firms which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result of Castro's action. They were convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to their
problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the United States Government was not, and should not, become aware of this operation.

6. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14 September 1960 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. Mr. James O'Connell, Office of Security, was present during this meeting and was identified to Roselli as an employee of Maheu. O'Connell actively served as Roselli's contact until May 1962 at which time he phased out due to an overseas assignment. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved, but through Maheu's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the "Cuban crowd." Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were ever paid out of Agency funds.

7. During the week of 25 September, Maheu was introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified to him as a courier operating between Havana and Miami, that he saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday supplement of "Parade." They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and Santos Trafficant, respectively. Both were on the list of the Attorney General's ten most-wanted men. The former was described as the Chicago chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Capone, and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately upon ascertaining this information.

8. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but, if he could be furnished some type of potent pill, that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind.
9. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal content.

10. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

11. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own resources.

12. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he be given $10,000 for organizational expenses and requested $1,000 worth of communications equipment.

13. Dr. Verona's potential was never fully exploited, as the project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised that the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved.

14. Of significant interest was an incident which involved a request levied by Sam upon Maheu.

   At the height of the project negotiations, Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire, who he learned was getting much attention from Dan Rowan while both were booked at a Las Vegas night club. Sam asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room to determine the extent of his intimacy with Miss McGuire. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff's office for questioning. He called Maheu and informed him that he had been detained by the police. This call was made in the presence of the Sheriff's personnel.

   Subsequently, the Department of Justice announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along
with the technician. On 7 February 1962, the Director of Security briefed the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumstances leading up to Maheu's involvement in the wiretap. At our request, prosecution was dropped.

15. In May 1962, Mr. William Harvey took over as Case Officer, and it is not known by this office whether Roselli was used operationally from that point on.

16. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States. Our records do not reflect the date of conviction, but it is believed to have been sometime during November 1967.

17. On 2 December 1968, Roselli, along with four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friars Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin rummy game.

18. Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security of his contacts with Roselli during November and December 1967 and January 1968. It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out the Agency for assistance in the deportation proceedings unless he actually faced deportation. Roselli expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

19. On 17 November 1970, Maheu called James O'Connell, Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from a Thomas Waddin, Roselli's lawyer, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activities with the Agency.

20. On 18 November 1970, Mr. Helms was briefed on the latest development in this case, and it was decided that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu was so advised of the Agency's position, and he was in
complete agreement with our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally should Roselli decide to tell all.

21. Subsequently, Roselli or someone on his behalf furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation. Attached are two Anderson columns dealing with this matter.

22. The last known residence of Roselli was the Federal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington.

Attachments
6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro. For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator and put in his place a CIA-backed government. The plot was code-named "Operation North." The CIA, with help from other covert agents, planned to overthrow Castro with the support of sympathizers in Cuba.

The plan called for a group of Cuban exiles to land on the island and take control of the government. The CIA provided the money and training for the operation, and the exiles were to be supplied with weapons and ammunition. The operation was to be a surprise attack, and the exiles were to be supported by local residents who would rise up against Castro.

But the operation failed, and the exiles were quickly surrounded by Cuban forces. The CIA then turned to other methods of overthrowing Castro. It began a campaign of assassination, using a variety of agents and methods, including poisoning, gunshots, and even a secret agent who was able to get into Castro's office to kill him.

The first attempt failed, but the CIA continued to try. It recruited a group of Cuban exiles who were to be trained in assassination techniques and given weapons and money to carry out the task. The operation was led by a man named Roselli, who had previously been a member of the CIA.

Roselli was able to get into Castro's office and kill him, but the plot was discovered and Roselli was captured. The CIA then turned to other methods, including using a secret agent who was able to get into Castro's office and kill him.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie.
 Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

By Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County infirmary.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 65-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld.

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1951. As part of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and install a client named Fidel.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination team on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana was "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimping business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the hull, and sank the boat. Roselli was taken out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chief to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1953. Throughout this period, Roselli was under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has forced a vital section of the 1958 federal firearms act. The law was intended to prevent the importation of arms.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require the federal firearms industry to report all sales of firearms and ammunition sales.

Discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, Roselli's arrest is a stunning blow to the Miami police. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien. He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

The jury's two CIA associates. Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell.

Firearms Fiasco

Under pressure from the firearms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce the 1958 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

The federal government has been in force for the two years that the law has been in force, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come from Cuba to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

The jury's two CIA associates. Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell.
PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD

Project Mockingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newsmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as being the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel (Mr. Lawrence Houston).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

00021

SECRET-ONLY
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, an officer of the KGB, defected to a representative of this Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country on 12 February 1964. After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Clinton, Maryland, from 4 April 1964 where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at [__] The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at [__] in an effort to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for Nosenko's further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

Nosenko was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that Nosenko was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of a Russian agent. He currently is living under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states "while I regret my three years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."
I. SURVEILLANCES

A. 

During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of a former staff employee, and a Cuban national with whom [redacted] became professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that [redacted] had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by [redacted] in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of [redacted] was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. 

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of [redacted] and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. [redacted] had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. Surveillance included coverage of the activities of Miss King during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. CELOTEX I

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Michael Getler of the Washington Post during
the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Getler's sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. CELOTEX II

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

E. BUTANE

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from the Washington Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two WFO Agents, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.
B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

A. SRPOINTER

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. AELADLE

For several years the Office of Security has provided support to Anatole Golitsyn, a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff.

C. REDFACE I

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security known as [ ] and operating as [ ]. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) [ ] and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.

E. [ ]

F. MERRIMAC

From February 1967 to November 1971, [ ] an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and managed several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that she was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.
# MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS

BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO
LOCAL POLICE

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<tr>
<td>Gas Mask M-17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel Helmet and Liners</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vest and Groin Protector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vest, Flak M-52</td>
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<td>Vest, Grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Flashing Red Light</td>
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*Searchlight, Tear Gas             | 36       |
*Chemical Baton 6 1/2"              | 36       |
*Chemical Baton 12"                 | 24       |
*Chemical Baton 26"                 | 24       |
*Mustang 35 Pistol                  | 6        |
*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap    | 36       |
*Stun Gun                          | 3        |

*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.*
SUBJECT: Audio Countermeasures Support to the United States Secret Service

On 25 July 1968, and at the specific request of the United States Secret Service, this Office provided two audio countermeasures technicians to the United States Secret Service in connection with the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois. This was not an official detail although both men were provided with temporary credentials identifying them as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

On 15 August 1968, we detailed the same two men to the United States Secret Service to cover the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida. On both occasions, the team members were debriefed upon their return and it is clear that their activities were confined exclusively to sweeping the candidates and potential candidates quarters.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Howard Osborn  
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Identification of Activities with  
Embarrassment Potential for the Agency

1. In responding on 7 May by memorandum to the DDO's request for the identification of any incident which might conceivably have an embarrassment potential for the Agency, I cited the equipment test which is mentioned in the attached memo. The test in question was related to the development of

and in the course of running these tests, our technicians were in and out of some four hotels in Miami, with radio equipment. This was shortly before the political conventions, and at least one of the hotels was within a block of the convention hall.

2. Although this completely innocent--although subject to misconstrual--activity may already have been drawn to your attention by your own staff, it has occurred to us that we should ensure you are aware of it, given the involvement of a Security officer,

Chief, Division D

Att:
M/R dated 7 May 73 by
subj: Equipment Test, Miami, Fla., Aug 71

cc: SECRET

00036
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Equipment Test, Miami, Florida, August 1971

The following details concerning the arrangements for Subject tests were provided by during a telephone conversation with the undersigned, 7 May 1973.

now retired, formerly assigned to was the for the August 1971 Field Test of the Security arrangements for the test were handled on behalf of and the visitors by in conjunction with the Security Officer, who was at the time. was in daily contact with Miami Police in the course of his official liaison duties.

was reluctant to call at home over an open telephone line to inquire about the specifics of the arrangements at this point, and suggested that the Security Officer by this time might have been transferred back to Headquarters and be available for a direct query.

The writer called, DIV/D Security Officer, who verified that indeed is stationed at Headquarters, with a current assignment to a located in is available via the following telephone connections:

The above details were provided by telephone to Chief, Division D at 1650 hours this date.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: ROSELLI, John

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. Reference is made to our recent conversation regarding the Agency's participation in political assassinations. Attached hereto is a memorandum dated 19 November 1970 which was furnished to Mr. Helms setting forth the circumstances of the Subject's activities on behalf of the Agency. Initially Roselli was unwitting of Government interest, but as time went on, he suspected that the U. S. Government was involved and specifically the CIA.

3. Roselli is presently serving a prison sentence for conspiracy in a Federal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington and awaits deportation upon completion of his current sentence.

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCI decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident. Attached hereto are two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson is also Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Washington Post, Sunday supplemental "Parade."

5. Individuals who were aware of this project were: Messrs. Dulles, Bissell, Colonel J. C. King, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,
William Harvey, and James P. O'Connell. Also included were Robert A. Maheu and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward Bennett Williams.

6. On 26 February 1971 arrangements were made with Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Raymond Farrell to flag any action that may be taken by his organization regarding deportation proceedings against Roselli. On 26 January 1972 James F. Green, Associate Commissioner for I&NS, advised that they were deferring any deportation action for another year and would again call it to our attention upon expiration of the deferral.

Atts

Edward J. [Signature]
Director of Security

SECRET
EYES ONLY

00040
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Controller

SUBJECT: ROSELLI, John

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Howard J. Orborn
Director of Security

Atts
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: ROSELLI, Johnny

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

3. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was made privy to the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, was briefed, but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the JM/WAVE officials. Certain TSD and Commo personnel participated in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of the mission.

4. Robert A. Maheu was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entree into the gangster elements as the first step toward accomplishing the desired goal.

5. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through clients, but was given to understand that he was a high-ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled all of the ice-making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.
6. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew Maheu as a personal relations executive handling domestic and foreign accounts, and tell him that he had recently been retained by a client who represented several international business firms which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result of Castro's action. They were convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to their problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the U.S. Government was not, and should not, become aware of this operation.

7. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14 September 1960 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, through Maheu's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the "Cuban crowd." Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals was ever paid out of Agency funds.

8. During the week of 25 September, Maheu was introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified to him as a courier operating between Havana and Miami, that he saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday supplemental "Parade." They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and Santos Traffinant, respectively. Both were on the list of the Attorney General's ten most-wanted men. The former was described as the Chicago chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Capone, and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately upon ascertaining this information.

9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but, if he could be furnished some type of potent pill, that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kickback payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind.
10. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal content.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Grla. After several weeks of reported attempts, Grla apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he be given $10,000 for organizational expenses and requested $1,000 worth of communications equipment.

14. Dr. Verona's potential was never fully exploited, as the project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised that the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved.

15. Of significant interest was an incident which involved a request levied by Sam upon Maheu.

At the height of the project negotiations, Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire, who he learned was getting much attention from Dan Rowan while both were booked at a Las Vegas night club. Sam asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room to determine the extent of his intimacy with Miss McGuire. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff's office for questioning. He called Maheu and informed him that he had been detained by the police. This call was made in the presence of the Sheriff's personnel.

Subsequently, the Department of Justice announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along with the technician. On 7 February 1962, the Director of
Security briefed the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumstances leading up to Maheu's involvement in the wiretap. At our request, prosecution was dropped.

16. In May 1962, Mr. William Harvey took over as Case Officer, and it is not known by this Office whether Roselli was used operationally from that point on.

17. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States. Our records do not reflect the date of conviction, but it is believed to have been sometime during November 1967.

18. On 2 December 1968, Roselli, along with four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friars Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin rummy game.

19. Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security of his contacts with Roselli during November and December 1967 and January 1968. It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out the Agency for assistance in the deportation proceedings unless he actually faced deportation. Roselli expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

20. On 17 November 1970, Maheu called James O'Connell, Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from a Thomas Waddin, Roselli's lawyer, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activities with the Agency.

21. On 18 November 1970, you were briefed on the latest development in this case, and it was decided that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu was so advised of the Agency's position, and he was in complete agreement with our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about
any publicity as it affected him personally should Roselli decide to tell all. He stated he would advise us promptly of any developments that he may become aware of in this matter.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator. The mission was called "Operation Mongoose." According to one source, four men were to be picked up in Cuba and flown to the United States for interrogation. Two were picked up, but only one confessed.

We are told the plot was hatched by the CIA's Cuban group, which was headed by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shady contacts who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA. Maheu was later convicted of fraud.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a raggedy-looking gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. Roselli, a former movie producer, was supposed to install a CIA spy in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsubstantiated by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to participate in the assassination attempt.

The story reads like the script of a James Bond movie.
Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

By Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been living in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County Jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. At the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a top FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused to answer our questions about the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chief engineer to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crackdown on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell is still on the CIA payroll. Both admired the tax-fugitive's friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities.

Harvey said he had a "hick regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "humbug.

"The Friar's Club indignity isoxy, Roselli had no more to do with that than I had," Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get evidence for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

Firearms Finansco

Under pressure from the arms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce a vital section of the 1968 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

For the two years that the law has been in force, the Treasury Department has ignored this key provision. The gun industry has complained it would be a bookkeeping nightmare.

The federal government, which would have to compile all the sales data, has been reluctant to spend the $84 million it would cost for computers and staff to maintain the firearms files.
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17 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Recent Activities of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff

1. Early in the evening of 10 December 1973, I received a telephone call from [Redacted] who informed the that he, in turn, had received a call from [Redacted], Intelligence Division, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.

2. It seems that [Redacted] had just spent an hour in conversation at his home with a [Redacted] in the Washington Metropolitan Police Department who had reported to him on his interview that afternoon with a Mr. Martin and a Mr. Horowitz, prosecutors of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff. [Redacted] had been subpoenaed for his appearance and he indicated to [Redacted] that the two prosecutors were principally concerned with two matters:

   a. What type of training had the Agency given members of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department? How long were the courses? and how often were they given?

   b. What support did the Agency provide to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department during demonstrations occurring in the Washington area in late 1969 and early 1970?

3. [Redacted] said that he had been shown a long list of names and asked if any of them had been involved either with the training given the Washington Metropolitan Police Department or the support to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department during the demonstrations. [Redacted] could remember only three names on the list. They were: [Redacted]
4. The three individuals named by [redacted] did in fact participate in both the training and support during the demonstrations. They are only three among others of my [redacted] special support group who were involved in these activities. Of extreme sensitivity is the fact that these same individuals were engaged in other highly sensitive activities which could cause the Agency severe embarrassment if they were surfaced today in the current "Watergate climate."

5. I briefed the Director personally on this development and he indicated that if the training and demonstrations surfaced that he would simply acknowledge that this had occurred but as he had assured members of Congress, we would not engage in this type of activity in the future. He agreed with my suggestion that we have the Legislative Counsel brief Congressman Nedzi and Senator Stennis on this since they have already been briefed on all activities of this nature undertaken by the Agency in the past. I briefed Mr. John Warner, Acting General Counsel, and agreed him that we would make no effort to brief members of my [redacted] until and if they are subpoenaed. Mr. Warner or members of his Staff will then caution them to only answer questions asked and not volunteer additional information. I am making a copy of this memorandum available to [redacted] of the Inspector General's Staff at the suggestion of the Inspector General, who I also briefed on this development.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

cc: IG Staff Attn: [redacted]
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary,
CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT: Project TWO-FOLD

1. This memorandum sets forth a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 5.

2. For the past several years, this office has been supporting the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) by spotting, assessing, and recruiting personnel to form an internal security unit whose primary mission is the detection of corruption within the BNDD. Subsequent to the recruitment and training stage, the individuals selected are turned over to the Chief Inspector of BNDD for operational guidance and handling in their various domestic assignments.

3. Recently, this Agency has extended this activity by supporting BNDD in the covert acquisition of individuals who are hired as Staff Agents utilized under nonofficial cover and directed against the principal international drug traffickers. These individuals are true employees of the BNDD and, although all administrative details relative to their employment are handled within the Agency, they are unaware of any Agency involvement.

4. It is felt at this time that a reaffirmation of our support to BNDD in Project TWO-FOLD is necessary and desirable.

5. Therefore, it is recommended that approval be granted for the continuation of Project TWO-FOLD as originally approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on 12 February 1971.

Howard J. Odhner
Director of Security

00056
SUBJECT: Project TWO-FOLD

APPROVED: ____________________________ *

DISAPPROVED: ____________________________

Distribution:
Orig. - Return to OS
1 - ER
1 - IG

* Per Mr. Colby's recommendation and DCI concurrence, terminate paragraph 2 activity and continue paragraph 3 only as the activity pertains to foreign assignments to collect narcotics intelligence abroad. Copy furnished IG.

Ben C. Evans, Jr.
O/ES
29 May 1973
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

11 May 1973

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations in this country. There are also reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.

8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office of Security has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on CIA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her.
Memorandum to: The Inspector General

Subject: Office of Security Survey - Office of Security Support to BNDD

1. In December 1970 Robert Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, asked Mr. Helms if the Agency could give him some assistance in shoring up the internal integrity of the BNDD. According to Ingersoll, the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics had been heavily infiltrated by dishonest and corrupt elements, who were believed to have ties with the narcotics smuggling industry. Ingersoll wanted us to help him recruit some thoroughly reliable people who could be used, not only as special agents in his various offices around the country, but also to serve as informants on the other BNDD employees in these offices.
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| Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security | | 9 May 1973 | |

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00064
9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT: Press Allegations re Use of Agency Polygraph

1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of William Beecher. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals—one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.
4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

6. The four individuals were The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Mr. Murrey Marder, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Mr. Marder apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Mr. Marder plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Mr. Marder but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. G. Marvin Genmile
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Security
Department of State

SUBJECT: Special Technical Interviews

1. Attached are the technical interview reports on

2. As in other cases involving the use of polygraph, it is imperative no reference be made to this Agency's involvement in these actions.

3. As you will note, the reports are not classified and I shall defer to your judgment in regard to the level of classification.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

[Signature]

Director of Security

00069
5 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA for use against a

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of

There was also Agency help given in Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional details. He said Senator Russell and Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.

Attachment
9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:

   -- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/O.

   -- _______ and _______ investments and accumulation of Government capital.

   -- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA for use against ________

   -- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.

John M. Clarke
5 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

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Inspector

Attachment

- 2 -

SECRET EYES ONLY

00074
**FROM:**
Director of Finance  
1212 Key Building

**TO:**
1. Deputy Director for Management & Services  
   Headquarters
2.  
3.  
4. Director of Central Intelligence  
   Headquarters
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**DATE:** 7 May 1973

**EXTENSION NO.**

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**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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**EYES ONLY**  

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**FORM:** 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS  

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**MORI DocID:** 1451843
MEMORANDUM FOR:

FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown in other documents in the Agency. It has been kept very close with Mr. Yale, Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby. All files have been purged.

00076
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Management and Services
FROM: Director of Finance
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

1. Colonel White, Executive Director-

2. 

3. Details the Agency has reimbursable and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. Project TOWFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5. 

SECRET EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

6. Payment to White House - Reimbursement to White House as approved by Executive Director-Comptroller for $33,655.68 representing cost of postage, stationery and addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received by the White House as a result of the President's speech on Cambodia in May 1970.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Management and Services
FROM: Director of Finance
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

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3. Detainees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. Project THOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5.

SECRET EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

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(Signed) Thomas B. Yale

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM: Director of Finance

SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

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SECRET EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities

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(signed) Thomas B. Yale

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance
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Attached are pertinent documents and papers relating to Para 6 of the Director of Finance's memo to the DCI dated 7 May 1973, Subject: "Special Other Government Agency Activities"

Warren D. Magnusson

Atts
Mr. Magnusson's phone conversation with Mr. John Brown at approximately 10:20 on 26 May 1970:

B: Guess we're back together again!

M: Got more problems?

B: Yes, don't know how much Watts told you.

M: I didn't talk to Watts. Think he called Colonel White.

B: Let me explain background. As a result of the Cambodia speech, we're getting relatively inundated with correspondence and normally all of this is sent to the Department of State for answering. What we're doing -- we're continuing to send all correspondence to State. However, the President made determination he'd like to answer support over his signature here and we asked the Department of State to support us on this effort. They're in a position where they can provide only limited support at this time. They're committed for $10,000 which would probably handle in the area of maybe 60,000 responses.

M: How many responses altogether counting pros and cons?

B: The cons are quite a large group that they're handling themselves also.

M: Are they going to be handling pros too?

B: $10,000 is for pros. They're doing cons. On pros they can pick up only $10,000 worth. We estimate it will be around $8,000 per 50,000 and it looks like at present time we've got over 100,000 responses in and it could go upwards of 150,000 or greater. Looks like we'll need a minimum of another $10,000, probably in area of $15,000, additional. This covers cost of printing, postage and addressing.

M: Just printing, postage and addressing? Not any overtime for any salaries or anything like that?

B: No, the posting of the things we'll do ourselves -- by hand. No problem. We're talking about physical costs of job -- cost of stamps, cost of envelopes and cards, and cost of having them addressed by outside firm. We'll handle putting stamp on, inserting, and sealing and mailing. Only talking about cost associated with three aspects of the operation.

M: Postage, addressing and printing.

B: Yes, reason I asked NSA to see if they could arrange -- depending on how volume goes -- probably another $10,000 to $15,000.

M: These are just pros? State is handling all cons themselves?

(continued)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued - Page 2)

B: Yes, this is just portion of pros we're talking about. My understanding get in touch with you to work out mechanics of how we would handle the billing to make sure it's straight and we do it properly so it fits in with your accounting system.

M: This is only portion of pros. State doing some too?

B: They're contributing $10,000 to the pros as well as doing all the cons. They're picking up quite a load as a result of this. One hell of a lot of response coming in on this.

M: Bound to be. Tell you, John, let me give you a call back later today if I may. Have to take a look about where I would fit this stuff in. Are you going to be in this afternoon?

B: I'll be around. If I'm not in my office I'll get back to you as soon as I come back.

M: I'll give you a call then.

B: Can't be real definite -- not sure how we're going to peak out. Not sure what backlog is. I'll check into that so when we talk this afternoon I can be little more definite. Probably run into that area, I think.

M: Okay, I'll get back in touch with you.

B: Okay, thank you, Warren.

End of Conversation
Mr. Magnussen's phone conversation with Col. White at 15:40 on 26 May 1970:

M: I talked with John Brown today and it seems like -- as you mentioned -- as a result of Cambodia, inquiries going into White House. The State Department is doing all the work on the cons -- there are pros and cons. The State Department is going to answer all the cons and the President has determined that he wants to answer personally all the pros. However, the State has agreed to pick up some of those too in the amount of $10,000. That will cover maybe 60,000 of the answers. They estimate there's going to be from 100,000 to 150,000 answers that will have to be put out by the White House. Estimate it's going to cost about $8,000 per 50,000. Think it might go to 150,000. $10,000 to $15,000 additional which the White House will have to pay for. The charges are only going to be for printing, postage and addressing by an outside firm. No salaries for overtime or anything like that. They're going to lick the stamps in the White House, paste the stamps on and insert the message into the envelopes. John Brown said he had requested NSC to see if they could arrange, presumably with us, I guess, for another $10,000 to $15,000 depending on volume. He was talking as more or less foregone conclusion we would do it. I made no commitment. Told him I'd look into it.

W: How would we do this?

M: We would do it by asking them to pay amount and then send over 1080 to us with bill for the postage, bill for the addressing of the envelopes and bill for the printing accompanying this and we would just send check back. They would send short memorandum with it certifying these are the charges.

W: I think we want to know what we spend our money for but I don't think we want the public records to show that we paid for it.

M: What we can do, Sir -- I can ask them to send over a 1080 with certification that these are the charges for classified services per our conversation, and if you're willing to take that we can certainly do it that way.

W: Will this be an outside firm? Couldn't we just pay the firm? What would be better? I'm not sure.

M: I think a short memo just saying attached 1080 is for charges previously agreed to between this Agency and themselves and that's all and then we send them check for that. Otherwise, there's always chance that an outside firm might realize it was us paying for it.

W: I guess it's the best way to do it. I'd like to have in our records -- nobody else has access to -- exactly what it was for -- all about it; their records, which are audited by the General Accounting Office, as little as possible.

(continued)
Mr. Magnusson and Col. White (continued - Page 2)

M: Think I can talk to them and arrange that so he just sends unclassified 1080.

W: Go ahead and do it. I'll have to sign off on it, I suppose. You go ahead and arrange it in way that will give us full record. As far as any records of their's are concerned, I would prefer to have minimum.

M: I can write memo and John Brown can refer to this and our phone conversation in a memo accompanying the 1080.

W: Okay, go ahead and do it. Put limit on it. When they talked to me they said $10,000.

M: He said $10,000 to $15,000 because they're just pouring in. Might run above $10,000.

W: Approximately $10,000 but in no case will it exceed $15,000 -- something like that. Okay.

M: All right, Sir.

W: Thank you, Warren.

End of Conversation

/4/5 - 2/1/67
Mr. Magnusson's phone conversation with Mr. John Brown at approximately 17:00 on 26 May 1970:

M: Think we can go ahead and do this. Have to be careful as to way this is documented -- that's the only thing. Would like to suggest that I write memo for the record -- kind of co-sign it -- agreeing to amount and so forth and the way we do this. Memo would have in it what it's for and then you would send us a 1080 for this, referencing this memo and our conversation.

B: You're thinking in terms of reimbursing us again? Wouldn't it be better for us to have direct charge to you?

M: No, because of public record. In order to have all the things in our hands. It wouldn't look good for us to pay the bills direct for this sort of thing.

B: It would not?

M: No, if you people pay the bills ..... 

B: (interrupting) Even to pay a large postage fee? Bulk of expense will be postage.

M: But we have to document what it's for -- if you people can just pay it, then we'll give you money for it.

B: What would our memo say?

M: Say attached is 1080 referencing memo dated such and such.

B: What does the memo say -- that we're making reference to?

M: I'll write that up and bring over to you.

B: What, basically, are we going to say it's about?

M: Have $10,000 with limit of $15,000 and would be for printing of these things and so on.

B: Just wondering if you have direct billing it seems to me that serves purpose of memorandum.

M: The direct billing from, let's say, the printer, the addressograph company or something like that, to us might raise questions outside and I think powers that be don't want to have fact that we're paying for this sort of thing anywhere where it can be dug up. Easiest and cleanest way to do this is you people go ahead and pay and we'll reimburse you immediately.

B: Do we have to have this memo?

(continued)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued - Page 2)

M: I'd keep in my safe here.

B: Wouldn't it be adequate to send 1080?

M: Don't forget, you people keep copies of 1080's -- you have to by law. 1080 would have to cite what billing is for because of that, then that would open up to GAO or somebody else as to who's paying for this sort of thing.

B: We have to cite what it's for?

M: Let's say it's "XYZ Printing Company" and you pay bill. This looks like you're paying it. You send us 1080 which says nothing and we give you money for this. We ourselves have to have on our records what we're paying for for our own auditors which doesn't get outside of our Agency.

B: It's for your internal auditors? It would not get outside? Okay, that sounds all right.

M: I'll draw the memo up and bring it over there and you can see it.

B: That sounds good, Warren.

M: Would next Monday be all right with that memo?

B: Yes, we'll go ahead and order.

M: You can get going and so on.

B: Don't know what final cost is going to be. Hate to restrict ourselves. We figure total cost is going to be around $25,000. Got over 100,000 already that are just prorata 200,000 that haven't been analyzed yet. Of 200,000 they estimate possibly upwards of 50,000 or 60,000 could pertain to Cambodia. Of the backlog of 200,000, 60,000 could be of type that will be answered in this mailing. Our best estimate would be it may run over.

M: I've got instructions, John, to indicate in memo that it's for approximately $10,000 but not to exceed $15,000. If and when it exceeds $15,000, we'll start over again and I'll inquire further as to whether we can cover the other -- okay?

B: Okay.

M: Open to negotiation if it runs higher.

(continued)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued - Page 3)

B: It may run higher. If 60,000 letters come out being pro, will take us to $26,000 or somewhere in that vicinity.

M: Then I'd have to go back and inquire to see if powers that be will cover the other part. I think it's best to wait 'til that happens.

B: Okay, good enough.

M: What time Monday?

B: Why don't you give us call here Monday? My secretary will line it up.

M: Okay.

B: Thank you, Warren.

End of Conversation
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Mr. John Brown, Staff Secretary, White House, and the undersigned concerning the accounting and the reimbursement procedure for White House expenditures in connection with the printing, postage and addressing of replies to certain mail addressed to the President.

2. It was estimated and agreed that these expenditures would amount to approximately $10,000, but not exceed $15,000, and the request for reimbursement to this Agency would be based upon receipt of a memorandum categorizing the expenses and certifying to their validity. The memorandum will also transmit a Standard Form 1081 and copies of the vendors' invoices where applicable.

3. Upon receipt of the above memorandum, Standard Form 1081 and copies of vendors' invoices, a U. S. Government Treasury check will be drawn and forwarded to the White House.

WARREN D. MAGNUSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance

CONCUR:

John Brown

SECRET 00091
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

1. On 18 August 1970, the undersigned received a telephone call from Mr. John Brown (145-2167) advising that the mailing had been heavier than anticipated (increased to 250,000 pieces) and that the dollar requirement for subject purpose had increased from $15,000 to $25,000.

2. I apologetically advised Mr. Brown that since our records showed that prior approval was limited to $15,000 I would have to advise and confirm with my superiors that the increase to $25,000 was acceptable, as I was sure it was.

3. In the absence of Col. White (on leave), Mr. Bush immediately contacted Mr. Clarke, who was not in his office. On 19 August, Mr. Clarke telephonically approved the increased level and Mr. Brown was duly informed.

Chief, OF

SECRET 00092
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1970

Dear Mr. Magnusson:

Pursuant to your telephone call to Mr. John Brown regarding the breakdown of costs in connection with the mailing of the Acknowledgement Cards concerning The President's Speech on The Situation in Southeast Asia, the following costs were incurred:

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>Computer Marketing Industries, Inc.</td>
<td>$12,746.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement Cards</td>
<td>$3,185.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Envelopes</td>
<td>$1,051.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $16,982.42

Sincerely yours,

Carson M. Howell
Administrative Officer

Mr. Warren D. Magnusson
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
15 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:  Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting

SUBJECT:  Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing, Verbage and Advertising Expenses

IN RECIPIENT:  Memorandum for the Record, dated 24 August 1970, same subject

1. Attached hereto is a accounting submitted from the White House for mailing expenses.

2. It is requested that the original voucher be administratively approved and certified as to the availability of funds and returned to this office for payment.

Attachments:
Memo from Mr. Howell
dated 10 Sept 1970
SF 1081 (orig and 2)

(15 Sept 70)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record, dated 24 August 1970, same subject

1. Attached hereto is accounting submitted from the White House for mailing expenses.

2. It is requested that the original voucher be administratively approved and certified as to the availability of funds and returned to this office for payment.

Attachments
   Memo from Mr. Howell
dtd 10 Sept 1970
SF 1061 (orig and 2)

WARREN D. MAGNUSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance

00095

13 Sep 70
**VOUCHER AND SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS AND CREDITS**

**TO**: [Blank]  
[Blank] (D. O., symbol)  
300  
[Blank] (D. O., symbol)

Washington, D. C.  
(Address)

**WITHDRAW FROM**:  
[Blank]  
300  
[Blank] (D. O., symbol)

**PAY TO**:  
[Blank]  
300  
[Blank] (D. O., symbol)

**DEPARTMENT**: Executive Office of the President  
**BUREAU**: The White House Office  
**ADDRESS**: 11-01-0091  
Washington, D. C. 20500

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<td>1100110.001</td>
<td>$16,982</td>
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**Total**: $16,982

---

Details of charges or reference to attached supporting documents

For the printing of Acknowledgment Cards, Envelopes, and to Keypunch names & address and place on magnetic tape and the preparation of heat transfer labels and affix to envelopes, in connection with the acknowledging of mail concerning the President speech on the Situation in Southeast Asia.

For use of office billed:

I certify funds are available.  
FAN [Blank] NOR [Blank] CODE [Blank]

**CERTIFICATE OF OFFICE BILLED**

I certify that the items listed herein are correct and proper for payment from the appropriation(s) designated.  

(Blank)  
(Authorized administrative or certifying officer)

Paid by check No. [Blank]  
C/D No. [Blank] dated 00096

© U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961-607821
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [Blank]

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House

1. It is requested that a check in the amount of $16,000 be drawn payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

2. This disbursement is chargeable as follows:

   [Blank] [Blank] [Blank]

3. All documentation concerning this transaction is being held in this office for security reasons and is available to the Agency auditors.

4. Please forward the check to this office for transmittal to the appropriate official.

[Signature]

MANUEL D. MAGNIGI
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning

00097
Mr. John Brown
Staff Secretary
The White House Office
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Brown:

Enclosed is U. S. Treasury Check No. _______ in the amount of $16,842.42 which represents reimbursement of Bureau Schedule No. _______ copy enclosed. This schedule was forwarded to this Office by Mr. Carson M. Howell, Administrative Officer, on 10 September 1970.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]

WARREN D. MUnSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance

Note: _______ called me. He advised that document receipt was not sent back with letter (3 Oct) as called Mr. Brown, secretary who said the call was received at _______ of the Guard's desk. He then called back as of 5 October, received at _______ again and the call was received at _______.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: WARREN MAGNUSON

We have finally received the cost breakdown for acknowledging the mail in connection with the President's speech on the situation in Southeast Asia. By copy of this memorandum I am requesting our administrative office to forward that portion of the bill applicable to you.

If there are any problems in handling this, please let me know.

Thank you.

[Signature]
JOHN R. BROWN III

cc: Carson Howell
Keypunch names, place on magnetic tape, prepare and affix to envelopes heat transfer labels, and furnish printout. $7,410.35

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<td>$16,673.26</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record, dated 24 August 1970, same subject

1. Attached hereto is the second accounting, in the amount of $16,673.26, submitted from the White House for mailing expenses. Check for the first accounting in the amount of $16,982.42 was forwarded to the White House on 2 October 1970.

2. It is requested that the original voucher be administratively approved and certified as to the availability of funds and returned to this office for payment.

[Signature]
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance

Attachments
SF 1081 (orig & 2 w/att)
Memo from the White House
dated 7 Dec 1970
Memo to D/PPB, transmitting
1st accounting, dated 15 Sept 70
Copy of 1st 1081
Memo from the White House
dated 10 Sept 70
Memo for the Record dated 24 Aug 70

00101
VOUCHER AND SCHEDULE
OF WITHDRAWALS AND CREDITS

D. O. No. ______________________
Bu. No. ______________________
Bu. No. ______________________
PAID BY ______________________

To ____________________________
(Distributing officer — office billed)

You are authorized to effect the withdrawals and credits indicated below.

(Distributing officer — office billed)
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT
Executive Office of the President

BUREAU
The White House Office

ADDRESS
Washington, D.C. 20500

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<th>Summary</th>
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<td>1101100.001</td>
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Total: .46,615.26

Details of charges or reference to attached supporting documents:
For the printing of Acknowledgement Cards, Envelopes and Postage for mailing, and to Keypunch names, place on magnetic tape, prepare and affix to envelopes heat transfer labels, and furnish printout, in connection with the acknowledgment of mail concerning the President's Second speech on the Situation in Southeast Asia. See attached list for breakdown of costs.

For use of office billed:
For use of billing office:

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICE BILLED
I certify that the items listed herein are correct and proper for payment from the appropriation(s) designated.

26-6-1971
(Date)

Paid by check No. ____________
C/D No. ______________________
dated 00102

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981-07921
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Certification and Liaison Division

SUBJECT: Reimbursement to The White House

1. It is requested that a check in the amount of $16,673.26 be drawn payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

2. This disbursement is chargeable as follows:

   FAN [_____]  MOR [_____]  Code [_____]

3. All documentation concerning this transaction is being held in this office for security reasons and is available to the Agency authors.

4. Please forward this check to this office for transmittal to the appropriate official.

   [Signature]
   Deputy Director for Liaison and ___

   OF [_____]

   00103
Mr. John R. Brown III  
Staff Secretary  
The White House Office  
Washington, D. C. 20500  

Dear Mr. Brown:

Enclosed is U. S. Treasury Check No. [ ] in the amount of $16,673.26 which represents reimbursement of Bureau Schedule No. [ ] copy enclosed.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]

Director for Liaison and Planning  
Office of Finance

Enclosures  

OF [ ]
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailers to PFIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailers were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailers. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to
protect foreign visitors. Recently, was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. 
8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lock picker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Frank O'Malley of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Frank if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Mr. O'Malley sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Mr. O'Malley did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but [ ], (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972.

All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9. Resume Sent to McCord: [ ], a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to [ ] was James McCord’s security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but [ ] was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, [ ] telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told [ ] that his resume had been found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if [ ] had any connection with McCord. [ ] explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, [ ] telephoned EEAB. [ ] of OP and [ ] of OS were notified immediately.

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
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<th>Extension No.</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>14 May 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director for Management and Services</td>
<td>5/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:
SUBJECT: Sensitive ActivitiesPerformed by the Office of Logistics
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

   a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project designated [currently designated [ ]]. Colonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project [ ] substantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of [ ] because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

   b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

   c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment I reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Moffet Naval Air Station in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967. Due to demand, a second printing of 500 copies was made in September 1968. The title page of the book gives attribution to Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meeting place in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts

cc: DD/M&G
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<tr>
<th>Requesting Office</th>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS
BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO
LOCAL POLICE

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<th>ITEM</th>
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<td>*Searchlight, Tear Gas</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>*Chemical Baton 6 1/2&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap</td>
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<td>*Stun Gun</td>
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</table>

*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services  
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:
SECRET
EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

2

EYES ONLY
SECRET

00123
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project designated [ currently designated ] [current designated ] Colonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project [ ] substantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Moffet Naval Air Station in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FRIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 500 copies was made in June 1967. Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made in September 1968. The title page of the book gives attribution to Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meeting place in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

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Director of Logistics

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<tr>
<td>*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap</td>
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<td>*Stun Gun</td>
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*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>D/OJCS, Hq.</th>
<th>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)</th>
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Carbon copy removed for use (and destruction) in working up check on OJCS stores on Mess programs.

15 October 1973

00134
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Sensitive Projects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OJCS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Identification</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>HYDRA</td>
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<td>SANCA</td>
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<tr>
<th>Sensitive Projects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer file of drug data.</td>
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</table>
Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS  Project Officer
Organization, &
Telephone

Nature of Project
OJCS Reason for Listing

Statistical analysis of psychological data.
Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

SPYDER

OS

Data on radio frequencies used for support of In-Place Monitoring System, a system to identify unauthorized transmitters.

DMVREC

OS

File of automobile license numbers.

File of Agency applicants who were not hired.

Nature of data.

Nature of data.

Nature of data.

MORI DocID: 1451843

EYES ONLY
SECRET

00136
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OJCS</th>
<th>Project Officer</th>
<th>Nature of Project</th>
<th>OJCS Reason for Listing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Identification</td>
<td>Organization, &amp;</td>
<td>of Project</td>
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Association with the named organization.

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For

JOHN D. IAMs
Director of Joint Computer Support
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<tr>
<th>FROM: Director of Communications Hqrs.</th>
<th>EXTENSION NO.</th>
</tr>
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| TO: Office designation, room number, and building | DATE 10 May 1973 |

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<tr>
<th>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. DDM&amp;S Hqrs. [Ref SC] The attached is in further response to your request.</td>
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<td>15.</td>
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</table>
FROM: Special Programs Division, OC
TO: D/CO
NAME: Mr. Jack J. Keith
SIGNATURE: 
DATE: 10 May 73

REMARKS:
1-2: Forwarded per your request of 7 May to identify operations that are not clearly within CIA's "cluster." All of these operations have been reviewed on us by the Directorate of Operations - those of Para 3 have been accompanied by assurances of approval by the (then) DCI.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

8 May 1973

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD), Office of Communications, Operational Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of
exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects and Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an [REDACTED] HF/DF system was conducted [REDACTED] Division U/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

Chier, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.
9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Organizational Dealings with Activities Inside the United States

1. This MFR records organizational dealings with activities inside the United States known to this office.

2. In September 1972, requested secure communications in the Miami Area with local offices of BNDD and Customs.

The communications link was never installed advised in April 1973 that there were plans underway in Miami to combine various Federal agencies anti-drug efforts under a new Justice Department Division, and at this time it was not known where the new anti-drug office would be located.

3. During the Democratic and Republican conventions, supported requirements levied by the Secret Service concerning name traces and other intelligence information relating to subversive influences which might affect those conventions. provided some technical advice and procedural assistance in establishing a useful means of communicating between the two correspondents. WHD should be able to provide a detailed resume of activities supported in this matter.

Thomas E. O'Donnell
Chief, Americas Staff, OC
The attached memorandum identifies the funds referred to in Chuck Briggs' notes of 13 and 20 January 1972.

** "Since these notes are on a totally separate sensitive subject, pls pull them from this file -- WEC " (Note to C/MPS)
29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973, Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>NAME AND ADDRESS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>INITIALS</th>
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<th>ACTION</th>
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<th>PREPARE REPLY</th>
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<td>APPROVAL</td>
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<td>COMMENT</td>
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<td>RETURN</td>
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<td>CONCURRENCE</td>
<td>INFORMATION</td>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
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Remarks:

Note. action required
by 16.

1288

00146

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: W. E. Colby  23 May 73

DATE

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: IG -

As find out what the two notes refer to - Maybe DDO files will show

23 MAY 1973

(DATE)
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS
1 W. E. Colby 5/23

ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT FILE RETURN
CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE

Remarks:

See second sheet of notice on your copy only. Do not know if this was related in any way. We have no details in OPPB of this DCL approved expenditure.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE
Charles A. Briggs, D/PPB 5/23/73

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969 with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for its In-Place Monitoring System. DD/S&T (then ORD) was the computer individual working with and, I think, would have details.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency focal points were [redacted] and [redacted] I understand [redacted] has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, [redacted] and Colby are attached also.

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will not be available until tomorrow.

O:\BB\CV\3892\1439\4393(3393\12)
I - D:\BB\E\663\O\73\116 /s/ Charles A. Briggs
I - M. E. Colpa
O:\F \8 - 3995.42266 Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting

Attachment
As stated

SECRET
4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the travel.

7 Feb 72 Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals—all in FY 72. Cost probably $10K. Minnick ready to make first trip. ________ is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran visit.

7 Feb 72 See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and follow-on memos from ________ (21 Jul 72) and Colby (2 Aug 72).

12(? May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American (Station Chief?) conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd, White House, was laying on a ____________ for himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.

23 Jun 72 ________ commented on Krogh/Minnick interest in getting CA activities, including large-scale FM, on narcotics front. ________ pushing small-scale PP.

6 Jul 72 ________ called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film. We will send."

2 Aug 72 ________ called re Colby letter (attached). Said—travel orders ready; need money this FM (No record in my notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint recollection of its being to Mexico City). ________ and ________ contacted by ________

1 Nov 72 Related? ________ call. Again notes are cryptic: ________ GAO-Grace ________ Survey BNDD problems/ Mexico.
On Mr. Colby's copy only:

13 Jan 72    ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive CS project - no details.

20 Jan 72    Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.