MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (20-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).

3. On 13 April 1972 the met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the and met with at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:
   a. would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.
   b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.
   c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.
d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.

5.

6. has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY to Miami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist in providing the support described in paragraph four above.

7. Station WH/Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing JNFALCON as a meeting site when necessary. The location of Station WH/Miami (J'COBRA) has not been revealed to the USSS. (J'COBRA is located some distance from JNFALCON.) Additionally, the Miami Security Field Office maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.

8. The understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
9. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to ______ to insure that the ______ is fully conversant with the guidelines and basic agreements with the Secret Service, and has all of the information agreed upon in Headquarters.

Signed

Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Exec. Dir/Comptroller
2 - Acting DDP
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(Typed 23 June 1972)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Plans

1. This memorandum describes the support which the Secret Service has requested from CIA with regard to the Democratic National Convention. It is recommended that the Agency furnish the support outlined in paragraph 3 of this memorandum and your approval is requested.

2. By memorandum 1-39-610.53 of 30 March (attached as reference), the Secret Service has requested a meeting with appropriate Agency officers to discuss the Agency's support to the Secret Service prior to and during the Democratic National Convention. The Secret Service plans to send an agent to Miami on 11 April to commence preparations for the convention and wishes to have the meeting with Agency Headquarters officers prior to the agent's departure for Miami.

3. While details regarding the type of support which the Secret Service will request of the Agency will not be known until there has been a meeting with the Secret Service on this matter, it is evident from the Secret Service memorandum and from our experience in supporting the Secret Service at the Republican Convention in Miami in 1968 that the Secret Service desires:

A) Briefings on Cuba and Cuban policy towards the United States. Counterintelligence information on Cuban operations against the United States which could affect the security of the convention.
B) Briefings on Cuban exile activities in the United States.

C) Name checks on hotel and convention employees; name checks on those persons in the Miami area whom the Secret Service considers a threat to its protective mission.

D) A watchlist of persons whom the Agency considers a potential threat to the security of the convention.

E) [Liaison with a designated officer for the purpose of conducting name checks against files and other files available]

4. Agency support to the Secret Service for the convention will be centralized at headquarters and will be controlled by headquarters. [Chief, under the general supervision of the CI Staff, will serve as the coordinator of this support.]

James Angleton, Chief, CI Staff

1 Attachment

cc: DDGI

CONCUR: Deputy Director for Plans

The recommendation contained in paragraph 1 is approved.

[Signature]

Direct. of Central Intelligence

Date 1 APR 1972

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

1-30-610.53

Date: March 30, 1972

BY LARAICH:

TO
Central Intelligence Agency
ATTN: Mr

FROM
JAMES J. ROWLEY - DIRECTOR


In view of our responsibilities regarding the protection of Presidential candidates, we have initiated security preparations for the Democratic National Convention, which will be held in Miami, Florida, between July 9-15, 1972.

We request a meeting as soon as possible between representatives of our Intelligence Division and your agency to discuss intelligence support prior to and during the Democratic National Convention. We are specifically interested in discussing the appropriate channels for routing name checks of hotel and convention employees, as well as other individuals of protective interest to this Service. We anticipate there will be several thousand names to be checked. We would also like to discuss the current Cuban situation, particularly any existing relationships between pro-Cuban groups in the Miami area and mainland Cuba, since we consider these groups to be a potential threat to our protective mission.
7 May 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.

Edward L. Sherman
Chief
Missions and Programs Staff
8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

   a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.

   b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

   c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.
5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency.

6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings presided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)
Telephone conversation of General Cushman and someone in White House, 23/7/71

Bob, how are you.

DDCI: Just fine; I just talked to Jack Sherwood and he suggested I give you a buzz.

I deeply appreciate it. I asked Jack to call you. I spoke to Rose yesterday, and told her "I had a little project here for John Ehrlichman and I need very discreet assistance from the Company, and I should like to touch base with Bob. I met him at Jack Sherwood's."

DDCI: That's right.

That's right and beyond that I would like to just establish a relationship because from time to time we have a few needs in your area. Let me tell you what we need to know here. Your Agency would be the only one to help. I have checked with the Bureau, Bob, and they have nothing on this fellow. Just a mere name check but it apparently has some significance, of course. Ray Finkelstein; born in Belgium about 1940; moved to Brazil about age 12 with his family. This might be helpful. He now is working with one Gilbert Straub, apparently Straub is hooked up with that Kornfeld outfit: IOS. We have a need to know what Finkelstein is all about.

DDCI: We will do our best, of course; we have some counterintelligence files which sometimes turn up people but ordinarily, of course, we don't surveil any Americans but this fellow might have come to our notice.

He may not be an American, just a European Jew; that is the problem, the Bureau has come up with zero.

DDCI: Do you know where he is physically located?

He may be in Geneva; Straub is apparently in Geneva.

DDCI: Well, let me get on this and I will get back to you.
Nixon Puts an Eye on His Brother

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon has given a high priority to the problem of keeping the President's impor-
tant brother, Donald, out of federal water.

Donald Nixon has a weakness for cutting corners to keep the President's personal 
interests in line with the administration's goals. He has been known to make deals
that might reflect unfavorably on the President.

Not long afterward, Donald began negotiating with John Hill, a Boston manufacturer of
sound equipment, who wanted to transfer some of his products to the federal government.
Hill told us that Donald merely wanted to use the company's West Coast office to
facilitate the transfer, and that the President's brother would not be interested in the
company.

No Longer Adviser

Although Donald had made contact with Elmer Stone, a lawyer for
the Aeronautical Company, he had not been invited to participate in
the discussions. In January, 1970, Ehrlichman summoned Donald to
attend a White House party hosted by the President. Donald had
not been informed of the purpose of the meeting and was later
asked by the President to keep his brother out of trouble. "I have
established, are strictly
untrue.

Ehrlichman also gave
Donald's son, Donald, Jr., a
prettier before the boy went
to Switzerland last summer to
work for the International
Control of the company. The
company has now
transferred young Nixon to
the Bahamas.

His father, talking to a few
visitors, including my associate
George Clifford, considered that
Donald, Jr., was something of
a disappointment to the family.
He had been off the stage
ernally with the mountains asociating with hilies, to be
the overseas job
arranged.

The boy had said he was
going to work for Investors
Overseas Service, which
has been in financial
difficulty.

"I told him not to say that," said
Donald, a note of exasperation
in his voice, "if that gets
around, he's going to be in a
corner. I was to say he was going
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arranged.
Nixon Kin Is Mum On Vesco Cash Gift

By JAMES R. POLK

Edward C. Nixon, brother of the President, is keeping his silence in the face of court testimony that he played a role in arranging a $200,000 campaign contribution in cash from a financier accused of fraud.

"No comment that is news-
worthy. Thank you. Good-
bye," Nixon said when finally reached yesterday at his unlisted telephone number in Edmonds, Wash., after a week of calls. Then he hung up.

A New Jersey campaign official, Harry L. Sears, has testified he was told the Nixon brother made a call to Washington to confirm that the donation by financier Robert L. Vesco was wanted in cash.

Sears said under oath he was present when the 43-year-old Nixon arrived at Vesco's business headquarters in Fairfield, N.J., after a helicopter flight from New York City. However, Sears said he didn't stay for the meeting among Nixon, Vesco and business associates.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has filed a civil suit against Vesco accusing him of a $2 million fraud in losing the assets of his self-called JCS Ltd., mutual fund network.

Edward Nixon, the Sears said is a former director of a Vesco company, is the second member of the President's family to be linked to the financier. Donald A. Nixon, a son of the President's elder brother, is Vesco's personal administrative assistant, usually based in Nassau, the Bahamas.

The SEC probe has indicated the $200,000 cash donation came from funds at Vesco's Bahamas Commonwealth Bank in Nassau. The money was flown to Washington April 10, although the Nixon campaign failed to report the donation under the new disclosure law.

A federal court hearing is scheduled Monday in New York City on the SEC's bid for an injunction against violation of securities laws. Sears' testimony came in a pretrial deposition in the SEC case.

Papers Called Embarrassing

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Edward C. Nixon

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00587
Vesco Arrest Warrant
Issued by Federal Judge
For Grand Jury Inquiry

Financier Hasn't Been in the U.S.
For Months; His Lawyer Fears
Panel Will Produce Indictment

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter
NEW YORK — Federal Judge Edmund L.
Pelland issued a warrant for the arrest of embattled New Jersey financier Robert L. Vesco.
In order to bring him to court before a grand jury here investigating his activities, Mr.
Vesco has been out of the U.S. for several months.

No criminal charges have been brought against Mr. Vesco. But the U.S. Attorney's office, which requested the bench warrant, previously had asked the judge to find Mr. Vesco in contempt of court for failing to heed a subpoena ordering him to appear before the grand jury. The government tried to serve the subpoena on April 15 in Nassau, Bahamas Islands.

The grand jury is understood to be investigating the circumstances of Mr. Vesco's $250,000 in contributions to President Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. At the time, the Securities and Exchange Commission was conducting a well-publicized inquiry into Mr. Vesco's business affairs. The SEC filed a deluge civil suit against him and 41 other men and concerns on Nov. 27. The Nixon finance committee returned Mr. Vesco's contributions to him on Jan. 31.

Mr. Vesco's attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, told the judge yesterday he had reason to believe that Mr. Vesco would be indicted by the grand jury. Mr. Williams said that if forced to appear, Mr. Vesco would invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless he were granted immunity against prosecution. Mr. Williams added that the U.S. Attorney's office had already replied to him that it wouldn't offer immunity.

Mr. Williams, who earlier had asked the judge to dismiss the contempt application on technical grounds, said the circumstances didn't call for Mr. Vesco's arrest.

After the court was adjourned, Mr. Williams declined to discuss reports that the 37-year-old Mr. Vesco intended to renounce his U.S. citizenship, even though the attorney at an earlier hearing had said he would raise the question of citizenship.

James W. Rayhill, an assistant U.S. attorney, brought the matter up in court, saying the government had information that Mr. Vesco was "currently attempting to renounce his U.S. citizenship in Costa Rica," where he last year took up legal residence. It's understood that Mr. Rayhill wasn't referring to a disclosure made late Wednesday by Costa Rica's president, Jose Figueres.

President Figueres, on a two-day visit to this country, said that Mr. Vesco in an audience two or three weeks ago formally announced his intention to renounce U.S. citizenship.

In Washington, the State Department said Mr. Vesco has told Costa Rican authorities that he already has renounced American citizenship before two notaries, with his lawyer's help. However, the U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica contended that didn't count, because it wasn't done before a consular officer. The State Department's legal experts are checking to determine whether that view is correct.

The U.S. has a 1922 extradition treaty with Costa Rica, covering 21 crimes, including robbery, forgery, embezzlement, and fraud. The U.S. considers its 1991 extradition treaty with Britain to apply to the Bahamas, but it isn't clear whether the Bahamas agree. The British treaty covers such crimes as fraud and misrepresentation, but the warrant issued yesterday for a grand jury appearance isn't a matter for which extradition is possible.

Mr. Vesco has a wife and family in Bound-
town, N.J., but has bases of operations in Nassau and in San Jose, Costa Rica. Government prose-
cutors declined to comment when asked what steps they would take to have Mr. Vesco arrested if he were located in either of those countries.

The SEC's civil suit accuses Mr. Vesco of directing the "fiddling" of $21 million in accounts of four foreign mutual funds managed by I.O.S. Ltd. Mr. Vesco formerly headed both I.O.S. and International Controls Corp., of Fairfield, N.J.
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); FBI (active staff participation agreed to only in May 1971); Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; CIA and any necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies. (Following have participated: Treasury, State.) Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General in reporting through the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olsen. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA.

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. Initiated July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and C. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

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SUBJECT: The MICHAOS Program

1. The MICHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The MICHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:
   a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.
   b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MICHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the project of the MICHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated earlier, MICHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets
S\(\text{ENSITIVE}\)

have been recruited and run exclusively for the CHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the CHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The CHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

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5. CHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the CHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. (It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division.) The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.
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**ACTION**
- DIRECT REPLY
- PREPARE REPLY

**APPROVAL**
- DISPATCH
- RECOMMENDATION

**COMMENT**
- FILE
- RETURN

**CONCURRENCE**
- INFORMATION
- SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**

Sam:

Attached are the following:

1. Background paper on TIC #7
2. Comments on facts and statistics
3. Comments on AID by Mr. Schlesinger 1963 (which Mr. Colby might find of interest)

00595

**FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER**

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

25/4/73

UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL  SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.

2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI/PG also administers and supervises Project

In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint Central Intelligence Agency Technical Investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to police/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON WITH OPS/AID

CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend courses

B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,

C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions.
E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized,

G.

H.

PROJECT

It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. It also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. Recently it has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.
COMMENT

[ ] does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by [ ] has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. [ ] has such contacts at home - local and federal level - because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the [ ] have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA; the U.S. Secret Service; and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.

3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of [ ]

4. [ ] with Dan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Mitrione, an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.

[ ] James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Joint CIA/USAID Terrorist (Technical) Investigations Course #7 (English language) CI Staff's Project

1. This effort is a joint CIA/USAID training program for foreign police/security personnel. The initial phase of the training will be conducted at the International Police Academy (IPA), Washington, D.C. during the period 2-27 April 1973. The following subject matter is covered in this phase of the training: investigative techniques, collection and preservation of evidence, records, files, and reporting, gathering of information on terrorist groups and their activities, a student seminar devoted to discussions on terrorist and other hostile activities currently existing in their respective countries, etc. This phase of the training is concluded by a two day orientation by the Bomb Squad of the Dade County Police Department in Florida.

2. The second phase of this training will be conducted by Agency during 30 April - 25 May 1973. The technicians utilize cover. The objective of this phase of the training is to develop individual student technical capability to realistically conduct investigations into known or suspected incidents of sabotage/terrorist bombings by:

a. Providing trainees with basic knowledge in the uses of commercial and military demolitions and incendiaries as they may be applied in terrorism and industrial sabotage operations.

b. Introducing the trainees to commercially available materials and home laboratory techniques likely to be used in the manufacture of explosives and incendiaries by terrorists or saboteurs.
c. Familiarizing the trainees with the concept of target analysis and operational planning that a saboteur or terrorist must employ.

d. Introducing the trainees to booby trapping devices and techniques giving practical experience with both manufactured and improvised devices through actual fabrication. Emphasize the necessity of alertness for detecting and countering booby traps placed by saboteurs or terrorists.

e. Conducting several field exercises to give each trainee the opportunity for detecting and neutralizing various explosive and incendiary devices likely to be used by terrorists or saboteurs, including letter bombs, packages, attache cases, etc.

f. Conducting several investigative field exercises of explosive incidents to alert the trainee to the need for and manner in which to collect, identify, and preserve legally admissible evidence for prosecutive action.

3. The program provides the trainees with ample opportunity to develop basic familiarity and use proficiently through handling, preparing and applying the various explosive charges, incendiary agents, terrorist devices and sabotage techniques. USAID, International Police Academy (IPA) has received reports from former foreign police/security personnel who participated in the program indicating that they were called upon to utilize the skills they acquired through this training in the handling of explosive devices in their respective country. Attached is a letter from a participant in TIC #6 stating that he deactivated a letter bomb device which was sent to the [blank] Embassy in [blank].

4. Subject course will have 26 participants from ten (10) foreign countries. Nine (9) are financed by AID, eight (8) by CIA and nine (9) by their own governments.
5. Separate end of course reports will be prepared by USAID and CIA, TSD personnel.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
FACTS AND STATISTICS

AID/OPS TRAINING

AID/OPS, International Police Academy sponsors some seven hundred (700) foreign police officers for training in the United States each year. These officers are selected from underdeveloped countries.

Some 350-400 of these officers are trained in specialized areas of law enforcement.

During FY 1973 supported two of our field stations by providing training in VIP protective security for personnel.

AID/OPS-CIA TRAINING

During FY 1973 two joint USAID/OPS/CIA Technical Investigations training programs were conducted for foreign police/security personnel representing countries. The purpose of the training is to develop individual student technical capability to realistically conduct investigations into known or suspected incidents of sabotage/terrorist bombing or other activities.
NATIONAL SECURITY
Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead

Edited by
David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen

Introduction by
Admial Arleigh Burke, Director

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Published for the
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION
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FREDERICK A. FRÆGER, Publisher
New York - London

1963

00604
Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade

—James R. Schlesinger

Summary

The analysis of this paper rests on the assumption that American policy-makers should not be so concerned with the pursuit of hard-to-obtain ideological objectives that they exhaust the power potential implicit in trade and aid relationships. Rather the trade and aid programs should be managed so as to preserve an environment in which pressures can be brought to bear to serve the national interest at a later, and perhaps more critical, date. This emphasis on power considerations implies both (a) that the assistance program cannot be based primarily on humanitarian or idealistic goals, and (b) that economic ties with other nations should not be severed simply because of our disapproval of other social systems, including those based on communism. Though typically public opinion vastly overstates the strategic leverage that can be gained through economic weapons, this leverage is still not negligible. One can argue that in the past the United States has failed to take advantage of the power potential implicit in aid and trade through its failure to develop concepts and mechanisms of deterrence in ways akin to what has been done in the military field. Much of the difficulty may be ascribed to a failure to develop sanctions, which discourage actions unfavorable to our interests, as well as incentives, which encourage cooperation. No system of deterrence can exclusively stress the carrot and ignore the stick.

More is being demanded of the aid program than it can reasonably achieve. Assuming that the primary emphasis of the aid program is to encourage social and economic development rather than to elicit direct support for American foreign policy
objectives, it is argued that we should attempt to develop stable
social and political conditions by strengthening the "legitimacy"
of the existing social order in the eyes of the respective
publics—rather than attempting to export the trappings of
American democracy.

Technological change, the easy availability of substitutes, and
the lengthy period for adjustment in a prolonged struggle have
all reduced the impact of the "supply effect" which was at one
time the main weapon of economic warfare. If the economic
wepons of strategy are to be at all effective under today's
conditions, the "influence effect" must rise correspondingly in
importance. This implies that we should be in a position to
threaten to do damage to other economies through the curtail-
ment of access to Western markets. In order to keep this threat
an ever-present one, we must, however, continue to trade in
volume with other countries, including Communist ones. Particu-
larly, in dealing with the underdeveloped nations the potential
effectiveness of such threats may prove to be considerable.
One final consideration—it would be unwise to use potential weapons of this sort for niggling purposes. The balance of payments has been troublesome and is properly an object of concern in Washington, but surely it is not a first-order consideration in our relations with the underdeveloped nations. Suggestions have been batted about that we should make use of the aid program to force recipients to buy from us in ways that go beyond tied aid. Under the best of circumstances, our bargaining power is limited, and shooting away strategic ammunition for so paltry an economic goal would seem to reflect a poor sense of proportion.

Aid

Within an over-all framework designed to discourage hostile or predatory attitudes toward the West, the aid program may seek to foster the maximum rate of economic and social progress. In the basic policy of Aid, the Kennedy Administration has explicitly adopted this goal. As has been indicated there are costs to this decision. Outsiders are not likely to be much liked even under the best of circumstances, which hardly apply to the underdeveloped countries, and their intervention in whatever direction will in the long run excite antagonism based on real or fancied wrongs. Nevertheless, the basic decision has been made. Let us examine in what way we may proceed so that the good effects clearly outweigh the ill effects.

There are two initial postulates: (1) our bargaining power will be limited, and (2) American notions of social reform and of equity are neither necessarily applicable in the underdeveloped lands, nor need we assume that those whose cooperation we must win will find them appealing. These postulates are interrelated. Jointly they imply that we cannot press forward on all fronts to create a society in which a good American democrat will feel at home, but must instead concentrate our energies on those social changes which will spur economic growth even if the immediate results are more consistent with the cultural genius of the peoples involved rather than our own tastes. We ought not expect them to make the same choices as we would, or, if they make the same choices, to achieve in a ten-year period what it took us eighty years to achieve. Finally, in reaching judgments on social processes in other lands, we cannot apply what are our own—or, in reality, higher—standards of purity.

As outsiders, we will be unable to perceive the social function of behavior which is superficially corrupt, and will tend to lump
it together with that which is purely parasitical. With respect to our own history, retrospectively we have come to find merit in what once were regarded as the disreputable procedures of an organization like Tammany Hall in that it provided a kind of social security and a welcome for the newly arrived immigrant. We are accustomed to the daily dangling of new post offices, good committee assignments, and bridges over credits in the outback before wavering Congressmen, and warm approval is given, for its fine sense of political realism, to whatever administration is doing the dangling by those who agree with its goals. Toward similar procedures abroad we are inclined to take a simple muckraking attitude. We look askance at the higgling of the political market—with a malice that would do credit both to missionaries and old-style political reformers. If we hope to achieve a fair measure of success, we shall have to sharpen our critical faculties and learn to distinguish between unappetizing social devices which are functional and those which are simple barriers to progress.

The statement of objectives by AID is a very ambitious one. The purposes of the assistance program include stimulation of self-help, encouragement of progressive forces, and achievement of governments based on consent, which recognize the dignity and worth of individuals who are expected to participate in determining the nation's goals. No doubt, a statement of aspirations is in large part window dressing, but the criteria by which self-help is moving toward social and political progress are more specific: a more equitable distribution of income, a more equitable tax system with increased yields, expanded welfare programs, increased political participation and civil liberties, and so on. Several points may be made regarding the objectives: first, there are too many; second, they are to some extent inconsistent; and third, they ignore the real resources available.

There is, in the first place, the long-perceived clash between economic progress, on the one hand, and the combined goals of equitable distribution of income, immediate improvement in living standards, and security on the other. This underlying conflict spills over into a tension between rapid economic progress and the introduction of democratic processes. On this issue there appears to have been a revolution in informed opinion in the United States during the past five years. During the late fifties, it had become almost an axiom that authoritarian, if not totalitarian, governments had innate advantages in guiding economies toward rapid growth. The prevailing view was
based, no doubt, on an assessment of the record of the Soviet regime, and an exaggerated notion of how much the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" would accomplish. Perhaps the earlier "pessimism" regarding the relative performance potential of "free" and "controlled" economies was overdone, but have we not gone too far in the now prevailing "optimism" that any clash between economic progress and the democratic institutions which insure the dominance of the voz popul is minimal?

The average citizen—particularly when he is ill-housed, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and ill-educated—seems most likely to be interested in the here and now. A government which is responsive to the desires of the public will continually be tempted to mortgage the future for the present. The "abstinence" or "waiting" which classical and neoclassical economics state to be necessary ingredients in economic progress will be hard to require, as will be the incentive schemes (and the accompanying conspicuous consumption) which are likely to strike the average voter as inequitable. We may recall that the Perón regime was (and still may be?) the most popular regime in recent Latin American history. Or we may observe the economic consequences of Brazilian democracy, and have our doubts. The inflow of American resources may be able to make showpieces out of several small, recently-democratized nations like the Dominican Republic, but we ought not assume either that democracy assists in economic development, or that the Dominican example is widely applicable. This is not to say that some judicious prodding in the direction of democracy may not be a wise policy, but it must be judicious, and cannot be based on the assumption that democracy necessarily fosters the political stability essential to growth.

One of the criteria by which self-help can be judged as justifying additional aid is an improvement in the savings ratio. Some students of the aid program would put major emphasis on changes in the savings ratio in that it provides a relatively objective standard by which an improvement in economic performance can be judged. If we apply an objective standard, complaints about the distribution of aid and subjectivity in the

* Charles Wolf, Jr. of RAND has been attempting to develop an economic model which will provide an objective measure of the performance of aid recipients in terms of self-help. The criterion is the savings ratio. In the model the attempt is made to eliminate the influence of other variables, such as per capita income, income distribution, and degree of urbanization, which account for a good deal of the observed variation in the savings ratio as between nations and between different periods of time.
8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, dated 7 May 1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. **Question:** Do we recruit Americans?

   **Answer:** Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessments purposes only and do not perform any recruitments.

b. **Question:** Do we use alias documents on Americans in course of operations?

   **Answer:** Yes, we do use alias documents when recruiting American support assets. The great majority of these recruitments are done in alias. All recruitments of foreign targets are done in alias.

c. **Question:** What disciplinary controls do we have over alias documents?

   **Answer:** We maintain a current list in FR Division Headquarters of the alias documents issued to each Base.
More importantly, each Base Chief is responsible for supervising and maintaining control over the alias documents used by the case officers on his Base.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

SECRET/SENSITIVE
**COUNT 1**

**DO-55**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SUBJECT: (Optional)</th>
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<td>FROM: Acting Chief, FR Division</td>
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| 1. | EA/DDO |  |
| 2. |  |
| 3. | DDO |  |
| 4. | Conversation with FR Div | R |
| 5. | He indicated that the introductory and closing paragraphs of this memo could be released in the sanitized form shown. |
| 6. | OGC | January 13, 1981 |

| 7. |  |
| 8. |  |
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| 14. | FULL TEXT COPY—DO NOT RELEASE |
| 15. | Exempt (b)(1) (b)(3) |

| FORM | 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS | SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | INTERNAL USE ONLY | UNCLASSIFIED |
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At the risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by Foreign Resources Division run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which Foreign Resources Division has participated and/or is participating that contain somewhat greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

   a. [Blank] provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by [Blank] personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts.

   b. [Blank]
c. Alias Documentation: Clearly, FR Division does the great majority of its operational work by having its case officers utilize alias documents. All recruitments are done in alias. Thus, the alias documentation is a prerequisite for effective operations. Furthermore, our case officers have utilized fully backstopped alias credit cards for renting automobiles, motel rooms, hotel rooms for operational meetings, etc. These credit cards are backstopped by accounts in alias which are promptly paid at the appropriate time. I see no problem in the continued use of alias documentation and moreover, I feel it is absolutely essential to continue using alias documentation wherever and whenever possible.

d.

e.
2. Summarizing the above, I believe that all of the activities outlined are clearly within the acceptable risk frame. The other activities, although clearly involving some degree of risk are necessary and valuable and in my opinion should be continued.

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division
SECRET

DRAFT OUTLINE FOR DDO BRIEFING

I. Statement of Organization and Functions

II. Official T/O

III. Location of Field Units

IV. Cover

V. Targets

VI. Methodology

VII. Budget

VIII. Coordination
   A. Internal
   B. External

X. Statistics:
   A. Recruitment
   B. General Support Assets
   C. Positive Intelligence Reporting
SECRET

FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION

I. Statement of Organization and Functions
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Case

1. By memorandum dated 25 May 1973, I informed you of the results of an interview of Mr. [ ] who reported that an employee of the Office of Security, had stated during a discussion period at Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 in September 1971 that the Office of Security had been involved in the "Ballou case." (The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided on 7 June 1971 by Montgomery County Police and Federal law enforcement officers. When the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, forced their way into the house, Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers opened fire and seriously wounded Ballou. He was hospitalized for several months and was left partially paralyzed. I believe he is now suing over the incident.)

2. We interviewed Mr. [ ] certain other employees who attended the Seminar, and the Director of Security to determine just what was said at the Seminar and the extent of any Agency involvement in the Ballou case. We find that participants in the Seminar were encouraged to discuss the details of their work and associated problems. Mr. [ ] mentioned an assignment he had been on with the U.S. Secret Service at the 1968 National Conventions and his liaison activities with the Montgomery County Police.

3. [ ] reports that in discussing the latter subject he related a conversation he had with Inspector [ ] of the Montgomery County Police, sometime in June 1971 after the Ballou incident had been reported in the newspapers. According to [ ], the police inspector had thanked him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had given to the Montgomery County Police and remarked that...
this equipment had probably saved a policeman's life. The inspector commented that the account of the Ballou incident appearing in the press was not the whole story. With the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided, the police had intercepted a telephone call from Ballou to a friend in which Ballou outlined plans to "kill a cop." The police then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan, and it was during this raid that Ballou was shot.

4. [Blank] said that he has no other knowledge of the Ballou case, except for what he has read in the newspapers, and that he has not had any other conversations about the case with any members of the Montgomery County Police. We learned nothing from our inquiries that would indicate any other Agency involvement in the Ballou case.

5. The following are related excerpts from the "Family Jewels" submission of the Director of Security on 16 May 1973:

During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department; Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department; Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department; New York City Police Department; and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

On 25 July 1968, and at the specific request of the United States Secret Service, this Office provided two audio countermeasures technicians to the United States Secret Service in connection with the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois. This was not an official detail although both men were provided with temporary credentials identifying them as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.

On 15 August 1968, we detailed the same two men to the United States Secret Service to cover the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida. On both occasions, the team members were debriefed upon their return and it is clear that their activities were confined exclusively to sweeping the candidates' and potential candidates' quarters.

William V. Broe
Inspector General

OIG: [Blank]
(6 June 1973)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - ExecSec/CIA MC
00635
MEMORANDUM

JM FOR: The Record

Mr. F. P. Bishop is following up per para 7 of IG memo to DCI dtd 25 May.

cm/31 May

00636
(DATE)
FROM: Inspector General

TO: Mr. Wm. E. Colby

DATE: 5/30

OFFICER'S INITIALS: E

COMMENTS: BY HAND, NOT TYPING IN REGISTRY.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Mr. William E. Colby

1. On 17 May the name of ________________________ was referred to this office as having attempted to contact the Director concerning "activities outside the Agency." I attempted to contact him on 21 and 22 May, but he was on leave. On 23 May he stated he wanted to check a portion of his information and asked if he could come to my office on 24 May.

2. ________________________ came into the Agency as a JOT in October 1971 and is currently assigned to the Soviet/EE Section. He has a very strong personnel file.

3. ________________________ advised that in August 1971 he attended the Advanced Intelligence Seminar. On the first evening of the seminar the students had a "getting acquainted" session where each one gave a brief description of his duties. One of the students, ________________________ of the Office of Security, however, carried on after the session was over and expanded on the briefing he had given. He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery County Police, stating that the Office of Security gave electronic and other support to that organization.

4. He further indicated that the Office of Security had been involved in the "Ballou case". ________________________ described the Ballou case as follows: The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided on 7 June 1971 by the Montgomery County Police and some Federal law enforcement officers. After the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, had forced their way into the house Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers immediately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. He spent a long time in the hospital and is partly paralyzed at the present time.
His case was given much publicity in the Washington Post at the
time. There was additional publicity in the last several months
when Ballou instigated a lawsuit against the raiding officers.

5. identified another student, who was assigned to IAS, as a friend of
He stated that also seemed to know the specifics of the Ballou
case.

6. I thanked and told him this was just the type of
information we wanted to receive so that it can be investigated
and appropriate action taken if the information is borne out.

7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advise the Director concerning our findings.

william v. broe
Inspector General
Noted

Mr. called the Director on 16 May at 3:05 re "activities outside the Agency". I told him Director was out of the office, but we would return his call. Mr. called back that day and said he was going to Fubini lecture and would call us back. He never did call back. Mr. Colby said to turn over to Mr. Broe.
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<td>Recommend the IG express your appreciation to &amp; assure we will follow this up (which, of course, we already have done by terminating the activity). NEC</td>
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DATE: 22 May 1973
22 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Mr. William E. Colby

Mr. Colby advised me that [redacted] had called the Office of the Director in line with the Director's memorandum to all employees dated 9 May 1973, requesting all employees to report activities which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of the Agency.

[redacted] is employed as a GS-5 clerk in the Cable Secretariat. He joined the Agency in September 1967 and worked in the Office of Security for 3-1/2 years before transferring to the Cable Secretariat in 1970.

While in the Office of Security he was assigned to a support desk, SD3. The primary function of this desk was to [redacted] During his assignment to this desk, [redacted] supported a project entitled SRPOINTER-HTLDGUAL [redacted] described the project as follows. The Office of Security [redacted] had a unit at the JFK International Airport that photographed mail going to Soviet Bloc countries. This work was done by Agency staff employees. The mail was placed in bags by the regular Post Office employees and stacked. After their departure for the night, the Agency employees would open the mail and photograph it. Both incoming and outgoing mail, including postcards, were photographed. A watch list was maintained and priority was given to the names listed, but generally all mail was processed.

The results of the operation were sent to Washington Headquarters where they were handled by [redacted] He would receive a teletype advising him of the registry number and the number of items. He would check to see if the number of items received was correct and route the material to the appropriate offices. Generally about 1/4 of
the material was separated into bundles bound with rubber bands. This portion was sent to TSD for technical processing. The remaining material was sent to the CI Staff.

About twice a month the CI Staff would add names to or delete names from the list. [Redacted] would send the changes in the list to the field office. The watch list was made up primarily of [Redacted] who were in the United States. When [Redacted] left the Office of Security in 1970, the project was still active.

[Redacted] was in no way emotional or belligerent. He presented the facts quickly and clearly and said he had no other information. He stated he would have come forward with the information sooner but he had only recently had time to read the Director's memorandum. The writer thanked him for his interest.

William V. Broe
Inspector General
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT: Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou Case

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00646
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(6 June 1973)

William V. Broe
Inspector General
BROE

Follow-up interview re Mr. request xxx to see DCI.

FROM: FP Bishop

RETURN TO: File on Interviews held on behalf of DCI re Watergate/Jewels

00648
31 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: Interview with

1. On 31 May 1973 I questioned [_____] about what he had said at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 and the extent and nature of the relations he had had with the Montgomery County Police. He said that he and others had been encouraged to discuss their work and the problems related thereto with other Seminar members and told that what they said would be "non-attributable." In this context he had discussed the Office of Security's relations with local Police Forces including the Police Force in Montgomery County. He said he mentioned the "Ballou Case" as an example of how the Montgomery County Police had used equipment provided by the Agency in their work, but denied that he had said or implied that the Agency was "involved" in the Ballou case. He said that he had also related to the other Seminar members the fact that the Agency had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the protection of the President and Vice President and that he and others had been detailed to work with the Secret Service on counter-audio activities at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the Republican National Convention in Miami. I asked [_____] who was on the Chicago detail, if he was detailed to protect the Vice President. He said that he was detailed to Tom Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked in effect as a member of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly.

2. I questioned [_____] as to whether his relations with the Montgomery County Police was training oriented, equipment oriented, or if he had engaged in any operations or activities with the police. He said his relations with the Police had been entirely equipment oriented and had been limited to the Chief of Police and one or two senior Inspectors. The extent of assistance given consisted of the Agency providing the Police with surplus technical
equipment which was of no further use to the Agency, and briefing them as to its use. He said he would not define these briefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed.

3. said that his only knowledge of the "Ballou Case", except what he had read in the papers, came from one telephone conversation he had with Inspector of the Montgomery County Police sometime after accounts of the Ballou shooting had appeared in the press. He said the Inspector called to thank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had given the Police and mentioned that it had probably saved the life of a policeman. He said that the Inspector explained to him that the account of the incident appearing in the press was not the whole story, that with the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided the Police had been able to intercept a telephone call from Ballou to a friend in which Ballou had outlined plans to "kill a cop." The Police had then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan and it was during this raid that Ballou was shot. said that he had had no other conversations with the Montgomery County Police on that subject. He said he had mentioned it at the Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved in the Agency's dealings with domestic Police Forces. He said he recalled that there was quite a bit of discussion and argument by the Seminar members about the propriety of the Agency assisting local police forces and working with the Secret Service in the U.S., but that he did not recall any extensive discussion about the Ballou Case and that at no time had he said that the Agency was directly involved. said he remembered that seemed particularly concerned about the Agency's involvement in domestic activities and that sometime later, around January or February 1972, talked to Colonel White about his concern and Colonel White in turn talked to the Director of Security. Since that date, he said, he has not had any further direct contact with the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of the Director of Security.

[Signature]
Inspector

SECRET

00650
31 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [Blank] Office of Security

1. On 31 May 1973 I questioned [Blank] about what he had said at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 and the extent and nature of the relations he had had with the Montgomery County Police. He said that he and others had been encouraged to discuss their work and the problems related thereto with other Seminar members and told that what they said would be "non-attributable." In this context he had discussed the Office of Security's relations with local Police Forces including the Police Force in Montgomery County. He said he mentioned the "Ballou Case" as an example of how the Montgomery County Police had used equipment provided by the Agency in their work, but denied that he had said or implied that the Agency was "involved" in the Ballou case. He said that he had also related to the other Seminar members the fact that the Agency had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the protection of the President and Vice President and that he and others had been detailed to work with the Secret Service on counter-audio activities at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the Republican National Convention in Miami. I asked [Blank] who was on the Chicago detail, if he was detailed to protect the Vice President. He said that he was detailed to Tom Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked in effect as a member of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly.

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equipment which was of no further use to the Agency, and briefing them as to its use. He said he would not define these briefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed.

3. [Redacted] said that his only knowledge of the "Ballou Case", except what he had read in the papers, came from one telephone conversation he had with Inspector [Redacted] of the Montgomery County Police sometime after accounts of the Ballou shooting had appeared in the press. He said the Inspector called to thank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had given the Police and mentioned that it had probably saved the life of a policeman. He said that the Inspector explained to him that the account of the incident appearing in the press was not the whole story, that with the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided the Police had been able to intercept a telephone call from Ballou to a friend in which Ballou had outlined plans to "kill a cop." The Police had then staged a raid to forestall Ballou's plan and it was during this raid that Ballou was shot. [Redacted] said that he had had no other conversations with the Montgomery County Police on that subject. He said he had mentioned it at the Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved in the Agency's dealings with domestic Police Forces. He said he recalled that there was quite a bit of discussion and argument by the Seminar members about the propriety of the Agency assisting local police forces and working with the Secret Service in the U.S., but that he did not recall any extensive discussion about the Ballou Case and that at no time had he said that the Agency was directly involved. [Redacted] said he remembered that [Redacted] seemed particularly concerned about the Agency's involvement in domestic activities and that sometime later, around January or February 1972, [Redacted] talked to Colonel White about his concern and Colonel White in turn talked to the Director of Security. Since that date, he said, he has not had any further direct contact with the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of the Director of Security.

F. P. Bishop
Inspector

- 2 -
31 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with FMSAG

1. [Redacted] said he recalled [Redacted] talking about the Office of Security's liaison with the Police Forces in the Metropolitan Area and that the Ballou case was mentioned. He also recalled that [Redacted] had mentioned that the Agency had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connection with surveillance work against radical groups at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. He said that he could not remember exactly what [Redacted] said, but he did recall that there was considerable discussion and debate among the class members about the propriety of the Agency engaging in such activities.

2. Later in January or February 1972, at a time when [Redacted] was Chairman of the Management Advisory Group (MAG), he said he discussed these matters, and questioned the extent to which the Agency should become involved in domestic intelligence activities, with Colonel White and later with Mr. Colby. The MAG also raised the general problem in a couple of their papers, but without citing specific detailed examples. He said he understood that Colonel White had taken the matter up with the Director of Security and that some changes had been made as a result.

T. T. Bishop

Orig - File w [Redacted] Interview
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

29 May 1973

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Involvement in Outside Activities on Basis of Information Provided by

On 29 May 1973 I talked to Mr. [blank], who was a classmate of [blank] and [blank] at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 held on 8-24 September 1971. Mr. [blank] said that each student was asked to describe and talk about his work in the Agency and he recalled that Mr. [blank] had talked about the Office of Security's liaison with and assistance given to and received from, the Police Departments in the Washington Metropolitan area. He said he could not recall specifically what was said, but to the best of his memory Mr. [blank] described training given to either the Prince George's or Montgomery County Police concerning surveillance methods and electronic techniques. He said that he did not recall any discussion of the "Ballou case" and that he had no knowledge of that case other than what he had read in the newspapers.

F. F. Bishop
30 May 1973

S E C R E T

I talked with Mr. Osborne on 30 May about Mr. statements concerning remarks made by Mr. at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 during the period 3-24 Sept. 1972. Mr. Osborne said that fact that the office of security had relations with the local police forces in the Metropolitan Washington Area had been reported to the DCI in the Family Jewels Memo dated 16 May 1973, but that he had no knowledge of the Bellau Case and had not previously heard of any agency involvement in or connection with the case.

He suggested that I go aboard and talk to Mr. and get that fact I could from him, but that he also intended to talk to Mr. to get himself. He remarked that Mr. was a very good briefier, but inclined to be over-expensive at times and talk to much.

4 June 1973

Joel again with Osborne. He had checked on story and to see if there was any further involvement by the Agency in the Bellau case. The facts he had obtained corresponded with those given by the DCI. Osborne said that the DCI recently had been informed that the Agency had been involved with a counterintelligence team of the FBI, and that the Familie Jewels had been requested to the DCI at the end of May 1973.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Mr. William E. Colby

1. On 17 May the name of [redacted] was referred to this office as having attempted to contact the Director concerning "activities outside the Agency." I attempted to contact him on 21 and 22 May, but he was on leave. On 23 May he stated he wanted to check a portion of his information and asked if he could come to my office on 24 May.

2. [redacted] came into the Agency as a JOT in October 1957 and is currently assigned to the Soviet/EE Section. He has a very strong personnel file.

3. [redacted] advised that in August 1971 he attended the Advanced Intelligence Seminar. On the first evening of the seminar the students had a "getting acquainted" session where each one gave a brief description of his duties. One of the students, [redacted], of the Office of Security, however, carried on after the session was over and expanded on the briefing he had given. He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery County Police, stating that the Office of Security gave electronic and other support to that organization.

4. He further indicated that the Office of Security had been involved in the "Ballou case." [redacted] described the Ballou case as follows: The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided on 7 June 1971 by the Montgomery County Police and some Federal law enforcement officers. After the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, had forced their way into the house Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers immediately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. He spent a long time in the hospital and is partly paralyzed at the present time.
His case was given much publicity in the Washington Post at the time. There was additional publicity in the last several months when Ballou instigated a lawsuit against the raiding officers.

5. [ ] identified another student, [ ] who was assigned to [ ] as a friend of [ ]. He stated that [ ] also seemed to know the specifics of the Ballou case.

6. I thanked [ ] and told him this was just the type of information we wanted to receive so that it can be investigated and appropriate action taken if the information is borne out.

7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advise the Director concerning our findings.

William V. Broe
Inspector General
List of Students

Name | Office | Room No. | Extension

Ballon case, Silver Spring, 7 June 71

SECRET 00658
MEMORANDUM FOR: Five

Original of this file handed Dr. Chamberlin by Mr. Colby. We made 4 copies and returned the original to ___ who wanted a copy.

13 Aug '73
(DATE)
00659
5317 Briley Place; N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016
29 February 1972

Mr. Lloyd Shearer
Editor-at-Large
Parade Magazine
140 N. Hamilton Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90211

Dear Mr. Shearer:

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1972, and its kind words about me. As you can imagine, your challenge set me to work to meet it. As a result I can say, under oath if need be, that CIA has never carried out a political assassination, nor has it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred. Whether this fully meets your challenge, I cannot say (it takes two to tango), but it is a long way from the original statement in Mr. Scott's column that CIA "uses political assassination as a weapon." Perhaps I am too sensitive, but I would hope you could set the record straight for your readers.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

NB - Mr. Helms approved the dispatch of this letter —

00660
PARADE

LOLLD SHEARER
Editor-at-Large

Parade Publications, Inc.  *  OI 5-2073
140 N. Hamilton Drive
Beverly Hills, Calif. 90211

February 7, 1972

Mr. W.E. Colby
5317 Briley Pl.
Washington, D.C. 20016

Dear Mr. Colby:

Thank you for your kind and informative letter of January 11 concerning Operation Phoenix.

I don't want to get into a running word-battle with you on the subject of political assassination in Indo-China or the role of CIA and other of our agencies in Operation Phoenix.

I am just wondering if you would care to say flatly that the CIA has never used political assassination in Indo-China or elsewhere and has never induced, employed, or suggested to others that such tactics or devices be employed.

If you will make that flat statement under oath, I will not only apologize, I will tango with Dick Helms in Garfinckel's largest show window at 14th and P--providing, of course, Mrs. Helms gives her permission.

Again, I thank you for your interest and commend you for the really outstanding service you have rendered the country. You are indeed one of Helms' finest.

Respectfully,

LOYD SHEARER
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**Remarks:**

I suggest we let the whole thing drop.
Dear General Colby:

(1) Thank you for your article, "Should Lesbians Be Allowed To Play Professional Football?" I found it intriguing and we plan to run it in a future issue under your by-line, of course.

(2) Thank you for arranging a tango with me and Dick Helms of Her Majesty's Tel Aviv Rifles. Even at Williams, Dick was one of the great tango-artists of our time. Carfinkels, Woodrop-Lathrop, even Hacht---in fact, any place and time of your choosing is O.K. with me.

(3) One sad note! Will you tell Angus we cannot use his new car bumper sticker: LICK DICK in '72, because it is open to misinterpretation. In addition, we try to remain politically neutral.

(4) As to your willingness to say under oath that the CIA has never been party to political assassination, I, of late, have been travelling a good deal. In the course of my travels I happened to encounter Oleg Penkovsky---not your Oleg---but Penkovsky, a bartender in Cleveland, Ohio. Penkovsky told me that you signed a secrecy agreement, Form 270, witnessed by Victor L. Marchetti. Under the terms of this agreement you are pledged to eternal silence concerning CIA activities. Unless you have a special Papal dispensation---the kind given Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., it seems to me you are lip-sealed.

Perhaps this does not apply to hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. If this is so, please let me know; and we will take it from there.

(5) I will be in Washington shortly staying at the home of Jack Anderson out in Silver Spring. Perhaps we can meet there for a small summit. I will have with me several former Green Beret members who want to discuss with you the subject of CIA imposters in South Vietnam, who lied to them and me, too.

Let me hear from you. All the best.

April 30, 1972

LLOYD SHEARER
Editor-at-Large

PARADE

Parade Publications, Inc.
146 N. Hamilton Drive
Beverly Hills, Calif. 90211

April 30, 1972
Mr. Lloyd Shearer  
Editor-at-Large  
Parade Magazine  
140 N. Hamilton Drive  
Beverly Hills, California 90211  

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[Signature]  

W. E. Colby  

W. E. Colby
February 7, 1972

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Washington, D.C. 20016

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Respectfully,

LLOYD SHEARER
5317 Briley Place
Washington, D.C. 20016
January 11, 1972

Mr. Lloyd Shearer
Editor at Large
Parade Magazine
733 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassination as a weapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIA established a new high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam." Since I have held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (during detached service from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operation Phoenix, I believe I am uniquely qualified to testify (as I have in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

a. CIA does not and has not used political assassination as a weapon.

b. Operation Phoenix was run by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam, with the support of the CORDS element of the U. S. Military Assistance Command in coordination with several U. S. agencies including CIA.

c. Operation Phoenix is not and was not a program of assassination. It countered the Viet Cong apparatus attempting to overthrow the Government of Vietnam by targeting its leaders. Wherever possible, these were apprehended or invited to defect, but a substantial number were killed in firefights during military operations or resisting capture. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely in degree, between these combat casualties (even including the few abuses which occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who read Parade, I should appreciate your publishing this letter.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

Distribution:

Orig. - Address: 1 - ExR 1 - ExDir 1 - Mr. Thuemer
1 - William Sullivan of Staff (via SAVA - 12 Jan) 1 - Colonel Farnham (OSD/JS)
Mr. Lloyd Shearer  
Editor at Large  
Parade Magazine  
733 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10017  

January 11, 1972  

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W. E. Colby

5317 Briley Place  
Washington, D. C. 20016
Q. Four years ago actress Hedy Lamarr had a man named Donald Blyth jailed for attempted rape. He claimed at the time that Hedy had invited him to share her bed. What ever happened to that case?—D.L., Lubbock, Tex.

A. Lamarr is the Los Angeles district attorney. The former accused Blyth of attacking her with a knife. Miss Lamarr then sued Blyth, claiming he had attacked her. Blyth is now serving a nine-year sentence for attempted rape.

Q. How many times has actor Ernest Borgnine been married, and is he a wife-beater?—E.T.R., Springfield, Mass.

A. Borgnine has been married four times. His last wife, Donna, has charged him with beating her, as seeking a divorce.

Q. Is there any agency of the U.S. Government which has been authorized to include political assassination in its practices?—M. Wilson, Austin, Tex.

A. The U.S. agency which uses political assassination as a weapon is the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of its men in Vietnam have assassinated civilian Communists in an effort to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure. Operation Phoenix run by the CIA established a new high for U.S. political assassinations in the early 1960s.

Q. Does Richard Nixon have his own private golf course at Key Biscayne?—Emma Reynolds, Orlando, Fla.

A. Not at Key Biscayne. He owns a six-hole pitch-and-putt course on his San Clemente, Calif., estate.

Q. How long does it take radioactive fallout from Chinese nuclear tests to reach the U.S.?—Mark Chesebrough, Barstow, Calif.

A. Approximately three days depending on the wind.
5317 Briley Place
Washington, D. C. 20016
January 11, 1972

Mr. Lloyd Shearer
Editor at Large
Parade Magazine
733 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Shearer:

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Sincerely,

[Signature]

W. E. Colby
Mr. Lloyd Shearer
Editor at Large
Parade Magazine
733 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017

January 10, 1972

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b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element of the U. S. Military Assistance Command in coordination with several U. S. agencies including CIA.

c. Operation Phoenix is not and was not a program of assassination but rather an endeavor to counter the Viet Cong apparatus leading the attempt to overthrow the Government of Vietnam by apprehending or defeciting its members. Some of these were killed in firearms during military operations or resisting capture. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely in degree, between these combat casualties (even including occasional and few abuses) and the victims of the Viet Cong's systematic campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who might be misled by Mr. Scott's column, I should appreciate your publishing this letter.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
### OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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**Remarks:**

Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments.

_Right on target, I think if you have not already seen so I suggest you ask Houston to have a look at it._.

---

**FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO**

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE
---|---
O/ExDir | 10 Jan 72
Mr. Lloyd Shearer  
Editor at Large  
Parade Magazine  
733 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10017  

Dear Mr. Shearer:  

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a. CIA does not and has not used political assassination as a weapon.  

b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element of the U. S. Military Assistance Command.  

c. Operation Phoenix is not a program of assassination. Members of the Viet Cong apparatus were killed in the course of military operations or resisting police arrest. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these (even including occasional -- and few -- abuses) and the Viet Cong's conscious campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.  

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who might be misled by Mr. Scott's column, I should appreciate your publishing this letter.  

Sincerely,  

W. E. Colby
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Mr. Lloyd Shearer
Editor at Large
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733 Third Avenue
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W. E. Colby

5317 Briley Place
Washington, D. C. 20016
10 January 1972

Victims of the
C. Operation Phnom Penh is not and never has been a program of annihilation and genocide. It is a brutal, ruthless, and vicious effort to destroy the country. As a consequence, all of the civilian and military components of the Government of Cambodia are now directly involved in the operation to root out the remnants of the Pol Pot regime.

The true situation, as Mr. Scotty Chaffee reported, was the result of the assassination of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge has expelled the Government of Cambodia from Phnom Penh on 09 January 1979. Since then, Phnom Penh has been controlled by the Khmer Rouge without any factional interference.
guarded by an armed military escort or bodyguard unit. Since any attempt to arrest party members or, particularly, party officials frequently entails some kind of fire fight, members of the Viet Cong apparatus have, obviously, been killed in the course of military operations or while resisting police arrest. There is, however, a vast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these casualties deriving from armed combat (even including occasional small-arms fire) and the Viet Cong's conscious, systematic campaign of terrorism against an armed, non-combatant referred to by Mr. Scott.
Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments. If possible, we should appreciate your response this afternoon.
Mr. Lloyd Shearer  
Editor at Large  
Parade Magazine  
733 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Shearer:

In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott's Personality Parade responses stated that CIA "uses political assassination as a weapon" and that Operation Phoenix "run by the CIA established a new high for U. S. political assassinations in Vietnam." Since I have held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (during detached service from CIA) responsible for U. S. support to Operation Phoenix, I believe I am uniquely qualified to testify (as I have in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that:

a. CIA does not and has not used political assassination as a weapon.

b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element of the U. S. Military Assistance Command.

c. Operation Phoenix is not a program of assassination. Members of the Viet Cong apparatus were killed in the course of military operations or resisting police arrest. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these (even including occasional -- and few -- abuses) and the Viet Cong's conscious campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who might be misled by Mr. Scott's column, I should appreciate your publishing this letter.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Mr. Houston
Mr. Warner

I have asked [illegible] to look this over and give you his comments. J. 1/10/72
Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments. If possible, we should appreciate your response this afternoon.
5317 Briley Place  
Washington, D. C. 20016  
10 January 1972

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Editor at Large  
Parade Magazine  
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New York, New York 10017

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a. CIA does not and has not used political assassination as a weapon.

b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element of the U. S. Military Assistance Command, in coordination with CIA and other US agencies.

c. Operation Phoenix is not a program of assassination. Members of the Viet Cong apparatus were killed in the course of military operations or resisting police arrest. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these (even including occasional -- and few -- abuses) and the Viet Cong's conscious campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

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W. E. Colby
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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Remarks:

Mr. Colby asked that the attached be sent to you for comments. If possible, we should appreciate receiving your response this afternoon.
The noted phrases should, in my opinion, be cut out. They are the kind that lead to the italicized "Editor's Note" at the end of the letter which rebuts the whole point being made by the letter writer.

"Resisting police arrest" will get you, with the press, nothing but snide snicking cracks... and as we're really not going to win too much in such a short letter anyway, why not skip the occasional abuses bit.

There's my thoughts.

ANT

00684
Mr. Lloyd Shearer  
Editor at Large  
Parade Magazine  
733 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10017

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b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Vietnam with the support of the CORDS element of the U.S. Military Assistance Command.

c. Operation Phoenix is not a program of assassination. Members of the Viet Cong apparatus were killed in the course of military operations [redacted]. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely degree, between these [redacted] and the Viet Cong's conscious campaign of terrorism referred to by Mr. Scott.

In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who might be misled by Mr. Scott's column, I should appreciate your publishing this letter.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
Dear Mr. Shearer,

Thank you for your letter of Feb 7, 1972 and the kind words about me. As you can imagine, your quite appropriate challenge set me to work to see if I could meet it. I share the results of my inquiries with you.

As a result, I can say that CIA has never carried out a political assassination, as it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred. I cannot say that it never suggested or that on the two occasions I find this was done.
So I can't ask you to change although I take
but then

we called off the idea before the act took place. Our policy is that no such acts be suggested or undertaken or assisted.

In summary, I cannot hold you to meet your challenge. I still think however, that the facts are a long way from the original statement you mention that CIA "uses political assassination as a weapon." Perhaps we in CIA are more sensitive, but we would hope you could set the record straight rather than that to your reader.
The CIA has never carried out a political assassination. 

Assassinations were conducted by senior CIA officials, not on the ground. They were carried out to influence the outcome of events. The operation was called "Black."

A few months ago, a "Black" operation was launched. It failed.

A political assassination was attempted but failed.
judged, employed or suggested to others that
political assassinations be employed. A clear
instruction has been issued that this must be
done and that any indications of such activity
which might in any way be ascribed to C19 be reported
to the Director once.
Notes:

Diem: CIA had no foreknowledge of Diem's assassination. CIA attempted to arrange a safe conduct out of Vietnam for Diem and Nhu.

Lumumba: CIA had nothing to do with Lumumba's death. Early in the war, however, an action was initiated but abandoned.

Castro: Part of the Bay of Pigs plan involved a coup targeted on Castro as the leader of the defending forces. This was a part of a large paramilitary operation. A political assassination on a separate occasion was initiated but abandoned.

Counter-Voodoo: In Vietnam in 1964, teams were organized and paid by CIA to conduct operations against the Viet Cong. These later became the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). These were a part of...
the war effort, not political assassination squads. When questions arose as to their tactics, CIA interpreted it to mean it had tightened its and the GVN controls over them.

Laos: In the war in Laos, communists and guerrilla squads played an important role against the North Vietnamese. These were a part of paramilitary and military operations, not political assassination.
Phoenix. This has been described in depth detail to Congressional committee.
It was not a program of assassination.