Maintaining Vigilance

Counterintelligence in the War Against Terrorism

Michael J. Sulick

US counterintelligence (CI) sometimes failed during the Cold War. Until unmasked, a number of Soviet spies inflicted serious damage on national security that could have shifted the balance in a war with the Soviet Union. The Soviets would have enjoyed significant military advantage armed with, among other secrets, the US Continuity of Government plan passed by Robert Hanssen, the volumes on US Navy capabilities from the Walker spy ring, and information on tactical nuclear weapons and military communications from retired Army Sgt. Clyde Conrad. Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union never went to war, and Moscow never had the opportunity to exploit the advantages gained from its Cold War spies.

Now, however, the United States is at war. The enemy can immediately exploit information gained through espionage to launch attacks. Imagine a Hanssen or an Ames spying for a terrorist group, providing them data about US counterterrorist sources, analyses, and intelligence gaps—the damage could be catastrophic. Terrorist espionage inside the US Intelligence Community is no longer a remote possibility. Clandestine reporting has surfaced terrorist plans to infiltrate the community, and the number of government employees and applicants investigated on suspicion of terrorist connections is steadily increasing.

Considering the potential speed of implementation and high-casualty focus of terrorist tactics, US counterintelligence cannot afford to fail to uncover enemy spies in this war.

Neutralizing espionage is only one of the roles that counterintelligence plays. CI also compiles and analyzes information on the enemy’s security services to disrupt their intelligence collection against the United States and facilitate our penetration of their ranks. It establishes mechanisms to protect sensitive intelligence through compartmentation, yet disseminate that intelligence to appropriate consumers. CI provides critical support to intelligence collection by vetting sources to ensure that information is comprehensive, accurate, and not designed to deceive—in the terrorist arena, disinformation from a single double agent could divert us from a real attack. The very nature of terrorist tactics, relying on surprise, clandestinity, and compartmentation, has thrust intelligence into a central role in the war against terrorism.

The critical role of intelligence in this war argues for closer integration of counterintelligence and counterterrorist efforts than now exists. In a recent article in The Economist, six distinguished IC retirees emphasized the need for a new approach: “... the jobs...”
of countering terrorism and countering hostile intelligence services are hardly distinguishable from the other. To separate them artificially, as the IC does now, is to make a difficult task even harder. Along the same line, retired Gen. William Odom, a former director of NSA, noted the link between counterintelligence and counterterrorism in testimony before the US Senate: "CI is intelligence about the enemy's intelligence... because terrorists have much in common with spies, operating clandestinely, CI must also include counterterrorism intelligence, both domestically and abroad."2

Currently, CIA has a Counterintelligence Center (CIC) and a separate Counterterrorist Center (CTC).

A few years ago, the FBI established counterterrorist and counterintelligence components within its national security division, but the two operate independently. Only at the Department of Defense are the two disciplines integrated, but their activities are primarily limited to force protection and safeguarding military installations, personnel, and classified information.

This article examines the many ways in which closer integration of these similar missions could maximize the contributions of powerful counterintelligence tools in the fight against terrorism.

Terrorists as Intelligence Operatives

Simply put, terrorist groups operate like intelligence services. Terrorists spy before they terrorize. They case and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy's vulnerabilities from elicitation and open sources. They vet potential recruits by rigorous screening procedures. Like intelligence officers, terrorists practice tradecraft. Materials found in al-Qa'ida safehouses in Afghanistan and other countries include training manuals on espionage tradecraft, such as the identification of clandestine meeting and deaddrop sites, techniques to recruit sources, covert communications, and tracking and reporting on targets.

Terrorists also prepare their operatives to live cover with an intensity Soviet illegals would have envied. In an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Afghanistan, US forces discovered handwritten notes with guidance on operating under cover, including tips on traveling in alias, pocket litter to carry, and types of clothing to wear, down to details about the proper underwear to don in a foreign land.3

For al-Qa'ida terrorists, living cover even has the sanction of Islamic doctrine. Some of the September 11 hijackers were believed to have been adherents of takfiri waal Hijra, an extremist offshoot of the Moslem Brotherhood spawned in the 1960s, whose adherents claim that the Koran advocates integration by Moslems into corrupt societies as a means of plotting attacks against them.4 According to takfiri precepts, al-Qa'ida operatives can play the infidel to gain access to the enemy's targets and can even violate Islamic laws provided that the goal justifies the otherwise illicit behavior. The September 11 hijackers wore expensive jewelry and sprayed themselves with cologne at US airports, believing that these Western traits would shield them from the scrutiny given orthodox Moslems. The immersion of these 19 hijackers into American society tragically illustrates the effectiveness of living cover down to the smallest detail.

If terrorist groups operate like intelligence services, counterintelligence can play the same role in combating them as it has and


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The best defense is recruitment of our own spies in their ranks.

Terrorists, however, have already attempted to infiltrate their targets like intelligence services do. They have sought employment, for example, that is designed to collect specific information needed for planning attacks. Al-Qa'ida recruit Iyman Faris, a naturalized American citizen, used his job as a truck driver to travel across the United States casing for the sabotage of bridges and derailment of trains. To infiltrate its targets, al-Qa'ida also recruits members who are

US allies have discovered similar terrorist recruits in their midst. Richard Reid, the infamous "shoe bomber," is a British citizen of Anglo-Jamaican ancestry who was radicalized in London jails. Considering their unsavory backgrounds, all of these al-Qa'ida recruits would presumably fail to pass muster if they attempted to apply to the intelligence services of the United States or its allies. John Walker Lindh, however, was of a different mold. Dubbed the "American Taliban" after his capture in Afghanistan, Lindh, came from an affluent northern California suburb, had no criminal record.

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and carried decent academic credentials. He had studied Arabic and traveled extensively in the Middle East, experiences that might have made him an attractive candidate for US intelligence. If terrorists operate like intelligence services, intelligence officers should assume that they will attempt to infiltrate the security agencies of their main enemy by cultivating promising candidates for employment with backgrounds similar to Lindh's.

Terrorist spies within the Intelligence Community also would present more imminent risks than Cold War spies who passed information on US plans, intentions, and capabilities. Once the Cold War spies were discovered, the government had time to adopt and implement counter-

measures to balance the losses. But time is not on our side in the war on terrorism. Terrorist spies within the Intelligence Community could acquire information on gaps and vulnerabilities that could be used to plan attacks in very short order, or could even launch attacks from within against the agencies themselves. Our current security system was designed in the Cold War to protect classified information, not personnel and physical infrastructure. Now, however, we must develop a system that can do both.

More Employees to Worry About

The problem of protection against spies from within is further complicated by the fact that personnel and facilities must also be defended from individuals with minimal or no clearance—custodial staff, cafeteria workers, maintenance and delivery personnel—who have no access to areas with classified information, but could still pose a threat.
Terrorist D&D not only borrows from the Soviet bloc services but also is deeply rooted in Islamic tradition. Shiite Muslims, for example, practiced the concepts of taqiya, precautionary deception and dissimulation, and kitman, the concealment of malevolent intentions, against their Sunni enemies in the 7th century, and they continue to do so against today’s adversaries. One of the common tactics of kitman and taqiya involves “deceptive triangulation,”—persuading one enemy that a jihad is directed against another enemy. Taqiya is regarded as a virtue and a religious duty, a “holy hypocrisy” that justified lies and subterfuge in defense of the faith.
Intelligence is now vital to a host of non-traditional users.

The budding alliance between intelligence and law enforcement is still an uneasy one. As former CIA General Counsel Jeffrey Smith wryly noted, “It’s like putting diplomacy in the War Department.” Intelligence collects secrets, informs policymakers, and warns of threats; law enforcement catches criminals and tries them in public. In the counterterrorist arena, these distinctions are now blurred by the need to share intelligence with law enforcement and the need for law enforcement to act on that intelligence.

Expanding the number and type of recipients of intelligence inevitably increases the risk of leaks of classified information. Such compromises can be costly, jeopardizing the security of agents operating in the most unforgiving environments, shutting down technical collection operations, tipping off terrorists to our capabilities, and perhaps driving them toward new plans and targets.

One of the most dramatic developments after September 11 was the recognition that intelligence information needs to be shared among a vast number of consumers to prevent future terrorist attacks. Intelligence previously disseminated to a handful of top policymakers is now vital for a host of non-traditional users in the counterterrorist arena, particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and state and local law enforcement that had never required such access in the past.

Counterintelligence alone will not eliminate the probability of some compromises of counterterrorism information. We have never avoided compromises in other areas, and we face a far more daunting challenge in counterterrorism considering the volumes of information and increased numbers of consumers. Nor will counterintelligence resolve the inherent contradiction between expanded intelligence sharing and compartmentation of sources and methods. CI can, however, help establish mechanisms to achieve some balance between the two.

Counterintelligence training can also help to familiarize new consumers with the proper procedures for handling intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security has established a counterintelligence office of its own and set among its main tasks a counterintelligence awareness program for its constituent agencies and state and local law enforcement officials. CIC already manages an extensive CIA training program open to Intelligence Community members that focuses on counterintelligence awareness. To the extent resources permit, CIA as well as other agencies sponsoring similar training should collaborate with DHS to develop and implement tailored counterintelligence awareness training for state and local officials who are granted access to intelligence information. All efforts to ensure that the expanded pool of recipients handles sensitive material carefully are steps in the right direction. Any leak averted as a result may be a source protected or, perhaps, a terrorist attack prevented.

Next Steps

While many of the comments above apply to CIA's two core missions of operations and analysis, the integration of counterintelligence practices throughout the Intelligence Community could enhance overall US intelligence collection and analysis on terrorism. Some have argued that Intelligence Community reorganization is required to integrate the two disciplines.

Gen. Odom has advocated a new "National Counterintelligence Service" to manage counterterrorism and counterintelligence. The retired intelligence professionals cited in The Economist article proposed a new organization within the FBI incorporating counterintelligence and

11 William Odom, Testimony to the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 June 2002.

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counter-terrorism and subordinate to the DCI—somewhat similar to the National Reconnaissance Office's joint relationship with the Department of Defense and the DCI.\footnote{Bryant, et. al., The Economist, 10 July 2003: 4.}

Discussion of broad Intelligence Community reorganization goes beyond the scope of this article. While debate proceeds about reorganization, however, valuable time is lost as terrorists plan more attacks. Counterintelligence operational, analytic, and investigative capabilities already exist and are well-developed in key national security agencies. The issue is marrying these capabilities more closely with counterterrorist efforts and ensuring that counterintelligence professionals and their tools—their knowledge of intelligence service modi operandi, agent validation procedures, D&D analysis, and compartmentation mechanisms—are fully integrated into counterterrorist components of the IC.
In Conclusion

CIA and other US intelligence agencies were established by law for the primary purpose of collecting intelligence to protect national security, not to catch spies and conduct counterintelligence activities. But we cannot ensure that our intelligence is complete, accurate, and protected unless it is supported by solid counterintelligence practices. Counterintelligence, sometimes described as the "skunk at the party," is often resisted by intelligence officers troubled by its innately mistrustful and skeptical approach. As former Chief of CIC Jim Olson has remarked: "There's a natural human tendency on the part of both case officers and senior operations managers to resist outside scrutiny ... when necessary, a CI service has to impose itself on organizations and groups it is assigned to protect."14 Considering the high stakes in the war on terrorism, it is time for counterintelligence to impose itself now.