MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 25, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: NORTH/SOUTH
SUBJECT: Evening Report

Daily Activities (Erb)

North-South Initiatives. Garten chaired a session last night at which S/P staff and some private consultants reviewed possible North-South policies and actions that might be taken in a climate that is hostile to major initiatives. No conclusions yet, and further meetings and drafting will take place over the next few weeks. (C)

Senate Consideration of foreign assistance bill. At different times today and last week I discussed the aid bill with Beckel, Bergsten, Albright, and Owen. Two possible approaches, Beckel favors acceptance of Senate approval of the House aid levels and elimination of the Cuba and Viet-Nam amendments as well as the inevitable middle ground, emerge. Owen favors a strong effort to restore half of the cuts made in the House, plus elimination of the two amendments. Bergsten's consultations with Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members indicate that Inouye will strike the Cuba and Viet-Nam amendments but the situation regarding aid levels is unclear. Inouye apparently favors cuts in the IDB, but he will restore Asian Development Bank levels, and Schweiker may support an increase in IDA. No one in the Senate showed any enthusiasm for a large restoration of the House cuts. (LOU)

The situation has been complicated by the possibility of IMF and World Bank action to give cost-of-living salary increases to their staffs and by pending IMF action on an arrangement (that the Executive Branch accepted) with the new IMF Managing Director to raise his salary to roughly $140-150,000 before taxes. McNamara would follow suit, a development that has incensed Congressman Long who feels that he was misled. He wasn't, but he can do some damage on the Senate side. Bergsten has seen the British Executive Director, Dale, and others in an attempt to postpone IMF/World Bank action on these delicate issues. Sam Cross will follow this up next week. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL/GDF

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-8
CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

MTN. Alan Wolff and I reviewed various MTN issues today. He agreed that we are doing better with the LDCs in the negotiations on tariffs than in the talks on codes. Getting the major LDCs in the trade codes will be difficult, but critical to success of the negotiations and Congressional approval of the MTN package. Wolff has also made what I feel are unpalatable proposals regarding LDC graduation from the Generalized System of Preferences. He proposes a TPRG discussion of the Preferences issue and I suggested that he add LDC code negotiations to the agenda. (C)

Colombo Plan. Possible high-level participation in the December Colombo Plan meetings here in Washington and the central place to be given at the meetings to basic human needs policies add significance to that forthcoming event. Because of the moderation of the NAM's statement in Belgrade on BHN we may be able to advance toward greater LDC understanding of a broad BHN approach. I will provide BHN material and guidance regarding last year's PRC decision to those who are preparing for the meeting. (C)

Hunger Commission. Lynn Daft, Peters, and DuSault (OMB), and I discussed NSC/DPS cooperation in back-stopping the Linowitz Commission on World Hunger. Daft and I agreed on an approach to the statement announcing the Commission and on the means of managing the transition from Peter Bourne to Henry Owen as White House "point man." (U)
Significant Intelligence (Erb)

The G-77 and the MTN. At a meeting in Geneva earlier this month a G-77 subcommittee began to lay plans for criticism of the MTN, not within the framework of the negotiations, but at the May '79 UNCTAD V meeting in Manila. Comment: Such an approach would detract from LDC participation in the closing stages of the MTN and contribute to the likelihood of a confrontation at UNCTAD V. (SECRET/XGDS-2/Noform)

Steel.

Comment: The United States continues to push for LDC participation in the steel group. In a conversation with Barraclough, OECD Secretary General Van Lannep has suggested that OECD members be required to object to the participation of particular countries if they wished to limit the steel group's membership. OECD Secretariat staff and some USG officials doubt that this "negative-consensus" method will work. (TOP SECRET/Codeword-XGDS-2)
Daily Activities (Pastor)  

August 25, 1978

Yesterday, I attended the organizing meeting for PRM-41 on Mexico. The level of attendees was quite high, and all clearly understood the importance of our relationship with Mexico and the need for developing a coherent strategy. Also met with Benson Ford and his colleagues and gave them a briefing of our policy to Latin America with special emphasis on Mexico, where Ford is very interested in investing.

Last night, I attended a seminar involving Gen. Lanusse, former President (1969-73) of Argentina. Lanusse urged the largely American audience to understand the "Argentina reality," and to loosen up the human rights policy or risk a nationalist reaction. One Professor of Argentina history used a marvelous quote from Lanusse himself that you cannot beat terrorism with government-sanctioned violence. Lanusse admitted Argentina had "gone wrong somehow;" he did not have any kind words for Videla.

Vaky thinks that Videla is currently debating whether to receive him, and he believes we shouldn't push at this time. I urged him to try to put together an overall strategy paper on U.S. policy.

On Nicaragua, I relayed the message from Reg and Bill Odom to Vaky that we should go in quietly to the Panamanians and State our concern with the Sandinistas within the overall context of our global anti-terrorist policy. Perez and Torrijos have both publicly tried to justify their involvement by stretching the principle of non-intervention beyond its legitimate limits. After hearing some other disturbing reports about the Sandinistas and speaking to David, I have set up a CIA briefing on this subject on Monday and an inter-agency meeting on U.S. policy on Tuesday. Jonathan Steele of the Manchester Guardian and Richard Valeriani of CBS called for background briefing on the Nicaraguan situation. I saw Valeriani on CBS's morning show, and he got the story right.

Vaky recommends at least a one week delay on a Presidential response to Mrs. Chamoro's letter, and I concur.

Puerto Rico is causing concern. Cleaned off with Henry on a press release which Andy Young may issue on Monday restating our full support for self-determination. The problem is that the Committee looks about evenly split. Our Puerto Ricans may hold the balance in their hands, but they're playing hard ball. They told USUN that if we continue to aim for deferral, we will hear the word "colonial" all day long. They may be prepared to compromise on a consensus statement -- not necessarily inscribed -- which urges the Committee to continually review the issue. I will follow this closely over the weekend.
Met with Richard Strauss of ICA to go over some of the follow-up work on the Humphrey Scholarship Program. We are selecting universities with an eye for excellence and for certain Congressional districts. I will send a memo on that next week. Also met with Barry Sklar who is writing the Latin America part of a study being prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the effectiveness of U.S. human rights policy. Also worked on Cuba and on the Presidential message to the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries.
Ecuador: Embassy Quito's assessment indicate that plotting to eliminate Roldos as a potential candidate continues. The Embassy indicates that their soundings have confirmed the existence of a plot to establish sufficient fraud in the first round voting to try to convince Poveda to cancel the follow-up elections. At the same time, however, they have encountered enough doubt and dissent to possibly undermine the scheme. The decisive moment may be reached during the week of September 4 when the Guayas province results are scheduled for review. (S XGDS-2)

Mexico: Secretary Schlesinger briefed Ambassador Margain on progress of US natural gas legislation and our desire to resume negotiations with the Mexicans. Schlesinger emphasized that we understand the importance of the price to Mexico and that there are various ways to meet Mexican political interests without disrupting our own. Margain was impressed and promised to raise the issue with Lopez Portillo during his consultations in Mexico. (C)

Haiti: The Haitian Foreign Ministry informed our Embassy that they will not seek the return of Lucien Rigaud and had been looking for a way to get rid of the problem posed by his presence in the Mexican Embassy. (C)

OAS: A special OAS session called to deal with human rights commission issues was diverted to a discussion of commodity problems and concern over US protectionism. Sugar and copper were the concerns with Peru, Chile, and Jamaica speaking out forcefully. Jamaica characterized consultations with the US in all forums, including the OAS, as an "exercise in futility." (U)

Ecuador: Press reports indicate that Natural Resources Minister Semblantes announced that GOE favors an oil price hike of no more than 5%. The Embassy comments that while Ecuador usually follows Venezuela's lead, it will diverge in its own interest and usually follows suit when an OPEC consensus develops. (LOU)

Mexico and Nicaragua: Our charge briefed Foreign Minister Roel on the Nicaraguan situation. Roel indicated that the only long term solution was the removal of Somoza and held forth on the need for the US to stop supporting Somoza. Roel expressed interest in receiving further information on the Nicaraguan situation. (S XGDS 1)
United States Government

Memorandum

To: AA/PPC, Mr. Charles Paolillo (Acting)

Weekly Report

To understand Argentina's economic history, the approach of a psychiatric social worker might be more useful than that of an economist...

Considerable progress has been made in stabilizing both the economy and society in the short run, although at a cost in terms of yet another sharp drop in real urban wages and some loss of political freedom.


15. Case 2662 - Alberto Samuel Falicoff

The Commission heard public testimony from the wife of Dr. Falicoff, denouncing the detention, imprisonment and torture of Mr. Falicoff by the Security Forces. The arrest took place in his residence, in the presence of his wife, who was also detained and later released. Mrs. Falicoff signed the testimony.

Doctor Falicoff, a physician, was practicing in the Cordoba Children's Hospital and was a member of the Medical Association of that city.

The Commission considers pertinent the complete transcription of Mrs. Falicoff's testimony:

On Thursday, November 25, 1976, at 18 hours, the bell rang in the apartment where I lived with my husband, Dr. Alberto Samuel Falicoff and my son, Alfredo Falicoff, who was then two years of age. I saw through the peephole four men in civilian clothes standing against the wall. When they realized I was there, they knocked the door, and told me to open it or they would shoot. Since the baby was sitting watching television in
line with the door, I opened it. They quickly entered and grabbed me by the arms. I was frightened and screamed. They said "Keep quiet, for the baby's sake" and asked me where my husband was. I replied that he worked at the Clinic. Then they began to search the house, locking me and my son in his room. They searched the living room and dining room, dismantled the stove and the venetian blinds, and removed the pictures from the walls. I saw this being done because the baby asked to go to the bathroom and they let me take him. After half an hour, they ordered me to prepare the baby's supper. They were courteous to me and told me they knew that I had done nothing. They said they had come looking for my husband. After a while, they brought the janitor in and locked him in the apartment also. They said they had done this to keep him from warning my husband. They did the same thing with a neighbor, who came in because he thought that thieves had broken in. The janitor, who was a very old man, was very frightened. My husband arrived at about 2 o'clock and unlocked the door with his keys. When they heard the elevator, they again sent me to my son's room. They immediately locked themselves up with my husband in our room and I began to hear the sounds of a struggle, pushing and blows. Later, an officer of the Army Intelligence Service arrived along with another officer.

They were all well dressed, in suits and ties and carrying a walkie talkie. They came in and out quietly and, on one occasion, brought sweets and toys for the baby, who behaved very well with them because they let him touch their revolvers. They told me to prepare clothing for the baby, since they had decided to take me with them. I asked them to let him say goodbye to his father and they did so. I then saw my husband with his hands tied with a cable. I explained to the child that they were going to take him to his grandmother's house and I begged them to do so. I gave them the address of my mother in El Chaco and her telephone number. Then they took us away. They took the money we had in our pockets and any jewelry they found. They said that if I was taking any medicine to bring it with me, and I did so. I went down in the elevator with my husband and three of them. They put sunglasses on me with paper pasted on the inside of the lenses. My husband's hands were tied. It was 2130 hours. They took us in separate cars. I was taken in a bright yellow car. I sat in the back of the car with one of them. The ones in the front seat had not entered the apartment. They asked, quietly, why my hands were not tied. The one in the back answered: "That's no problem". While we were driving down the first streets, I tried to see the road; from Patricios, we
turned on Martín García and then on Almirante Brown. Then they realized I was watching the road, so they pressed my head down on the legs of the one alongside me, and pointed a revolver at me. After travelling at high speed for about 20 minutes, we arrived at our destination. The car stopped and they made me get out and walk about 30 meters. Others came and asked why they did not bring the car in. They answered the lights weren't working and that the highbeams were on and they were not going to enter with the highbeams on. We entered a building with a very large door (a garage door, or perhaps, much bigger). From the little I was able to see, there was a very large room with no one in it. They took me down a spiral staircase to a basement. There they told me to close my eyes and they put a very tight blindfold, with elastic in the back, on me, which immediately gave me an intense headache. They handcuffed me and shackled my feet together by a chain with padlocks on both shackles. They were very tight and had sharp edges. Then they took me to a kind of cell. The place was full of these cells. In other words, they were small rooms made of pressed board or cardboard, with chairs and a small desk in them. They left me there for a while, and I could hear that they were interrogating my husband in the cell on one side, but I could not hear what they were saying.

The interrogation and the detention: I was soon taken to another room much further away, and they told me to remember that my number was 103. After half an hour, someone entered and asked me whether I was going to say anything or whether I preferred to have them take me in. I said that I knew absolutely nothing. They began by asking me my name, I.D. number, the name of my parents, brothers, and my husband, his parents and brothers, and the date and place of my birth. They left and after a while they returned and asked me to tell them what my husband was doing in Córdoba. I answered that, because of his work as a physician, he had been in contact with patients whose parents were prisoners, and a short while ago, they had begun to ask him to help them with money, samples of milk, etc., and I knew that he had only done that because he always brought home cans of milk, used clothing, books and other food for the prison. Then we decided to move to Buenos Aires. At that point in the interrogation, other persons entered. They attached no importance to me, and all of them left. I began to feel totally exhausted and I slept sitting up. When they returned, they asked me again for my I.D. number. I actually couldn't remember because I felt so exhausted and I told them so. Then they left. After a while,
I began to hear, coming through one of the walls of pressed board, the sound of a lot of running water, and then the cries of my husband insulting them and repeatedly calling them "murderers". This is repeated approximately every hour, or perhaps less. Obviously the torture room is next door. On the following day —I guess—they took me out and led me to a corridor on the same floor. My legs are so swollen that the shackles begin to cut into my skin. A nurse came who loosens the shackles and put cotton around my legs. A guard asked him "Why are you doing that?" and the nurse replied "So... we don't have to treat her afterwards". He asked me why, I, a doctor, had gotten into this, and he said he didn't understand how, with all the money we could earn, we had ended up here. He added that if I needed anything to ask to speak with Pedro, the nurse, since there were other Pedros there. There were chairs against the wall on each side, in the passageway, very close to each other. They told me to close my eyes. Then they took the mask off and ordered me to open my eyes. I could not see anything because they were taking photographs and the flashbulbs blinded me. One of the ones who had been to my house approached me and put a hood of thick white cloth over my head. He explained that with that hood they would not bother me. That was because they were taking people to the torture room according to the order of their chairs. I could see that, because the door was nearby and every time they took someone out, the noise of running water and the desperate screams of pain could be heard, despite the fact that a record player was constantly playing very loud music. There were certain songs that they played more frequently, and despite the fact that the tapes were worn, I could hear the lyrics which went roughly: "and now what are they? where are they? what are their ideals? etc." I wondered why my legs were so swollen. I said that I had a weak heart and therefore bad circulation. They put another chair in front of me to put my legs up on. One asked me if I recognized his voice, and I said he was one of the ones who had been at my house. I asked for my child and he said "Relax", we have notified your family and they are coming to get him." Afterwards I noticed that they brought my husband to the chair alongside me, because I recognized his pants and shoes. During the entire time I was there, I heard the same sound; the loud record player, screams of pain, running water. The guards wore rubber boots. I suppose I spent an entire day and night there because the music was interrupted twice when they brought food to the guards and their superiors. They drank a lot of wine asking the guards to bring more. I could smell the wine. The Chief came and asked how things were going. They answered that three persons had died, two men and
one woman. The Chief told them to be more careful because that was too many for one day. That day they took my husband away a number of times, and I recognized his screams. Twice I heard his difficulty breathing and it sounded as though he had swallowed his tongue. The music stopped and an urgent call for the doctor came over the loudspeaker. I heard people running, and I heard the doctor say, if they wanted him alive, that was enough for now, and not to go further. Then they took me to one of the rooms. This time they took off the hood, and I saw that several of the ones who had been to my apartment were there along with one I did not know. They now spoke harshly to me and again asked me for information. A torturer entered wearing jeans, a red jacket and rubber boots. He was blond, with a red face, and he told them "I will give to her". To me he said: "All right, I'm in a hurry, tell me whether you know anything, or I will give you the 6 pointed cattle prod." The others wanted to hurry me. I cried and said I was telling the truth; I knew nothing; I was not a militant; and since I did not like such things I consciously knew nothing about them. They asked me what money we were living on, and I told him ours. They took me again to the corridor. After several hours, they made many of the people line up, each with his hands on the shoulders of the person in front of him. There were probably about ten of us, and they made us walk, climb stairs, and then take an elevator. We probably went up about five floors, and there they made us squat down and told us to stretch out on a mattress. Alongside of me there was a man who did not comply well, and they kicked and punched him for about an hour. I immediately fell into a deep sleep. I was completely exhausted, and I no longer cared what happened to me. I was so exhaustion that, while they were taking me there they pained me and I wasn't even startled. When I awoke they served sandwiches. They made me sit up, but I could eat only a few mouthfuls. I continued to sleep, I believe, the entire day, I cannot be sure. I woke up in the morning and they were distributing a little food to each person in turn. I felt rested, and tried to find out what was going on. I heard those with me calling the guard to go to the bathroom. I did the same thing. Soon one of them made me stand up, and I hit my head on a beam. I realized that the roof was very low. In the bathroom, the guard took off my hood. He asked me how old I was, whether I was married, and whether I had any children. He was a kid about 17 years old. He was very kind to me and told me to read what was written on my hood. The words "possible release" were written on the cloth in thread. I asked what it meant, and he told me they were going to release me. I asked him why I was there, and he said it was a mistake. His only
job was to see that the prisoners did not speak, did not take off their hoods, and those who did so, he could beat at will until he knocked them out. He and the others were taught karate and self defense. They were made to read books like Papillon and to hate the prisoners, about whom the only thing they knew was that they "are enemies of the country, who want to destroy it, by destroying the army". They were kids 15 to 20 years old. Sometimes they were called kids, but usually they were called by their first names. At night they were given bottles of wine, and then they became very violent. This guard told me that some of them were taken on raids, and sometimes they were given special commendation or merit awards. They were very proud of that. For example, he told me that the previous day he has been assigned to go to a house that someone had denounced. It answered the description, and when the owners tried to escape, they had to shoot them: a young woman with a child two or three years old. Later they learned that the people were not involved. He had felt bad about that, but the persons who denounced innocent people were to blame. He took me to my place again, and there I continued to spy. I could see that it was a large "L" shaped room. It was of make-shift construction on the terrace of the building, since the outer walls were only one meter high. A peaked roof came down to there. Its highest part was in the middle of the room, which is where the guards go. In the angle of the "L" there is a large table where they eat and a medicine chest and a small file. We were on both sides in sort of pressed board cubicles about 1 meter high. The cubicles where I was were make-shift so I was able to move them carefully. The rectangle was made up of four separate "L" shaped parts. I think that this detail is very important because of what I am going to tell further on. That day I realized that they brought someone to the cubicle on my left, and I heard him barely complain, as though he were very ill. I thought it was my husband. So I moved over, displaced one of the walls and changed position (we were lying on the floor on a mattress and a blanket. That is all we had). I managed to see my husband, shirtless, with marks everywhere from the cattle prod. I realized that he had no more than two centimeters in a row of unmarked skin. He breathes heavily and asks for "water, water", but his voice is very weak and it is hard for him to move his tongue so the words do not come out. A guard came, and told him not to bother them, that they could not give him water because if they did he would die. They sat us down and gave us a sandwich and a small bottle of water and a cup of broth. I hid the small bottle and, when they came back to take it away, they did not realize it was missing. Then, carefully watching out for the
guards, I put my hands through into my husband's cubicle and was able to touch him. I felt that he had a fever. He tried to touch my hands. Then I passed the water to him and he drank it all. The same thing happened the next day. A few days later, they let him eat and gave him water. Little by little he began to recover. Once when the guards were not watching, we spoke a little. He told me he had gone out in a car with them, telling him that he was going to take them to a rendezvous near the Italian Hospital. When they were not paying attention, he jumped out of the car and a bus ran over his body. He succeeded in yelling his name so that people could notify his family. They immediately put him back into the car and when they brought him back they tortured him more than ever. He tried to encourage me and told me that he was very proud of me. Every day of the month I spent there was the same, stretched out on the mattress and constantly shackled. Sometimes they took the handcuffs off for a few days, and they took the hood off permanently. The electric light was always on and the music was always playing loudly. Once a day, after much begging, they took me to the bathroom. On three occasions, I was able to take a bath and change into clothing they gave me. While I did so, the guards would open the door whenever they wished. I had to undress, bathe and dress again in three minutes. For the bath they took off our handcuffs, chain and shackles. Meals were always the same: in the morning, a cup of stew, at noon a meat sandwich and sometimes a cup of broth, and at night the same. On some days, one or two meals were omitted. I don't know exactly how many people were there, but I estimate that there were about 50. The pregnant women—and there were many of them—were given special meals; in the morning coffee with milk, at noon and at night, meat with mashed potatoes, and in the evening coffee with milk. Sometimes they were given vitamins. Every day the guards punished two or three persons. They did so for any reason; because they removed their hoods while they were sleeping, because they were not lying right; it because the guards suspected them of spying; or for any other reason. The punishments consisted of kicks and punches for hours until they were left unconscious. The panic is constant. Only once was the situation reversed: the lights went out and the guards were frightened and rushed out. Then they realized how ridiculously they were behaving and they returned, with their weapons in their hands, saying: "Everybody quiet, don't move"; but even their voices were trembling. Another time, the lights went out—it must have been about December 20th—and we could hear troops marching past. In the first days they called roll, asking for the name and number of each person. My husband was on one side of me, with the number 104. I was number 103; at
my other side was number 102, a lawyer whom they had taken from
his office in the Palermo area the same day they took us. I
could see him as well as I could see my husband: he was
olive-skinned, had black wavy hair and a beard and was of
average build. He wore a mask. Later I overhead that he was a
veternarian, and that his sister, a teacher who had been
brought in a month before, had—according to what I've heard—
recently married a widower with children. They were going to
hold her until her brothers appeared and she did not know where
they were. They took her from the room a few days before I
left, and I suppose they released her. They called one of the
prisoners "peg-leg." He was very near me, and by his voice
seemed to be an older person and very weak. One night the
guards got drunk and began to bet that they could make him
stand on his peg-leg. They brought him into the middle of the
room and ordered him to do it. He begged them, said it was
impossible, that he was going to fall. Then they began to kick
him, punch him, and they stood him up. Of course, he fell.
They stood him up again, he fell again, and so on, throughout
the night. It was a most macabre spectacle. The guards went
crazy, they beat him without interruption and the poor man was
begging them to stop. There was the sound of blows to the
lungs, the abdomen, the noise of broken bones. They stopped
when he fell unconscious. Afterwards he was delirious for two
or three days until they called the doctor. The doctor said he
had many broken bones and ordered him to be taken away. I
didn't hear him again. In early December, a transfer occurred.
Apparently they were taking away those who had been there the
longest; however, they included among them the lawyer who was
next to me; in all, some 40 persons. They adjusted the
handcuffs, the shackles and the hoods. They assembled them
together, were taking them out when the noise of an airplane
was heard that seemed to be landing nearby. (I shall explain
that the sound of airplanes was very frequent. I also heard a
train, and a helicopter, two or three times every day). After
a time, the sound of an airplane was heard again, then nothing
more. A guard asked another where they were being taken, and
he answered: "Fishfood". They were very few people left in the
room, and they changed our places. Fortunately, my husband and
I continued to be next to each other with the same consecutive
numbers. But I shall explain that there were three or four
with the number 100, others with 400, 700, 900, etc. On the
following day, they began to bring in a large number of new
people and this continued for successive days, until they had to
put us on the floor, in the guard's passageway. Many of them
were taken out at night and were ordered to get dressed.
Apparently they were released. Also, when it rained very hard, (I heard the rain in spite of the noise because the roof was over our heads) they took out people to release them. They were careful to have the people well dressed and, in the case of women, to tie them up as much as possible. I could not see my husband now, nor speak to him because my new cubicle was completely made of wood. However, he made friends with an occasional guard—that is, one who did not work there but came to fill in because many of them were on vacation. The boy was really very good, and taking a risk himself, he took us to the bathroom and let us speak to each other without hoods. Of course he was present, so that we could only speak about ourselves. My husband had a very small hematoma but the doctor said that the dislocation was not going to be set because a general anesthesia would be needed to relax the muscles and that could not be done there. To do that he would have to be transferred, and transfer was impossible. He explained that the nurse came by every two or three days, but never touched anyone; however, they usually gave some medicine, mostly laxatives, antispasmodics and eyedrops, because we all had conjunctivitis because of the hood and the mask. The guards had the eyedrops; sometimes when somebody said that he needed them, the guard himself inserted the drops. I began to feel bad. I had nightmares about my son every night because despite their having told me that my parents had him, I did not believe them. All of this was due to the fact that they had taken off the white hood and given me a gray one like all the others. Also, because of the time that had elapsed. I realized that there was very little possibility that they would release me, because the ones they released only stayed a very short time. I mentioned this to my husband, and he always tried to encourage me. I spent the day thinking about how to get out, I began by trying to get to know the place, telling the guard who took me to the bathroom that with the little water they give us we were dying of thirst (which was true) and I offered to carry the bottles as often as necessary and to do any kind of work, cleaning, etc. I said that from lying down so much I was beginning to feel weak, and I was afraid that I would not be able to walk when they took me to my house the following week (that was pure fabrication). The guard began to take me to wash the dishes, to the bathroom, and let me go without handcuffs, to carry water bottles, to clean up the bathrooms. Some of the trays and dishes had the seal of the Argentine Army. So the days passed. There were no windows in the bathroom, but there was a door locked with a key, which was the guard's closet. I found it opened one day, and I saw the guard's civilian clothing and that the closet had a window
covered with a blanket. I lifted the blanket and saw thick grass and a heavy metal screen outside of it. I could see many tall trees, and at the end, high woven wire, a pick-up truck and a kind of garage. It would be possible to escape by breaking the window and cutting the metal screen. We were not very high up, surely the fourth or fifth floor. Blankets would be needed to climb down. But was the woven wire electrified? And what lay beyond? I could not see. Furthermore, we had to take our chains off. They they took us to bathe, they unlocked the padlock with a master key that the chief of the guards had; he gave it to them only on those occasions. I realized that my husband was very weak because of everything that had happened, and that he also had a dislocated shoulder. However, it would be a question of giving it more thought. One day, while I was washing the plates, they took me to wash diapers and rubber pants. This impressed me very much because I realized that there were children on the other side from where we were. At that time I heard the voice of children about 4 years of ages, asking the guards why their fathers had those things on their heads. I asked the guard how it was possible for children to be there. He said that they were the only ones and that they had been brought with their parents because there was no place to leave them. However, they were going to be taken away the next day. Another day I was taken to the linen room to arrange the clothing they were taking to the laundry, by sex and size. Again I saw children's clothing in those places, I heard the voices of women who were working in the kitchen and sewing torn clothing. When the guards finished their shifts, they said that they were going to the swimming pool. One day they took me down to one of the boxes. They took off my hood and left me alone for a moment. I looked at the walls of the box and was impressed by the number of bloodstains. Some of them were very high. I don't know how they did it but since the stains are very large and there are small splattered stains around them—monstrous. He came back and told me to talk to him about something. I told him that I did not know anything and that the only thing I was thinking about at that time was my husband and my child; that I had nightmares about my son and that if they did not release me, I would take off my hood and that I knew very well that that meant that the guards would kill me; that they should release me, that I did not know why they were keeping me there. He told me that it was very likely that I would leave. They told a guard to take me upstairs again. On one occasion when the guard was not watching, I told my husband that I would probably leave and that he should be on the lookout for times when the guards were not watching so that we could talk. But there were watching us, especially from that
night until the time of my departure. The following night, the Chief guard came, told me to sit up; he handcuffed my hands behind me. They picked up my mattress and searched my cubicle. They felt my breasts and between my legs; they shoved me around and moved me to another cubicle. During the previous interrogation, I had been told that, while they knew that I had not taken part in the activities that led to my arrest, considerable time had passed since my arrival at the place of detention, and under such circumstances, I could not leave. I told them that they could not commit another injustice added to the injustice of my arbitrary detention, and after an exchange of opinions among themselves, they proceeded to interrogate me exhaustively on all the circumstances that I might have observed during my detention. Thus, I was interrogated on what my opinion was about the treatment the prisoners were receiving, whether I felt that they were tortured there, whether I had any idea of where I was, and under what security authority the procedure there were conducted. To all of these questions I answered: that I was totally ignorant of the details they were asking of me, and that I felt the treatment was adequate. They asked me what I knew of my husband and I answered that I knew that he was alive, that I had recognized his voice when he spoke with the guards, and I denied that I had seen him. I was led again to my usual place where the guards handcuffed my hands behind me, and they watched very closely to see whether I tried to communicate with my husband. That evening, they sent me to bathe and to change my clothes. The one who told me that I was going to be released appeared and told me that I was going to Resistencia, to my mother's house. He was so drunk that he threatened me and they handcuffed my hands behind me and sent me to a cubicle. On one side was a girl having an asthma attack and she was also handcuffed with her hands behind her. She was frantic because with the hood she was choking even more. She had an oxygen mask beside her, but with her hands tied she could not put it on and she asked the guards to do it. They didn't listen to her. After a while, they got me up and took off my handcuffs and shackles. The drunk guard came and took me downstairs. Soon I realized from the fresh air that I was outside. A car approached and they put me in it. It was raining. They put me in the front seat. The car went round and round many times. I suppose it was going around in the park of the same building because I noticed that the road was muddy and the car was skidding from side to side. Also, it seemed to me that it was turning in the same places. This went on for a while. Then we went on to an asphalt road and drove for several hours until they took off the mask that they had put on me to replace the hood before we left. We were on General Paz Street. I was
alone with the drunken guard. He told me that I was completely free but not to communicate with my in-laws, never to go to Córdoba, and not to come out in Buenos Aires for several months. He repeated that all of my movements were going to be carefully watched and to remember that they still had my husband. I told him that I was going to leave the country, and he told me not to, to let a long time pass; otherwise I would have problems. It was 5 o'clock in the morning of December 24, 1977. He gave me a document, a Federal Police I.D., with one of the photos they'd taken of me, but with a number other than my real one, and a forged signature. He told me to burn it as soon as I reached El Chaco and to get a duplicate of my real I.D. He gave me three million pesos, told me to go to the Austral window, and said that I had passage reserved in the name of Mrs. Ramos; that if there was no room they were going to take me in the pilot's cabin and that I should buy my son a cart for Christmas. He left me at the airport entrance. My plane left at 9:20 pm. I realized that there were two men, an 18 year-old youth and a man around 40, who watched me until the airplane took off. In El Chaco there were almost always several pairs in cars along the street of my mother's house and I never noticed anyone following me. Although I hardly went out of doors for months.

After my release I lived at my house in El Chaco. When I went to the police headquarters to arrange for my passport, I was told after lengthy proceedings and psychological harassment that they had received a denunciation of my disappearance. When they asked who had made it, I replied that it was my mother. Then they made me sign a statement that I had been absent from my home voluntarily and for private reasons. After signing the statement, I was issued a passport with the warning: "With this record, you can't leave the country unless you sign this statement."

At its 46th session, the IACHR approved a resolution on this case. The government, in a note dated October 8, 1979, presented its observations denying any responsibility for the facts denounced.

The Commission undertook a study of the resolution it had adopted, in view of the fact that the Argentine Government, in its request for a reconsideration, had submitted new evidence. It decided however, to maintain all of the above-mentioned Resolution, having found no evidence to discredit the allegation made by the claimant.
OVER THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ARGENTINA HAS PASSED THROUGH SEVERAL CYCLES OF ALTERNATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY RULE; SINCE 1955, THERE HAVE BEEN SIX MILITARY AND SIX CIVILIAN PRESIDENTS. BEGINNING IN 1969, VIOLENCE MOUNTED PROGRESSIVELY FROM THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT AS GROUPS WITH WIDELY DIFFERENT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTIONS STRUGGLED FOR POWER. AS A RESULT, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAVE MAINTAINED A "STATE OF SIEGE" FOR SOME NINE OF THE PAST TEN YEARS. AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS VIOLENCE IN 1975-1976, TERRORISM HAD TAKEN ON BROAD DIMENSIONS: BOMBINGS, ROBBERIES, KIDNAPPINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS WERE COMMON OCCURRENCES. ORGANIZED TERRORIST GROUPS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM NUMBERED SOME 5,000-6,000 PERSONS, WITH SYMPATHIZERS ESTIMATED AT AN ADDITIONAL 15,000.

BY 1976 THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA HAD DETERIORATED SHARPLY. COURTS AND POLITICAL LEADERS WERE BEING INTIMIDATED; INFLATION APPROACHED 800 PERCENT AND MANY ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES HAD BEEN DISRUPTED. AT THIS POINT, THE ARMED FORCES AGAIN TOOK CONTROL OF THE STATE, WITH THE AVOWED GOALS OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ENDING TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION. THEY PROMISED THAT DEMOCRACY WOULD ULTIMATELY BE RESTORED. THE ARMED FORCES MAINTAINED THE STATE OF SIEGE IMPOSED IN 1974 BY PRESIDENT MARIA

BY 1978 SPOKESMEN FOR THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE WAR ON TERRORISM HAD BEEN WON. AS DESCRIBED IN LAST YEAR'S REPORT, 1979 SAW IMPORTANT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REDUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. IN 1980 THE TRENDS ESTABLISHED THE YEAR BEFORE CONTINUED AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVED, BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN:


-- THE NUMBER OF DETAINEE HAS BEEN REDUCED. EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DETAINED UNDER THE SPECIAL EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT SINCE 1974. ABOUT 1,800 PRISONERS ACCUSED OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMES
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 7
BUENOS AIRES 7776 REMAINED IN DETENTION AT THE END OF 1980. ABOUT 750 WERE BEING HELD EITHER WITHOUT TRIAL, SOME FOR MANY YEARS, OR AFTER SERVING THEIR SENTENCES. ABOUT 600 HAD BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN COURTS. ANOTHER 400 WERE IN TRIAL STATUS.
— UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM HAS INCREASINGLY ASSERTED ITSELF. THE SUPREME COURT HAS, IN EFFECT, ORDERED LOWER COURTS TO INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES. HOWEVER, THE COURTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANY OF THE MANY DISAPPEARANCES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION.
— TERRORISTS REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO REININFILTRATE THE COUNTRY BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THE FACE OF ACTION BY THE SECURITY FORCES. THERE WERE NO NEW MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MONTONEROS IN 1980.
— PRISON CONDITIONS IMPROVED. COMPLAINTS IN THE PAST FOCUSED MOST HEAVILY ON OVERCROWDING, LACK OF MEDICAL TREATMENT, INADEQUATE FOOD, AND RESTRICTIONS ON VISITS. TODAY, SUCH CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY RELIEVED AND SUCH CONCERN AS IS EXPRESSED FOCUSES ESPECIALLY ON PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS, PARTICULARLY ARBITRARY USE OF AUTHORITY BY GUARDS.
— THE MILITARY DESIGNATED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PERIOD

PSN:039418   PAGE 01   TOR:270/21:50Z   DTG:261841Z SEP 80
1981-84 while reiterating its commitment to return the country eventually to civilian rule. No date has been fixed for that devolution. The government maintained a formal dialogue with political leaders as part of the process that is intended to lead to the return of democracy.

At the invitation of the Argentine government, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visited Argentina in September 1979, to investigate human rights abuses. In its final report the commission recorded a past pattern of wide scale human rights abuses and made an extensive list of recommendations to the Argentine authorities for correcting the situation.

Argentine human rights groups remain active and well organized. Though occasional harassment continued, it was at a lower level than in the past.

1. Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from:

A. Torture

There have been few reports from people detained for national security reasons during 1986. Existing reports suggest, however, that physical mistreatment continues to be used as part of the interrogation of such detainees. In the past testimony from former detainees indicates that mistreatment took the form of electric shock, immersion of head in water, mock executions, severe beatings and psychological abuse. Most observers have concluded that such treatment continues to be meted out to newly disappeared individuals. The Argentine constitution prohibits torture and the government has publicly stated that it has never authorized its use.

B. Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.

In April, 1979, the government decreed uniform prison regulations which have led to a general improvement in prison conditions. While conditions reportedly improved significantly for a time after the issuance of the decree, they again deteriorated in some respects thereafter. In May, 1986, a new decree was issued aimed at uniformly improving conditions, particularly arbitrary use of authority, availability of medical treatment, access to reading material, work and exercise. Initial reports suggest there has been an improvement in these areas since May. However, human rights groups remain concerned, particularly about the
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING PRISONERS. THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS A
REGULAR PROGRAM OF PRISON VISITS.
C. DISAPPEARANCES
THE ARGENTINE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS
RECORDED ELEVEN REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE VICTIM WAS PROBABLY TAKEN BY THE
SECURITY FORCES. THERE ARE REPORTS BY HUMAN RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS ASSERTING THAT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE PEOPLE
DISAPPEARED -- PERHAPS TOTALING AS MANY AS 22. MOST
QUALIFIED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL OF THE PEOPLE
WHO DISAPPEARED HAD ACTIVE LINKS TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
SOME OF THE DISAPPEARED SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED WHILE
SEEKING TO ENTER THE COUNTRY, WHILE OTHERS HAD ENTERED OR
WERE LIVING IN THE COUNTRY CLANDESTINELY. AT THE SAME TIME,
THERE WERE A FEW INSTANCES OF FORMER TERRORISTS WHO AFTER
CAPTURE WERE PLACED BEFORE THE COURTS, WHEN IN THE PAST
SUCH PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED. AS A RULE,
HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT CAPTURED TERRORISTS ARE NOT
BEING BROUGHT TO A PROPER TRIAL BEFORE EITHER MILITARY OR
CIVILIAN COURTS.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A WIDELY PUBLICIZED ALLEGED ABDUCTION
AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINES IN LIMA, REMAIN OBLSCURE.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
CHARGE THAT ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES PARTICIPATED IN
THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION IN PERU. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
HAS STATED THAT THE THREE WERE MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS
BUT HAS DENIED ANY ROLE IN THEIR DISAPPEARANCE, POINTING
TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE BODY OF ONE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS
IN A MADRID APARTMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGESTING THAT SHE
WAS LIVING THERE AFTER HER REPORTED DISAPPEARANCE.
TO DATE THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO PROVIDE AN ACCOUNTING OF THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE WHO ALLEGEDLY DISAPPEARED IN THE PAST. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED ARE DEAD. BASED THEIR CONCLUSION ON THE STATEMENTS OF FORMER DETAINEES WHO REPORT THAT MOST OF THEIR FELLOWS ARE EXECUTED AS WELL AS THE DEARTH OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY, MOST OBSERVERS HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE GREAT BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED ARE INDEED DEAD. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH THIS WITH CERTAINTY, HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT.

THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE 23, ESTABLISHES THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DETAIN AND HOLD PRISONERS UNDER A "STATE OF SIEGE" (WHICH HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 1974). THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE REFERRED TO AS THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER ("PEN") FOR THE SPANISH WORDS PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL). THE EXECUTIVE HAS INTERPRETED THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PLACES NO EXPLICIT TIME LIMIT ON THE DURATION OF THE PEN DETENTION, AS MEANING IT CAN HOLD PRISONERS UNDER THE PEN POWERS INDEFINITELY. THE SUPREME COURT, OVERRULING A NUMBER OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS, HAS UPHeld THIS VIEW, ACCEPTING BROAD AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES OF ASSOCIATION WITH SUBVERSION AS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR DETENTION. SOME PEN PRISONERS HAVE BEEN IN JAIL WITHOUT CHARGE FOR SEVERAL YEARS -- INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER DETAINED BEFORE 1976. IN 1980 THE GOVERNMENT REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEN PRISONERS TO ABOUT 1,200, FREEING SOME, BRINGING SOME TO TRIAL, EXPELLING OTHERS, AND PLACING OTHERS ON SUPERVISED LIBERTY. APPROXIMATELY 750 PEN PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD WITHOUT TRIAL, SENTENCING OR AFTER SERVING SENTENCE. THE REMAINDER ARE EITHER IN TRIAL STATUS, OR SERVING SENTENCES AFTER MILITARY OR CIVILIAN TRIALS. IN ADDITION TO THE PEN PRISONERS, APPROXIMATELY 600 INDIVIDUALS ARE IN JAIL ON OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINAL CHARGES. THUS THE TOTAL PRISON POPULATION OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINALS IS APPROXIMATELY 1,800 COMPARED TO THE APPROXIMATELY 8,400 THAT WERE ARRESTED ON SUCH CHARGES SINCE 1974.

A 1979 GOVERNMENT LAW SHORTENING THE PERIOD FOR COURT FINDING OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH HAS ALLEVIATED SOME PERSONAL HARDSHIPS IN LEGAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS FOR THE SURVIVORS OF THE DISAPPEARED. THE LAW DREW SHARP CRITICISM FROM ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, RELATIVES AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BECAUSE OF FEARS THE GOVERNMENT
E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

The trial of those accused of subversion or terrorism may be held in civilian or military court. Civilian courts follow the customary legal provisions regarding open and fair trials. Argentine law, however, requires written rather than oral testimony, so that "open" has a different meaning and different consequences from those in other legal systems. The law provides that the civilian courts are independent. Military tribunals, before which civilians may be tried, conduct their proceedings in secret. The defendants have access only to a military defense counsel who is usually not a lawyer. Defendants legally may be kept unaware of the evidence against them, in both military and civilian proceedings.

Although used for national security matters, the system of military tribunals usually does not now deal with newly captured terrorists and their active supporters. Lawyers have generally been reluctant to assume the cases of people charged with terrorism or subversion fearing harassment or reprisals. The New York City Bar Association following its visit to Argentina in April 1979 concluded that in 1975-1978 some lawyers disappeared or were detained if they defended clients or causes unpopular with the government. Over the past two years, no lawyers disappeared or were detained for such reasons, and it appears that the profession is operating more
SECURELY THAN IN THE PAST.


F. INVASION OF THE HOME.

THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN PROTECTED BY ARGENTINE LAW, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE. THE SECURITY FORCES, HOWEVER, HAVE OFTEN VIOLATED SUCH SANCTITY DURING THEIR ANTI-TERRORIST AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS. THOUGH THE NUMBER APPEARS TO HAVE DROPPED OFF SHARPLY DURING 1980, AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT VIOLATION OF THE HOME'S SANCTITY WAS EMPLOYED ON SOME OCCASIONS.

2. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF SUCH VITAL NEEDS AS FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION:

ARGENTINA IS ONE OF THE MOST DEVELOPED OF THE NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. ITS STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGH. IN 1978 PER CAPITA INCOME IN CURRENT DOLLARS WAS $2,331 AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS HAVE—WITHIN THE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS OF RECENT YEARS—Sought TO CONFRONT SOCIAL NEEDS. INFANT MORTALITY IN 1970-79 WAS 50 PER 1,000 BIRTHS. IN 1977 93PCT OF THE ADULT POPULATION WAS LITERATE. OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA WAS ONLY 2.0PCT IN 1980 BUT SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A HIGHER LEVEL OF HIDDEN UNEMPLOYMENT. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME HAS BECOME LESS EQUAL IN RECENT YEARS, IN PART AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES DESIGNED TO REDUCE INFLATION AND REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE SECTOR. TOWARD THAT END, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO OPEN THE ECONOMY TO BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 5 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
EXTERNAL COMPETITION BY LOWERING TARIFF PROTECTION, REDUCING SUBSIDIES, AND LIMITING STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMY. INFLATION, HOWEVER, IS STILL HIGH, RUNNING AT ABOUT 75 PCT FOR THE YEAR.
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND TRANSACTION IS A RIGHT OF THE CITIZENS. THE TAX SYSTEM IS PROGRESSIVE AND TAX COLLECTIONS ARE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE, THOUGH COMPLIANCE REMAINS A PROBLEM.
EDUCATION HAS BEEN FREE AND IS WIDELY AVAILABLE, THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW MOVING TO REQUIRE TUITION FOR UNIVERSITY-LEVEL EDUCATION. HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS ACCOUNT FOR A MAJOR SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET. GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE AND TRADE UNION MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS MAKE TREATMENT AVAILABLE AND AFFORDABLE TO MOST OF THE POPULATION.
THERE IS A SERIOUS HOUSING DEFICIT IN ARGENTINA, MOST OF IT ATTRIBUTABLE TO NOW DEFUNCT LEGISLATION THAT SUSTAINED RENT CONTROL GUIDELINES.

3. RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:
   A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY
   IN 1980 THE MARGIN FOR EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY, PROVIDED FOR BY THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. IN EARLIER YEARS THE CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION MADE MANY ARGENTINES FEARFUL OF ASSERTING THESE FREEDOMS. THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY FOR POLITICAL GROUPS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE MARCH 1976, AND MARXIST PARTIES TO THE LEFT OF THE COMMUNISTS BANNED.
   THE PRESS IS NOT SUBJECT TO PRIOR OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP FOR POLITICAL — AS OPPOSED TO MORAL — CONTENT. GOVERNMENT IMPOSED GUIDELINES AND SELF-CENSORSHIP DO PLAY AN IMPORTANT

THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE PRESIDENT BE A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND THE MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES PROFESS THIS FAITH. OTHER RELIGIONS ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER WITH THE GOVERNMENT; ALL BUT THE JEHovah'S WITNESSES ARE PERMITTED TO FUNCTION, AND THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS, INCLUDING A 300,000-450,000 MEMBER JEWS COMMUNITY.

THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY CONDEMNS RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE. ARGENTINE JEWS HAVE WELL DEVELOPED COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, EXERCISE THEIR RELIGION WITHOUT RESTRAINTS AND PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ARGENTINE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS CORRECT RELATIONS WITH THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL ANTI-SEMITIC POLICY. DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE "DIRTY WAR" THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF ANTI-SEMITIC BEHAVIOR IN THE SECURITY FORCES. VIRULENT ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE REMAINS ON SALE IN THE COUNTRY. IN 1980, SEVERAL JEWISH SCHOOLS WERE BOMBED IN JULY AND AUGUST AND MORE RECEIVED ANONYMOUS THREATS. THOUGH THE CULPRITS WERE NEVER FOUND, IN THE FACE OF THESE ATTACKES THE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO REASSURE ARGENTINE JEWS.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED TO PERMIT THE LEGAL REGISTRATION OF THE JEHovah'S WITNESSES WHO NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 30,000 IN ARGENTINA. THEIR PROPERTIES AND MEETING PLACES HAVE BEEN CLOSED, AND WITNESS CHILDREN HAVE BEEN EXPULSED FROM PROVINCIAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS FOR REFUSING TO SALUTE THE FLAG AND SING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOW RULED IN TWO CASES THAT PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO SCHOOL.

SEVERAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, UNITING ACTIVISTS AND RELATIVES OF THE DISAPPEARED, HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE.
ROLE IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. SOME
LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS WERE SEVERELY HARASSED AND
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 6 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
THREATENED IN THE PAST AND SEVERAL ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED.
IN 1980 IT APPEARED THAT THE ORGANIZATIONS WERE OPERATING
IN A CLIMATE OF ENHANCED SECURITY THROUGH THERE CONTINUED
TO BE OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT.

B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN
TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION.

THE ARGENTINES ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WITHOUT RESTRICTION
WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO LEAVE WITHOUT RESTRICTION. THEY
ARE FREE TO EMIGRATE. THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION PERMITS
PERSONS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION (PEN) TO CHOOSE
SELF-EXILE. EXERCISE OF THE "RIGHT OF OPTION" WAS
DENIED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT UNTIL 1978 AND IS STILL
RESTRICTED THROUGH THE USE OF AN EXTENSIVE SCREENING
PROCESS FOR ALL APPLICANTS. MANY APPLICATIONS WERE DENIED
DURING 1980, EVEN THOUGH TET APPLICANTS HELD DOCUMENTS
AUTHORIZING THEM TO ENTER OTHER COUNTRIES.

ARGENTINA HAS ACCEPTED ABOUT 300 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES.
THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM HAS GONE REASONABLY WELL FOR
MOST OF THESE. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN VERY DISCONTENT,
PARTICULARLY ABOUT JOB CONDITIONS AND HAVE Sought TO
LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ARGENTINA HAS ALSO ACCEPTED 11 CUBAN
REFUGEES. TWO PEOPLE WHO REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED IN 1980
WERE PARAGUAYAN COMMUNISTS LIVING AS REFUGEES IN ARGENTINA.
MARRIED WOMEN LIVING IN ARGENTINA MUST HAVE THE PERMIS-
SION OF THEIR HUSBANDS TO TRAVEL ABROAD WITH THE CHILDREN
IF THE HUSBAND IS NOT ACCOMPANYING THEM.

C. FREEDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
MOST ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS REMAINED
LEGALLY SUSPENDED IN 1980. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION
IS TO RETURN THE NATION TO FULL DEMOCRACY BUT IT HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED A TIMETABLE FOR REALIZING THAT GOAL. AS

ARGENTINE WOMEN ENJOY EQUAL JURIDICAL STATUS WITH MEN. WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE NOT A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN ARGENTINA, AS JOBS AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, ALONG WITH SUPPORT SYSTEMS THAT FACILITATE THE SIMULTANEOUS HANDLING OF JOB AND FAMILY, ARE READILY AVAILABLE. SEX DISCRIMINATION IS PROHIBITED IN EDUCATION, POLITICS AND EMPLOYMENT. TRADITION AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS STILL DictATE THAT A WOMEN'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO HUSBAND AND HOME AND LIMITS WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK FORCE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 7 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776
OF THE NEW LAW WILL NOT BE CLARIFIED UNTIL THE MINISTRY
OF LABOR ISSUES DETAILED REGULATIONS, WHICH MAY TAKE UP
TO ANOTHER 120 DAYS TO BE DRAFTED. THE ICFTU CONDEMNED
THE LAW AS A VIOLATION OF UNION RIGHTS.
ALTHOUGH ENJOYING NO OFFICIALS STANDING OR RECOGNITION BY
THE GOVERNMENT, SEVERAL LABOR GROUPINGS ARE ACTIVE IN MAKING
THEIR VIEWS KNOWN. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY OPPOSE THE
GOVERNMENT'S TRADE UNION LAW ON GROUNDS THAT IT RESTRICTS
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AS DEFINED
IN CONVENTIONS 87 AND 98 OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZA-
TION AS RATIFIED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO
OPPOSE THE NEW LAW'S PROHIBITION AGAINST POLITICAL ACTION
BY TRADE UNIONS.

4. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE AND RECORD REGARDING INTERNATIONAL
AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
IN LATE 1978, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INVITED THE
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) TO VISIT
ARGENTINA. THAT VISIT TOOK PLACE FROM SEPTEMBER 6 TO 20,
1979. THE COMMISSION MET WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER
HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL
AND LABOR OFFICIALS, TOOK TESTIMONY FROM FAMILY MEMBERS
OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS AND FROM FORMER PRISONERS AND
VISITED SEVERAL PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS. THE IAHRC
RECORDED A PAST PATTERN OF WIDE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,
INCLUDING VIOLATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT RE THE RIGHT TO
LIFE, TO PERSONAL SECURITY, TO PERSONAL LIBERTY, TO DUE
PROCESS, TO FREEDOM OF OPINION, EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION,
THE IAHRC ALSO OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, FREEDOM OF RELIGION PREVAILS
IN ARGENTINA, IT REPORTED THAT THERE IS NO OFFICIALS POLICY OF ANTI-SEMITISM, THOUGH IN SOME INSTANCES JEWS HAVE BEEN THE SUBJET OF DISCRIMINATION. THE IAHRC FORMULATED A SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FOR CORRECTING THE ABUSES IT HAD OBSERVED. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDED AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED; EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES; RELEASE OR TRIAL OF THOSE BEING HELD UNDER PEN; IMPROVEMENT IN PRISON CONDITIONS; ESTABLISHMENT OF DUE PROCESS; ALLOWING THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES TO EXERCISE FREELY THEIR RELIGION AND TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS; AND TO ASSURE SECURITY AND FREEDOM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.

ARGENTINA HAS NOT SIGNED THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE PROGRAM IN ARGENTINA, WITH REGULAR PRISON VISITS.

END TEXT.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield
FROM: Patricia Derian
SUBJECT: Human Rights Country Report

Attached is the completed Human Rights report on: ARGENTINA

The report is mainly based on extensive reporting from our mission abroad, research and analysis in the Department of State and review of current non-governmental organizations' statements, such as Amnesty International. The report is prepared according to a standard format and guidelines.

The report has been approved in the Department of State by the appropriate geographic bureau, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Policy Planning Staff, the Office of the Legal Advisor, the Office of Congressional Relations, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State. If appropriate, it has also been cleared by AID.

The report is not to be shown to, or discussed with representatives of any foreign government. This not only applies to this report, but to reports on other countries.

As you know, all such reports are by statute required to be submitted by the Secretary of State to the Congress by January 31, 1980. The Department is providing this completed report to you for your information. Should you notice any factual errors, please, let me know directly within three days.

This report has been cleared by the Secretary of State personally.
Over the past twenty-five years Argentina has passed through several cycles of alternating civilian and military rule; since 1955, there have been six military and six civilian presidents. Beginning in 1969, violence mounted progressively from the left and the right as groups with widely different political objectives and conceptions struggled for power. As a result, both civilian and military governments have maintained a "state of siege" for some nine of the past ten years. At the height of this violence in 1975-1976, terrorism had taken on broad dimensions: bombings, robberies, kidnappings and assassinations for political reasons were common occurrences. Organized terrorist groups on both sides of the political spectrum numbered some 5,000-6,000 persons, with sympathizers estimated at an additional 15,000.

By 1976 the situation in Argentina had deteriorated sharply. Courts and political leaders were being intimidated; inflation approached 800 per cent; and many essential public services had been disrupted. At this point, the Armed Forces again took control of the state, with the avowed goals of promoting economic recovery and ending terrorism and corruption. They promised that democracy would ultimately be restored. The Armed Forces maintained the state of siege imposed in 1974 by President Maria Estela Peron, closed Congress, deposed the President, and replaced all members of the Supreme Court. Elected state and local governmental officials were replaced by military officers, and political party activities, including the right of assembly, were prohibited. Most trade unions were intervened and all strikes were banned.

The security forces embarked on a widespread counter-campaign of violence aimed at terrorists as well as elements of the society they considered subversive; many known or suspected terrorists, as well as many persons with no subversive record, disappeared. Many others were detained by the Executive without any specific charge under the "state of siege" powers of the Constitution.

The most carefully recorded and documented list of unexplained disappearances, compiled by the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Buenos Aires, contains about 6,500 cases for the period 1976 to 1979. Some estimates, however, run considerably higher. The Mission of the New York City Bar Association, which visited Argentina in 1979, considers a figure of 10,000 as more accurate, while Amnesty International asserts that 15-20,000 persons have disappeared. There is substantial evidence that most of these persons were abducted by the security forces and interrogated under torture; as most have not reappeared, many observers believe that they were summarily executed. There have been reports, difficult to verify, that some missing persons have been seen alive in detention centers.

As regards use of the Argentine Executive's "state-of-siege" detention powers; some 8,200 persons have been arrested under these provisions since 1974, both by the present Government and its predecessor. While many of those so detained have been released, others have been held without trial for long periods of time.
of the Executive, the Argentine constitution places no specific time limit on detention under the "state of siege". Several courts (first-instance and appellate) held that such prolonged detention is in essence an imposition of punishment without due process, and hence unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, has overruled these lower court decisions and upheld the Executive's position.

Conditions of detention were often cruel, and serious problems of mistreatment, overcrowding, and insufficient medical care often existed. Although the Government asserts that torture was never authorized, there is extensive evidence that torture was routinely used during interrogation by the security forces.

Beginning in early 1978, Government spokesmen declared the war on terrorism to have been won. Conceding that excesses had been committed, the national authorities, through a variety of directives and personnel transfers, have sought to tighten control over the operations of the security forces. At the invitation of the Argentine Government, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visited Argentina in September 1979 to investigate human rights abuses. The Commission interviewed many government, human rights, religious, political and labor officials, and had access to several prisons and detention centers. A mission of the New York City Bar Association was also permitted to visit Argentina in 1979.

Since late 1978, the incidence of disappearances has declined significantly. They numbered many thousands in both 1976 and 1977, and over 500 in 1978; since then such occurrences have been sharply reduced. In 1979 there were 44 known disappearances, most of which occurred in the first half of the year. There are indications that the Government has committed itself to end this practice.

The number of prisoners held without charge under the Executive's "state-of-siege" has been reduced substantially; about 1,300 remained in late 1979. The Government has released large numbers of these detainees. An estimated 1,000 others have been tried and convicted and are still serving prison terms. About 500 more are currently on trial. A review board is working actively on cases of the remaining prisoners. A presidential decree in April regularizing prison rules led to significant improvements in many prison facilities.

Terrorist activities in Argentina have largely ceased. There are reports that small numbers of terrorists are being trained in third countries and are returning to Argentina. In three separate instances, terrorists attempted to murder high officials in late 1979. The GOA has declared that the incidents of the past year are isolated events which do not signal a major resurgence of terrorism.

Political party activity continues to be prohibited and labor unions remain narrowly circumscribed; Government guidelines limit freedom of expression. The Government
The law has been criticized by Argentine and international labor organizations as a Government attempt to curtail organized labor's political and economic power.

In late 1979, the Government promulgated a "political plan" containing broad guidelines for an eventual return to civilian rule and a promise to develop specific proposals in 1980, following a dialogue between military leaders and diverse civilian groups.

Argentine human rights groups are active and well organized, although their leadership has been subject to severe harassment and arrest.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

   a. Torture

There is extensive evidence, primarily the statements of former detainees, that torture has been routinely used by the security forces. It has been most frequent during the first days of interrogation and, according to numerous reports, has taken such forms as the use of electric shock, immersion of the head in water, mock executions, and other types of severe physical and psychological abuse. There are also credible allegations that such practices continued in 1979, with new detainees. The national Government has publicly stated that it has never authorized the use of torture.

   b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

There is an extensive body of evidence indicating that summary execution was a common practice during the years when large numbers of people were being detained by the security forces.

Before early 1979, conditions of imprisonment were poor, and medical services rudimentary. In April 1979, the government decreed uniform prison regulations which have led to a general improvement in prison conditions. There are some reports of continued abuse, but in general over-crowding has been reduced, medical care is better, and visits by family and legal counsel assured, as in the receipt of educational and writing material. The International Committee of the Red Cross maintains a regular program of prison visits.

   c. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment

The Argentine Constitution, in Article 23, establishes the power of the Executive Branch to detain and hold prisoners under a "state of siege" (which has been in effect since 1974). The constitutional provisions are referred to as the National Executive Power ("PEN" for the Spanish words Poder Ejecutivo Nacional). The Executive has interpreted the Constitution, which places no explicit time limit on the duration of the PEN detention, as meaning it can hold prisoners under the PEN powers indefinitely. The Supreme Court, overruling a number of lower court decisions, has upheld this view, accepting broad and unsubstantiated charges of association with subversion as sufficient grounds for detention. Some PEN prisoners have been in jail without charge for several years -- including
a significant number detained before 1976.

Since January 1, 1979, 44 persons, who have not since been located, have disappeared under circumstances suggesting that they were taken by security forces; most of these disappearances occurred in the first half of the year. There have also been charges that persons are being held clandestinely by the security forces. While there is no evidence that large numbers of persons are thus being held, hopes have been nourished by the experience of some prisoners who "disappeared", were presumed to be dead, and later -- in some cases months or years later -- reappeared as officially acknowledged prisoners held under the "PEN". Reports of the existence of clandestine camps have diminished in the last several months.

In September 1979 the Government approved a law shortening the period required for a court finding of presumptive death; it gives the Government as well as relatives the right to initiate proceedings. The law has alleviated some personal hardships in legal and financial matters; however, it has drawn sharp criticism from Argentine human rights organizations, relatives, and the European Parliament because they feared the Government would use the law to arbitrarily close the cases of the disappeared.

In 1979 the Government reduced the number of prisoners being held under the "PEN" from 3,400 to about 1,300, freeing some, bringing some to trial, expelling others and allowing still others to leave the country. Perhaps another 1,000 are serving sentences after trial and conviction on charges of terrorism, or "subversive" political activity or associations. About 500 more are still in trial status.

d. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The trial of those accused of subversion or terrorism may be held in civilian or military court. Civilian courts follow the customary legal provisions regarding open and fair trials. Argentine law, however, requires written rather than oral testimony, so that "open" has a different meaning and different consequences from those in other legal systems. The law provides that the civilian courts are independent, but the pressures accompanying trials involving subversion and terrorism make it difficult for the courts to maintain independence. Military tribunals, before which civilians may be tried, conduct their proceedings in secret. The defendants have access only to a military defense counsel who is usually not a lawyer. Defendants legally may be kept unaware of the evidence against them, in both military and civilian proceedings.

An adequate defense in cases of terrorism or subversion is also difficult to ensure because many attorneys are reluctant to assume cases of this nature for fear of harassment and reprisals. The New York City Bar Association, in its report on the visit of its mission of lawyers to Argentina, concludes that some lawyers disappeared or were detained as the result of defending clients and causes unpopular with the Government, resulting in the intimidation of other lawyers.

While the courts are constitutionally independent, in 1976 the Junta replaced all members of the Supreme
Court; it also removed a number of judges in lower courts, though most judges were retained. The courts have often upheld Executive interpretations of laws and the Constitution. However, there have been instances, when the courts challenged Government actions and interpretations of its powers. The most celebrated of these cases revolved around detained newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman -- who was ordered released by the Supreme Court in an opinion the Junta upheld despite the reported objection of some members of the military.

The Bar Association's report also highlights other problems associated with the lack of due process, but does state that "the ingredients for progress are present" in Argentina. In its report the Association cited the decline in abductions, the Government's commitment to expand procedural safeguards, and certain Supreme Court efforts to exert pressure in the direction of due process. The report recommends the removal of all detainees from executive detention, new trials for those convicted in military courts, an accounting for the disappeared, the termination of restrictions on the exercise of the right to vote (see Section 3b) and the reestablishment of the rule of law and constitutional guarantees.

e. Invasion of the Home

The sanctity of the home has traditionally been protected by Argentine law, custom and practice. The security forces, however, have often violated such sanctity during their anti-terrorist and anti-subversive operations. Though the number of intrusions dropped off during 1979, information available suggests that violations of the home's sanctity in the form of raids and unauthorized searches remains a practice of these forces.

2. Government Policies Toward the Fulfillment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care and Education:

Argentina is one of the most advanced of the newly industrialized nations. Indices of Argentina's standard of living are high. In 1978 per capita income in current dollars was $2,331 and Argentine governments have -- within the economic constraints of recent years -- sought to confront social needs.

Unemployment in Argentina was only 1.8 percent in 1978; the distribution of income has become less equal in recent years, in part as a result of government policies designed to reduce inflation and revitalize the country's productive sector. Toward that end, the Government has made an effort to open the economy to external competition by lowering tariff protection, reducing subsidies, and limiting state involvement in the economy. Inflation, however, is still high, running at about 160 percent for the year.

The tax system is progressive and tax collections are increasingly effective, though compliance remains a problem.

Education has been free and is widely available, although the Government is now moving to require tuition for university-level education. Illiteracy is virtually
private, and trade union medical care programs make treatment available and affordable to most of the population.

There is a serious housing deficit in Argentina, much of it attributable to now defunct legislation that sustained rent control guidelines. Corruption in the public sector has declined significantly under the current government.

3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including:

   a. Freedom of Speech, Religion, and Assembly

   The Argentine Constitution provides for these freedoms, but under both civilian and military governments they have been circumscribed since the imposition of the "state of siege" in November 1974. The climate of violence and repression in Argentina in recent years has made many Argentines fearful of exercising freedom of speech.

   Since 1976 the Government has intervened or confiscated a number of newspapers, notably La Opinion, edited by Jacobo Timerman. Journalists have been among the Argentines who "disappeared". Although the press is not subject to prior official censorship, Government-imposed guidelines result in self-censorship. Newspapers have, however, actively criticized the Government on economic policy and have discussed political issues including, especially in recent months, human rights. Most foreign publications enter Argentina without censorship although occasionally some issues are censored for political and sexual content.

   The Argentine Constitution requires that the President be a member of the Catholic Church, and the majority of Argentines profess this faith. Other religions are required to register with the Government; all but one are permitted to function, and there are substantial minority religious groups, including a 450,000 member Jewish community. There are credible reports of anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviour in the security forces, but the Government publicly condemns religious prejudice and maintains officially correct relations with the organized Jewish community. The Government has refused to permit the legal registration of the Jehovah's Witnesses who number approximately 30,000 in Argentina. Their properties and meeting places have been closed, and Witness children have been expelled from provincial school systems for refusing to salute the flag and sing the national anthem. Although the Supreme Court has now ruled in one case that primary school children should be allowed to return to school, the Witnesses still report instances at the local level where children are expelled from school for failure to respect national symbols.

   Several human rights organizations, uniting activists and relatives of the disappeared, have played a significant role in Argentina over the past several years. Some leaders of these groups were harassed and threatened during 1979, and a police raid on the headquarters of three of the organizations in August raised questions about the future. The police action was ordered by a federal judge. The files of the organizations seized during the raids had not been returned to them by
December, when this report was prepared. The "Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo" -- relatives of disappeared persons -- who used to assemble in front of the Ministry of the Interior in the Plaza de Mayo, were forcibly prevented from using the Plaza late in 1978 and early 1979 and were not permitted to return in 1979. Some of the "Mothers" themselves disappeared, including at least one during 1979.

b. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel and Emigration

Argentines are free to travel without restriction within the country and to leave without restriction. They are free to emigrate. The Argentine Constitution permits persons held under executive detention (PEN) to choose self-exile. Exercise of this "right of option" was denied by the current government until 1978 and is still restricted through the use of an extensive screening process for all applicants. Many applications were denied during 1979, even though the applicants held documents authorizing them to enter other countries.

c. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

After the March 1976 coup d'etat, the Government restricted or suspended most elements of the democratic political process. It has expressed its intention of moving the country back toward normal constitutional, democratic processes but has not established a timetable for reaching this goal. In December 1979, the Government promulgated a "political plan" containing broad guidelines and a commitment for an eventual return to civilian government. The plan promises implementing legislation in the second half of 1980 following a dialogue between military leaders and diverse civilian groups.

The right of assembly for political groups has been suspended since March of 1976, but the Government has tolerated a low level of organized political activity by established political parties. Party leaders meet, spokesmen criticize a variety of government policies and actions, and proclamations are issued in the names of specific parties. Some informal meetings of party leaders have, however, been disrupted by the police, and the leaders detained for brief periods.

 Argentine women enjoy equal juridical status with men. Women's rights are not a contentious issue in Argentina, as jobs and educational opportunities, along with support systems that facilitate the simultaneous handling of job and family, are readily available. Sex discrimination is prohibited in education, politics and employment. Tradition and social customs still dictate that a woman's primary responsibility is to husband and home and limits women's participation in the work force.

The government has intervened major trade unions, replacing high level union officials with military personnel, and strikes have been prohibited. In 1976, and again in mid-1979, the Government detained a number of important labor leaders (almost all have since been released). Strikes for wage increases have nevertheless occurred and nearly all have been settled without violence. On November 15, after more than three years of study, the Government issued a new Trade Union
law which sets the guidelines for Trade Union organization and lays the groundwork for lifting the suspension of union activities which has been in effect since the Armed Forces took power in 1976. It is not clear when the Government will lift the suspension of the right to strike and to bargain collectively. From the Government's point of view, the new law is designed to introduce more grass roots democracy and freedom of association for the workers than existed in the past; labor leaders, on the other hand, see it as an emasculation of union power, as it proscribes all political activity and greatly restricts control over social funds. The procedural steps for the implementation of the new law will not be clarified until the Ministry of Labor issues detailed regulations, which may take up to another 120 days to be drafted. The ICFTU has condemned the law as a violation of union rights.

In September 1979, two major groups of union leaders merged to form the United Leadership of Argentine Workers (CUTA), a provisional committee which purports to speak in the name of the organized Argentine trade union movement in the absence of an officially functioning national central body. Although enjoying no official standing or recognition by the Government, CUTA is active in making its views known. For example, CUTA opposes the recent trade union law on grounds that it restricts freedom of association and the right to organize as defined in conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization as ratified by the Argentine Government. It also opposes the new law's prohibition against political action by trade unions.

4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights:

In late 1978, the Argentine Government invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina. That visit took place from September 6 to 20, 1979. The Commission met with President Videla and other high-level government, human rights, religious, political, and labor officials, took testimony from family members of disappeared persons and from former prisoners, and visited several prisons and detention centers. The Commission will submit its formal report to the OAS in 1980. Argentina has not signed the American Convention on Human Rights.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains an active program in Argentina, with government approval, on behalf of imprisoned persons. The ICRC also monitors prison conditions. The Government has usually received and facilitated the efforts of various groups and individuals seeking to investigate allegations of human rights abuse.
April 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman

Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President Carter to express her deep appreciation for the President's efforts on behalf of her husband. The letter, which was delivered to our Embassy in Israel where she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador Castro's work on this case and Mrs. Timerman's hope that these efforts will lead to her husband's release.

The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be released. While this review was underway the Argentine Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated our position that Timerman should be released on the merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in the immediate future.

We recommend that the President sign the attached reply to Mrs. Timerman.

Jack Perry
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Suggested reply
2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to President Carter
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDELA FROM PRESIDENT CARTER

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIDELA ASAP.

BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: LET ME SAY AGAIN HOW PLEASED I WAS TO MEET WITH YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON FOR THE SIGNING OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES. OUR CONVERSATION GAVE ME A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, WITH WHOM WE WISH TO HAVE THE BEST OF RELATIONS.

2. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR COMMENT THAT WE BOTH HAD THE SAME ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION -- AND THAT YOU SAW OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS ON BOTH. I SHARE THE SAME HOPES.

3. I MIGHT RECOGNIZE THAT ARGENTINA IS FREQUENTLY CHARGED WITH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU WERE CERTAINLY CORRECT IN STATING THAT TERRORISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO ISOLATE ARGENTINA IN THEIR PROPAGANDA. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THAT SUCH PROPAGANDA WILL LOSE ITS FORCE IN THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS YOUR GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATES PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH IMPROVEMENTS.

4. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT OBJECT

*** ASMR COMMENT ***

ARTH IN VP PASTOR THE...
In visits by human rights specialists from respected international organizations, such visits will be an important means of educating international public opinion on improvements in human rights in Argentina.

5. In this regard, let me mention the very important role played by non-governmental human rights organizations, and my hope that they will continue to contribute to the advancement of human rights and my firm belief that they should retain their consultative status at the United Nations.

6. I welcome your expression of hope that the detainee problem might be resolved by Christmas this year. As I told you, there is great interest and concern in the United States over the fate of people detained in Argentina under the national executive power. The clarification of their status would be well received, I believe, throughout the international community. Like your government's recent announcement of the restoration of the right of option and a parole for detainees, such a clarification would be another important step in demonstrating Argentina's commitment to the protection of human rights.

7. I was most gratified and pleased to learn that your government intends to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I realize that the timing of your government's ratification is dependent upon political considerations, but I hope that you will find it possible to ratify the treaty in the near future. Argentina's full adherence to the treaty would have great importance. It would not only demonstrate Argentina's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; it would also, I am convinced, give a significant impetus to worldwide acceptance of the treaty as an important means of avoiding war.

8. I was very pleased that your government participated in the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation conference in Washington. I believe it will provide a great opportunity for our nations to work with others in making nuclear energy an important and safe means of meeting our energy requirements.

9. Mr. President, the personal relationship which...
Established in Washington provided me this opportunity to write you. I very much hope that we continue to exchange views with frankness and candor so as to strengthen relations between our two great peoples.

10. In this regard, I particularly appreciate your letters of September 28 and October 11, 1977, and the information which you related in the second letter concerning the Deutsch family. As I am sure you are aware, there is considerable and continuing congressional and public concern on this matter in my country.

11. In his meeting with you in November, Secretary Vance will have the opportunity to continue our dialogue.

12. I want to thank you and Mrs. Videla for the very kind invitation to attend your son's wedding, and regret that we were unable to attend. Please give our congratulations and best wishes to your son and his bride. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End quote. Vance BT
TO: Ms. Loretta Braxton

FROM: Julie Jacobson, State Secretariat

Attached is cable to post concerning October 11 letter on Deutsch family we discussed yesterday. Please take off our suspense. Thanks.
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDALI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER

I. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIDALI ASAP.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

1. I WAS PLANNED AND PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO SIGN THE TREATY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. I REALIZE THAT THE SIGNS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE TREATY WILL PROVIDE THE STRENGTH TO EFFECTIVELY DEPENDABLES IN OUR FUTURE. ARGENTINA'S INCLUSION IN THE TREATY WOULD HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. IT WOULD NOT ONLY DISCRIMINATE HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT DO A LOT OF HELPING OUR ENERGY REQUIREMENTS.

2. I WAS PLANNED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON. I BELIEVE IT WILL PROVIDE THE OCCASION TO COMMUNICATE VIEWS WITH THE-FACE-TO-FACE WHICH I WISH TO MAINTAIN WITH THE BEST OF RELATIONS.

3. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES. WE BOTH HAD THE SAME END – HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RESPECTFUL. WE BOTH HAD THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE GOOD FOR ME, WHO ARE SAVINGS THE SAME HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES. WE BOTH HAD THE SAME END – HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RESPECTFUL. YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE GOOD FOR ME, WHO ARE SAVINGS THE SAME HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. IN THIS REGARD, LET ME MENTION THE VERY IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. I HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO THE PROGRESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA.


7. IN MY COMMUNICATION WITH YOU, I WAS INFORMED THAT YOU WERE PLANNED TO VISIT THE USA. I AM ENDED THAT YOU WILL RETURN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

8. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

9. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

10. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

11. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

12. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

13. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

14. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

15. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

16. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

17. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

18. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

19. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

20. IN THIS REGARD, I WISH TO BELIEVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter from President Videla of Argentina, dated October 11, 1977

Attached is a copy of a letter to the President from President Videla, which has just been received. Please provide a translation and comments as soon as possible. We plan to incorporate the President's response into the draft the Department has already provided.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América
D. James E. CARTER
WASHINGTON D.C.

Estimado Señor Presidente:

De acuerdo con lo que amigablemente convinimos durante nuestra reunión en Washington, en el sentido de mantener canales de comunicación directos e informales, me place enviarle estas líneas motivadas en uno de los temas que abordamos en nuestro encuentro. Me refiero al caso de la familia Deutsch.

Como conclusión de las investigaciones efectuadas por los organismos competentes, se ha podido establecer que:

- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y su esposa, que abandonaron ilegalmente nuestro país, son activos miembros del Partido Comunista Revolucionario.

  Su función, dentro de la citada organización ilegal era la de efectuar tareas de Información e Inteligencia, vinculadas a la actividad de los grupos terroristas que actúan en el país.

- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la misma organización subversiva, desempeñándose como activista en el ámbito estudiantil.

- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anteriores, encubrió las actividades ilegales de sus hijos.

- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos, próximamente, a los Tribunales Militares competentes.
En cuanto a la señora de Alejandro Deutsch y sus hijas Elsa y Susana Silvia, han sido puestas en libertad al constatarse que no tenían conocimiento ni vinculación alguna con las actividades ilegales del resto de la familia.

Quiero, al presentar a V.E. mi más afectuoso saludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial interés con que acompañó su actuación y, una vez más, reafirmar la fraterna amistad de los argentinos por el pueblo de los Estados Unidos de América.

[Signature]
**3C CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE**

**LOG NUMBER**: 7706879

**RECEIVED BY**: Videla, George

**TO**: Free from Free Videla of Argentina

---

**INTERNAL PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADV CYO</th>
<th>S/S/SC/MAE/</th>
<th>CONC/</th>
<th>INFO</th>
<th>REC</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STAFF SECRETARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN EUROPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEMS (SOCCOS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.H.C. &amp; P.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID EAST/NORTHERN AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGULAR MAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS: ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS: LATEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS: AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS: ECONOMIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS OF AFRICA: SPECIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY ANALYSIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGRESS/LEG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION REQUIRED**

- MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT
- MEMO FOR MR. BREEZELSKI
- REPLY FOR
- APPROPRIATE ACTION
- MEMO TO
- RECOMMENDATIONS
- JOINT MEMO
- REFER TO FOR
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY
- CONSULTATION OR CONSENT
- DUE DATE
- COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

---

**DUE DATE**

- COMMENTS
- SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (IF TAKEN)
- DUE
- CY TO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUE</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED IF TAKEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/19</td>
<td>D. L. Joelson and Lt. Col. Turner</td>
<td>C. C. L. Lezinski</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**SPECIAL DISPOSITION**

---

**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS**

---
E.M. has received by mail the following letter, dated March 11, from wife of Jacobo Timmerman:

"Dear Mr. Carter:

Being the wife of the journalist Jacobo Timmerman and mother of his three sons, I would like to express my sincere thanks for your proceedings with the President of the Argentine Republic in behalf of my husband's release. He is still being "detained and isolated under surveillance" in our Buenos Aires home.

Furthermore, I would like to let you know that the courageous and gallant work of Dr. Castro, your ambassador to Argentina, following your inspiration in your prestigious struggle in behalf of human rights, has greatly contributed to preserve until now my husband's life.

Jacobo Timmerman is only guilty of having insisted, both personally and as a journalist, in fighting for democracy and human rights. But if in still being kept a prisoner in our work, there is no judicial or political charge against him.

I am only asking that with the help of you, in full name, to convey finally the efforts of your administration.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]

Embassy of Argentina in Buenos Aires"
PETT Not making will lead to the marriage of our children and the union with us.

Each more, my heart felt thanks,

Mrs. Piske n. Sippe, Me ick o. St. 3, Tel, 891,

71. Unr B no s.

Printed by:
TO: The Secretary
    The Deputy Secretary
FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky
       HA - Patricia M. Derian

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) The following is a summary of the human rights situation in Argentina. A more detailed review of current conditions is set forth in the attachment.

(C) Disappearances: Seventeen since February 1; three have turned up arrested by the GOA, one was released, and 13 remain unresolved. The last reported disappearance occurred May 13. In 1978, 55 persons disappeared per month; in 1977, 180; in 1976, 300.

(C) Accounting for the Disappeared: The GOA is preparing new legislation to shorten to six months the time period for declaring presumptive death. Army Commander and Junta Member Viola has spoken publicly for the first time of the disappeared as "those who will be absent forever" and told the Embassy he thinks, with rare exceptions, most of the disappeared are dead. The GOA has so far refused to provide individual accounting.

(C) PEN Prisoners: The GOA announced on June 29 it now holds 1,723 persons under PEN (executive detention). It is not clear how many former PEN detainees have been freed and how many have continued in prison after civil or military trials, but the Embassy and the ICRC estimate the total number of political prisoners at just under 3,000 in all of these categories. GOA officials plan to reduce the PEN category to 800-1,000 by late 1979; the latter will continue to be held for an unstated period. In early 1978, the GOA acknowledged that it held about 3,500 PEN prisoners.
(S) Clandestine Prisoners: The question of whether clandestine prisoners exist in significant numbers remains unresolved. If there are, they could number up to a few hundred as an outside limit; our Embassy considers it unlikely that the number would be that high: We have no firm evidence. Fragmentary data, however, suggest the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners and of some small scattered clandestine detention centers about to be closed.

(C) Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with only 18 GOA approvals so far for PEN prisoners seeking to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately 170 applications since September 1977 for all countries.

(C) Prison Conditions: The GOA issued nationwide uniform prison regulations in late April and consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities. In February, there were reports of two beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance in prisons and, in May, of a number of beatings and robberies among a group of prisoners in transit. The ICRC has told us that it believes prison conditions have improved over last year, when it criticized the GOA for poor prison conditions.

(C) The Judiciary: The NYC Bar Association mission noted that the Executive continues to be uncooperative in responding to habeas corpus petitions. The Judiciary has made some attempts to force greater cooperation, but its effective power remains limited.

(C) Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue: Videla and Viola appear to be trying to carry out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce PEN detentions. Hardliners such as General Suarez Mason and General Menendez have recently stepped up calls for a new GOA offensive to root out "intellectual subversion." A political test of strength between these two points of view is shaping up for year's end.

(U) The NYC Bar Association mission noted that progress is possible but would come much faster if the Argentine legal profession would take a more active interest in return to rule of law.
(U) The Church and some elements of the press have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with human rights.

Attachment:

Detailed Review of Current Conditions.


8/1/79 X21966

Clearances: INR/RAR:JBuchanan

(C) This record since February compares to previous years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month.
Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) Following is a description of key human rights developments since the Task Force completed its assessment in early February:

Disappearances

(C) We have received reports of seventeen disappearances for the period since February 1. We immediately communicated these reports to high GOA authorities and asked for information on their whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information that three of the persons were arrested and charged in the courts. One person was briefly detained and then released. The GOA has been unable to provide information on the thirteen other cases. In three cases, however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives by letter or telephone call to advise that they were well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance took place May 13. A list of unresolved disappearances, including those three, is attached.

(C) The victims of these abductions/disappearances have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups. Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers' Party, and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the nonviolent political left.

(C) This record since February compares to previous years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month in 1978, 180 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in 1976. In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances since 1975; in the month following publication, the Assembly received reports of an additional 105 previously unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained 80 1978 disappearances unknown to the Embassy and one from 1979.

Accounting for the Disappeared

(S) The GOA has not yet taken any public step to account for the disappeared. The Government has addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as
shortening the period for legal presumption of death. There are also indications that it is seeking to establish what documentary evidence exists throughout the security apparatus.

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor briefed EC-9 ambassadors in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new legislation and said that relatives will be able to petition the Government for assistance and information three months after the occurrence of a disappearance. The Government will have three months to establish the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no information is developed, relatives will be able to claim survivors’ benefits and regularize their legal status. Although he did not supply details, Pastor said relatives will be able to claim indemnization.

(C) General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro on June 25 that the GOA does not have information on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of these people were alive. He said a few of the disappeared may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions. In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29) Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared, calling them "those who will be absent forever." Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this tacit statement as an admission that many of the disappeared were killed by Argentine police and military forces.

(C) The Embassy concluded in a recent trends report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that the apparatus for disappearing people still exists although, even considering a small upsurge of disappearances in the past several weeks, it appears less used than in the past."

PEN Prisoners

(C) The GOA has continued to release detainees from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that the political prisoner population in this category is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29 that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the beginning of 1978 at about 3,500. It is not clear
how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty and how many remain in custody under some form of charges in judicial processes, or after having been convicted by either military or civilian tribunals. The Embassy and ICRC estimate the total current prison population of persons confined because of the GOA's counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000, including those held under PEN and persons who have been tried and convicted in civil or military courts. We have been told by a source on President Videla's staff that the GOA will continue to review the status of PEN detainees and plans to have the number down to 800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since the "Campora amnesty" of 1973 makes it impossible to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials have said that a certain number of persons will continue under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court.

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor said the GOA has augmented its legal staff reviewing PEN detention from four to 30.

Clandestine Prisoners

(S) The Embassy has received fragmentary but credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly acknowledged. In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared in late 1978, was released by the authorities. It appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely are either the "disappeared" in process through the security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperating with the authorities. As the number of new disappearances has dropped, there is little reason to think that there are still substantial numbers "in process." The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that some small, scattered clandestine detention centers still exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons. It is believed that such centers would be closed before the arrival of the IACHR in November.
Right of Option

(LOU) Argentine Government action on the right of option program continues at a slow pace. The GOA has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy has issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola assured Ambassador Castro again that approval of right of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials announced that about 170 persons have been released under right of option for travel to all countries.

Prison Conditions

(LOU) The GOA has published uniform regulations for the treatment of detainees in a move designed to end variations in treatment at different facilities. The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees. We have reports, however, that the regulations have not yet been fully implemented in all facilities. The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities.

(LOU) According to reports reaching ICRC officials from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared from prison, another was tortured, and a third died as a result of beatings by guards. In early May, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights reported that some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during the transfer.

The Judiciary

(U) As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report, the executive power continues to decline to provide information in response to habeas corpus petitions filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds for continued detention, invoking its alleged power to hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection to the denial of due process and deterioration in the executive power of the judiciary in recent years.
(U) The courts have recently tried a number of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced them to prison terms. Three police officers were recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners.

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue

(C) President Videla and Army Commander Viola are maintaining their leadership position within the GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military still favor repressive policies directed at a broad range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political subversives which clearly would include groups unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past. General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological subversion."

(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights. However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees, jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely affected by present GOA economic policy.

(U) The New York Bar Association's report on human rights conditions in Argentina noted that ingredients are present for future progress in human rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine legal profession is essential for a quick return to civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a more active role in this area.
HUMAN RIGHTS: ARGENTINA

Political terrorism of the left and the right has wracked Argentina since the late sixties, and was partially responsible for the economic and political breakdown precipitating the March 1976 coup. The Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terrorism led to a massive counter-terrorist campaign, undertaken by the security forces.

Although the Government has publicly stated that terrorism has largely been defeated, the anti-terrorist campaign of the last few years has continued and has resulted in severe violations of human rights. Recently, however, instructions have been issued by the Minister of Interior to the police, and reportedly to the military, to curb excesses in counter-terrorist operations.

At present, the Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). The state of siege powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a wide variety of persons for long periods without formal charges. The USG reports an additional 500 prisoners in military camps.

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably from the level of the past two years. From January to August 1978, 347 were added to PEN and 446 released.

Security personnel and prison officials use torture routinely during the interrogation process.

In addition, thousands (estimates range between 3,600 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces. These cases, known as the disappeared, include a broad range of people, such as labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors and political party leaders. A movement is growing, led by human rights organizations and the Mothers of the Disappeared, with the support of some elements of the Church, to trace the missing people. The Government, however, has not accounted for the vast majority of the disappeared, many of whom are presumed to be dead. At present, disappearances and summary executions are reported to continue on a reduced scale of 16-45 per month.
The GOA in late 1977 reinstituted a limited "right of option" for political prisoners, held under executive detention, to request exile. However, from January to August, only 56 were allowed to leave under this program.

The GOA for the first time in February 1978 published lists of those detained under the state of siege.

Responsive action has been taken on a few cases in which the U. S. has expressed special interest. Newspaper editor and Jewish leader Jacobo Timerman was transferred from PEN detention to house arrest, Alfredo Bravo, Co-chairman of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled, Guillermo Vogler was released to the U. S. under the right of option, and four of the five Deutsch family members were released. Also placed on parole was Perez Esquivel, leader of Paz y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee.

Official harassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have borne much of the brunt. Reports of anti-Semitic incidents targeted at members of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decreased.

Severe restrictions remain on civil and political freedoms, among these trade union rights, fair judicial processes, and the activities of political parties. Press freedom continues to be curtailed although some restrictions were recently lifted. There appears to be little concerted or effective effort to date to check fundamental abuses or revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would prevent human rights violations in the future.

We had hoped that the Argentine Government would have been able to accept a visit by the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). However, the conditioned invitation issued by the GOA was not acceptable to the Commission. Negotiations are continuing.

**ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS**

On October 27, 1977, the U. S. voted no on a gas pipeline loan in the IDB. We followed this up with "no" votes on a cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on December 8. On November 3 we did, however, support an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds that it meets basic human needs.
-- Early in 1978, we abstained on an industrial credit and a grain storage loan, both in the World Bank. We abstained rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government that we had noted limited improvements in some areas, and to encourage further positive developments. We followed this by an extension of a $60 million agricultural credit loan in April and abstained on three IFC loans.

-- Economist is currently holding back over 7600 million in transactions for Argentina because of human rights considerations.

-- Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY '78. The Administration declined to sign the FY '77 FMS agreement and is not requesting FMS credits for Argentina for FY '79. All arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list) are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis; only very few selected new items with no apparent relationship to human rights have been approved.

-- On various occasions, we have discussed our human rights concerns with the GDA at the highest levels, including trips by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary and the Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that we want better relations with that country, but that there would have to be improvements in the human rights area. He specifically asked for movement on: an invitation to the IAHRC; establishment of a mechanism to inform the families of disappeared persons of their whereabouts; and, trial, release or exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners held without charge.

-- The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of individuals who are either detained or have disappeared to the Argentine Government and have requested that they furnish information on these individuals.
MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IN ARGENTINA

The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently continue although not on the massive scale of the past two years.

In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical torture continues to be used regularly during the interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called 'criminal subversives' who do not fully cooperate." It reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports of torture, this is not because torture has been foresworn but "derives from fewer operations" because the number of terrorists and subversives has diminished.

Torture used to intimidate and extract information is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock, the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with cupped hands." A 1978 Amnesty International report in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse, rape...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with boiling water, oil and acid: and even castration."

The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable information about a case in late December 1977, and in the past few weeks credible information about another case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place in 1976 and 1977.

One well-known case of physical abuse was Jacobo Timerman. Another well-publicized case by Amnesty International was that of Elizabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old West German citizen who died three months after her arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our Embassy have numerous documented examples.

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports "guard brutality" in the jails, and "beatings and assaults" during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures for Argentine security forces." These procedures are
expected to continue at least until after the World Cup Soccer matches in June.

Our Embassy further notes that, while penalties exist for police maltreatment of common criminals, they do not for political detainees. Furthermore, no such charges have been made publicly against members of the Armed Forces which carry out much of the counter-subversive operations, although internal disciplinary proceedings have reportedly taken place for some "unauthorized excesses." Interior Minister Hardindeguy in May called for an end to police use of terrorist tactics, and it was reported that the military received similar orders. However, no progress has been reported in deed.

Disappearances

Reports of torture do not of course deal with the thousands (estimates range in the tens of thousands) of Argentine citizens who were abducted by security forces and summarily executed. These cases, known as the disappeared, include not only suspected terrorists but also encompass a broader range of people—including labor leaders, workers, clergy, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A recent dramatic occurrence was the abduction in December of five "mothers of the disappeared" and two French nuns, whose bodies were reportedly discovered washed ashore.

There is a growing movement led by human rights organizations and the Church to trace the missing people. In La Prensa of May 7, an open letter to President Videla was printed as a full page ad listing the names of 2,592 disappeared and urging an accounting. It was sponsored by three Argentine human rights organizations and paid for by contributions from large numbers of Argentine citizens. Editorials in Argentine newspapers this month further called attention to the "political timebomb" of the tragic disappearances. The Buenos Aires Herald declared "Every effort must be made to trace missing people. It is the only way to convince the world, and to prove to ourselves, that we do care about human rights. If anxious relatives are ignored or treated with callousness, they will become symbols as victims of a totally brutalized society." Innumerable letters are received by the US Government from the relatives and friends of the disappeared calling for an accounting.
Internationally, human rights organizations are also supporting this campaign. Amnesty International, for example, on May 18 launched a major drive against political imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in Argentina.

Both the internal and external pressure building seek to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public accounting.
CONFIDENTIAL

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 1

ACTION: NEA

INFO OCT 81 ARS 11 ADS 88 WA 85 PW GS NYCG 83 SP 82 SS 15 CITE 89 DODG 06 1MR 84 GSZG 80 FA 81 9007 V

R 751115Z OCT 79
FM AMBASSADOR "TEL AVIV"
TO SECSTATE VASHOC 4307
INFO USICA VASHOC
AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES

CONFIDENTIAL: SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 22928

STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; HA FOR DERIAN
USICA FOR AR

E.O. 12805: RDS 18/75/95 (DIETERICH, V.J.) OR/O
TAGS: PR, PB, PIB, IA
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE EXILE JACOB TIMERMAN

1. IC - ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE DIETERICH, WHO KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE, TIMERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT "IS EXPERIENCES, AND THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIMERMAN WILL BE IN THE UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARD FROM THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN. THEN HE WANTS TO SEE WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE DEPARTMENT, AND AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

3. TIMERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE "LEADER" OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED ZBIGNIEW BREZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN BECAUSE HE HAD SAID TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN. THE OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAD SLANDERED FASCISM. HE WAS ALSO QUESTIONED CONCERNING SUPPOSED CONTACTS BETWEEN BEGIN AND THE MONTONEROS DURING A BEGIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN 1975. TIMERMAN BELIEVED THESE QUESTIONS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT BEGIN'S BOOK "WAR IN THE HOLY LAND" HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG MATERIALS USED BY THE MONTONEROS. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEN. HARGUIÑEZ IN THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A BEGIN VISIT. THE GENERAL INFORMED HIM THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE THAT PATT DERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE WAS HIS COUSIN.

4. TIMERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LAVUSSÉ'S EXPRESS SECRETARY EDUARDO SAJON DIES OF A HEART ATTACK DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

5. TIMERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV DAILY MAARIV AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED COLUMBIA. THIS YEAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS, BUT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE WILL BRANCH INTO BROADER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THE THEME OF A SPEECH HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526
Authority NLC - 24-91-4-1-9
NARA 45 Date 7-25-89

CONFIDENTIAL

AND MORE
WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE.
ARGENTINA

1980/1981 PLAN OF ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 29 the Interagency Group for Latin America developed a strategy, subsequently approved by the President, to achieve better balance in our relations with Argentina. Before the strategy could be fully implemented, Argentina became heavily involved in supporting the new Bolivian regime. Imminent GOA recognition of the Bolivian regime and continuing reports of Argentine involvement led to the postponement of Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit. The visit was to have been the major vehicle for implementing most of the initiatives to improve U.S.-Argentine relations in 1980.

Argentina continues to be heavily involved in supporting financially and militarily the Bolivian regime. There is some indication that because of the strong USG reaction and the effect on our bilateral relations, Argentine leaders are willing to counsel moderation to the Bolivians, but there is no clear indication as yet the GOA is in fact exerting needed pressure to end the more repressive and corrupt practices of the Garcia Meza regime. Over the longer term, we would hope that Argentina would encourage a return to civilian rule and avoid a polarization in Bolivian society.

Argentina is unlikely to cooperate further in the West's partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union. Although we had been told earlier that cooperation was possible and depended on the size of the 1980/1981 harvests, our Embassy was informed last week that Argentina would sell as much grain to the USSR as is available.

The U.S. continues to have a significant stake in maintaining and furthering improved bilateral relations. We continue to seek Argentine support on East-West and Hemispheric issues, in international fora and on non-proliferation. We also seek to influence Argentine internal developments on human rights and on an eventual return to democracy, as well as to limit the potential increase of Soviet influence there. Other strategic interests include its size, geographic location, natural resources, and relatively advanced economic, scientific,
and cultural development. Argentina has the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America and potentially one of the world's richest oil-bearing areas in its vast continental shelf. Argentina's port facilities and coastline could play an important role in the protection of critical sea lanes.

The U.S. also has major commercial interests in Argentina. U.S. exports to Argentina more than doubled in 1979 over 1978 (from $704 million to $1.5 billion). In the first nine months of 1980 exports increased 59.3% over the same period in 1979 to $1.8 billion. Of particular interest to U.S. industry are the potentially large exports related to the huge hydroelectric projects being undertaken by the GOA with Paraguay. Potential sales in one project alone could total up to $350 million. The U.S. Government has been actively supporting the bids of U.S. firms in these projects.

The U.S. faces a potentially serious confrontation with Argentina at the OASGA beginning November 19 on the issue of the IAHRC's human rights report. Failure to reach agreement could affect our other national interests. In addition, we need to consider the U.S. approach to President Viola during his planned visit to Washington, particularly with regard to the GOA's interest in resuming arms purchases and the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment barring such sales.

II. STATUS OF 1980 ACTION PLAN

A. Continuing or Early-Action Initiatives:

-- Meeting of the U.S./Argentine Mixed Economic Commission. The meeting has been scheduled for April 1981 (the earliest mutually convenient time frame). The agenda will include discussion of bilateral trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations.

-- Bilateral Income Tax Treaty. Conclusion of the Treaty is in the final stages.

-- Consular Convention. Both parties are reviewing a proposed text.

-- Human Rights. We have continued the dialogue, most recently through high level bilateral discussions at the UNGA. We are continuing discussions at the OASGA.
1) Need for timely response

2) Can the claim be self-assessed? 
-- Nuclear Relations. We are continuing negotiations aimed at resolving the remaining safeguards issues to permit the delivery of highly and moderately enriched uranium for Argentina's nuclear research program as well as components for its power program. We hope negotiations will be completed this year. We continue to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, most recently during bilateral talks at the UNGA.

B. Initiatives where the Timing is Undecided:

-- Visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires. Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Argentina was postponed following Argentina's support of the Bolivia coup and recognition of the new Bolivian regime.

-- The first round of periodic security consultations focusing on security of the South Atlantic. These talks will highlight the critical strategic implications of the South Atlantic and create interest in cooperation for its defense.

-- Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues. We would exchange views on global issues and explore ways to promote mutually beneficial policies. The agenda would include an exchange of views on human rights policies and Argentina's evolution toward democracy, East-West and Hemispheric cooperation, and international issues such as law of the sea and the transfer of arms and technology.

-- Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement. We have withheld signing the agreement until GOA participation in the partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union is resolved.

-- An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. H reports that consultations with the Congress are completed and have been favorable. HA disagrees as to the scope of the consultations.

-- A high-level military visit. We told the President we will keep under review the desirability of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
A final decision, including timing, would take into account continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

C. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. In view of the GOA's continuing involvement in Bolivia and its policy of non-cooperation on grains restriction, which initiatives should be rescheduled and which should be deferred for later decision?

III. ARGENTINA AT THE OASGA

A. Background:

One of the most controversial issues at the OASGA will be how to handle the IAHRC's human rights report on Argentina. If Argentina perceives it is unjustly or harshly treated by the OAS in general or the U.S. in particular, it may make good on its threat to walk out of the OAS. GOA officials have also implied that the U.S. position at the OAS will be taken into account in considering the award of contracts for hydroelectric projects such as Yacyreta.

Following USG representations, Argentina allowed the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) in September 1979. The Commission's special report was severely critical of Argentina, calling on the GOA to inter alia account for the disappeared and bring to trial and punish those responsible, lift the state of siege, release or grant the right of option to depart Argentina to those persons held under Executive detention, investigate and punish those responsible for torture, and restore due process guarantees.

Consideration of the IAHRC's report on Argentina may be the most divisive issue in this year's OASGA. Many human rights groups and representatives from the Argentine exile community plan to visit Washington during the meeting and will push for Assembly condemnation. Argentine Nobel laureate Perez Esquivel also plans to be in Washington during the meeting. While these activities will heighten publicity over Argentina's case in the U.S., they will serve even more to focus public attention on the Commission's activities in Argentina. The Argentine Government believes harsh action by the OAS will establish precedent for similar treatment in other international fora, and it is seeking...
an omnibus resolution which would not name specific countries. Mexico, Venezuela and Peru are strong supporters of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and, in varying degrees, favor an activist stance by the OAS in the human rights field.

U.S.-Argentine bilateral discussions could be crucial to achieving a satisfactory outcome. We are working informally with Argentina and other interested countries to develop an OAS resolution which, while not calling for condemnation of Argentina, will recognize the work of the Commission, take note of the human rights situation at the time of the report, note the improvements since, and call on the GOA to take into account the report's recommendations for improved human rights observance.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Should the U.S. back off on its position calling for a country-specific resolution and accept an an omnibus resolution which would make some specific mention of Argentina, if that is the consensus of the other OAS members?

2. Should we accept an omnibus resolution not mentioning Argentina?

V. U.S. MILITARY SALES TO ARGENTINA

A. Background:

At the May 14 Policy Review Committee meeting on Argentina, it was decided that it would be premature to consider rescission or modification of legislative restrictions on military supply to Argentina this year. In 1981, legislative modifications to permit training and perhaps other actions concerning military supply might be considered if the human rights situation in Argentina continued favorably. The current human rights situation is described in the attached summary.

IMET Training Programs, the sale of training under FMS and military supplies to the GOA (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system. In
order to permit the sale of these items, either:

— the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment would have to be rescinded or modified;

— a Presidential determination that a proposed sale was in the U.S. national interest would have to be evoked (At present, the President has no such leeway for Humphrey-Kennedy; however, legislation is pending in this year's FAA which would give the President this authority); or

— the Congress would need to pass specific legislation permitting a particular sale.

DOD has identified strategic and economic interests which support the sale of military aircraft in the near term:

— There is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance P-3 aircraft to the GOA to counter the Soviet buildup in the South Atlantic.

— Argentina plans to embark next year on a $3 billion modernization program for its Air Force. The GOA has told us that it prefers U.S. equipment and that it is committed to making a decision by June 1981. If the U.S. is unable to respond by that date, Argentina will turn toward European suppliers.

The U.S. proscription of military sales toward Argentina, while not affecting the availability of military equipment to the GOA (European suppliers have been more than willing to fill the gap), have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Modification of our posture must take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and internationally who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

U.S. arms sales policies toward Argentina must also take into account the strategic balance in the Southern Cone. Chile already sees our improving relationship with Argentina as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. Major U.S. arms sales to Argentina while we maintain our present cool and distant relationship with Chile would further tip the balance.
of power in favor of Argentina; this plus the political signal renewed arms sales would convey to both parties could encourage Argentina to seek a military solution to the Beagle Channel dispute, if the current mediation fails.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Has there been sufficient improvement in the human rights situation to change our position on military sales?

2. What specific human rights improvements would be required for us to change our position?

3. Are there strategic or economic consideration which would cause us to seek approval of specific sales?

4. What are the ramifications of a resumption of sales to Argentina on the military balance in the Southern Cone? On our stance toward other countries with human rights violations?

IV. PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

A. Background:

Argentine President-designate Roberto Viola tentatively plans to travel to New York December 5 to address the Council on Foreign Relations and U.S.-Argentine Chamber of Commerce. According to the Argentine Embassy here, he may also visit Washington December 6-7.

Viola is a moderate within the Argentine military hierarchy, friendly to the United States, and sympathetic to U.S. views. His visit would provide an opportunity to influence future Argentine policies on Bolivia, grains, human rights, and Tlatelolco. On the other hand, coming to Washington in the middle of a Presidential transition is awkward. The Carter administration will not be in a position to discuss policy beyond January 20. Whether the President-elect or his advisors would want to see him to review U.S.-Argentine relations is problematical.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Whether Viola should be encouraged to come to Washington.
2. In the event of an affirmative answer, who should see him?

Attachment:
Status of Human Rights in Argentina.

Drafted: ARA/SC: GJWhitman: mas ;
11/10/80
The human rights situation in Argentina has improved over previous years, but remains serious. Most seriously, fundamental, internationally recognized rights of the integrity of the person have been violated through the application by the security forces of the tactic of disappearance. The number of confirmed disappearances registered in Argentina this year total 11, but there are unconfirmed reports of 22 or more. This total is in contrast to the many thousands who disappeared in 1976 and 1977, more than 600 in 1978 and 44 in 1979. There continue to be reliable indications that individuals detained as suspected terrorists or subversives are subject to torture. There has been no accounting for past disappearances.

The number of detainees on other than common criminal charges has been reduced, although the numbers remaining are still significant. Since 1974, 8200 people accused of terrorism or subversion have been detained under the special executive powers of the President. By September 1980, prisoners accused of other than common crimes totaled 1,700 to 1,800. Of these about 750 were being held without trial, some for many years or after having served their sentences. About 600 had been tried and convicted in military or civilian courts and another 400 were in trial status. The right of option program, which allows qualified prisoners to choose self-exile in lieu of detention, has been greatly restricted by Argentine Government regulations. As a result, of the 277 prisoners who have qualified for the U.S. Hemispheric Parole Program, only 82 persons have been able to travel to the United States.

Prison conditions have improved, although there is still concern over psychological conditions which may have been a factor in a number of suicides. Earlier complaints regarding overcrowding, lack of medical treatment, improper food, and restrictions on visits have been largely resolved.

The opportunities for the exercise of political freedoms remain circumscribed by the prohibition on political activities and de facto limits on the freedom of expression. Within uncertain limits, politicians and the press increasingly voiced criticism of the Government's actions and plans. Occasionally politicians were detained on the grounds that they had overstepped the limits of the law. The military designated the
President for the period 1981-1984, while reiterating its ultimate commitment to return the country to civilian rule. However, no date has been fixed for that devolution.
Cleared: ARA/SC: REService
ARA: JABushnell
ARA/RPP: GJones
ARA: WGBowdler
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience -- in the U.S. and elsewhere -- before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last --the invitation-- may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization. I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified. (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

Or we should have a PRC on the above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
EXDIS
Rome for Vatican Office
DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INTAFF
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM PINT AR
SUBJECT: THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE
REF: BUENOS AIRES 7578

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DISAPPEARANCE IS STILL THE STANDARD TACTIC
FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH CAPTURED
TERRORISTS. THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO THIS METHOD IS
PROFOUNDLY ROOTED IN ELEMENTS THAT RANGE FROM EFFECTIVE-
NESS THROUGH EXPEDIENCY TO CULTURAL BIAS. WE DOUBT WHETHER
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPPROBRIUM WILL, IN THEMSELVES, CAUSE
THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE TACTIC AND GRANT CAPTURED TERROR-
ISTS DUE PROCESS. GETTING THE AUTHORITIES TO ABANDON THIS
TACTIC WILL BE AN UPHILL BATTLE. WE MUST TRY.
THE VATICAN MAY BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE IN THIS
EFFORT WHICH SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE LEADERSHIP THAT
THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM—ESPECIALLY
THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COURTS. END SUMMARY.

3. THOUGH DRAMATICALLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS FROM PREVIOUS
LEVELS, DISAPPEARANCE CONTINUES TO BE THE STANDARD TACTIC
FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH PEOPLE
THEY BELIEVE TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
DISAPPEARANCE IS A EUPHEMISM FOR THE UNACKNOWLEDGED DETEN-
TION OF AN INDIVIDUAL BY SECURITY FORCES. BASED ON EVERYTHING WE KNOW, WE BELIEVE THAT DETAINEES ARE USUALLY TORTURED AS PART OF INTERROGATION AND EVENTUALLY EXECUTED WITHOUT ANY SEMBLANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE TO USE THIS PROCEDURE ONLY AGAINST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED THIS YEAR HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MONTONEROS.

4. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WON THE "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST THE TERRORISTS TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE THAT TIME THE MONTONEROS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ONLY ISOLATED, IF OCCASIONALLY SPECTACULAR, ACTS FOR WHICH THE TERRORIST ACTORS HAVE OFTEN EVENTUALLY PAID WITH THEIR LIVES. THUS, EVEN IF ONE WERE TO CONCEDE THE CASE BEFORE, NECESSITY HARDLY CAN BE INVOKED BY THE MILITARY TO JUSTIFY THE USE OF DISAPPEARANCE AS A COUNTER-INSURGENCY TECHNIQUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CONTINUED USE OF DISAPPEARANCE HAS A VERY HIGH INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST FOR THE GOVERNMENT. IT IS ON THE DEFENSIVE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE STRAINED BY THE ISSUE. THE PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT OF ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINE MONTONEROS IN PERU FORCED PRESIDENT VIDELA TO CANCEL A TRIP TO LIMA THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TO SYMBOLICALLY EXPRESS HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEMOCRATIC INTENTION. AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THIS GOVERNMENT, OUR CONTACTS, EVEN AMONG THE MILITARY, RECOGNIZE THESE COSTS AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY DISAPPEARANCES WILL CEASE.

5. BUT THEY DON'T THIS UNWILLINGNESS DOES NOT REFLECT SIMPLE BLOODY-MINDEDNESS BY UNTHINKING MILITARY MEN. IF IT DID THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE MORE SOLUBLE. RATHER THE ARGENTINES HAVE RESORCE TO DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE:

--IT WORKED. MORAL AND LONG TERM POLITICAL COSTS APPEAR LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO THE GOA.

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DEFEATED ONE OF THE LARGEST TERRORIST ASSAULTS ON A MODERN SOCIETY USING THIS TACTIC. THE EXPERIENCE OF WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN USING THE LAW TO MOVE A TERRORIST THREAT MAKES LITTLE IMPRESSION HERE SINCE THE MILITARY ACCURATELY EVALUATE THE THREAT THAT THEY BESTED AS BEING MUCH LARGER THAN THE ONE THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRG FACED. RATHER, ARGENTINES INVOKE ITALY'S CONTINUING TORMENT AS WHAT THEY MIGHT HAVE FACED IF THEY HAD STUCK TO THE LAW.

--IT CONTINUES TO BE EFFECTIVE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS YIELD UP INFORMATION UNDER TORTURE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS CAN BE TURNED AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES. DISAPPEARED
PRISONERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE A FRIGHTENING EXAMPLE THAT INHIBITS THE MONTONEROS' ABILITY TO RECRUIT NEW PERSONNEL.
EXDIS

ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INATAF

--THE MILITARY ARE UNWILLING TO USE CIVILIAN COURTS TO
PUNISH ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THEY ARGUE THAT THE COURTS
WOULD SIMPLY LET THE TERRORISTS GO. IN VIEW OF THE
STIFF SENTENCES HANDED OUT RECENTLY TO TERRORISTS
CAPTURED IN EARLIER YEARS, THIS ARGUMENT IS NOT CONVINCING.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM IS FOUNDED FIRST IN THE
INABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE FOR USE
IN THE COURTS AGAINST MEN AND WOMEN FANATICALLY DEDICATED
TO THEIR CAUSE—OTHER THAN THAT EXTRACTED FROM THE
DETAINEES UNDER TORTURE. SECONDLY, THE SECURITY SERVICES
ARE UNWILLING TO SURRENDER THEIR COMPLETE CONTROL OVER
THE DETAINEES.

--THE MILITARY DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE.
THEORETICALLY A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE WOULD
HANDLE THE TERRORISTS, METING OUT CAPITAL SENTENCES IF
THAT WERE TO ITS TASTES. HOWEVER, FOR SUCH A SYSTEM
TO WORK, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE OFFICERS OF RECORD WHO
IN THE FUTURE COULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR
ACTIONS. AS ONE MAN, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE MAJOR
SECURITY FORCES, TOLD US, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO
ARGENTINE OFFICER WHO WANTS TO HAVE HIS NAME ON RECORD
AS ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST. UNDER THE
CURRENT SYSTEM, THE MILITARY ARE RESPONSIBLE AS AN
INSTITUTION BUT THE INDIVIDUAL IS FREE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY.

--AT BEST, THE RULE OF LAW IS A WEAK AND FRAGILE CONCEPT IN
ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY DOES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM AND ITS
DISREGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DUF PROCESS REFLECT WIDESPREAD ATTITUDES IN THIS SOCIETY. ARGENTINES WHO GENUINELY BELIEVE IN THE RULE OF LAW, SOME IN THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS OPPOSING IT, REMAIN A MINORITY.

---FORCING THE SECURITY FORCES TO ABANDON THE TACTIC WOULD INVOLVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND VERY POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE SECURITY FORCES. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION MAKE IT A VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST COUNT ON A MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS MORE OR LESS UNIFIED.

---INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPINION ARE GIVEN LESS WEIGHT BY THE MILITARY THAN THE NEED TO CLEAN UP THE REMANANTS OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR. THEY WILL NOT EASILY CHANGE THEIR TACTICS TO MOLLIFY CRITICISM.

6. THE USE OF DISAPPEARANCE IS NOW RESTRICTED, WE BELIEVE, TO ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THIS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH DISAPPEARANCES OCCUR DEPENDS SOLELY ON THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WHO ARE ACTIVE AND GET CAUGHT. AS THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS HAS DECLINED, SO HAVE THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES. THIS TENDENCY WILL CONTINUE IF THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS CONTINUES TO DROP, BUT DISAPPEARANCE AS AN ACCEPTABLE TACTIC WILL NOT END SOON.

7. AS THE WAR BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES GOES ON, HUMANITARIAN VALUES AND US RELATIONS WITH THIS COUNTRY ARE CAUGHT IN A CROSSFIRE. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN DO LITTLE TO AFFECT THE TERRORISTS' CHOICE OF WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON TACTICS IT WILL USE IN THIS WAR IS NOT MUCH GREATER. IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE AGAINST ARGENTINE "SUCCESS" IN ITS UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND PARA-MILITARY GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES WE MUST MAKE THE EFFORT.

WE SHOULD:

---MAKE IT CLEAR TO GOA OPINION MAKERS THAT WHILE WE HAVE NO SYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS WE CANNOT CONDONE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST THEM. SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO EMPLOY SUCH TACTICS THERE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TO NORMAL RELATIONS.

---ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO PONDER SERIOUSLY HOW THIS POLICY IMPEDES ITS EFFORTS TO MAKE ARGENTINA A RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS.

---STIMULATE THE GOVERNMENT TO THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE MAY BE THE BEST ANSWER. IF THE MILITARY COULD BE SHAKEN OUT OF THEIR BELIEF THAT DEATH IS THE ONLY REASONABLE PUNISHMENT
FOR TERRORISTS, THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGES IN USING THE MILITARY COURTS. THE BRAZILIANS RIVIED ON THEM DURING THEIR SUCCESSFUL BOUT WITH TERRORISTS. THIS EXAMPLE MIGHT HELP CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE.


RUSER
BT
MEMORANDUM FOR:       THE PRESIDENT

From:               Warren D. Christopher

Subject:        Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine Relations

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

I. OBJECTIVES

Our principal objective will be improve our relationships so as to foster Argentina's identification with the West; to seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); to foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns; to encourage further specific
improvement in current human rights practices (e.g. due process for all persons suspected of subversion or terrorism); and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence. We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and in other Hemispheric issues.

II. ACTIONS FOR 1980

1. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate:

--A visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1.
--A meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the U.S. delegation to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

--Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues, with the first round of such talks to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

2. Nuclear Relations

We want to keep open the door for such cooperation as Argentina may desire for its nuclear program, as a way to maintain influence for the longer-term. In particular, we should try to meet our commitment to provide highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program. We should:

--Try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law, the remaining safeguards issues to permit
delivery of the research fuel and the licensing of U.S. components;

—once this is done, undertake a review of the advisability of modifying U.S. policy to facilitate greater participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program. (The principal case currently at issue is an export license permitting the sale of a high-pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

3. Human Rights

We would continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

--the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina and which maintains the integrity of the OAS Commission on Human rights;
—there be no new disappearances, (i.e., extra-legal abductions of persons suspected of association with terrorism or subversion, including persons believed to be active terrorists);

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities be processed through normal judicial channels, thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and

—there be substantial progress in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners--1,300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora, and concluded that this should not be a central requirement for improving our bilateral relationship.
4. **Military Relations**

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in relations (including a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). We plan to:

---

**begin periodic security consultations with Argentina;** the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

---

**invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues;**

---

**invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas.** (The Executive Branch will consult with members of Congress on this initiative.)
Other issues are:

---High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability to proceed with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as developments in human rights and U.S.-Argentine relations.

---Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, to seek special legislation to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.
5. Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

— Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs;

— Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;

— Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. We believe recent Soviet activities are a subject for the NATO experts group on Latin
America and should be addressed in that forum. Human rights are discussed by the WEO group in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. A majority of the Inter-Agency Group recommended against any new bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues.

7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

As a general point, the Group noted that many of these steps will merely restore a better balance in U.S. relations with the two countries since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations). There was agreement that Brazil would not respond favorably to a proposal for trilateral security talks at this time.
Not addressed by the Group, but a problem of some consequence, nonetheless, is the Chilean perception that we have "tilted" toward Argentina. Chile sees our warming relationship with Argentina as being directly threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoid war. However, the Chileans seem to fear that the Argentines, enjoying improved relations with the U.S., and seeing Chile increasingly isolated, will be encouraged toward adventurism. This problem of an imbalance in our relationships in the Southern Cone, and of the dangers that this could pose to peace in the region, will need to be looked to in the not-too-distant future.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS: JANUARY 23

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (R&T) CARLOS PASTOR, FOREIGN MINISTER
   DR. JOSÉ ALFREDO MARTÍNEZ DE FOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY
   COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
   MR. VICTOR RAÚL, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)
   GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
   RAÚL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA
   CLAUS V. RUSEN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA)
   WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER)

5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1953; THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOODPASTER MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS AND MATTERS HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IT WAS HIS GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AN ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS TROUBLES U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, AND THAT U.S.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCALCULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24, FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR RESTORING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE ROJO'S RESPONSE TO OUR EFFORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

9. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S FIRST PRESENTATION.
PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S EXPLANATION OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH THE WISH AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS WE ADMIT THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL — HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND TOGETHER?

10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT" DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT WE ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, PASTOR CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR BAD RELATIONS ARE THE NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. THE UNITED STATES HAS Seldom UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF U.S. POLICY, AND INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS.

1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA Fought A WAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE YEARS, AND ARGENTINA WON THE WAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S. SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS — RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION" WAS THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IT THIS SYMBOLISM, PASTOR "FELT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO
SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES —
RATHER AS THROUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD
CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES,
WHEN THE U.S. HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT
INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OF
ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNFAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE
KEMPREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF
ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS — EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED,
TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.

13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1932
ARGENTINA WAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE
WORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ("WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A
THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED THE U.S. IN
PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA; THIS COUNTRY HELPED
DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE; WE WERE THE FIRST
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES;
WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS;
WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A
RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.
14. U.S. LACK OF APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE ARGENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS FOR EXAMPLE THAT YOU WANT TO USE US TO TAKE IN THE SATE OF IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

15. FOR THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, YOU MUST ASK NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, PASTOR SAID, AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ARGENTINA CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA. THESE CHANGES OF ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE REFLECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONGRESS, AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASKED THAT THE U.S. STOP PRESSING ARGENTINA SO HARD IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPONSE TO WHICH WE COULD CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION HE PLANS TO MAKE LATER THIS YEAR").

16. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HE DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.)

17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY" ROASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT GOVERNMENT THOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED-BY CUBAN PRESIDENT DORICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLENDE; ITS LATTER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND KIDNAPPINGS. NOW YOU HAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OR SERIOUS CRIME. "WE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS
COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID.

19. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A FULL ALLIANCE; THE EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A "NEW NEUTRALITY" WITH WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL COMFORTABLY, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE "UNCERTAIN." THEN WE ADDED: YOUR REVISIONS OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL OF LATIN AMERICA NEEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS.

19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART OF OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO RESTORE THIS SITUATION.

20. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER "AS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS. IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE THE POINT OF PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE A LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OF FUEL FOR RESEARCH REACTORS.

21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER MENT ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LESS EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTION. (COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM "POLITICAL PRISONER" GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. YOU WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.)

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT AREAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED.
"At the highest levels of government, I talked with Secretary Vance about some of this the day before leaving Washington. He is concerned for basic levels of human treatment, but knows too of your past difficulties and Argentina's efforts to restore legal processes." (Comment: General Goodpastor addressed other specific points. These too are included in greater detail in the subsequent conversation.)

23. General Goodpastor reflected on the need for timely consultation. He recalled that the lack of it can do to an alliance. He spoke of better coordination and using "the embassy as a consultative device. He concluded: "We understand that the right of citizens to be protected from violence is an important right, and we feel Argentina has come far toward accomplishing this. The United States understands this — but you must understand some of the institutions that have made the U.S. strong. Among them is a free press, vital to our society even while we admit the press tends to accentuate the negative."

24. (Comment: This concluded substantive discussions on January 23. [Censored] will continue with Pastor's presentation and General Goodpastor's responses on January 24.)
6. Timerman also mentioned that he believes the right-wing and very anti-Semitic newspaper *Cabildo* is financed by Diana de Massot, publisher of *Nueva Provincia* in Bahia Blanca. Mrs. Massot was well-known to the embassy, and if memory serves, received a Maria Moors Cabot or IAPA Award in 1973 or 1974.

7. As to the future of Argentine politics, Timerman says he sees a situation in which moderate and right-wing elements in the military will compete for Peronist support, which may create a situation in which Isabel Peron will be in a position to decide who runs Argentina.

8. In conversation with Timerman one is left with a chilling impression that he is simply reporting what he has experienced and believes. He characterizes the Argentine military right as classically totalitarian and anti-Semitic.

9. Timerman is now employed by the important Tel Aviv daily *Maariv* and seems comfortable with that fact, although he said he might be interested in spending some time at an academic institution in the US. He specifically mentioned Columbia. Thus far he has written only on Latin American matters, but it is to be expected that he will branch into broader discussion of international political matters. He said that the theme of a speech he will give in the United States will be human rights as the ideology of the eighties, and added that the US

---

4. Timerman also reports that he believes Labusse's Express Secretary Eduardo Sajon died of a heart attack during torture by electric shock. Since he was a relatively young man, the military did not suspect that he had a heart condition.

5. Timerman is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina because he fears reprisals by the military against family still in Argentina. As an example of this he mentioned that Robert Cox, editor of the Buenos Aires Herald, had sent a message to him through the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires asking him not to mention Cox in any articles.
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 PM-06 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSA-00 PA-01 HA-05 /067 W
----------060441 2804242 /23

R 25151OZ OCT 79
FM AMBASSADY TEL AVIV
TO SECKSTATE WASHDC 4308
INFO USSICA WASHDC
AMBASSADY BUENOS AIRES

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 22920

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC
APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL
AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS
HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND
THE WHITE HOUSE LEWIS

CONFIDENTIAL
November 2, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Jacobo Timerman (U)

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher, who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department of State believes you should meet with him. (C)

Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina because he fears reprisals by the military against friends still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup (which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an unfriendly (rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would be less likely to be accommodating to future cases. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That in lieu of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to Timerman conveying your congratulations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: An Update of Human Rights Developments in Argentina

I. Hopeful Developments

-- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.

-- Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

-- Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

II. Negative Developments

-- Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems likely that the security forces were responsible.
In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military resentment against President Videla, who made a very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of human rights, is being held by the government on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.

At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

III. Conclusion

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy Buenos Aires recommends that we should await developments before further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully informed as events unfold.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE TERENCE A. TODMAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Congressman Henry Waxman of California has brought to our attention the fact that a relative of one of his constituents, Alejandro Deutch, was allegedly kidnapped by the Argentine secret police along with his entire family (his wife, Helene, and three daughters). According to Congressman Waxman, Alejandro Deutch is not political in any way, but is Jewish. He is an air conditioner manufacturer; his wife is a pediatrician. Mr. Deutch is reportedly a diabetic which leads his family to have great concern about his health.

Congressman Waxman wanted the subject raised with the Argentinian delegation during their visit here. I understand that Pat Darien has also been informed of this case. We believe it would be useful if you could pursue it at an appropriate level with the Argentinian delegation, and we would appreciate receiving a report of their response so that Congressman Waxman could be appropriately informed.

/s/
David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: Pat Darien
Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the
Deputy Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NARA 8/25/13
DECLASSIFIED
NARA DFA 7/25/14
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL — GDS

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been re instituted. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest -- Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family -- the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

Authority: NSC Waiver 2013
NARA Date 7/25/14
We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for $50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRC's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice. . . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..."
I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance $270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice. The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least $1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against
us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel -- including Kissinger -- to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated
than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scapegoats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ATTACHMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>HUMAN RIGHTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HUMAN RIGHTS &amp; U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CONSULTATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BIOGRAPHIC DATA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla  
Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes
HUMAN RIGHTS

The 1978 human rights record of the military junta led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. Serious violations still occur, however, raising questions about the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures that Argentine officials insist be recognized as "fundamental improvements."

There is no evidence available to us that would indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the treatment of political-security cases is in sight.

On the positive side:

-- An apparent, although unverifiable, decline in the rate of disappearances has occurred since mid-1977. Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights activists believe that the rate has declined. If true, this is the most important development listed here.

-- Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook serial publication (nine lists to date) of the names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) prisoners acknowledged as detained.

-- The "right of option" program has been implemented, enabling executive detainees to petition for exile in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 prisoners have so far departed under this procedure, however.

-- Responsive action has been taken on cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest, e.g., Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and the Deutchs.

-- Attempts reportedly have been made by some security authorities to regularize detention procedures, return counterterrorist troops to normal military activities, and demilitarize the police.
On the negative side of the ledger:

-- Disappearances continue, with one of the several security entities probably responsible in nearly every instance. Victims have included not only suspected terrorists but also labor leaders and workers, human rights advocates, scientists and doctors, members of radical political parties, and others whose specific vulnerability remains unknown.

-- Despite President Videla's professed desires, renegade security elements continue to operate with apparent impunity because they act with the toleration if not under orders of some military officials. At least in cases involving suspected terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and summary execution are standard practices.

-- There are five reasonably documented cases (which occurred in February and March) in which political prisoners were released and almost immediately assassinated, presumably by security officials. There have been reports of other cases like these.

-- A particularly shocking incident, which occurred last December, was the abduction by unidentified security personnel of 13 members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, a group that pressures the government for information on disappearance cases. According to reports, the bodies of seven of the group, including two French nuns, later washed ashore.

-- Official harassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have borne much of the brunt.

Problem of the "disappeared." Estimates vary widely, but at least several thousand people have disappeared since the March 1976 military coup. Security personnel have been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most egregious violations tend to occur. In mid-1977 there was some fear that the gradual reduction in the number of terrorist combatants would be followed by a sweeping and systematic effort to eliminate so-called "intellectual authors"
of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran afoul of military hardliners. To our knowledge, no such sweeping attack was initiated, although, as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and representing a variety of sectors and interests have been abducted. Many are reported or presumed to be dead.
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment

On October 1, 1978 the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act will enter into effect and prohibit the sale of items on the Munitions Control List to Argentina.

The amendment was passed by Congress in August 1977 because of the serious human rights problems in Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in Argentina merited.

Based on this amendment, and more general legislation, the Department has held back most license requests for Argentina -- over 200 are now pending. This has created a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and triggered their turn to European arms suppliers.
KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT

Drafted: ARA/ECA: JNBumpus: jma
9/1/1978 x 29166

Clearance: ARA/ECA: CWRuska
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS

The United States has taken the following restrictive actions in response to human rights violations in Argentina.

The International Financial Institutions

-- IBRD - We have abstained on three loans valued at $265 million since June 1977.

-- IDB - We have voted no on three loans worth $123 million since October 1977.

-- IFC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans since March 1978.

The Export-Import Bank

By law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights into consideration when considering new transactions. Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the Bank. One of these cases, a request by Allis-Chalmers for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative reaction in Argentina. The Bank announced that it could not give Allis-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have strengthened the company's hand in the international bidding for the contract because of the human rights situation in Argentina. The Argentines called in our Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they considered this intervention in their domestic affairs.

The Boeing Corporation, which has requested Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private banks in the face of the Export-Import position. The company may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million order.

Military Sales

-- There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases valued at $145 million pending. Mainly spare parts, some cases have been held back eight months or more.

-- 101 requests worth some $25 million for Foreign Military Sales letters of authorization are pending action by the U.S. They will not be acted upon unless there is positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES

Drafted: ARA/ECA: JNBumpu: jma
9/1/1978 x 29166

Clearance: ARA/ECA: CWRuss
Under Secretary Newsom Visit

Under Secretary Newsom's late May visit to Argentina was made with the hope of eliciting some positive movement in the human rights area. Newsom made clear to the Argentines that our basic concern was for the rights of the person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas:

1. Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a visit by the Commission to Argentina
2. Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners held without charge.
3. Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the disappeared of the fate of these people.

Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would 1) recommend approval of the Allis-Chalmers and Boeing requests for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale of military training if the Argentines would agree to a mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite the IAHRC).

The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would take, but the conversations were generally positive in tone.
UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT

Drafted: ARA/ECA: JNB::rus:jma. 9/1/1978 x 29166

Clearance: ARA/ECA: CWRus:jma
Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive nuclear energy program in Latin America. It seeks to become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, and to become the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere. It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural (unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon suppliers of enriched fuel. Natural uranium reactors require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina can produce small quantities of this material, it cannot produce heavy water in the amounts required to support its ambition of complete independence. Acquiring heavy water production technology is therefore of critical importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is available only from the U.S. and Canada. However, technology of a lower order might be available elsewhere.

Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine leadership in the nuclear field are not clear. Argentina's decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable reprocessing plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to forego this program unless parallel action is taken by Brazil. This plant would give Argentina an ample source of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program as early as 1981. There is no evidence of a decision by the government to carry out such a program, but the capability is there.

Our most important lever in Argentina is the possibility of eventual transfer of heavy water production technology. We have made clear that the supply of heavy water production technology to Argentina is conditioned upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the cancellation or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing project. The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to distort the U.S. position to obtain this technology without foregoing reprocessing. They maintain that since they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated their readiness to accept full scope safeguards, the U.S. is obligated to supply this technology. But, we understand that in fact they have not deposited their instrument
of ratification in Mexico City. We are uncertain whether this is in retaliation for U.S. human rights initiatives or simply bureaucratic laggardness.

Both Governments have thus far managed to keep our nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue, but this is becoming increasingly difficult. In an effort to keep nuclear cooperation from becoming linked to the deterioration in other aspects of our relationship with Argentina, we are sending a delegation to Buenos Aires in October to discuss some next steps in expanding our cooperation in this area.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Argentina

Drafted: OES/NET: RDeming: deh
9/1/78
Clearance: PM: ALocke (substance)
S/AS: RKelly (substance)
CONSULTATIONS

We have attempted to convey to the Argentines our interest in maintaining continued contact and cooperation in areas other than those directly related to human rights.

Joint US-Argentine Economic consultations are scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington. The talks will touch most areas of economic concern, including discussion of the MTN, countervailing duties, investment and tourism.

We are also scheduling an October visit to Argentina by a nuclear group which will discuss possible ways of expanding cooperation in this field. We hope that sandwiching the two meetings -- nuclear and economic -- around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not a unilateral declaration of hostility by the U.S.
ARGENTINA

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Argentina is Latin America's most European state. Its highly literate population of 26 million is Latin America's best trained. The first Latin American state to build a nuclear reactor (1958), it is the first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another country - to Peru in 1978. In agriculture, its potential remains vast. It is already the fourth largest wheat exporter in the world as well as the fourth largest cattle producer.

At the time of the military takeover in March 1976, the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disintegrated. Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600%. Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms of human rights.

The three man Junta which came into power in 1976 has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and prospects are for a continuation of relative internal peace for the foreseeable future.

President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk dissension within the senior ranks. Civilian politicians and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose objective is to restore democratic rule.

The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined powers. Massera himself will retire soon and has his lines out to civilian politicians and labor leaders in a clear bid for the Presidency at some future date. Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counter-terrorist, is now championing human rights.

The political parties, whose activities were suspended when the Junta came to power, discreeted themselves by their ineffectiveness before the 1976 coup and have
shown little effective resistance to the military government. They have few attractive candidates or issues to offer the voters. The Peronistas, a coalition of populist and minor labor elements won over 50% of the vote in the last election in 1973, but are divided over who should inherit Juan Peron's mantle. The middle class Radicales are making some effort to revive their party and stimulate public support, but seem to be making little effective headway.

In the next few years, there appears little possibility of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot of major sectors of the population. Although the Junta has been successful in rationalizing the economy and restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revolution conditions, serious problems remain.

The government has built up foreign exchange holdings of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion annually and is attempting to balance the budget and has held unemployment to 4%. However, the government has not been able to control inflation, which is still running at over 100% per year. Expectation of runaway inflation is the main obstacle to private enterprise-oriented Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for economic recovery. Given credit for the economic progress made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military backing if the situation does not improve soon. Most serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living standards. Real wages have declined by as much as 30% in some sectors in the last two years and popular discontent is increasing.

The United States has $1.4 billion in investments in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial banks. U.S. companies and banks have continued to show interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that the country is politically and economically stable before making new long term investments.

The U.S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses with Argentina. 1977 exports to Argentina were $383 million. The Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for the First Quarter of 1978 was $42 million.
Organized terrorist movements have been largely brought under control. The once powerful Montonero revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) have been decimated. Assassinations and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still occur occasionally. The American business community, which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to 50 business representatives in 1975 but has now increased to somewhere over 100.

The human rights situation remains bleak. While the government did acknowledge in February that it is holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees. Meanwhile, disappearances and torture continue. We have made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better relations, but that there will have to be improvement in the human rights area before this is possible.
United States - Argentine Relations

The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and human rights violations, and reports on steps we have taken to promote human rights. This latter category includes the use of our voice and vote in the international financial institutions, a subject which the Argentine Minister of Economy surely will raise with you.

United States Interests

- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal processes.

- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and presumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity. (The Department is currently considering possible strategies to inhibit this trend.)

- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has estimated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may contain more than double existing proved reserves in the Western Hemisphere.

- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the production of grains and meat.

- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at $1.4 billion; our banks are owed $3 billion; and we have a $250 million trade surplus. (Prospects for greater trade and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals and agricultural fields.)

- Scientific: Argentina is important to our Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar resources.

- International Influence: Argentina is an almost wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial and cultural leader in Hispanic America.
Political Violence and Human Rights

The Argentine military inherited an almost impossible situation when they took over the government of Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and inflation were rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood aside to permit the military to do their job. Now, well over a year later, the military have largely accomplished their initial security goals but are not moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On the contrary, they are polarizing society. The government refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimidation of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are undeniable. While not directly attributable to the government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarchists and Marxists, continue to murder military personnel, policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate. Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassination attempt last month.

Promoting Human Rights

The United States raised the question of human rights with the Argentine military even before their well-advertised coup in March 1976. Since then we have pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with little to show in return. (Historically, Argentina has been the Latin American state least susceptible to our influence.)

- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978 military sales credits were being halved as a result of the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argentines that $36 million in 1977 credits could not be signed as a result of the human rights situation.

- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability to internal security are now denied routinely. Other munitions licenses are also being held up although we have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commercial arms purchases.

- A $700,000 grant military training program has survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although this program's demise seems likely in 1979.
In the international financial institutions, since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out of the Inter-American Development Bank which might trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment. In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway project.

Most recently we have been faced with the problem of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on May 31. The Secretary said the Administration is as a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to the advancement of human rights. He suggested that it might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications for loans until it could show a definite improvement in human rights. Martinez stated that this might be possible in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he was anxious to move ahead on a $100 million World Bank project. The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan was particularly difficult for us (because it may be hard to argue that it benefits the needy).

Suggested Talking Points

Martinez de Hoz may well make a plea for greater understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and raise the question of our votes in the international financial institutions. You might wish to:

-- Compliment the Minister for his achievements to date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of Argentine agriculture).

-- Inquire about the health of the former Foreign Minister who is now recovering from an assassination attempt.

-- Ask why it has not been possible for the government to begin to restore legal processes after it has acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the guerrillas.

-- Note the Administration's overall commitment to human rights and the great difficulty we are encountering with respect to Argentine projects in the international financial institutions.
-- Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan projects in the financial institutions that do not clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society.
SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN
BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN
WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A
NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN
RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE
OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST
1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MILITARY COURTS,
POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES
OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN
THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR
ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

1. AS NOTED IN REFTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S)
PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY
FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA
OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN
RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE
LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE.
AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED
JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS.

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS
NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS
CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY
THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY IMMEDIATELY TO VERIFY
THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED.
(MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS
LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM
DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

Authority State 01/28/2015
NARA: XP Date 01/28/15
JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES. 4638

3. AS FOR SPECIFIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES WERE FOR
DAVID DIVINSKY AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MILER, BOOK PUBLISHED AS RELEASED FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY FOR SUBVERSIVE CRIMES; AND JUAN CARLOS ROUSSELOT, LISTED AS RELEASED FROM CUSTODY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER DIVINSKY HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FEARING TO VERIFY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE INDICATION OF THE USUAL FATE OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LISTS BEGAN TO BE PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED AND REPORTED SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCES INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LISTED IN DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFICITE INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORITY.)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAMP (WHO HOSTED PATRICIA DERIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOI ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CHICA PRISON WHOSE NAME HAS TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND AS A DETAINEE UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN REMAINED UNCHANGED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.

CONFIDENTIAL
JACOBINI CHARLES
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

CONFIDENTIAL

BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DRA-02 CIAE-00 DQDE-00 PM-04
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00
IO-15 ( ISO )

-----------------051019 230354Z /64

R 221858Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638

4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES
HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES
PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL.
(WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS
WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND
SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS OR
INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES
TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL
OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A
COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW
THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S
DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND
THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT
IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE
OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR
WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION
IS UP IN SEPTEMBER.

6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF
THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z

WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT IN
OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DEGREE FURTHER
PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND
"ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT,
HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING
CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT TERM SUSPENSION
DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE
APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS
BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631).

7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS
WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S.
VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS
COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16
FLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE

CONFIDENTIAL
"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMAGE OVERSEAS". (NO OTHER PA COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING \ WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WE NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN THE
OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVIDENCE"-
OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B--IS THAT THE INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT I AND ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING BUREACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS OF RIGHTS POSITION.

CHAPLIN

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting
SUBJECT: The President's Interest in Argentine Human Rights Improvements

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has now responded to the instructions sent to it concerning the President's interest in human rights improvements in Argentina. The exchange of messages on this subject is attached. The Embassy concludes that recent steps have some substance, but recommends caution with respect to associating the President with any specific favorable developments. Nevertheless, our Charge in Buenos Aires did call the attention of the Minister of Economy, the key civilian in the Argentine government, to the President's statement at Yazoo City. According to the White House transcript of July 21, the President said, "We have seen recently in Argentina 342 political prisoners, who had been there for a long time, released."

I.

We can point to the following hopeful human rights developments:

-- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm categorically that there have been four releases, and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.
Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will restore a limited form of the "right of option," whereby state of siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the human rights situation remains very unsatisfactory in Argentina, particularly in the Buenos Aires region.

Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems likely that the security forces were responsible. (It is noteworthy that Argentina's most important newspaper, La Nacion, which has not distinguished itself on behalf of human rights, called unequivocally on July 18 for the Argentine government to protect lawyers from barbarism.)

In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military resentment against President Videla, who made a very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of human rights, is being held by the government on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.
At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

Nearly all serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power; Suarez is seconded by a retired general who acts as governor. These men are being held responsible by many for the latest round of violence.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the possibly hopeful but very uncertain human rights situation, I believe that we should await developments before further public comment. We will remain alert for favorable developments, as the President has directed, and for appropriate opportunities to express his gratification.

Attachments:

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE II BUENOS 06656 01 OF 13 212226Z 5763 BUENOS BSSSS II OF B3 312226Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-81 ISO-85 IRA-85 TRF-88 CIAE-88 OODE-85 PM-85
| R-81 IRK-10 L-83 HSAE-80 HSC-85 PA-81 RP-82 |
| SS-19 TCA-11 A10-85 /678 U |

R 212114Z JUL 7B
FN AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSSTATE WASHDC 562B
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USCINCSO OUARRY NTS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 6666

E.O. 11662: GDS
TAGS: SHUH, AR

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDUP

REF: BUENOS AIRES 4734

PART I -- NEW EVENTS AND INDICATORS

(The following is not a complete report of all new events since our last report of June 16, 1976. A follow-up septel will be submitted next week.)

Decision reported imminent on persons held under institutional act.

Senior military contacts continue to report that a governmental decision should be announced before August 1 regarding the 35 plus persons presently being held under the Acta Institucional. The junta evidently is undoubtedly uneasy about the acta which inter alia detains indefinitely a number of senior peronist leaders without specific charges or trial. According to military sources, the junta has decided in principle that before August 1 all persons being held under the acta should receive specific sentences as acts of "revolutionary justice" or be turned over to the judicial system for criminal prosecution or set free. One navy contact in early July admitted that the decision-making process in each case was proving to be very difficult, but he was optimistic the determinations would be made and approved by the junta.

Mistreatment of prisoners reported

A number of the embassy's human rights contacts have reported that recently Catholic paroled peace activist Adolfo Maria Perez Esquivel was severely beaten by prison guards in La Plata prison several weeks prior to his release. A number of his ribs were broken. Some sources report that another permanent assembly leader (separate group) was severely tortured during his initial interrogation. (Warning: NASA-4, leakage of these reports in Washington may put these men in grave danger.)

Embassy has received reports in the last several months that some pen prisoners prior to their release from La Plata prison have been brutally beaten by prison guards. "Red cross authorities (protect) have expressed their concern to embassy regarding the physical abuse of prisoners in La Plata prison."

Material witnesses reported tortured

Permanent assembly and nunciatura sources (protect)

*NEW* new drug reported introduced

A human rights source contact in the medical profession whose reporting has been reliable in the past informed the embassy in late June that terrorists and subversives selected for elimination were now being administered injections of "ketalar," which source described as a powerful anesthetic, instead of curace. According to source, ketalar is administered in an intramuscular injection to the prisoner as a preventive health measure, the subject rapidly loses consciousness and vital functions cease. Source alleges that subjects are then disposed of in rivers or the ocean.

LOCAL LAWYER WHO ACCEPTS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES REPORTED TO EMBASSY ON JULY 18 THAT THE MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS, DANIEL ALBERTO EGEA, WHO HAS BEEN UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION SINCE EARLY 1976, WAS ABducted for five days in early July by men claiming to be from the security forces. Mrs. Egea was beaten and threatened during her interrogation which focused on her son's political activities and former friends. During the last two days of her captivity she said she was treated kindly and released with apologies, but with an accompanying threat to remain quiet. We are checking further as to the significance of the reported interrogation of alleged 'political activities.'

[Confidential Section 2 of 3]

[Confidential Section 3 of 3]
II - JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES PROBLEMS CONTINUE

Jehovah's Witnesses' leader informed Embassy on June 30 that government action has resulted in the virtual expulsion of every Jehovah's Witnesses child from the Argentine school system. The witnesses believe that more than a thousand children have recently been expelled.

According to the witnesses' spokesman, many school systems used the Witnesses refusal to participate in the elaborate June 26 flag day exercises as the pretext for the expulsion. To the Witnesses participation in flag day ceremonies is a form of religious worship and is forbidden.

The Argentine witnesses have submitted a detailed article on the repression of the local church for publication in the August or September Jehovah's Witnesses Magazine, Awake. The article is expected to be printed in all the world's major languages. According to the Witnesses spokesman, the Argentine leadership plans to distribute copies of the article to all senior executive and judicial officials in Argentina, as well as to each Argentine ambassador abroad.

The witnesses' spokesman contended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship has still not issued the forms for the registration of religions in Argentina under Law 21,745. He added that there was no possibility of the witnesses registration being approved. Given the current decree banning the Witnesses from publicly practicing their faith, he noted that the Argentine government is now referring to the Jehovah's Witnesses as an "organization with religious colorations" (time religious). On June 8, the local press reported that the province of Santiago del Estero had issued a decree prohibiting any type of activity by the Witnesses. The decree orders the seizure of all witnesses' materials and the closing of all Witnesses' facilities where "public or private" meetings are held.

RED CROSS ACTIVITIES: TORTURE REPORT

Six Red Cross Swiss national delegates and two Swiss doctors are continuing to visit Argentine non-criminal prisoners throughout Argentina. The Red Cross plans to visit all the major penal facilities in Argentina three times during 1978 and the smaller institutions twice.

ICRC source (protect) stated that at present Sierra Chica holds 518 pen prisoners and tiny La Rioja prison appears to be the country's worst. In general, throughout Argentina pen prisoners are underfed, have little or no medical attention and no heat in the winter.

The Red Cross delegate stated that ICRC reps had interviewed almost every pen prisoner in Argentina.

He noted that about 50 percent had been tortured. Some had merely been beaten up but the large majority had been subjected to electric shock or the submarine. The ICRC rep was not optimistic that the Red Cross would be able to influence any change in the widespread practice of torture in Argentina. The rep stated that no government in the world admits that torture takes place and a government cannot correct a problem which it does not recognize.

The delegate recognized that physical mistreatment of pen prisoners is infrequent after they have passed through the interrogation phase, I.E., after they have passed officially to the pen. However, various forms of psychological torture persist in the prisons.

Estimated prison population as of July 1, 1978:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prison</th>
<th>Pen</th>
<th>Dam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Plata Prison</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoto Prison</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Chica</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronda</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistencia</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawson</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordoba</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseros Municipal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICRC estimates (protect) 8 unrecognized prisoners held at the disposition of military authorities. According to security forces there may be up to 500 around the country at any given point in time.

VILLA DEVOLO FIRE UPDATE

ICRC source (protect) informed Embassy recently that four prisoners held under pen were involved in the March 14, 1978 Villa Devoto riot and fire. According to source, all four were being held on drug charges but simultaneously under pen as well, as they had falsified Argentine passports when arrested, which put them under suspicion of being possible subversives as well. Three of the drug traffickers died in the fire. The badly burned survivor told the ICRC that he and the other pen prisoners had no connection with subversion but were drug addicts and traffickers who had obtained false passports to use in connection with their drug dealing activities.

With reference to a May 4, 1978 letter to the Secretary in which Cora director Laurence H. Birnks argues against export licenses for the sale of three troop-carrying Boeing CH-47 helicopters alleging that "helicopters similar to the ones being supplied" were used in putting down the Villa Devoto prison riot and crushing labor strikes, we note the following based on discreet inquiries of security sources:
1. The front pages of Argentine newspapers reflect the decision of Eximbank to deny a $270 million financing of U.S. exports by Allis-Chalmers for the Yacireta Hydroelectric Project in line with the U.S. human rights policy.

2. The American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina, representing over one thousand business entities, at its annual meeting today voted unanimously to condemn this action. Aside from this case, countless other U.S. corporations have or will be prejudiced by this policy in favor of other corporations of other nationalities.

Our estimates in this regard run into the billions of dollars. It means the loss of countless jobs in the United States and the irrevocable disappearance of United States presence in the Argentine market and a further worsening of the overall United States balance of trade position. Lastly, it can only result in unnecessary bad will in a nation where billions of U.S. dollars are already invested.

3. We strongly recommend this action be reversed before further irreparable damage is done.

The American Chamber of Commerce in Argentina
Alexander Perry, President
20:27 EST

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority: Sec. Webster
NAHA Data: 1977
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

E.O. 13526

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1 OF 2 BLENS L 14 23737

SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOVERNMENT LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS FROM BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOVERNMENT FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING JUNE 21. HE WAS NOT AT THE AIRPORT BY A FONOFP REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR U.S.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, CRI. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH U.S. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEW ON LATIN AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT SOA NO MORE THAN EVER WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED THAT CHROMIUM—THE US COUNTRIES' REQUIREMENTS—WAS TO SURVIVE. HE STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF INTEREST TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT OF OMISSION, BUT IT WAS A FACT THAT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPANDING, EFFECT ENDED.

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT NEXT ON HIS SCHEDULE. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFRICA, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE US FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA. HE APPOINTED PRESENT SECRETARY CARTER FOR THIS PURPOSE. KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA TREATY AND SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS RECOGNIZABLE THAT A MYTH PREVAILING THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE INVINCIBLE. SINCE WHEN HE ASKED, CUBAN SOLDIERS FARED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH IN AFRICA AND EFFECT THE WORLD TO SPREAD
RESIDENCE OF KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO PERSONNEL DEPARTED WITH A VISIT OF ECONOMY MARTIHE DE DEZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTATE. THIS WAS "ONLY A JICE L. ET.

8. ON HIS RETURN FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. AS HE CAME TO OPEN THE FORTY-EIGHT SURVEY PERSONNEL AS WENT TO THE CLANT HARRIED SOME OF THE ECONOMY DEPARTMENT. LATER, IN DAY, A SACHNER AND FAMILY DEPARTED WITH A VISIT OF ECONOMY MARTHE DE DEZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTATE. THIS WAS "ONLY A JICE L. ET.

9. ON HIS RETURN FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. AS HE CAME TO OPEN THE FORTY-EIGHT SURVEY PERSONNEL AS WENT TO THE CLANT HARRIED SOME OF THE ECONOMY DEPARTMENT. LATER, IN DAY, A SACHNER AND FAMILY DEPARTED WITH A VISIT OF ECONOMY MARTHE DE DEZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTATE. THIS WAS "ONLY A JICE L. ET.

10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE HOLDING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. 90% OF THE PERSONNEL INVITED WERE WELL REPRESENTED.

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY MR. AND MRS. MARTHE DE DEZ. THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF BANKERS, ECONOMISTS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE MEETING DISCUSSED MEANS TO ATTRACTION FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER WEALTHY PERSONALITIES TO THE EMBASSY. THE MEETING DISCUSSED THE EMBASSY'S NEW RELATIONS WITH OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. A DINNER WAS PLANNED TO BE THE FULL COVERAGE OF THE EMBASSY.

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTIALLY MENTIONED A NIP OFF THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN AUDIENCE MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY'S COURSE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF DIPLOMATS, ECONOMISTS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. A DINNER WAS PLANNED TO BE THE FULL COVERAGE OF THE EMBASSY.

13. DR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED IN A GUEST AND ATTENDS MEETING WITH THE ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA'S POPULAR PRESS COVERAGE. DURING THE MEETING, MR. AND MRS. KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY THE EMBASSY. THE MEETING DISCUSSED THE EMBASSY'S NEW RELATIONS WITH OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. A DINNER WAS PLANNED TO BE THE FULL COVERAGE OF THE EMBASSY.
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON EXIM BANK DENIAL OF LETTER OF INTEREST.

1. FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE CONCERNING EXIM BANK HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR USE BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN:

Q: HAS THE ADMINISTRATION CUT OFF EXPORT-IMPORT TRANSACTIONS WITH ARGENTINA?

A: THAT QUESTION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO EXIM. HOWEVER, I CAN TELL YOU THAT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT, THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CONSULTED WITH THE DEPARTMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PENDING APPLICATION BY ALLIS-CHALMERS FOR ARGENTINE PROJECTS AT THIS TIME. WE RECOMMENDED TO THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AGAINST PROCEEDING WITH THE TRANSACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION.

DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE ADVISED THEIR ARGENTINE COUNTERPARTS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PERSISTENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS TROUBLES US DEEPLY. THESE PROBLEMS INCLUDE:

- NUMEROUS DETAINES BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGES;
- THE DISAPPEARANCES OF INDIVIDUALS, WHO IN THE PAST HAVE INCLUDED CHURCHMEN, LABOR LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO WORK OUT WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN...

** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *"
COMMISSION IN HUMAN RIGHTS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS
FOR A VISIT TO ARGENTINA.

THE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW CLOSELY OUR
POLICIES REGARDING ARGENTINA IN THE HOPE THAT MEASURABLE
IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THERE WILL
ALLOW THE US GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A MORE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN ASKED AT PRESS BRIEFING. CHRISTOPHER
April 7, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Status Report on Progress in Human Rights in Latin America

In accordance with your request of March 14, there are attached human rights progress reviews on Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.
ARGENTINA


Ten months after having carried out a military coup that removed President Isabel Peron from power, the Argentine Armed Forces were at the height of an anti-subversive campaign to put an end to urban and rural guerrilla movements. The campaign was conducted under a state of seige and the security forces of the police and the military ruthlessley pursued all suspected subversives, detained them clandestinely and abused them severely. Prisoners were subjected routinely to torture during interrogation and general abuse during detention. In January 1977, approximately 280 persons per month were being detained (both legally and otherwise) by the security forces and throughout the anti-subversive campaign an estimated 15,000 persons disappeared. Most were probably summarily executed. The Government eventually acknowledged the detention of over 3,000 persons. Many of these persons had no connection to subversive movements.

2. Major Human Rights Events Since January 1977

1. February, 1978

The Government published the first in a series of lists that purported to list all PEN detainees.

2. February-March 1978

There were reliable reports concerning the surfacing of mutilated bodies on beaches. None were subsequently identified, to our knowledge. Similar credible reports circulated in December.

3. April 17, 1978

Jacobo Timerman was transferred to house arrest where he still remains despite a July 20 Supreme Court finding that there were no grounds for his detention.
4. May 7, 1978

A 3-page ad appeared in La Prensa consisting of a letter to Videla and the names of 2,592 disappeared persons. It was funded by the PAHR, the League on Human Rights, and the Ecumenical Movement. It symbolized the increase in activity by those groups and the increasing willingness of the press to address the issue either in this form or through reporting and editorials.

5. October 17, 1978

The Government announced that the IAHRC had been invited to Argentina. An earlier conditioned request made in June was rejected by the IAHRC.

6. December 1978

The Plaza de Mayo was closed to the Mothers as their regular meeting and demonstration site.

7. December 1978

Politically-inspired abduction and murder of Argentine career diplomat Elena Holmberg causes widespread shock and concern among influential circles who had previously ignored problem of disappearances.

8. December 25, 1978

A Christmas amnesty benefited 193 persons of whom we know 186 were actually released.

9. Early 1979

Preliminary evidence suggests a decrease in violations of category one rights with few reports of disappearances or torture having been received.

10. March 1979

The local ICRC representative stated that
prison conditions had clearly improved and he expected further improvements both because of the IAHRC visit and because government officials now seemed to want the improvements.

There was probably some quantitative improvement in 1978 with respect to 1977, but the qualitative aspect remained little changed with disappearances continuing at a high rate and torture and prisoner mistreatment common.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Philip M. Klutznick

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Argentina: Bilateral Trade Factors that Merit
Consideration

The PRC is scheduled to meet to review U.S.-Argentine relations in light of
recent Soviet initiatives in Argentina. Such a review would not be complete
without consideration of the significant developments in U.S.-Argentine trade.
Thus, I am attaching a memorandum summarizing this bilateral trading relation.

The following points bear highlighting:

1. Argentina now has a very free market with substantial potential for U.S.
exports. At the recent trade fair in Miami and in several other contexts
the Argentine officials have made clear their interest in improving trade with
the U.S.

2. Bilateral trade with the U.S. is strong and improving. Continued improve­
ment would have both political and economic benefits for the United States.
(We are, of course, not unaware of the conditions relating to human rights
and other factors which have slowed such improvement in recent years, and
which must still be considered.)

   a. Continued improvement in bilateral trade would help offset the Soviet
      Union's vigorous effort to expand its trade with Argentina and then
      exploit its trade position politically.

   b. It would help demonstrate to the Argentines the tangible value of
      improving their relations with the U.S.

   c. The strengthened economic interchange would have substantial benefits
      for the U.S. For example, the Yacyreta hydroelectric project, if
      awarded to the U.S. bidders, would create 18 million hours of work for
      U.S. workers.

3. In the proposed October meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission it
would be in the U.S. interest to respond affirmatively, to the extent possible,
to Argentine concerns on bilateral trade issues.
U.S. Trade with Argentina. Argentina is the fourth-largest market for U.S. exports in Latin America, after Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, and ranks twentieth in the world. Following Argentine trade liberalization measures of the late 1970s, particularly reduction in customs duties, U.S. exports to Argentina registered impressive gains. A striking 124 percent increase in U.S. exports was achieved in 1979 over 1978, with total sales of nearly $1.9 billion resulting in a U.S. trade surplus with Argentina of $1.3 billion. The resumption of Eximbank lending to Argentina in the autumn of 1978 has also stimulated U.S. exports.

Argentina is an important supplier in the international market as well as a significant U.S. import market. The country's exports exceeded $6.5 billion in 1979; imports climbed to over $5 billion, nearly $2 billion of which was supplied by U.S. exporters. West European suppliers and Japan represent the major foreign competition for U.S. suppliers to the Argentine import market.

The major items imported into Argentina from the U.S. include aircraft, organic chemicals, construction and other heavy duty earthmoving equipment, automotive parts, and telecommunications equipment. The best prospects for U.S. manufacturers in the future include, in addition to the items previously noted, machine tools, electric power generation, transmission and distribution equipment, and chemical and petrochemical machinery. The prospects for increasingly larger volumes of U.S. exports to Argentina appear quite promising.

Argentine imports may be up by 20-25 percent in 1980. In all likelihood the Argentine market for industrial and raw material imports will be even larger in 1980 than the boom market of 1979. As noted previously, U.S. exports to Argentina more than doubled in 1979, despite aggressive European and Japanese competition.

Although the U.S. is Argentina's largest single trading partner, the Soviet Union represents an extremely important market for Argentine suppliers. Argentine exports to the USSR increased nearly 83 percent in 1978 over 1977. Currently, the Soviet Union receives more than 6 percent of total Argentine exports, a considerable amount of which is grain. Argentina's balance of trade with the USSR in 1978 ran a surplus in excess of $370 million.

Bilateral Trade Issues of Concern to Argentina. For the past two months the Department of Commerce has reviewed with the Argentines the current bilateral trade issues of concern to them. Recently decisions favorable to Argentina have been made by the USG on several of these issues. Argentina was redesignated a beneficiary country for the United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on several products, including sugar and corned beef, and a number of new items of interest to Argentina were added to the GSP list. (Several import-sensitive items which Argentina wished to have included were not added during the recently completed GSP review.) In addition, President Carter announced on March 24 that he had decided not to grant import relief to the U.S. leather wearing apparel industry, despite a finding by the ITC that the U.S. industry was being injured by increased imports. Twenty million dollars in Argentine exports would have been affected if import relief had been granted.
(U) Among the other issues raised by Argentina are the U.S. insurance industry's claim that Argentine maritime cargo insurance requirements are discriminatory, and the Food and Drug Administration's study of nitrates in foods that could affect Argentine exports of corned beef to the U.S. These two issues are currently being reviewed in the U.S. Government.

(U) The Argentines also raised the issue of countervailing duty actions the U.S. has taken against Argentine products. Argentina has not signed the MTN Subsidies Code, although it has indicated its intent to do so. Argentine accession to the Code would improve the prospects for removal of these duties.

(U) The Argentines questioned sanitation requirements administered by the Department of Agriculture which are applied to unwashed wool and cooked ground meat imported from Argentina. These requirements are designed to protect against hoof and mouth disease.

(U) The Argentines asked for an increase in the cheese quota and for the addition of a quota for Mozzarella cheese. Argentina has been informed that it will not receive a quota for Mozzarella cheese. The procedure for redistributing other unfilled cheese quotas is well established and any future redistributions will be handled as in the past. Argentina would be given a similar opportunity to fill such a shortfall.

(U) The Argentines also asked that the U.S. not reimpose import restrictions on specialty steel and not increase sales of quebracho extract from the strategic reserves. Neither of these actions is expected to be taken by the U.S.

(U) U.S. Investment in Argentina. Argentina's foreign investment laws are among the most liberal in Latin America and do not exclude foreign investment from any sector. U.S. foreign direct investment in Argentina as of yearend 1978 totalled $1.7 billion, up from $1.5 billion in 1977 and $1.0 billion in 1970.

(U) As a host country for U.S. foreign investment, Argentina ranks 19th in the world and 5th in Latin America (excluding tax havens in the Caribbean), after Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The hydrocarbon, automotive and financial sectors are the primary attractions, although investments are also being made in the machinery and equipment, drugs and cosmetics, chemicals, and food, beverages and tobacco sectors. The mining sector is also emerging as a potential focus of major new MNC activity. International investor confidence is definitely on the upturn as a result of the apparent stability and economic achievements of the military government, attractive investment guidelines, and a government drive to inform businessmen of opportunities.

(U) OPIC. From 1959-1970 OPIC had an inconvertibility agreement with Argentina, but from 1970-1976 experienced a great many claims of inconvertibility and, therefore, stopped issuing guarantees. Any plans to arrive at a new agreement (covering inconvertibility or expropriation) after the new government assumed power in 1976 were shelved as a result of the human rights problem. In addition, OPIC's new focus on lower income developing countries would further reduce any OPIC activity in Argentina even if the human rights issue were to be resolved.
The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project

(U) A joint Argentina/Paraguay undertaking, Yacyreta is the largest infrastructure project and the most potentially lucrative U.S. export opportunity in Latin America. Currently at stake are contracts for turbines and generators and civil works services having an export value of $830 million. Bid submissions are due this June, and contract awards are expected in October or November (turbines and generators) and next January (civil works).

(C) Competition is intense -- primarily from a Japanese consortium, Argentine and Spanish firms, and a consortium of West German, Italian and Russian entities. The U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay advises that the latter consortium is favored. When asked by an Argentine envoy, President Stroessner reportedly raised no political objections to the possibility of the turbine generator contract going to a group which includes the Russians.

(C) The Soviets have previously supplied hydroelectric equipment to Argentina. The Soviet enterprise Energomachexport was awarded the contract for twelve 140 MW hydraulic turbines at Salto Grande in 1974 for the price of $40 million. The U.S. company was the next lowest bidder for $58 million.

(C) There have also been press reports and reports from other sources that the Soviets received oral commitments from Argentina to purchase Soviet hydroelectric generating equipment during the recent visit of the Soviet mission to Argentina. This commitment appears to be a general commitment for future purchases of Soviet equipment and does not relate specifically to the Yacyreta project.

(C) Morrison-Knudsen has requested OPIC insurance coverage for construction equipment and bonding for the Yacyreta project. A meeting of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (Christopher Committee) is scheduled to consider this request on May 15.

Human Rights Issue and the IFIs

(U) The Harkin Amendment requires the U.S. representative to the IBRD and IDB not to support (i.e., either to abstain or oppose) loans by these IFI's to gross violators of human rights, except loans that directly meet Basic Human Needs. The policy is administratively implemented so that the beneficiaries of the loan must be the poor or disadvantaged. Since 1977, the U.S. representative has abstained on 19 IBRD and IDB loan proposals to Argentina and voted in favor of two. (Note: Eximbank financing is permissible under current policy, although with reservations from State's Humanitarian Affairs Bureau.) Eleven loan proposals are now in the IBRD and IDB pipeline for Argentina.

(U) How our trade interests in Argentina are affected by human rights policy is difficult to characterize with any precision. Exporters claim it has poisoned the commercial atmosphere for U.S. products, and that the exporters are themselves made uncertain by the apparent U.S. policy struggles and inevitable delays. No doubt some business has been consciously diverted to U.S. competitors by the Argentine authorities and private sectors.
U.S. Policy on Human Rights

Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a trip to the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All three governments were rather slow to adjust, but they have come to understand its importance.

Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S. currently attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged the Uruguayans to suppress all forms of subversion. They are particularly confused because the human rights situation in their country has definitely improved in the last year.

In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we should be careful not to put the government on the defensive least we strengthen the hard-liners. The result would be even worse violations of human rights.
Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other. He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico.

I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more democratic governments. It would also provide an opportunity to deal with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S. and Latin America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive.

Orfila said that the U.S. would increase its credibility if we were more evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very one-sided.

Belize

On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only two-thirds of the southern province of Belize, which amounted to about one-fifth of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on Guatemala’s part, since the country has been demanding total annexation of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britain on April 4, to negotiate with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on this issue. He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned to Great Britain its interest in Orfila’s effort that Great Britain would be moved to persuade Prime Minister Price. (Comment: This is a particularly important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support Guatemala.)
El Salvador

The Secretary General was very pleased with his success in getting the President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras. The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries.

OAS

Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the present OAS. He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a manageable one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody ganged up on him, and the U.S. remained silent. The Permanent Council of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In fact, he called it "a joke."

"I need your help to change this place," Orfila said. Orfila would like to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, human rights, and political issues. He thinks it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance. In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently 1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors to the U.S. attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S. delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador to the OAS.)

Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said, he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last OAS meeting in Santiago, and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion, and that was it. Grenada was the site.
(Comment: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state of international politics in the hemisphere. At Latin America's insistence, the U.S. has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS, but the Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in this regional forum. Any international leadership on the part of the Latin Americans has been in global fora like CIEC, as well as at UNCTAD in the United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality of representation there is one indication of the low importance which countries attach to it.

The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very healthy sign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support his efforts.

Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed, no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's efforts in human rights. We should also encourage the OAS to leave the economic and social fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFFIDENTIAL
May 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: CONGRESSIONAL (Albright)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Rhodesia. Have spent quite a lot of time talking to Hill staffers about the Rhodesia sanctions situation. There seems little question at this time that we would lose a vote to retain sanctions. The best intelligence we can get now is that Helms is going to offer an amendment to lift on the first legislative day after the British elections, i.e., May 7. At this point, if we are going to avoid a total loss we need to do some heavy lobbying at least to get time for the SFRC to hold hearings. This is the strategy that worked on the House side. Funk and I will be sending you a separate memo assessing the situation. (C)

Panama. I don't know what Rick is doing up there but Church is becoming more difficult. Today he voted against aid to Panama, stating that toll revenues would be high enough to take care of any development problems. The language in the bill is not a prohibition -- the funds were cut, however. (C) In addition, funds were cut for El Salvador and Paraguay. The overall aid levels are $10 million below last year -- and we can expect more on the floor. (C)

Chile and Argentine Restrictions. Spent a ridiculous amount of time working out language to respond to Zorinsky's proposal to add a Presidential waiver to language prohibiting aid to Argentina and Chile. State human rights was concerned lest we give the wrong signals about our human rights policy. At the end of the day, with David's help, I think we have it resolved. We recommend removing all country specific restrictions. (U)
ARGENTINA

A. Human Rights Information

1. Political Situation

Argentina is a federal republic headed by President Jorge Rafael Videla, who came to power on March 24, 1976, after a coup overthrew the administration of President Isabel de Peron.

The March 1976 coup was precipitated by serious political and economic instability which fed upon each other. In March, the Consumer Price Index was increasing at a 566% annual rate (on an accelerating curve). There was deepening recession, and an external payments crisis threatened default on foreign debts. Violence was rampant. In the three years of the Peronist administration (1973-76), over 2,000 Argentines died as a result of left and right-wing terrorism. Since March, political violence has claimed at least 1,000 lives.

The current cycle of violence in Argentina began in the late sixties with the formation of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Montoneros, both terrorist organizations dedicated to violent revolution and working closely with guerrilla groups in Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia. When guerrilla organizations were defeated or ousted in these three countries, many of their members fled to Argentina, beginning in the early 1970's with the defeat of the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Significant rightist counter-terror commenced under the Peron regime and with the sponsorship of his confidant Lopez Rega.

2. Legal Situation

The Argentine Constitution of 1853 is in effect. In practice, however, the decrees and laws promulgated by the military government take precedence in case of conflict. This principle has been consistently upheld by the Argentine Supreme Court.

The Argentine Constitution is closely patterned after the United States Constitution and provides most of the same legal guarantees. The major exception is a "State of Siege" provision contained in Articles 23, 67 and 86 of the Constitution. These articles provide for the suspension of habeas corpus temporarily, the detention of suspects indefinitely and the moving of accused persons from place to place within the country.
without their consent.

The State of Siege was invoked by the Peronist government and has been in effect since November 6, 1974.

B. Disregard of Internationally-Recognized Human Rights

1. Integrity of the Person

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The rights of life, liberty and security of person are violated regularly by terrorists at both ends of the political spectrum. Both the current and predecessor administrations have reportedly acquiesced in violations attributable to persons associated with the government; the legal security forces have reportedly killed detainees suspected of terrorism. Right-wing terrorism or counter-terrorism has been carried out by vigilante squads operating with apparent impunity. Active duty and retired military and police personnel are reportedly members of such squads. Their victims have included a wide variety of individuals, suspected terrorists, other leftists, priests and foreign political exiles. There are no reliable statistics on the number of victims of these groups, but a reasonable estimate would be in the hundreds. The most notorious episode took place on August 30, when 30 leftist prisoners were allegedly "executed" in Pilar, in part as retaliation for the murder of a retired general, and in part apparently as a warning to leftist extremists. (The Amnesty International Report 1975-76 attributes 2,000 political assassinations since 1973 to the AAA, Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, a vigilante organization initially associated with the Peron government.) It should be noted that reported visible instances of rightist violence have declined in recent weeks, but it is too early to draw any conclusions at this time.

Leftist terrorism, though weakened, continues and has been responsible for hundreds of political assassinations and kidnappings. Many policemen, military personnel and businessmen have been murdered at random. Argentine executives of American business firms have been frequent victims in 1976. American and foreign executives in considerable numbers have left Argentina to escape kidnapping and/or murder. In 1975, the American Consular Agent in Cordoba, John Patrick Ryan, was murdered by the Montoneros, while a USIA officer, Alfred Loun, was kidnapped and narrowly survived his ordeal.
Article 5: While torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or "mishment have not been a general practice in Argentina, such methods are reportedly used by the security forces to extract information from some prisoners, particularly suspected or proven terrorists. After initial questioning, prisoners of this type apparently receive more or less normal treatment. Olga Talamante, an American released shortly before the March coup, has stated that she was tortured; the same charge was made by American Gwenda Lee Loken Lopez, who was held from April to September 1976. (Father James Weeks, who was imprisoned in Argentina, from August 3-17, testified about the mistreatment of prisoners in Argentina on September 28, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. Father Weeks said "most... atrocities are carried out by right-wing extremist groups made up of police and para-military personnel." Amnesty International's 1976, Testimonies on Persons. Torture and Detention in Argentina, describes several cases of reported torture.)

Article 8: Legal redress for governmental abuse of basic rights is normally available in Argentina but may well be denied in cases involving charges of subversion.

Article 9: The security forces have detained numerous persons for investigation and questioning under the provisions of the State of Siege or other laws, e.g., arms controls laws. Some are held indefinitely, others are freed after a short time, and still others are passed on to the regular courts or to military courts as prescribed by law. An accurate estimate of persons detained under the State of Siege is impossible to calculate. At the time of the March coup, the Amnesty International Report 1975-76 estimated that over 4,000 people were under detention without trial for unlimited periods. The figure is currently lower in all probability. In October 1976, during a visit to the United States, the Argentine Foreign Minister told the press there were 1,000 prisoners as of that date. He reportedly said that 300 persons had been released a few days earlier. We have no independent information to corroborate any of the above statistics.

Article 10: The right to a fair hearing. In Argentina, preliminary investigations are conducted by judge. The right of trial is not honored in cases trying with military courts.
and with most members of the Cabinet, including the
Minister of the Economy and the Minister of Interior.
In addition, Embassy officers and visiting American
officials discuss human rights regularly in conversations
with their Argentine counterparts. Officials at the
Department of Defense, including the Director of the
Inter-American Region, have discussed the subject with
resident and visiting Argentine military officers. Our
military attaches in Buenos Aires also consistently raise
the problem of human rights with their Argentine
counterparts in an effort to make them aware of U.S.
views. In these discussions, the following topics have
been raised repeatedly by American officers.

-- Access to and the treatment of American
prisoners held on political charges.

-- Deep concern over reports of officially-
tolerated mass murders, and the indiscriminate
killings of political refugees and priests.

-- The urgent need to control vigilante groups
and punish terrorism of both the left and the right.

-- The safety of political refugees.

-- Anti-Semitism.

-- The need to bring to trial or release alleged
subversives.

-- The need to publish the names of prisoners.

The Government of Argentina has stated that the current
situation is temporary and that normal conditions will be
restored within a short time.

At the behest of Congress and American citizens, we
have also inquired about Argentine and other non-American
nationals held in detention. While most of our diplomacy
has been private, the Ambassador did raise the subject of
human rights in an interview published in July by Argentina's
leading business publication, "Mercado". The Ambassador noted
that human rights violations had disturbed U.S. relations with
other countries and expressed the hope that this would not
happen with Argentina, noting President Videla's promise to
respect human rights.
The United States Information Service reprinted in pamphlet form and distributed to key Argentines and to the media Secretary Kissinger's speech in Santiago last June. USIS also provided all media with copies of then Assistant Secretary Rogers' speech on "Human Rights and U.S. Policies in Latin America". "La Opinion", one of the most important Argentine newspapers, published the complete text of the Rogers' article. Our Embassy also sent the text of both the Secretary's speech and the Rogers' article to the Foreign Ministry and to the Office of the Presidency. In addition, USIS officers have given numerous briefings to Argentine journalists in an effort to explain the U.S. position on human rights.

2. Disassociation of U.S. Security Assistance from Violations Of Human Rights

In September, our Embassy in Buenos Aires outlined the human rights provisions of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to high-level Argentine officials, giving a copy of the law to the President and Foreign Ministry on September 12. The Commander of the U.S. Military Group at the same time raised the subject with the Minister of Defense and provided him with a copy of the same legislation.

Argentine leaders have stated that as a matter of policy they do not condone and are seeking to curb violations of human rights, but that in the present atmosphere of terrorism, they cannot yet control the situation.

D. U.S. Security Assistance Program

1. Justification for Continuation of Program

United States security assistance to Argentina for Fiscal Year 1977 consists of $48.4 million in foreign military sales credits and less than $700,000 in grant military training. These sums were justified to Congress and approved soon after the Videla Government came to power.

The United States does not extend aid to the Argentine police, except to control and interdict the flow of narcotics.

U.S. military credits are used almost exclusively for major investment items, such as ships and aircraft. They have little or no bearing on the counterrorist capability of the armed forces.
Security assistance demonstrates our desire to cooperate militarily with a country which has 1,000 miles of coast-line on the South Atlantic reaching to Cape Horn. Our assistance orients the Argentine military professionally toward the United States, exposing them to our technology and methods. In return, it offers the United States easier access to the Argentine military who have always influenced events in their country and are now the dominant sector. It also gives the Argentine military a certain vested interest in good relations with the United States. This helps promote and protect our various interests and helps ensure that we will get a hearing on matters of concern to the U.S.

Argentina, it should be noted, is already a middle power in terms of development. It has a high rate of industrialization and is one of the world's leading exporters of foodstuffs. In addition, it has substantial uranium deposits, well-trained physicists and ambitious plans for nuclear power development. U.S. direct investment in Argentina totals $1.4 billion; U.S. exports were $628 million in 1975; our imports were $215 million; and we have a credit exposure of about $2.7 billion, of which almost $600 million is owed to the ExIm Bank and the balance to commercial banks.

2. National Interest Determination

In order to preserve a professional relationship with the Argentine Armed Forces and demonstrate our interest in constructive overall relations with Argentina, thereby promoting the U.S. policy objectives outlined above, the Department of State is of the opinion at this time that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide continued security assistance to Argentina. The Department is monitoring the situation closely.
CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1 OF 2 QUITO 5442

DEPARTMENT PASS ALL ABA POSTS
E.O. 12662: GTS 6/12/88 (FIMBRES, RUDY V.) 03-M
TAGS: SNUM, EC

SUBJECT: (C) HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE: THE FLAVOR OF THE FIRST DAY

REF: QUITO 5325 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.


END SUMMARY.

3. SPONSORED BY THE FREDERICH KERST FOUNDATION FINANCED INSTITUTO LATINO AMERICANO DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES (ILDIS) AND THE GOB, A LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD IN QUITO AUGUST 11-13. ATTENDED BY PROMINENT LATIN POLITICIANS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIGURES, SUCH AS ARGENTINA'S Rector CAMPORA, BOLIVIA'S JAMIE PAX ZAMORA, COLOMBIA'S ALFREDO VAZQUEZ, COSTA RICA'S LAMIEL ODNER, CHILE'S PABLO LETELIER, EL SALVADOR'S GUILLERMO UNGO, MEXICO'S GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUA'S PATRI LOPEZ CARDINAL AND VENEZUELA'S CARLOS ANDRES PIZAR

THE CONFERENCE PROPOSES TO ORGANIZE A PERMANENT LATIN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority State Waiver 2015
NARA Date 7/25/15

CONFIDENTIAL COPY
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A SECONDARY
PURPOSE IS TO REVIEW THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN LATIN
AMERICA. THE BOLIVIAN SITUATION, AND ARGENTINA'S
ROLE THEREIN, ARE LIKELY TO RECEIVE THE MAJOR ATTENTION
ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION WILL ALSO BE
ADDRESSED. THE CONFERENCE IS DESIRABLY LEFTIST AND THE
U.S. UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CONTINUE UNDER CRITICISM.

4. THE FIRST DAY'S SESSION DEMONSTRATED THE LEFTIST
AND SOMewhat ANTI-U.S. FLAVOR OF THE CONFERENCE. THE
OPENING SPEAKER, DR. ALFREDO VASQUEZ CARDOSO, RE-PROMIN
OF COLOMBIA, SPENT APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN MINUTES OF AN
HOUR LONG SPEECH CONdemning THE U.S. FOR THE FALL OF
CHILE'S ALLENDE, ARGUING THAT "NIXON-KISSINGER-CIA POLICY
OF DEStABILIZATION WAS ACTUALLY SATANIZATION." HE WENT
ON TO CASTIGATE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS
HAVING THE RESULT OF POLITICIZING LATIN AMERICAN ARMED
FORCES, E.G., THE ARMED FORCES WERE MORE PRONE TO
TAKE CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.

5. THE SECOND SPEAKER, JOSE FRANCISCO PENA GOMEZ,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DOMINICAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
AND PRESIDENT OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BEGAN BY QUOTING THE OPENING
PHRASES OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND SPENT
MOST OF HIS HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE DISCOURSE ON THE
ROLE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AS HE CAME TO THE CONCLUDON
OF HIS REMARKS, HE MADE APOLOGIES TO HIS GOOD
FRIEND THE REVEREND JOE ELDREDGE OF THE WASHINGTON
OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, WHO HE KNEW TO BE A TRUE
FIGHTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" (APPLAUSE), THEN LAUNCHED
INTO A SCREAMING, FIST SHAKING, BODY SHAKING, POET
STOMPING TIRADE AGAINST THE "IMPERIALIST UNITED STATES"
(STANDING Ovation).

6. BOTH MORNING AND AFTERNOON SPEAKERS MADE REFERENCE
TO EXISTING PROBLEMS IN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND CHILE,
BUT THEY STUDIously IGNORED MENTIONING POSITIVE ASPECT
AND RESULTS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. ALTHOUGH
EL SALVADOR HAS NOT YET BEEN MENTIONED, BOLIVIA AND THE
GARCIA MEZA COUP HAVE COME UNDER SHARF ATTACK ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE ANDEAN PACT STAND AND NICARAGUA'S
CALL FOR AN MFM WERE LAUNDED, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
JAIME PAZ ZAMORA, SILES ZUAZO'S RUNNING MATE, NO FIVE CHOSE
TO GIVE THE U.S. CREDIT FOR ITS ROLE IN DEFENSE OF
BOLIVIAN DEMOCRACY. ARMANDO VILLANUEVA, PERUVIAN
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS, WarnED
THE DELEGATES TO BEWARE OF PANAMERICANISM AND INTEGRATION.
ACCORDING TO VILLANUEVA, THE UNITED STATES IS THE
PANAMERICANISM AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISTS ARE
BEHIND INTEGRATION.
7. President Roldos addressed the evening session of the conference. In a short welcome, he expressed his hope that the meeting would be productive and if there were any criticisms of Ecuador, the delegates would not hesitate to discuss them.

8. An indication of the one-sidedness of the conference was carried in El Tiempo on August 12. Argentine, Jorge Cesarsky, claimed that he was expelled from the seminar when he objected to former President Rector Campora's presence on the grounds that the ex-president created and directed a band of assassins that executed thousands of Argentines. Cesarsky alleged that a second reason for his expulsion was his desire to remind the assembly of human rights violations taking place in Cuba. Cesarsky charged that the assembly's objective is to condemn human rights violations of one political ideology and overlook those of other ideologies. Cesarsky's name does not appear on any of the published lists of invitees, thus, our initial assumption is that he simply showed up at the conference.

9. The conference has received widespread publicity. Particularly impressive was an El Comercio editorial which justified the creation of a new human rights organization on the basis that existing ones had been discredited by extremists who had co-opted them. The editorial noted that human rights are observed only in democratically governed countries, and expressed
Participants were proud democrats, in contradiction to our own thinking and suggest that conditions and violations by both the U.S. and other are called off.

I. Comment: Notwithstanding the ecumenical assembly on the Democratic Leavings of the Participants, it is anticipated that only Human Rights violations will be given considerable prominence, while U.S. violations will be completely ignored while alleged U.S. violations will be given considerable prominence. Anti-U.S. statements during the first day's session were more muted than expected; however, most of the speakers were politicians. It is likely that the more radical fringe will have their turn today and tomorrow and we believe it likely that some will take that opportunity to launch a few barbs at the U.S.

Gonzalez

2. A LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH WILL BE HEADQUARTERED IN QUITO, OFFICIALLY CAME INTO BEING AUGUST 13 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE THREE-DAY COE-ILDIS SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE. HORACIO SALVADOR BORJA, FORMER CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN WASHINGTON AND SUBSEQUENTLY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT VELASCO, WAS NAMED EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION. PRESIDENT VELASCO AND GERMAN SILES ZUazo
OF BOLIVIA WERE NAMED ST-OFFICIO PRESIDENTS. FORMER PRESIDENT OF VENEZUELA CARLOS ANDRES PEAZ WAS NAMED ACTUAL PRESIDENT. JAIMI PAZ ZAMORA, LIONEL PRIZZOLA, OSWALDO GUAYASAMIN, ALFREDO VASQUEZ CARRISOZA, JOSE FRANCISCO PENN, GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, DANIEL ODEB, MANUEL UNCO AND RUBEN BERRIOS MARTINEZ WERE NAMED TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. ECUADORANS OSWALDO GUAYASAMIN AND BISHOP LEOMITAS PROANO, ARGENTINIANS HECTOR CAMPOA AND EMILIO MIGNONI, BOLIVIAN JAIMI PAZ ZAMORA, BRASILIANS DON HELDIA CAMARA AND LOEPEL EPIZULLA, COLOMBIANS ALFREDO VASQUEZ CARRISOZA AND APOLINARIO ZUZ CALLEJA, COSTA RICAN DANIEL ODUB, CHILIAN FABIO INTE, EL SALVADOERANS GUILLERMO MANUEL ONG AND ROBERTO LARA VEDADO, JAMAICAN JOHN THOMPSON, MEXICAN GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUAN ERNESTO CARDENAL, PANAMANIAN GERARDO GONZALEZ PERUVIAN ARMANDO VILLAFUERTA, PUERTO RICAN RUBEN BERRIOS, DOMINICAN JOSE FRANCISCO PEN, GOMEZ AND URUGUAYAN JUAN FERREZA WERE NAMED TO THE COUNCIL OF DIRECTORS.

THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE CONFERENCE WERE:

- A DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOV'T OF CONDUCT PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT ROLDO AND ADOPTED BY THE ANDIN PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS;
- AN ENERGY CONDEMNATION OF THE GARCIA MEZA COUP AND THE CONSEQUENT SYSTEMATIC AND CRUEL VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TAKING PLACE IN BOLIVIA;
- RECOGNITION OF THE CLANDESTINE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL UNIT GOVERNMENT AS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT;
- RECOGNITION OF THE PRUDEMOCITO REVOLUCIONARIO AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATION OF THE WILL OF THE EL SALVADORAN PEOPLE;
- CONDEMNATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EL SALVADOR;
- CONDEMNATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY;
- REITERATION OF THE ASSOCIATION'S SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ITS FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE; AND
- CONDEMNATION OF REPRESSIVE REGIME PERSECUTION OF 

NO PROVISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE BULGARIAN.

4. REFERENCE TO THE LATTER DAY'S SESSIONS FOLLOWING THE MATTER SET IN THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS. ATTACKS ON THE US WERE NOT DOMINANT. OUR FRENCH SOCIALIST WARNED THAT THE COUP IN BOLIVIA WOULD BE THE FIRST IN A SERIES. THAT SOUTH AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS WERE WAITING FOR ELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RONALD REAGAN TO
LAUNCH THEIR ATTACKS ON DEMOCRACY. AS COULD HAVE BEEN
EXPECTED, PUERTO RICAN DELEGATE RUBEN BERRIOS ATTACKED
THE US CLAIMING THAT PUERTO RICO WAS THE FRONT LINE
IN THE BATTLE AGAINST US IMPERIALISM.

5. THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATE, ARCHBISHOP TEOTONI DOS SANTOS, PROPOSED THAT THE CONFERENCE PASS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD URGE THE US TO GRANT GENERAL AMNESTY TO ALL UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS. ARCHBISHOP DOS SANTOS ARGUED THAT BY MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH THE MILLIONS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ASSOCIATION COULD BEGIN BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE PRESSURE GROUP. THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE IDEA WILL SURFACE AGAIN.

6. IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT ROLDOS WHO IN HIS WELCOMING SPEECH EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT IF THE DELEGATES FOUND GROUNDS FOR CRITICISM IN ECUADOR THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DO SO, GOT HIS WISH. SOME SIX ECUADOREAN CITIZENS, REPRESENTING VARIOUS NATIONAL UNIONS, THE PEASANTS' ORGANIZATION AND PROVINCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEES, ROSE TO DENOUNCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ECUADOR. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THEIR DENUNCIATIONS WAS ECUADOR'S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, WHICH PERMITS THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES. PRESIDENT ROLDOS SPOKE ON THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THIS LAW SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, AND THE CONFERENCE DELEGATES, WHO REPEATEDLY LAUDED ROLDOS, DID NOT PASS ANY RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE LAW. ECUADOR WAS ALSO CITED FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN AND LABOR RIGHTS DURING THE RECENT TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE. OTHER ECUADOREANS SPEAKERS CASTIGATED THE SUMMER INSTITUTE FOR LINGUISTICS (SIL), A PROTESTANT MISSIONARY GROUP WHICH WORKS IN
AMAZON REGION. THE SPEAKERS' CHARGES THAT THE GROUP
OF DESTROYING INDIAN CULTURE AND THEIR DEMANDS THAT
THE SII BE EXPULSED FROM THE COUNTRY WERE NOT NOTED TO
THE EMBASSY. EMBASSY OFFICERS PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN IN
CONTACT WITH THE PERSONNEL AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT
SII'S EXPULSION FROM EQUADOR IS NOT IMMINENT.

7. CCY AND HRC LAUNCHED WITH CONFERENCE DELEGATES
OF ELDREDGE AND LAURIE WISEBERG ON AUGUST 13. BOTH
AGREE WITH EMBASSY'S CONCLUSION THAT THERE SEEMED TO
BE A CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE NEITHER TO GIVE CREDIT TO
THE UNITED STATES NOR TO CRITICIZE CUBA. ELDREDGE
POUNCED OUT THAT THE DELEGATES POLITICAL LEANINGS MADE
SOME CRITICISM OF THE US MANDATORY, BUT THAT THERE
APPEARED TO BE A GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO HOLD IT TO A
MINIMUM. ACCORDING TO ELDREDGE MOST OF THE DELEGATES
WERE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY, BUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXPRESS PUBLICLY
THAT GRATITUDE.

COMMENT: IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN THE DELEGATES'
CRITICISMS OF ARGENTINA, MORE WAS NOT SAID ABOUT THE
ARGENTINE ROLE IN BOLIVIA; IT IS ALSO UNFORTUNATE THAT
THE DELEGATES CONFINED THEMSELVES TO CRITICISMS OF
RIGHTWING DICTATORSHIPS. HOWEVER, ALL IN ALL THE
CONFERENCE WAS NOT BAD FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. THE EVENT
WAS QUITE OBVIOUSLY YET WELL FINANCED. ILDIS PICKED UP
THE TAB FOR AIR FARES AND HOTEL BILLS AND PROVIDED
TRANSLATORS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS WHO DID NOT
SPEAK SPANISH. YET AT NO TIME WAS THE FUTURE FINANCING
OF THE ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
HAD TOLD US THAT HORACIO SEVILLA WILL NOT BE RETURNING
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THAT THE MINISTRY WILL NOT
PAYING HIS SALARY WHILE HE SERVES AS EXECUTIVE-
SECRETARY OF THE ASSOCIATION. WE DO NOT NOW IF THIS
IS TO BE A FULL-TIME JOB AND IF IT IS, WHO IS TO PAY
THE BILL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE
ASSOCIATION IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

CONDEZ

***CONFIDENTIAL***
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 11, 1978

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Kissinger on Human Rights in Argentina and Latin America

The attached cable summarizes Kissinger's visit to Argentina for the World Cup. His praise for the Argentine government in its campaign against terrorism was the music the Argentine government was longing to hear, and it is no accident that his statements were played back to us by the Southern Cone countries during the O.A.S. General Assembly. His other comments on the security problem in Latin America and the Soviet/Cuban threat surprise me only in that they are about 15-20 years out of date.

What concerns me is his apparent desire to speak out against the Carter Administration's human rights policy to Latin America within two weeks of his return—which is soon. Frankly, I think it would be a mistake from a political point of view for him to make such a speech since he will only open himself to criticism for being anti-human rights since clearly Latin America is one of our success stories. On the other hand, we don't want to get into a public argument with him on this subject when we will need his help on SALT, etc.

You may want to call him and ask how he enjoyed his trip and whether he would mind if a member of your staff--me--debrief him on his trip. That would provide me with an opportunity to see whether he is really concerned enough about our human rights policy to launch a campaign and also to give him some information on the effectiveness of our human rights policy in Latin America.

cc: Jessica Mathews
MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL  NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  August 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:  ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM:  JESSICA TUCHMAN
SUBJECT:  Human Rights -- Argentina

The President's positive remarks at Yazoo City on the Argentine human rights situation caused something of an upset at State which does not view recent events in Argentina in the same positive light. This was apparently the origin of the memorandum to you at Tab A. Its message is that the human rights situation in Argentina is still very bad, notwithstanding recent announcements, and that therefore the President should not make favorable comments until we know more about what's really going to happen. Among other things, the memorandum points out that while the GOA announced the release of 342 prisoners, we can only confirm that 4 have so far actually been released.

In case you feel that the President would be interested, a shortened version of the State memorandum is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Bob Pastor concurs.

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

CONFDIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: An Update of Human Rights Developments in Argentina

I. Hopeful Developments

-- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.

-- Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

-- Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

II. Negative Developments

-- Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems likely that the security forces were responsible.
In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military resentment against President Videla, who made a very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of human rights, is being held by the government on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.

At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

III. Conclusion

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy Buenos Aires, recommends that we should await developments before further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully informed as events unfold.
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Remark That Argentine Improvements in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps -- the release of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of the right of exile -- should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The State Department also requested further information on whether the announced steps have been taken.

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation of a democratic form of government.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET - GDP

July 7, 1977

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR
SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improvement in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore, their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C, a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which lends support to State's conclusion.

I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second time during his conversation with President Perez of Venezuela.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
   Approve_________  Disapprove_________

2. That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B.
   Approve_________  Disapprove_________

Jessica Tuchman concurs.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority Nsc waiver 17113
NARA EF 50fo 17111

SECRET - GDP
ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment covers the Argentine government's 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments.

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments.

(C) We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below. The record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged.

(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

(C) Political prisoners: Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the disposition of the national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution (PDN prisoners).

* The current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention.
There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAH prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons.

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

(C) Torture and prisoner mistreatment: Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include such things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military's conception of social order) groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety
officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or his or her summary execution. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives who have interviewed most of the PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation.

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 an ICRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year.

(C) Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion. (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (d) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers.

(C) Reports received from released prisoners tend to substantiate the ICRC's observations on the frequency of torture.
(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the figure of 15,000 for disappearances over the past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.

(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we have any information, could be considered terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made a significant shift in their targeting practices to draw into the security net a range of non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance of persons with a common association past or present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However, there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific act of the victim.

(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with few known exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals have criticized the government's economic, political and human rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the security forces.

(C) There has been no significant official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines' standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts
regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.

(C) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government House in downtown Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on cases for which their operatives have been responsible.

(C) "Reappearances" emerged as a new and possibly under-reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human rights organizations.

(C) Fair public trial. All who have been detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges against them.
Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in civilian or military courts, there are two notable problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal groups such as the ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional evidence.

Invasion of the home. The detention practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and stealing the personal property of the detainee.

Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the net result was to leave the situation little changed. Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.

It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds of abuses because the available statistical material is not always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977.

The status of PEN prisoners with respect to judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner held under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half or more of the current PEN detainees are either being tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition for exile under the right-of-option program.
the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month for the January-April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence, the situation changed little during 1978.

(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism uncontrolled. The conclusion that conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence that the security forces continued to operate without effective central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence sources stated that:

-- President Videla and his moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and control over security operations;

-- new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and military operations within the bounds of the law; or

-- police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for abuses.

(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional and local military authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the law or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central control over operational counterterrorist units.
a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment with the general economic and political performance of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on Videla's part.

(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable changes involved the following officers:

--- Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in Chief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units, his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.

--- Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial processing of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a needed improvement over Suarez Mason.

--- Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.

--- Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of...
counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.

-- Brig. General Juan Bautista Sassiain's appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel.

-- Major General Luciano B. Menendez, a fanatic on subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez's retention may be attributable to the need for his services in the event of hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the March 1976 coup. Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand change.

(C) IAHRC visit. From the Argentine government's perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site investigation.

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than the IAHRC visit.
IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACKE DIETERICH, WHO KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE, TIHERMANN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE ARGENTINA MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIHERMANN WILL BE IN THE UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARD FROM THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 17. AFTER THAT HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OERIAN. THEN HE WILL GO TO WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE DEPARTMENT, AND AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

3. TIHERMANN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE "LEADER" OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED ZBIGNIEW BREZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN BECAUSE HE KNEW TOO MUCH. THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

4. TIHERMANN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LANUSSE'S EXPRESS SECRETARY EDUARDO SALON DIED OF A HEART ATTACK DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

5. TIHERMANN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV DAILY HAARI AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT, ALTHOUGH HE SAYS HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED COLUMBIA. HE SAYS THE MILITARY WANTS TO HAVE SOME MEANING IN LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS, BUT IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT HE WILL BRING INTO FOCUS THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN AND ANTI-SEMITIC.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority by authority
NARA E.G. Date 11/11/83

CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9
WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMERMANN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE.

LEWIS
OP IMMED
DE RUESBA #8154 2841610
C 1016032 OCT 80
FM AMBASSAD BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7695
THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

INFO AMBASSAD ASUNCION 5231
AMBASSAD BRASILIA 4323
AMBASSAD CARACAS 4611
AMBASSAD LA PAZ 4068
AMBASSAD LIMA 3718
AMBASSAD MONTEVIDEO 6800
AMBASSAD SANTIAGO 4966


doctypes/secret/EXDIS

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR INTAFF
EO 12065: RDS-4 10/8/96 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: AR
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
REF: (A) WHITE HOUSE 7597 (NOTAL) (B) BUENOS AIRES 8098 (NOTEL); (C) BUENOS AIRES 7652 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA
OCTOBER 8 (REF A). GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND
APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED
THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING. IN THE
MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAY THAT HE FULLY RECIPROCATED
THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING
US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY GOVERNMENT", HE SAID, "WILL
SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS
POSSIBLE." HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS
IN THE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS
BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH
IN AN EARLIER MEETING HE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA,
GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO-
DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WILL "ONE WAY OR ANOTHER"
BE RESOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC
INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, THAT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS
'WERE REQUIRED FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO PROSPER.'

3. VIOLA, AS USUAL OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE MEETING TO EXPLORE OTHER MATTERS -- IN EFFECT HE SAID "ASK ME QUESTIONS." THE CHARGE INQUIRED WHAT GENERAL VIOLA SAW AS THE AGENDA FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. VIOLA RESPONDED BY LISTING WHAT HE CALLED THE "PROBLEMS." GIVEN TO SCHEMATIC RESPONSES, HE STATED THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS IN THE POLITICAL AREA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE LEGISLATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO RENEW THEIR LEADERSHIP AND "FUNCTION NORMALLY." IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, HE SAID, THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO REVITALIZE THE ECONOMY, "BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE." IN THE SOCIAL AREA, HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY OPPOSED TO THE BROAD INTERESTS OF MOST ARGENTINES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION AND INSTITUTING OTHER, UNDEFINED, MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL FIELD. VIOLA STOPPED WITH THESE PRIORITIES. BUT WHEN QUERIED ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS FOUR OBJECTIVES: TO INCREASE THE "PRESENCE" OF ARGENTINA IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE COUNTRY WAS NOT SEEKING REGIONAL HEGEMONY); TO REBUILD ARGENTINA'S TIES TO THE ANDINE PACT; TO REPAIR AND EXPAND RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE; AND TO RESTORE AND STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

4. VIOLA THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT SOME OF HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S BASIC GOALS. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY TOOK OVER IN 1976 WITH ONE OBJECTIVE: TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE AND GENUINE DEMOCRACY. THE MILITARY WANTED TO FINALLY END THE CYCLE IN WHICH INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ALTERNATE WITH MILITARY REGIMES, GETTING THE MILITARY PERMANENTLY OUT OF THIS GAME BY BUILDING A HEALTHY DEMOCRACY WAS STILL THE MILITARY'S OBJECTIVE AND ONE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FAITHFULLY PURSUE, HE SAID.

5. THESE THOUGHTS LED TO A QUESTION ON PERONISM BY THE CHARGE. VIOLA SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE POWER KNOWING THAT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE OPTIONS IF
EXDIS

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCSINSOCO FOR INTAFF

HAS HAD SINCE 1946—PERONISM AND ANTI-PERONISM. STATING

THAT HE WAS CHOOSING HIS WORDS WITH GREAT CARE BECAUSE

THE SUBJECT IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ONE, VIOLA SAID

THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN TODAY PERONISM IS A

MAJORITY. PERONIST SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP AND STRONG IN

ARGENTINA. BUT PERONISM HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED AROUND A

LEADER AND LACKED A WELL DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASE; THE

MOVEMENT NOW NO LONGER HAD SUCH LEADERSHIP. THE PROBLEM

FOR THE MILITARY WAS HOW TO SHAPE THIS FORCE TO DEMO-

CRATIC PURPOSES. HAVING RAISED THE ISSUE, HOWEVER,

VIOLA DID NOT OFFER A CLEAR SOLUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT

ON THE ONE HAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE "AN

ALTERNATIVE" WHICH WOULD APPEAL TO SOME SECTORS OF PERON-

ISM. HE ALSO SAID THAT EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION ON PARTY

ORGANIZATION COULD HELP SHAPE PERONISM TO DEMOCRACY. IN

DISCUSSING THE POLITICAL FUTURE, VIOLA SEEMED TO DISMISS

THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN OFFICIAL PARTY FOR EVENTUAL

ELECTIONS. AT LEAST THAT APPEARS TO BE THE IMPORT OF HIS

REMARK THAT IT WAS "TOO LATE" TO FOLLOW THE POLITICAL

PATH TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN STRUCTURING THAT

COUNTRY'S PARTY LIFE. VIOLA SAID THAT "IF WE WERE GO-

ING TO DO WHAT THE BRAZILIANS DID, WE SHOULD HAVE

STARTED FIVES YEARS AGO."

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, VIOLA ELABORATED ON THE
ECONOMIC ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TWO GO TOGETHER. HE ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED THE POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT PARTICIPATION IS DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS: INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES, ELECTRICITY, WATER, ETC.); STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES (FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUSTRY); AND INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN THE PAST FOR SOCIAL OR POLITICAL REASONS. THIS LAST GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES WERE "COMPLICATED" AND THERE WAS LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUY THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE:
A. VIOLA’S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT IF HE SHOULD TRAVEL IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY’S OFFER TO HELP WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS. AS HIS OWN PLANS DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT. VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US.
B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IHREC REPORT AT THE OASGA. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE, AS ROS HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA’S TRIP TO WASHINGTON. VIOLA STATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE’S LAST MEETING WITH HIM (REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

RUSER
MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

March 5, 1979

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Mexico. With Erb and Owen, I worked on a letter on GATT for the President to send to Lopez Portillo. Secretary Vance met with Mexican Finance Minister Ibarra, who was very positive about the President's visit. He also was relatively encouraging about the MTN, and after the meeting, Bergsten met with Ibarra for a couple of hours to discuss the codes. Negotiations will continue next week. Ibarra also said that Mexico would be prepared to consider contributing to IDA if the U.S. provided assurances that we didn't intend to phase them out of the MDB's. (C)

Worked on the NRC decision with Jessica and State. The problem was pretty much resolved by Askew, who postponed his trip to Mexico. The decision will be conveyed in a routine manner. (C)

I talked to Frank Weil of Commerce on their closing the Trade Center in Mexico City. The reason the decision was disclosed on February 14th was because of a Congressional hearing. He said that Commerce is closing all its trade centers abroad, and therefore is not discriminating against Mexico. He gave a good defense of his decision, and I will just leave it at that. Discussed with Owen and Poats the prospective decision by X-M on a loan to Chrysler for a plant in Mexico. We believe X-M should be encouraged to go ahead, provided we are not over-ruling everyone else. Also met with Rich Nuccio, a professor from Williams who is interested in Mexico. (C)

Nicaragua. Met again with our Ambassador Solaun, and agreed that the best posture at this time to Nicaragua is cool and correct -- low-key to GON and looking for appropriate occasions to underline our continued support for the democratic process. (C)

Argentina. Re-worked a memo on Argentina after discussing it with Jessica. (C)

General Viola, Commander of the Argentine Army, gave assurances (again) to our Ambassador that Argentina's human rights record will improve. Viola deplored the hundreds of disappearances and frankly admitted this was their "nightmare." "The dead will not reappear," he said. He could not guarantee a complete cessation of disappearances but promised they would drop dramatically as would tortures, the use of the electric prod, etc. Viola asked...
that the GAO not be judged by the past, but by the present and the future. (C)

Costa Rica. Initial sparring between the U.S. and Costa Rica over positions on the upcoming tuna negotiations occurred last week with Costa Rica's Minister of Economy firing the first volley. He informally placed on the table a 57 per cent minimum for coastal state allocations, but was told that our formal maximum was 45 per cent. In spite of what appears to be inflexibility on the part of both Costa Rica and Mexico, we are still planning to hold the scheduled tuna talks in Washington March 7-8. (C)
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE. VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT IN RIGHT OF OPTION CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE IABRC WOULD FIND IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, BUT OFFERED NO HOP FOR "DESAPARECIDOS." HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING GOA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES. VIOLA FELT AN OAS MILITARY PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

3. APPRECIATION FOR MFM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA, JUNTA PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER, REQUESTED I MEET WITH HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFICE. DUE TO MY BEING OUT OF COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. HE "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT HOW THINGS STOOD IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET SHOWED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS.

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OUS AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. HE HOPED

**WHSR COMMENT**

FOE: PASTOR, BLOOM
DEPARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEPT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO", RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE IT CLEAR TO VICLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG. VICLA'S CONCERN WAS THAT DUE TO IMPORTANCE OF NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CAVE IN ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURE TOWARDS GOA. I ALLAYED VICLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIEW ON ARGENTINA. I REMINDED VICLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT" AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE CONTINGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS. HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT.

5. IAHRBC VISIT: VICLA REMINDED ME IAHRBC WOULD BE VISITING ARGENTINA STARTING SEPTEMBER 6. HE STATED THIS DATE WAS CHOSEN BY IAHRBC AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VICLA STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRC VISIT RESULTING IN VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TORTURE AND NO IRREGULAR ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS WAS A BLACK MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION.

6. DESAPARECIDOS: VICLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT WE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR — JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBOARDS, AS IF THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "I TAPE YOUR FIGURES OF FIFTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR. LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARED IN SIX MONTHS." I INTERRUPTED HIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTY-TWO DISAPPEARANCES. HE SAID "EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE FROM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY TIME IAHRBC ARRIVED GOA WOULD REACH THE ZERO STATUS. VICLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE "DESAPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT RETURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HE REPEATED IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT BE SURFACING. AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VICLA'S REPLY WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION ON THE DISAPPEARED.
ANT IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE
WE DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE
MIGHT BE A FEW CASES SURFACING — THOSE UNACCOUNTED
FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS.
VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT ON
DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAE IT WOULD BE A
STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE
PALATABLE TO SOCIETY.

RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION
PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE WAS REMINDED
GOA — THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — HAD NOT GIVEN
EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD
RAISED ALL KINDS OF BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED
WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OF OPTION CASES
WOULD BE MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID THESE CASES
WERE HIGH ON THE AGENDA.

TIMERMAN CASE: RECENTLY "CONVACION", NAVY ORIENTED NEWSPAPER, AND THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED TIMERMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE. I TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE ACCURATE. HE DENIED ANY TRUTH TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMERMAN WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCUPLATED HIMSELF BY STATING IF IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO. IN A JESTING FASHION, I SUGGESTED TO VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA HE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD THE WAY. HE SMILED AND REPLIED HIS OBSTACLES WERE WELL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, CHIEF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION ON THIS SUGGESTION FOR AS LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA HE HAS NEVER ADMITTED SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWLIERD HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH SUAREZ MASON. I TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED ME TO HIS RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO"—"GAUCHO BARBECUE". IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED EVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE IS STILL SOME HOPE.

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OF RENEWED AND CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON THE PORACIO SARAGOVI CASE. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE. I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN HIS LAP AS IT WAS A MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP FOR REVIEW BY HIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

12. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS,
FLAIRED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OF OUTSTANDING PLAYERS
FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A
FULL STADIUM OF OVER 75,000 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME.
I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE "COMMON HERD"
BUT AS I WALKED INTO THE STADIUM, AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN
SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DE
HONOR" (VIP BOX). I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT
THE VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY
DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTLEMAN WAS QUITE SERN IN TELLING
ME I BELONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S BOX. I WAS THE ONLY
AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WERE SEVERAL
AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS THE ONLY ONE PERMITTED
to sit near the President and the Junta. I thought this
was an unusual twist considering somewhat strained
relations due to negative newspaper stories from USA.

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA TELLED TELLING
ME HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TO SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS
NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS
ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE
SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH US ON NICARAGUAN
POLICY, BUT FEARED SENDING A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING
WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THAT
COUNTRY FEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING
MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.
VIOLA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WANTED BEYOND DIALOGUE
AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL
AND TROOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA
RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY
PEACE FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC WOULD NEVER BUY IT.
IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS UPSETTING OR "GOING" FOR ME TO GIVE
HIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO
NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA.

12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING
VIOLA'S OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA, WHO COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO.
MASSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO
SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT
HE HAD PLANNED THIS. MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT
APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD BEEN WITH HIM.
IT'S JUST THE CASE OF THE OLD "ARGENTINE INTRIGUE" JUST
AS SUAREZ-MASON WANTED VIOLA TO KNOW THAT I WAS HAVING
AN "ASADO" WITH HIM.

CASTRO
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON December 21, 1978

NSS Rvw Completed - Released in Full - Refer to DOS - 11/13/12

1. Beagle Channel Conflict Looms Closer: General Viola called in Ambassador Castro this morning to advise him that in view of Chile's latest communique, Argentina had no other option but to resort to military action. The general went on to ask that the U.S. help explain to the world why Argentina had no other recourse. Castro recommended patience and pointed out that papal mediation was still a possible option. Viola, however, did not desist from his line that Chile's response had terminated any prospects for further diplomatic movement. (Buenos Aires 9958, PSN 54104)

DOS REVIEWED 11-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

2. Meeting with Von Staden on Cruise Missile Definition: During a meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher yesterday, Ambassador Von Staden expressed his government's serious concern with the possibility that the U.S. might consider agreeing that ALCMs on non-heavy bombers would fall under the same limits as nuclear ALCMs as a solution to the cruise missile definition issue. He said the Germans would see serious problems with such a solution, since a non-nuclear element would be introduced into the SALT negotiations for the first time. Von Staden asked whether such a solution would create precedents for the Soviets to demand that other non-nuclear elements be included in future negotiations and whether the U.S. would share German concern that the whole non-circumvention question would have to be seen in a different light, with non-circumvention applying to non-nuclear weapons. He also asked whether the new U.S. language in the "Declaration of Intent" could lead to a situation in which the Soviets could demand nuclear elements not subject to the negotiations be taken into account. Christopher assured Von Staden that his questions and comments would be transmitted to the U.S. delegation before they left, and also pointed out that if an agreement was reached, the President would take great pains to make clear that what was in the agreement and the protocol would not constitute precedents for future negotiations. (State 320329, TOSEC 150002, NODIS Cherokee, PSN 54076) (S)
1. Embassy Tel Aviv Comments on the Egyptian-Israeli Talks:
Ambassador Lewis believes that indications be slowing down the pace of negotiations raises the question of how the U.S. should proceed following Khalil's visit, especially if it turns out that the Egyptians want to reopen the text of the treaty and continue negotiations on the linkage issue. If Egypt accepts the treaty, there is some chance of persuading Israel to find a formula on linkage; however, if Egypt equivocates, the hope of getting the cabinet to accept something further on linkage will shrink to about nil. Lewis also has "the gravest doubts" that a slowdown by Sadat will produce what he wants from the Israelis; it will have the opposite affect. Lewis adds that Begin agreed to only a ninety day settlement freeze and that, with the conclusion of this period in mid-December or January, Begin might renew settlement activity. The U.S. cannot afford an extended delay and Lewis recommends that a new U.S. initiative, obviously required to break the impasse, be launched no later than mid-December. (Tel Aviv 18266 NODIS, PSN 24694, 24695)

2. Somoza Discusses His Difficulties: A Nicaraguan official informed Ambassador Solaun today that Somoza, for the first time, openly admitted to his cabinet on Monday that he was under tremendous pressure. Somoza allegedly characterized the plebiscite proposal as a means to "kick him out of the country" and raised as alternatives the calling of a national constituent assembly or simply his resignation. Solaun comments that, if true, the apparent change of attitude by Somoza could augur well for a resolution to the Nicaraguan problem. Somoza is apparently starting to believe that the U.S. means business. (Managua 6156, PSN 24866)

3. Beagle Channel—Ambassador Castro Talks with General Viola: General Viola told Ambassador Castro yesterday that, although there were still serious problems ahead, the Argentine government intended to negotiate in good faith and would strive to settle the channel dispute
by peaceful and honorable means. Viola emphasized
that Argentina wants a peaceful solution and not a
confrontation and indicated that the recent troop move­
ments were carefully controlled so as not to place
them close enough to the border where "temptations"
could cause an incident. Viola again stressed the
defensive nature of the troop deployments and made
the suggestion that, during the negotiating or mediation
period, there should be a mutual freeze on troop move­
ments or even perhaps a withdrawl. (Buenos Aires 9361,
PSN 24704, 24706)
SITUATION

AFGHAN

MESSAGE

FLASH

TO

AMBUSSY BUENOS AIRES FLASH 6975

CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE

TO AMBASSADORS BUENOS AIRES

SUBJECT:

ARGENTINE COOPERATION ON GRAIN EMBARGO

TENENTE GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA

DOMICILIO CONOCIDO

BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

DESPUES DE SACUDARLO EN UNA FORMA MUY ATENSA, SE CE

SOLICITA SU INTERVENCIÓN PERSONAL CON SUS COMPANEROS

DEL GOBIERNO ARGENTINO, MUY ESPECIALMENTE AL SEÑOR

PRESIDENTE VIDELA Y LOS INTEGRANTES DE LA JUNTA,

REFERENTES A LO POSIBLE COLABORACIÓN CON E.E.U.U. EN

EL CONTROL DE LA EXPORTACIÓN DE GRANOS A LA UNION

SOVIÉTICA, QUISIERA ACLARAR QUE ESTA COLABORACIÓN NO

CONTEMPLA LA SUSPENSIÓN DE CONTRATOS YA FIRMADOS SINO

MAS BIEN LA IMPORTANCIA DE NO ENTRAR EN NUEVOS CONTRATOS

QUE TENDRÍAN EL PROPOSITO DE COMPENSAR POR EL EMBARGO

DE HÍ GOBIERNO.

WHIR COMMENTS

EDB IDEAL, THORN, BREN

PSN1028673

DT00111817

TOR0011912

SENSITIVE

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2
RECUERDO MUY CLARAMENTE QUE DURANTE SU PARTICIPACIÓN EN LA JUNTA USTED SIEMPRE ME MANIFESTÓ SU APOYO AL CONCEPTO DE NO INTERVENCIÓN Y SU ODIO HACIA AQUELLOS PAÍSES QUE TOMABAN PASOS E INCURSIONES AGRESIVOS CONTRA OTROS PAÍSES. TAMBIÉN RECUERDO SU ADHESIÓN Y RESPECTO A AQUELLOS PRINCIPIOS QUE PREVALENEN EN DERECHO INTERNACIONAL.

TOMANDO EN CUENTA LA RECENTE LLORANTE INDEBIDA AGRESIÓN DE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA HACIA AFGANISTÁN, LE SUPlico MUY ENCARECIDAMENTE EJERZA SU INFLUENCIA CON LOS MANDATORIOS DE SU GOBIERNO PARA QUE PRESTEN SU COLABORACIÓN EN EL SENTIDO MANIFESTADO EN LOS PARÁGRAFOS ANTERIORES.

SÍEMPRE HE AGRADECIDO SUS EXPRESIONES DE CARINO HACIA MI PAÍS Y LA MISMA VEZ RECONOZCO QUE DURANTE SU ESTANCIA COMO MINSERDO DE LA JUNTA Y COMANDANTE EN JEFÉ DEL EJERCITO SU ACTUACIÓN SIEMPRE FUE UNO DE HACER TODO LO POSIBLE PARA CONTINUAR MEJORANDO LAS TRADICIONALES BUENAS AMISTADES ENTRE EE.UU. Y ARGENTINA.

AGRADECIERO SU AMISTAD Y GENTILEZA. RECIBE LAS SEGURIDADES DE MI ATENSIÓN Y CONSIDERACIONES. REGRESARÉ A BUENOS AIRES EL PROXIMO JUEVES, PERO ANTES DE ESO LE AGRADECERÍA SUS COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL TEMA AQUI PLANTADO.

END MESSAGE. VANCE
EQRiX5INU KORN1YENKO REJOINED THAT IF WE WERE IN FACT INSISTING THAT THE NYAP PEOPLE COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO FILL VACANCIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN WASHINGTON OR SAN FRANCISCO THAT IN EFFECT WOULD AMOUNT TO PNG ACTION AND WOULD, OF COURSE, BE AN EXTRA COMPLICATION FOR BOTH SIDES. KORNIYENKO THEN ADDED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES AT THE MOMENT FOUNDED THEMSELVES WITH THEIR AMBASSADORS AT HOME. IF WE WERE TO DECIDE TO FREEZE EMBASSY STAFFS AT PRESENT LEVELS, WOULD THAT MEAN THE AMBASSADORS COULD NOT RETURN? CHARGE COMMENTED HE THOUGHT IT CLEAR THAT THAT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. POSITION, AND KORNIYENKO HASTENED TO ADD THAT IN MENTIONING THE AMBASSADORS HE INTENDED NOTHING MORE THAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OF THE U.S. POSITION.

10. KORNIYENKO ONCE MORE MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER IN LANGUAGE SUCH AS THAT USED BY THE U.S. IN UNILATERALLY DETERMINING HOW THE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED, AS WAS STATED IN THE SOVIET NOTES. HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE U.S. ACTIONS WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS.

11. CHARGE REPEATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK RESPONSES TO KORNIYENKO'S QUESTIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL MATTERS; BUT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE REASON
FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN, THEY HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN FRIVOLOUSLY; THEY WERE SERIOUS MEASURES WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES; TAKEN FOR THE REASON STATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT PROVIDED NO BASIS FOR THE MEASURES TAKEN AND THAT THERE WERE IN FACT NO GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTIONS UNDER ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW OR AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE CONTINUED, COULD SAY A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MATTER AND COULD FIND EXPLANATIONS NO LESS HARSH THAN THOSE USED BY U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THOSE ASPECTS AT THIS TIME.

CHARGE AGREED.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF NOTE CONCERNING
The decision of the Government of the USA concerning the suspension of the opening of the consulate general of the USSR in New York and the withdrawal from there of the Soviet advance party is a flagrant violation of the relevant agreements between the two countries, including that reached during the Soviet-American meeting at the highest level in July 1974. The said unilateral action of the American side testifies to the fact that it is acting in complete disregard of its obligations which ensue from international agreements which it concludes. The Soviet side absolutely condemns these illegal actions by the Government of the USA as directly hostile to the interests of the development of relations between the two countries and incompatible with the generally accepted practice of the maintenance of relations between states. It must be clear that the Soviet side will draw the appropriate conclusions.

The Soviet side places all responsibility for the consequences of the said action on the Government of the USA.
RESERIVING TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO FULL RESTITUTION OF
MATERIAL DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE AMER-
ICAN SIDE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE POSITION THAT
PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE GUARANTEING OF THE
SECURITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE PREMISES AND PROPERTY
OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK WILL BE AGREED
UPON IN THE PROPER MANNER,
IN THE LIGHT OF THE SAID UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THE USA,
THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO DETERMINE AT A FUTURE TIME ITS
GENERAL POSITION TOWARD THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT ON THE
OPENING OF CONSULATES GENERAL OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN
NEW YORK AND KIEV, RESPECTIVELY.

MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980, END TEXT.

14. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE NOTE CONCERN-
ING AEROPHOT FREQUENCY.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR REFERS TO THE
NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7
1980, AND CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.
THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA TO POSTPONE FOR
AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL CIVIL
AVIATION TALKS, WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE AMERICAN
SIDE ITSELF, AND UNILATERALLY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
REGULAR FLIGHTS TO THE USA OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT IS COM-
PLETELY ILLEGAL AND IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY THE UNITED
STATES OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT HAS ACCEPTED, INCLUD-
ING THOSE RESULTING FROM THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED
IN AN EXCHANGE OF AIDE-MEMOIRES IN MARCH 1979. SUCH
PROVOCATIVE CONDUCT CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES;
THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA ALL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAID MEASURES
FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND RESERVES TO ITSELF
THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL RESTITUTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE.

MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980, END TEXT.

15. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE NOTE CONCERN-
ING FISHERY ALLOCATIONS.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, REFERRING TO
THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7
1980, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING;

END TEXT.

SITUATION: AFGHAN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV
MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2

MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980,
END TEXT, GARRISON

ST
THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

1. Kaunda Concerned by Possibility of a Reagan Presidency:
   During private discussions with Ambassador Wisner today, President Kaunda expressed deep concern over the possibility of a Reagan presidency. He said he was not confident about Reagan's views on South Africa or the Middle East -- two issues which were immensely important to him personally.
   In addition, Kaunda said his recent visit to Eastern Europe had brought home the critical state of detente and reinforced his belief that the President would be better in dealing with the Soviets than Reagan. While admitting that American policies do not vary greatly between presidencies, Kaunda said he nevertheless wanted to warn us of his deep concern should Reagan be elected, and he asked that his prayers for the President be communicated. (Lusaka 3928, PSN 4260) (C)

2. Presidential Message to Viola: In response to the President's congratulatory message, General Viola expressed his "profound appreciation" and said he fully reciprocated the President's belief in the importance of strengthening U.S.-Argentina relations. Viola said his government would seek to make U.S.-Argentine relations as productive as possible. He returned to this theme several times, stating that he believed the current issues between our two countries were the product of present circumstances and will "one way or another" be resolved. The Argentine leader went on to describe the agenda of his government as one which would seek first to produce legislation that will allow the political parties to renew their leadership and "function normally;" to revitalize the economy "both industry and agriculture;" and to correct the impression that the government was essentially opposed to the broader interests of most Argentines. Viola added that his government had four objectives in the foreign policy arena, which were to increase the "presence" of Argentina in the southern cone, rebuild Argentina's ties in the Andean Pact, repair and expand relations with Western Europe, and restore and strengthen relations with the U.S. (Buenos Aires 8154, PSN 4066, 4090) (C)
3. U.S.-PRC Grain Negotiations: According to Ambassador Woodcock, the substantive work on the grain negotiations appears to be near completion. He adds however, that the U.S. delegation faces considerable uncertainty with regard to the timing of the formal conclusion of the agreement and its announcement. At the delegation's request, Woodcock has agreed to intervene with the foreign ministry to seek initialing of the agreement on Monday, thereby permitting announcements in both capitals immediately afterwards. Woodcock adds that the Chinese are deeply disturbed about wire service reports from Washington on the agreement and have strongly emphasized that there should be no public announcements before the agreement is formally concluded. (Beijing 10016 NODIS, PSN 4030) (S)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1980

1. Afghanistan Expels All American Journalists: Embassy Kabul was informed today by the foreign ministry that all American journalists have been ordered to depart Afghanistan on the first available aircraft. The Afghan official stated that this action had been taken because of the "American journalists' interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and their biased reporting." Our embassy estimates that there are 30 to 50 American journalists and cameramen in Afghanistan, and it is now in the process of informing the journalists and assisting them to exit the country. (Kabul 175, PSN 36409) (C)

2. Christopher/Genscher Meeting: Christopher outlined to Foreign Minister Genscher yesterday our strategy toward Iran, explaining the need to implement economic sanctions and requesting FRG assistance. He clarified that we hope sanctions will obviate the need for other, more risky measures, and stressed the importance of European support. Genscher expressed an FRG willingness to help as much as possible on sanctions, indicated coordination with the other Europeans, and promised an early decision. The foreign minister stressed the need to consider our decisions and the developments in Iran carefully to ensure that European nationals are not taken hostage. The foreign minister stated it is important that Iranian leaders not see the conflict with the U.S. as more important than the Soviet threat; therefore, Western public statements should not diminish the Soviet conflict with the Islamic world. Genscher proposed that the Western reaction to the events in Afghanistan be incorporated into an overall political strategy, and outlined some steps the EC is considering in this regard, including new arrangements with Yugoslavia and consideration of a possible political arrangement with the Gulf states and Iraq modeled on the EC-ASEAN cooperation agreement. Genscher further stressed the need to reach a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement, and described Israel's security concerns as small compared to the threat now posed by the Soviets to all countries of the region. (Bonn 916, PSN 35795, 35800, 35802, 35806, 35810) (S)
3. Cooper Meeting with French Economic Officials: On Iran, the French identified legal problems in applying the Security Council resolution in the face of the Soviet veto, and recommended we consider putting the Soviets in a corner tactically by pressing them on what "measures" they would be prepared to take under Resolution 461. They questioned the tactical advisability of countries other than the U.S. imposing further measures at this time, but conceded that they probably have the legal ability to take some additional actions. Cooper proposed three areas where concrete support from our allies would be extremely useful in the Soviet/Afghanistan situation: no undercutting of U.S. actions; no new official export credits; and, strict application of COCOM criteria. The French will not undercut U.S. measures; will continue normal commercial relations, will not cut off official credits, and will take a tough line but act slowly in renegotiating the Franco-Soviet credit agreement. On COCOM, the French did not know what cases they might be submitting and promised to get back to us soon. (Paris 1739, PSN 35768, 35772, 35776, 35780) (S)

4. U.S./Argentine Relations: Ambassador Castro met on Tuesday with former Junta member General Viola, who is expected to succeed Videla as president in 1981, for a general review of U.S. Argentine relations. Viola appeared deeply perturbed about the adverse turn of events in our bilateral relations, and attributed this to the lack of communication between the executives and foreign ministers of both countries. He feels it is imperative that a dialogue be established as soon as possible between the President and President Videla and also between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Pastor. Viola stated that both countries should see each other on the basis of conditions as they exist on and look into the future rather than base their policy on past acts. The general expressed serious concern over the State Department's human rights report on Argentina and felt the wording of the report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and anti-Americanism if Argentines felt the report was an unfair evaluation of their country. Viola agreed to do whatever he could to get the government's cooperation on the restriction of grain sales to the USSR. (Buenos Aires 472, PSN 35961) (C)
CONFIDENTIAL

STATE FOR HAJALA VANY; NA FOR DERRIA
WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE WHITE HOUSE —

S. IN CONVERSATION WITH THERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A CHILLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN AND ANTI-SEMITIC.

S. THERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV DAILY Haaretz and seems comfortable with that fact, although he said he might be interested in spending some time at an academic institution in the UK. He specifically mentioned Columbia. Thus far he has written only on Latin American matters, but it may be expected that he will branch into broader discussions of international political matters. He said that the theme of a speech he will give in the United States will be human rights as the ideology of the 1980s, and added that the US

3. THERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE "LEADER" OF AN ALLIED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGAN WHICH SHOWED ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING WATCHED BECAUSE HE HAD DREADED TO USE THE TERROR LEFTIST-FASCISTS IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN. THEN HE WILL GO TO WASHINGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE DEPARTMENT, AND AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

4. THERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LAHUSE'S EXPRESS SECRETARY EDGARO SAJON DIED OF A HEART ATTACK DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT HE HAD A HEART CONDITION.

5. THERMAN IS NOW RELUCTANT TO TELL ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES IN ARGENTINA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS BY THE MILITARY AGAINST FRIENDS STILL IN ARGENTINA. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS HE MENTIONED THAT ROBERT COX, EDITOR OF THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM NOT TO MENTION COX IN ANY ARTICLES.


7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, THERMAN SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE AND RIGHT-WING PLAYERS IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERONIST SUPPORT, WHICH MAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISRAELI PERSONS WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA.

8. IN CONVERSATION WITH THERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A CALLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN AND ANTI-SEMITIC.

9. THERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV DAILY Haaretz and seems comfortable with that fact, although he said he might be interested in spending some time at an academic institution in the UK. He specifically mentioned Columbia. Thus far he has written only on Latin American matters, but it may be expected that he will branch into broader discussions of international political matters. He said that the theme of a speech he will give in the United States will be human rights as the ideology of the 1980s, and added that the US

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLC-24-91-4-1-9

NARA: E52174-1-91-1
CONFIDENTIAL

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMEBERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE LEWIS.
2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA 
OCTOBER 8 (REF A). GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND 
APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED 
THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING; IN THE 
MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAY THAT HE FULLY RECIPROCATED 
THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING 
US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY GOVERNMENT," HE SAID, "WILL 
SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS 
POSSIBLE." HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS 
IN THE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS 
BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH 
IN AN EARLIER MEETING HE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA, 
GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO-
DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WILL "ONE WAY OR ANOTHER" 
BE RESOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC 
INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, THAT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS 

***WHSR COMMENT***
Were required for the relationship to prosper.

3. Viola, as usual open and accessible, made it clear that he wanted to use the meeting to explore other matters — in effect he said "Ask me questions." The Charge inquired what General Viola saw as the agenda for his government. Viola responded by listing what he called the "problems." Given to schematic responses, he stated that the first priority was in the political area where the government would have to produce legislation that will allow the political parties to renew their leadership and "function normally." In the economic area, he said, the first priority was to revitalize the economy, "both industry and agriculture." In the social area, he said it was necessary to correct the impression that the government was essentially opposed to the broad interests of most Argentines. He suggested that this could be accomplished by effectively implementing the labor reform legislation and instituting other, undefined, measures in the social field. Viola stopped with these priorities. But when queried on foreign policy issues he said that his government has four objectives: to increase the "presence" of Argentina in the Southern Cone (he hastened to add that the country was not seeking regional hegemony); to rebuild Argentina's ties to the Andean Pact; to repair and expand relations with Western Europe; and to restore and strengthen relations with the United States.

4. Viola then took the opportunity to spell out some of his thoughts on the military government's basic goals. He said that the military took over in 1976 with one objective: to lay the foundations for a secure and genuine democracy. The military wanted to finally end the cycle in which ineffective and unstable democratic governments alternate with military regimes. Getting the military permanently out of this game by building a healthy democracy was still the military's objective and one that his government would faithfully pursue, he said.

5. These thoughts led to a question on Peronism by the Charge. Viola said that he and his colleagues did not want to leave power knowing that in five to ten years the country would again be faced with the options if
6. In response to a question, Viola elaborated on the
ECONOMIC ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TWO GO TOGETHER. HE ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED THE POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT PARTICIPATION IS DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS: INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES, ELECTRICITY, WATER, ETC.); STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES (FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUSTRY); AND INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN THE PAST FOR "SOCIAL OR POLITICAL" REASONS. THIS LAST GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES WERE "COMPLICATED" AND THERE WAS LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUY THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE:
A. VIOLA'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT "IF" HE SHOULD TRAVEL, IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY'S OFFER TO HELP WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS. AS HIS OWN PLANS DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT. VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US.

B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IAHRC REPORT AT THE OASGA. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE, AS ROS HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD AVERSLEY AFFECT THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON. VIOLA STATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM (REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. RUSER
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. EBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman

Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President Carter to express her deep appreciation for the President's efforts on behalf of her husband. The letter, which was delivered to our Embassy in Israel where she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador Castro's work on this case and Mrs. Timerman's hope that these efforts will lead to her husband's release.

The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be released. While this review was underway the Argentine Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated our position that Timerman should be released on the merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in the immediate future.

We recommend that the President sign the attached reply to Mrs. Timerman.

Attatchments:
1. Suggested reply
2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to President Carter
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Bolivia. Faced with the alternatives of increasing repression or negotiating a face-saving exit, Col. Natusch is apparently considering surrendering power to the Congress on the condition that Guevara not be reinstalled as President. At Natusch's request, the Congress has been called for a meeting. Guevara said he will not step aside, and there is no readily available consensus candidate in the wings. Stay tuned. (C)

Central America and the Caribbean. Worked on the FY 81 budget with Poats and others trying to get it to reflect the kind of priority which the President attaches to the region. Also worked on a paper suggesting U.S. policy guidelines to the Caribbean for use at the PRC meeting on Wednesday. (C)

Guatemala. Met with Dr. Gallardo, a leader of Guatemala's Social Democratic Party. He recounted in great detail the efforts by the military government to assassinate Christian Democratic and Social Democratic political leaders. He also talked about the extensive corruption in the military, and asked the U.S. to withdraw our aid to the government. On Sunday, I spoke before a group of country directors of the AFL's labor organization in Latin America. Several thought that the situation in Guatemala was much more urgent than I had thought. They attributed part of the social crisis to the union-busting activities of right-wing U.S. businessmen in Guatemala. (C)

You Don't Look Jewish. Last week, Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine editor who the military recently released after a couple of years in prison, told me that much of the Argentine military believe that a world-wide Jewish conspiracy is at the heart of the terrorist problem in Argentina, and that you are the head of that conspiracy; Linowitz is your deputy, and Timerman was the director in Argentina. He said that this organization chart can be seen in a number of Argentine prisons. When Timerman pointed out to his captors that you are a Pole and a Catholic, they said that was only your alias. They "know" you are Jewish because they studied the New York City phone book and found that a number of "Brzezinski's" had Jewish first names! (C)

Press Contacts. None. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on 11/5/85

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-54-8-39-5
NARA EF Date 7/9/10
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

December 3, 1977

1. Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz - Ambassador Dinitz came to see me this morning to tell me he will be leaving Monday evening to join Begin at the close of Begin's visit to London. I informed Dinitz of my Middle East trip, stressing that we see our role as supporting Egypt's and Israel's efforts. Dinitz assured me that Israeli press criticism of the U.S. in no way reflects the views of the Israeli Government. Begin is very interested in continuing the intimate dialogue with the U.S. and wants us to be very much involved in whatever Israel does, since he knows that Israel will need American help and advice in the future. I also informed Dinitz about Phil Habib's trip to Moscow.

Dinitz raised the F-16 question. I asked him to look at how procurement and payment could be spread out so as not to take up all of Israel's military funding in a single year. Dinitz is anxious to have the F-16 problem resolved before Defense Minister Weizman's visit early next year. He also raised the question of the length of time required for negotiations on new U.S. military technology and indicated that the Israelis will want to talk further with us about this. I said that in the light of recent developments we might want to take another look at the question of F-5s for Egypt. Dinitz reiterated Israel's standard concern about lethal weapons for Egypt but said there might be some new thinking now in Jerusalem. I will pursue discussion of this issue with the Israelis during my trip.

On Dinitz' inquiry, I related my efforts with the Argentines regarding the Timerman case. Dinitz expressed appreciation for this, and for our help in the UN in the vote on the Center of Palestinian rights.

Dinitz spoke with considerable satisfaction about the dinner Barbara Walters is arranging for him and Ghorbal on Sunday. He is obviously looking forward to it.
2. Congressional Consultations on Trip Announcement -
   As we had discussed, Hodding will announce the Middle East trip
   at noon on Monday. We will inform the leadership and key members
   of the Foreign Relations and International Relations Committees of
   the fact that I plan to make the trip before the announcement is made.
   I plan to talk personally to as many of these people as I can on Sunday
   evening and Monday morning. I will explain our objectives and ask
   for their public support.

   3. Panama Treaty Passage - On Thursday, I reported
      that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff believed the
      Committee's resolution would link Panama treaty ratification to
      the passage of enabling legislation by both Houses. I think we have
      succeeded for the time being in forestalling such an amendment.
      The Committee will not push for this amendment, although it is
      conceivable that we will face it on the floor.

      Bob Byrd has confirmed that he has asked that the treaties
      be reported by January 25th, with floor action to begin in the first
      week of February. He expects floor action to take three weeks,
      so final passage could come in late February or early March.

      The State Department has a substantial task force working
      on all aspects of the Treaty ratification process. I find that it is
      functioning well. Doug Bennet, Frank Moore and our legislative
      staffs seem to be meshing smoothly and doing the necessary planning.
      I conclude that we are reasonably well prepared for what will be an
      extremely difficult and subtle legislative struggle.

   4. Presidential Mail - I am glad to report that the State
      Department backlog of responses to Presidential mail referred to
      us for answering has been eliminated and we are now in compliance
      with the nine-day limit for processing such correspondence. We
      have also taken steps to solve the long range problem by organizational
      steps within the Department and by contracting with a high speed
      correspondence processing service.
5. Lawsuit Against Transfer of Crown of St. Stephen

Senators Curtis and Hayakawa and Representatives Kemp and Doman have sued to enjoin the transfer of the Crown of St. Stephen. They claim the U.S. has title, presumably as trustee, to the Crown and that it may not be transferred without authorization of Congress. We see no merit in this claim. Judge June Green has scheduled a hearing at 2:00 Monday on Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order. But this may be postponed. We are working to develop a strategy that will permit the matter to be adjudicated without interfering with the transfer of the Crown on January 6.

We are proceeding to discuss arrangements with Hungary, including an exchange of letters and public announcement of Cardinal Lekai's participation and will give you our advice promptly concerning the timing of a joint announcement.

6. Jim Wright and the Middle East - I met yesterday with Jim Wright and six other members of his delegation which visited the Middle East. The group was optimistic about the prospects for peace, interested in remaining close to the peace process in which they feel they have participated at a critical and historic moment. Jim and his colleagues were especially encouraged by popular reactions in Israel to Sadat's visit, the Israeli government's interest in Sadat's West Bank formula of confederation or federation with Jordan, and in the West Bank mayors' acceptance of demilitarization of a West Bank entity.

7. U.S./Japan Economic Negotiations - I mentioned a couple of days ago that I would provide some additional background on our trade relations with Japan.

We are satisfied with the progress of our trade talks so far. Our current approach results from a thorough USG Interagency consensus. No agency thinks we have pressed too hard. Our intent is not to escalate the pressure -- only to maintain the present level consistently. The danger is that, if we flinch or wobble now, the Japanese will be quick to judge this as indecisive and vacillating. We are adjusting our position to Japan's political and economic realities as we progress.
The level of pressure achieved successfully galvanized Japan's bureaucracy into urgent consideration of our suggestions. Fukuda's recent cabinet changes improve the potential for responsiveness and cooperation. Both Ambassador Mansfield and our Japan experts urge that, if we apply sustained, even pressure, we are likely to get some trade concessions at little expense to US/Japan relations. More than with previous issues, such as Tokai Mura, how firmly and consistently we handle this matter will determine how Japan responds to future issues with this Administration. If we ease off, we lose respect, prospective concessions and undermine future Japanese responsiveness.

Our aim is for a successful visit by Bob Strauss at the end of the year, followed by a unilateral Japanese announcement of measures to eliminate its payments surplus and help blunt protectionist pressures.

8. Uganda - We have taken a number of steps to terminate the training of the Ugandan police helicopter pilots and mechanics. We have telephoned and written to each of the schools involved requesting that they not go forward with the training. The results were mixed.

Warren then wrote asking the Federal Aviation Administration to advise the two Texas schools involved that the official certifications toward which the training is directed will not be issued. The FAA has done so, and we have informed the Uganda Embassy here of this step. The FAA action, which will quickly become public knowledge, will put pressure on the schools to end the training. We considered and rejected the possibility of cancelling the trainees' visas, in part because the legal appeals might have prolonged their stay, which is scheduled to end before January 1.

We have also decided to deny visas to officially connected Ugandans for any training or education in this country. We would only review a decision in the event of exceptional circumstances (UN sponsorship, obvious UN benefit, etc.).
SUE:

PLEASE SEND THIS ALONG TO DENIS CLIFT AT CAMP DAVID FOR HIS CLEARANCE.

ALSO, WOULD YOU PLEASE VERIFY WITH DCLIFT -- DOES THE REFERENCE TO "VAKY VISITING ALONE" MEAN NO ACCOMPANYING PERSONNEL OR JUST A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY OF ARGENTINA?

THANKS.

LOUISE
SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR VAKY

9/6
5:55 P.M.
SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, SEPTEMBER 5, AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY TO PRESIDENT VIDELA OR DR. YOFRE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS BUT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE A CENTRAL CONCERN. WE WISHED TO WORK WITH ARGENTINA IN HAVING GOOD RELATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT VIDELA RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC), ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION. WE WOULD NOT LINK ARGENTINE ACTIONS WITH OUR OWN. PROGRESS ON CASES SUCH AS JACOBO TIMERMANN WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

3. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST BE UNITED AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE
WESTERN WORLD. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT TROUBLED BY OBJECTIVE CRITICISM. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. SUCH CRITICISM HAD COMPelled HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOVERNMENT PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR POPULAR ISSUES.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT, TO PUT RELATIONS ON A MORE POSITIVE COURSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO ARGENTINA TO MEET WITH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE FOR A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER THE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRc OR BEFORE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER (DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING), WHICH HE SAID SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1, THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15. AT AN Earlier POINT, HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ALONE AND REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESE.


7. ACTION REQUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOW KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA HIMSELF, IF POSSIBLE, OR WITH YOFRE (WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING) MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: {1} WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK PLACE; {2} WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U.S. DESIRE TO BRING...
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12: NLC-133-57-8-5-8

U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE WHICH SHOULD EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS: (3) YOU HAVE BEEN AS TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE MONDALE-VIDEL CONVERSATIONS; (4) WE ARE NOW TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE WE STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN ROME; AND (5) NOW THAT VIDELA IS BACK, DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE TIMETABLE WHICH MIGHT BE LIKELY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND THE VAKY TRIP?
ARGENTINA

PARTICIPANTS

ARGENTINA

President Jorge Rafael Videla
(HORhay RAFAIel VeeDEHleh)
Vice Admiral Oscar Montes,
Foreign Minister
(ODIScar MOHNtes)

US

The President
The Secretary
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Chargé Maxwell Chaplin
Mr. Robert Pastor

Checklist

-- Courtesy Point - We want to thank President Videla for his warm reception of Assistant Secretary Todman on his recent trip to Argentina.

-- Human Rights - We want to impress on the Argentines our concern over their continuing gross violations of basic human rights. We understand that they inherited a chaotic mess, but terrorism is now largely controlled. Human rights violations continue however. We think now is the time to move ahead. We are heartened to hear of releases of prisoners and the reinstatement of the "right of option".

-- Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco - We want to impress on the Argentines the danger of nuclear arms proliferation; full safeguards are a necessity. We also want them to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco to indicate Argentine dedication to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

-- Malvinas/Falkland Islands - We want to stay out of this Argentine--UK dispute. We are pleased that conversations are going on between the two governments to resolve the questions.

-- Helicopter Sale - (If raised by President Videla) - We limited the equipment which will be supplied on the eight commercial Model 212 Bell helicopters because of present problems in the human rights field.

-- Trade - Point out that current US health and custom regulations will not allow Argentine fresh meat to enter the US.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-(e-47)-1-2-0
CONFIDENTIAL
NARA EF Date 7/9/11
ARGENTINA

I. Setting

President Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in a March 1976 coup d'etat. Economic instability and right-wing and left-wing violence were rampant. The new government took the form of a Junta composed of the chiefs of the three armed services with Videla (Army) as President. It had two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

The struggle against terrorism from the left is now largely won, but the excesses of counterterrorism remain a serious problem. Some of the security forces are running out of control. We believe that President Videla is a moderate who probably would constrain such right-wing terrorism if he could, but pressure from hard-line military officers restricts his freedom to act. Some progress in human rights has been made, however. Prisoners have been released and the Argentines have announced they will soon reinstate the "right of option".

The once powerful trade unions are under tight wraps and many of their leaders have "disappeared". The government is considering a plan for incorporating civilians into political process, but no action has yet been taken.

In the security field we are concerned that the Argentines $350 million favorable trade balance with the Soviet Union, may lead them to seek Russian weapons. Our restrictions on arms sales for human rights reasons pushes them toward the Russians.

In the economic field, the Videla government began to reverse the populist programs of the Peronist years by reestablishing a free market economy. The results have been generally very successful; but inflation remains a continuing problem and labor has been squeezed. The U.S. had a $250 million favorable trade balance with Argentina in 1976.

U.S.-Argentina difficulties relate to the excesses of counterterrorism and our general concerns regarding nuclear proliferation. (The latter issue is now coming to the fore.)

CONFIDENTIAL
II. Issues

I. Human Rights

The human rights situation in Argentina is the principal obstacle to closer relations. There have been some improvements, including the release of some prisoners and an announcement that the "right of option" will soon be reinstated. However, the Argentine government continues to refuse to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners. Disappearances, summary executions, torture, and instances of anti-Semitism also occur.

As the result of human rights violations, we proposed a reduced FMS credits program for FY '78. Argentina rejected the proposal but kept the door open to FMS sales and training. We have not signed the FY '77 FMS agreement for human rights reasons. We are now refusing all military items for internal security use. All other requests for military items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

The Argentines will not participate in this year's joint US-Latin American fleet exercise (UNITAS). Their stated reason for nonparticipation is "difficulty in obtaining small parts" for their ships. We believe it is a protest of our arms sales policy.

The Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to this year's security assistance bill will virtually eliminate military ties to Argentina on October 1, 1978.

We have abstained, voted against and pressed the Argentines to withdraw loan proposals in the international financial institutions. There is no AID program in Argentina because of its high per capita income.

Talking Points

-- The United States recognizes that Argentina has been victim of a brutal terrorist campaign.

-- The Argentine government has decisively mastered the security situation, but it does not appear to be moving with sufficient speed and determination to abolish lawlessness by security forces and others.

-- We are concerned that people are being repressed simply because they dissent. Lawful opposition should not be confused with subversion.
-- We strongly urge an end to the state of siege and the public listing of all prisoners showing their place of detention and the charges against them. Due process should be restored and all future excesses punished.

-- Reports of continued torture and disappearances are distressing.

-- We want to express our concern over the case of Jewish publisher Jacobo Timmerman of the respected daily La Opinion. He is being held without charges. Should an outbreak of anti-Semitism occur it would be most harmful to US-Argentine relations.

-- We do recognize the partial steps taken by the Argentine government to assure basic human rights. The May release of prisoners and the recently announced intention to restore the "right of option" are positive indications of such Argentine movement. (The "right of option" allows Argentine citizens to leave country if held under State of Siege provisions.)

-- We think it essential for the government to recognize its unquestioned strength. It should begin to gamble on the side of returning the country to the rule of law.

-- Human rights concerns will not permit us to sign the FY 1977 FMS credits.

-- We regret the Argentine nonparticipation in the UNITAS exercise but appreciate their offer of logistic support. We look forward to their rejoining UNITAS in the future.

2. Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Argentina has the most advanced nuclear capability of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for an autonomous fuel cycle. The Argentine government has stated that it seeks nuclear technology in order to satisfy its energy needs and for strictly peaceful purposes. We are concerned, however, because of Argentina's apparent progress toward acquiring an independent, unsafeguarded reprocessing capacity. We are considering the transfer of sensitive heavy water technology to the Argentines if they will forego reprocessing and accept full scope safeguards. The Argentines recently signed a limited safeguards agreement with Canada covering previously purchased nuclear fuel. They are now discussing with the Canadians the possibility of accepting full scope safeguards in return for further Canadian technical assistance in the nuclear area.

CONFIDENTIAL
Talking Points

-- The United States is concerned over the possible spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. We feel the world community must take steps to reduce this growing danger.

-- At the same time, the United States recognizes the need for states to expand and diversify their energy resources on a secure basis.

-- We applaud the recent Argentine-Canadian limited safeguard agreement.

-- Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would demonstrate Argentine commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- The US is considering Argentine requests for technical assistance and nuclear cooperation. Specific requests relating to nuclear fuel are also under study.

3. The Malvinas/Falkland Islands

Argentina has disputed British possession of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) since 1833. The 2,000 inhabitants of the islands want nothing to do with Argentina. The issue is further complicated by possibly large oil reserves in the Falkland Island shelf. In July, the UK and Argentina began another round in a series of conversations about sovereignty of the islands. The US has not taken sides in this dispute. (In talking with Videla you should use the Argentine name, Malvinas.)

Talking Points

-- We are pleased that Argentina and the UK are carrying on conversations directed toward resolving this question.

4. Sale of Helicopters (If raised by GOA)

We have agreed to sell the Argentine military eight Bell 212 commercial model helicopters, two of which will be used to transport President Videla. However, we did not agree to the original configuration requested by the Argentines. Machine gun mounts were eliminated on all of the eight, and armor plating was permitted only on those two aircraft to be used for President Videla's security.
We requested assurances from the Argentines that the helicopters will not be used for internal security purposes.

Talking Points

-- Concern that the helicopters might have internal security uses caused the US to request assurances. Retention of the armor plating on two of the helicopters will help to guarantee the safety of President Videla.

5. Trade

Argentina's continuing recovery from past economic difficulties should stimulate demand for US goods. The already large trade deficit with the US will worsen; Argentina will want to rectify the balance by exporting fresh meat products to the United States. US sanitary regulations do not permit importation of fresh meat from countries with endemic foot and mouth disease, such as Argentina.

Talking Points

-- We recognize Argentina interest in exportation of fresh meat. But we do not foresee the possibility of removing sanitary restrictions until adequate safeguards against transmittal of foot and mouth disease can be assured. Argentina has suggested export from disease-free areas, but USDA has ruled that the Tariff Act of 1930 precludes exceptions for parts of countries.
BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL (Entire text)

BILATERAL PAPER

ARGENTINA

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor

I. PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary Carlos Washington Pastor
Ambassador Vaky (Phonetic: pahsTOR)

II. INTRODUCTION

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level bilateral exchange with us during the course of the Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses. The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some public action to bolster President Videla's and General Viola's prestige and authority.

III. ISSUES

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1, the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports that prison conditions have improved. There is, however, still little information on the fate of disappeared persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show cause for holding alleged subversives have not been successful.

Points to be Made

-- We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, and urge the government to continue to investigate recent cases and definitively end the practice.

-- We hope families of the disappeared will receive information that they request.

-- We are pleased with the release of prisoners held under Executive Power, and hope that all
prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed.

-- We remain deeply concerned over the continued detention of Jacobo Timerman, and hope that he will be released without delay.

-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners released under the Right of Option Program.

B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was most helpful in supporting the United States and the Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA supplied arms to the Somoza regime. It cannot be expected to have much influence with Nicaragua.

Point to be Made

-- We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will support the Andean countries in their efforts to assist Nicaragua.

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress.

Point to be Made

-- We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that both will continue to work with the Vatican.

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland) safeguards and other conditions they will require for the sale of a heavy water plant. (We would have preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We are also discussing with the GOA the additional U.S. safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980, needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We do not wish to take the initiative on this.

Point to be Made (If raised)

-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology. Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear export law and policy.

August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

March 21, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: NORTH-SOUTH

SUBJECT: Evening Report

Daily Activities

(Hansen)

Continued preparation for PRM 8.

(Thornton)

Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general background discussion.

In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for PRM 10 at the State Department.

(Pastor)

1. On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador, and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but the two which we spent the most time on were the current political situation in Argentina and U.S. policy on human rights. They told me that they were well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States. Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U.S. commitment to human rights would not waiver.
2. Attended a discussion where there were two delegates to the Cuban mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles.

3. Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Estado da Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state of U.S.-Brazilian relations. He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the short term, U.S. policies on human rights may cause some problems, but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling off period might be in order.

4. Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile, and discussed the current political situation in Chile.

5. Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, background memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and various memoranda.

Significant Information/Intelligence

(Thornton)

My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing defeat at the polls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also, but they will require detailed analysis. It is not completely certain yet that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders very well.

In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered.
The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba was here today and has left for the UN. Bill Schaufele tells me that the meeting was productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday.

The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended. It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus procedures and hence very limited in what it can do.

SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look like a basis for building a Namibia settlement.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Edmund S. Muskie

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Argentina

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin America developed a strategy, subsequently approved by you, to improve our relations with Argentina during 1980.

However, following the IG meeting two events occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing of our initiatives:

— The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant Secretary Bowdler’s visit to Buenos Aires was postponed as a result.

— Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions to the Soviet Union.

I emphasized both of these issues, in addition to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy received the impression that continued cooperation on grains is possible but much depends on the size of the 1980/81 harvests. We plan to continue our efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires, Washington, and at international meetings.

Argentine decision-making is influenced by the nearness of our presidential election and by their own presidential transition. General Viola will replace President Videla March 29, 1981.

Under these circumstances, we believe that, while it is important to proceed with as many of the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would be inappropriate to proceed this year with some of the steps earlier contemplated. However, we should maintain private dialogue and avoid public confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult. The steps we intend to proceed with this year and those we plan to defer until next year are as follows:

SECRET
I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives:

-- We will pursue our significant commercial and economic interests in preparation for the meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission to be held in Buenos Aires, probably in March or April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe). The meeting will include discussion of bilateral trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations. We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue over the issues that may be current at that time.

-- We will move forward on negotiations to arrive at an agreement on the assurances required for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco as they had earlier promised you.

-- We will seek to conclude the negotiations for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular convention.

II. Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year:

-- The first round of periodic security consultations, focusing on security of the South Atlantic.

-- Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues.

-- Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine decision to limit grains to the Soviet Union.

-- An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations with the Congress are completed and we are satisfied as to the timing of the initiative.

-- A high-level U.S. military visit, although we should keep under review the desirability of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Edmund S. Muskie

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Argentina

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin America developed a strategy, subsequently approved by you, to improve our relations with Argentina during 1980.

However, following the IG meeting two events occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing of our initiatives:

-- The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed as a result.

-- Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions to the Soviet Union.

I emphasized both of these issues, in addition to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy received the impression that continued cooperation on grains is possible but much depends on the size of the 1980/81 harvests. We plan to continue our efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires, Washington, and at international meetings.

Argentine decision-making is influenced by the nearness of our presidential election and by their own presidential transition. General Viola will replace President Videla March 29, 1981.

Under these circumstances, we believe that, while it is important to proceed with as many of the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would be inappropriate to proceed this year with some of the steps earlier contemplated. However, we should maintain private dialogue and avoid public confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult. The steps we intend to proceed with this year and those we plan to defer until next year are as follows:

---

SECERT
I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives:

-- We will pursue our significant commercial and economic interests in preparation for the meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission to be held in Buenos Aires, probably in March or April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe). The meeting will include discussion of bilateral trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations. We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue over the issues that may be current at that time.

-- We will move forward on negotiations to arrive at an agreement on the assurances required for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco as they had earlier promised you.

-- We will seek to conclude the negotiations for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular convention.

II. Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year:

-- The first round of periodic security consultations, focusing on security of the South Atlantic.

-- Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues.

-- Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine decision to limit grains to the Soviet Union.

-- An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations with the Congress are completed and we are satisfied as to the timing of the initiative.

-- A high-level U.S. military visit, although we should keep under review the desirability of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODFASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODFASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR, FOREIGN MINISTER
   DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY
   COMODORO CARLOS CAYANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
   MR. VICTOR BEAUGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)
   GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODFASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
   RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA
   CLAUS V. RUSSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (AOR/ES)
   WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER)

5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1980, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOODFASTER MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DATES AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS AND MATTERS HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IT WAS HIS GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AN ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS TROUBLES U.S.-ARGENTINA RELATIONS, AND THAT U.S.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCALCULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24, BRIGADIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR RESTORING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR EFFORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

8. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S FIRST PRESENTATION. PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S EXPLANATION OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH THE WISH AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS WE ADMIT THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL — HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND TOGETHER?

10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT" DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT WE ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, PASTOR CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR 'BAD RELATIONS ARE THE NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. THE UNITED STATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF U.S. POLICY, AND "IMADMISSIBLE" U.S.G. ACTIONS.

1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA Fought A WAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE YEARS. AND ARGENTINA WON THE WAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S. SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS — RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION" WAS THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS THIS SYMBOLISM, PASTOR WENT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO
SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES --
RATHER AS THOUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD
CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES,
WHEN THE U.S. HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT
INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OF
ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNFAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE
HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF
ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS -- EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED,
TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.

13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1962
ARGENTINA WAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE
WORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ("WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A
THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED THE U.S. IN
PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA; THIS COUNTRY HELPED
DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE; WE WERE THE FIRST
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES;
WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS;
WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A
RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04: NLC-24-91-3-3-8

OP IMMED
STU271
DE RUESSBA #0828/2 0291720 ADX057083 - MCN SVCD; PROCESS
C 291417Z JAN 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L; SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 0828

NODIS

14. U.S. LACK OF APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE ARGENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS FOR EXAMPLE THAT YOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAKE IN THE SHAH OF IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

15. FOR THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, GOA MUST ASK NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, PASTOR SAID, AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ARGENTINA BE CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA. THESE CHANGES OF ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE REFLECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONGRESS, AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASKED THAT THE U.S. STOP PRESSING ARGENTINA SO HARD IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPONSE TO WHICH WE COULD CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION HE PLANS TO MAKE LATER THIS YEAR").

16. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HE DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.)
17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY" BOASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT GOVERNMENT WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLENDE; ITS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND KIDNAPPINGS. NOW WE HAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OR SERIOUS CRIME. "WE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS
COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID.

18. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A FULL ALLIANCE; THE EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A NEW NEUTRALITY WITH WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL COMFORTABLE, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE UNCERTAIN. THEN HE ADDED: YOUR REVISIONS OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA -- ALL OF LATIN AMERICA NEEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS.

19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY -- IT IS PART OF OUR SHARED HERITAGE -- AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO RESTORE THIS SITUATION.

20. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS. IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE PROGRESS -- BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE THE POINT OF PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE A LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OF FUEL FOR RESEARCH REACTORS.

21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LESS EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTION. (COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM "POLITICAL PRISONER" GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. "YOU WERE REFERING TO TERRORISTS AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.)

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT AREAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED
AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. "I TALKED WITH SECRETARY VANCE ABOUT SOME OF THIS THE DAY BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON. HE IS CONCERNED FOR BASIC LEVELS OF HUMAN TREATMENT, BUT KNOWS TOO OF YOUR PAST DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE LEGAL PROCESSES." (COMMENT: GENERAL GOODPASTER ADDRESSED OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS. THESE TOO ARE INCLUDED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION.)

23. GENERAL GOODPASTER REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR TIMELY CONSULTATION, AND RECALLED WHAT THE LACK OF IT CAN DO TO AN ALLIANCE. HE SPOKE OF BETTER COORDINATION AND USING THE EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO BE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT, AND WE FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THIS. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS -- BUT YOU MUST UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE MADE THE U.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS, VITAL TO OUR SOCIETY EVEN WHILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE."

24. (COMMENT: THIS CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON JANUARY 23. SEPTEL WILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES ON JANUARY 24.) CASTRO
Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's, lobby OAS and other countries to follow our example, and assess whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken. (S)

Assessment

The report was prepared by INR—not HA-- and it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. Let me summarize the report:

-- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number. (S)

-- "Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment." The Red Cross estimated that 90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are executed. (S)

-- Disappearances -- probably by security units -- continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978. (Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while
the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear have vague associations with the "political left" rather than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

Illegal invasion of the home — including theft by security units — remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent. (S)

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes that the explanation for continued official terrorism is army politics. (S)

Policy

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S)

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address two questions:

1. What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)

2. What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range audience before taking any steps, lest we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

An Effective Policy

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government
decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.; (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage delay. (S)

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of Argentina's most hard-line Generals have been transferred, and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. (3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six months or more.

RECOMMENDATION:

Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision pending the IAHRC report.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____
cc: Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Channel dispute is over. On the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets much more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent as far as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA.

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

Maybe
2B - thought he should be friendly, strong, then Videla hand, and see if he then can clean up his act. We need to keep that "no" habit might be until it.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Mrs. Carter's Meeting with the Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Winner (C)

As per our conversation, I have prepared a short memorandum for Mrs. Carter's meeting tomorrow (Thursday) morning at 11:30 with the Argentine. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve_____  Disapprove_____
MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. CARTER

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Winner (C)

I understand that you will be meeting with Argentine Peace Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel. In 1973, Perez Esquivel, a sculptor and Professor of Architecture, established the Ecumenical Movement of Peace and Justice, an organization of Catholics, Protestants and others opposed to violence by both right-wing and left-wing political forces in Argentina. In 1974, he became Secretary General of the Peace and Justice Service, a Buenos Aires-based network of human rights activists throughout Latin America. (C)

He has been very complimentary of the President's human rights policy, and of our former Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, but as the attached UPI report indicates, he said that he was "gravely concerned" about the human rights movement because of Reagan's election. The Argentine government is unhappy that he received the Nobel Peace Prize, and the government has suggested indirectly that he may have contributed to terrorism. Our Embassy is aware of no information that would substantiate the charge. Indeed, he is a strong advocate of Gandhian non-violence. (C)

Perez Esquivel has also criticized military aid to the Junta in El Salvador, and there is some question about whether he cares as much about condemning left-wing terrorism as he does about government repression and right-wing terrorism. The President alluded indirectly to the point in his speech to the OAS on Wednesday, where he said: (C)

"The cause of human rights will be all the stronger if it remains at the service of humanity rather than at the service of ideological or partisan ends -- and if it condemns both terrorism and repression." (U)

I suggest you make the following points:

-- The President and I both wanted to personally congratulate you for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. (U)

-- As you know, the President has placed great emphasis on the importance of human rights for the U.S. and the world. Your award is symbolic of the importance which the entire world attaches to human rights today. (U)
-- We believe very deeply that for the human rights movement to remain strong it must be credible and to do it has to be perceived as separate from ideological or partisan political groups. We must support a free and just political process but not a political group. We must seek balance in our compliments and in our criticism; we should condemn the terrorism of the left as strongly as the repression of the right. If we fail to maintain that balance, we will fall victim to one side or the other. And the cause of human rights will suffer. (U)

-- I have heard that you may visit El Salvador. As the President said, we have supported the Junta in its effort to implement fundamental reforms and to resist efforts by the right to restore an old tyranny and of the left to create a new one. We have tried to use our aid -- both economic and non-lethal military aid -- to encourage the Junta to curb human rights abuses. Bob Pastor is prepared to discuss the situation there at greater length if you so desire. (U)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

At your request I have taken the main points in my memorandum to you and included them in a memorandum from you to Secretary of State Vance. Still, I recommend that you use the memorandum as talking points with the Secretary rather than send it. I am gun-shy -- not to say paranoid -- about sending memos from here to other agencies. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend that you not send the memorandum at Tab I, but rather phone Secretary Vance.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

cc: Jessica Mathews

SECRET
Review on March 20, 1979

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-81-2-6-7
NARA E.F. Date 7/19110
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience -- in the U.S. and elsewhere -- before taking any steps, lest we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,500 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last --the invitation-- may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization. I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified. (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
National Security Council

March 10, 1979

Confidential

Note to: Zbigniew Brzezinski

From: Jessica Tuchman Mathews

Subject: Argentina and Human Rights Policy

Bob's recommendation is that we delay a change in policy until after the IAHRC visit and report, and indicates that the delay will be a few months. In fact it will probably be much longer. It took 13 months after the visit to El Salvador to get out the final report. It will take at least as long to do the controversial Argentine report. So we are talking about a probable delay until June 1980 at least.

Cc: Bob Pastor

Confidential

Review on March 9, 1985
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

October 19, 1977

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR

SUBJECT: President's Request for Information on Letter from Videla

Rick Inderfurth asked me to provide this information very quickly for you. I am working on the letters, but I expect that I will not be able to send them forward until I return from Panama -- which will not be until late Thursday night because of very poor flight connections.

A memorandum from you to the President is provided at Tab I.
The letter from President Videla of Argentina to you was dated October 11, 1977, but it was received by Bob Pastor at approximately 5:00 p.m. on October 18, 1977. Videla had asked the Embassy to deliver the letter directly to the National Security Council for delivery to you, but we informed the State Department immediately of its contents.

The letter referred to the case of the Deutsch family, which you raised in your discussion with President Videla. In the letter, Videla made several points:

- First, that Daniel Deutsch and his family had fled Argentina illegally, and that they were active members of the Communist Revolutionary Party. (According to our files, Daniel Deutsch and his wife left Argentina legally and are currently in the U.S.)

- That Daniel Deutsch's sister, Liliana, is also a member of the organization, and is in jail in Argentina.

- That their father, Alejandro Deutsch, covered up for both of his children.

- That for these reasons Alejandro and Liliana Deutsch are being held.

- And that the other three members of their family have been released.

Videla closed the letter by reaffirming the friendship between the Argentine and American people and saying that he would like to continue to have direct communication with you. We are incorporating a response to this letter within the context of a longer letter from you to President Videla which we are drafting referring to other important points in your conversation with him.
Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América
D. James E. CARTER
WASHINGTON D.C.

Estimado Señor Presidente:

De acuerdo con lo que amistablemente convinimos durante nuestra reunión en Washington, en el sentido de mantener canales de comunicación directos e informales, me place enviarle estas líneas motivadas en uno de los temas que abordamos en nuestro encuentro. Me refiero al caso de la familia Deutsch.

Como conclusión de las investigaciones efectuadas por los organismos competentes, se ha podido establecer que:

- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y su esposa, que abandonaron ilegalmente nuestro país, son activos miembros del Partido Comunista Revolucionario.

Su función, dentro de la citada organización ilegal, era la de efectuar tareas de Información e Inteligencia, vinculadas a la actividad de los grupos terroristas que actúan en el país.

- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la misma organización subversiva, desempeñándose como activista en el ámbito estudiantil.

- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anteriores, encubrió las actividades ilegales de sus hijos.

- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos, próximamente, a los Tribunales Militares competentes.
Residente de la Nación Argentina

- En cuanto a la señora de Alejandro Deutsch y sus hijas Elsa y Susana Silvia, han sido puestas en libertad al constatarse que no tenían conocimiento ni vinculación alguna con las actividades ilegales del resto de la familia.

Quiero, al presentar a V.E. mi más afectuoso saludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial interés con que acompaño su actuación y, una vez más, reafirmar la fraternal amistad de los argentinos por el pueblo de los Estados Unidos de América.
Human Rights

Guatemala and El Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S. foreign military assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights. Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e., the U.S.) policy on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S., but her efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think) the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction of U.S. policy.

Panama

Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was taken by the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive.

Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway. Unless he accepts a special role for the U.S. within this guarantee-system, we are back to the beginning.

Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can convince Perez and Lopez MichelBen to get Torrijos to accept our requirements on neutrality.

Cuba

A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing the State Department to begin direct and confidential talks with Cuban officials. Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to set a time, place, and agenda for talks.
Early Warning Signals (Pastor)

Panama

The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents. Those visits, coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation.

Cuba

The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the increase in press reports and rumors about U.S.-Cuban discussions. Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who believe there is a need for a new U.S. policy.
Critical Observation and Recommendation (Pastor)

Public Diplomacy

To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S. has been conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S. does not know — that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba, for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a matter of days or weeks.

I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some issues). But I do not believe that we have thought through the implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties. For example, on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own country may set back negotiations with the other. I am not sure there is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not believe that an attempt to keep better control of secrets will work, but the entire question of how public diplomacy relates to private negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which should be explored at greater depth.

Human Rights

The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress. There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S. foreign policy than in any recent period.

Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human rights policy -- this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad. We must begin, of course, by realizing that the U.S. cannot determine events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The question is: how? And I have been tasking the bureaucracy on this question with no success.

Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question. Another part may be that I am very skeptical when the bureaucracy says we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives. But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments.
Key Foreign Reactions (Pastor)

**Venezuela**

Venezuelan President Perez praised the President in his March 11 annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour presentation included:

---

- reference to the President's February 22 letter as a "categorical" refutation of the assertions in the *New York Times* of CIA payments, and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature";

---

- a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress" being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation.

The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have struck a responsive chord with Perez. The Venezuelan leader not only refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak -- Brazil reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his nuclear proliferation remark -- in order to identify ideologically with specific policies of the Administration.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: Monday, March 7, 1977

PLACE: Organization of American States
        Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary General Alejandro Orfila
              L. Ronald Scheman, Sub-Secretary for
              Management
              John Ford, Special Assistant to the
              Secretary General
              Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff

U.S. Policy on Human Rights

Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a
trip to the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay,
and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of
Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration
would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was
not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila
warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All
three governments were rather slow to adjust, but they have come to
understand its importance.

Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S. currently
attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged
the Uruguays to suppress all forms of subversion. They are parti­
cularly confused because the human rights situation in their country has
definitely improved in the last year.

In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and
the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address
is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do
we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we
should be careful not to put the government on the defensive least we
strengthen the hard-liners. The result would be even worse violations
of human rights.
Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other. He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico.

I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more democratic governments. It would also provide an opportunity to deal with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S. and Latin America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive.

Orfila said that the U.S. would increase its credibility if we were more evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very one-sided.

The United States in the Caribbean

Belize

On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only two-thirds of the southern province of Belize, which amounted to about one-fifth of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on Guatemala's part, since the country has been demanding total annexation of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britain on April 4, to negotiate with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on this issue. He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned to Great Britain its interest in Orfila's effort that Great Britain would be moved to persuade Prime Minister Price. (Comment: This is a particularly important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support Guatemala.)
El Salvador

The Secretary General was very pleased with his success in getting the President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras. The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries.

OAS

Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the present OAS. He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a manageable one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody ganged up on him, and the U.S. remained silent. The Permanent Council of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In fact, he called it "a joke."

"I need your help to change this place," Orfila said. Orfila would like to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, human rights, and political issues. He thinks it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance. In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently 1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors to the U.S. attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S. delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador to the OAS.)

Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said, he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last OAS meeting in Santiago, and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion, and that was it. Grenada was the site.
CONFIDENTIAL

(Comment: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state of international politics in the hemisphere. At Latin America's insistence, the U.S. has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS, but the Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in this regional forum. Any international leadership on the part of the Latin Americans has been in global fora like CIEC, as well as at UNCTAD in the United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality of representation there is one indication of the low importance which countries attach to it.

The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very healthy sign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support his efforts.

Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed, no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's efforts in human rights. We should also encourage the OAS to leave the economic and social fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 23, 1977

TO: THE SITUATION ROOM
FROM: NORTH-SOUTH

Attached is this Section's submission for the President's Weekly Report.
Alert Items (Pastor)

Belize. President Laugerud Garcia of Guatemala reportedly has hardened his position with respect to how much Belizean territory is necessary for any settlement with the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, border tensions have intensified. The Guatemalan Government is conducting military exercises involving personnel and aircraft in the Peten District, and British troops have gone on alert. Although this development probably should be interpreted as a case of sabre rattling, the possibility exists that the so-called "exercises" may be a smoke screen to cover preparations for some sort of actual military operation against Belize. UK and Guatemalan representatives will be meeting in Washington on July 6 and 7.

Venezuela. The Perez State Visit is scheduled for June 28-29. The Venezuelan President is prepared to discuss human rights, non-proliferation, energy, the Caribbean, Belize, Cuba, the OAS, North-South relations, conservation, multinational corporations and illicit payments. Additionally, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister has informed our Embassy in Caracas that Perez or someone in his party will wish also to bring up agriculture and food, cooperation in cancer research, experimental drugs, and Puerto Rican control of its "patrimonial sea."
Recent Developments (Pastor/Trachtenberg)

OASGA. The issue of human rights dominated the seventh OAS General Assembly from the opening speech to the last rebuttal. Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Guatemala and El Salvador opposed the human rights position, with Uruguay far out in front as a harsh critic of U.S. politization of the IAHCRC. Thanks largely to Mrs. Carter's trip, Ecuador and Peru lined up alongside traditional human rights supporters like Costa Rica and Venezuela. These countries, joined by the U.S., formed the core of a group which defended a strong resolution commending the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for its work and recommending that the OAS allocate greater resources to the Commission.

Ultimately, four human rights resolutions were approved. The key victory involved the resolution to ratify the Inter-American Human Rights Convention which eventually passed with key additional support from Peru, Ecuador, and Haiti. The efforts of Argentina and Chile to persuade the General Assembly to call for "reform" of the commission to meet the challenge of terrorism were defeated. Venezuela, which emphasized that human rights have been violated for centuries by nations who use terrorism as their justification, played the leading role through the entire conference.

Panama Canal Treaty. The negotiations for a new treaty broke down briefly this week. General Omar Torrijos called his negotiators home because he felt the U.S. delegation displayed too little flexibility. Talks resumed June 23. Torrijos reportedly instructed his negotiators last weekend to remain firm on the question of compensation by the U.S. for use of military bases in the Canal Zone and on the issue of Panama's freedom to select its own representatives to the Canal entity's governing council.

Hopes persist that we will have a Treaty by this summer.
Sit-in at ECLA Headquarters in Chile. The group of 24 women and two men who began a sit-in at headquarters of UN ECLA in Santiago on June 14, and whose demands included (1) the disclosure of information as to list of "disappeared" Chileans, and (2) the entry into Chile of a special UN representative, peacefully evacuated the building at noon today.

Upon learning of the incident, UN Secretary General Waldheim had cabled President Pinchet asking that reassurances be given as to the fate of the detainees and stating that "an unconditional agreement to receive a visit from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Human Rights in Chile would be a constructive move. Although the U.S. had indicated its hope that Pinochet would be as responsive as possible to Waldheim's request, the Chilean President initially had described the UN effort as an "interference."

Eventually, however, the Chilean Government agreed to "forgive" the demonstrators and provided the Secretary General with what information it could find about the cases of the relatives of the persons occupying the ECLA building. In addition, the Chileans have invited the Secretary General himself to visit Chile.
SIT-IN AT ECLA HEADQUARTERS IN CHILE

On June 14, a group of 24 women and two men representing families of individuals detained by Chilean authorities began a sit-in at the headquarters of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Santiago, Chile. The whereabouts of the detainees is unknown, and the demonstrators are demanding:

1. information on the welfare and whereabouts of a list of individuals who have disappeared,
2. entry into Chile of a special representative of the UN Secretary General, and
3. assurances of their own safety.

Upon learning of the demonstration, Secretary General Waldheim sent a cable to Chilean President Pinochet asking that reassurances be given as to the fate of the detainees. He also stated that an unconditional agreement to receive a visit from the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Human Rights in Chile would be a constructive move.

In response to a request for support from Waldheim, our Embassy in Santiago told the Chief of Staff of the Presidency that we hoped that Pinochet's response to the Secretary General would be as forthcoming as possible and that it would be considered in the context of our recently initiated dialogue with the Chilean Government.

Pinochet's initial reaction, as viewed by our
Chargo' in Santiago, was to describe the Waldheim initiative as "interference". Latest reports indicate, however, that the Chileans have agreed to "forgive" the demonstrators and provide Waldheim with what information it can find about specific cases of relatives of the demonstrators. In addition, the Chileans have issued an invitation to the Secretary General, himself, to visit Chile. Waldheim is considering sending an emissary to Chile, and the Chileans seem receptive — on the condition that the frame of reference for the visit be broadened so that not only the fate of the missing Chileans would be discussed, but other human rights conditions as well.

The most recent news is that the demonstrators peacefully evacuated ECLA headquarters in Stgo. at noon today. The exact terms of the settlement are not yet known.
Guatemala and El Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S. foreign military assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights. Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e., the U.S.) policy on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S., but her efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think) the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction of U.S. policy.

Panama

Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was taken by the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive.

Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway. Unless he accepts a special role for the U.S. within this guarantee-system, we are back to the beginning.

Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can convince Peres and Lopez Michelsen to get Torrijos to accept our requirements on neutrality.

Cuba

A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing the State Department to begin direct and confidential talks with Cuban officials. Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to set a time, place, and agenda for talks.
Early Warning Signals (Pastor)

Panama

The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents. Those visits, coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation.

Cuba

The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the increase in press reports and rumors about U.S.-Cuban discussions. Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who believe there is a need for a new U.S. policy.
Critical Observation and Recommendation (Pastor)

Public Diplomacy

To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S. has been conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S. does not know — that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba, for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a matter of days or weeks.

I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some issues). But I do not believe that we have thought through the implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties. For example, on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own country may set back negotiations with the other. I am not sure there is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not believe that an attempt to keep better control of secrets will work, but the entire question of how public diplomacy relates to private negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which should be explored at greater depth.

Human Rights

The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress. There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S. foreign policy than in any recent period.

Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human rights policy -- this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad. We must begin, of course, by realizing that the U.S. cannot determine events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The question is: how? And I have been tasking the bureaucracy on this question with no success.

Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question. Another part may be that I am very skeptical when the bureaucracy says we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives. But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments.
Key Foreign Reactions (Pastor)

Venezuela

Venezuelan President Perez praised the President in his March 11 annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour presentation included:

--- reference to the President's February 22 letter as a "categorical" refutation of the assertions in the New York Times of CIA payments, and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature";

--- a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress" being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation.

The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have struck a responsive chord with Perez. The Venezuelan leader not only refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak -- Brazil reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his nuclear proliferation remark -- in order to identify ideologically with specific policies of the Administration.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 19, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN
ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Nuclear Talks in Brazil and Argentina

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from State laying out a proposed strategy for nuclear proliferation talks with Brazil and Argentina during Secretary Vance's forthcoming trip. It arrived after Nye and Smith had already arrived in Argentina for preparatory talks.

The memo says little about Argentina—only that we will seek a decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but may have to settle only for a declaration of intent to ratify (judging from recent intelligence reports, we may not even get that much).

With regard to Brazil, State believes that time is on our side (growing Brazilian dissatisfaction with the German deal; the next Brazilian President seems to be more flexible on this issue; and increasing French pressure on Pakistan) and that "Geisel is likely to reject cut of hand any package of proposals we present at this time". State concludes therefore that we should not present our proposal on the FRG/Brazil agreement and instead confine these discussions to a general discussion of the "hemispheric security problem".

We believe that this is a mistake. Since the Brazilians know that we have already presented the proposal to the Germans, and since the President's letter to Geisel made reference to Smith's presenting the details on this trip, the Brazilians might be understandably offended if, after inviting Smith at Carter's request, they find he has little to talk about.

We also believe that the proposal should be sweetened by the addition of a proposal for joint US-Brazil cooperation in non-nuclear energy R&D projects. This is the proposal you approved in Pastor's recent memo.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-67-4-3-4
NARA EF Date 7/19/11
Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor

I. PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Carlos Washington Pastor

Ambassador Vaky

(Phonetic: pahsTOR)

II. INTRODUCTION

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level bilateral exchange with us during the course of the Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses. The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some public action to bolster President Videla's and General Viola's prestige and authority.

III. ISSUES

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1, the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports that prison conditions have improved. There is, however, still little information on the fate of disappeared persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show cause for holding alleged subversives have not been successful.

Points to be Made

-- We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, and urge the government to continue to investigate recent cases and definitively end the practice.

-- We hope families of the disappeared will receive information that they request.

-- We are pleased with the release of prisoners held under Executive Power, and hope that all
prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed.

-- We remain deeply concerned over the continued detention of Jacobo Timerman, and hope that he will be released without delay.

-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners released under the Right of Option Program.

B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was most helpful in supporting the United States and the Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA supplied arms to the Somoza regime. It cannot be expected to have much influence with Nicaragua.

Point to be Made

-- We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will support the Andean countries in their efforts to assist Nicaragua.

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress.

Point to be Made

-- We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that both will continue to work with the Vatican.

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland) safeguards and other conditions they will require for the sale of a heavy water plant. (We would have preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We are also discussing with the GOA the additional U.S. safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980, needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We do not wish to take the initiative on this.

Point to be Made (If raised)

-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology. Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear export law and policy.

August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE “DANGEROUS” CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN NEAR FUTURE BUT NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NOT BE SOLE CRITERIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINA’S VOTE IN OAS ON NICARAGUA, AND NOTED THAT U.S. VALUES HIGHLY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A FRIEND -- AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM A “FESTERING SORE” IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ON NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING INDEPENDENT, UNALIGNED COUNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED

DEN

FOB: PASTOR, BLOOM, COCHR

PSN: 007520  PAGE 01  TCR: 227/02:37Z  DTG: 142220Z AUG 79
"TO NEED FOR COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY. TURNING TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE. PASTOR RESPONDED THAT TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA Completes ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATER PLANT AND "FEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMMARY.

3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST 10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER) HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTEFOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF THAT MEETING FOLLOWS:

CENTRAL AMERICA

THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA SAW THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVED SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA.

IN RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AS VERY DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM CUBA TO LAY LOW AND TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE FROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES. AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSISTANCE IT WILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN, BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF GREAT INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERU.

IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE "INTENSE PINK". HE CONTINUED THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT COMMUNISTS USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECONOMY. THE GOA HOPES IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO PROCEED ALONG THE DEMOCRATIC
PATH BUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT
BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY.

HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT
THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE
LEADER OF THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR
CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED
AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE ONLY THING TO
MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO BE THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS
DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED
A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.
IF THIS COMMISSION APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT WILL
SEE MARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND
IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED
AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN THE OAS
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OF
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO NOT COMPLETELY
COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE U.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE
THE U.S. "TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE." AFTER THE
U.S., THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE MEXICO,
BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN
ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED
THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE
U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED
ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS
CONSIDERED A FRIEND -- AN ALLY. THE U.S. VALUED HIGHLY
ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO
CONTINUE INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS
AND OTHER ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS FRIENDS AND
ALLIES. THE U.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW
REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BUT, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED,
THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING
SORF IN OUR RELATIONS.

TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT
THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT
AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS
IN THE GNR; CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER
WAY. NICARAGUA HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT
WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND UNEALIGNED COUNTRY. THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS WHO ARE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. THE U.S. FEELS THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TO HELP THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLEMS. IF THESE TENSIONS ARE NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE WILL LIKELY BE AN EXPLOSION OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE WHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCE WE ALL HAVE A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE.


THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT NICARAGUA’S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED THE U.S. TO BE FORTHCOMING IN ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO ASSURE THAT NICARAGUA OVER TIME WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TOPPLE THEM. THE MINISTER SAID HE PERCEIVED THIS IN HIS TALKS WITH HIS CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. HE FELT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER COMMUNICATION ON IDEAS OF HOW TO STOP NICARAGUAN ENCROACHMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE FELT HONDURAS HAD A GOOD CHANCE TO SURVIVE ANY THREATS. BUT WITH RESPECT TO SALVADOR, THE TIME IS SHORT TO RESPOND TO THAT COUNTRY’S POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE FELT THAT UNLESS SALVADOR RESPONDED QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT WAS IN PERIL.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED
AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING PROVIDING MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOULD BE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS AND THAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH FROM A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT COULD GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TO CHANNEL ANY RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, HE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVE OUR LONGER-RANGE OBJECTIVES.

THE TERRITORIAL SEA

THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE U.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 200 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT REFER TO. HE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARbled STORY COMING OUT OF THE LOS NEGOTIATIONS.

TREATY OF TLaTELLOCO

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PREDECESSOR THAT ARGENTINA WOULD MOVE ON TLaTELLOCO, AND HE ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF IT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WANTED TO BE FRANK. ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENERGY, AMONG THEM NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW REACHED THE STAGE OF BEING ABLE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT ITS ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED THE GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN COMPLETE ITS ENERGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FULLY DETER-
MINED TO SIGN TLADELLOCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED, ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAN ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND TO THE TREATY OF TLADELLOCO.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED.

THE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WHEN ARGENTINA COULD SIGN.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS COULD BE IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA WAS PRESSURED ON THE MATTER SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT ABIDE BY THE COMMUNIQUE. HE ASSUMED ARGENTINA'S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATION OF A DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD RATIFY TLADELLOCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THE "CENTRAL CONCEPT" HAD NOT CHANGED; WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 7, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR
SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improvement in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore, their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C, a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which lends support to State's conclusion.

I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second time during his conversation with President Perez of Venezuela.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

   Approve _______ Disapprove _______

2. That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B.

   Approve _______ Disapprove _______

Jessica Tuchman concurs.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-55-1-6-5-3
NARA E 7/13/11
SECRET

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Bolivia/Argentina. The Bolivian Junta is trying desperately to convey an appearance of normality in La Paz; but it is failing. Resistance by miners, curfews, shortages, and the omnipresence of the military make it impossible. Resentment of the Argentine presence and involvement is also increasing. The evidence is pretty clearly that Argentina's 30-man military advisory mission in Bolivia planned and directed the coup, and is now directing the repression. Argentina is also considering a $200 million credit (in the form of higher prices for Bolivian gas). Even the Brazilians have been surprised by the Argentine involvement. The Argentine Charge informed the State Department that the cancellation of Bowdler's visit was a serious setback in US-Argentina relations. They deserve more of the same. (S)

Peruvian Inauguration. Despite the fact that there were nearly 10 heads of state at the Peruvian inauguration, Bowdler informs me that Mrs. Carter was the focus of attention, with Bélaunde making special gestures of friendship and appreciation to her during his addresses and at all of the occasions. I spoke to Mrs. Carter at some length, and she was pleased with her discussions with all of the heads of state who were there. She was pleased with the extent to which the Venezuelans were playing a large role in the Caribbean and Central America, and encouraged the Colombians to do the same. Bowdler will go down to see Turbay to discuss this in greater detail in a couple of weeks. By the sounds of her readout, she clearly did an excellent job conveying our policies and persuading the various heads of state of the President's deep interests in a wide range of Latin American problems. (C)

Cuban Sugar Sales to Japan. In response to indications that Cuba will seek to double its current annual sugar sales to Japan (300,000 tons worth $200 million) in connection with an upcoming Trade Mission, our Embassy in Tokyo has discretely approached the GOJ and urged that the Japanese consider alternate sources such as Brazil for additional supplies. Japanese officials told us they believed current negotiations between Japanese companies and the Cubans over a contract to replace the current five-year pact were stymied. The Japanese preferred a three-year deal at present levels while the Cubans sought a five-year deal with considerably higher annual sales. It was not known whether agreement would be reached. (S)

Press Contacts. None (U)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 29, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Argentina/Bolivia. This morning's press carried the news that the Argentine Government had "resumed normal relations" with Bolivia, thus becoming the first country to extend recognition to the new regime. We had already taken the decision to postpone Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires, and had instructed the Embassy to so inform Argentine officials. Judging from the strongly negative reactions of Argentine officials yesterday when postponement was still only a possibility, we are probably in for another severe chill in our relations. While the degree of damage limitation which will be required is not clear, much of the slow improvement since the Goodpastor visit may be in jeopardy. Similar decisions on recognition can now probably also be expected shortly from Bolivia's other neighbors (Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay). (S)

Bolivia. La Paz appears to have returned to normal, with the exception of certain areas such as the university which remain closed and guarded. The Embassy has picked up unconfirmed reports from several sources that Hernan Siles, who won a plurality in the June 29 voting, is setting up an underground government and intends to announce on August 6 (the scheduled inauguration day for the new President) that he is the legitimate President of Bolivia. The Papal Nuncio has made representations to the new authorities in favor of humane treatment for detainees, but has received no response. It is reliably reported that the regime is shaking down businessmen for contributions. (C)

At the OAS the Nicaraguans withdrew their request for a Permanent Council meeting to decide whether to convene a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Bolivia. They were apparently responding to advice from those who backed last week's resolution that the time was not propitious for another session on the Bolivian situation at this time. (C)

Cuban Refugees. A personal sweep by USINT personnel of the Mariel Harbor area yesterday failed to turn up any evidence of large numbers of US boats or detect any unusual movement of people into the area. Meanwhile, in San Jose, statements by Evelio Estrella to the effect that "all" refugees remaining in Costa Rica would be permitted to enter the US legally have raised expectations in the Cuban community and greatly increased crowds at the Consulate. (C)

El Salvador. Senior officers of the IMF, IBRD and IDB have told State in confidence that they were visited by an FDR delegation recently and advised not to continue operations with the current GOES. All three institutions took the approach as a direct threat to their personnel. State has suggested that the Embassy talk privately with trusted GOES officials to pass on above information and suggest that quiet and inconspicuous security measures be instituted for IFI personnel. (S)

Cuba. Castro's three hour speech to the faithful on July 26 is characterized by USINT as a curious mixture of revolutionary fire and cool pragmatism. On the one hand, Castro praised pluralism in Nicaragua, including private sector participation and aid from capitalist countries. Yet at the same time he returned to themes from the sixties by citing armed revolution as the only way open to oppressed peoples. From available reports it appears that Castro did not mention the refugee situation, but did lambast the Republican platform and candidates. I am getting the full text and will reserve further comment until I've had a chance to study it in detail. (C)

Note: Family business (a delayed arrival) kept me out of the office most of the day. (U)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Argentina. The U.S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization, economic problems, the NAM, etc. The Argentines have clearly passed through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will unquestionably have a saluting and moderating influence as they begin the task of re-building a more democratic society. There is a feeling among them that they have just turned the corner, though they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics. Today, the human rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture, and an accounting of the disappearances. He also provided an interesting statistic on the civil war: 659 Argentine soldiers or police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000 civilians. (S)

Caribbean. Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID, State, World Bank, IDB, and OMB to discuss the U.S. position at the donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week. Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG meets in June. The World Bank has set a target of $650 million for the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the Caribbean Development Facility (CDF). We are going to have to come up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978 level of 30% of the CDF. (S)

Two officers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the PRM on Central America. I asked them to do some work on the implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and on NATO. (S)

Mexico. STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete negotiations. The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon. Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17 on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that. Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)
SUBJECT: Evening Report

April 11, 1979

Chile. Attended a meeting at State chaired by Christopher to discuss whether there should be a Presidential determination in accord with the Chafee amendment on the Export-Import Bank to lift the $750,000 ceiling on loans to Chile. The decision needs to be made before April 22nd because of an application to Export-Import and this is on the eve of the Chilean government's decision on Letelier. It is an extremely tough decision. The human rights situation in Chile does, not in my opinion, justify a Presidential determination, but then our interest in combating terrorism as reflected by the Letelier case might justify such action. My inclination would be not to make a determination, but also to make clear to the Chilean government (and to the American people) that our concern over the Letelier case remains very strong. (C)

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The OAS met today and decided to hold an early election for the new Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Such an election will permit someone other than a hard line Brazilian to lead the Commission in its visit to Argentina. (C)

Bob Pastor went to Cambridge to give a speech at Harvard University on the United States' Human Rights Policy to Latin America. (U)

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

State Department review completed

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-54-8-4-6
NARA EF Date 7/19/16

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 : NLC-24-54-8-4-6
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: NORTH-SOUTH
SUBJECT: Evening Report

May 16, 1977

Daily Activities

1. Friday night I spoke at the American University on U.S. human rights policy to Latin America, and met with a somewhat skeptical but quite knowledgeable audience. Questions were raised about our policies in Argentina, Uruguay, and particularly Chile. One person asked me whether or not the President would meet with Eduardo Frei, or whether our policy was to deal solely with the military junta. I begged off answering those questions.

2. Met with Diego Aria, Minister of Communications of Venezuela, and his special assistant Antonio Hererra, to discuss President Perez' trip. In particular, we focused on the agenda of the trip, and Aria listed the obvious issues with the exception of human rights. Aria said that the U.S. has now suddenly discovered human rights, but Perez has been advocating a more forthright policy on human rights for many years. In addition, he said that he thought that the idea of a Western Hemisphere Energy Institute in which the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and perhaps Argentina, could pool their technology in order to increase the production of petroleum and alternative energy resources was a good one.

3. The informal and small interagency meeting involving people from Treasury, CIA, State, and Jessica Tuchman and I from NSC, to discuss future U.S. policy to Chile and in particular the question whether the President should meet with Eduardo Frei went very well. Frei has served us a very difficult decision. If Carter doesn't meet with him, some will analogize the snub with Ford's decision not to meet with Solzheintsyn. If he does meet with Frei, the Pinochet regime will unquestionably take it as an affront with the likelihood of harsh consequences. (I will send you a memorandum on this shortly.)

5. Representative Dante Fascell called me this morning and said that he was hearing reports from many Latin Americans that they were confused about the purposes of Mrs. Carter's trip. He asked whether the trip would in fact be substantive. I answered that I thought the distinction between a substantive trip and a goodwill trip may be a bit artificial. Mrs. Carter was going to Latin America to convey a sense of what the new Administration stood for, what its goals and priorities were. She would be talking about the President's speech at the OAS and seeking comments from the hemisphere's leaders on the new directions sketched out by the President. And following from the President's pledge to consult with Latin America, she would be seeking to elicit from the Latin Americans ideas on ways in which our countries can cooperate on the issues -- particularly human rights -- that concern all of us. He said that he thought the list of purposes which I mentioned was appropriate and correct for her trip, and he urged me to make sure that these purposes would be conveyed to a larger audience so that the Latin Americans would not misinterpret her trip.

(Hansen)

Will spend most of the week writing a major paper ("Basic Human Needs") for PRM 8 Track II. The paper will be longer than necessary for PRM 8 meeting purposes, but will attempt to develop a set of propositions and proposals on the subject that may be of use to the Front Office in a variety of ways (speech material, ideas for your own consideration, etc.). If Hormats is correct in his assumption that little if anything will result from the PRM 8 process (in terms of a PRC paper of any interest); and if Thornton is correct that the PRM 8 process is more of a "sensitivity-raising" exercise than anything else; then this paper may end up serving as a first draft paper from me to the Front Office on one possible North-South set of initiatives.

Significant Information/Intelligence

(Pastor)

Panama. Apparently, Torrijos is reasonably satisfied with our new position on the Canal Treaty negotiations. He is sending his negotiators back tomorrow, and negotiations are expected to resume on Wednesday.

Venezuela. In a conversation with Assistant Secretary Todman, President Perez of Venezuela expressed great support for the U.S. position on non-proliferation, and said that he would raise the issue of ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with President Videla when he visited Argentina soon. Perez also spoke about the Caribbean and the problem of Belize, and the need to stem Soviet influence in Africa.
Cuba. On Friday, the Treasury Department announced that it is allowing travel agents in the U.S. to make group hotel reservations in Cuba and pay the Cuban Government or businesses directly.

El Salvador. The situation in El Salvador is quite tense after the assassination of the Foreign Minister. Rightist groups are said to be merging to avenge the death of Borgonovo.

Ethiopia and the Soviet Union granted each other most-favored-nation status.

Zaire. The Nigerian mediation effort has been dropped reportedly because of Angola's unwillingness to discuss reopening of its border with Zaire.

Sudan. While demonstrations against both Ethiopia and the USSR continue in Khartoum, the government decided to reduce Soviet presence in Sudan. Only those Soviet nations who are attached to the Embassy will be allowed to remain.

Somalia. Somali President Siad announced that Somalia would go to war if Ethiopia invades the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 9, 1977
TIME: 9:00 am
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: President Carter/President Videla Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS:

ARGENTINA
Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla
President of Argentina
Oscar A. Montes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship
Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador
to the United States
Julio Cesar Carasales,
Ambassador to OAS
Enrique Quintana,
Chief of Protocol
Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid,
Aide-de-camp

US
President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing
his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President
and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope
for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it
provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have
conversations about issues of common concern.

President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the
opportunity to witness an event of such major importance as
the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have
a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed
that the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of
one era but opens a new one in which the United States has
demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America.
He added that the Argentine presence was his government's
effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed
that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and
downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which
impeded close relations have always been overcome by the
basic identity of interests of the two nations.
As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest to understand he had ever heard — the President either chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of expressing himself. He found this typical of Argentina which he and his wife had visited some years previously. President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary Todman during the latter’s recent visit to Argentina.

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion of two major issues with the objective of improving relations between the two nations.

Non-Proliferation

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear technology — which is a great credit to Argentina — he hoped that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina’s ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unrestricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction of nuclear explosives.

President Carter said that the United States, the European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safeguards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards but stressed the importance the United States places on the Tlatelolco and the NPT. This is very serious to the United States, and it would remain of constant concern.
President Videla responded by observing that the two countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power reactor is currently in use, a second under construction and a third in the planning phase. He understood President Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those which were really needed. However, he understood that even this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and the world.

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter must be aware of the great need for proper political timing of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from its gravest national crisis, so the government must be particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions permit - perhaps before the end of the year - he would give proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this reassured President Carter.

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference it would be particularly exciting if it would be possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising this issue with the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification would also remove our concerns about technology and heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the interest of establishing a common export policy.

Human Rights

The political changes in Argentina have been given careful study by the American government, and recent developments there said President Carter, have impressed me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's
government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and
the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the
study of the achievements of President Videla's government
led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great
strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the secur­
ity and the strength of the government would lead to the
alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the obser­
vation of human rights in Argentina. The President stated
he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human
rights violations and noted the particularly high press
interest in this subject in the United States. Certain
cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that
of editor Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have
many relatives in the California area! He said that a Wash­
ington group concerned with the subject of human rights had
provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina
without public notice of their arrest or charges against
them. The President acknowledged that some of these allega-
tions may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the
privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the
state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list
available so the State Department could provide it to Presi­
dent Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt
that the friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years
were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue
could come between the two countries. He felt that more
progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said
he had great admiration and appreciation for what President
Videla has been able to do for his country, and asked
what additional steps could be taken to alleviate the con­
cern in the United States (which, indeed, may have been
exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina.

President Videla recounted the situation in which
Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic,
political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which
led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take
over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring
values and human rights of which President Carter spoke.
Those who recognized that man was created in God's image
must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists
wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced
what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their
undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military
man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these
misfortunes of war.
President Videla said that the war, while virtually over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla said there were incidents for which the government was responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He said, however, that he could not accept the image of a brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate his country from those other nations which shared its basic values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural friends such as the United States.

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within a short period the negative consequences of the repression would be eliminated.

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with dealing with subversive elements. He was not detained because of his name—there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been detained under the national executive power in the first year of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months. Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding.
President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent institutions and operated beyond the control of the executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated it was turned over to the military or civilian courts or the individual was released. While for security reasons it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged with providing information to relatives about the possible detention and charges against family members. President Carter expressed his desire to help restore world appreciation of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped that President Videla would give the United States the opportunity to do so. As President, he said he knew how much opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the UN to visit Argentina, not to check on you but to certify the progress made by the GOA.

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed that facts were infinitely more important than words. The visits of Mr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and the Senators are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the subversive underground; second, when a terrorist is killed by his associates who may suspect betrayal; third, terrorists were killed in battle; and fourth, people were killed by excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility to eliminate it. He said he was not troubled by visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which can testify to the facts in Argentina.

President Videla regretted that it was necessary to devote the short time available to discussion of the two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number of important remaining bilateral issues, which should be covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the consultations.
President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the invitation for Secretary Vance to visit Argentina. President Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated this discussion, which would have to be ended because the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented President Videla with his book and a collection of satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated with expressions of mutual goodwill.
TO: DR. BRZEZINSKI

Attached one heartless memo for the starving urchins of Kingston. Long live the Zbigniew Brzezinski Memorial Aquarium for Wetbacks!

Bob Pastor

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-25-4-5-8
NARA Date
February 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: JESSICA TUCHMAN  
                      ROBERT KIMMITT
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Security Assistance

1. While I agree with State that security assistance to Uruguay should be eliminated and the assistance to Argentina reduced by half, I also agree with OMB's assessment that Congress will regard that as "tokenism." I think the best way to reconcile the two positions, however, is not in asking State for alternatives but in asking it for a framework to justify these cuts. Since Argentina and Uruguay have two of the worst human rights records of all those Latin American nations receiving security assistance, I don't believe it should be especially difficult to justify these as opposed to other cuts.

2. Jamaica Assistance. $31.5 million in supporting assistance will not be sufficient to realize the extravagant claims made by the State Department like relieving their economic crisis or reversing the leftward drift of the government. But some assistance from the new Administration is essential to send a new signal to Jamaica, to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, and to the international community about Jamaica and about the U.S. It will indicate a new tolerance in U.S. foreign policy for ideological pluralism which will be well-received in the Caribbean and in the developing world. (And we should remember that Jamaica has a democratic government.) The U.S. does not need $31.5 million to send a signal, however; half of that would be sufficient.

If the U.S. were interested in improving relations with Jamaica, the worst thing it could do is begin a bilateral assistance program because before too long, we would raise unrealistic expectations in the U.S. that we could transform their government at the same time that we aggravated nationalistic predispositions in Jamaica. Even worst would be to use the money to try to get Jamaica to accept the IMF Stabilization package because Jamaica will probably accept the package anyway and because $3.5 billion is not sufficient to persuade them and would not be welcomed as a reward for "good behavior." For the moment, then, I would recommend that the President agree to grant only enough assistance to send a signal. A soft loan for a new hospital in Kingston would be perfect. At the same time, he should appoint a new Ambassador and make clear that we are undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S. policy to the Caribbean.
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions -- PRC Meeting on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTS

State
Warren Christopher, Dep. Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep. Under Secretary

Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary for Internat. Economic Policy and Research

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't. Secretary for Nuclear Energy

Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear Exports Div. Chief, Bureau of Nonproliferation

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen

National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina and the Soviet Union. It was agreed that we should continue to seek improvement in our relations with Argentina, recognizing
that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deterioration) is likely until there is a new government in Buenos Aires in early 1981. In the next few weeks we may have to show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improving trend of Argentina's human rights performance. (S)

Looking to the longer-term, and assuming continuing improvement in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort to strengthen our ties with Argentina. This could ultimately lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative restrictions on military supply. (S)

This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too close a relationship with the Soviets -- a relationship that is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of the Argentine regime. (S)

All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship than do the other agencies. Defense was particularly concerned that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argentina to draw close to the USSR. An interdepartmental Group will be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with the broad policy structure agreed upon. (S)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET
INFORMATION

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Minutes — PRC Meeting on Argentina (C)

OSD Review Completed

PARTICIPANTS

State
Warren Christopher, Dep. Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep. Under Secretary

Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary for Internat. Economic Policy and Research

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't. Secretary for Nuclear Energy

Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear Exports Div. Chief, Bureau of Nonproliferation

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen

National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a certain implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term game in the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although...
even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its impact on their people. In addition we are very much concerned about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against the GOA. Over time however this has developed into a cooperative vote trade-off between the two sides. In the coming months, Bushnell continued, Argentina will have a hard time taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until the decision on a successor is made in September and probably the period of inaction will continue until early next year when a new government is in place. We will not be able to force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human rights front to avert condemnation. The other important short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo where they have not been supportive of our interests.

Hodges asked whether Argentine human rights performance has improved.

Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but there are still gross violations and the system of repression remains in place. One could say that they have probably killed most of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now fewer political prisoners and in some instances the rule of law is being followed better.

Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured him that the current economic policies would continue under a new government next year. Hodges pointed out that we have a great economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do everything we can to maximize that.

Owen, speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentinians have undoubtedly made their decision and will follow the same policy next year as they did this year. They have almost certainly reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other than that provided by crop conditions.
Starkey agreed with this conclusion.

Aaron said it was not clear from the paper what the issue is -- are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circumvented.

Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will not support us.

Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to find a way to announce a one-year policy success.

Aaron. Do we want to take some move against Argentina because of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was lectured at the highest levels of government here about the need for Argentine cooperation.

Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina to match the warnings that were given to Martinez.

Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn't care very much about its relations with the United States.

Christopher, discussing the purpose of the meeting, said that the real decision to be addressed is one of tone. The paper should then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out the individual implementing decisions in line with the broad decision on tone to be made by the PRC. Mr. Christopher also observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to court us.

Claytor said he did not blame them; our policies are forcing them to the Soviets.

Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about being a major supplier for their hydroelectric project. Martinez had said that he would favor the United States if all other factors were equal.

Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard.

Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary Christopher tomorrow.
Keeny, discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question. We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) expand these relations unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility though on whether we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law. The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program.

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn them to the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make greater progress next year when there will be a new administration and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked, should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor" things.

Keeny said it depended on which items were involved.

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bankrupt in general and that we should do absolutely everything we can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.

Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the specifics.

Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not abandoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are unable to extend cooperation.

Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pending from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem over the next six months or so.

Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he believed that the group should support the middle option. We should give due weight to positive trends in the human rights area but should not try to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.
at this time since that would be impossible with the present Congress and politically unwise. This Option B needs fine tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an initiative on the military side, including training at least.

Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher's summation, for the trends in human rights are important. The Commerce Department also supports Option B.

Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our relations. The options as stated in the paper are too static. Our goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, there is no possibility of changing the military legislation now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time being any change in our military supply policy. The Interdepartmental Group should set up an 18-month program with benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance.

At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We should make clear our irritation with them at this time and then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with Videla. We should take the opportunity of the new administration, however, for turning a new page. If we move to improve our relations with them now we will simply not have the respect of the Argentinians.

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine military to restore relations between our two armed services. At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small things interfere with our dealing with this problem.
Pustay supported Claytor's statement, and noted that we now have a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine military and JCS would like to pursue them. He noted for instance the Galtieri (sic) invitation which is being held up in State Department. Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come.

Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his own political purposes, would like to receive the invitation but not actually accept it until after the Presidential decision is made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are likely to become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether, following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want to give this signal of reward to them.

Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not take reprisals against them until they publicly announce the content of their agreement with the Soviets.

Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much in all likelihood. In any event reality will depend on the Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some six months.

Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them undermine us.

Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us either next year.

Pustay, returning to the question of General Galtieri's visit, said that it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on the Olympics.

Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.

Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there seemed to be no stark alternatives that need to be put to the President. It was generally agreed that:
1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement towards improvement in our relationship.

2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the electoral situation in Argentina.

3. We will also have to see whether we need to react to the Argentinian decision on grain.

These are short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group can review as it goes along. On the longer term:

4. If there is continued improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations with the new regime.

The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this improvement might involve.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Zbig,

I gather that Secretary Muskie will ask approval for Gerry Smith's exploration with our allies of ways of meeting their concerns regarding nuclear power at tomorrow's meeting with you and Harold Brown. Gerry would then talk quietly about this issue with our allies at an international energy meeting he is attending at Vienna next week. (C)

Substantively, I believe that Gerry is on the right track: This exploration will help to reduce bitterness between Europe and the United States about this issue, and eventually produce policies that will strengthen non-proliferation. It is the intent to conduct this exploration in low key, so that it will not arouse political controversy in this country before the election. (C)

Procedurally, you will recall that this issue was discussed at a PRC, where all the agencies concerned (except the Council on Environmental Quality) supported Gerry's proposal, and it was agreed that his paper should be revised, prior to being discussed at a second PRC. Secretary Muskie then concluded that it would be better to launch Gerry's exploratory discussions without the bureaucratic formality inherent in a PRC, in order to preserve our flexibility and avoid leaks. If you now decide that a second PRC meeting is needed before we do anything, it will be impossible for Gerry to undertake these discussions at the Vienna International Atomic Energy Meeting for which he is leaving Saturday, and a major opportunity will have been lost to begin this exploration before the Venice Summit and in the right multilateral forum. (C)

I recommend that you support Secretary Muskie's proposal to allow Gerry Smith to begin these exploratory discussions next week without fanfare in Vienna. (C)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THROUGH: CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON

SUBJECT: M-B-B Lunch - Hidalgo (U)

We should turn off the Hidalgo stops in Argentina and Chile for the following reasons:

1. We do not want to deflect attention from Bowdler's visit to Argentina in July. This will be the key step in our policy execution in the area and the Argentines should get no mixture of signals. Another "symbolic" visit will not impress the Argentines.

2. It will be very hard to keep a visit to Chile from appearing to be a gesture to make up for the UNITAS decisions. There is no reason for us to apologize for that decision.

Note, by the way, that there is no substantive reason for Hidalgo to go to Latin America and it diverts him from the Caribbean area where such a visit could be useful. At least the visit could be postponed.

If the decision is to go ahead, however, it is critically important that Hidalgo be under close control from the political side so that he correctly enunciates our policy. Mechanically this would involve:

1. Thorough briefings from State and NSC.

2. No contacts with Senior Argentine or Chilean officials or the local press unless in the company of the Ambassador or DCM.

3. Perhaps a competent, Spanish-speaking Department officer along on the trip.

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on June 10, 1986
What can we get out of the trip?

1. There might be some mileage in showing that we have a Spanish-speaking (albeit not Latin American) person in this senior position, although this is not likely to be the reaction in Argentina or Chile, which view themselves as better than Mexicans.

2. In Argentina, Hidalgo will be one more signal that we are seeking to normalize our relations with Argentina and will give their military something to be happy about since there is no chance that we can move on repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey.

3. In Chile, it is probably useful to give an occasional signal that our ostracism of Chile is neither total nor permanent. If there is to be near-term political movement within Chile it will probably come from the military.

4. Hidalgo should, in Argentina, ensure that the human rights message is stated firmly and clearly. If he does this, it may have added effect, coming from a person of mixed political and military credentials.

5. In Chile, this mixture of credentials could also be useful in getting across the depth of concern here over the Letelier case, even among people who are not rabidly opposed to the current Chilean Government. If Hidalgo were diplomatically adroit, he might even be able to convey the idea that we could deal more readily with a military government under some other leadership.

BUT, I have no evidence that Hidalgo is adroit and I don't know what his personal views (if any) are on these matters. As I look at the balance of what good he could do as opposed to how much harm, the latter is clearly greater. (C)

Why doesn't he stay home and campaign for the President?

This was coordinated with Pastor who will also write an additional memo.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Hidalgo's Visit: DOD and Latin America -- MBB Lunch (S)

DOD's decision to press Secretary of Navy Hidalgo's trip to Argentina and Chile is symptomatic of their continued efforts to undermine the President's human rights and security objectives in Latin America. I hope you will oppose Hidalgo's visit, and urge Harold Brown to focus his department's energies on the Caribbean area and on strengthening our ties to the military in democratic countries in the region. (S)

There are two serious consequences, which follow from DOD's persistent preoccupation on the Southern Cone: (1) our human rights policies to the region are weakened; mixed signals of US intentions are sent, playing into the hands of those who seek proof of Carter's inconsistency; and (2) they have no time or strategy for dealing with the real security problems in the Caribbean area or for developing warm relationships with the military in democratic nations, like Venezuela or Colombia. The President has repeatedly said he wanted us to reserve our warmest relationships for the democracies in the area and have cooler, more distant relations with military governments. We have been reasonably successful in doing this, although DOD has not been helpful. (S)

While I think it's a good idea to move gradually toward a more normal relationship with Argentina, and this includes a military dimension, I think it's practically obscene and definitely makes us look wildly inconsistent for DOD to gallop off at such a quick pace to a new relationship. The Inter-agency group has agreed to more military measures for cooperation than I think is appropriate, but a visit by Hidalgo will break the camel's back. The only thing we will get out of his visit is grief. We've got enough. (S)

As we move toward an improved relationship with Argentina, it is of the greatest importance that our two galloping horses -- Commerce and Defense -- be encouraged to stress the continuity of our concerns about human rights; otherwise, it will look like another zig in our policy. DOD and Commerce will not even mention human rights, except to say that we're o.k., you're o.k., unless they are told to do so. (S)

cc: Tom Thornton/Linc Bloomfield

SECRET
Review 6/10/90
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1984

TIME AND PLACE: 10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions — PRC Meeting on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTS

State
Warren Christopher, Dep. Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Defense
W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal Dep. Ass't. Secretary

Agriculture
James Starkey, Dep. Under Secretary

Commerce
Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary for Internat. Economic Policy and Research

Energy
Woody Cunningham, Ass't. Secretary for Nuclear Energy

Arms Control and Disarmament
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear Exports Div. Chief, Bureau of Nonproliferation

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence
Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

White House
David Aaron
Henry Owen

National Security Council
Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina and the Soviet Union. It was agreed that we should continue to seek improvement in our relations with Argentina, recognizing...
that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deteriora-
tion) is likely until there is a new government in Buenos Aires in early 1981. In the next few weeks we may have to show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improving trend of Argentina's human rights performance. (S)

Looking to the longer-term, and assuming continuing improvement in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort to strengthen our ties with Argentina. This could ultimately lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative restrictions on military supply. (S)

This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too close a relationship with the Soviets -- a relationship that is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of the Argentine regime. (S)

All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship than do the other agencies. Defense was particularly concerned that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argentina to draw close to the USSR. An interdepartmental Group will be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with the broad policy structure agreed upon. (S)

[Handwritten note: Inclined to move faster]
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance

1. Harriman Dinner for Fraser - I received a report this morning about the dinner last night by Averell Harriman for Malcolm Fraser. Muskie made the observation that never in his memory since the end of World War II had the country been more united behind the President as a result of the response to the State of the Union. Glenn, while using more cautious language, echoed the same sentiments.

2. Argentina - I received a cable from Buenos Aires this afternoon which reports a meeting between Foreign Minister Pastor and our Ambassador. The Foreign Minister went out of his way to scotch the rumors that the Argentinians were backing off of the understandings reached with Andy. He said that he had heard some of these rumors but they were not reliable. Pastor indicated he would probably call me in the next day or so to let us know the Argentinians are not backtracking, and that they want to support and be with the United States.

3. Rhodesia and the Security Council - In close cooperation with the British, Don McHenry negotiated major changes in the African draft resolution of January 31. Early this morning, London requested a series of further changes and renewed its plea that we vote "No" if the UK does. McHenry reported that the Africans are disposed to consider further alterations but that they will remain firm on the paragraph condemning South African intervention. We expect that something close to the present draft will be tabled. Don believes that the text has been improved to the
point where we should support it. The British Mission in New York favors a UK abstention, but their instructions are clear in insisting on deletions of the condemnation of South Africa. I will talk to Don again in the morning and be in touch with you. The vote won't come until tomorrow afternoon.

4. Summer Olympics - Within the past 24 hours we have had a strong confidential message of support from the PRC, a public statement from Japan, and evidence that public opinion is slowly moving the French government in our direction. Equally encouraging are the courageous public stands taken by the governments of The Netherlands and Norway. Muhammed Ali's five-nation trip to Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia and Senegal, is now set. Indications are that Ali will receive an enthusiastic welcome even from nations inclined to go to the Moscow games. The impact of his mission in Africa should be considerable. African and US press interest is mounting and a number of reporters and a network pool are expected to join the party in Dar-es-Salaam or Nairobi.

5. Greek Reintegration and Resumption of Base Negotiations - Matt Nimetz met with the Greek Ambassador today to respond to Prime Minister Karamanlis' message to me. He told the Ambassador that we continue to attach great importance to Greek reintegration, that we are willing to resume negotiations for a new agreement on our bases in Greece, and that Bernie Rogers would soon be in touch with Greek military leaders to discuss his latest proposal. Matt urged the Greeks to cooperate with Rogers.

Karamanlis' message urged that the base negotiations consider a US pledge to maintain the existing ratio in our future military assistance to Greece and Turkey. Matt told the Ambassador we could not enter the negotiations with preconditions, but were aware of the need to design our military assistance programs in a manner which preserved the military balance in the region; our legislation required this. The Ambassador thought Athens would need some commitment on aid proportionality. We are considering ways to meet the Greek concerns while not committing ourselves to any fixed ratio.
6. FRG Proposal for International Assistance to Turkey -

German Finance Minister Matthoefer gave Ambassador Stoessel the following FRG preliminary thinking on the international assistance effort for Turkey: The FRG envisions a five-year program subject to annual review but with a "big start" the first year. The total economic assistance the FRG is contemplating as its contribution for 1980 is $290 million (US FY-81 request for economic assistance is $200 million). The US would have to exceed the FRG (perhaps by $50 million) but this could be in the form of military assistance. The FRG is also considering making a commitment for $347 million in military assistance in 1980 (US FY-81 request for military assistance is $250 million FMS). The FRG believes that three times the combined US and FRG contributions can be elicited in the total program. This would mean $3.5 billion in economic and military assistance from all sources in 1980. Matthoefer wants to complete the program by April.

7. Victor Palmieri's Report - We have sent you Victor Palmieri's report on his January trip to Southeast Asia, which focuses on the Indochina Refugee program, and the complex Kampuchean relief situation in particular. The report makes clear that the food situation in Kampuchea is very likely to take a major turn for the worse in early spring without more effective distribution of the relief supplies now coming into the country under the ICRC/UNICEF program. This could add to the serious refugee pressures in Thailand. I commend the report to your attention.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: THOMAS THORNTON
SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum - Argentine PRC (U)

State has generated a lot of paper for this meeting. At Tab B is a "discussion paper" that was written for the planned, but cancelled, meeting on Argentina two weeks ago. You can skip it. (U)

At Tab A is the issues paper for the current meeting. Although it makes reference to the earlier "discussion paper" it is essentially self-contained. After a three-page discussion of the setting, the paper goes into the mid-range issues in some detail and then concludes with three broad options for policy (pp. 10-11). Not surprisingly, the middle of these options is the policy that was proposed in the old discussion paper. The two surrounding options can be characterized as the "Pat Derian Option" -- a very cool approach to the Argentinians and the "DOD Option" -- which would press ahead more rapidly than we are doing now. There is an annex on Soviet-Argentine relations that you can skip. (S)

I would not recommend that you get involved in the discussion effective by ensuring that some basic considerations are kept in view:

--- We are concerned about the growth of Soviet influence in the Southern Cone, Brazil as well as Argentina. We should avoid forcing Argentina to turn to the Soviets, but our main thrust (in private discussions as you did with Martinez, but also publicly) should be to point out that Argentina is approaching a basic choice in its orientation. There is only one way that choice can go, given Argentine history and the anti-Communist rationale used to justify the regime's policies. We should enlist the support of our allies in this. (S)
Argentina has given us little to be thankful for on grain sales to the USSR. Their exports have substantially weakened the effectiveness of the grain suspension, and we have no reason to believe they will be more cooperative in the next crop year. Within our overall strategy, we should keep strong pressure on them; attempt to elicit their support (however unlikely); and not be apologetic about our own actions (as State has tended to be). (C)

We should not gratuitously offend Argentina on human rights and should pay attention to ways of rewarding improvement in their behavior. We should not make a major shift in our policies, however, for their performance is still among the worst in Latin America (see the summary on p. 2 of Tab A). We also must keep the overall credibility of our policy in mind and should not trade off human rights concerns against loosening of their Soviet ties or a cutback in grain sales. Our focus should be on improvement of current practices. The need for an accounting of the "disappeareds" cannot be swept aside although it should not be the prime focus of our approach. (S)

Military contacts are important and should be encouraged in an inconspicuous way. They should be done in a way that underscores, rather than weakens, our human rights policy. It would be foolhardy to seek any revisions in the legislation at this time to permit us to sell military equipment to Argentina. That would be too clear an abandonment of our human rights policy. This is true even for sale of training, as desirable as that may be in itself. (Madeleine agrees.) (S)

Overall, the choice has to be for Option B. Much, however, will depend on the manner of our presentation. We should be tough with Argentina, not approach them as a supplicant. Through the three visits to B.A., we have made a serious opening bid and have gotten nothing in return except perhaps their decision on the Olympics. If some of our human rights people have been overly zealous they may need to be reined in a bit, but the essence of the problem is in Argentine performance, not our reaction to it. (S)

Bob Pastor points out that Argentina was not helpful to us at San Jose, partly in deference to Cuba. Add to this their failure to carry through on their promises to ratify Tlatelolco and their other shortcomings and we have a picture of a pretty
tough case. We should handle it that way, while trying to get Argentina to shape up on issues of importance to us. (S)

Addendum (I): Our commercial relations with Argentina are not part of the agenda but may be raised by Luther Hodges. The most important pending item is OPIC guarantees for US involvement in a hydroelectric project, affecting both Argentina and Paraguay. The relevant human rights legislation is apparently ironclad and precludes OPIC support. Yet Hodges has just completed a trip to Argentina to promote US sales of hydroelectric equipment! The Christopher committee will meet on this one Thursday and Linc and I will try to find a reasonable solution to this silly situation. It looks, however, like we may be in a legal straight-jacket. (C)

Addendum (II): Brazil is also not specifically on the agenda and although we are of course concerned about Soviet blandishments there, I see no issue that needs PRC consideration. Ambassador Sayre wrote to Harold Brown (who sent a copy of the letter to you -- Tab C) about exchange of military visits. That, however, can be handled routinely. (C)

Clearances: Lincoln Bloomfield (in draft)
Tim Deal (""
Jerry Oplinger (""

SECRET
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITED
XGDS-4

August 28, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single-spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-President and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself reading through the entire 14-page Memcon, though I had intended only to skim it.

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have prepared below a short summary of that Memcon.

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"—plain-clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. Then began the horror.

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punishment. He himself was:

-- beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;

-- subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;

-- subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;

-- subjected to "the submarine"—repeatedly being held under water until almost drowned.

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITED
XGDS-4 (Classified by Z. Brzezinski)
Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:

— As he was moved from detention center to detention center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.

— Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was applied; a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by and her boy friend shot when he objected; the group was beaten.

Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a litany of questions about the activities and political affiliations of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session, Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded, heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired. Then he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and to detention.

Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on an entirely different plane—as civilized people conducting a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner", and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would be found to have committed suicide. During his months in La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his own and worse.

In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said he provided this information "to show you what you are fighting for". He asked that the Embassy treat the information carefully, "as my life is in your hands".

cc: Jessica Tuchman
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
                  DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest -- Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family -- the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.
We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for $50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRC's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice... Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..."
I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourselves, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance $270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice. The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least $1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against
us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel -- including Kissinger -- to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated
than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape-goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.
Argentina

Delegation: Foreign Minister Carlos Washington Pastor will head the GOA delegation. Other members unknown. A retired, 56 year-old, Air Force Brigadier General, Pastor was appointed Foreign Minister in November 1978 by President Videla. He had no previous diplomatic experience, and his appointment was attributed to his close ideological affinity with Videla and his marriage to the President's sister. Pastor is not believed to be well versed in foreign affairs and has not won wide respect; he is regarded, however, as hard working and conscientious. He is generally pro-U.S., but strongly disagrees with U.S. human rights policy. He speaks no English.

Indochina Refugee Policy: The GOA expressed its intention to receive 100 Indochinese in 1978 and recently announced that it would receive 300 family groups from Indochina. It also recently doubled its financial contribution to the UNHCR for assistance to Indochinese refugees.

Rescue of Refugees at Sea: The GOA has instructed its Merchant Marine to rescue refugees encountered at sea. We have no reports of specific incidents of rescue and do not know what procedures would be followed.

Likely Future Policy: The GOA can be expected to continue its willingness to receive small numbers of refugees, conditioned on its resettlement experience with those it is already pledged to receive.

Department of State
July 16, 1979
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET JCS Review Completed

MORI C03316040

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

May 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Argentina. The U.S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization, economic problems, the NAM, etc. The Argentines have clearly passed through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will unquestionably have a salving and moderating influence as they begin the task of re-building a more democratic society. There is a feeling among them that they have just turned the corner, though they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics. Today, the human rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture, and an accounting of the disappearances. He also provided an interesting statistic on the civil war: 659 Argentine soldiers or police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000 civilians. (S)

Caribbean. Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID, State, World Bank, IDB, and OMB to discuss the U.S. position at the donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week. Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG meets in June. The World Bank has set a target of $650 million for the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the Caribbean Development Facility (CDF). We are going to have to come up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978 level of 30% of the CDF. (S)

Two officers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the PRM on Central America. I asked them to do some work on the implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and on NATO. (S)

Mexico. STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete negotiations. The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon. Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17 on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that. Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C)
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: NORTH-SOUTH
SUBJECT: Evening Report

Daily Activities

(Thornton)
Continued preparation for PRM 8.

Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general background discussion.

In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for PRM 10 at the State Department.

(Pastor)

1. On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador, and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but the two which we spent the most time on were the current political situation in Argentina and U.S. policy on human rights. They told me that they were well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States. Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U.S. commitment to human rights would not waiver.