Right of Option

(LOU) Argentine Government action on the right of option program continues at a slow pace. The GOA has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy has issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola assured Ambassador Castro again that approval of right of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials announced that about 170 persons have been released under right of option for travel to all countries.

Prison Conditions

(LOU) The GOA has published uniform regulations for the treatment of detainees in a move designed to end variations in treatment at different facilities. The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees. We have reports, however, that the regulations have not yet been fully implemented in all facilities. The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities.

(LOU) According to reports reaching ICRC officials from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared from prison, another was tortured, and a third died as a result of beatings by guards. In early May, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights reported that some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during the transfer.

The Judiciary

(U) As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report, the executive power continues to decline to provide information in response to habeas corpus petitions filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds for continued detention, invoking its alleged power to hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection to the denial of due process and deterioration in the executive power of the judiciary in recent years.
(U) The courts have recently tried a number of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced them to prison terms. Three police officers were recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners.

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue

(C) President Videla and Army Commander Viola are maintaining their leadership position within the GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military still favor repressive policies directed at a broad range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political subversives which clearly would include groups unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past. General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological subversion."

(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights. However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees, jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely affected by present GOA economic policy.

(U) The New York Bar Association's report on human rights conditions in Argentina noted that ingredients are present for future progress in human rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine legal profession is essential for a quick return to civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a more active role in this area.
UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES SINCE
February 1, 1979

Roberto and Maria Rosa Barreiros

Reported picked up by the police on March 12. Mr. Barreiros's mother subsequently received a telephone call from her daughter-in-law advising that the couple was well and would reappear. There has been no word from them since.

Julio Cesar Abruzzese

Reported picked up by police on April 11. Mr. Abruzzese was reputed to be involved in criminal activities and his disappearance does not appear to have political significance.

Thelma Doroty Jara de Cabezas

Mrs. Jara de Cabezas was reported picked up by the police on April 27. She was a key official of the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives of the Disappeared and Detained (FDD). Letters have subsequently been received from her (one by Ambassador Castro) describing in detail her work for the FDD and denouncing the Montoneros for having used her for subversive political ends. Family members are convinced that the letters are genuine. There has been no further word from her.

Mario Marrero (April 20), Jorge Sabador Gollo (April 26), and Elbio Jose Rodriguez (April 23). All are in their 20's.

These three persons were reported disappeared in separate incidents in Buenos Aires. We have received no information concerning their whereabouts.

Jorge V. Szaider, Jorge Perez Brancato, Hugo Malosovsky, Noemi Graciela Beltone, Carlos Alberto Perez, and Mirta Silber de Perez. All are in their 20's.

These six persons were reported picked up by the police on May 13 in a Buenos Aires apartment while they were holding a political discussion. No word has been received since on their whereabouts.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

September 1, 1978

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - David D. Newsom

FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky

SUBJECT: Vice President Mondale's Meeting with Argentine President Videla

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to sign the attached Briefing Memorandum from you to Vice President Mondale for the Vice President's meeting with Argentine President Videla, September 4, in Rome.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Vice President Mondale has agreed to meet with President Videla on September 4 in Rome to discuss the deterioration in U.S.-Argentine relations. Attached is a Briefing Memorandum with Talking Points and several supporting Background Papers.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Briefing Memorandum.

Drafted:ARL/EEA:NBouton:mk
9/1/78
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

September 1, 1973

From:       Cyrus Vance  

Subject: Meeting with Argentine President Videla  

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration in our relations. The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose.

SETTING

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military government in Argentina has seriously abused basic human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of Munitions List items will go into effect October 1, Attachment 2), held back approval of Argentine transactions in the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan proposals in the International Financial Institutions (Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement by indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would result in relaxing these restrictions.

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, reassess its relationship with us, and prepare to adopt an adversarial course.

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human rights and improve relations, Under Secretary Newson visited Argentina last May and suggested that some
relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible if the Argentine government would take one or more of the following steps (Attachment 4):

- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR) on a visit to Argentina;
- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners held without charge;
- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the fate of the disappeared.

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider that the situation has measurably improved in the last two years. The recent denial of an Ex-Im letter of interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation in our sanctions.

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of South America, Argentina could become a significant negative force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation (Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues.

**Videla's Approach**

We do not know exactly what Videla will say. He may simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations.

**Your Approach**

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's
We recommend you say specifically:

-- On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations;

-- As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking -- some modest steps, such as release of export licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice security communications equipment and other items on our Munitions Export Control List.

-- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of the human person.

-- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations (Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand these relations as conditions permit.

-- We believe a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations would be desirable. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.

-- The place and format for such consultations would be for President Videla to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, as previously proposed.
ATTACHMENTS

1 - HUMAN RIGHTS
2 - KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT
3 - HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
4 - UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT
5 - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA
6 - CONSULTATIONS
7 - ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND
8 - BIOGRAPHIC DATA

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla
Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes
HUMAN RIGHTS

The 1978 human rights record of the military junta led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better, than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. Serious violations still occur, however, raising questions about the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures that Argentine officials insist be recognized as "fundamental improvements."

There is no evidence available to us that would indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the treatment of political-security cases is in sight.

On the positive side:

-- An apparent, although unverifiable, decline in the rate of disappearances has occurred since mid-1977. Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights activists believe that the rate has declined. If true, this is the most important development listed here.

-- Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook serial publication (nine lists to date) of the names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) prisoners acknowledged as detained.

-- The "right of option" program has been implemented, enabling executive detainees to petition for exile in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 prisoners have so far departed under this procedure, however.

-- Responsive action has been taken on cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest, e.g., Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and the Deutchs.

-- Attempts reportedly have been made by some security authorities to regularize detention procedures, return counterterrorist troops to normal military activities, and demilitarize the police.
On the negative side of the ledger:

-- Disappearances continue, with one of the several security entities probably responsible in nearly every instance. Victims have included not only suspected terrorists but also labor leaders and workers, human rights advocates, scientists and doctors, members of radical political parties, and others whose specific vulnerability remains unknown.

-- Despite President Videla's professed desires, renegade security elements continue to operate with apparent impunity because they act with the toleration if not under orders of some military officials. At least in cases involving suspected terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and summary execution are standard practices.

-- There are five reasonably documented cases (which occurred in February and March) in which political prisoners were released and almost immediately assassinated, presumably by security officials. There have been reports of other cases like these.

-- A particularly shocking incident, which occurred last December, was the abduction by unidentified security personnel of 13 members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, a group that pressures the government for information on disappearance cases. According to reports, the bodies of seven of the group, including two French nuns, later washed ashore.

-- Official harrassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have born much of the brunt.

Problem of the "disappeared." Estimates vary widely, but at least several thousand people have disappeared since the March 1976 military coup. Security personnel have been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most egregious violations tend to occur. In mid-1977 there was some fear that the gradual reduction in the number of terrorist combatants would be followed by a sweeping and systematic effort to eliminate so-called "intellectual authors"
of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran afoul of military hardliners. To our knowledge, no such sweeping attack was initiated, although, as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and representing a variety of sectors and interests have been abducted. Many are reported or presumed to be dead.
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment

On October 1, 1973 the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act will enter into effect and prohibit the sale of items on the Munitions Control List to Argentina.

The amendment was passed by Congress in August 1977 because of the serious human rights problems in Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in Argentina merited.

Based on this amendment, and more general legislation, the Department has held back most license requests for Argentina -- over 230 are now pending. This has created a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and triggered their turn to European arms suppliers.
KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT

Date: ARA/ECA: JN: 13 Sep 71
5/1/1972 x 29166

Clearance: ARA/ECA: CR: 2
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS

The United States has taken the following restrictive actions in response to human rights violations in Argentina.

The International Financial Institutions

- IBRD - We have abstained on three loans valued at $265 million since June 1977.
- IFC - We have voted no on three loans worth $123 million since October 1977.
- IFC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans since March 1978.

The Export-Import Bank

By law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights into consideration when considering new transactions. Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the Bank. One of these cases, a request by Allis-Chalmers for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative reaction in Argentina. The Bank announced that it could not give Allis-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have strengthened the company's hand in the international bidding for the contract because of the human rights situation in Argentina. The Argentinos called in our Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they considered this intervention in their domestic affairs.

The Boeing Corporation, which has requested Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private banks in the face of the Export-Import position. The company may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million order.

Military Sales

- There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases valued at $145 million pending. Mainly spare parts, some cases have been held back eight months or more.
- 101 requests worth some $25 million for Foreign Military Sales letters of authorization are pending action by the U.S. They will not be acted upon unless there is positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.
Under Secretary Newsom Visit

Under Secretary Newsom's late May visit to Argentina was made with the hope of eliciting some positive movement in the human rights area. Newsom made clear to the Argentines that our basic concern was for the rights of the person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas:

-- Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a visit by the Commission to Argentina

-- Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners held without charge.

-- Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the disappeared of the fate of these people.

Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would 1) recommend approval of the Allis-Chalmers and Boeing requests for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale of military training if the Argentines would agree to a mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite the IAHRC).

The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would take, but the conversations were generally positive in tone.
Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive nuclear energy program in Latin America. It seeks to become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, and to become the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere. It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural (unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon suppliers of enriched fuel. Natural uranium reactors require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina can produce small quantities of this material, it cannot produce heavy water in the amounts required to support its ambition of complete independence. Acquiring heavy water production technology is therefore of critical importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is available only from the U.S. and Canada. However, technology of a lower order might be available elsewhere.

Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine leadership in the nuclear field are not clear. Argentina's decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable reprocessing plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to forego this program unless parallel action is taken by Brazil. This plant would give Argentina an ample source of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program as early as 1981. There is no evidence of a decision by the government to carry out such a program, but the capability is there.

Our most important lever in Argentina is the possibility of eventual transfer of heavy water production technology. We have made clear that the supply of heavy water production technology to Argentina is conditioned upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the cancellation or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing project. The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to distort the U.S. position to obtain this technology without foregoing reprocessing. They maintain that since they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated their readiness to accept full-scope safeguards, the U.S. is obligated to supply this technology. But, we understand that in fact they have not deposited their instrument
of ratification in Mexico City. We are uncertain whether this is in retaliation for U.S. human rights initiatives or simply bureaucratic laggardness.

Both Governments have thus far managed to keep our nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue, but this is becoming increasingly difficult. In an effort to keep nuclear cooperation from becoming linked to the deterioration in other aspects of our relationship with Argentina, we are sending a delegation to Buenos Aires in October to discuss some next steps in expanding our cooperation in this area.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Argentina

Drifted: CES/NET:RDwing:deh
3/1/78
Clearance: PM: A Locke (substance)
   3/AS: MKelly (substance)
CONSULTATIONS

We have attempted to convey to the Argentines our interest in maintaining continued contact and cooperation in areas other than those directly related to human rights.

Joint US-Argentine Economic consultations are scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington. The talks will touch most areas of economic concern, including discussion of the MTN, countervailing duties, investment and tourism.

We are also scheduling an October visit to Argentina by a nuclear group which will discuss possible ways of expanding cooperation in this field. We hope that sandwiching the two meetings -- nuclear and economic -- around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not a unilateral declaration of hostility by the U.S.
ARGENTINA

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Argentina is Latin America's most European state. Its highly literate population of 26 million is Latin America's best trained. The first Latin American state to build a nuclear reactor (1958), it is the first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another country - to Peru in 1978. In agriculture, its potential remains vast. It is already the fourth largest wheat exporter in the world as well as the fourth largest cattle producer.

At the time of the military takeover in March 1976, the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disintegrated. Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600%. Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms of human rights.

The three man Junta which came into power in 1976 has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and prospects are for a continuation of relative internal peace for the foreseeable future.

President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk dissension within the senior ranks. Civilian politicians and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose objective is to restore democratic rule.

The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined powers. Massera himself will retire soon and has his lines cut to civilian politicians and labor leaders in a clear bid for the Presidency at some future date. Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counter-terrorist, is now championing human rights.

The political parties, whose activities were suspended when the Junta came to power, discreet themselves by their ineffectiveness before the 1975 coup and have
shown little effective resistance to the military government. They have few attractive candidates or issues to offer the voters. The Peronistas, a coalition of populist and minor labor elements won over 50% of the vote in the last election in 1973, but are divided over who should inherit Juan Peron's mantle. The middle class Radicales are making some effort to revive their party and stimulate public support, but seem to be making little effective headway.

In the next few years, there appears little possibility of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot of major sectors of the population. Although the Junta has been successful in rationalizing the economy and restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revolution conditions, serious problems remain.

The government has built up foreign exchange holdings of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion annually and is attempting to balance the budget and has held unemployment to 4%. However, the government has not been able to control inflation, which is still running at over 100% per year. Expectation of runaway inflation is the main obstacle to private enterprise-oriented Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for economic recovery. Given credit for the economic progress made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military backing if the situation does not improve soon. Most serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living standards. Real wages have declined by as much as 30% in some sectors in the last two years and popular discontent is increasing.

The United States has $1.4 billion in investments in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial banks. U.S. companies and banks have continued to show interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that the country is politically and economically stable before making new long term investments.

The U.S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses with Argentina. 1977 exports to Argentina were $363 million. The Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for the First Quarter of 1978 was $42 million.
Organized terrorist movements have been largely brought under control. The once powerful Montonero revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) have been decimated. Assassinations and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still occur occasionally. The American business community, which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to 50 business representatives in 1975 but has now increased - to somewhere over 100.

The human rights situation remains bleak. While the government did acknowledge in February that it is holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees. Meanwhile, disappearances and torture continue. We have made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better relations, but that there will have to be improvement in the human rights area before this is possible.
August 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: NORTH-SOUTH (Thornton/Notes)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U) 

The day was mostly spent working on a letter to Mrs. Gandhi and preparing for the Zia visit. Also looked into the status of the Mugabe visit, following a phone call from Don McHenry. (C)

At the North-South meeting we reviewed the outcome of the IDCA-State debate on concentration of AID efforts. So far so good, but we will have to keep this under continuing review. (C)

Todman called from Madrid asking about the status of the Equitorial Guinea package. I told him to rest easy. (U)

Charge Ruser in Argentina reports that while the Argentine military is solidly behind the Bolivian coup, they are less than sure that Garcia Meza can last. He suggests that should Garcia Meza begin to falter, we suggest to the Argentines that they might ease him out in favor of a more acceptable candidate. (S)

Press Contacts: None. (U)

South Africa. CONGEN Capetown reports that rioting in the black townships broke out yesterday when SA police took action against the South African version of "gypsy-cab" drivers. The car services have proliferated as a result of increases in transit fares from township to city. The police chose the exact anniversary of the 1976 Capetown riots as the date to move. So far the violence has not spread to the mixed race townships. (C)

Namibia. Internal USG debate, as well as that between the Contact Group members, on how to influence the SAG response to SecGen Waldheim's 6/20 letter is focusing on the question of what degree of pressure/persuasion is appropriate and how it should be administered. McHenry tends toward the hard and fast approach while our ambassadors in the field, including Keeley in Salisbury, favor one that is less intense. (C)
I. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DISAPPEARANCE IS STILL THE STANDARD TACTIC FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH CAPTURED TERRORISTS. THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO THIS METHOD IS PROFOUNDLY ROOTED IN ELEMENTS THAT RANGE FROM EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXPEDIENCY TO CULTURAL BIAS. WE DOUBT WHETHER INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPPROBRIUM WILL, IN THEMSELVES, CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE TACTIC AND GRANT CAPTURED TERRORISTS DUE PROCESS. GETTING THE AUTHORITIES TO ABANDON THIS TACTIC WILL BE AN UPHILL BATTLE. WE MUST TRY.

THE VATICAN MAY BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE IN THIS EFFORT WHICH SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE LEADERSHIP THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM—ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COURTS. END SUMMARY.

3. THOUGH DRAMATICALLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS FROM PREVIOUS LEVELS, DISAPPEARANCE CONTINUES TO BE THE STANDARD TACTIC FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH PEOPLE THEY BELIEVE TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. DISAPPEARANCE IS A EUPHEMISM FOR THE UNACKNOWLEDGED DETENTION.
TION OF AN INDIVIDUAL BY SECURITY FORCES. BASED ON EVERYTHING WE KNOW, WE BELIEVE THAT DETAINES ARE USUALLY TORTURED AS PART OF INTERROGATION AND EVENTUALLY EXECUTED WITHOUT ANY SEMBLANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE TO USE THIS PROCEDURE ONLY AGAINST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED THIS YEAR HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MONTONEROS.

4. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WON THE "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST THE TERRORISTS TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE THAT TIME THE MONTONEROS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ONLY ISOLATED, IF OCCASIONALLY SPECTACULAR, ACTS FOR WHICH THE TERRORIST ACTORS HAVE OFTEN EVENTUALLY PAID WITH THEIR LIVES. Thus, even if one were to concede the case before, necessity hardly can be invoked by the military to justify the use of disappearance as a counter-insurgency technique. On the other hand, the continued use of disappearance has a very high international political cost for the government. It is on the defensive in international organizations. Relations with the United States continue to be strained by the issue. The probable involvement of Argentine Security Forces in the disappearance of three Argentine MONTONEROS in Peru forced President Videla to cancel a trip to Lima that he wished to make to symbolically express his government's democratic intention. At the political level in this government, our contacts, even among the military, recognize these costs and express the hope that eventually disappearances will cease.

5. BUT THEY DON'T THIS UNWILLINGNESS DOES NOT REFLECT SIMPLE BLOODY-MINDEDNESS BY UNTHINKING MILITARY MEN. IF IT DID THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE MORE SOLUABLE. RATHER THE ARGENTINES HAVE RESORT TO DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE:
---IT WORKED. MORAL AND LONG TERM POLITICAL COSTS APPEAR LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO THE GOA.
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DEFEATED ONE OF THE LARGEST TERRORIST ASSAULTS. ON A MODERN SOCIETY USING THIS TACTIC. THE EXPERIENCE OF WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN USING THE LAW TO MEET A TERRORIST THREAT MAKES LITTLE IMPRESSION HERE SINCE THE MILITARY ACCURATELY EVALUATE THE THREAT THAT THEY BEAT AS BEING MUCH LARGER THAN THE ONE THE UNITED STATES AND THE TEG FACED. RATHER, ARGENTINES INVOKE ITALY'S CONTINUING TORMENT AS WHAT THEY MIGHT HAVE FACED IF THEY HAD STUCK TO THE LAW.
---IT CONTINUES TO BE EFFECTIVE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS YIELD UP INFORMATION UNDER TORTURE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS CAN BE TURNED AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES. DISAPPEARED
PRISONERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE A FRIGHTENING EXAMPLE THAT INHIBITS THE MONTONEROS' ABILITY TO RECRUIT NEW PERSONNEL.
EVIDENCE FOR USE IN THE COURTS AGAINST MEN AND WOMEN—FANATICALLY DEDICATED TO THEIR CAUSE—OTHER THAN THAT EXTRACTED FROM THE DETAINERS UNDER TORTURE. SECONDLY, THE SECURITY SERVICES ARE UNWILLING TO SURRENDER THEIR COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE DETAINERS.

—THE MILITARY DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE. THEORETICALLY A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE WOULD HANDLE THE TERRORISTS, METING OUT CAPITAL SENTENCES IF THAT WERE TO ITS TASTES. HOWEVER, FOR SUCH A SYSTEM TO WORK, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE OFFICERS OF RECORD WHO IN THE FUTURE COULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS. AS ONE MAN, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE MAJOR SECURITY FORCES, TOLD US, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO ARGENTINE OFFICER WHO WANTS TO HAVE HIS NAME ON RECORD AS ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST. UNDER THE CURRENT SYSTEM, THE MILITARY ARE RESPONSIBLE AS AN INSTITUTION BUT THE INDIVIDUAL IS FREE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY.

—AT BEST, THE RULE OF LAW IS A WEAK AND FRAGILE CONCEPT IN ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY DOES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM AND ITS...
DISREGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS REFLECT WIDESPREAD ATTITUDES IN THIS SOCIETY. ARGENTINES WHO GENUINELY BELIEVE IN THE RULE OF LAW, SOME IN THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS OPPOSING IT, REMAIN A MINORITY.

—FORCING THE SECURITY FORCES TO ABANDON THE TACTIC WOULD INVOLVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND VERY POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE SECURITY FORCES. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION MAKE IT A VERY UNATTRACTION ALTERNATIVE TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST COUNT ON A MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS MORE OR LESS UNIFIED.

—INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPINION ARE GIVEN LESS WEIGHT BY THE MILITARY THAN THE NEED TO CLEAN UP THE REMNANTS OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR. THEY WILL NOT EASILY CHANGE THEIR TACTICS TO MOLLIFY CRITICISM.

6. THE USE OF DISAPPEARANCE IS NOW RESTRICTED, WE BELIEVE, TO ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THUS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH DISAPPEARANCES OCCUR DEPENDS SOLELY ON THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WHO ARE ACTIVE AND GET CAUGHT. AS THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS HAS DECLINED, SO HAVE THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES. THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IF THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS CONTINUES TO DROP, BUT DISAPPEARANCE AS AN ACCEPTABLE TACTIC WILL NOT END SOON.

7. AS THE WAR BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES GOES ON; HUMANITARIAN VALUES AND US RELATIONS WITH THIS COUNTRY ARE CAUST IN A CROSSFIRE. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN DO LITTLE TO AFFECT THE TERRORISTS' CHOICE OF WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON TACTICS IT WILL USE IN THIS WAR IS NOT MUCH GREATER. IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE AGAINST ARGENTINE "SUCCESS" IN ITS UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND PARA-MILITARY GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES WE MUST MAKE THE EFFORT.

WE SHOULD;

—MAKE IT CLEAR TO GOA OPINION MAKERS THAT WHILE WE HAVE NO SYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS WE CANNOT CONDONE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST THEM. SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO EMPLOY SUCH TACTICS THERE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TO NORMAL RELATIONS.

—ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO PONDER SERIOUSLY HOW THIS POLICY IMPEDES ITS EFFORTS TO MAKE ARGENTINA A RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS.

—STIMULATE THE GOVERNMENT TO THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE MAY BE THE BEST ANSWER. IF THE MILITARY COULD BE SHAKEN OUT OF THEIR BELIEF THAT DEATH IS THE ONLY REASONABLE PUNISHMENT
FOR TERRORISTS, THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGES IN USING THE MILITARY COURTS. THE BRAZILIANS RELIED ON THEM DURING THEIR SUCCESSFUL BOUT WITH TERRORISTS. THIS EXAMPLE MIGHT HELP CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE.


RUSER

BT
ARGENTINA

1980/1981 PLAN OF ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 29 the Interagency Group for Latin America developed a strategy, subsequently approved by the President, to achieve better balance in our relations with Argentina. Before the strategy could be fully implemented, Argentina became heavily involved in supporting the new Bolivian regime. Imminent GOA recognition of the Bolivian regime and continuing reports of Argentine involvement led to the postponement of Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit. The visit was to have been the major vehicle for implementing most of the initiatives to improve U.S.-Argentine relations in 1980.

Argentina continues to be heavily involved in supporting financially and militarily the Bolivian regime. There is some indication that because of the strong USG reaction and the effect on our bilateral relations, Argentine leaders are willing to counsel moderation to the Bolivians, but there is no clear indication as yet the GOA is in fact exerting needed pressure to end the more repressive and corrupt practices of the Garcia Mesa regime. Over the longer term, we would hope that Argentina would encourage a return to civilian rule and avoid a polarization in Bolivian society.

Argentina is unlikely to cooperate further in the West's partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union. Although we had been told earlier that cooperation was possible and depended on the size of the 1980/1981 harvests, our Embassy was informed last week that Argentina would sell as much grain to the USSR as is available.

The U.S. continues to have a significant stake in maintaining and furthering improved bilateral relations. We continue to seek Argentine support on East-West and Hemispheric issues, in international fora and on non-proliferation. We also seek to influence Argentine internal developments on human rights and on an eventual return to democracy, as well as to limit the potential increase of Soviet influence there. Other strategic interests include its size, geographic location, natural resources, and relatively advanced economic, scientific,
and cultural development. Argentina has the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America and potentially one of the world's richest oil-bearing areas in its vast continental shelf. Argentina's port facilities and coastline could play an important role in the protection of critical sea lanes.

The U.S. also has major commercial interests in Argentina. U.S. exports to Argentina more than doubled in 1979 over 1978 (from $704 million to $1.5 billion). In the first nine months of 1980 exports increased 59.3% over the same period in 1979 to $1.8 billion. Of particular interest to U.S. industry are the potentially large exports related to the huge hydroelectric projects being undertaken by the GOA with Paraguay. Potential sales in one project alone could total up to $350 million. The U.S. Government has been actively supporting the bids of U.S. firms in these projects.

The U.S. faces a potentially serious confrontation with Argentina at the OASGA beginning November 19 on the issue of the IAHRC's human rights report. Failure to reach agreement could affect our other national interests. In addition, we need to consider the U.S. approach to President Viola during his planned visit to Washington, particularly with regard to the GOA's interest in resuming arms purchases and the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment barring such sales.

II. STATUS OF 1980 ACTION PLAN

A. Continuing or Early-Action Initiatives:

-- Meeting of the U.S./Argentine Mixed Economic Commission. The meeting has been scheduled for April 1981 (the earliest mutually convenient time frame). The agenda will include discussion of bilateral trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations.

-- Bilateral Income Tax Treaty. Conclusion of the Treaty is in the final stages.

-- Consular Convention. Both parties are reviewing a proposed text.

-- Human Rights. We have continued the dialogue, most recently through high level bilateral discussions at the UNGA. We are continuing discussions at the OASGA.
-- Nuclear Relations. We are continuing negotiations aimed at resolving the remaining safeguards issues to permit the delivery of highly and moderately enriched uranium for Argentina's nuclear research program as well as components for its power program. We hope negotiations will be completed this year. We continue to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, most recently during bilateral talks at the UNGA.

B. Initiatives where the Timing is Undecided:

-- Visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires. Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Argentina was postponed following Argentina's support of the Bolivia coup and recognition of the new Bolivian regime.

-- The first round of periodic security consultations focusing on security of the South Atlantic. These talks will highlight the critical strategic implications of the South Atlantic and create interest in cooperation for its defense.

-- Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues. We would exchange views on global issues and explore ways to promote mutually beneficial policies. The agenda would include an exchange of views on human rights policies and Argentina's evolution toward democracy, East-West and Hemispheric cooperation, and international issues such as law of the sea and the transfer of arms and technology.

-- Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement. We have withheld signing the agreement until GOA participation in the partial grain embargo on the Soviet Union is resolved.

-- An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. H reports that consultations with the Congress are completed and have been favorable. BA disagrees as to the scope of the consultations.

-- A high-level military visit. We told the President we will keep under review the desirability of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
A final decision, including timing, would take into account continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

C. **Issues To Be Discussed:**

1. In view of the GOA's continuing involvement in Bolivia and its policy of non-cooperation on grains restriction, which initiatives should be rescheduled and which should be deferred for later decision?

III. **ARGENTINA AT THE OASGA**

A. **Background:**

One of the most controversial issues at the OASGA will be how to handle the IAHRC's human rights report on Argentina. If Argentina perceives it is unjustly or harshly treated by the OAS in general or the U.S. in particular, it may make good on its threat to walk out of the OAS. GOA officials have also implied that the U.S. position at the OAS will be taken into account in considering the award of contracts for hydroelectric projects such as Yacyreta.

Following USG representations, Argentina allowed the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) in September 1979. The Commission's special report was severely critical of Argentina, calling on the GOA to inter alia account for the disappeared and bring to trial and punish those responsible, lift the state of siege, release or grant the right of option to depart Argentina to those persons held under Executive detention, investigate and punish those responsible for torture, and restore due process guarantees.

Consideration of the IAHRC's report on Argentina may be the most divisive issue in this year's OASGA. Many human rights groups and representatives from the Argentine exile community plan to visit Washington during the meeting and will push for Assembly condemnation. Argentine Nobel laureate Perez Esquivel also plans to be in Washington during the meeting. While these activities will heighten publicity over Argentina's case in the U.S., they will serve even more to focus public attention on the Commission's activities in Argentina. The Argentine Government believes harsh action by the OAS will establish precedent for similar treatment in other international fora, and it is seeking...
an omnibus resolution which would not name specific countries. Mexico, Venezuela and Peru are strong supporters of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and, in varying degrees, favor an activist stance by the OAS in the human rights field.

U.S.-Argentine bilateral discussions could be crucial to achieving a satisfactory outcome. We are working informally with Argentina and other interested countries to develop an OAS resolution which, while not calling for condemnation of Argentina, will recognize the work of the Commission, take note of the human rights situation at the time of the report, note the improvements since, and call on the GOA to take into account the report's recommendations for improved human rights observance.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Should the U.S. back off on its position calling for a country-specific resolution and accept an omnibus resolution which would make some specific mention of Argentina, if that is the consensus of the other OAS members?

2. Should we accept an omnibus resolution not mentioning Argentina?

V. U.S. MILITARY SALES TO ARGENTINA

A. Background:

At the May 14 Policy Review Committee meeting on Argentina, it was decided that it would be premature to consider rescission or modification of legislative restrictions on military supply to Argentina this year. In 1981, legislative modifications to permit training and perhaps other actions concerning military supply might be considered if the human rights situation in Argentina continued favorably. The current human rights situation is described in the attached summary.

IMET Training Programs, the sale of training under FMS and military supplies to the GOA (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system. In
order to permit the sale of these items, either:

-- the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment would have to be rescinded or modified;

-- a Presidential determination that a proposed sale was in the U.S. national interest would have to be evoked (At present, the President has no such leeway for Humphrey-Kennedy; however, legislation is pending in this year's FAA which would give the President this authority); or

-- the Congress would need to pass specific legislation permitting a particular sale.

DOD has identified strategic and economic interests which support the sale of military aircraft in the near term:

-- There is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance P-3 aircraft to the GOA to counter the Soviet buildup in the South Atlantic.

-- Argentina plans to embark next year on a $3 billion modernization program for its Air Force. The GOA has told us that it prefers U.S. equipment and that it is committed to making a decision by June 1981. If the U.S. is unable to respond by that date, Argentina will turn toward European suppliers.

The U.S. proscription of military sales toward Argentina, while not affecting the availability of military equipment to the GOA (European suppliers have been more than willing to fill the gap), have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Modification of our posture must take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and internationally who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

U.S. arms sales policies toward Argentina must also take into account the strategic balance in the Southern Cone. Chile already sees our improving relationship with Argentina as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. Major U.S. arms sales to Argentina while we maintain our present cool and distant relationship with Chile would further tip the balance
of power in favor of Argentina; this plus the political signal renewed arms sales would convey to both parties could encourage Argentina to seek a military solution to the Beagle Channel dispute, if the current mediation fails.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Has there been sufficient improvement in the human rights situation to change our position on military sales?

2. What specific human rights improvements would be required for us to change our position?

3. Are there strategic or economic consideration which would cause us to seek approval of specific sales?

4. What are the ramifications of a resumption of sales to Argentina on the military balance in the Southern Cone? On our stance toward other countries with human rights violations?

IV. PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA'S VISIT TO THE U.S.

A. Background:

Argentine President-designate Roberto Viola tentatively plans to travel to New York December 5 to address the Council on Foreign Relations and U.S.-Argentine Chamber of Commerce. According to the Argentine Embassy here, he may also visit Washington December 6-7.

Viola is a moderate within the Argentine military hierarchy, friendly to the United States, and sympathetic to U.S. views. His visit would provide an opportunity to influence future Argentine policies on Bolivia, grains, human rights, and Tlatelolco. On the other hand, coming to Washington in the middle of a Presidential transition is awkward. The Carter administration will not be in a position to discuss policy beyond January 20. Whether the President-elect or his advisors would want to see him to review U.S.-Argentine relations is problematical.

B. Issues To Be Discussed:

1. Whether Viola should be encouraged to come to Washington.
2. In the event of an affirmative answer, who should see him?

Attachment:
Status of Human Rights in Argentina.

Drafted: ARA/SC: GJWhitman: mas
11/10/80
STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA

The human rights situation in Argentina has improved over previous years, but remains serious. Most seriously, fundamental, internationally recognized rights of the integrity of the person have been violated through the application by the security forces of the tactic of disappearance. The number of confirmed disappearances registered in Argentina this year total 11, but there are unconfirmed reports of 22 or more. This total is in contrast to the many thousands who disappeared in 1976 and 1977, more than 600 in 1978 and 44 in 1979. There continue to be reliable indications that individuals detained as suspected terrorists or subversives are subject to torture. There has been no accounting for past disappearances.

The number of detainees on other than common criminal charges has been reduced, although the numbers remaining are still significant. Since 1974, 8200 people accused of terrorism or subversion have been detained under the special executive powers of the President. By September 1980, prisoners accused of other than common crimes totaled 1,700 to 1,800. Of these about 750 were being held without trial, some for many years or after having served their sentences. About 600 had been tried and convicted in military or civilian courts and another 400 were in trial status. The right of option program, which allows qualified prisoners to choose self-exile in lieu of detention, has been greatly restricted by Argentine Government regulations. As a result, of the 277 prisoners who have qualified for the U.S. Hemispheric Parole Program, only 82 persons have been able to travel to the United States.

Prison conditions have improved, although there is still concern over psychological conditions which may have been a factor in a number of suicides. Earlier complaints regarding overcrowding, lack of medical treatment, improper food, and restrictions on visits have been largely resolved.

The opportunities for the exercise of political freedoms remain circumscribed by the prohibition on political activities and de facto limits on the freedom of expression. Within uncertain limits, politicians and the press increasingly voiced criticism of the Government's actions and plans. Occasionally politicians were detained on the grounds that they had overstepped the limits of the law. The military designated the
President for the period 1981-1984, while reiterating its ultimate commitment to return the country to civilian rule. However, no date has been fixed for that devolution.
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8

Cleared: ARA/SC: REService
ARA: JABushnell
ARA/RPP: GJones
ARA: WGBowdler
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Edmund S. Muskie
Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Argentina

October 18, 1980

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin America developed a strategy, subsequently approved by you, to improve our relations with Argentina during 1980.

However, following the IG meeting two events occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing of our initiatives:

-- The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed as a result.

-- Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions to the Soviet Union.

I emphasized both of these issues, in addition to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy received the impression that continued cooperation on grains is possible but much depends on the size of the 1980/81 harvests. We plan to continue our efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires, Washington, and at international meetings.

Argentine decision-making is influenced by the nearness of our presidential election and by their own presidential transition. General Viola will replace President Videla March 29, 1981.

Under these circumstances, we believe that, while it is important to proceed with as many of the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would be inappropriate to proceed this year with some of the steps earlier contemplated. However, we should maintain private dialogue and avoid public confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult. The steps we intend to proceed with this year and those we plan to defer until next year are as follows:

SECRET

XDS 10-10-90
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8
I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives:

-- We will pursue our significant commercial and economic interests in preparation for the meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission to be held in Buenos Aires, probably in March or April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe). The meeting will include discussion of bilateral trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations. We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue over the issues that may be current at that time.

-- We will move forward on negotiations to arrive at an agreement on the assurances required for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco as they had earlier promised you.

-- We will seek to conclude the negotiations for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular convention.

II. Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year:

-- The first round of periodic security consultations, focusing on security of the South Atlantic.

-- Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues.

-- Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine decision to limit grains to the Soviet Union.

-- An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations with the Congress are completed and we are satisfied as to the timing of the initiative.

-- A high-level U.S. military visit, although we should keep under review the desirability of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience -- in the U.S. and elsewhere -- before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights
policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,500 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last --the invitation-- may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization. I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified. (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

At your request I have taken the main points in my memorandum to you and included them in a memorandum from you to Secretary of State Vance. Still, I recommend that you use the memorandum as talking points with the Secretary rather than send it. I am gun-shy — not to say paranoid — about sending memos from here to other agencies. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend that you not send the memorandum at Tab I, but rather phone Secretary Vance.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

cc: Jessica Mathews

DECLASSIFIED
Review on March 20, 1979

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-91-3-12-8
NARA EF Deto 71914
CONFIDENTIAL

March 10, 1979

NOTE TO: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS

SUBJECT: Argentina and Human Rights Policy

Bob's recommendation is that we delay a change in policy until after the IAERC visit and report, and indicates that the delay will be a few months. In fact it will probably be much longer. It took 13 months after the visit to El Salvador to get out the final report. It will take at least as long to do the controversial Argentine report. So we are talking about a probable delay until June 1980 at least.

cc: Bob Pastor

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on March 9, 1985
Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's, lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken. (S)

Assessment

The report was prepared by INR—not HA—and it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. Let me summarize the report:

-- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number. (S)

-- "Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment." The Red Cross estimated that 90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are executed. (S)

-- Disappearances -- probably by security units -- continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978. (Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while
the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear have vague associations with the "political left" rather than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

Illegal invasion of the home -- including theft by security units -- remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent. (S)

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes that the explanation for continued official terrorism is army politics. (S)

Policy

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S)

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

An Effective Policy

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government
decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want.

This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage delay. (S)

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of Argentina's most hard-line Generals have been transferred, and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. (3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six months or more.

RECOMMENDATION:

Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision pending the IAHRC report.

Approve______ Disapprove______
Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Channel dispute is over. On the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets much more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA.

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

2B - Maybe we should be friendly, stay out of Videla's hand, and see if he can clean up his act. We need to shut him out but it might be until 1.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 18, 1980

SECRET
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: THOMAS THORNTON
SUBJECT: M-B-B Lunch -- Argentina and Chile (U)

Argentina

As you will remember, there was an exchange of memos between Muskie and Brown -- the former wanting to leave our relations with Argentina essentially on ice, the latter wanting to proceed with some military cooperation gestures (see attached package). An IG was held last week to confirm the State position, with the understanding that Brown could appeal if he wants to. He apparently does. (C)

The issue is whether we should show willingness to move ahead with various minor military cooperation matters (e.g. joint talks, inviting an Argentine instructor to our school in Panama) despite the Argentine position on grain and their actions in Bolivia. Nobody sees the possibility of taking any major steps (e.g. the repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey) even if we wanted to. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: Support State's position that there should be no further moves made towards Argentina by this Administration, on the following grounds:

--- They have behaved very poorly towards us.

--- There is no time urgency to any of the issues at stake.

--- The Argentines are unlikely even to respond to feelers from this Administration, preferring to wait for the Republicans.

--- To the extent that we have cards to play, let's leave them for the next administration, who might get something in return for them. The Carter Administration certainly won't. (S)

SECRET
Review on Nov. 18, 1986

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E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-24-91-3-12-8
NARA EE Date 7/9/14
Chile

A year has passed since the Letelier sanctions were imposed and we had agreed among ourselves to review policy towards Chile about now. State had, in fact, begun to do so, when Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put on the agenda so that we could get a determination whether or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It is a fairly close call:

Con

-- There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several months.

-- The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, perpetuating the rule of Pinochet. It may also be retrogressing on human rights.

-- By leaving changes to the next administration, we give them some cards to play.

Pro

-- The Letelier sanctions have had no effect, were never intended to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue).

-- Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance with regard to violation of the person has improved greatly and in the course of events this should have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid this, however, with the result that we are much tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I violations are much worse. This is anomalous and discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle Channel contestants.

-- Since we said that we would review our policy, let's do it. We are still the Government. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: I think we should go ahead with the review on two grounds:

-- Let's leave a credible policy behind, and
-- If we don't sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint in our relationships. (S)

I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines (e.g. reaffirming the President's decision on 1981 UNITAS participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile). (S)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. CARTER
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Winner (C)

I understand that you will be meeting with Argentine Peace Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel. In 1973, Perez Esquivel, a sculptor and Professor of Architecture, established the Ecumenical Movement of Peace and Justice, an organization of Catholics, Protestants and others opposed to violence by both right-wing and left-wing political forces in Argentina. In 1974, he became Secretary General of the Peace and Justice Service, a Buenos Aires-based network of human rights activists throughout Latin America. (C)

He has been very complimentary of the President's human rights policy, and of our former Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, but as the attached UPI report indicates, he said that he was "gravely concerned" about the human rights movement because of Reagan's election. The Argentine government is unhappy that he received the Nobel Peace Prize, and the government has suggested indirectly that he may have contributed to terrorism. Our Embassy is aware of no information that would substantiate the charge. Indeed, he is a strong advocate of Gandhian non-violence. (C)

Perez Esquivel has also criticized military aid to the Junta in El Salvador, and there is some question about whether he cares as much about condemning left-wing terrorism as he does about government repression and right-wing terrorism. The President alluded indirectly to the point in his speech to the OAS on Wednesday, where he said: (C)

"The cause of human rights will be all the stronger if it remains at the service of humanity rather than at the service of ideological or partisan ends -- and if it condemns both terrorism and repression." (U)

I suggest you make the following points:

-- The President and I both wanted to personally congratulate you for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. (U)

-- As you know, the President has placed great emphasis on the importance of human rights for the U.S. and the world. Your award is symbolic of the importance which the entire world attaches to human rights today. (U)

Review on 11/19/86
-- We believe very deeply that for the human rights movement to remain strong it must be credible and to do it has to be perceived as separate from ideological or partisan political groups. We must support a free and just political process but not a political group. We must seek balance in our compliments and in our criticism; we should condemn the terrorism of the left as strongly as the repression of the right. If we fail to maintain that balance, we will fall victim to one side or the other. And the cause of human rights will suffer! (U)

-- I have heard that you may visit El Salvador. As the President said, we have supported the Junta in its effort to implement fundamental reforms and to resist efforts by the right to restore an old tyranny and of the left to create a new one. We have tried to use our aid -- both economic and non-lethal military aid -- to encourage the Junta to curb human rights abuses. Bob Pastor is prepared to discuss the situation there at greater length if you so desire. (U)
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. POLCOUNS (HALLMAN) TALKED WITH OFFICER ON THE STAFF OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CAVANDOLI (BEAUGE) ON JANUARY 29 ABOUT RESULTS OF GOODPASTOR VISIT. BOTH WERE NOTETAKERS DURING GOODPASTER-PASTOR-MARTINEZ DE HOZ CONVERSATIONS.

3. BEAUGE WAS PLEASED THAT BUENOS AIRES PRESS COVERAGE OF THE VISIT HAD BEEN SYMPATHETIC — "NO PROBLEMS HERE FOR THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID.

4. HE WAS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT BEHIND-THE-SCENES Fallout -- NOT, HE SAID, BECAUSE ANYTHING HAD GONE WRONG, BUT BECAUSE HE SENSES THAT EXPECTATIONS WERE BUILT WITH HIS BOSSES HE FEARS WILL NOT BE SATISFIED. THESE DEAL WITH:

A. THE DEPARTMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS. THIS, BEAUGE SAID, IS SOMETHING PASTOR AND CAVANDOLI BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION DEFINITELY CAN CONTROL. THEY WILL BE BITTERLY UNHAPPY IF THE REPORT IS UNFAVORABLE.

B. ACTION BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY.

C. DECLASSIFIED

** NO IDENTITIA ! **

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POB: PASTOR, THORN

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COMMISSION, BEAUGE SAID CAVANDOLO HAD GIVEN TOO
MUCH WHEN HE SAID THAT GOA COULD ACCEPT
KEEPING ITEM 12 B UNDER REVIEW. ON
REFLECTION, THAT COURSE WOULD KEEP OPEN
THE "ARGENTINA CASE," AN INDIVIDUALIZATION GOA
DOES NOT WANT. GOA WILL TAKE THE
POSITION THAT REJECTION IS THE ONLY PRACTICAL
COURSE IN ORDER NOT TO MIX THE MATTER WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH, AFTER ALL, WILL CONTINUE
UNTIL THE COMMISSION'S REPORT IS ACTED UPON AT
THE NEXT OAS MINISTERS MEETING. GOA WANTS U.S.G.
HELP IN THIS POSITION. WHEN HALLMAN ASKED WHETHER
THIS WAS AN OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION OF
CAVANDOLO'S PRESENTATION BEAUGE SAID THAT
YES IT WAS.

C. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION'S REPORT.
BEAUGE SAID HE AND HIS BOSSES KNOW THAT ANY
SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S.G. TRY TO SWAY PAOR
FROM HIS STEEP VIEWS ON ARGENTINA IS A
NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT A
STRATEGY OF TRYING TO PERSUADE OAS MEMBERS
TO VOTE MODIFICATIONS TO THE REPORT MAY
EMERGE -- ESPECIALLY COUNTRIES HAVING
CITIZENS WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMISSION.
RECALL THAT PASTOR SAID; BEAUGE REMINDED,
THAT IT SEEMS POINTLESS FOR A GOVERNMENT TO
CHOOSE BAD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA JUST
BECAUSE OF THE VIEWS OF A CITIZEN OF THAT
COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, BEAUGE SAID, THE
"OFFICIAL GROUP" NAMED TO WRITE ARGENTINA’S
REPLY TO THE COMMISSION’S REPORT LABORS
MANFULLY WITH LEGAL ARGUMENTS.

5. ASKED HOW HE FORESEES ARGENTINA WILL APPROACH
UNDERTAKINGS ON GRAINS EXPORTS MADE DURING GOODPASTER’S
VISIT, BEAUGE AT FIRST FOUND IT PUZZLING SOMEONE SHOULD
BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A PRECISE SUM DETERMINED FOR
ARGENTINA’S COARSE GRAINS SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION.
CONCEDING AT LAST THAT MARTINEZ DE HOZ’S AGREEMENT
TO PUT A LIMIT ON SALES TO SOVIET GRAIN TRADING
COMPANIES INDICATED THAT AN AMOUNT ACTUALLY BE
FIXED, BEAUGE WENT ON TO SAY HE Doubted That MANY
BEYOND THE ECONOMY MINISTER HIMSELF WOULD EVER
LEARN WHAT WAS THE DETERMINED SUM. BEAUGE WAS UNCERTAIN
ABOUT MODALITIES OF ARGENTINA’S PRESENTING INforma-
TION ABOUT GRAINS EXPORTS TO THE MONITORING GROUP,
SAYING THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT HIS MINISTRY.

6. ONE OTHER SUBJECT CAME UP: ARGENTINA’S PARTICI-
PATRONIN THE OLYMPIC GAMES. AFTER ARGENTINA'S
STRENIGHT EFFORTS TO "DE-POLITICIZE" THE WORLD CUP
GAMES HELD HERE IN 1978 AND THE WORLD CUP CONFERENCE HELD THE FOLLOWING YEAR IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO BACK AWAY FROM THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS.
BEAUGE KNEW OF NO CURRENT DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITV THAT ARGENTINA BOYCOTT THE GAMES, BUT ALSO
SAID THAT A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE ARGENTINE
OLYMPICS COMMITTEE PRESIDENT THAT ARGENTINA DEFINITELY
WOULD PARTICIPATE HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH HIGHEST
GOA AUTHORITIES.

CASTRO
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3889

NODIS
E.O. 12065: IDS-1 1/28/10 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPE, AR
SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA GENERAL TRADE/GRAINS TOPICS: JANUARY 23
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: LIMITING ARGENTINA'S GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR, FOREIGN MINISTER
   DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY
   COMODORO CARLOS CAYANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
   MR. VICTOR BEAGUE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)
   GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
   RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA
   CLAUS V. RUSEK, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (A/R/A/EA)
   WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER)

5. TIME AND PLACE: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1980! THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: GENERAL GOODPASTER MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY LED ARGENTINA'S PART OF DISCUSSIONS DEALING WITH SHIPMENTS OF GRAINS FROM ARGENTINA TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR EFFORTS TO GET ARGENTINA TO LIMIT THESE SHIPMENTS, THE MINISTER FOUND MANY REASONS FOR ARGENTINA'S NOT ATTEMPTING LIMITATIONS, THE GREATEST BEING HIS

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BELIEF THAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DENY GRAINS TO THE SOVIET UNION WERE BOUND TO FAIL AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO INTERRUPT ARGENTINA’S POLICY AND PROFITS TO THIS END. HE AGREED HOWEVER TO MAKE PRIVATE REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET GRAINS TRADING COMPANY TO LIMIT PURCHASES IN ARGENTINA TO Past LEVELS (PLUS A "GROWTH FACTOR") AND TO COOPERATE IN SHARING INFORMATION REGARDING ARGENTINA GRAINS SHIPMENTS.

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS THE FOREIGN MINISTER’S PRESENTATION OF POLITICAL SUBJECTS. END MEM CON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

8. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FIRST PRESENTATION. GENERAL GOODFASTER LED WITH PRESENTATION OF OUR RECONCILING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THAT EVOLVED WITH THE SOVIET UNION’S INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE SAID THAT WE WANTED TO EXPLAIN HOW WE BELIEVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORTS OF GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION FIT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER ACTIONS OUR GOVERNMENT IS TAKING TO FACE THIS NEW SITUATION. WE SAID THAT WE ALSO HAD COME TO DISCUSS WAYS TO DEEPEN AND STRENGTHEN ARGENTINE-U.S. RELATIONS.

9. IT WAS URGENT, GOODFASTER CONTINUED, TO TAKE AN IMMEDIATE, FIRM AND SUSTAINED STAND IN FACE OF THE SOVIET ACTION — AND NOT TO REPEAT THE COURSE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET UNION’S EARLIER INCURSION INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHEN IMPETUS HAD BEEN LOST. THIS LATEST SOVIET ACT WAS FAR MORE BLATANT IN THAT IT WAS THE FIRST MILITARY INVASION OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE, AND PRACTICALLY FROM THE BEGINNING INVOLVED SIX ARMY DIVISIONS AND ULTRA-MODERN AIRCRAFT. THOUGH WE CONCEDE THAT IMMEDIATE GOALS AND LOCAL CONCERNS MAY HAVE MOTIVATED THE SOVIET UNION, THE STRATEGIC-DYNAMIC EFFECT WAS NEVERTHELESS ONE OF THREAT TO PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AND, FROM THAT, TO ALL THE WEST.

10. OUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, USING GRAINS SHIPMENTS AND THE PROSPECT OF BOYCOTTING THE OLYMPIC GAMES, WAS A QUICK SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR ALLIES. THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT TOLERATE SOVIET CONDUCT. NOW WE ARE INVOLVED IN EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL OUR ALLIES, INCLUDING PAKISTAN AND NATO — PLUS THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA — TO COORDINATE ACTION. WE BELIEVE A SOVIET TACTIC WILL NOW BE TO PLAY A WAITING GAME, EXPECTING THAT THE ALLIES CAN BE DETACHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN.
11. LIMITATIONS OF GRAINS SHIPMENTS ARE SIGNIFICANT, EVEN IF THE RESULTS OF THESE ARE PRINCIPALLY TO PROCLAIM INTENTIONS. OUR BEGINNING, WE ADMIT, WAS CLUMSY IN THAT WE FAILED TO CONSULT FULLY, BUT NEITHER SECRETARY VANCE NOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-DIRECTOR INTENDS TO ABUSE FRIENDSHIP. WE LOOK TOWARD TO EXTENSIVE, TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ARGENTINA REGARDING SUPPLY, STORAGE, SHIPMENT AND POSSIBLE DIVERSIONS OF GRAINS.

12. GENERAL GOODPASTER WENT ON TO REMIND THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT CALLED FOR A "BOYCOTT" AND WOULD FULFILL COMMITMENTS MADE BACK IN 1975 TO SHIP THE USSR 8 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN. ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ ASKED FOR A LEGAL EXPLANATION OF "COMMITMENT" AND HOW WE JUXTAPOSED THE WITH "AUTHORIZATIONS" ALSO FORESEEN IN THE 1975 AGREEMENT. MR. ROSEN EXPLAINED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT LAWYERS HAD STUDIED THE QUESTION AND MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT WAS PROMISED AND WHAT HAD BEEN MADE CONDITIONAL ON FURTHER AGREEMENT.
13. Pastor asked whether it was not true that the
Soviet Union has stocks perhaps even amounting to
two or two and one half years of consumption, and
if this were true now U.S. limitations could be
made effective. General Goodfaster replied that
while we were not certain about the quantity of
Soviet Grains Carryover we estimate a Soviet
production-holding capacity of two hundred million
tons, against a Soviet wish to dispose of four
hundred million. At very least our action plus
last year's short Soviet production would lead to
heavy pressure and drawdown of any existing stocks.

14. Limitations on exports to the Soviet Union,
gerest General Goodfaster continued, would have effect on
activities on the margins of Grains trade: Poultry
and Pork production will have to be reduced. This
creates domestic problems for the Soviet Government,
disaffection.

15. Foreign Minister Pastor asked whether denial of
Grains to the Soviet Union betrayed President Carter's
promise not to use food as a weapon, to which Mr. Rumsen
replied that basic human consumption will not be affected.
A ten percent cut, for example, in Grains would, rather,
affect Soviet efforts to diversify consumer patterns.

16. Pastor went on to object that basically it was
Western weakness demonstrated in the past that had
allowed inroads into Afghanistan -- just as it had
been asserted, into Central America. Would it not be
more effective to use military measures to counter
MILITARY THRUSTS? PASTOR ADDED THAT HE WAS EQUALLY DUBIOUS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN OLYMPICS BOYCOTT.

17. MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOOK THE FLOOR TO DEVELOP THESE THEMES. HE DISAPPROVES, IN PRINCIPLE, OF USING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN MILITARY-POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS BECAUSE THE ONLY REALLY CERTAIN EFFECT IS TO DESTROY AN ECONOMIC ORDER. IF ANYTHING, HE SAID, LET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BE USED AGAINST ECONOMIC CHALLENGERS.

18. FURTHER, THE MINISTER DOUBTED WE HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT ONLY THE U.S. AND ARGENTINA ARE SIGNIFICANT FEED GRAINS EXPORTERS. HE VIEWED AS BOLSTER CONSIDERATIONS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO ABIDE BY GRAINS EXPORT LIMITATIONS, SINCE THE EXPORTABLE SURPLUS OF THESE AREAS WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE DESTINED TO OTHER KINDS OF MARKETS.

19. PERFECTION OF A LIMITATIONS POLICY WILL BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE, THE MINISTER SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT "LEAKAGE" JUST FROM U.S. SUPPLIES COULD AMOUNT TO THREE OR FOUR MILLION TONS. AND IF THIS WERE TRUE OF THE U.S., IT WOULD BE EVEN LIKELIER IN THE CASE OF ARGENTINA AND OTHER EXPORTERS. HE DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE DETERRED TO THE POINT OF CHANGING ITS POLICY FOR A FEW MILLION TONS OF GRAIN.

20. MARTINEZ DE HOZ WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THE WORKINGS OF THE ARGENTINE GRAINS TRADE. THIS GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY SOUGHT TO DISMANTLE THE GRAINS MONOPOLY INHERITED FROM EARLIER GOVERNMENTS. THE POLICY IS FUNDAMENTAL, AND IT HAS LED TO THREE CONSECUTIVE BUMPER CROPS. SUPPORT PRICES ARE USED TO THE SMALLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE AND, GENERALLY SPEAKING, THERE ARE NOW OUTSIDE THE WHEAT TRADE. UNLIKE IN SOME COUNTRIES (THE MINISTER CITED CANADA) THE GRAINS BOARD DOES NOT BUY UP CROPS BUT MERELY REGISTERS INTENDED EXPORTS WITHOUT REGARD TO DESTINATION. EXPORTERS BUY DIRECTLY FROM PRODUCERS, USUALLY ON F.O.B. (BUENOS AIRES OR ROSARIO) TERMS. IT IS THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES THAT USUALLY PURCHASE ON C.I.F. TERMS AND DOING THIS ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINAL DESTINATIONS. THE SOVIET GRAINS TRADING ENTITY BUYS IN ARGENTINA LIKE ANY BIG INTERNATIONAL DEALER.

21. A SUGGESTION THAT THIS PATTERN BE ALTERED IS VERY SERIOUS BUSINESS. HAD YOU ASKED US WE COULD HAVE EXPLAINED ALL THIS, MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID. AT AN EARLIER POINT PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT THESE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, BUT AT THIS POINT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ADOPT MEASURES THAT COST US REVISION OF THE BASIC PREMISES OF OUR SYSTEM. MARTINEZ BE NOES WENT ON TO SAY THAT NEW CIRCUMSTANCES SPEAKING AGAINST THIS FORECLOSURE WERE DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE — GIVEN ESPECIALLY HIS CERTAINTY THAT THERE WILL BE DIVERSIONS, AND THAT WHATEVER ARGENTINA MIGHT DO WOULD LITTLE AFFECT WHAT PRIVATE TRADERS DO IN ITALY, SPAIN, GERMANY OR SWITZERLAND.
22. The minister pointed to other practical difficulties. He asserted that on the day of the conversation there was a thirty dollar spread between embargoed and free grains. This creates severe trade and management problems, and it also creates the question whether Argentine farmers might not lose this price advantage — not to an effective policy of limitations but rather to private traders in other countries.

23. Martinez de Hoz complained that current market distortions created by U.S. policy already had cost Argentina markets. Bolivia, he said, had cancelled grains contracts with Argentina when offered embargoed U.S. grains on concessional terms. This took place, he said, after Argentina had complained to the U.S. during bilateral consultations. Conversations with Mexico had stopped when Mexico found it could get U.S. wheat put suddenly on the market. Argentina's traditional sorghum market with Japan slumped when U.S. sorghum prices fell.

24. Goodpasture defended: We had not said that grains limitations would pull the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. But effective restriction — restrictions, that is, not offset from other sources — send a clear signal of solidarity to the Soviet government. It is solidarity, after all, that restrains the Soviet Union from using force to gain its ends in Europe. Nor else should Soviet attention be commanded with regard to Argentina's lost sales; it was clearly not the intention of the U.S. to adopt a Bulgar-the-neighbor policy. The minister's presentation already makes Argentina's concerns...
A SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE U.S. CLOSE, CONTINUING CON-
SULTATIONS MUST FOLLOW. WHAT WE SEEK BASICALLY IS
MEANS OF MAINTAINING ARGENTINA'S SALES AT HISTORIC
LEVELS — ALREADY THE ANNOUNCED POLICY OF THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT.

25. MARTINEZ DE NOZ REPLIED THAT THIS POLICY IMPLIED
NOT SEEKING TO CHANGE THE MARKET — AND THAT THIS
INCLUDED A RESOLUTION NOT TO INTERVENE, HE OFFERED
HOWEVER THAT INFORMAL MEANS, SHORT OF INTERVENTION
MIGHT BE FOUND. ARGENTINA COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, GO
TO THE SOVIET GRAIN TRADING ENTITY AND ASK THAT IT
LIMIT PURCHASES TO "X-QUANTITY." THIS WOULD NOT,
HOWEVER, SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT ULTIMATELY HAPPENS
TO ARGENTINE GRAIN SOLD F.O.S. TO A LARGE ITALIAN
FIRM.

26. GENERAL GOODPASTER PROBED MARTINEZ DE NOZ'S
ADMISSION THAT SOME PRIVATE WORD COULD BE GIVEN TO
THE SOVIET TRADING COMPANY. GIVEN THAT ARGENTINA
BELIEVES THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF DESTINATION CONTROL
ARE SO GREAT THAT YOU ARE UNPREPARED TO TRY, DO YOU
IN FACT AGREE TO HOLD U.S.S.R. PURCHASES TO "HISTORIC
LEVELS"?

27. MARTINEZ DE NOZ REPLIED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE
DONE IN SECRET BECAUSE, HE SAID, SO MUCH HAD
GONE AWRY ALREADY; PUBLIC OPINION WAS OFFENDED
AT THE U.S. DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTING ARGENTINE
VIEWS ABOUT AN EARLIER AGREEMENT. THE DAY'S
"CLARK" NEWSPAPER CONTAINED A SHARP STATEMENT BY
AGRICULTURE UNDER SECRETARY KATHAWAY ABOUT MEASURES
AGAINST ARGENTINA IF THE COUNTRY FAILED TO JOIN IN
UNITED STATES PLANS. MEANWHILE, ARGENTINA HAD CLOSED
GRAINS BOARD REGISTRATIONS AS OF JANUARY AND THEN KEPT THE BOARD
CLOSED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE GOODPASTER VISIT. EXTENSION OF THE
CLOSURE WOULD DISTORT THE LOCAL MARKET FURTHER.

28. GENERAL GOODPASTER TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO
POSSIBILITIES WITHIN THE EXISTING ARGENTINE SYSTEM FOR
AVOIDING DIVERSIONS. MARTINEZ DE NOZ CORRECTED
THAT THE CONVERSATION SHOULD NOT TURN ON "DIVERTING
COUNTRIES," BUT RATHER ON "DIVERTING COMPANIES
OPERATING IN SITUATIONS OF GREAT FLUIDITY." ARGENTINE
BILLS OF LADING DO SHOW DESTINATIONS BUT, MARTINEZ
DE NOZ SAID, NOT FINAL ONES. THUS AN ENORMOUS COMMERCE
APPEARS HEADED FOR ROTTERDAM — BUT ONLY BECAUSE THAT
INTERMEDIATE POINT IS EUROPE'S LARGEST ENTREPÔT.

29. GENERAL GOODPASTER ASKED WHETHER ARGENTINA COULD
COME TO SOME AGREEMENT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES REGARDING DIVERSIONS OF ARGENTINE GRAINS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD, AS ITS INITIATIVE, TAKE UP THE MATTER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN THROUGH NOT TO TAKE ACTION WHICH WOULD HURT ARGENTINE FARMERS, AND ANY SUCH CONSULTATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN AGREEMENTS EXISTING JUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THOSE OTHER COUNTRIES. MEANWHILE, MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID, WE WILL NOT OURSELVES PULL STRINGS OR TRY TO MANIPULATE MARKETS.

30. (COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION ENDED AT 2215 TO BE TAKEN UP AGAIN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.)

CASTRO
HUMAN RIGHTS: ARGENTINA

Political terrorism of the left and the right has wracked Argentina since the late sixties and was partially responsible for the economic and political breakdown precipitating the March 1976 coup. The Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terrorism led to a massive counter-terrorist campaign, undertaken by the security forces.

Although the Government has publicly stated that terrorism has largely been defeated, the anti-terrorist campaign of the last few years has continued and has resulted in severe violations of human rights. Recently, however, instructions have been issued by the Minister of Interior to the police, and reportedly to the military, to curb excesses in counter-terrorist operations.

At present, the Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). The state of siege powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a wide variety of persons for long periods without formal charges. The USG reports an additional 500 prisoners in military camps.

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably from the level of the past two years. From January to August 1978, 347 were added to PEN and 446 released.

Security personnel and prison officials use torture routinely during the interrogation process.

In addition, thousands (estimates range between 1,000 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces. These cases, known as the disappeared, include a broad range of people, such as labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A movement is growing, led by human rights organizations and the Mothers of the Disappeared, with the support of some elements of the Church, to trace the missing people. The Government, however, has not accounted for the vast majority of the disappeared, many of whom are presumed to be dead. At present, disappearances and summary executions are reported to continue on a reduced scale of 16-45 per month.
The GOA in late 1977 reinstituted a limited "right of option" for political prisoners, held under executive detention, to request exile. However, from January to August, only 56 were allowed to leave under this program.

The GOA for the first time in February 1978 published lists of those detained under the state of siege.

Once again permission has been granted for the ICRC to visit non-military prisons.

Responsive action has been taken in a few cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest. Newspaper editor and Jewish leader Jacobo Timerman was transferred from PEN detention to house arrest, Alfredo Bravo, Co-Chairman of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled, Guillermo Vogler was released to the U.S. under the right of option, and four of the five Deutsch family members were released. Also placed on parole was Perez Esquivel, leader of Paz y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee.

Official harassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have borne much of the brunt. Reports of anti-Semitic incidents targeted at members of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decreased.

Severe restrictions remain on civil and political freedoms, among these trade union rights, fair judicial processes, and the activities of political parties. Press freedom continues to be curtailed although some restrictions were recently lifted. There appears to be little concerted or effective effort to date to check fundamental abuses or to revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would prevent human rights violations in the future.

We had hoped that the Argentine Government would have been able to accept a visit by the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). However, the conditioned invitation issued by the GOA was not acceptable to the Commission. Negotiations are continuing.

ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS

— On October 27, 1977, the U.S. voted no on a gas pipeline loan in the IDB. We followed this up with "no" votes on a cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on December 8. On November 3 we did, however, support an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds that it meets basic human needs.
Early in 1978, we abstained on an industrial credit and a grain storage loan, both in the World Bank. We abstained rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government that we had noted limited improvements in some areas, and to encourage further positive developments. We followed this by an extension of a $60 million agricultural credit loan in April and abstained on three IFC loans.

Citibank is currently holding back on over $600 million in transactions for Argentina because of human rights considerations.

Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY '78. The Administration declined to sign the FY '77 FMS agreement and is not requesting FMS credits for Argentina for FY '79. All arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list) are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis; only very few selected new items with no apparent relationship to human rights have been approved.

On various occasions, we have discussed our human rights concerns with the GOA at the highest levels, including trips by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary and the Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that we want better relations with that country, but that there would have to be improvements in the human rights area. He specifically asked for movement on: an invitation to the IAHRC; establishment of a mechanism to inform the families of disappeared persons of their whereabouts; and trial, release or exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners held without charge.

The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of individuals who are either detained or have disappeared to the Argentine Government and have requested that they furnish information on these individuals.
MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IN ARGENTINA

The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently continue although not on the massive scale of the past two years.

In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical torture continues to be used regularly during the interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called 'criminal subversives' who do not fully cooperate." It reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports of torture, this is not because torture has been foresworn but "derives from fewer operations" because the number of terrorists and subversives has diminished.

Torture used to intimidate and extract information is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock, the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with cupped hands." A 1978 Amnesty International report in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse...rape...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with boiling water, oil and acid; and even castration."

The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable information about a case in late December 1977, and in the past few weeks credible information about another case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place in 1976 and 1977.

One well-known case of physical abuse was Jacobo Timerman. Another well-publicized case by Amnesty International was that of Elisabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old West German citizen who died three months after her arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our Embassy have numerous documented examples.

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports "guard brutality" in the jails, and "beatings and assaults" during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures for Argentine security forces." These procedures are
expected to continue at least until after the World Cup Soccer matches in June.

Our Embassy further notes that, while penalties exist for police maltreatment of common criminals, they do not for political detainees. Furthermore, no such charges have been made publicly against members of the Armed Forces which carry out much of the counter-subversive operations, although internal disciplinary proceedings have reportedly taken place for some "unauthorized excesses." Interior Minister Herindeguy in May called for an end to police use of terrorist tactics, and it was reported that the military received similar orders. However, no progress has been reported in deed.

Disappearances

Reports of torture do not of course deal with the thousands (estimates range in the tens of thousands) of Argentine citizens who were abducted by security forces and summarily executed. These cases, known as the disappeared, include not only suspected terrorists but also a broader range of people—labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A recent dramatic occurrence was the abduction in December of five "mothers of the disappeared" and two French nuns, whose bodies were reportedly discovered washed ashore.

There is a growing movement led by human rights organizations and the Church to trace the missing people. In La Prensa of May 7, an open letter to President Videla was printed as a full page ad listing the names of 2,592 disappeared and urging an accounting. It was sponsored by three Argentine human rights organizations and paid for by contributions from large numbers of Argentine citizens. Editorials in Argentine newspapers this month further called attention to the "political timebomb" of the tragic disappearances. The Buenos Aires Herald declared "Every effort must be made to trace missing people. It is the only way to convince the world, and to prove to ourselves, that we do care about human rights. If anxious relatives are ignored or treated with callousness, they will become symbols as victims of a totally brutalized society." Innumerable letters are received by the US Government from the relatives and friends of the disappeared calling for an accounting.
Internationally, human rights organizations are also supporting this campaign. Amnesty International, for example, on May 18 launched a major drive against political imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in Argentina.

Both the internal and external pressure building seek to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public accounting.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

Taiwan Legislation. A bill reflecting the Conference Committee's decisions is being put in final form and will be reported early next week. The end product is an amalgam of provisions from the House and Senate versions. In some instances the Conference Committee made helpful additions or changes; in other instances it included less desirable provisions, but nothing in the Committee's action is contrary to the concepts underlying normalization. There is no impairment of the central purpose of enabling us to maintain a satisfactory entity for conducting unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan. Indeed, new language was added in Conference recognizing that "governmental" relations between the United States and Taiwan have been terminated. Thus it appears this legislation will reach you in satisfactory shape.

Claims/Assets Agreement. The Chinese have not yet responded to our offer to sign the claims/assets agreement which was initialed by Secretary Blumenthal March 2 in Beijing. The ostensible reason is procedural -- the need for State Council approval of the agreement before it can be signed. The possibility exists that they intend to defer signing until after the Administration has acted on the Taiwan legislation.

Security in Wake of Peace Treaty Signing. Violent reactions against Americans in the wake of the Peace Treaty signing are possible, particularly in some Arab countries. We have alerted our missions abroad that the signing will probably take place March 26. We have instructed some of them to consult with host governments about increased protection and report to us on measures taken and their assessment of the threat.
Grenada. We announced at noon today that we will continue friendly and cooperative relations with Grenada, and that our Ambassador at Bridgetown will travel to Grenada to meet with the Governor General and the new Prime Minister. Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana have formally recognized the new government, as has the UK. Our public announcement explicitly noted that our decision was based on the new government's stated commitment to free elections and constitutional government. We have reiterated this same point to the Grenadians, other interested Caribbean states and the UK.

Common Fund. The framework agreement reached in Geneva on the Common Fund is a significant step forward in the North-South dialogue and effectively removes the Fund as a contentious political issue for UNCTAD V at Manila in May. An Interim Committee will meet later this year on remaining operational issues. We have said we cannot accept the current voting arrangement giving 47 percent of the votes to the developing countries and only 42 percent to OECD countries, and this will be further negotiated.

P-3 Flights. Djibouti has approved our request for increasing our monthly P-3 flight to two flights per week over the next two weeks. When we can judge better the Arab reaction to the Egypt-Israel Treaty, we will consider the prospects for Oman's approval of P-3 access on a longer-term basis.

Security Assistance. The House Foreign Affairs Committee completed mark-up of the security assistance authorization today. The FMS and MAP programs were approved, for the most part, as requested by the Administration. Zablocki hopes the security assistance bill will go to the floor March 29.

Human rights advocates eliminated IMET for Guatemala and derailed a proposal by Gus Yatron to permit Chile, Argentina and Brazil to participate in regional IMET programs. $10 million in FMS for Zaire was rejected partially on human rights grounds.
FMS for Panama was cut from $5 million to $2.5 million. This cut was initiated by Republicans as a slap at the Canal treaties, but they were supported by new Democratic members of the Committee who were lodging human rights protests.

Middle East Consultations. Dick Stone told us today that the U.S. proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was excellent, and that we should accept no further tightening of the language which would require approval by the Senate as a treaty. Javits agreed that the agreement as drafted was generally acceptable and would not require Senate approval. Hamilton felt that the whole concept of the MOA was hard to swallow. Although he accepted the need for some security assistance to Israel, he felt that the paragraphs dealing with U.S. policy should be omitted.

Stone and Javits seemed prepared to accept a $1.5 billion FMS program for Egypt. Both felt that they could, under certain circumstances, accept an F-4 sale to Egypt. Stone said he would find the whole package acceptable, unless there were some particularly threatening type of hardware included.

Mexico. While awaiting a formal response from the Mexican government on our proposal for reorganizing the Consultative Mechanism, we are moving ahead to establish the new working groups and to set up meetings with the Mexicans in April. The energy group will meet following preliminary meetings on natural gas and electricity exchanges in Mexico City the first week in April. On trade, we are pressing the Mexicans to conclude negotiations with us before we conclude our MTN tariff negotiations in Geneva April 6. For the other six working groups, we are proposing or already have agreed with the Mexicans on April meeting dates.

Israeli Settlements. With the U.S. abstaining, the UN Security Council today passed the Jordanian Resolution establishing a three-nation Commission "to examine the situation concerning the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories." The vote was 12-0 with three abstentions (U.S., UK, Norway). We abstained on the Resolution after it was moderated at our insistence. A tacit
call for sanctions against Israel was deleted and the Commission's mandate was narrowed considerably from the original Arab proposal. Israel announced that the Commission would not be allowed to enter the occupied territories.

Castro. Yesterday we received the following message from Fidel Castro, through one of his aides: Cuba is not now interested in official conversations and needs a gesture from the U.S. before the dialogue can usefully be resumed. While Cuba foresees no immediate hope for progress in our relations, it does not want any backsliding either, and will do nothing to provoke hostile relations with us. Cuba remains interested in pursuing links with the Cuban-American community, keeping up contacts with the U.S. on the prisoner release programs, holding talks with the U.S. Coast Guard later this spring, and continuing its cooperation with the FBI on security matters affecting the Pan-American Games that will be held in Puerto Rico.
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA ON JACOBO TIMENMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE. VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT IN RIGHT OF OOPTION CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE IAHERC WOULD FIND IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, BUT OFFERED NO HOP FOR "DESAPARECIDOS." HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING GOA'S WILLINGNESS TO cooperate WITH USQ IN ITS OBJECTIVES. VIOLA FELT AN OAS MILITARY PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY

3. APPRECIATION FOR MFM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA, JUNTA PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER, REQUESTED I MEET WITH HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFICE. DUE TO MY BEING OUT OF COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. HE GREETED ME WITH THE TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT HOW THINGS STOOD IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINNESS BUT YET SHOWED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS.

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OAKS AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. HE HOPED

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FOE: PASTOR, BLOOM

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DEPARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEPT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO", RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE CLEAR TO VIOLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG. VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS THAT DUE TO IMPORTANCE OF NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CAVE IN ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIENT POSTURE TOWARDS GOA. I ALLAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIEW ON ARGENTINA. I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT" AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE CONTINGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS. HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT.

5. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA REMINDED ME IAHRC WOULD BE VISITING ARGENTINA STARTING SEPTEMBER 8. HE STATED THIS DATE WAS CHOSEN BY IAHRC AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VIOLA STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRC VISIT RESULTING IN VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TORTURE AND NO IRREGULAR ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS WAS A BLACK MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION.

6. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT HE LOOKED AT ME WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN -- FROM EAR TO EAR -- JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURNS, AS IF THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "I T AKE YOUR FIGURES OF FIFTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR; LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARANCES IN SIX MONTHS."

I INTERRUPTED HIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTY-TWO DISAPPEARANCES. HE SAID "EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE FROM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY TIME IAHRC ARRIVED GOA WOULD REACH THE ZERO STATUS. VIOLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE "DESAPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT RETURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HE REPEATED IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT SURFACING AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VIOLA'S REPLY WOULD BE THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION ON THE DISAPPEARED
ANT IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE HE DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE MIGHT BE A FEW CASES SURFACING — THOSE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THESE WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS. VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT ON DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRG ARRIVED. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE PALATABLE TO SOCIETY.

7. RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE WAS REMINDED GOA — THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — HAD NOT GIVEN EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD RAISED ALL KINDS OF BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OF OPTION CASES WOULD BE MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID THESE CASES WEREN'T HIGH ON THE AGENDA.
CP IMMED
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TO: RUESBA 5172/2 1772115
C: 2620172 JUN 79
F: AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES

TO: S/STAT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1253

CC: ILENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172

2. TIMERMAN CASE: RECENTLY "CONVICTED" NAVY ORIENTED NEWSPAPER, AND THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED TIMERMAN’S IMMINENT RELEASE. I TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE ACCURATE. HE DENIED ANY TRUTH TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMERMAN WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF BY STATING IF IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO. IN A JESTING FASHION, I SUGGESTED TO VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA HE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD THE WAY. HE SMILED AND REPLIED HIS OBSTACLES WERE WELL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, CHIEF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN’S NEMESIS. I EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION ON THIS SUGGESTION FOR AS LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA HE HAS NEVER ADMITTED SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWERED HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH SUAREZ MASON. I TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED ME TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - "GAUCHO BBQ". IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS BBQ I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED EVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN’S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE IS STILL SOME HOPE.

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OF RENEWED AND CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON THE PORACIO SARAGOVI CASE. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE. I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN HIS LAP AS IT WAS A MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP FOR REVIEW BY HIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

10. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS,
PLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OF OUTSTANDING PLAYERS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A FULL STADIUM OF OVER 75,000 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME. I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE "COMMON HERD" BUT AS I WALKED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DF HONOR" (VIP BOX). I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT THE VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTLEMAN WAS QUITE STERN IN TELLING ME I BELONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S BOX. I WAS THE ONLY AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WERE SEVERAL AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS THE ONLY ONE PERMITTED TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES FROM USA.

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA TOLD ME HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TO SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USG ON NICARAGUAN POLICY, BUT FEARED Sending A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THAT COUNTRY FEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. VIOLA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WAS NOT BEYOND DIALOGUE AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL AND TROOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY PEACE FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC WOULD NEVER BUY IT. IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS CRYING OR HOPING FOR ME TO GIVE HIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA.

12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING VIOLA'S OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA AS I WAS COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO. MASSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT HE HAD PLANNED IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD SPENT TIME WITH HIM. IT'S JUST THE CASE OF THE OLD ARGENTINE INTRIGUE JUST AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO KNOW THAT I WAS HAVING AN "ASADO" WITH HIM.

CASTRO
PART I -- NEW EVENTS AND INDICATORS

(The following is not a complete report of all new events since our last report of June 16, 1976. A follow-up September will be submitted next week.)

Decision reported imminent on persons held under Institutional Act.

Senior military contacts continue to report that a governmental decision should be announced before August 1 regarding the 35 plus persons presently being held under the Acta Institucional. The Junta evidently is undoubtedly uneasy about the Acta which inter alia detains indefinitely a number of senior Peronist leaders without specific charges or trial. According to military sources, the Junta has decided in principle that before August 1 all persons being held under the Acta should receive specific sentences as acts of 'revolutionary justice' or be turned over to the judicial system for criminal prosecution or set free. One naval contact in early July admitted that the decision-making process in each case was proving to be very difficult, but he was optimistic the determinations would be made and approved by the Junta.

Mistreatment of prisoners reported

A number of the embassy's Human Rights contacts have reported that recently Catholic paroled peace activist Adolfo Maria Perez Esquivel was severely beaten by prison guards in La Plata prison several weeks prior to his release. A number of his ribs were broken. Same sources report that another permanent Asamblea leader (Separe Mem) was severely tortured during his initial interrogation. Warning: XGDS-4. Leakage of these reports in Washington may put these men in grave danger.

Embassy has received reports in the last several months that some prisoners prior to their release from La Plata prison were brutally beaten by prison guards. Red Cross authorities (Protect) have expressed their concern to embassy regarding the physical abuse of prisoners in La Plata prison.

Material witnesses reported tortured

Permanent Assembly and Human Rights sources (Protect)
Interviewed almost every Pen prisoner in Argentina. He noted that about 50 percent had been tortured. Some had merely been beaten up but the large majority had been subjected to electric shock or the submarine. The ICRC rep was not optimistic that the Red Cross would be able to influence any change in the widespread practice of torture in Argentina. The rep stated that no government in the world admits that torture takes place and a government cannot correct a problem which it does not recognize.

The delegate recognized that physical mistreatment of Pen prisoners is infrequent after they have passed through the interrogation phase, i.e., after they have passed officially to the pen. However, various forms of psychological torture persist in the prisons.

Estimated prison population as of July 1, 1978:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prison</th>
<th>Pen</th>
<th>Dam</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Plata</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>28 to 50 multiracial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devoto</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra</td>
<td>550</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Caseros</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendosa</td>
<td>22</td>
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ICRC estimate (protec): 400

# Unrecognized prisoners held at the disposition of military authorities. (According to security forces there may be up to 500 around the country at any given point in time.)

Villa Devoto fire update

ICRC source (protect) informed Embassy recently that four prisoners held under pen were involved in the March 14, 1978 Villa Devoto riot and fire. According to source, all four were being held on drug charges but simultaneously under Pen as well, as they had false Argentine passports when arrested, which put them under suspicion of being possible subversives as well. Three of the drug traffickers died in the fire. The badly burned survivor told the ICRC that he and the other Pen prisoners had no connection with subversion but were drug addicts and traffickers who had obtained false passports to use in connection with their smuggling activities.

With reference to a May 4, 1978 letter to the Secretary in which Com Director Laurence N. Birn argues against export licenses for the sale of three troop-carrying Boeing CH-47 helicopters alleging that "helicopters similar to the ones being supplied" were used in putting down the Villa Devoto prison riot and crushing labor strikers, we note the following based on discreet inquiries of security sources:

The Red Cross state that ICRC reps had interviewed almost every Pen prisoner in Argentina. He noted that about 50 percent had been tortured. Some had merely been beaten up but the large majority had been subjected to electric shock or the submarine. The ICRC rep was not optimistic that the Red Cross would be able to influence any change in the widespread practice of torture in Argentina. The rep stated that no government in the world admits that torture takes place and a government cannot correct a problem which it does not recognize.

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ICRC estimate (protect): 400

# Unrecognized prisoners held at the disposition of military authorities. (According to security forces there may be up to 500 around the country at any given point in time.)

Villa Devoto fire update

ICRC source (protect) informed Embassy recently that four prisoners held under pen were involved in the March 14, 1978 Villa Devoto riot and fire. According to source, all four were being held on drug charges but simultaneously under Pen as well, as they had false Argentine passports when arrested, which put them under suspicion of being possible subversives as well. Three of the drug traffickers died in the fire. The badly burned survivor told the ICRC that he and the other Pen prisoners had no connection with subversion but were drug addicts and traffickers who had obtained false passports to use in connection with their smuggling activities.

With reference to a May 4, 1978 letter to the Secretary in which Com Director Laurence N. Birn argues against export licenses for the sale of three troop-carrying Boeing CH-47 helicopters alleging that "helicopters similar to the ones being supplied" were used in putting down the Villa Devoto prison riot and crushing labor strikers, we note the following based on discreet inquiries of security sources:...
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE ASSERTION THAT US MILITARY TYPE HELICOPTERS WERE USED IN HANDLING THE RIOT SITUATION AT VILLA DEVOTO. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT IT WAS NOT A PRISON UPRISING AS SUCH. THERE WERE NO POLITICAL DETAINERS IN THE CELL BLOCK CONCERNED (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE SO-CALLED "SUBVERSIVE ANGEL" TO THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS MENTIONED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE,) AND ALMOST ALL—IF NOT ALL—OF THE DEATHS RESULTED FROM SMOKE AND HEAT CAUSED BY THE FIRE THE INMATES HAD STARTED. ADDITIONALLY, THE SECURITY FORCES STATED THEY DO NOT USE HELICOPTERS TO RUSH STRIKES OR TARP ON STRIKE-SOUND FACTORS BECAUSE IT IS JUST NOT OPERATIONAL AND WOULD BE WASTEFUL OF RESOURCES. (WE BELIEVE THAT SMALLER HELICOPTERS WERE USED FOR SPOTTING POSSIBLE SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS ALONG THE RAILROAD LINES DURING THE RAIL STRIKE LAST NOVEMBER, HOWEVER. SEVERAL BOMBS WERE SET OFF ON THE TRACKS DURING THE STRIKE.)

THE FEDERAL JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE VILLA DEVOTO INQUIRY HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE INVESTIGATION FOR JURISDICTIONAL REASONS. THE CASE IS NOW BEING TURNED OVER TO CRIMINAL COURT JUDGE WHO WAS CHOSEN BY LOT FROM THE CRIMINAL BENCH.

DETECTION FACILITIES REPORTED CLOSED

A LA PLATA HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN EARLY JULY THAT THE ARAMA DETENTION FACILITY OUTSIDE OF LA PLATA HAS BEEN ABANDONED AND ITS PRISONERS TRANSFERRED. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL SIMILAR REPORTS REGARDING THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL IN BUENOS AIRES. THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL'S DETENTION FACILITY WAS DESCRIBED IN GREAT DETAIL IN THE SO-CALLED "NAEGIO LETTER" WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES AND FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. THE EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THE DEACTIVATION REPORTS OF EITHER OF THESE WELL-KNOWN DETENTION FACILITIES.

RELEASE OF DETAINED UNION LEADERS STILL PENDING

A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS V'NDCI INFORMED EMBASSY IN EARLY JULY THAT THE RELEASE OF 14 UNION LEADERS ANNOUNCED JUNE 26 BY THE PERONIST-LEANING BISHOP OF LA PLATA WAS STILL UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE FOW OFFICIAL SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO ANNOUNCE THE NAMES OF THE LABOR LEADERS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT NOTED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR RELEASE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE TIMERMANN CASE

ACCORDING TO TIMERMANN'S FAMILY, THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNCIL ON PATRIOTAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO: The Secretary
FROM: ARA - Terence A. Todman

Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22, 1977

I. Objectives

U.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto US refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Development Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear reprocessing raises the specter of its becoming a member of the nuclear club.

President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty, of the progress on human rights improvements basic to other issues. But Videla's position is not secure, and there are indications that the Argentines expect to make some basic decisions on their relations with us after evaluating their talks with you.

In this context, our objectives are to:

- strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies on these issues overlap);

- obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, preferably at a date certain in the near future, and to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing issue;

- encourage Videla to follow through on his promise of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture.
Argentina's objectives are twofold:

— the government wants a clarification of what Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they would like our cooperation, including military sales; and

— President Videla will try to make the talks appear cordial and substantive and hence to demonstrate to Argentine public opinion that his government has our ear and respect.

II. Setting

Although Argentina is Latin America's most European country, chronic political instability and exaggerated economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise significant achievements. At the time of the military takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had disintegrated: fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year.

The three-man Junta, of which President Videla is the Army member, came to power with two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

Organized terrorist movements are now largely under control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have been reduced to some 700 combatants, and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to only 120. Both groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk, high visibility operations such as assassinations of military officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings.

The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still relatively common, and respond to various motives, including personal vendettas, political radicalisms of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverings to weaken contending government factions, and may on occasion be designed to embarrass Videla himself.

Under these conditions, official and unofficial abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted, and torture is fairly common during the first days of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses of the security personnel have been punished, but there is no public record of it.
Economic performance has improved under the Junta. Foreign currency reserves now exceed $3 billion, inflation has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978, serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected and record level crops and exports were reached in 1976-77.

On the negative side, the government has not been able to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks and more unrest is likely.

Problems or not, Argentina's international economic position is improving steadily. Exports should reach $4.5 billion this year, compared to imports of about $4 billion, including more than $700 million from the US. Interestingly, while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some $400 million in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from the Soviet Union.

Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation have led to considerable new interest, and some new activity by foreign investors. US investment now stands at $1.4 billion and loans by US banks to Argentina exceed $3 billion.

The military dominate the Argentine political scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors and managers of nationalized companies. With the exception of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are excluded from major decision-making positions.

Internal military rivalries are endemic. President Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions, but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army generals remain in key command positions even though their retirement would relieve right wing pressures on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices, takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency.

The Junta has not committed itself to restoring civilian rule, but consultations between prominent citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile, political party activities are suspended, and the
powerful labor unions are largely under the control of military interventors.

Argentina's international activity has been limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal politics and by a general disinclination to identify closely with the problems of the Third World. However, Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic service which could help build better understanding between the DCs and LDCs in international fora.

As noted above, the U.S. is the country which presents the most significant challenges for the Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our conditioning of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human rights performance, and may be on the verge of making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us.

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear technology, and probably has the capacity to produce a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations and may hope that cooperation on that front might strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on other fronts, including human rights.

The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g. the dispute over rights to Parana River water.) There is, however, no great tension now. An April U.K. international arbitration decision awarding ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised nationalist sentiments in Argentina, already resentful of the British presence in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy apprehended nine Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats in October, but the seizures do not seem to have had a lasting impact on Argentine-Soviet relations.

III. Key Issues

1. Human Rights

U.S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that better relations are dependent upon their making human rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "disappearances."
Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the human rights violations which have taken place were a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight against terrorism, that such violations are being gradually brought under control, and that a full return to the rule of law will take time.

Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine human rights violations have severely strained our relations. The Argentines claim not to understand why we have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI loans. They believe that we overemphasize official violations and underestimate the terrorist actions which triggered them.

Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted brutally. Many terrorist activists and suspects have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights advocates not involved in the bloodletting.

Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning the disappeared are often ignored by the government. A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information about disappeared family members. We have received a letter signed by 178 of them asking for your intercession with the Argentine government.

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution enable the government to detain prisoners without charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged to President Carter to try to resolve the cases of the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by Christmas, but there has been little progress. A recently reinstated "right of option", which would allow political prisoners to choose exile instead of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few prisoners.

There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter-
vention on behalf of jailed newspaper editor, Jacobo Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman Harkin has asked that you inquire about the application of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group has just given us an unverified list containing the names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared or have been detained in Argentina.

Points to be Made

-- Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel compelled to express our concern.

-- President Carter was heartened by President Videla's desire to resolve the status of political detainees by Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000 individual cases, but we hope that they will soon be decided.

-- We were encouraged by the decision to restore the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will allow many detainees to be freed from prison.

-- We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of the AP reporter Serrat.

-- The government should clarify what has happened to individuals who have disappeared without explanation. We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the security forces appear to have been involved in many instances.

-- A public accounting of all prisoners held by the government would help resolve questions about disappearances and would considerably improve Argentina's world image.

-- We still frequently hear reports of torture, especially during the first days of detention. We understand that the fight against terrorism has been brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable under any circumstances. Torture should be forbidden and future cases tried in the courts.
2. Terrorism

U. S. Objective: To remind the Argentines that we, too, abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist measures that violate human rights.

Argentine Objective: To focus U. S. thinking on terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider "shameful" conditions of internal disorder.

Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U. S. concentration on human rights violations by government authorities has forced attention away from terrorism, which they say also violates human rights and is the real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully pressed a campaign in international organizations to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister Allara during his calls at the Department in early November. The Foreign Minister will have especially strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin in May.

A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens their concern; two Armed Forces officers were assassinated, three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been bombed in the last month.

Points to be Made

— Terrorist attacks against government officials and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish to express our sympathy to these men and their families.

— We are as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however, condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and due legal process.

3. Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco

U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear explosions.
Argentine Objectives: To complete its nuclear fuel cycle in order to have greater energy independence, to become a nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative ties with the U.S.

Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina, which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state, views nuclear technology as a source of both energy and international status. It was the first to have a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major exporter of technicians under IAEA programs.

If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans, accept full-scope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background papers, but a key immediate objective of our foreign policy and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco now.

Points to be Made

-- The United States is determined to do all it can to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

-- Ambassador Smith is available to brief your officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement and a Comprehensive Test Ban.

-- It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary, if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water.

-- Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course, involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urgent world study is conducted on how to reprocess in a safer manner.

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
We accept and support Argentina's expectation that its Latin American neighbors should also make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies.

What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take a bold step on behalf of continental security and move now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

We were heartened by President Videla's conversation with President Carter, and President Videla's commitment to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate Argentina's dedication to peace.


U.S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we want a good military relationship, but to get them to understand that this depends on their human rights performance.

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values its military ties to the U.S., but that without a clarification of U.S. arms policies, particularly on spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient its military procurements and relationships.

Essential Factors: U.S.-Argentine military relations have deteriorated sharply as a result of U.S. actions taken to disassociate the U.S. from the GOA's human rights violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina has refused all military sales financing for fiscal year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively banned military training and arms sales as of October 1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already, the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine military requests.

While our policy has little real military significance for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises this year. Until substantial progress is made on human rights considerations—release or the affording of due process to detainees, and the ending of torture and disappearances—Argentina can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed.
Points to be Made

-- The United States values its military relations with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which have led to the current situation regarding military sales and training.

-- Our willingness to provide equipment is directly related to internal security policies. Given the present situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the Administration to justify military sales to Argentina.

-- We hope earnestly that the restoration of due process in Argentina will permit us to develop more normal military relationships.

-- This would permit us to advise the Congress of a changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after October 1, 1978.

5. Argentina and the International Financial Institutions

U.S. Objectives: To explain to the Argentines that we cannot support their loan requests, except those which meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial human rights improvements.

Argentine Objective: To persuade the U.S. to vote "yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs.

Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of voting "no" on one loan and told the Argentines that this was due to improvements in their human rights situation. We added, however, that it would be difficult for us to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held back loans until October when they submitted a $36 million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted "no", and informed the Argentines that without human rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since voted "yes" on a potable water loan in the IDB that met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB, $60 million for science and technology development and $50 million for electrical transmission lines, have been delayed until after your visit.)

The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously, to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now,
after significant improvements in human rights have taken place, vote "no".

**Points to be Made**

--- We do not seek to intervene in the internal affairs of other societies; but we believe that no member of the United Nations can claim that violations of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely its own affair.

--- We will continue to use our vote in the IFIs to promote human rights and hope that conditions in Argentina will permit us to take a more positive stance in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up.

--- (If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine progress on economic questions and this is revealent to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans.

6. **North-South Issues**

**U.S. Objectives:** To encourage Argentina to use its influence within the G-77 on issues where our interests overlap.

**Argentine Objective:** To encourage the U.S. to cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting middle-income developing countries.

**Essential Factors:** Although outwardly supportive of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina has been quietly but energetically arguing against many G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American countries, Argentina is concerned about important aspects of the New International Economic Order, and increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country between DC's and LDC's.

Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities favors Africa and Asia. It is not a major exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. Last September, it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize the Latin American region's vitally important credit standing with private lenders.
As a middle-income country, however, Argentina has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy" as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCs.

Points to be Made:

-- The United States appreciates the constructive, moderate position Argentina has taken on many economic questions in the international fora. We hope they will continue to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues of importance to the world community as a whole.

-- Argentina is a country with strong ties to both the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions to North/South issues.

-- We look forward to cooperating closely with the Argentines in the MTN negotiations, and would be interested in exchanging views on ways in which developing countries can become more involved in international economic decisions generally.

-- Our support for the basic human needs approach is not designed to supplant programs to develop infrastructure and productivity, which are obviously essential to meet basic human needs in all developing countries.

7. U.S. - Argentine Mixed Commission

U.S. Objective: To be receptive to Argentine requests for closer economic consultations.

Argentine Objective. To reactivate the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission on Economic Relations.

Essential Factors: A U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission was established in 1966, but is moribund. The Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secretary Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an unspecified date, possibly in January.

We consider a consultative group useful, but would prefer to organize it at a relatively low level, e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time.
The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated Commission to consider ways to improve their negative trade balance with the U.S. — some $400 million in 1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission. (Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina limits raw beef trade, we did import some $100 million worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a claim pending in the Argentine courts.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a useful instrument to achieve shared economic interests.

-- Our health restrictions against Argentine beef are not a device to deny access to U. S. markets. We welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and sanitation matters.

-- The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending countervailing duty cases and is taking that information into consideration in making its decision.

8. Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition (If raised)

U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals for cooperation.

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition.

Essential Factors: The Argentines first suggested this Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what they want the group to do and gave the impression that they may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition.

-- We would like to cooperate with Argentina to alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere.

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8
9. Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries

U. S. Objectives: To encourage greater technology development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology available, regardless of origin.

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral agreements.

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978. The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a conference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina.

Points to be Made:

-- We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with the goal of cooperating with LDC's to enhance use of technology available in their countries.

-- We hope to work with Argentina to direct the Conference toward that goal.

-- We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of superior technology available elsewhere.

10. Malvinas/Falkland Islands

U. S. Objective: To urge negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents, while staying out of the middle of this Argentine-U. K. question.

Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. (The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.)

Essential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations will take place in New York in December, but there is basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover. The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants'
unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility that large oil deposits may exist in the area.

We have consistently urged both parties to seek a solution through negotiation. The Argentines, however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman in early November that an "incident" was possible so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge restraint on the Argentines to permit an evolutionary approach.

**Points to be Made:**

(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request, we believe you could profitably take the lead in raising this issue.)

-- The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas.

-- Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CAJIBBEAN (Pastor)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Caribbean. Met with Caribbean Country Director to go over policy papers on Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana. I encouraged him to be much more precise in identifying what it is that concerns us in each of these countries so that our actions can be effectively targeted. Met with Owen and others to discuss aid to the area. (C)

Cuba. I encouraged State to work on a message to our posts in the Caribbean, explaining why our October 1st actions are responses to Soviet/Cuban actions rather than as efforts by the U.S. to bring the Cold War to the Caribbean. Andy Young criticized our Caribbean policy for viewing it as a "Cold War playground." He said we "would like to see them (Jamaicans) lay down and be good colored folks and accept the crumbs from the Master's table. That will never work in the Caribbean, and no amount of military maneuvers that you put on down there is going to intimidate anybody and make them love us any more." (C)

The Cuban UN Mission has asked for U.S. views regarding an invitation by the University of Puerto Rico to Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Alarcon to participate in a debate and seminar on Puerto Rico's status. The Cubans said they do not want the visit to be a further irritant in our relationship. If the U.S. views his trip unfavorably, that "certainly would be taken into consideration in deciding whether to apply for a visa. I think we should let this happen: the Puerto Rican statehooders would destroy Alarcon."

UN Security Council Seat. After eleven ballots, Cuba has slowly enlarged its majority. The last vote is 80-65. A blocking third remains, but don't know how much longer. USUN may try to ask the Colombians to withdraw in favor of the Peruvians, who might do better as a NAM member. (C)

Human Rights. Spoke to Ed Sanders and recommended that the President not meet with Timmerman since that would be rubbing the nose of the moderate Argentines in the dirt. They risked a coup to release Timmerman; the least we can do is not draw anymore attention to the issue. Also worked on Letelier. (C)

Press Contacts. None (U)
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Letter from President Videla (U)

Attached at Tab A is the translation of a letter from Argentine President Videla dated January 18, responding to your January 11 letter on Afghanistan. President Videla joins in condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan, but complains of "measures adopted unilaterally and without consultation." Because a Presidential Emissary has since visited Argentina, I believe that no reply is necessary. (C)
MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Letters from Videla and Ziaur Rahman (U)

Attached are advance copies of two letters that we have received from Heads of State, Videla of Argentina and Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh. (U)

The letter from Videla is pro forma and probably does not warrant any reply at this time. (U)

The letter from Zia is more interesting. It seeks to deflect our unhappiness with Bangladesh's performance on Iran by pointing to the much more helpful role that they have been playing regarding Afghanistan. Zia, incidentally, is hopeful of paying a call on you sometime this year. We haven't encouraged him. (C)
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BDG FOREIGN SECRETARY KIBRIA ON APRIL 15 HANDED AMBASSADOR A LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT ZIAUR RAHMAN. KIBRIA ASKED AMBASSADOR TO SEND LETTER TO WASHINGTON AND NOTED THAT LETTER WOULD ALSO BE HANDED OVER BY BDG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

3. TEXT OF LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

14 APRIL 1980
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
AS WE CELEBRATE OUR NEW YEAR'S DAY OUR FRIENDS ABROAD ARE NATURALLY IN OUR THOUGHTS. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF BANGLADESH AND ON MY OWN BEHALF IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO SEND YOU OUR WARM GREETINGS ON THIS HAPP OCCASION AND WISH THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONTINUED PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY.

IT IS, INDEED, A MATTER OF SATISFACTION TO US THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE BOUND BY CLOSE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, SHARED DEMOCRATIC AND HUMAN VALUES AND SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON MANY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT THESE TIES WILL GROW STILL STRONGER DURING THE YEAR AHEAD.

MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOUR, OF COURSE, KNOW, WE IN BANGLADESH ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PEACE AND STABILITY BECAUSE PEACE AND STABILITY ARE A PRE-REQUISITE FOR PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RAISING THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF OUR PEOPLE. WE, THEREFORE, VIEW WITH

**********WHSR COMMENT **********

ZB AA DENED VP
EOB: BLOOM, DEAL, THORN, SULL, KIM, HUNT, SICK

PAGE 01

TOR: 106/14:052
DTG: 150945Z APR 80
GREAT CONCERN SOME OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR REGION.
ARMED OCCUPATION OF A SMALL NON-ALIGNED SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRY
BY A GREAT POWER AND EARLIER A SIMILAR MILITARY-INTERVENTION IN
INDO-CHINA INDICATE A GROWING DISREGARD FOR THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY
OF SMALL STATES AND ALSO GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY. BANGLADESH, THEREFORE, TOOK A FIRM STAND AGAINST SUCH FOREIGN INTERVEN-ITIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AND ALSO AT THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC
FOREIGN MINISTERS’ CONFERENCE HELD RECENTLY IN ISLAMABAD.
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BANGLADESH IS NATURALLY DISTURBED
AT THE CONTINUING IMPASSE OVER IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS. WE CONSIDER
AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, BEEN MAKING
ALL POSSIBLE ENDEAVOURS IN THIS DIRECTION AT VARIOUS LEVELS.
GUIDED BY OUR COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONVENTIONS
WE CONSISTENTLY STOOD FOR THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC
PERSONNEL DETAINED IN TEHRAN. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS
IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM
KEEPING IN VIEW THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION.
RECENTLY, I HAVE ADDRESSED A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
BANI SADR UNDERSCORING THE NECESSITY OF AN EARLY SOLUTION OF
THIS PROBLEM IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN OUR
REGION. WITH A VIEW TO INITIATING A MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION,
I HAVE SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF STEPS, SUCH AS THE TRANSFER OF
THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES TO THE CUSTODY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
ALLOWING THE HEADS OF MISSIONS TO VISIT THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION,
I HAVE ALSO STRESSED THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD ALSO BE IN THE
FINE TRADITION OF ISLAM AND CONTRIBUTE IN EASING THE PRESENT
TENSION AND LEADING TO AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM;
WHILE LOOKING FORWARD TO A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM
THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT, WE ARE ALSO CONSULTING LIKE-MINDED
ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WITH A VIEW TO A POSSIBLE INITIATIVE AT THE
FORTHCOMING ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR FINDING A SPEEDY AND
PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
I WISH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, GOOD HEALTH AND SUCCESS.
WITH KIND PERSONAL REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,
(ZIAUR RAHMAN)

4. ACCOUNT OF MEETING AT WHICH KIBRIA PRESENTED LETTER
FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.

SCHNEIDER
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 17, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON

SUBJECT: Letter to Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Winner (U)

The attached package is largely self-explanatory. Our Charge from Buenos Aires made an impassioned telephone plea to me not to send the letter. The GOA will be mad, but I think the Embassy's main worry is that the letter will coincide with the arrival of our new Ambassador. I propose to give them up to one week's leeway as to delivery time of the letter to cause the minimum problem on that front. (C)

If there "must" be a letter, Embassy Buenos Aires suggested sending one only when Perez actually gets the prize. They point out that we are, apparently, the only country to be sending a letter at this time. But we should be, and I think the timing is better now than later. (C)

Another possibility is a message with no signed original. If you could clear off on the text either today or early tomorrow (Friday or Saturday), the Embassy could deliver it before Schlaudeman arrives. They think this would assuage the pain. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you approve the text to be sent as a message without a signed original.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you put off sending the letter until Perez actually receives the prize early next year.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-24-91-43-7

NARA EF Date 7/9/14

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on Oct. 17, 1986
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Letter to Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Winner (U)

Attached for your signature is a letter that we asked State to draft, congratulating Argentine Nobel Peace Prize winner, Adolfo Perez Esquivel.

There is some downside to sending this letter. The Argentine Government is furious about the award; our knowledge of Perez Esquivel is very limited; and he may be going soon to El Salvador, where he will probably take positions that we do not welcome. Indeed, he has already been publicly critical of our support for the junta in El Salvador. We will instruct the Embassy to tell Perez, when they deliver your message, that we would like to talk with him before he goes. (C)

Clearly, however, you should sign the letter. Argentine human rights has been a major concern of your Administration and it is important that you stress your continuing identification with that issue. The problem in El Salvador (and its playback here) could be difficult, but it is manageable. The attitude of the Argentine Government results only from their own continued shortcoming in the human rights area. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached letter. (U)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

Declassify on Oct. 17, 1985

Confidential Authority NCI-24-91-4-3-7

NARA EF Date 11/9/11

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 NCI-24-91-4-3-7
MEMORANDUM

FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (past)
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Jamaica. Seaga's Finance Ministry has identified a $157 million balance of payments financing gap for November and December. GOJ has already negotiated a $100 million credit with a consortium of U.S. and Canadian commercial banks. The six month bridging loan is tied to negotiations with the IMF. GOJ expects $48 million from the Venezuelan oil facility. The rest will hopefully come from bilateral donors. Meanwhile, a GOJ team will arrive on November 17 for simultaneous negotiations with the IMF and World Bank -- first time ever. Agreement on an extended fund facility and program loan may be completed as early as mid-December. The IMF staff sees a need for a USG contribution of $50-60 million in fast disbursing aid. That will not be easy to find, but we should find it. (C)

FRG does not plan to increase bilateral aid beyond the DM 42 million already granted. The problem here is that the Foreign Ministry sees things our way but doesn't have any new money and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has some money, but doesn't see it our way. (The Foundation gave Manley's PNP $300,000 for the election campaign.) (C)

Human Rights. Mrs. Carter's staff called and asked for an immediate recommendation on whether she should meet with Perez Esquivel, the Argentine Nobel Prize winner. I said that I thought she should meet with him, but that I expect it would be difficult to get a recommendation from the State Department, as they would have many views on that. I checked with Thornton, and he agreed on both points. Her staff thinks that she might want to keep a low profile, however. (C)

Barbados. In response to harsh statements made about him by the Grenadian Prime Minister, Barbados Prime Minister Adams has recalled his country's Prime Minister to Grenada, furthering its isolation.

Press Contacts. None. (U)
BRIEFING PAPER

COUNTRY AND REGIONAL PAPERS

ARA

Latin American Region

AF

Ethiopia
Kenya
Sudan
Zaire

EA

China, Republic of
Indonesia
Korea
Philippines
Thailand

EUR

Greece
Portugal
Turkey
Yugoslavia

NEA

Middle East

Egypt
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Lower Persian Gulf and Oman
Saudi Arabia
Syria and Iraq
Yemen

North Africa

Morocco
Tunisia

The Subcontinent

Regional Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-17-121-3-3-3
NARA EF Date 7/9/11

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/12/12: NLC-17-121-3-3-3
LATIN AMERICA

Current State of Issue

Armaments purchases by Latin American countries have been historically a smaller part of total national expenditures than any other world region except Africa. It follows that Latin America has absorbed only a small portion of worldwide U.S. military sales.

In recent years, however, many Latin American countries have begun to place increased emphasis on acquiring more modern equipment of all types, including supersonic combat aircraft. We have attempted to assist in meeting what we believe are the legitimate defense needs of individual countries while resisting purchase requests which we believe would contribute to arms competition in the area. Several have turned to France, England, Israel, Italy and, in one case, the Soviet Union for advanced arms which we have been unwilling to sell or unable to supply at the time requested. The primary issue we now face is how to deal with sales by European, Soviet and Israeli suppliers of increasingly sophisticated and destructive types of weaponry, often on liberal credit terms, without relaxing our own restrictions. (For a discussion of prospective arms sales requests by individual Latin American countries, see APPENDIX A).

Current U.S. Policy

We do not wish to become a party to arms escalation and arms races in the Hemisphere which could lead to destabilization and increase the likelihood of armed conflict; we wish to encourage the use of scarce economic resources for economic and social development. Within these limitations, we have continued to try to respond to legitimate requests for equipment to modernize existing armed forces and to replace obsolete or worn out equipment.

We do not approve Latin American requests for jet aircraft whose performance exceeds that of the F-5 or A-4, or for aircraft carriers, TV-guided air-to-ground munitions, incendiary munitions, (including napalm and white phosphorus), attack helicopters and miniguns. Quantities of conventional arms which are approved for sale in Latin America are also closely controlled in order to avoid contributing to a regional arms imbalance.
Brief History of Policy

For over a decade it has been our policy to limit sales to weapons and equipment which are primarily designed for defensive purposes, unlikely to give the recipient country a significant advantage over its neighbors and of a design and in numbers which will not stimulate regional arms competition. Our decision in the mid-1960s to make the A-4 and F-5 aircraft eligible for sale to a number of countries in Latin America (actual sales to be decided on an individual basis) came only after evidence accumulated that several countries in the Hemisphere would turn to Western European suppliers and those suppliers would be prepared to respond with sales of high performance jet aircraft if we continued to try to limit our deliveries to Korean War-era or older aircraft.

Congressional Perspective

Although Congress has acted to limit or interrupt arms sales in several countries, as noted below, it has not taken any actions which affect policy toward the region in general. It has supported the policy of limiting both the quantities and capabilities of arms which we have made available to the area.

Human Rights Aspects

Countries which have been the objects of recent Congressional interest on human rights grounds include:

Chile - Section 406 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 prohibits military grant assistance, security supporting assistance, military sales credits and the guarantee of any military loan to Chile. It also prohibits cash sales and the issuance of export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act.

Uruguay - The Koch Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1977, Section 505, forbade, on the ground that human rights have been systematically violated by the Uruguayan Government, the extension during FY 1977 of FMS financing, grant training or grant materiel assistance to Uruguay. It did not prohibit FMS or commercial sales for cash and did not forbid the use of prior year credits for arms purchases.
Argentina - Congressman Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee plans to hold hearings on human rights in Argentina next year. Congressman Drinan recently returned from a visit to Argentina and has questioned our security assistance policies as well as U.S. involvement in international economic and financial assistance programs in Argentina. Neither the Fraser Subcommittee nor Congressman Drinan, however, has yet proposed specific restrictions on arms sales and security assistance to Argentina.
ACTION A-14

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TELEGRAM --

PACE

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ACTION AIK-14

BuENOS AIRS N-3 272113Z

OC'-BL ISO-38 CLAI-BB 30DE-BJ PM-HS M-ll IRR-1S

N-3 NSAE-BB NSC-B? PA-B1 SP-R2 SS-15 ICA-11

B477 BUENOS B4837 SI OF S2 Z7211BZ

THEM. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDELA HE GAVE HIS FULL
SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT
WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS
A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT
AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF
ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL
CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN
CONQUERING TERRORISM, BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED
IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.
HE TENDED UP CIVIL WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD
CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS
FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA
LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE
TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS—FROM BANKERS TO AMERICANS. IN MOST
INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT
HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THERE ARE NOT
JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED
HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A
FEW EXCEPTIONS.

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY
WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY
A FANTASTIC REP WHO SOUGHT HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER
WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW
WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS
FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT
A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT
VIDELA, COL. MALLEK GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO
AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA
PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET
WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL.
IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE
SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY
VIDELA ASKED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED
WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN
AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER
WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN
NATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ALL L.A. COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE
STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN
AMERICA WOULD BE HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE
BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED
OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY
ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A
DELIBERATE ACT OR ANYBODY'S PART. IT WAS JUST A FACT THAT
WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPLODING, L.A. RECEIVED

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICA MAY BE NEXT OF
MINDS AND COUNTRY'S EYES. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN
AFRICA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USFOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA.
HE APPLAUDS PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH.
KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER'S FOREIGN
POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIR-
CRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WOULD
BE MISTAKEN TO THINK THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT
WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA HAS
A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT
AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF
ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL
CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN
CONQUERING TERRORISM, BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED
IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.
HE TENDED UP CIVIL WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD
CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.
Early Thursday morning Dr. Kissinger met with Dr. Jorge Luis Borges, noted Argentine poet and writer. This prompted much news coverage. Later in day Kissinger and family departed with Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz to overnight at an Estancia (farm). This was mostly a social event.

9. On his return from the farm, Kissinger spoke to Embassy personnel. He gave a pep talk to American Foreign Service personnel as well as locals. He narrated some of his experiences while in U.S. service. His humorous approach was well received by all.

10. On Friday evening a reception was given at Embassy residence honoring Kissinger and family. Approximately two hundred persons attended. Top officials were well represented.

11. After the reception, Kissinger attended a dinner given by Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz. This group was composed of bankers, economists and industrialists. The main discussion concerned means to attract foreign industrial and other investment to Argentina. The long term lack of political stability and inflation seemed to be the main concern of the group. Little else developed from the dinner.

12. On June 24 Kissinger participated in an off the record press conference and was made an honorary member of Argentine Council on International Relations. This group is comprised of former foreign ministers, who hold themselves up to the public as the “elite group” on foreign affairs. Dr. Kissinger gave an off the cuff talk. He stressed that there was no questions but that Americans needed knowledge about Argentina’s past, especially Argentina’s lack of familiarity with Argentina’s experience in fighting terrorism. He explained his opinion that he had done an outstanding job in fighting terrorist forces, but was concerned that methods used in fighting terrorism must not be perpetuated. He explained a move towards democratic means should be taken if democratic deals are to prevail.

13. Dr. Kissinger also appeared in a question and answer period on one of Argentina’s popular news commentators. During the interview Kissinger stated that terrorism was one of the greatest violators of human rights. He said it was unfortunate that in some countries human rights was being used as a weapon against its friends.

Comment: the Kissinger family attended a football game in Rosario, where he was introduced to the public. Indications are he was well received by the audience. He also attended two other games in Buenos Aires as a guest of President Videla. The Argentine media gave favorable and heavy coverage to the Kissinger visit.

Comment: Dr. Kissinger told the Ambassador he would not criticize the Carter Administration so long as he was overseas. He spoke highly of President Carter’s foreign policy to the Ambassador, but felt he would speak out against the congressional posture.
A \text{early} \text{Thursday} \text{morning}, DR. Kissinger met with DR. Jorge \text{Luis} \text{Résrges,} \text{vice}\text{president of the} \text{Cuban} \text{newspaper} \text{Prensa Libre}. \text{He} \text{spoke} \text{off} \text{the} \text{record} \text{with} \text{a} \text{few} \text{other} \text{Cuban} \text{newspaper} \text{people}. \text{This} \text{prompted} \text{much} \text{news} \text{coverage}. \text{Later} \text{in} \text{day}, \text{Kissinger} \text{and} \text{family} \text{departed} \text{with} \text{the} \text{minister} \text{of} \text{economy} \text{Martinez} \text{de} \text{Noz} \text{to} \text{have} \text{an} \text{overnight} \text{stay} \text{at} \text{an} \text{Argentina} \text{farm}. \text{This} \text{was} \text{mostly} \text{a} \text{social} \text{event.}

\text{In} \text{his} \text{return} \text{from} \text{farm,} \text{Kissinger} \text{spoke} \text{to} \text{embassy} \text{personnel.} \text{He} \text{gave} \text{a} \text{pep} \text{talk} \text{to} \text{argentine} \text{foreign} \text{service} \text{personnel} \text{as} \text{well} \text{as} \text{locals.} \text{He} \text{told} \text{some} \text{of} \text{his} \text{experiences} \text{while} \text{in} \text{US} \text{service.} \text{His} \text{hilarious} \text{approach} \text{was} \text{well} \text{received} \text{by} \text{all.}

\text{On} \text{Friday} \text{evening,} \text{a} \text{reception} \text{was} \text{given} \text{at} \text{embassy} \text{residence} \text{hosting} \text{Kissinger} \text{and} \text{family.} \text{Approximately} \text{two} \text{hundred} \text{persons} \text{attended.} \text{GOA} \text{top} \text{officials} \text{were} \text{well} \text{represented.}

\text{After} \text{the} \text{reception,} \text{Kissinger} \text{attended} \text{a} \text{dinner} \text{given} \text{by} \text{minister of economy} \text{Martinez} \text{de} \text{Noz}. \text{This} \text{group} \text{was} \text{comprised} \text{of} \text{barristers,} \text{economists} \text{and} \text{industrialists.} \text{The} \text{main} \text{discussion} \text{concerned} \text{means} \text{to} \text{attract} \text{foreign} \text{industrial} \text{and} \text{other} \text{investment} \text{to} \text{Argentina}. \text{The} \text{long} \text{term} \text{lack} \text{of} \text{political} \text{stability} \text{and} \text{inflation} \text{seemed} \text{to} \text{be} \text{the} \text{main} \text{concern} \text{of} \text{the} \text{group.} \text{Little} \text{else} \text{developed} \text{from} \text{the} \text{dinner.}

\text{On} \text{June} \text{24,} \text{Kissinger} \text{participated} \text{in} \text{off} \text{the} \text{record} \text{press} \text{conference} \text{and} \text{was} \text{made} \text{a} \text{non}\text{member} \text{of} \text{national} \text{council} \text{on} \text{international} \text{relations.} \text{This} \text{group} \text{is} \text{comprised} \text{of} \text{former} \text{foreign} \text{ministers,} \text{who} \text{hold} \text{themselves} \text{up} \text{to} \text{the} \text{public} \text{as} \text{the} \text{"elite group."} \text{They} \text{are} \text{outside} \text{of} \text{foreign} \text{affairs.} \text{Dr. Kissinger} \text{was} \text{off} \text{the} \text{record} \text{talk} \text{was} \text{told} \text{there} \text{was} \text{no} \text{secret} \text{but} \text{the} \text{Americans} \text{lagged} \text{knowledge} \text{about} \text{Argentina's} \text{history} \text{especially} \text{Argentina's} \text{experience} \text{with} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}. \text{He} \text{explained} \text{his} \text{experience} \text{within} \text{terrorism}.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 11, 1978

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR
SUBJECT: Kissinger on Human Rights in Argentina and Latin America

The attached cable summarizes Kissinger's visit to Argentina for the World Cup. His praise for the Argentine government in its campaign against terrorism was the music the Argentine government was longing to hear, and it is no accident that his statements were played back to us by the Southern Cone countries during the O.A.S. General Assembly. His other comments on the security problem in Latin America and the Soviet/Cuban threat surprise me only in that they are about 15-20 years out of date.

What concerns me is his apparent desire to speak out against the Carter Administration's human rights policy to Latin America within two weeks of his return—which is soon. Frankly, I think it would be a mistake from a political point of view for him to make such a speech since he will only open himself to criticism for being anti-human rights since clearly Latin America is one of our success stories. On the other hand, we don't want to get into a public argument with him on this subject when we will need his help on SALT, etc.

You may want to call him and ask how he enjoyed his trip and whether he would mind if a member of your staff—I—debrief him on his trip. That would provide me with an opportunity to see whether he is really concerned enough about our human rights policy to launch a campaign and also to give him some information on the effectiveness of our human rights policy in Latin America.

cc: Jessica Mathews
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

October 5, 1978

Subject: Request for Appointment with Vice President Mondale by Emilio Massera, Military Junta Argentina.

On September 26, a private individual recommended to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is visiting the United States October 9-11.

Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Massera had written President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President. Our recommendation on the latter is attached.

Our recommendation on a presidential appointment, and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the Vice President as well. Our Ambassador specifically recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State.

As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

Jack Perry
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina

On September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Emilio Massera wrote President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President.

The Admiral has now retired from military service and is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the United States in an attempt to gain international recognition to further his domestic ends. Massera is viewed with suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The Department agrees with this view; we do not want to antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials.

We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

Attachment:
Suggested Draft Reply

Jack Penn for
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
Dear Admiral Massera:

I have been asked to respond to your September 15 letter to President Carter concerning relations between our two countries.

As you suggest, there is a need for continuing dialogue between Argentina and the United States so that the problems which exist can be discussed and resolved.

We are hopeful that the conversations held between President Videla and Vice President Mondale will lead to actions which will make it possible to bring about closer cooperation and better understanding between our two countries.

Like you, we believe that it is essential for all countries to work toward a world in which the dignity of all is acknowledged and observed.

President Carter’s schedule is very filled in the next few months but I would be pleased to have an opportunity to talk with you when you visit Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Viron Vaky has also expressed a desire to meet with you during your stay here.

With my best regards.

Sincerely

Robert Pastor
BUENOS AIRES, 15 de setiembre de 1978.

Excelentísimo señor Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América
Dr. JAMES EARL CARTER
WASHINGTON - ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

Señor Presidente:

Al cesar en mis funciones como miembro de la Junta Militar de la República Argentina, he creído conveniente dirigirme a usted para hacerle participe de algunas reflexiones sobre la situación de mi país.

Así como los argentinos tenemos dificultades para comprender en plenitud las acciones de la política norteamericana, de la misma manera debemos admitir que por parte de su gobierno deben existir similares inconvenientes para visualizar los reales problemas que nos aquejan a los argentinos.

Ello, como es lógico, produce diferentes enfoques de un país con respecto a otro. Pero es deber de los gobernantes visualizar cual es la verdadera intención con que se llevan a la práctica esas interpretaciones diferentes, con el objeto de adecuar el accionar propio a los mejores intereses nacionales.

En tal sentido, me siento obligado a manifestar que, aún cuando personalmente he llegado a disentir con algunos aspectos de la política exterior de su gobierno con respecto a mí, jamás abrigué la menor duda de que sus pasos estaban inspirados por un noble y genuino interés por el bienestar de la República Argentina, en el contexto global de las naciones que tradicionalmente han sentido y actuado como integrantes del mundo occidental.

En mis frecuentes visitas a todos los países sudamericanos, he hecho especial hincapié en la necesidad de emprender la reconquista del espíritu de Occidente por parte de todos los países americanos, como único camino para salvaguardar nuestra identidad continental. Es así que he enfatizado hasta el cansancio que a Occidente no hay que buscarlo en el mapa, porque es hoy una actitud del alma que no está atada a ninguna geografía. Occidente es el hombre protagonizando la dignidad esencial de la vida. Occidente es la libertad de pensar y de hacer. Occidente es el respeto al honor, al trabajo, al talento. Pero Occidente es también el amor, es la esperanza, y es la misericordia.

Esta insistencia en sacar a la luz ese espíritu dormido de nuestros pueblos, ha sido acogido siempre con beneplácito. Resulta extraño entonces comprobar que, paradójicamente, el tema central de las presentes divergencias argentina-norteamericanas sea el mismo que nos ofrece la mayor posibilidad de una comprensión total entre nosotros.

Comprendo que existen dificultades para promover una generosa campaña de promoción de los derechos humanos en el mundo, que no roce en algunos aspectos la sensibilidad de los propios amigos. Pretender que esto no ocurra sería casi utópico y falso de realismo político. Yo mismo he sentido la incomprensión de los esfuerzos por promover dentro de mi propio país un cambio de outlook.
Es por tal razón que interpreto debidamente -y en tal convencimiento se la agradezco- la generosa mención que usted hizo el 27 de enero, ante un grupo de periodistas de la Nueva Inglaterra reunidos en la Casa Blanca, sobre nuestro rol en la cuestión de los derechos humanos.

Esa actitud nuestra que mereciera tal mención suya, es firme y decidida. Puede usted tener la certeza de que no habrá desviación de ese propósito bajo la Comandancia de mi sucesor, el Almirante Armando Lambruschini.

Señor Presidente: al despedirme de usted como miembro del máximo órgano de poder de la República Argentina, lo hago persuadido de que debo seguir bregando -desde el llano- por la consecución de los objetivos que se propusieron las Fuerzas Armadas al hacerse cargo del poder. Como he manifestado recientemente ante la IX Conferencia Naval Interamericana, las ideas no pasan a retiro. Yo puedo asegurarse que las mías no lo harán y que por tal razón seguiré bregando para restablecer a breve plazo la estructura institucional de mi país.

Mis recientes conversaciones en Caracas con el Presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez y con los ex-Presidentes Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria y Larrazábal, han robustecido mi convencimiento sobre las posibilidades del afianzamiento democrático en la América Latina.

Espero que en los próximos meses, oportunidad en que tengo planeado "a brief sentimental return to Washington" en donde viví por dos años en la década del 60, pueda tener la ocasión de conversar personalmente con usted sobre la evolución de la situación argentina.

Sinceramente,

[Signature]
His Excellency  
Mr. President:

Now that I have ceased to be a member of the Military Junta of the Argentine Republic, I should like to share with you some thoughts about the situation in my country.

Just as we Argentines have difficulty in fully understanding United States policy actions, your Government must, of course, have similar trouble in visualizing the real problems that confront Argentina. The natural result is that differences in points of view develop between the two countries. But it is the duty of those in power to seek to understand the true intentions with which those differing interpretations are put into practice, in order that they may make their own actions consistent with their countries' best interests.

In that connection I feel impelled to state that, even though I have personally disagreed with some aspects of your Government's foreign policy with respect to mine, I never harbored the slightest
doubt that your course was inspired by a noble and genuine interest in the well-being of the Argentine Republic as one of the nations that have traditionally felt and acted as members of the Western world.

On my frequent visits to all the South American countries, I have laid special emphasis on the need for all the American countries to recapture the Western spirit as the only way to safeguard our continental identity. I have thus repeatedly stressed that the West is not to be sought on the map, because today it is a spiritual attitude independent of geography. The West is mankind acting out the essential dignity of life. The West is freedom of thought and action. The West is respect for honor, work, talent. But the West is also love, hope, and compassion.

This insistence on bringing to light that sleeping spirit of our peoples has always been favorably received. It is therefore strange to note that, paradoxically, the central theme of current U.S.-Argentine differences is the very one that offers us the greatest potential for complete mutual understanding.

I realize that it is difficult to conduct a generous human rights campaign in the world without occasionally bruising the sensibilities of one's own friends. To pretend otherwise would be almost Utopian and politically unrealistic. I myself have felt the lack of understanding for efforts to promote a change in outlook within my own country.
It is in that light that I interpret—and appreciate—your generous reference, on January 27 to a group of New England journalists gathered at the White House, to our role in the matter of human rights.

We remain firm and determined in the attitude that inspired your comment. You may rest assured that there will be no departure from it under my successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini.

I take my leave of you, Mr. President, as a member of the supreme governing body of the Argentine Republic, convinced that I must continue to strive—from afar—for the attainment of the objectives undertaken by the Armed Forces when they took power. As I recently stated before the Ninth Inter-American Naval Conference, ideas do not retire. I can assure you that mine shall not and that I will therefore continue to strive for the early reestablishment of my country's institutional structure.

My recent conversations in Caracas with President Carlos Andres Perez and with former Presidents Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria, and Larrazabal strengthened my conviction regarding the possibility of assuring democracy in Latin America.

I hope that in a few months' time, when I am planning "a brief sentimental return to Washington," where I lived for two years in the 1960's, I may have the opportunity for a personal
conversation with you on the development of the Argentine situation.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR:          MS. CHRISTINE DODSON
                       NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on September 21, 1978.

William E. Brown
Director, S/S-I
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. 23836
Letter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Member of the Military Junta of Argentina to President Carter.

Admiral Massera notes that he is writing this letter on the date of his retirement from the Junta. He states that he believes there may have been misunderstandings between our two countries because of a mutual misinterpretation of the policies that have been implemented. He does not, however, doubt the sincerity of the U.S. in adopting these policies. He believes there is a community of interest between Argentina and the U.S., both of which are dedicated to the dignity of human life. He states that his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy also believes in these values. He hopes to speak with you personally in the next few months when he visits Washington.
ACTION: ARA
INFO TO: 

URGENT  

Date  9/27/78

Remarks: Please prepare recommendation for the VP under a Tarnoff.
Byeginski Memo.

Authorized by: [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera.

It has been recommended to the Vice President by a private individual that the Vice President agree to meet with Admiral Massera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations, I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly appreciate a State-NSC recommendation on this proposal.
MESSAGE NO. 161  CLASSIFICATION: Confidential  No. Pages 2
FROM: N. West (Name)  Extension 3323 (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO(Agency)  DELIVER TO:  Extension  Room No.
State  Peter TarACP  

REMARKS: Recommendation  Due Date
   Oct 3, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR:

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

To: Christine Dodson
From: Denis-Cliff
Date: September 26, 1978
Subject: Proposed Mtg w/ Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera

ACTION REQUESTED:

_____ Draft reply for: ______ President's Signature

_____ White House Staff

_____ Other

_____ Direct reply

_____ Dispatch

xxxxx Recommendations/Comments

_____ Other

DUE DATE: **** October 3, 1978

COMMENTS:

[Signature]

for CHRISTINE DODSON

STAFF SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting With Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera

It has been recommended to the Vice President by a private individual that the Vice President agree to meet with Admiral Massera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. Given the current state of play of U.S.-Argentine relations, I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly appreciate a State-NSC recommendation on this proposal.
THE DYNAMICS OF ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKING

Conclusions

Our analysis of the Argentine decision-making mechanism indicates that:

--emphasis is always upon the tri-service nature of the government with the Navy and the Air Force over-represented in an effort to maintain the degree of military cohesion necessary for effective rule;

--nonetheless, the Army is the predominant service, capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies if compromise is impossible;

--each service formulates its own policy positions based on service consensus, and differences are ironed out at the top;

--compromise in the interest of unity is always sought and usually achieved;

--while often slow and cumbersome, the process has worked, and Videla is comfortable with it;

--the Army's potential power and the tri-service arrangement will continue to be the significant factors under the new junta-president formula; and

--outsiders seeking to influence the decision-making process must seek access at the top through, in the US case, the Videla-Viola channel.

* * *

Army predominance is the crucial element in the present as in past Argentine military governments. The post-March 1976 government has been a tri-service affair in structure and operation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have shared office-
holding responsibilities as equitably as the manpower of the
two junior services permits, and all three services have
participated fully in the decision-making process. All
participants, however, conduct themselves with the knowledge
that a unified Army is the "most equal" of the services,
capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies
if compromise with Air Force and Navy views cannot be reached.

Army willingness to accept a tri-service governing format
in which the other two services are, in fact, over-represented
rests on the belief that armed forces unity is critical to the
viability of military government. Past experience (especially
the 1965-73 Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse governments) has
demonstrated that military governments dominated by one man or
one service run a high risk of alienating significant elements
within the armed forces and thereby, forfeiting the chance for
prolonging effective rule. Establishing the Air Force and
Navy as equal parties in the governing process ensures that
they will have a stake in its success and presumably act
accordingly.

Within the tri-service format, the decision-making process
basically involves each service developing its own policy
positions, with differences of opinion being compromised through
discussion in one of several formal and ad hoc forums. When
a tri-service consensus cannot be reached, the matter is
decided by majority vote in the junta (a president's selection
or removal requires an unanimous vote.) At each step in the
decision-making process, votes are cast in representation of the
officer's particular armed force.

Within each service, the task of canvassing opinion and
drafting policies usually falls to the office of the Chief of
Staff or the Secretary General, insofar as that process is
formalized. On political matters, the service secretaries
genereal (Army-Brigadier General Reynaldo Bignone; Navy-Rear
Admiral Eduardo Fracassi; Air Force-Brigadier General Basilio
Lami Dozo) have shouldered much of the burden not only for for-
mulating policy but also for conducting inter-service bargaining
to compromise differences. For example, recent negotiations
to delineate the power relationship between the junta and the
president after Videla retirement as army commander were
handled by the secretaries general. In essence, the general
secretariat in each service has become a cabinet for the
service commander. The secretary general is a trusted subordinate
of the commander, and the secretariat is staffed by carefully
selected officers, often at the colonel level.
When disagreements are not resolved prior to junta consideration of the issue at hand, it is extremely important for all three junta members to enter discussions with the solid backing of their subordinates. Thus, important junta meetings are often preceded by intra-service gathering chaired by the relevant commander and attended by all senior officers of the service. These are closed meetings involving frank, extended, and often heated discussions. Nothing beyond possibly the topics discussed is disclosed to the public. Service discipline is usually strong enough to ensure almost unanimous support for whatever service position emerges from senior officer conclaves.

With the emphasis always upon compromising differences, ad hoc decision-making instrumentalities are employed without hesitation when the circumstances demand. In late April, for instance, during the deliberations over the choice of a president, the key meeting may well have been that of the "big junta" on March 28-30. Senior officers from the services (9 Army Major Generals; 3 Vice Admirals; 6 Air Force Brigadiers) met in ad hoc fashion, settled on Videla, and left the details on the president-junta relationship to be ironed out by the secretaries general. At that meeting, Army Major General and Interior Minister Ablano Harguindeguy bluntly informed his Air Force and Navy colleagues that the Army represented 70% of the armed forces' power and therefore, like it or not, Videla would be president. It was one of the few occasions of which we are aware, that the Army has so bluntly wielded its recognized power advantage.

Decision-making centers outside the junta are also characterized by the tri-service arrangement. The Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) advises the presidency concerning armed forces' opinion on proposed legislation. The nine CAL members (3 senior officers from each service) seek and reflect the views of their own services, and votes are cast by service with the majority deciding. Should the presidency disagree with the CAL, the matter is decided by majority vote in the junta.

The cabinet ministries are divided among the services (3 Army, 2 Navy, 2 Air Force, 2 civilian) and tend to become the preserve of the presiding service. Navy control of the Foreign Ministry, for instance, has led Videla at times to conduct foreign policy outside Foreign Ministry channels. Even here, however, the tri-service rule is evident in form if not in substance. Each service is entitled to place what are called Junta Delegates in each of the ministries and presidential secretariats, and in the government of the City of Buenos Aires.
The apparent anomaly in this governing system lies in the ability of the junior services to outvote the more powerful Army two-to-one at almost every turn. That this has not happened often, and never on a major issue on which the Army is unified, can be attributed to:

— the wide area of inter-service and intra-service agreement on the general parameters of the National Reorganization Process, a crucial factor which lends cohesion to the entire process;

— tacit recognition of the Army's strength in any forced showdown; and

— the knowledge that schisms would be the harbinger of a near-term end to military rule.

Generally, the Navy has been more prone to challenge the Army on a variety of issues, often because of the personal interests and ambitions of Commander Massera. Air Force Commander Agosti has supported the Navy insofar as challenge has been useful to maintain the independence and influence of the junior services. But the Air Force has generally been inclined to side with the Army when a confrontation looms. Agosti has no desire to test the Army's power, nor does he want to appear to be endangering the military's reconstruction process by backing a navy boss whose motivation is suspect in most military quarters outside the Navy.

It is a cumbersome decision-making process, often slow to function, and almost bound to give the appearance of indecisiveness and, at times, of officials working at cross purposes. The problem is complicated by the difficulty that the Army often experiences in developing positions acceptable to senior officers with varying political and policy preferences. Moderates like Videla and new Army Commander Viola must work carefully to ensure the continued support of hardline generals like Suarez Mason (Corps I, Buenos Aires); Menendez (Corps III); and Laidlaw (Planning Ministry.) Without a coherent Army position on key issues, the whole tri-service pattern begins to disintegrate.

However slow and seemingly inefficient the process may be, it has worked. Tri-service support for the government remains solid, and there is little indication of grumbling in the ranks because officers or groups of officers feel their opinions are not being at least heard. The system has the added virtue of fitting neatly with Videla's personal style and temperament. Cautious and reticent about acting without careful preparation, Videla has not been uncomfortable with the tri-service arrange-
mcnt. Argentines as well as Argentine-watchers have questioned the viability of his low-key style in a country that has always demanded and usually received strong presidential leadership. Nonetheless, his success to date in preserving armed forces cohesion argues the wisdom of his tactics.

Massera's machinations have often added a discordant note to the governing process since the March 1976 coup. Politically astute and ambitious, the admiral has been building a political base that he hopes to parlay into the presidency, perhaps within two or three years. Seen in this light, Massera's criticisms of Videla's and the Army's handling of affairs emerge as an attempt to compile the basis for a subsequent Massera challenge to military government. He apparently plans to present himself as a former junta member who dissented from unpopular policies (e.g., human rights violations and labor repression.)

There is little doubt that Massera has complicated the junta's governing task, but his experience reflects the two key characteristics of this military government, army predominance and tri-service participation.

--Massera has never pushed Videla to the point of an open confrontation that would force one or the other from power. Massera knows he would lose. He cannot obtain sufficient Army support to oust Videla in his favor.

--Massera has been effective because he has maintained the support of his own service.

Impact of the Fourth Man Scheme

Videla's August 1 assumption of the presidency as a retired officer has necessitated changes in the decision-making process. Some new guidelines have been established to regulate the president-junta relationship, but little is clear beyond the fact that:

--the junta will remain the supreme governing body, setting policy guidelines and reviewing presidential actions to ensure that they remain within those guidelines; and

--the president will be responsible for daily government operations, enjoying considerable powers of appointment (often with junta consent.)

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months. Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support. If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliance can be expected to reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated into a de facto government by the Army.

Pressure Points. The only feasible tactic for outsiders interested in influencing the Argentine decision-making process is to attempt to gain access at the top. Since the US cannot directly influence the number of officers in any service necessary to create a consensus behind our preferred policies, the alternative is to work through moderate leaders in the hope that they will be able to sustain the support of their subordinates.

At present, the selection process is complicated by:

--the blurring of lines of authority that has accompanied installation of the junta-president formula; and

--the imminence of the annual military promotion/retirement cycle; it could alter the political complexion of the armed forces, especially the Army.

 Nonetheless, the most promising alternatives remain Videla, Viola, and moderate army officers close to those two, particularly Army Secretary General Bignone and Brigadier General Jose Villarreal, Secretary General of the Presidency.

A possible pressure point may emerge in the figure of Vice Admiral Armando Lambruschini who is expected to replace Massera as Navy commander on September 15. A Navy chief disposed to cooperate with Videla would simplify and expedite the governing process. Most importantly from the US perspective, it might obviate the Army's felt need to circumvent the navy-controlled Foreign Ministry and thereby prevent the lack of communication within the Argentine government that has complicated, among other things, the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations.

Lambruschini will not indulge in the kind of political machinations characteristic of Massera. However, his political views are not well-known, nor is the extent to which he will be
susceptible to manipulation by a retired Massera. Likewise, we cannot judge the degree to which the brutal murder of Lambruschini's daughter will be reflected in the new commander's attitudes and actions.

**IAHRC Visit.** We have no information on the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations not contained in Embassy reporting (see appended copy of Buenos Aires 6425 of August 18 for the most recent account of Argentine attitudes.)

Timing is a crucial element. The nationalistic response to recent US actions (or at least how US actions were perceived) provides a pretext for rejecting an IAHRC visit that can be convincingly used by hardline officials who would not accept a visit under any terms. The current Argentine atmosphere makes it extremely difficult for Videla to issue an invitation without provoking charges of "vende patria" from disgruntled military and aroused citizens.

The chances of a visit will increase if the IAHRC can justify something less than a totally unconditioned presence in Argentina. We understand that a precedent for a visit under previously agreed guidelines may exist in the form of the Commission's 1974 visit to Chile. The Commission may also be inclined to compromise because of the area-wide implications of an on-site visit to any Southern Cone country. By accepting half-a-loaf, the IAHRC might fatally undermine the reported mid-1977 agreement among Southern Cone governments to ban IAHRC visits to the area.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached herewith is a copy of your Evening Report of June 21, 1977, with the President's comments.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-7-19-4-18-1
NARA EF Date 7/9/14
Guinea. I met with the Guinean Prime Minister and several members of his Cabinet today. At the end of a long session, he said that he was authorized by President Toure to tell us that the Soviet intelligence flights out of Guinea would be stopped, as of today. Although not necessarily tied to the termination of the flights, he tabled a request for Coast Guard cutters to patrol Guinea's shores. I told him that we doubted that Guinea's security was threatened, but would earnestly consider the request.

Although our information is that human rights conditions are very bad in Guinea, the Prime Minister strongly endorsed our human rights initiatives. He said that Guinea is prepared to allow an international group to conduct an examination of its human rights situation. Because Guinea reportedly holds large numbers of political prisoners, I indicated it would be a significant step if Guinea would identify its political prisoners, indicate the reasons for their incarceration, and the length of their sentences.

I told the Prime Minister that if Guinea followed through on the statements made today, it could lead to a great improvement in our relations. He seems desirous of doing so, to open the way to more aid and investment and to offset close ties with the Soviets. The Prime Minister delivered a letter to you from President Toure, which we forwarded immediately with a rough translation.
Belgrade. The wire services are reporting a tough statement by Soviet Delegation chief Vorontsov to the effect that if the Soviet Union does not get its way in the current debate over the agenda for the main meeting there could be "great unpleasantness (and) the failure of our mission." This is characterized by the press as a Soviet threat to walk out if they cannot achieve a satisfactory agenda.

Our Delegation believes that the Soviet statement is a tactical ploy to pressure the West to be more receptive to the Eastern position on the agenda, rather than a threat to walk out. Despite dramatic press reports, there is no atmosphere of confrontation or crisis in Belgrade. Generally speaking, the preparatory meeting in Belgrade is proceeding along anticipated lines, and we should be prepared for a substantial period of pulling-and-hauling.

OAS. Before the OAS meeting in Grenada ended late yesterday, the U.S. Delegation, assisted by Venezuela and Costa Rica, pushed through a strong resolution on human rights. It was supported by every country visited by Mrs. Carter except Brazil. The resolution affirms the rule of law and asserts that no circumstances justify torture or prolonged detention without trial. It commends the OAS Human Rights Commission (composed of seven experts elected as individuals rather than as representatives of their countries), and asks member states to cooperate with the Commission and not to retaliate against individuals who cooperate with it.

The resolution also asks the Commission to organize a program of consultations with governments, institutions, and organizations to fulfill its function of protecting human rights in the hemisphere. This last point is a step short of the program of Commission visits to member countries for which we had originally hoped, but it is a step forward.

In contrast to previous General Assemblies, economic issues were not given priority attention. The Latin Americans appeared to be more interested
in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation. We had to abstain on several resolutions (e.g., OPEC exclusion, Panama Canal tolls) but we were able to support a general resolution on trade cooperation and consultation.

Portugal. Our efforts to secure international financial support for Portugal have been successful. Meeting yesterday in Paris, eleven countries -- Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela -- made formal commitments to provide $750 million in balance of payments loans over the next eighteen months. Austria, Ireland and Canada have participation under active and sympathetic consideration. For its part, Portugal announced its intention to take further economic stabilization steps in cooperation with the IMF and to negotiate a second credit agreement with the IMF by the end of the year.

Although some follow-up with foreign governments will be necessary to complete arrangements, our major effort now will be to secure Congressional approval of the $300 million loan the U.S. has pledged as our contribution. The House and Senate have approved legislation authorizing the loan. The House is expected to appropriate the $300 million later tonight or tomorrow, but the Senate is not expected to act until late July.

Yugoslav M-47 Tanks to Ethiopia. We have instructed our Ambassador to raise the issue of the tanks with the Yugoslav government.

Canadian Gas Prices. The Government of Canada announced today that the price of natural gas exported to the U.S. will increase from $1.94 to $2.16 per thousand cubic feet. The Canadians had proposed a price of $2.25 but agreed to reduce it after discussions with us. The nine cent price reduction will save consumers approximately $90 million. The new price will remain in effect for at least six months, but will then be subject to review. Further price increases can be expected as Canada continues its policy of pricing natural gas at the equivalent of world oil prices.
Cuba. We learned late Monday that an anti-Castro terrorist group was planning a raid on Cuba. We passed this information to the Cuban Government the same day. Cy inquired whether the FBI could caution the exile terrorists against making the raid, but we were informed that this cannot be done without jeopardizing the lives of informants. However, our law enforcement authorities plan to make arrests if evidence is developed, and to interdict the raid if it proceeds.

On Tuesday, at the request of U.S. Customs, we alerted Cuba that four unmarked U.S. Customs ships are observing the terrorist group. Yesterday, we received a Cuban reply thanking us for the information we passed and advising that its naval units are aware of the presence of our ships.

Foreign Affairs Appropriations. The House is wrapping up two days of fairly intense debate on the appropriations bill tonight. Among the major developments, Congressman Miller prevailed late today with an across-the-board five percent cut (212-178). Funds can come from one program or all. Earlier in the day, we staved off an effort to make a substantial cut in funds for the International Development Association of the World Bank. The leadership worked hard against both these amendments. All other fund-cut amendments were defeated.

Today Mozambique, Angola, and Cuba were added to the list of countries to which "indirect" assistance is prohibited by the Young amendment, passed yesterday. On the other hand, after eliminating all remaining military aid to Argentina yesterday, the House today restored approximately $3 million for aid to Nicaragua (225-187). Finally, Harkin's amendment to reduce the FMS program for Korea was defeated this evening on a voice vote. Majority Leader Wright, Republican Ed Derwinski, HIRC Chairman Zablocki and Sam Stratton led the debate against the amendment.
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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-2-2

Department of State

DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

Page 01 of 01

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tags: oc0m, efim shun c

subj: Secretary Blumenthal's bilateral meeting with argentina

ref: guatemala 3418, bridges-bittner telecon

As per request by Mr. Peter Bridges there follows memo on Secretary Blumenthal's bilateral meeting with argentine minister of economy Martinez de Hoz:

Memorandum of Conversation

Participants:

Argentina: Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, Minister of Economy

Alfodc Cesar Diaz, President of the Central Bank

Dante Simone, Executive Director, IMF

U.S.:

Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury

C. Fred Benders, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Arnold Mackinhoff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Richard Arellano, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Edward Bittner, Office of Developing Nations, Finance, Treasury

Time and Place:

May 31, 1977 - U.S. Chancery, Guatemala

Subj: Bilateral meeting with Argentina

Martinez de Hoz said he was grateful for opportunity to explain personally to Secretary Blumenthal the economic progress that Argentina has made since the administration of Videla. He began by saying a detailed description of the political situation leading up to the military takeover in May 1976, emphasizing that the military reluctantly assumed power when Peron's wife had less control of the political situation and the economy had reached a critical state. He said he agreed to be ministp of economy only if he had complete political backing of the military and if he would have control over all ministries involving the economy. The military inherited a legacy of terrorist organizations which Peron had backed in order to oppose the previous governments, but which ultimately got out of control.

Martinez de Hoz said the economic progress which has been made under his leadership is directly due to the President's attention to economic matters. The economy, however, is in a critical state of recession. The government has reduced inflation and improved foreign trade, but the general protection of human rights, which has been crucial in the past, is no longer available.

The meeting focused on the need for a political solution to the current situation in Argentina. Martinez de Hoz stressed the importance of the human rights issue and the need for a democratic transition. The U.S. side expressed support for the efforts to stabilize the economy and improve the political situation.

The memorandum concluded with a discussion of future plans and the need for continued cooperation between the two nations.
BLUMENTHAL SAID THAT WHILE WE ARE UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S PROBLEM AND WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE BADILLO AMENDMENT REQUIRE US TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS BY THE IDB FOR COUNTRIES WITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE NEEDY. THE HARK IN AMENDMENT, WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE WOULD EXTEND THIS LAW TO OTHER IIFS. WHILE HUMPHREY AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLICY AND CONV:CTIOh, COMMITTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDEA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO LOANS 'IN THE PIPELINE FOR IDB CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD BE HELD UP, BUT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT A $100 MILLION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IDB. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS $500 MILLION QUOTA WITH THE IDB IF THE LOAN WERE DELAYED TO THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAN MIGHT GET THROUGH THE "NEEDY" LOOPHOLE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION.

BLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IDB LOAN IS VERE LELY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND ASKED WHO WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORISTS.

ARELLANO SAID THERE IS NO WAY OF NORMALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

IN RESPONSE TO BLUMENTHAL'S QUESTION ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA, MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE CHARGES.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS CLEAR. HE HOPE TO SEE PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESS MADE.

BLUMENTHAL DEMANDED THAT THE SECDEF LOCATED IN HIS IDB MEETING BE RESEND AS A PREVIEW OF US. WISHES TO STUDY THE FUTURE OF INTAL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR BEING ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT THE IDB ON THIS OCCASION.

AS REPORTED PETE, CONGRESSMAN BADWILL EXPLAINED
United States - Argentine Relations

The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and human rights violations, and reports on steps we have taken to promote human rights. This latter category includes the use of our voice and vote in the international financial institutions, a subject which the Argentine Minister of Economy surely will raise with you.

United States Interests

- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal processes.

- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and presumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity. (The Department is currently considering possible strategies to inhibit this trend.)

- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has estimated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may contain more than double existing proved reserves in the Western Hemisphere.

- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the production of grains and meat.

- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at $1.4 billion; our banks are owed $3 billion; and we have a $250 million trade surplus. (Prospects for greater trade and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals and agricultural fields.)

- Scientific: Argentina is important to our Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar resources.

- International Influence: Argentina is an almost wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial and cultural leader in Hispanic America.
Political Violence and Human Rights

The Argentine military inherited an almost impossible situation when they took over the government of Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and inflation were rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood aside to permit the military to do their job. Now, well over a year later, the military have largely accomplished their initial security goals but are not moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On the contrary, they are polarizing society. The government refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimidation of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are undeniable. While not directly attributable to the government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However, battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarchists and Marxists, continue to murder military personnel, policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate. Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassination attempt last month.

Promoting Human Rights

The United States raised the question of human rights with the Argentine military even before their well-advertised coup in March 1976. Since then we have pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with little to show in return. (Historically, Argentina has been the Latin American state least susceptible to our influence.)

- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978 military sales credits were being halved as a result of the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argentines that $36 million in 1977 credits could not be signed as a result of the human rights situation.

- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability to internal security are now denied routinely. Other munitions licenses are also being held up although we have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commercial arms purchases.

- A $700,000 grant military training program has survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although this program's demise seems likely in 1979.
CONFIDENTIAL

- In the international financial institutions, since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out of the Inter-American Development Bank which might trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment. In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway project.

Most recently we have been faced with the problem of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on May 31. The Secretary said the Administration is as a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to the advancement of human rights. He suggested that it might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications for loans until it could show a definite improvement in human rights. Martinez stated that this might be possible in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he was anxious to move ahead on a $100 million World Bank project. The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan was particularly difficult for us (because it may be hard to argue that it benefits the needy).

Suggested Talking Points

Martinez de Hoz may well make a plea for greater understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and raise the question of our votes in the international financial institutions. You might wish to:

-- Compliment the Minister for his achievements to date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of Argentine agriculture).

-- Inquire about the health of the former Foreign Minister who is now recovering from an assassination attempt.

-- Ask why it has not been possible for the government to begin to restore legal processes after it has acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the guerrillas.

-- Note the Administration's overall commitment to human rights and the great difficulty we are encountering with respect to Argentine projects in the international financial institutions.

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-- Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan projects in the financial institutions that do not clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society.
Your Visit to Argentina November 20–22, 1977

I. Objectives

U.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto US refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Development Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear reprocessing raises the spectre of its becoming a member of the nuclear club.

President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty, of the progress on human rights improvements basic to other issues. But Videla's position is not secure, and there are indications that the Argentines expect to make some basic decisions on their relations with us after evaluating their talks with you.

In this context, our objectives are to:

--- strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies on these issues overlap);

--- obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, preferably at a date certain in the near future, and to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing issue;

--- encourage Videla to follow through on his promise of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture.
Argentina's objectives are twofold:

-- the government wants a clarification of what Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they would like our cooperation, including military sales; and

-- President Videla will try to make the talks appear cordial and substantive and hence to demonstrate to Argentine public opinion that his government has our ear and respect.

II. Setting

Although Argentina is Latin America's most European country, chronic political instability and exaggerated economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise significant achievements. At the time of the military takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had disintegrated: fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year.

The three-man Junta, of which President Videla is the Army member, came to power with two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

Organized terrorist movements are now largely under control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have been reduced to some 700 combatants, and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to only 120. Both groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk, high visibility operations such as assassinations of military officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings.

The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still relatively common, and respond to various motives, including personal vendettas, political radicalisms of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverings to weaken contending government factions, and may on occasion be designed to embarrass Videla himself.

Under these conditions, official and unofficial abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted, and torture is fairly common during the first days of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses of the security personnel have been punished, but there is no public record of it.
Economic performance has improved under the Junta. Foreign currency reserves now exceed $3 billion, inflation has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978, serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected and record level crops and exports were reached in 1976-77.

On the negative side, the government has not been able to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks and more unrest is likely.

Problems or not, Argentina's international economic position is improving steadily. Exports should reach $4.5 billion this year, compared to imports of about $4 billion, including more than $700 million from the US. Interestingly, while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some $400 million in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from the Soviet Union.

Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation have led to considerable new interest and some new activity by foreign investors. US investment now stands at $1.4 billion and loans by US banks to Argentina exceed $3 billion.

The military dominate the Argentine political scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors and managers of nationalized companies. With the exception of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are excluded from major decision-making positions.

Internal military rivalries are endemic. President Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions, but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army generals remain in key command positions even though their retirement would relieve right wing pressures on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices, takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency.

The Junta has not committed itself to restoring civilian rule, but consultations between prominent citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile, political party activities are suspended, and the
powerful labor unions are largely under the control of military interventors.

Argentina's international activity has been limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal politics and by a general disinclination to identify closely with the problems of the Third World. However, Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic service which could help build better understanding between the DCs and LDCs in international fora.

As noted above, the U.S. is the country which presents the most significant challenges for the Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our conditioning of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human rights performance, and may be on the verge of making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us.

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear technology, and probably has the capacity to produce a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations and may hope that cooperation on that front might strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on other fronts, including human rights.

The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g. the dispute over rights to Parana River water.) There is, however, no great tension now. An April U.K. international arbitration decision awarding ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised nationalist sentiments in Argentina, already resentful of the British presence in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy apprehended nine Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats in October, but the seizures do not seem to have had a lasting impact on Argentine-Soviet relations.

III. Key Issues

1. Human Rights

U.S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that better relations are dependent upon their making human rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "disappearances."
Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the human rights violations which have taken place were a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight against terrorism, that such violations are being gradually brought under control, and that a full return to the rule of law will take time.

Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine human rights violations have severely strained our relations. The Argentines claim not to understand why we have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI loans. They believe that we overemphasize official violations and underestimate the terrorist actions which triggered them.

Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted brutally. Many terrorist activists and suspects have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights advocates not involved in the bloodletting.

Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning the disappeared are often ignored by the government. A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information about disappeared family members. We have received a letter signed by 178 of them asking for your intercession with the Argentine government.

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution enable the government to detain prisoners without charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged to President Carter to try to resolve the cases of the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by Christmas, but there has been little progress. A recently reinstated "right of option", which would allow political prisoners to choose exile instead of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few prisoners.

There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter-
vention on behalf of jailed newspaper editor, Jacobo Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman Harkin has asked that you inquire about the application of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group has just given us an unverified list containing the names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared or have been detained in Argentina.

Points to be Made

-- Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel compelled to express our concern.

-- President Carter was heartened by President Videla's desire to resolve the status of political detainees by Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000 individual cases, but we hope that they will soon be decided.

-- We were encouraged by the decision to restore the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will allow many detainees to be freed from prison.

-- We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of the AP reporter Serrat.

-- The government should clarify what has happened to individuals who have disappeared without explanation. We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the security forces appear to have been involved in many instances.

-- A public accounting of all prisoners held by the government would help resolve questions about disappearances and would considerably improve Argentina's world image.

-- We still frequently hear reports of torture, especially during the first days of detention. We understand that the fight against terrorism has been brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable under any circumstances. Torture should be forbidden and future cases tried in the courts.
2. Terrorism

U.S. Objective: To remind the Argentines that we, too, abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist measures that violate human rights.

Argentine Objective: To focus U.S. thinking on terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider "shameful" conditions of internal disorder.

Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U.S. concentration on human rights violations by government authorities has forced attention away from terrorism, which they say also violates human rights and is the real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully pressed a campaign in international organizations to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister Allara during his calls at the Department in early November. The Foreign Minister will have especially strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin in May.

A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens their concern; two Armed Forces officers were assassinated, three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been bombed in the last month.

Points to be Made

— Terrorist attacks against government officials and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish to express our sympathy to these men and their families.

— We are as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however, condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and due legal process.

3. Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco

U.S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear explosions.
Argentine Objectives: To complete its nuclear fuel cycle in order to have greater energy independence, to become a nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative ties with the U.S.

Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina, which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state, views nuclear technology as a source of both energy and international status. It was the first to have a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major exporter of technicians under IAEA programs.

If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans, accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background papers, but a key immediate objective of our foreign policy and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco now.

Points to be Made

--- The United States is determined to do all it can to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

--- Ambassador Smith is available to brief your officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement and a Comprehensive Test Ban.

--- It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary, if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water.

--- Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course, involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urgent world study is conducted on how to reprocess in a safer manner.
-- We accept and support Argentina's expectation that its Latin American neighbors should also make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies.

-- What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take a bold step on behalf of continental security and move now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- We were heartened by President Videla's conversation with President Carter, and President Videla's commitment to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate Argentina's dedication to peace.


U. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we want a good military relationship, but to get them to understand that this depends on their human rights performance.

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values its military ties to the U. S., but that without a clarification of U. S. arms policies, particularly on spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient its military procurements and relationships.

Essential Factors: U. S.-Argentine military relations have deteriorated sharply as a result of U. S. actions taken to disassociate the U. S. from the GOA's human rights violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina has refused all military sales financing for fiscal year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively banned military training and arms sales as of October 1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already, the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine military requests.

While our policy has little real military significance for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises this year. Until substantial progress is made on human rights considerations—release or the affording of due process to detainees, and the ending of torture and disappearances—Argentina can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed.
Points to be Made

— The United States values its military relations with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which have led to the current situation regarding military sales and training.

— Our willingness to provide equipment is directly related to internal security policies. Given the present situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the Administration to justify military sales to Argentina.

— We hope earnestly that the restoration of due process in Argentina will permit us to develop more normal military relationships.

— This would permit us to advise the Congress of a changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after October 1, 1978.

5. Argentina and the International Financial Institutions

U.S. Objectives: To explain to the Argentines that we cannot support their loan requests, except those which meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial human rights improvements.

Argentine Objective: To persuade the U.S. to vote "yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs.

Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of voting "no" on one loan and told the Argentines that this was due to improvements in their human rights situation. We added, however, that it would be difficult for us to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held back loans until October when they submitted a $36 million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted "no", and informed the Argentines that without human rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since voted "yes" on a potable water loan in the IDB that met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB, $60 million for science and technology development and $50 million for electrical transmission lines, have been delayed until after your visit.)

The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously, to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now,
after significant improvements in human rights have taken place, vote "no".

Points to be Made

-- We do not seek to intervene in the internal affairs of other societies; but we believe that no member of the United Nations can claim that violations of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely its own affair.

-- We will continue to use our vote in the IFIs to promote human rights and hope that conditions in Argentina will permit us to take a more positive stance in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up.

-- (If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine progress on economic questions and this is relevant to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans.

6. North-South Issues

U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its influence within the G-77 on issues where our interests overlap.

Argentine Objective: To encourage the U.S. to cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting middle-income developing countries.

Essential Factors: Although outwardly supportive of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina has been quietly but energetically arguing against many G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American countries, Argentina is concerned about important aspects of the New International Economic Order, and increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country between DC's and LDC's.

Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities favors Africa and Asia. It is not a major exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. Last September, it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize the Latin American region's vitally important credit standing with private lenders.
As a middle-income country, however, Argentina has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy" as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCs.

Points to be Made:

-- The United States appreciates the constructive, moderate position Argentina has taken on many economic questions in the international fora. We hope they will continue to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues of importance to the world community as a whole.

-- Argentina is a country with strong ties to both the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions to North/South issues.

-- We look forward to cooperating closely with the Argentines in the MTN negotiations, and would be interested in exchanging views on ways in which developing countries can become more involved in international economic decisions generally.

-- Our support for the basic human needs approach is not designed to supplant programs to develop infrastructure and productivity, which are obviously essential to meet basic human needs in all developing countries.

7. U.S. - Argentine Mixed Commission

U.S. Objective: To be receptive to Argentine requests for closer economic consultations.

Argentine Objective: To reactivate the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission on Economic Relations.

Essential Factors: A U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission was established in 1966, but is moribund. The Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secretary Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an unspecified date, possibly in January.

We consider a consultative group useful, but would prefer to organize it at a relatively low level, e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time.
The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated Commission to consider ways to improve their negative trade balance with the U.S. — some $400 million in 1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission. (Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina limits raw beef trade, we did import some $100 million worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a claim pending in the Argentine courts.

Points to be Made:

— The U.S. views the Economic Commission as a useful instrument to achieve shared economic interests.

— Our health restrictions against Argentine beef are not a device to deny access to U.S. markets. We welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and sanitation matters.

— The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending countervailing duty cases and is taking that information into consideration in making its decision.

8. Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition (If raised)

U.S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals for cooperation.

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition.

Essential Factors: The Argentines first suggested this Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what they want the group to do and gave the impression that they may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

Points to be Made:

— The U.S. will listen with interest to Argentine proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition.

— We would like to cooperate with Argentina to alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere.

SECRET
9. Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries

U. S. Objectives: To encourage greater technology development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology available, regardless of origin.

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral agreements.

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978. The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a conference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina.

Points to be Made:

-- We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with the goal of cooperating with LDC's to enhance use of technology available in their countries.

-- We hope to work with Argentina to direct the Conference toward that goal.

-- We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of superior technology available elsewhere.

10. Malvinas/Falkland Islands

U. S. Objective: To urge negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents, while staying out of the middle of this Argentine-U. K. question.

Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. (The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.)

Essential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations will take place in New York in December, but there is basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover. The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants'
unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility that large oil deposits may exist in the area.

We have consistently urged both parties to seek a solution through negotiation. The Argentines, however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman in early November that an "incident" was possible so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge restraint on the Argentines to permit an evolutionary approach.

Points to be Made:

(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request, we believe you could profitably take the lead in raising this issue.)

--- The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas.

--- Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve.
A SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
MAY - OCTOBER 1977

October 21, 1977

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4-3
Afghanistan

May 19, 1977

IDA Agricultural Bank - $12 million

The Committee recommended that a demarche be made to the GOA linking our support for their loans in the international financial institutions to human rights considerations.

Argentina

May 19, 1977

IBRD - $100 million
IFC - $7 million
IDB Gas Pipeline - $35 million
IDB Petro-chemical Program - $83
IDB Urban and Rural Potable Water - $40 million

The Committee agreed that Secretary Blumenthal should ask Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, when he sees him on June 1 at the Annual IDB meeting in Guatemala to postpone an upcoming $100 million industrial credit loan in the IBRD. He will also inform the Minister that, because of human rights considerations, we may have problems with other loans in both the IDB and the IBRD and that we would like to avoid a confrontation on them by having them delayed until a more propitious time. It was also agreed that the U.S. Executive Directors in the IDB and IBRD would indicate to their colleagues that the U.S. was seeking a delay on consideration of these loans.

June 9, 1977

The Committee was appraised that despite U.S. urging, the Argentines had refused to withdraw the $100 million loan in the World Bank. Another small $7 million loan was scheduled to come up for consideration at the same time. The Committee agreed that the U.S. should abstain on these two World Bank loans and make a statement at the Bank Board meeting explaining our action. The rationale for not deciding to vote no was that a graduated approach was considered to be more likely to obtain positive results from the Argentines. It was agreed that the U.S. Bank Director could let other Bank Directors know a few days in advance that we would not be supporting this loan.
August 11, 1977

- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
  - $36 million loan
  - IDB petro-chemical program $80 million loan
  - IDB/FSO potable water $32 million ordinary capital loan
  - $51 million Fund for Special Operations (FSO) local currency
  - IDB cellulose $50 million loan
  - IDB global industrial credit $30 million loan

There was a consensus in the Committee that the human rights situation had not changed sufficiently to warrant altering our previous position of opposing pending IFI loans because of human rights considerations. The Group, however, determined that it would be preferable not to take action on any of these loans until after it had considered the country evaluation paper for Argentina and directed that the paper be prepared by August 20.

September 28, 1977

- IDB gas pipeline $36 million loan
  - IDB petro-chemical program $80 million loan
  - IDB/FSO potable water $32 million ordinary capital loan, $51 million local currency
  - IDB cellulose $50 million loan
  - IDB global industrial credit $30 million loan

The Committee determined that the U.S. would support the IDB potable water loan on the basis that it provides for basic human needs, and vote no on the other four IFI loans considered at this meeting.
Benin

May 19, 1977

IDA Feeder Roads - $5.5m

IDA Technical Assistance - $2 m

The Committee recommended that the United States abstain on these two loans, and directed that U.S. Executive Director to make a statement in the Board explaining that our abstention is a reflection of our concern for human rights conditions in Benin.

June 24, 1977

ADF Rural Health Services - $5.5m

The Committee agreed that the United States should vote favorably on this loan and make private representations in the Capital of Benin and among Fund Board members explaining that we are supporting this loan because it clearly will directly benefit the needy.

Bolivia

August 11, 1977

IBRD urban development $17 million loan

IDB agricultural credit $6.4 million loan

AID agricultural sector II $8 million loan

AID small farm production $600,000 grant

AID rural enterprises and agri-business $8.3 million loan

AID product credit guarantee program $2.5 million guarantee

The Group agreed to accept the staff recommendation for support of the IFI and AID programs but directed that the Bolivian government be specifically informed by diplomatic demarche of our human rights concerns and our consideration of human rights situations in future evaluation of both bilateral and multilateral assistance. The demarche should include specific reference to the flaws in due process present in the judicial system, limitations on the free operation of labor unions, detention of labor leaders, arbitrary arrest and detention and denial of due process. The demarche can also express hope for an early return to democratic processes, noting the government's recent statement that elections will be early in 1980.
October 14, 1977

IDB, Vocational Education Loan, $20 million
IDB, Agriculture Credit Loan, $12 million

The Committee recommended that the U.S. support both of the upcoming loans to Bolivia in the IDB but to link their implementation to a demarche to the GOB expressing continued U.S. concern with the human rights situation in that country.

Brazil

June 24, 1977

IDB Petro-chemical Technology - $20m
IDB Copper Smelter - $60m
IDB Hydroelectric Facilities - $60m

The Committee recommended to the Secretary that, in a response to the Brazilian Foreign Minister's letter, he cite concern over the Brazilian pressure on Paraguay, note both recent positive actions with regard to rights of the person but continuing human rights concerns in Brazil, and mention that the U.S. takes the internal human rights situation in a country into account in connection with our consideration of loans in the IFIs.

September 14, 1977

IBRD Ceara rural development loan, $17 million, ordinary capital

The Committee agreed to postpone a decision on a formal demarche to Brazil in relation to a recent vote in favor of a $17 million loan (rural development) from the IBRD, until the Country Evaluation Plan on human rights in Brazil could be reviewed.
Central African Empire

August 11, 1977    AFDF health $5.5 million loan
                  AID Ouham Province rural health $435,000 grant

The Committee noted the difficult human rights situation in the country
and the recent arrests of foreign journalists and a U.S. Peace Corps
volunteer, and suggested deferring both pending loans until the country
evaluation plan could be considered.

September 21, 1977    ADF health loan, $5 million
                    AID Ouham Province rural health grant, $435,000

In response to a request made at the last meeting, a paper was prepared
on the situation in the CAE, outlining U.S. government's actions in
response to it. The report calls for cancellation of new fiscal year
'78 and '79 AID programs, a determination to defer a decision on
sending a USIA officer (PAO) and to not send an AID program officer to
Bangui, and a recommendation that the U.S. would not send a special
envoy from the President to the Emperor's coronation ceremony. The
report also calls for continuation of the peace corps program in the CAE.
It also calls for a fiscal year '78 AID appropriation of some $435,000
to finance the second phase of an ongoing rural health project. The
Committee agreed that this strategy is an appropriate one. In addition,
it was recommended that the U.S. abstain on an upcoming loan in the AFDF
to the Central African Empire, accompanying this abstention with a
statement by our alternative executive director at the AFDF to the
C.A.E.'s representative. This course of action would be consistent with
actions undertaken by us with regard to loans to Benin and Ethiopia.
Chile

June 24, 1977

AID Small Farmer Irrigation - $7 million
AID Small Farmer Marketing - $2.6 million
Export-Import Bank - Credit Request - Amount Unknown

The Committee agreed to recommend postponing implementation of the AID loans and reviewing them again later in the fiscal year. It also recommended that Ex-Im delay raising its current lending limitations for Chile. (Note: In a diplomatic note received on June 27, following the publication of the Committee's decision to delay implementation of two AID projects, the Embassy of Chile notified the Department of State of GOC desire to "decline the economic assistance" provided to them in the FY 77 Foreign Assistance Act. This amounts to $27.5 million: $15 million in PL 480 Title I and $12.5 million in development loans and grants).

September 14, 1977

IDB industrial credit relending loan, $20 million
CCC wheat purchase credit for rural miller's association, $10 million

The Committee agreed that the U.S. should vote against the proposed IDB loan of $20 million (industrial credit relending) if the Chileans press their application to a vote. It was noted that the Harkin Amendment requires a negative vote since Chile is a gross violator and the loan does not go to the needy. It was further felt that it would be desirable to have the supporting votes of the other western democracies in the IDB and efforts to make those countries aware of our position should be begun.

Discussion of a private Chilean group's application for a $10 million CCC credit (wheat) was inconclusive. It was decided, therefore, to postpone a decision on the Chilean application pending study of a paper on these aspects of CCC arrangements.
El Salvador

May 6, 1977  
IDB - Hydroelectric Power - $90 million

There was a general consensus within the Group that the U.S. which has veto power over a portion of this loan should approach the IDB management with an attempt to obtain an indefinite postponement of this loan for at least a few months until we could observe some change in the human rights situation in El Salvador. There was also a consensus that we should advise the GOES that our decision is based on both human rights concerns and concerns with the economic rationale of the project.

June 6, 1977  
IBRD sites and services - $12.7 million

The Committee was told that at the urging of the U.S. the Government of El Salvador recently withdrew a $90 million loan in the IDB. This move had a dramatic impact. In light of this, the Committee decided that we should vote in favor of this loan, clearly earmarked for the needy, which is coming up in the World Bank. At the same time it was agreed that the Salvadoran Ambassador to Washington and the other Bank Directors would be told that we are waiting to see results of our recent action on the IDB loan and that in the meantime wished to indicate our willingness to be helpful, especially with regard to loans to the needy. The rationale is that this approach is more likely to succeed with the Government of El Salvador at this time. The Ambassador would also be told what specific improvements we would like to see so that we can continue to be supportive in the future.
El Salvador

August 11, 1977

AID fundamental education and skills training
$3 million loan, $300,000 grant.

The Committee accepted the Working Group recommendation to go forward with an AID loan and grant in conjunction with a demarche. The representation would specify that our action on these bilateral and multilateral assistance programs would be based in part on our evaluation of the human rights situation and whether the projects directly benefit the needy. We appreciate the government's assurances concerning consular access but we are not satisfied with the report on the Richardson case. We are pleased that the threats against the Jesuits have not been carried out; the government can presumably take some credit for this. However, we are still concerned over continuing human rights problems, particularly the continued detention of political prisoners, the lack of adequate control to prevent excesses by the national guard and continuing harassment of priests. U.S. policy and law dictate that we continue to review this situation. We hope that progress in the human rights field will enable us to reconsider our action on the pending IDB loan at some future date.

September 21, 1977

IDB hydroelectric loan $90 million

Prior to the assumption in July of a new Administration in El Salvador, the government of that country, at the request of the U.S., withdrew a $90 million hydroelectric power loan from consideration in the IDB. The Committee considered whether developments since July would warrant going back to the government of El Salvador at this time and telling it that we would have no objection to its placing that loan back on the calendar of the IDB. The Group decided that Deputy Assistant Secretary Devine should consult interested Congressmen to determine whether they would oppose such an action. If Mr. Devine encountered strong opposition on the Hill, he would report back to the Group so that further consideration can be given to the advisability of such an approach at this time. The Group decided that in the absence of strong opposition on the Hill we would support this loan in the IDB.
**Ethiopia**

**May 19, 1977**  
IBRD Grain Storage - $24 million  

The Committee recommended that the United States abstain on this loan to Ethiopia, giving the U.S. Executive Director the option to make a statement to the Board, explaining that this action reflects our concern for human rights conditions in Ethiopia.

**August 11, 1977**  
AID rural roads $8 million grant  
AID southern Cema Cofu area rehabilitation $196,000 grant  
AID Upper Didessa development $4.1 million grant  

The Committee reached a consensus that, given the previous abstention by the United States on an IFI loan, that we should delay consideration of the AID projects until the next interagency meeting. This would permit a more detailed review as to whether there has been a sufficient change in the human rights situation and to determine whether the projects will unquestionably directly benefit the needy.

**September 14, 1977**  
AFDF rural road loan, $5 million  
AID rural roads, $8 million grant  
AID southern Cema Cofa area rehabilitation $196,000 grant  
AID Upper Didessa development $4.1 million grant  

At the last meeting it was thought that AID could defer proceeding on the three grants to Ethiopia until September 30. Subsequent to the meeting it was learned that AID would require an immediate decision on these projects in order to have time to process them before the end of the fiscal year. Accordingly, various members of the Group conferred by telephone in the time available, and it was concluded that in view of the nature of the grants and the character of our current relations with Ethiopia, the grants should be approved. It was also agreed that approval of the grants should be accompanied by a demarche linking our support to our desire to aid the needy and expressing our continuing concern over human rights violations in Ethiopia. Such a demarche has been made.

It was also decided to approve and support the pending AFDF loan for Ethiopia on grounds it fulfilled the criteria of aiding the "neediest and poorest", but that the U.S. would make a verbal demarche to the Ethiopian director of the AFDR on our continuing human rights concerns.
Guatemala

August 11, 1977  AID rural electrification $10 million loan
                 AID small farmer marketing $3.4 million loan

The Committee recommended approval of the two AID loans coupled with a
demarche to the GOG. The demarche should inform the GOG of our
continuing consideration of human rights factors in reaching decisions
on bilateral assistance and U.S. positions on multilateral loans. The
demarche could also note our concern with regard to recent increases in
violence and our hope that the government would continue to take actions
to discourage violence from extra-legal para-military groups both on the
left and the right. The U.S. will also follow closely the government's
actions in carrying out its commitment to permit a free political process
leading up to an open democratic election early next year.

Guinea

October 14, 1977  PL 480 Title I, $7 million - FY 1978

The Committee determined that as a result of human rights problems in
Guinea, the proposed PL 480 agreement would be reduced from $7 million
to $5 million.

Haiti

August 11, 1977

AID health services, $7.1 million grant
AID administrative improvement and training
   $300,000 grant
AID disaster preparedness $60,000 grant

The Committee concurred in the staff recommendation to support three
pending AID loans and carry out a demarche on human rights informing
the Haitian government of our continuing evaluation of human rights
factors in determining the character and level of bilateral assistance
programs and the U.S. position on multilateral loans. The demarche
would be presented by Ambassador Young and Deputy Coordinator for Human
Rights, Mark L. Schneider, accompanied by Ambassador Jones, during their
meeting with President Duvalier in Haiti August 15. The demarche would
include a follow-up to the Secretary's suggestion that a visit to Haiti
by the Inter-American Human Rights Committee would be viewed favorably
by many observers.
Indonesia

June 9, 1977

The Committee recommended that a demarche should be made to the GOI linking our future support in the IFIs to human rights considerations.

October 14, 1977

PL 480 Title I - CCC - $99.2 million
(total FY 78 program)

The Committee recommended that the U.S. go forward with the proposed Title I allocation to Indonesia, (which is less than last year's level) and suggested that our Embassy in Jakarta couple the implementation of the Title I agreement with a demarche to the Indonesian government, expressing concern over the human rights situation in that country.

Korea

May 19, 1977

IBRD Heavy Machinery - $15 million
IBRD DKFC IV - $70 million
IBRD Vocational Training - $30 million
IFC Kisco - $10 million
ADB Mineral Resources Exploration - $15 million

The Committee recommended to Mr. Habib, that in the context of his upcoming visit to Korea, he indicate to the GOK that we are examining their IFI loans on human rights grounds. Final recommendation of these loans would be deferred pending his return.

June 9, 1977

The Committee concluded that the process of troop withdrawal, coupled with President Park's political isolation and stubbornness indicated that a cautious approach would maximize the possibility of achieving positive results in the human rights area. It was agreed that the U.S. would vote yes on loans to Korea for the time being but that we would instruct our Embassy in Seoul to tell the Koreans that International Financial Institution (IFI) loans are being related in some countries to human rights. It was further agreed that we should let other Bank Board directors know that we are concerned with the human rights situation in Korea and have made our views known to the Korean government.
Malawi
May 6, 1977
IDA Blantyre Water Supply - $7 million

The Committee recommended that the United States support this loan. The Committee suggested however, that the U.S. should inform privately both the Malawian IBRD Director and the Malawi Government that (a) we voted for the loan because it will benefit the poorest segment of the population; (b) our action was taken despite our continued concern over human rights in Malawi; and (c) we hope to see improvements in this regard.

Nepal
June 9, 1977

The Committee recommended that a demarche should be made by the new U.S. Ambassador-to the GON upon his arrival, explaining that our continued support for their loans in the IFIs will be linked to human rights considerations.

Nicaragua
August 11, 1977
IDA electric power feasibility study
$550,000 grant
AID rural education development $10 million loan,
$980,000 grant
AID nutrition improvement $3 million loan
AID rural municipal development $3 million loan

The Committee reviewed the human rights situation and noted continuing Congressional concern over human rights practices in Nicaragua. It recommended that the pending IDB grant be deferred and the pending AID loans and grant also be delayed until the country evaluation plan for Nicaragua can be considered. It directed that the paper be made available by August 25.
Nicaragua

September 21, 1977
IDB technical cooperation grant, Canadian funds $455,000
AID rural education development $10 million loan, $980,000 grant
AID nutrition improvement $3 million loan
AID rural municipal development $3 million

The Committee noted that on September 20, the Government of Nicaragua had issued a decree lifting the state of siege. They discussed whether it should go ahead with the loans to Nicaragua in the light of this development. It was determined that, despite early indications that this is indeed a real improvement, the Group should wait until its meeting next week to determine what reaction we should take with regard to the loans.

The Group appeared to be in agreement that if this is indeed a real, and not a cosmetic, move on the part of the Government of Nicaragua; then it is something of very great significance and we should recognize it as such. It was pointed out that a proposal is being considered currently as to whether we should sign the FMS agreement with Nicaragua for 1977 in the light of this development. It was pointed out that any action with regard to FMS would, of course, be relevant to the decision of this group on loans.

September 28, 1977
IDB technical cooperation grant, Canadian funds $455,000
AID rural education development $10 million loan, $980,000 grant
AID nutrition improvement $3 million loan
AID health grant $20,000
AID health grant $55,000
AID education grant $20,000

The Committee decided to support the three AID grants to voluntary agencies, to take no action for the time being with regard to other AID loans, and to try to seek a delay in the consideration of the IDB loan so that the group could consider it at a subsequent meeting after more time had elapsed so that it could better access the effects of the lifting of the state of siege in Nicaragua.
Paraguay

May 6, 1977

IBRD Development Finance Corporation - $10 million

IBRD Rural Development - $22 million

The Committee agreed that the U.S. should vote in favor of these two loans on the basis of encouraging signs of support among the Paraguayan officials for improved human rights practices. The Committee agreed that we should reinforce Departmental communications by making an immediate high-level demarche to the GOP urging the Government to accept the request of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) to visit Paraguay and indicating that the GOP decision will affect our consideration of future bilateral and multilateral development loans. Prior to acting, the GOP, aware of our concern, took the initiative to inform both our Embassy and the Department that an invitation to the IAHRC would be forthcoming.

June 24, 1977

IDB(SF) Pre-Investment - $.9 million

IDB(SF) Agricultural Marketing II - $7.3 million

The Committee agreed that the Ambassador should ask the President of Paraguay to allow the IAHRC visit, inform him that the U.S. would have to vote against the two upcoming IDB loans if this was not done and suggest that the Government of Paraguay might wish to withdraw the loans if it could not let in the IAHRC at this time.

August 11, 1977

IDB/FSO agricultural marketing - $7.6 million loan, $165,000 grant

IDB/FSO Industrial preinvestment $900,000 loan, $200,000 grant, and $190,000 Canadian project preparation fund grant

IDB/FSO technical assistance $47 million loan

AID rural roads $5 million loan

AID market town development $5 million loan

In response to a recommendation made by this Committee at its June 24 meeting, the Government of Paraguay was asked, and subsequently agreed, to withdraw the first two IDB loans listed. Later, on its own initiative, it also withdrew the third IDB loan.
The Committee concurred in the staff recommendation that the absence of an invitation to the IAHRC which previously Paraguay had promised to issue, required our continued opposition to pending IDB loans. Paraguay should be informed that if there is a forthcoming invitation for an IAHRC inspection visit without restraints we will be able to support these loans, otherwise, we will not. Since we are seeking to delay the IDB loans at this time, the Committee decided to delay the final decision on pending AID loans.

September 14, 1977  AID grant to the Paraguayan National Council of Philanthropic Organizations, $50,000
AID grant to the Salesian Society, $96,000
AID grant to a national women's voluntary group for community services to women and disadvantaged people, $120,000

The three pending AID grants to private non-profit organizations for Paraguay were approved by the Committee, but it was also agreed that the U.S. should monitor the negotiations between the GOP and the IAHRC to insure that a certain date is reached for the investigative visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). It was agreed that such a Paraguayan agreement would be useful (a) as a test of the GOP's good faith; and (b) along with an assessment of the current human rights situation in determining our position on future Paraguayan loan applications to the IDB and several AID loans directly involving the GOP.

September 21, 1977  IDB/FSO agricultural marketing $7.6 million loan, $165,000 grant
IDB/FSO industrial preinvestment $900,000 loan, $200,000 grant and $190,000 Canadian project preparation fund grant
IDB/FSO technical assistance $47 million loan
IDB/FSO Potable water $498,000 grant
AID rural roads $5 million loan
AID market town development $5 million loan
AID housing investment guarantee $4 million
The Committee was informed that we have received assurances from President Stroessner and the Foreign Minister of Paraguay that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission will be allowed to visit that country as soon after the February 1978 elections as the IAHRC can arrange. The Committee discussed whether the U.S. should support upcoming loans and grants to Paraguay in the light of this assurance. It was determined, that we would support the AID loans and the IDB potable water loan. All of those loans would appear to meet the needy criteria. The Committee decided however that it would await further developments in Paraguay before deciding to support other upcoming loans to that country.
Regional Programs

Central American Regional

September 14, 1977  IDB Electrical Interconnection Study (countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama) $579,000, FS0

Southern Cone Regional

September 14, 1977  IDB Agricultural Research (countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) $3.5 million, FS0

The Committee decided to support the proposed IDB loan of $579,000 for an Electrical Interconnection Study for six Central American countries, since the loan was directed to a regional entity and that entity was independent of the countries involved.

However, it was decided to postpone a decision on the Southern Cone loan for agricultural research pending further analysis of the application.

There was general agreement (AID and State legal divisions) that the Harkin amendment does not apply to loans to regional organizations which have an established supranational identity and function and where such an intermediary does not appear to be a subterfuge to avoid the statute. But it was also determined that the Harkin amendment must be applied in instances where the regional organization served as a direct conduit for assistance to the constituent member state or where it was not independent of the countries themselves.

September 28, 1977  IDB/FSO agricultural research $3.5 million (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay)

IDB agricultural research $360,000 (Bolivia, Chile, Peru)

It was noted that both of these regional loans go for Agricultural research and the legislative history of the Harkin Amendment would seem to indicate that we could support this type of loan. In the absence of a State Department legal brief to the contrary, in the next few days, the Committee decided that the U.S. should support these regional loans.
September 28, 1977

IDB, Economic and Social Research (ECIEL)  
$1 million, headquartered in Brazil

IDB, Central American Intermediate Technology  
(ICAITI), $650,000

IDB, Artisan Industry Development in Guatemala,  
Bolivia, and Ecuador, $900,000

IDB, Urban Development Problems (FIPE),  
Headquartered in Brazil, $860,000

IDB, Development Banking (ALIDE), Headquartered  
in Peru, $81,400

IDB, Regional Wheat and Corn Institute (CIMYT),  
Regional Tropical Products Institute (CIAP),  
Potato Institute (CIP), $6.2 million,  
Headquartered in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru,  
respectively

The Committee agreed to support each of the pending regional loans.

Philippines

May 6, 1977

IBRD - Rural Development - $15 million

The Committee was informed that the Embassy makes periodical demarches  
to the GOP expressing our concern about human rights. The Committee  
agreed that the U.S. should vote in favor of this loan, which is directed  
at the rural poor, with the understanding that U.S. Embassy officials  
will continue informally to encourage positive action of the GOP which  
leads to improved human rights practices. The Committee agreed that we  
would include in our approach to the GOP reference to the fact that we  
take human rights considerations into account in examining IFI loan  
proposals.
Romania

May 16, 1977

IBRD Brason Bearings - $38 million
IBRD Bucharest Glass Fiber - $18.3 million
IBRD Polyester - $50 million

The Committee recommended that the United States support these three loans, however that a demarche should be made to the GOR linking our future support in the IFIs to human rights considerations.

Thailand

June 9, 1977

The Committee agreed that a demarche should be made to the GOT linking our support in the IFIs to human rights considerations.

Togo

August 11, 1977

IDA cotton $14 million credit
AID family health training $300,000 grant

The Committee concurred with the staff recommendation supporting the two pending AID programs, coupled with a demarche to the government on our human rights policy. The demarche should acknowledge the steps already taken by the Togo government to improve the human rights situation, and express our hope for continued progress. We should also recall in a positive vein President Eydema's previous statement to us that he will invite Amnesty International to visit Togo.
Uruguay

August 11, 1977

IDB/FSO technical assistance to the Bank of the Republic $200,000
IDB Paso Severino water supply $24 million loan
AID cooperative development $100,000 grant
AID credit union development $200,000 grant

The Committee determined on the basis of the human rights conditions in Uruguay that the Harkin Amendment would apply if the U.S. were to vote now on loans for that country. Therefore, the Committee recommended that Uruguay be requested to delay both pending IDB loans. The Committee also concurred with the OPIC statement that a recommendation will be made to the OPIC Board not to move forward with a pending proposal to initiate an OPIC program in Uruguay. Finally, the Committee determined to postpone a decision on two AID grants until more information is available on the beneficiaries, their ties to the government, and whether the program will benefit the needy.
MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Cuban Refugees. The San Jose II Conference began reasonably well yesterday, with 19 countries and 7 international organizations represented. It was clear Costa Rica’s enthusiasm had waned, but Carazo did agree to open the Conference, and repeated his "insist, insist, insist" formula for dealing with Cuban Government. Australia stated its willingness to take up to 200 refugees, and Italy, 50 to 100. Several speakers proposed taking the issue to the UN or the OAS. At today’s meeting, the U.S. delegation will seek to enlist support for a communique. (C)

Congress. Sat in on the President’s meeting with Charlie Wilson and Henry Hyde who said they were about to bolt from their long-standing support for foreign aid because of State’s ideological tilt to the left. The President soothed their right-wing anger and expressed his interest in being less negative in the future to Chile and Argentina. I passed this on to Christopher and will prepare a more detailed memo for you. By COB, Harkin called to accuse State of being soft on the right-wingers like Major D’Aubisson of El Salvador. Where is the silent majority in the middle? (C)

Grenada. Canadian officials have passed along reports they received from the Grenadian charge in Ottawa concerning forthcoming Soviet and Bloc assistance to the island. According to these reports, the Soviets will donate three million dollars of equipment (trucks, jeeps, pumps) to Grenada within the next nine months. Ten year, low interest Soviet credits will also be available. Bulgaria will provide canning and ice plants, and the Czechs are undertaking feasibility studies on the establishment of light industry and agro-industrial processing facilities. These reports appear to corroborate other information indicating increased Bloc cooperation and diplomatic contacts with Grenada. (C)

Jamaica. On the evening of June 29 government-owned TV carried a long segment of a speech by Jamaican Communist (Workers Party) President Trevor Munroe accusing the U.S. Embassy and the Defense Attache of involvement in the recent alleged coup plot. Munroe claimed he had evidence to support his charges and called for the DATT’s removal. Our Embassy has prepared strongly-worded contingency guidance denying any such connection and stressing our support for the democratic process. State watered-down the recommended guidance, and then approved it. (C)

El Salvador. JRG Member Colonel Gutierrez told Ambassador White in confidence that younger officers in the Guatemalan army are planning a coup. The model would be El Salvador’s October 15 Revolution, and the objectives would be far-reaching political, economic and social change. Gutierrez gave the impression that he believed support for the coup was building rapidly and that it could be expected soon. (C)

Press Contacts. None. (U)
ISSUES AND OPTIONS PAPER: URGENT LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES

I. Summary Overview

The Problem: whether to have a policy for Latin America as a region.

The overriding issue in our relations with Latin America is deceptively rhetorical. It is wrapped up in the phrase "special relationship". The phrase has meanings that are not only different but contradictory. Some are useful -- like the core security functions of the OAS. Some are unavoidable -- like the dependence of Latin America on our markets and capital. Some may lead us down blind alleys -- like the suggestion that we can solve global economic problems in this hemisphere alone. Some are pernicious, like the tradition of unilateral US intervention in neighboring states.

But the issue wrapped up in the words "special relationship" is real, not a straw man.

All other major issues are affected by decisions on the first, "special relationship" issue. This paper also considers five other specific issues:

-- the economic relationship;
-- special measures for the near neighborhood;
-- arms and local conflicts;
-- human rights; and
-- Cuba;

II. Background, Current Situation and Current Policy

The American public and Congress have limited interest in, or knowledge of, Latin America. Cuba aside, they are agreed that US security is not likely to be threatened from the hemisphere. Nonetheless, they have vague but deeply rooted feelings of community with Latin America; together
we are "the New World". These express themselves in the irrepressible phrase "special relationship". As a consequence, Americans are uncomfortable when we neglect Latin America, but have not been prepared to pay the economic costs of giving substantial content to a "special relationship".

This ill-defined sense of community and shared values leads Americans to set higher standards for Latin America than for other regions (viz. the astringency of the self-described "human rights lobby").

The Latins' perspective on the special relationship is almost a mirror image. They see our standards as paternalistic and interventionist. They increasingly reject a definition which implies hegemony — or even community, since they aspire to their own identity. But the Latins do expect special attention and special benefits from the United States, for they believe our power and wealth impose special obligations on us. To this extent, a degree of paternalism is expected. When Latins — and North Americans — talk about "neglect", the underlying assumption is that the US must at least demonstrate a personal and rhetorical concern. When we do, we create expectations of tangible concessions to real Latin interests.

The US, thus, is motivated by low-grade guilt which is not sufficiently acute to move us to the logic of our conclusions. The problem is complicated by the fact that absent real security interests or knowledgeable empathy — Congressional interest is fitful, particularistic, and expressed in terms of essentially domestic concerns like coffee, sugar, illegal immigrants, US prisoners, Mexican heroin and the projection of American values. Even our guilt has domestic roots in increasing awareness of the low economic and social status of the large, growing, increasingly articulate and organized Hispanic-American community — 18 million strong in 1976.

The "special relationship" in fact means many different things. To some it signifies the traditional US hegemony or paternalism. To the left it signifies economic dependence or US interference. To most it means special obligations on the US.

Exactly how much of the "special relationship" should be retained, and how much discarded, is the key policy question.
The Latins are united primarily by the desire to limit and regulate US power in the hemisphere -- and to evoke special benefits. The nature of desired benefits varies and tends to divide them: some (like the small Central American countries) want aid even if it does imply paternalism; most prefer bilateral trade/financial advantages.

To stop talking about ending the "special relationship" would be easy and very possibly desirable. To end Latin claims for special treatment on a hemispheric basis would not be easy. It has been tried before and been called "neglect".

Operationally, we face an annual series of inter-American meetings (the OAS system) that by their very existence attach a special nature to the relationship. Yet the Latins -- and many potent North Americans -- would see withdrawal from the OAS as worse than "neglect", as an effort to divide Latin America and deal with the weaker constituent parts rather than the stronger whole.

Against this backdrop, real US interests in Latin America include:

-- the absence of (a) strategic intervention by a hostile extra-hemispheric power or (b) intra-regional conflict that might invite extra-hemispheric intervention. This interest is particularly important in the near neighborhood (Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America and Panama);

-- 15% of our global exports, 25% of our oil imports, $19 billion in investment, and $60 billion in private bank exposure;

-- reversal, at least over the long term, of the dry rot attacking democratic forms in the hemisphere;

-- a hemispheric environment which both leaves us the time and energy to deal with the rest of the world and provides us a secure redoubt should we need it.

Latin interests are diverse and can be divisive as between countries and sub-regions:

-- all want increased access to the US -- and other OECD -- markets as essential to their development;
the major countries want us to take them seriously as international actors; the weaker nations, with some exceptions, are still inclined to follow our lead and to welcome US involvement in regional and sub-regional affairs;

all want a role in the international decisions that affect them economically and, most especially, in the decisions taken by the United States Government; but the smaller ones calculate that they have a better chance to pin us down in the OAS and other multilateral bodies, while Brazil and Mexico, and perhaps Venezuela, have enough weight to try quiet bilateral deals.

A. Current Situation. The trend over the past decade has been an odd mixture of growing independence and increasingly neuralgic interdependence.

Vietnam, Watergate, detente and disillusionment with the effectiveness of foreign aid have distracted the United States -- and depressed the Latins. The Latins have been striking out politically on their own in CIEC and the UN, diversifying their trade, buying arms elsewhere, putting together increasingly competent cadres of technocrats.

Our interdependence thus now reflects their middle-range economic status and consequent dependence on our markets, capital resources, technology and managerial competence more than any traditional "assistance" relationship. Yet these new relationships and resource needs are much harder to control than aid funds.

For the US, interdependence means $4.00 coffee, 3-8 million illegal immigrants fleeing poverty, $4 billion in Mexican brown heroin on our streets, fishing rights and investment disputes, the effect on our banks of a Mexican or Jamaican or Peruvian default. Interdependence also still means our trade surpluses, our access to oil and other important resources, and substantial political/security support in the OAS and elsewhere.

There are two particularly serious problem areas.

The Near Neighborhood. Mexico, some parts of the Commonwealth Caribbean and -- to a lesser extent -- Central America confront dangerous economic and social problems which impact directly on us. When they export poverty, we import
illegal immigrants. Unemployment is running as high as 50% in some Caribbean islands, and at least 40% of the Caribbean people are under 15 years of age. On another front, Jamaican "price leadership" has increased the cost of bauxite to American companies six-fold since 1974. As many as five economically unviable mini-states are emerging in the Caribbean. Cuba is fishing deftly in troubled waters.

Apart from short-term financial assistance in Mexico this past fall, the US has taken no serious initiatives in its near neighborhood -- where the only remaining democracies are located.

Democratic Forms and Human Rights are under severe stress throughout the hemisphere. Only Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and the Commonwealth Caribbean have managed to resist the authoritarian tide. In many countries, democracy was never more than skin deep; in others, economic and social reverses, plus terrorism, have discredited politicians, brought the military to power, and led to a frequently heavy-handed emphasis on order and "security". At the same time Watergate was leading us in the opposite direction: to a renewed appreciation of democratic values. We are caught between our real need to be true to ourselves and the fact that in projecting our values into the hemisphere we risk renewed forms of interventionism -- a risk enhanced by our sense of "new world" community and the absence of inhibiting security interests.

B. Current Policy. Current policy is to give modest rhetorical status to the "special relationship" -- without giving it much effective expression in trade, aid or deliberate transfers of technology/managerial assistance. The effort is to deal pragmatically with bilateral problems and to treat most economic issues as a function of broader North-South considerations. GSP affects only $1 billion of the $17 billion in Latin exports to the US. Bilateral aid is down to $200 million annually; we have invested only $42 million in the Caribbean Development Bank and are $300 million in arrears in our contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank.

The US has taken advantage of -- and perhaps contributed modestly to -- the decline in traditional anti-gringo solidarity by seeking deeper bilateral relationships with the most important Latin countries, Brazil most notably. Mexico is the current candidate, given our common problems. By the same token, the US has interposed no obstacle to diversification of Latin American relations with extra hemispheric interests.
The warming trend in US-Cuban relations was interrupted only by Angola and by Castro's position on the Puerto Rico issue.

On the other hand, the US has as yet been unable to devise a comprehensive policy with respect to our increasing interdependence with Mexico and the Caribbean.

III. Major Issues and Options

We have defined the first, strategic issue as the package of fallacies, ambiguities, and virtues known as the "special relationship", but which need separate consideration.

Discussion of issues and options proceeds from five key assumptions:

(1) there will be some progress in the broader North-South dialogue;

(2) publicized study groups, high-level missions and patronizing slogans are undesirable;

(3) a return to activist US hegemony or massive bilateral transfer of appropriated aid funds is domestically unsustainable;

(4) demonstrated movement toward a new Panama Canal treaty coupled with a Presidential statement of intention to eschew covert or military intervention would, as suggested by the Linowitz Report, constitute an adequate short-term regional policy (and would be consistent with either of the options under the first issue);

(5) immediate progress on Cuba is not central to any hemispheric strategy, but if it comes, it would need to be accompanied by reassurances to Latins worried by Fidel's intentions.

1. Issue: To have a Hemispheric Policy or Not

The central issue is whether the Administration wishes to treat the hemisphere as a conceptual and policy whole, and hence to give effective content to the special relationship. Or whether it wishes to focus its attention more narrowly on constituent elements of the hemisphere which are directly relevant to important US interests. The broad option below obviously subsumes the narrower option, but first steps and first words by the new Administration -- whichever option it
in fact chooses -- will take on a life and logic of their own. Thus, to chose Option II but then to have public reference to a "special relationship" will imply that the choice was, in fact, the broader option, to raise expectations at home and abroad and to lead to correspondingly shrill recriminations.

Option I: Hemispheric policy implying major forward steps designed to serve both Latin and US interests on the broadest possible front.

Option II: Differentiated policy less responsive to specific Latin expectations than to demonstrable US interests.

The costs and benefits of the two options are virtually self-evident. The risk in Option I is the difficulty of delivering, for example, Congressional votes on necessary implementing legislation. The principal benefit is that it will come closer to assuring a congenial hemisphere. The risk in Option II is that it will necessarily be focused more narrowly on policies and programs in the near neighborhood, the democracies (and, perhaps, Brazil); it therefore risks disillusion and reaction in South America. The benefit is that it is more sustainable domestically in practical political terms because Option I necessarily involves challenges to domestic economic interests.

Implementing actions

Option I:

-- visible Presidential involvement including an early speech (perhaps at the April OASGA) foreshadowing a major effort on trade and development problems;

-- intense, early effort to secure Congressional repeal of offending legislative amendments (e.g. Hickenlooper, Pelly, Gonzalez, etc.);

-- establishing a Cabinet committee to identify and propose measures on trade and bilateral assistance which would demonstrate the special commitment to Latin America;

-- push positively on human rights but measure sanctions carefully;

-- initiate and sustain serious correspondence on serious global/hemispheric subjects with major Latin leaders;
Option II:

-- Presidential involvement in the problems of the near neighborhood; general rhetoric would be restrained and eschew references to specialty;

-- survey mission through Caribbean by Under Secretary for Political Affairs preparatory to development of a well-funded policy;

-- special attention to democracies (and, in a rhetorically restrained fashion, to Brazil);

-- downplay US involvement in the OAS and other inter-American organizations.

2. Issue: How "Special" the Economic Relationship?

Trade and private capital flows are now key elements of the US-Latin American economic relationship. Trade (a) supplies the bulk of Latin American financial resources and goods Latin American needs for development, and (b) is affected or potentially affected by US Government actions. The Latin Americans see those actions as unpredictable and/or unsatisfactory.

More than any other factor, trade is the touchstone by which the Latin Americans will decide whether there is a "special relationship" that is meaningful in economic development terms.

Option I: Provide hemispheric preferences through legislation to give Latin America substantial benefits in the trade field which are not available to other developing countries.

Option II: Give no special consideration to the hemisphere.

Option III: Focus special attention on Latin America within a non-discriminatory global framework.

Option I would provide the clearest expression of US interest in Latin America. Politically, we would balance the EEC/Associated States arrangements; economically, it
would dwarf Lome. Option I would maximize trade opportunities for the semi-industrialized countries of this hemisphere that are in the best position to use them. Regional import liberalization might be more palatable to Congress than a global alternative.

On the other hand, there is little practical scope for substantial broadening or deepening of the US preference system, even regionally. Regional preferences would risk almost certain damage to our global economic relations, contrasting sharply with the traditional US goal of a single world economic system. They might slow the development of Latin American trade relations with Europe and Japan. The larger Latin American countries, with the exception of Colombia, strongly oppose regional preferences; the smaller, poorer countries would favor them.

Option II is consistent with global US objectives and would avoid GATT problems. But Option II ignores the cultural, historical, and institutional links between the US and Latin America. It could be seen as lacking an economic content parallel to the Rio Treaty and the OAS. It could bring charges of "neglect" in that aspect of the hemisphere relationship that is most important to the Latin Americans.

Option III seeks the best of both worlds -- and, of course, falls short. It is roughly current policy. It would be but a partial commitment to Latin American economic development. It would lean heavily on special mechanisms that are technically non-discriminatory. We would make the most of the fact that, of all the developing areas, Latin America -- with its higher degree of industrialization, education, and economic infrastructure -- is best able to take advantage of world markets for goods (improved through the Geneva negotiations), funds, and technology. Like Option I, it would require a high degree of political will in the US to avoid the mockery that domestic protectionism -- or failure to follow through concretely -- could make of it. But Option III would preserve the hemispheric option should the global approach break down.

**Implementing Actions**

**Option I:**

-- introduce legislation to extend and improve GSP for the benefit of Latin America; add more products
by deleting mandatory exclusions; liberalize the limiting elements (competitive need);

-- seek legislation to permit more relaxed application toward Latin America of current US countervailing duty, antidumping, and safeguard guidelines;

-- apply for a GATT waiver to permit a regional preferential arrangement; the quid pro quo would at least be explicit acceptance in the GATT of the Lome arrangement.

Option II

-- do nothing except pursue world trade policies on a reasonably liberal basis and with special concern for the needs of developing countries,

Option III

-- undertake intensified and broadened consultations in the OAS on trade and other economic matters, analogous to OECD consultations;

-- demonstrate willingness to give special consideration to Latin American needs in the implementation of US trade legislation, and to broaden GSP to products of particular interest to Latin America;

-- seek, in the MTN, special and differentiated treatment for developing countries; given its state of development, this would be especially beneficial to Latin America;

-- consider financial mechanisms to support Latin American trade, particularly among themselves, and to provide further balance-of-payments support;

-- fashion new arrangements to facilitate the flow and development of technology in Latin America;

-- expand bilateral and multilateral aid for Latin American including, as a priority matter, fulfillment of our commitment to the IADB.

3. Issue: The Near Neighborhood — To what Degree do we take Special Measures?

Our near neighbors — Mexico, the independent Caribbean, sometimes Central America — have been the historical subjects
of our concern and our interventions. Not till World War II did we really become concerned about Latin America as a whole. Even since then, our most serious concerns have been in the near neighborhood. (Obvious examples are the Cuban problems and the Dominican intervention of 1965.) But ironically our major efforts in economic assistance have not been in our neighborhood, where most of the remaining democracies are to be found.

We are not well positioned to meet the challenges. The issues of the ex-British Caribbean are new. In Mexico, the new thing is the geometric growth of old problems, although we go on coping with the intense "border" problems -- migrants, heroin, and so on -- in a particularistic, low-level way. We have no focal point for sorting out the trade-offs which will be required.

**Option I:** Continue on present course of not putting special emphasis on the problems of the near neighborhood.

**Option II:** Bring special (perhaps Presidential) focus to US-Mexican relations, including continuing high-level attention to mutual problems and availability of substantial resources where needed.

**Option III:** Focus on near-neighborhood problems as a conceptual whole (even though programs do not run across the board) by developing parallel and special programs for Mexico and the Caribbean, including special assistance to the latter.

Option I is the traditional, bureaucratically acceptable approach. It has worked reasonably well, and it involves the least cost in time and resources. It defederalizes problems, keeping responsibility in local jurisdictions. Option II would focus high-level national attention on problems which are in fact symbiotic. It could increase US-Mexican ability to make necessary trade-offs by looking at "the problem" as a whole. Option III would add the rest of the near-neighborhood, but primarily the Black Caribbean, to Option II. Option III thus suggests that, conceptually and in domestic political terms, the problems of the near-neighbors should be treated as a whole -- even though the implementing programs might be quite different. Caribbean problems are perhaps less susceptible to US actions, but trouble in the Caribbean (see separate transition paper) seems even more certain than in Mexico.
Implementing Actions

Option I

-- None, by definition.

Option II

-- Establish a cabinet-level committee on Mexico, supported by inter-agency working groups. One of the first agenda items would be coordination of the actions of the many USG agencies involved in Mexico;

-- public announcement of Mexican inter-agency group, with plea for support from Chicano community;

-- vigorous push for a law to achieve control of illegal immigration by making it illegal for employers to hire them, accompanied by special economic measures to enhance employment prospects in Mexico;

-- accompany the previous step by some form of amnesty to allow migrants already here to remain in their jobs, at least temporarily. (Current estimates are that from three to eight million are present in the US).

Option III

-- All of Option II, plus addition of Caribbean to concerns of inter-agency group;

-- Mission to the Caribbean by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. (This would not be a publicity spectacular but a chance to discuss new possibilities with the Caribbean chiefs of state.);

-- discussions with the British, Canadians, and possible Venezuelans on their role in the ex-British Caribbean;

-- substantial bilateral assistance programs to the Commonwealth Caribbean.

4. Issue: Arms and Local Conflicts

One of the most durable issues in the hemisphere is that of arms transfers. While the US was traditionally the major supplier, we now provide only 25% of arms being purchased and have imposed severe restrictions on the technological quality of what we sell. The most sophisticated weapons come from outside the hemisphere. Several countries -- Argentina
and Brazil -- now manufacture (and increasingly export) their own basic equipment.

In brief, we are no longer considered a reliable source of supply. The considerable influence we once enjoyed in this area is correspondingly diminished.

While Latin arms purchases do not represent more than an average of 2% of GNP, certain specific kinds of purchases (and relationships) are worrisome. The purchase of Soviet SU-22 fighter-bombers and T-55 tanks by Peru has introduced potentially dangerous instabilities into the west coast of South America which, combined with the Chile-Peru-Bolivia territorial dispute, could pose real difficulties for the US: the possibility (not now imminent) of a Peruvian attack on one or more of its neighbors. Similarly, Israeli aircraft sales to Honduras (in violation of Israel's arms transfer agreements with us) risk setting off an arms race in one of the poorest areas of the hemisphere.

Option I: Seek producer/consumer restraint agreements -- a very difficult task. As in the nuclear suppliers club, our goal should be qualitative restrictions;

Option II: Liberalize US sales policies modestly to improve our leverage;

Option III: Move toward ending the US role as arms supplier to Latin America.

At best, the options promise only marginal gains, but even they may be useful. Option I carries political risks in Latin America, although some governments might (at least tacitly) welcome another multilateral effort to restrain arms purchases -- provided our hand was not too heavy. The costs and benefits of Option II are difficult to weigh and are complicated by the human rights question; in addition, our storehouse of secondhand equipment is not what it was. Option III is Congressionally palatable but, by the same token, promises least benefits in the hemisphere; it could, of course be combined with Option I.

Implementing Actions

Option I

-- seek European/Israeli sales restraint. We have modestly more leverage than we have yet employed;

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-- introduce disruptive Soviet arms sales explicitly into our pursuit of detente;

-- consult with certain Latin governments preparatory to surfacing (via the Latins or multilaterally) renewed arms control proposals.

Option II

-- selectively increase FMS levels and liberalize policy with respect to sales of sophisticated weaponry (especially aircraft), but with clear understanding of inhibitions imposed by human rights violations.

Option III

-- phase out FMS by FY 1979;

-- eliminate all MLGRPS within three years, maintaining three-man Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC's) in only a handful of countries until the pipeline is dry.

5. Issue: Human Rights

How can the United States most effectively bring about greater respect for human rights in this hemisphere?

The new US Administration comes into office at a time of expectation in the US, in Congress, and most particularly among the peoples of Latin America. There is hope that a Democratic President can bring about improvement in the economic and political conditions in which most of the people in the hemisphere live. The echoes of FDR, JFK and even LBJ reverberate.

Most of the governing elites of this hemisphere are also expectant. They are ambivalent and uneasy about renewed US political activism. Some even see the US "human rights" concerns as a reflection of detente and communist propaganda; others as a new phase of US interventionists. Some note the declining US commitment to assistance/resource transfers and question whether political restrictions on resource flows to developing nations is not hypocritical. Interested Americans and Members of Congress moreover may have unrealistic expectations about the extent of US leverage in the proud and increasingly self-reliant nations of this hemisphere.
Any strategy to improve human rights in this hemisphere is closely entwined with the rhetoric and psychological baggage of the "special relationship".

The types of questions that will have to be asked are:

-- Can the Executive and Congress develop a collaborative strategy to create pressures and/or incentives (Jackson-Vanick may or may not be a model)?

-- Should the Executive take a strong stand on democratic values with clear policy implications for assistance programs and bilateral relations in order to encourage eventual change, realizing that the short-term results could be deteriorating official relations with over half of the nations of the hemisphere?

-- Should we concentrate on the diminution of torture, violation of due process, and prison conditions or press equally hard for all the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (including the rights to economic well-being which it also contains)?

-- Can we devise country-specific strategies to improve "human rights" conditions or should we seek to establish consistent global or hemispheric policies?

Although there is a variety of possible policies -- and permutations among them -- we have outlined two basic strategies that illuminate the issue most starkly:

**Option I:** A bold new policy placing human rights at the center of US bilateral relations and participation in international organizations.

**Option II:** A pragmatic approach articulated so as to leave ambiguous US policies and program options for specific countries.

Option I would revitalize US public and Congressional interest in foreign affairs, give clear direction to foreign policy agencies, and permit a zero-based budgeting approach to US bilateral and US-supported multilateral assistance programs. It would offer all nations including our own, an opportunity to begin anew and be measured from January 1977. It would lay down clear guidelines for our concerns in bilateral relations and establish a basis for US actions in defense of human
rights. But would US corporations and banks fall in line? How would international institutions respond? At least half of the governments of the hemisphere would have a strongly negative reaction. Although the impact would eventually be positive in a few countries, retrogression would result in others. Moreover, if Option I were not backed up by significant resource transfers and a positive "caring" approach to North-South issues, the US could be charged with hypocrisy. And were we to disengage from resource transfer to large numbers of countries on human rights grounds we would hinder economic development -- an important factor in improving the conditions of man.

Option II, even if stated forcefully could well be seen as insufficient by Congress and sections of the US public. The strongest opponents of repressive regimes seek US pressure, and then disengagement, where change in human rights practices does not take place. Option II would hold us open to charges of double standards, of realpolitik, and of caring about people only when our national security is not on the line. In either option there is apt to be a wide gap between our rhetoric and our ability to perform.

**Implementing Actions**

**Option I**

-- announce a policy that would place respect for the rights of man, political and economic, as a major objective of US foreign policy;

-- press for Senate ratification of all outstanding treaties and covenants dealing with these issues;

-- propose special assistance programs and commitments to those nations which demonstrate respect or improvement of respect for human rights;

-- develop particularly forthcoming political and economic programs for democracies;

-- announce that human rights performance will be measured from January 20, 1977 -- a fresh start for all nations;

-- state that all bilateral assistance programs are to be reappraised -- bilateral military and economic assistance will go only to nations that do not show a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights;

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announce a similar policy for US voting in all international lending agencies; and

develop with Congress a close working relationship in monitoring performance.

Option II

announce a policy that places respect for human rights as a major objective of US foreign policy but recognizes political diversity, economic development and national security as major competing concerns of nation states;

stress US desire to devote our efforts primarily to ending torture, improving prison conditions, and raising respect for due process worldwide;

give special emphasis in our assistance programs to democracies of the developing world;

devoice strategies for US policies and programs toward individual countries based on the leverage available, US interests, and type of change that can be expected;

develop private contacts with leaders of particularly repressive regimes such as in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay to convey US interest in supporting their efforts to achieve economic stability if important steps are taken in the human rights area; and

work with Congress to develop country specific approaches and seek modification of across-the-board legislation such as the Harkin Amendment.

6. Issue: Cuba

How and at what pace should the US renew relations with Cuba?

The new Administration may wish to test Cuban desires to improve relations. Cuban officials have indicated they are interested in reinstituting the 1973 Hijacking Agreement, which Cuba denounced following the terrorist destruction of a Cubana Airlines plane last October. Castro has shown intermittent
interest in restoring relations with the US. He wants access to US markets, technology and credits, US recognition of his revolution, and possibly to move beyond initial exchanges on hijacking.

"Normalization" of relations is a word loosely used in the US-Cuban context. To some it connotes resolution of all outstanding issues between the two countries, including compensation for nationalized properties, military questions and human rights. To others it means resumption of diplomatic relations. Castro and the Cuban leadership are ambivalent about restoration of extensive ties with the US which full "normalization" implies. In past years the Cubans have said diplomatic relations could only come at the end of the negotiating process. But recent American visitors to Havana have been told that such relations could come early on.

**Option I: Minimal Change.** Preserve the hijacking agreement but make clear we are making no basic changes in our policy until Cuba withdraws more troops from Angola.

**Option II: Prove Cuban intentions.** Make sufficient gestures to test Cuban interest in negotiating the entire range of bilateral problems. Diplomatic relations would follow progress on substantive differences.

**Option III: Seek Diplomatic Relations followed by negotiations on the major substantive issues.**

Option I would avoid antagonizing conservative Congressmen and segments of the US public at a time when Panama Canal Treaty negotiations are a top priority. The period between moving from Option I to one of the other options (after the Panama issue is clear) could be used to increase pressure on the Cubans to disengage from Southern Africa. But the Cubans would probably take Option I as an affront. Option II would permit businesslike openings to Cuba. While conservatives and certain Cuban exiles might be alarmed we could move slowly and demonstrate our intention not to give anything away. Extended low-key discussions would permit Latin and US domestic opinion to adjust to a US-Cuba rapprochement. But by negotiating first we could give Fidel the advantage. The talks could break-down prior to establishing a US presence in Havana which is more in our interests than his. Option III is most consistent with recent US practices (PRC and GDR) and would likely get us into more open talks and a presence in Havana sooner. But Option III carried out now would likely result
in a fusion of the anti-Castro and anti-Canal Treaty Congressmen, increasing the problems in achieving Senate support.

Implementing Actions

Option I

-- work thru the Swiss to renew the Hijacking Agreement following appropriate steps here regarding US intentions to prosecute and restrict Cuban exiles;

-- convey to the Cubans informally US interest in moving to negotiations and normalization if Cuba makes some appropriate gesture such as significant withdrawals of troops from Angola;

-- make publicly clear that we are ready to normalize if Cuba demonstrates it is not interested in supporting expanded conflict in Africa.

Option II

-- announce lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba and seek thru the Swiss to begin direct private talks with the Cubans in New York on Hijacking Agreement;

-- if Cubans respond favorably to initial meetings, announce jointly that US and Cuba have agreed to undertake discussions in New York on Hijacking Agreement and entire range of bilateral issues;

-- agree to establish diplomatic relations and lift embargo when good faith in negotiating process established.

Option III

-- seek confidential contacts with Cubans to determine their interest in moving quickly toward diplomatic relations;

-- the US would lift travel restrictions and the embargo on food and medicines. We would announce measures to restrict Cuban exile activity against Cuba;

-- Cuba would release American prisoners and agree to
negotiate in good faith all outstanding issues;

-- following reestablishment of diplomatic relations formal negotiations would begin.
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TELEGRAM

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TREASURE FOR PETER BRIDGES

E.O. 11652 COS

TAGS: CCOH, Ei IN SHUN. CT

SUBJ: SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

RE:
GUATEMALA 3116, BRIDGES-BERTER TELECON

AS PER REQUEST BY 15, PETER BRIDGES THERE FOLLOWS MEMO OF
SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINE MINISTER
OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ:

"MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
ARGENTINA; JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY
JULIO Cesar RIE, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK
DANTE SIMONE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF
U.S.
MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL, SECRETARY OF TREASURY
G. FRED BERGSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY
ALFRED HAGHANGI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY
RICHARD AKELING, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
EDMUND BITTMER, OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, TREASURY
TIME AND PLACE: MAY 21, 1977 - U.S. CHANCERY, GUATEMALA

SUBJ: BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN
PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT
ARGENTINA HAS MADE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VIDEALA. HE BEGAN
BY GIVING A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL WOBLATIONS
LEADING UP TO THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MAR 1976, EXPLAINING
THAT THE MILITARY RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN PERON'S WIFE WAS
LOST CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ECONOMY HAD
REACHED "POOR BUM". HE SAID HE AGREED TO BE MINISTER OF ECONOMY ONLY
IF HE HAD THE COMPLETE POLITICAL BACKING OF THE MILITARY AND IF
HE WOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER ALL MINISTRIES INVOLVING THE ECONOMY.
THE MILITARY INHERITED A LEGACY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH
PERSON HAD RACED IN ORDER TO OPPOSE THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS,
BUT WHICH ULTIMATELY WENT OUT OF CONTROL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ REPEATED THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, DIRECTING OUR ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC
DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT, INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, REDUCTION IN GOVERNMENT DEFICIT, DECLINE IN INFLATION, AND IMPROVEMENT IN EXTERNAL SITUATION. HE SAID HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A DECREASED GROWTH IN REAL WAGES AS THE PRICE FOR ACHIEVING STABILITY.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROGRESS IN THE ECONOMY WHICH HAS BEEN MADE UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION BUT CITED THE FACT THAT THE REGIME CORRUPTION WHICH HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS. HE CITED THE FACT THAT THE REGIME CORRUPTION WHICH HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS, NOT ONLY IN THE MILITARY AND THE TERRORISTS, NEVER
THOUGH, THE U.S. IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROCESS OF LAW
AND THE GENERAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ASKED UNOFFICIALLY

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1-1

Authority NLC-15R-3-1-1-1

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E.O. 13526

Confidential/EF 1-1-1-1-1-1-1

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 1

CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ SUBSEQUENT TO THE LATTER'S BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY BLUMENHAL. U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR RALPH DOUGLAS MADE THE SAME CASE ON A DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ.

SECRET

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BLUMENHAL SAI THAT WHEN WIRE ARE UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S PROBLEM AND WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE HARKIN AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLICY AND CONVICTION, COMMITTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA'S COMMITMENT TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ARGENTINA HAS TWO LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR IDB CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD BE HELD UP, BUT HERE CONCERNED ABOUT A $380 MILLION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IDB. THE HARKIN AMENDMENT, WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE, COULD EXTEND THIS MARCH TO OTHER IFIs. WHILE HARKIN AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLICY AND CONVICTION, COMMITTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

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BLUMENHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IDB LOAN IS VERY LIKELY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ AGREED TO DISCUSS SALARY ISSUE WITH ORTIZ MENA, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAKING IT PUT AS15. HE THEN BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTAL BEING REORGANIZED OR TRANSFORMED. SINCE INTAL IS THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN ARGENTINA, MARTINEZ DE HOZ IS ANXIOUS THAT IT REMAIN THERE IN SOME FORM.

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

Guinea. I met with the Guinean Prime Minister and several members of his Cabinet today. At the end of a long session, he said that he was authorized by President Toure to tell us that the Soviet intelligence flights out of Guinea would be stopped, as of today. Although not necessarily tied to the termination of the flights, he tabled a request for Coast Guard cutters to patrol Guinea's shores. I told him that we doubted that Guinea's security was threatened, but would earnestly consider the request.

Although our information is that human rights conditions are very bad in Guinea, the Prime Minister strongly endorsed our human rights initiatives. He said that Guinea is prepared to allow an international group to conduct an examination of its human rights situation. Because Guinea reportedly holds large numbers of political prisoners, I indicated it would be a significant step if Guinea would identify its political prisoners, indicate the reasons for their incarceration, and the length of their sentences.

I told the Prime Minister that if Guinea followed through on the statements made today, it could lead to a great improvement in our relations. He seems desirous of doing so, to open the way to more aid and investment and to offset close ties with the Soviets. The Prime Minister delivered a letter to you from President Toure, which we forwarded immediately with a rough translation.
Belgrade. The wire services are reporting a tough statement by Soviet Delegation chief Vorontsov to the effect that if the Soviet Union does not get its way in the current debate over the agenda for the main meeting there could be "great unpleasantness (and) the failure of our mission." This is characterized by the press as a Soviet threat to walk out if they cannot achieve a satisfactory agenda.

Our Delegation believes that the Soviet statement is a tactical ploy to pressure the West to be more receptive to the Eastern position on the agenda, rather than a threat to walk out. Despite dramatic press reports, there is no atmosphere of confrontation or crisis in Belgrade. Generally speaking, the preparatory meeting in Belgrade is proceeding along anticipated lines, and we should be prepared for a substantial period of pulling-and-hauling.

OAS. Before the OAS meeting in Grenada ended late yesterday, the U.S. Delegation, assisted by Venezuela and Costa Rica, pushed through a strong resolution on human rights. It was supported by every country visited by Mrs. Carter except Brazil. The resolution affirms the rule of law and asserts that no circumstances justify torture or prolonged detention without trial. It commends the OAS Human Rights Commission (composed of seven experts elected as individuals rather than as representatives of their countries), and asks member states to cooperate with the Commission and not to retaliate against individuals who cooperate with it.

The resolution also asks the Commission to organize a program of consultations with governments, institutions, and organizations to fulfill its function of protecting human rights in the hemisphere. This last point is a step short of the program of Commission visits to member countries for which we had originally hoped, but it is a step forward.

In contrast to previous General Assemblies, economic issues were not given priority attention. The Latin Americans appeared to be more interested
in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation. We had to abstain on several resolutions (e.g., OPEC exclusion, Panama Canal tolls) but we were able to support a general resolution on trade cooperation and consultation.

Portugal. Our efforts to secure international financial support for Portugal have been successful. Meeting yesterday in Paris, eleven countries -- Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela -- made formal commitments to provide $750 million in balance of payments loans over the next eighteen months. Austria, Ireland, and Canada have participation under active and sympathetic consideration. For its part, Portugal announced its intention to take further economic stabilization steps in cooperation with the IMF and to negotiate a second credit agreement with the IMF by the end of the year.

Although some follow-up with foreign governments will be necessary to complete arrangements, our major effort now will be to secure Congressional approval of the $300 million loan the U.S. has pledged as our contribution. The House and Senate have approved legislation authorizing the loan. The House is expected to appropriate the $300 million later tonight or tomorrow, but the Senate is not expected to act until late July.

Yugoslav M-47 Tanks to Ethiopia. We have instructed our Ambassador to raise the issue of the tanks with the Yugoslav government.

Canadian Gas Prices. The Government of Canada announced today that the price of natural gas exported to the U.S. will increase from $1.94 to $2.16 per thousand cubic feet. The Canadians had proposed a price of $2.25 but agreed to reduce it after discussions with us. The nine cent price reduction will save consumers approximately $90 million. The new price will remain in effect for at least six months, but will then be subject to review. Further price increases can be expected as Canada continues its policy of pricing natural gas at the equivalent of world oil prices.

SECRET
Cuba. We learned late Monday that an anti-Castro terrorist group was planning a raid on Cuba. We passed this information to the Cuban Government the same day. Cy inquired whether the FBI could caution the exile terrorists against making the raid, but we were informed that this cannot be done without jeopardizing the lives of informants. However, our law enforcement authorities plan to make arrests if evidence is developed, and to interdict the raid if it proceeds.

On Tuesday, at the request of U.S. Customs, we alerted Cuba that four unmarked U.S. Customs ships are observing the terrorist group. Yesterday, we received a Cuban reply thanking us for the information we passed and advising that its naval units are aware of the presence of our ships.

Foreign Affairs Appropriations. The House is wrapping up two days of fairly intense debate on the appropriations bill tonight. Among the major developments, Congressman Miller prevailed late today with an across-the-board five percent cut (212-178). Funds can come from one program or all. Earlier in the day, we staved off an effort to make a substantial cut in funds for the International Development Association of the World Bank. The leadership worked hard against both these amendments. All other fund-cut amendments were defeated.

Today Mozambique, Angola, and Cuba were added to the list of countries to which "indirect" assistance is prohibited by the Young amendment, passed yesterday. On the other hand, after eliminating all remaining military aid to Argentina yesterday, the House today restored approximately $3 million for aid to Nicaragua (225-187). Finally, Harkin's amendment to reduce the FMS program for Korea was defeated this evening on a voice vote. Majority Leader Wright, Republican Ed Derwinski, HIRC Chairman Zablocki and Sam Stratton led the debate against the amendment.
SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached herewith is your Evening Report of March 4, with the President's comments.

[Signature]

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

DOS REVIEWED 07 Feb 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-7-18-1-2-1
NARA EF Date 7/9/16
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

1. Bongo Comments on PLO: After you left the meeting with President Bongo yesterday, I asked him whether, in his opinion, there is any willingness on the part of the PLO to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Bongo replied that two PLO representatives (whose names escaped him) called on him recently in Gabon and gave him the impression that their position had changed somewhat. They appeared to agree to recognize the existence of Israel as an independent and sovereign state, no longer make their claims for complete repossession of Jerusalem, accepted a small part of the West Bank for their own state, and are agreeable to some kind of a federation with Jordan. The Palestinians told Bongo that they would have to accept the link with Jordan if only because they are without resources and could not survive alone. The Palestinians also told Bongo that they wanted to be able to attend the Geneva Conference at which a third country like the US would make a set of proposals along the lines mentioned above. According to Bongo's PLO visitor, Arafat is prepared to accept such an overall plan.

   It is, of course, hard for me to assess the PLO reactions that Bongo reported. We do not know the identity of his visitors or their relationship to Arafat. We will, of course, be very attentive to any indication that the PLO position may be evolving along the lines described by Bongo. The PLO is holding a congress on March 12 and we may conceivably see some small sign of change or flexibility then.

2. Habib Before Diggs Subcommittee: Yesterday afternoon, Phil Habib testified on our southern Africa policy before Charlie Diggs' subcommittee on African
Affairs. As you know, Diggs and the other members of the subcommittee are very attentive to the need to have our African policy made consistent with our commitment to social justice. Phil described your administration's current review of southern Africa policy as an effort aimed at strengthening the U.S. commitment to Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. The committee reacted very positively to our approach. Several members suggested policy tacks that Phil agreed we would take into serious consideration. Charlie Diggs made clear that the subcommittee would be taking a hard look to see how well our actions in southern Africa square with our announced intentions. Nevertheless, I believe that we have gotten off to a good start with a committee whose cooperation and support will be vital as we attempt to establish a consensus on southern Africa policy.

3. Argentina Spurns Foreign Military Sales Credits: The Argentine government has now formally notified us that it will not use its foreign military sales credit for FY '78. In a call on Warren Christopher, the Argentine Ambassador rejected the charge that Argentina was violating human rights. He also complained that his government had first heard of our aid cutoff from press reports of my testimony before the Inouye Committee. Warren replied that we were aware of Argentina's security problems, but he emphasized again the importance we attach to the rule of law and protection of human rights. Warren then reminded the Ambassador that we had warned Argentina previously that in our opinion it had become necessary to exercise some restraint in its anti-terrorist campaign.

4. Soviet American Maritime Accord: In late January we passed on to the Soviets a diplomatic note indicating that as of March 1 we intend to enforce a fishing jurisdiction that will follow the line set forth in the 1867 U.S.-Russian Convention that ceded Alaska to the U.S. This unilateral decision on our part was designed to discourage any attempt to renegotiate a key maritime boundary line in the Bering Sea. Several days ago the Soviets told us that they could accept our position. As a result we have avoided a potentially difficult boundary dispute and gained undisputed control over significant fisheries resources. Here is an instance of Soviet moderation which demonstrates that it is still possible to reach understandings with the Soviets on key issues despite disagreements on strategic or human rights questions.
5. Conversation with the Jamaican Foreign Minister: Warren Christopher and I met with Jamaican Foreign Minister Patterson yesterday to discuss bilateral relations and prospects for increased U.S. economic assistance. The Jamaicans do not hide their interest in trying to improve relations with us and proposed that a group of technical experts meet to study aid and trade questions. I said we would try to find a mutually convenient time for a short meeting between you and Prime Minister Manley.

On economic questions, the Jamaicans told me of their intention to resume discussions with the IMF in April in an effort to win further support for the ailing Jamaican economy. When I stressed the desirability of a negotiated settlement of the Revere bauxite dispute, Patterson responded that there was still disagreement between his government and the company over the value of Revere's facilities. However, the case had been taken to the Jamaican courts and the government would abide by the decision of the courts.

Patterson said that the Jamaicans feel they can benefit from Cuba's experience, especially in the construction of housing, schools and microdams, and they hope that the United States and Cuba will improve relations. Patterson also expressed hope for a new Panama Canal treaty.

6. Namibia: We called in South African Ambassador Botha this morning to ask for an update on his government's thinking on Namibia. Botha said that his government had not ruled out trying for an internationally acceptable settlement and that he personally believes that many of the seven points negotiated last September in Pretoria with Henry Kissinger still offer a basis for a negotiated settlement. However, the South African government also wants to keep the Namibian constitutional conference (which excludes SWAPO as an organization) alive and to include its participants in the negotiations for a final settlement. When we reiterated to Botha that time was of the essence in getting the Namibian peace process moving again, he promised to report our views to his government and be back to us next week.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

Arms Transfer Policy. The text of your statement on conventional arms transfer policy, was sent to all diplomatic posts this afternoon. Embassies in countries where we have supply relationships were instructed to inform their host governments promptly of the nature of the new policy. We provided key Embassies with guidance on matters of special interest to their respective host governments.

Nixon Letter. We told the Vietnamese today in Paris that the Nixon letter to Lester Wolff was not related to the normalization negotiations, and we downplayed the story in today's press briefing. The timing and content of Mr. Nixon's letter to Wolff seems to be part of his effort to regain a measure of public acceptance.

Todman Trip to Latin America. Assistant Secretary Todman returned this week from a quick swing through Latin America. In Colombia, President Lopez Michelsen pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which we are hesitant to deliver because of reported narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral policeman." He urges that we internationalize the...
Colombian officials pressed their view that we should give special preferences to Latin American goods to offset the preferences the European Community extends to former European colonies.

In Venezuela, President Perez, looking forward to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the single most important issue in our bilateral relations is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of generalized trade preferences.

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentina who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that he understood our human rights position and did not argue with its importance, but that Argentina just could not meet the highest standards until it wins the war against terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of Argentina's difficulties.

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil attaches great importance to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week during the CIEC meeting and will try to put his doubts to rest on this score. Although not discussed extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of primary concern to the Brazilians.

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government officials promised to speed up adjudication of the cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. Based on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution for the cocaine-source coca now produced there.
Japanese Aid Policy. Embassy Tokyo reports that Japan will increase its foreign assistance budget to almost $2 billion in fiscal 1977, up 21.7 percent over last year. The bulk of the increase will go to multilateral agencies. Actual disbursements lag increasingly behind budget levels, however, causing Japan to look for ways to accelerate use of its aid as well.

Japan's wealth, North-South pressures, and prodding from trading partners are gradually loosening Japan's traditionally tight purse strings. Fukuda reportedly even considered announcing a doubling of aid over five years at the Summit. If Fukuda and the Foreign Ministry continue to win out over the Finance Ministry and its allies, marked improvements in Japan's aid budget and disbursement levels over the next few years will result.

Panama Canal. In discussions yesterday and today, the Panamanian negotiators indicated acceptance, in principle, of a treaty provision under which both Panama and the United States would jointly maintain the neutrality of the Canal in accordance with established rules. The negotiators also indicated an awareness of the U.S. understanding that neutrality provisions would apply to threats to the Canal originating from within Panama as well as from third countries. The talks will continue tomorrow.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached herewith is a copy of your evening report of June 16, with the President's comments.

Zhigulev Brusilovich

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958
Authority NLC-7-18-4-12-7
NARA. E-F. Oct. 7/9/16.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

CSCE Preparatory Meeting. Today's opening session of the Belgrade preparatory meeting was purely ceremonial. At the first working session tomorrow, the United Kingdom delegation will table a "draft decision sheet" with proposed language for the decisions on timing, duration, agenda and modalities which are to be taken at the preparatory gathering. This paper was worked out by the NATO Allies in Brussels and represents a common NATO position. Our delegation will join the British in co-sponsoring the draft.

In a conversation yesterday with the head of our working delegation (Ambassador Sherer), the head of the Soviet delegation indicated that he hopes to move expeditiously through the preparatory meeting without discussion of political issues. However, he also noted the Soviet desire to have the fall meeting focus mainly on new proposals rather than on a review of implementation of the Helsinki agreement. The Soviets believe the review should be limited to plenary sessions, which would limit our ability to discuss specific problems of implementation. We will insist on a full and complete review which we do not regard as incompatible with consideration of meritorious new proposals. We will gain a better idea of the Soviet position as the meeting proceeds to discuss specific points of organization and timing.

Bulgaria. I met today with Madame Zhivkova, Chairman of the Bulgarian Cultural Committee and the daughter of Bulgarian Chief of State, Todo Zhivkov. She is here to sign our first bilateral cultural and scientific exchange agreement, and her visit signals
a desire to improve our relations. I expressed appreciation for her Government's cooperation in the Marev case and urged that they keep up the momentum in resolving our family reunification cases.

Argentine World Bank Loans. Despite a last-minute effort by Argentina to persuade us that recent actions, including prisoner releases, signify improvement in their human rights performance, our Executive Director will abstain on two World Bank loans to Argentina that come to a vote tomorrow. One major loan provides $100 million in industrial credits; the other extends a $7 million credit for a soybean project. Given the grave violations in Argentina and the fact that past promises of change have come to little, we felt that we would have to see more evidence of progress in order to approve the two loans. However, we will accompany our abstention with a statement recognizing that there are signs that the situation in Argentina may be improving.

Toth Case. Although Robert Toth continues to be questioned by Soviet security officials, there is no indication that the Soviets plan to try him. We believe, however, that the "protocols" he has been required to sign may be used as testimony against Soviet Jewish activists and dissidents at some point. Toth was questioned closely about his connections with Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, who provided information last November which Toth used in an article on Soviet Jews who had been refused emigration on grounds of having dealt with classified information. The information was relatively innocuous, but we speculate that the Soviets may allege that Shcharanskiy passed "state secrets." In so doing, they would avoid directly challenging your statement that Shcharanskiy had no connection with the CIA.

Legislation. As you know, the Senate is spending the week on foreign policy legislation. In the debate on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) yesterday, the Humphrey human rights provision survived by a vote of 50 to 43, but a Dole amendment prohibiting IFI loans
to Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos was adopted 56 to 32. Dole had virtually solid Republican support, and a reasonably broad spectrum of Democrats including the Majority Leader. We forestalled a similar amendment on the bilateral aid authorization today by offering a less-damaging substitute which extends the existing prohibition on direct aid but permits indirect assistance.

The Dole amendment language, does not occur in the House-passed version of the IFI authorization. There is some chance, therefore, that we can strike it in conference. This will be next to impossible, however, if the House adopts a similar amendment on the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill which will be debated at the beginning of next week.

Korean withdrawal is the next major trouble spot in the Senate. The State Department Authorization, which will be debated tomorrow, contains a McGovern amendment supporting the withdrawal policy. Howard Baker intends to introduce an amendment to strike the McGovern language which will prompt a debate over Korea withdrawal policy. Our tactic will be to broaden the McGovern amendment to insure adequate assessments at each stage of the withdrawal plus regular Congressional consultation. We have passed the word to Senator Byrd that Baker's amendment represents a direct challenge to Administration policy and asked him to tell us what he will support if he cannot support the broadened McGovern language. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled Stan Turner to testify next Monday on the assessments behind our withdrawal decision. Phil Habib and General Brown will then return to the Committee to support our policy.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

March 30, 1977

I enclose herewith a copy of your evening report of March 29, 1977, with the President's comments.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-7-18-1-19-3
NARA EF Deto 7/9/14

SECRET Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR:  THE PRESIDENT
FROM:  Warren Christopher

Position of New Indian Government on Non-Proliferation. Our Embassy in New Delhi has supplied a cautious reading of Prime Minister Desai's press statement that:

"We do not believe in nuclear weapons at all. That policy stands. I do not know whether it is necessary to have a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, but if it is not necessary it should never be done."

Following a meeting with Foreign Secretary Mehta, our Embassy cabled that they doubt there will be a basic change in Indian nuclear policy. We need to test this judgement and to influence the new government in the right direction. I will attempt to do so when I see the Indian Ambassador in the next few days, just before he returns to Delhi for consultations.

Ambassadorial Appointments. We have cabled host governments today requesting their agreement on an urgent basis to the following Ambassadorial appointments (an asterisk after the name connotes a career officer):

Algeria  Ulric Haynes
Australia  Philip Alston
Belgium  Anne Cox Chambers
Cameroon  Mabel Smythe
Great Britain  Kingman Brewster
India  Robert F. Goheen
Iran  William Sullivan*
Israel  Samuel W. Lewis*
Japan  Mike Mansfield
Kenya  Wilbert LeMelle
NATO  W. Tapley Bennett*
Pakistan  George S. Vest*
Turkey  Ronald Spies*
We can increase the number of Career appointments to be announced with this package if you wish.

Security Assistance and Human Rights. As you may know, five Latin governments "rejected" American military assistance based on the submission to Congress of the required human rights reports. It is interesting to note that four of the five seem to be having second thoughts about turning their backs on American military aid.

-- Although the Argentines turned down our FY 78 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program of $15 million, they still want to receive $700,000 in grant training. They also want to sign contracts for over $30 million in unobligated FY 77 funds, but we have refused thus far to honor their requests because of human rights conditions in that country.

-- We have begun to receive indications that Brazil didn't realize that its rejection of the $50 million credits for FY 78 meant that they would be unable to participate in the Foreign Military Sales cash sales program. They may ask permission to buy spare parts for American F-5E fighters and naval equipment, drawing on unobligated FY 77 money.

-- El Salvador and Guatemala are now hedging on their initial refusals to participate in rather small credit and training programs for FY 78 and unobligated FY 77 money.

We have told the Congress that we are not now asking that the FY 78 budget request for these countries be withdrawn. We prefer to let the situation settle down and assess our security relationships at a later date. However, the atmosphere in the House Appropriations Committee is such that some of these FY 78 programs may be eliminated, although we doubt that the Congress would eliminate the FY 77 funds still in the pipelines.

Follow Up to Fukuda Visit. With Jim Schlesinger's concurrence, we are initiating consultations with the Japanese at the technical level on the reprocessing facility at Tokai. These consultations will try to lay the groundwork for an eventual meeting between Jim and the Japanese Minister of Science.
Philippine Base Negotiations. Philippine Ambassador Romualdez, who just returned from Manila, has suggested that we resume military base negotiations in late May or early June. He said that Marcos still wants a clarification of the extent of the U.S. commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty to defend the Philippines against external attacks. We expressed doubt that a "clarification" would prove helpful to Marcos because of the evolution of Congressional attitudes and other factors, but we noted a resumption in negotiations in that period should be acceptable to us.

Middle East Debate in the Security Council. The Security Council is adjourning its debate on the Middle East this evening without taking substantive action. We have thus avoided a public confrontation with the Egyptians on the eve of Sadat's visit to Washington. The Egyptians reluctantly agreed to the adjournment after it became apparent that we would not approve the text of the substantive consensus statement they wanted. No date has been set for a resumption of the debate.
SECRET

DOS REVIEWED 28-Mar-2012; DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

FROM: SECRETARY VANCE

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER

INFO:

RELEASED BY: DG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: O.O.B.

OSD REVIEWED 06 FEB 2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 13526

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NARA E.F. Date 7/9/11

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12: NLC-7-18-3-19-1
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance, Jr.

May 26, 1977

1. **Powell Memo:** In reference to Jody’s memorandum to you, we have sent a cable to Seoul telling General Brown and Phil Habib that if there was deliberate Korean Government encouragement of criticism by the US military of your withdrawal plan or by the government-controlled press on your handling of the Singlaub affair, they should take up the matter with the Korean Government.

2. **Representation at International Conferences:** I have notified interested departments and agencies and issued the directive here and to our posts abroad that we must reduce the size of our delegations to international conferences by 15 - 25 percent. I have also emphasized that as many women and members of minority groups as possible should be included in our representation.

   We will take part in about 1000 international conferences this year. Such a large number of meetings involves considerable expense. I hope that by cutting back on the number of the people involved in these conferences, an appreciable savings can be made.

   The number of women members and minority groups in these meetings is far from adequate, and I have given instructions that a special effort be made to correct this.

3. **CIEC:** I leave Saturday evening for Paris and believe that the position which we have developed for CIEC is generally sound but I have some worries as we have discussed before. Dick Cooper and Solomon from Treasury are meeting today and tomorrow with other senior CIEC participants. They find the tone which LDC representatives are taking to be moderate. It is too early, however, to assess the outcome.
4. Latin Presidents Plan Meeting on US Policies: Presidents of Latin America's Southern Cone nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), disturbed by US policies, particularly on human rights, are apparently attempting to organize a summit meeting, perhaps as early as June 3, to coordinate their response. To our knowledge, no such summit has been held since 1967. Brazil is key to the meeting. Given Brazil's international status and their recent problems with us, President Geisel’s attendance would make the meeting significant and potentially difficult for us. Presidents Videla of Argentina and Stroessner of Paraguay want to forestall a blatantly anti-US gambit by broadening participation to include Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, but these countries almost certainly will refuse invitations. It is unlikely that Videla and Stroessner would refuse to participate if their neighbors, especially Brazil, agree to meet. (We will follow this closely and keep you informed.)

5. The Nangolo Execution: The South African Government has confirmed to our Ambassador its intention to execute Filemon Nangolo, the Namibian convicted in South African courts of murder and attempted robbery. SWAPO has contested the execution. If the South Africans proceed, which is quite possible, the execution will complicate the Namibian negotiations. We have backed up our strong demarche in Cape Town with a parallel approach to the South African Ambassador here stating that the execution could undermine current negotiation efforts. We have also asked the other members of the Western Contact Group to urge their governments to make similar representations in Cape Town.

6. Meeting with Roel: We held our meeting with the Mexicans today and have agreed to establish three working groups.

   -- Political: on-going discussions between myself and Foreign Secretary Roel.

   -- Economic: overall working group which will have subgroups in trade, finance and energy.

   -- Social: This will include migration, border crime and environment and possibly drug matters.
We held preliminary meetings of the working groups today. We will prepare a report for you within three months.

In my conversations with Roel we discussed ways in which Mexico might be helpful with Manley and the Belize problem. Roel also is interested in supporting our efforts on human rights and has some ideas on how we might work together to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. He will also give me his thoughts on how to revitalize the OAS so that we can concert our actions at Grenada next month.

The signing of the treaty was a step of major importance and I believe will help in moving the remaining non-signatories to join in.

7. Jackson Committee Hearing: I have just returned from Capitol Hill and will report to you tomorrow on my testimony before Scoop's Subcommittee.
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-1

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION

FROM: Secretary Vance

TO: President Carter

INFO:

RELEASED BY: [Signature]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: OOB.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

Lagos Conference. The South African nuclear issue came up frequently during the plenary session today. Shawn McBride, Ireland's maverick delegate, made a speech this morning in which he asserted that the South African Government had already exploded a nuclear explosive device. Speeches by African delegates referred to Western cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear field.

The Soviet representative will address the conference tomorrow. Originally scheduled to speak today, Andy asked for a delay until Thursday to be able to comment on and respond to the speeches of other delegates.

Law of the Sea. Elliot Richardson has informed us that he would be willing to continue to serve as principal U.S. representative at the next session of the Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for February 1978 and to handle advance preparations -- if you wish to have him do so. Cy and I think it is important to have Richardson continue in these difficult and complex talks, at least through the next session which may last two months. If it is agreeable with you, we will tell him that you share our desire that he continue through the next session of the Conference. No resubmission to the Senate would be required.
Korean Military Compensation Package. We and Defense have been looking carefully into how to handle the Korean military compensation package with the Congress. We believe that we should request special legislation authorizing the no cost transfer to South Korea of equipment from the U.S. ground forces which are to be withdrawn. We plan to consult with key legislative staff next week on the prospects for such a bill. We do not plan to ask the Congress to approve additional FMS sales credits outside the regular budget cycle.

Repatriation of U.S. Citizens from Cuba. It now appears that the first plane load of U.S. citizen repatriates and their families will not be ready to leave Cuba before next week. We had hoped to bring back the first plane load this Thursday, but the Swiss Embassy reports that many of the citizens interviewed so far may decide to remain in Cuba. Others are difficult to reach, do not have proper documentation, or are taking extra time to settle their personal affairs.

Todman Trip. Terry Todman's trip to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay had a significant impact in all four countries. Much of the interest centered on human rights, and his meetings with government leaders were taken as a sign that our policies are serious and non-discriminatory. He met freely with opposition groups who viewed the visit as a manifestation of concern and a cause for hope.

Although we should not attempt to take public credit for concessions, our concern for human rights has stirred domestic forces and created internal pressures for change in Latin America. Abuses continue and the administration of justice remains quite weak everywhere, but the direction of change is now generally positive throughout the Southern cone. Our challenge in the months ahead will be to demonstrate our support for human rights in ways that will encourage further positive evolution.

Always give me Ops' dispatches more quickly when they are received. J.C.
No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/11/20: NLC-7-20-5-22-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher

Rhodesia. In New York Cy had separate discussions on Rhodesia with Pik Botha and Mark Chona. Both agreed that the situation is critical and time is fast running out. Botha said Ian Smith is inclined toward an all-parties conference but his black colleagues in the Salisbury Group, especially Muzorewa, are not yet convinced.

Cy also raised the idea of an interim meeting between the principals. David Owen, who along with Brand Fourie, Botha's deputy, was present at the meeting with Botha, will sound out Nkomo on this question Thursday. Fourie said he would go to Salisbury this Sunday and provide us with word of Smith's reaction.

This morning Chona told Cy that Kaunda is gravely concerned about the deteriorating Rhodesian situation. The more time passes the less attractive the all-parties meeting will be to the Patriotic Front. Every effort must be made to convene the interim meeting. Chona talked to Mugabe in Khartoum and says he is willing to attend an interim meeting; so too, he maintained, is Nkomo (we have other information that Nkomo is still reluctant). Chona believes that if Smith can be convinced to go along, the other parties to the internal agreement will fall into line. He said the Front Line would do all it could and suggested Malawi's President Banda might be most effective in convincing Sithole and perhaps Muzorewa to agree to attend. Cy agreed that we had to move as quickly as possible.
Indonesia. Recent Indonesian military activities directed against a band of West New Guinea guerrillas forced us to raise the subject with the Indonesian Government. The Indonesians strafed villages in West New Guinea, using two U.S.-supplied light aircraft. At least one Indonesian incursion into Papua New Guinea territory was involved. The Indonesians now report that they understand the serious implications of continuing a military effort against the guerrillas near the border. The Indonesians have ordered troops to stay clear of the border area and are making an effort to restore good relations with Papua New Guinea.

Visa Policy. This week Senator Baker succeeded in passing an amendment to eliminate last year's McGovern Amendment, which liberalized our visa procedures and made it possible for members of "proscribed organizations," including Communist party members, to visit the United States. Our 42-50 loss in the Senate can be attributed largely to the AFL-CIO lobbying. We are taking steps in the House to try to assure that Baker's amendment is not adopted in conference. Dante Fascell is helping.

Haitian Emigration. 102 Haitian nationals, being held at Guantanamo after attempting to enter the United States illegally, were returned to Haiti yesterday. A review of their asylum requests by representatives from State, INS, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees determined that they were not bona fide refugees. A State Department officer accompanied the flights to Port-au-Prince to observe the reception and treatment given the returnees.

Portugal. Eanes has begun consultations with the political parties to find a formula for a new government that can win parliamentary support. None of the three democratic parties has foreclosed participation in a new government, but the concessions each will demand mean that a quick solution is unlikely. Should an impasse result, Eanes may take
advantage of the ambiguous Portuguese Constitution and attempt to promote a caretaker government to serve for four months until required elections are held. Our ambassador reports that whatever the outcome, formation of the government will unquestionably proceed within the established democratic framework.

Uganda. By a 73-1 vote, the Senate today approved a Weicker-Hatfield amendment to the IMF Authorization Act imposing a trade embargo against Uganda. The amendment covers both imports and exports, but exempts food sales. The embargo could be lifted only if you determined that Uganda is no longer engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. An attempt by Senator Church to substitute a non-binding resolution of condemnation was defeated, 46-30. In advance of the vote, we warned a number of Senators that a trade embargo could provoke Amin to retaliate against Americans in Uganda. Notwithstanding the fact that we have been advising Americans to leave Uganda for some time, action against our citizens would create heavy pressures on us for rescue or other countermeasures.

Argentina. In late June we approved the export of certain safety-related munitions list equipment to Argentina, because there appeared to be modest improvement in the human rights situation there. However, because the overall human rights situation was poor, we deferred approval of military training as well as other exports to the Argentine military. In addition, in carrying out our statutory obligation to advise the Ex-Im Bank on human rights conditions, we recently recommended that Ex-Im defer action on about $600 million in credits and guarantees for exports to Argentina.

Since we took these actions, there has been no significant improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina; there are continuing reports of disappearances and torture and a large number of
political prisoners. Moreover, although Argentina is in discussions with the IACHR, it has still not agreed to acceptable conditions for a visit. We are therefore continuing to withhold approval of Ex-Im credits and guarantees at this time.

There is mounting pressure on us from business and some Members of Congress to modify our advice to Ex-Im, since it may well result in the loss of considerable business for American firms. On the other hand, since the Argentine Government attaches considerable symbolic importance to Ex-Im financing, it may well make the human rights improvements necessary to enable us to be more positive. In the absence of such improvements, we plan to continue our present policy.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Warren Christopher, Acting

Tongsun Park. When Cy met this morning with the Korean Foreign Minister, they agreed that the Koreans would soon receive Justice Department officials to discuss with Korean Justice officials the terms and conditions under which we could interrogate Tongsun Park. This is a limited but significant step forward. The Koreans wanted us to agree to drop both the indictment and our request that Park return to the U.S., but Cy made clear that this was not possible. The Korean Foreign Minister was also told that we would be submitting the compensatory package to Congress at the appropriate time, after close consultations with the leadership. We expect Justice and the Koreans will separately announce the trip to Seoul tomorrow.

Hungary. In keeping with the terms of your decision regarding the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, Cy plans to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Puja on Saturday. Puja will be asked to confirm the assurances already given to Ambassador Kaiser and Billy Graham that the Crown will be maintained on continuing public display, that it will be received with honor in a public ceremony, and that the Cardinal will be an active participant in the ceremony. Once these assurances are confirmed by Puja, we will begin discussions with the Hungarians on the details of the return.
China. Cy hosted a dinner for Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua last night. Huang expressed regret that a prior commitment to visit Canada would prevent his meeting with you in New York. The dinner conversation, especially Huang's response to Cy's comment that we are studying his normalization proposals carefully but are not yet ready to reply, suggested that the Chinese understand our present situation and are not upset with the prospect of a limited delay in movement. Huang delivered a message from Chairman Hua to you, which stressed that normalization was not a diplomatic issue so much as a political issue. Cy told him that we would be back in touch with him through Leonard Woodcock on normalization.

In their discussion of global issues, Cy felt that Huang was somewhat more forthcoming on Chinese activity than he had been in Peking in August—especially in regard to East Africa, where he outlined a few things that the PRC was doing. He also seemed less critical of our Middle East policy than he had been a month ago.

Indian Ocean Talks. It seems clear the Soviets have accepted the General Declaration framework for Indian Ocean arms control that you approved and we proposed Monday. They appear satisfied with our suggestion that we commit ourselves in the Declaration to prompt negotiations on reductions in a second stage. On stabilization, they are trying to broaden the definition of the area, seeking to commit us to greater restrictions on our activities, probing our intentions with respect to Diego Garcia, and trying to find ways to get us to take our allies and bases in adjacent areas into account. But they have done this in a non-combative manner, leaving the door open for concessions by them. They have questioned us closely on our indirect assurances on strategic systems, and Ambassador Mendelevich said today they "appreciate" our effort to meet them on this point and will report fully when they return to Moscow. This round of the talks will end Saturday morning.

Law of the Sea. Elliot Richardson and I met with Norwegian Minister Evensen to discuss prospects for
getting back to a negotiating base that holds promise for concluding a comprehensive treaty. I made clear our strong dissatisfaction with the outcome of the last LOS negotiating session and our unwillingness to proceed unless an acceptable basis for dealing with the deep seabed mining issue can be found. Evensen, who has been a friend and a constructive force in the negotiations, is seeking new formulas and wishes to explore them in an informal small meeting in November, with the results to be reported directly to the President of the Conference. We have agreed to participate in that meeting.

SALT Unilateral Statement. Attached is the text of the proposed concurrent resolution worked out between Senators Church, Cranston and Jackson, as referred to in last night's report. As indicated, Cy told Church that we would have no objection.

Human Rights. The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance yesterday considered five large Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans to Argentina. It was the consensus of the Group that in view of the Argentine Government's very poor human rights record, we would recommend voting against four of the five loans. (Since we do not have veto power over these particular loans, and since other nations are not likely to join us in opposing the loans, they will probably be approved.) However, because the Group considers it important to send some signal of support for General Videla, we agreed to recommend approval of an $83 million loan for a potable water project which will benefit the needy.

The Group also considered a proposed IDB loan and several proposed AID projects for Nicaragua. There has been a significant development in the human rights picture in Nicaragua with the lifting of the state of siege on September 19. Some positive changes—such as a return of vigorous press criticism of the regime—have already occurred. On the other hand, disturbing reports of serious human rights violations in Nicaragua continue to reach us. In view of this mixed picture, it was the consensus of the Group that we should approve three small AID grants that would benefit the needy.
but defer consideration of two large AID loans and seek to postpone consideration of the IDB loan until we have a clearer picture of the trend.

Finally, the Group considered two IDB regional loans—one to a group consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay; the other, to a group consisting of Bolivia, Chile and Peru. While each group contains countries with poor human rights records, the loans in question (both for agricultural research) would help meet basic human needs. For this reason, it was the consensus of the Group that we should recommend approval of the loans.

Rhodesia. The UK resolution authorizing the Security Council to appoint a representative to join in military talks with Smith's military and the parties passed the Council with the Soviets abstaining and the Chinese not participating. There was only one amendment, by Libya, calling on the Secretary General to consult the Council in appointing his representative. The Soviets, Chinese, and Libyans expressed their reservations about the UN plan and the proposal for talks, and we expect the Soviets in particular to continue to make trouble behind the scenes.

Attachment.
RESOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO PRESIDENTIAL ACTION AFFECTING THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS

WHEREAS the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms will expire on October 3, 1977; and

WHEREAS a temporary observance of the limitations of the Interim Agreement will provide time for further negotiation, consistent with P.L. 92-448 toward a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms; and

WHEREAS the Congress desires that the United States negotiate a treaty supportive of United States national security without the burden and pressure of imminent deadlines; and

WHEREAS the Arms Control and Disarmament Act contemplates close cooperation and consultation between the Executive and Legislative Branches on matters of important substance; and

WHEREAS the interests of the United States are best served by a mutual recognition, in a spirit of comity, by the Congress and the Executive, of the importance of close consultation, cooperation and adherence to the constitutional and statutory sharing of responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs; and

WHEREAS the Administration has stated its unilateral intent that while the SALT II negotiations are being completed, the United States intends not to take any action inconsistent with the Interim agreement, provided that the Soviet Union exercises similar restraint; and

WHEREAS the Administration has expressly represented to Congress that the aforesaid declaration of intent is non-binding and non-obligatory upon the United States, now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, that the President is authorized to proceed in accordance with the declaration of intent of the Secretary of State of September 23, 1977 and the Senate of the United States and the House of Representatives concur.
November 7, 1977

DOS REVIEWED 20 Jan 2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

REFER TO CIA

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached herewith is a copy of your Evening Report of November 5, 1977, with the President's comments.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

CIA REVIEWED 09-May-2012: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-7-19-3-1-0
NARA EF Date 19/11/16

SECRET OPS
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

Argentina: I met yesterday with Deputy Foreign Minister of Argentina Allara, and underscored our hope that President Videla would be able to carry through on the human rights initiatives he outlined during your talk with him in September. Allara stressed the recurring terrorism problem, but his explanations were not defiant or petulant.

On non-proliferation, I was encouraged, given the advanced stage of Argentina's nuclear reprocessing facility, by Allara's statement that he could "see virtually no impediment to Argentina's ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco." Such a decision would require considerable courage on Videla's part in view of the pressure against ratification from important military elements. Allara said he hoped this matter could be resolved during Cy's visit to Argentina on November 21.

Romania: When he called on me this week, Romanian Deputy Prime Minister Patan made a strong pitch in favor of extending MFN to Romania on a multi-year basis. Patan argued that the annual renewal procedure under the Trade Act creates business uncertainty and provides a field day for critics of Romania. Patan had found a sympathetic ear in Senators Stevenson and Williams, and Congressmen Vanik and Bingham, among others. I told Patan that we
understand the difficulty and the irritation caused by the annual review, that we are prepared to consider favorably a longer review period, but that this will require study within the administration, including careful attention to the question of emigration from Romania to Israel. Patan was also planning to see Senator Jackson, and I emphasized that his reaction would be important.

South African Pass Laws: As you noted, the South African Government announced that it intends to propose measures to do away with the present system of issuing pass books to regulate the movement of blacks into urban areas. However, it appears that movement of blacks will continue to be controlled by requiring them to carry documents issued by the homelands which will be the functional equivalent of pass books. The Government's proposal is evidently intended to reinforce "separate development" by emphasizing homeland citizenship in lieu of South African citizenship.

Reportedly, the Government will also allow black workers who now have housing in white areas to be joined by their families. On the face of it, this seems to be a positive step but we will need to have more information to evaluate it. It is unlikely that many blacks will benefit from the change because there is little housing available to blacks in white areas. The change will not apply at all, for example, to the large group of migrant mine laborers who are required to live in bachelor hostels.

Human Rights: The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance has recently considered upcoming IFI loans to several countries:

--- Indonesia: It was the consensus of the Group that we should recommend a yes vote on four Asian Development Bank (ADB) loans to Indonesia, while indicating to the Indonesians that we are doing so on the assumption that they will keep their commitment to release some 10,000 political prisoners in December.

--- Bangladesh: The Group also agreed to recommend approval of three ADB and two World Bank loans to Bangladesh.
Three of the loans would clearly serve basic human needs; the other two would serve important developmental purposes in this very poor country. We have previously expressed to the Bangladeshis our concern about possible human rights violations flowing from the reaction to the October 2 coup attempt.

**Korea**: Pursuant to the Group's recommendation, we abstained on one Asian Development Bank loan to Korea and voted in favor of another, larger loan which would tend to serve basic human needs in certain respects. We have explained to the Koreans that the abstention reflects our serious concern about the lack of progress in improving human rights conditions in Korea.

**Chile**: The Group recommended voting against four upcoming Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans to Chile in view of its extremely poor human rights record.

**Bolivia**: The Group agreed to recommend approval of an IDB loan to Bolivia where there have been some encouraging signs of progress on human rights issues, including some movement in Bolivia's position concerning Americans imprisoned on drug charges.

**Uruguay**: The Group agreed to recommend that we oppose an upcoming IDB highway project loan to Uruguay because of its very poor human rights record.

**Rhodesia**: Lord Carver and General Chand met on November 2 with Rhodesian military commanders and on November 3 with civilian officials. The military expressed predictably strong opposition to basing the new army on the liberation forces, but conceded that since only the Patriotic Front can deliver a ceasefire, there is no alternative to dealing with it. Interestingly, despite their earlier scorn for the UN Force concept, the military pressed for assurance that the UN would be authorized to use force in support of the civil power. The civilian officials voiced concern about the "dictatorial powers" the Resident Commissioner would exercise and brought up the possibility of a modified internal settlement involving an alliance of Muzorewa, Sithole and "even Nkomo" backed by Kaunda and Machel.
Although the meetings produced no real progress, the Rhodesians have kept the door open to further negotiations, Smith's ill-humored comments to the press notwithstanding. Carver and Chand leave Salisbury today to continue consultations in Botswana, Mozambique and Nigeria.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

1. Cyprus - Foreign Minister Rolandas met with Warren and Matt Nimetz yesterday to describe his discussion Thursday with Kurt Waldheim on how to get the Cyprus inter-communal negotiations started early in 1979. Rolandas said the Greek Cypriots had problems with some of our framework proposals but knew that if they sought changes in their favor Turkish Cypriots would want to do the same. He had suggested to Waldheim several approaches to the Greek Cypriot domestic political problem, which he said would still enable the US ideas to be taken up as a "working paper" at the resumed negotiations. Rolandas stressed that, while they could not say so publicly, the Greek Cypriots did want the US to remain closely involved behind the scenes once the talks begin.

Warren talked with Waldheim this morning and urged that he seize the present opportunity by scheduling an early Greek-Turkish Cypriot meeting. Kurt promised to press ahead, shooting for a February 1 reconvening of the talks.

2. Inter-African Forces in Shaba - Our representative to the Paris five-power meeting this week assured our allies (France, Belgium, UK, FRG) that we share their general concern for maintenance of security in Shaba, and we agree it would be far preferable for the Moroccan and Senegalese troops to remain another six months. He made clear, however,
that we believe our original airlift contribution was significant and we have severe budgetary constraints that inhibit our providing further support. For this reason, we look to our European colleagues who have more direct interests in Shaba to shoulder the burden in this case. The French have nevertheless urged us to join them in a joint démarche in Rabat and Dakar to request that the forces remain. We replied today that we must reluctantly decline to participate in this approach since we would not be in a position to furnish the financing the Moroccans and Senegalese will require. The French Ambassador has pressed us again on this question. We were told in Paris that President Giscard intended to raise the matter with you at Guadaloupe, and he may now decide to approach you right away.

3. Iran - Members of the Bahai faith have stressed the very difficult situation of the Bahais in Iran. Bahais in Shiraz and nearby towns have recently been attacked by toughs and their houses, automobiles, and businesses fire-bombed. These attacks have occurred as pro-Shah demonstrators are spreading violence in the same cities, but we have no indication that there is a direct connection between the pro-Shah and anti-Bahai violence. There is very little that the US can do to assist these people in view of the turmoil and the hostile attitude of the Moslem population and government policy towards the Bahais. Any public statement by us is apt to make matters worse for the Bahais. We will be alert to opportunities to express our concern privately on behalf of the Bahais and other minorities in Iran.

4. Nicaragua - The Congress passed the Amnesty Law yesterday and Somoza signed it at 5:30 p.m., thus fulfilling the last of the FAO's preconditions for discussions with Somoza's party (PLN) on the plebiscite. The negotiating team convoked a meeting of the FAO, the PLN, the church and COSEP (private sector representatives) for today.

On Monday, the OAS Permanent Council will consider the report of the Ad Hoc Commission which investigated the border incident in which Costa Rican Civil Guardsmen were killed. The report came to no decision on blame, but recommends an observer force. A working group will
staff out the recommendation. Also on Monday, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers (attended mostly by representatives) will formally receive the IAHRHC human rights report on Nicaragua.

5. **Beagle Channel** - Presidents Videla and Pinochet both expressed appreciation for your messages. In his reply to you, Pinochet reaffirmed that Chile would not initiate military action. His Foreign Minister asked that we send military attaches as observers, which we have declined. Videla said he was exploring with his military commanders possible ways of resuming confident talks with Chile. The Argentine fleet is now in position near the disputed islands. Videla is being pressed by his hard-liners to authorize military action.

6. **Comprehensive Test Ban Status** - The CTB talks recessed on December 14, with resumption planned for January 29. At the last meeting, the Soviets gave preliminary approval to our proposed locations for the ten national seismic stations (NSS) in the USSR. We in turn agreed preliminarily with the ten locations the Soviets proposed for the US. Both sides kept open the possibility of adjusting some of the specific locations. (There are problems regarding sites proposed by the Soviets for NSS in British dependent territories.)

7. **Conclusion of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities**
   Discussions with Soviets - Enactment of the new Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 set in motion US-Soviet discussions on diplomatic privileges and immunities. These were concluded yesterday with an exchange of notes providing for expansion of such privileges and immunities to members of the administrative/technical and service staffs of our Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Washington in line with the Vienna Convention of 1961. The exchange of notes continues the traditional US-Soviet practice of according non-diplomatic personnel in Washington and Moscow all of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomats. The exchange of notes will facilitate our bilateral relations with the Soviets by eliminating a potential source of friction.
March 22, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

Taiwan Legislation. A bill reflecting the Conference Committee's decisions is being put in final form and will be reported early next week. The end product is an amalgam of provisions from the House and Senate versions. In some instances the Conference Committee made helpful additions or changes; in other instances it included less desirable provisions, but nothing in the Committee's action is contrary to the concepts underlying normalization. There is no impairment of the central purpose of enabling us to maintain a satisfactory entity for conducting unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan. Indeed, new language was added in Conference recognizing that "governmental" relations between the United States and Taiwan have been terminated. Thus it appears this legislation will reach you in satisfactory shape.

Claims/Assets Agreement. The Chinese have not yet responded to our offer to sign the claims/assets agreement which was initialed by Secretary Blumenthal March 2 in Beijing. The ostensible reason is procedural - the need for State Council approval of the agreement before it can be signed. The possibility exists that they intend to defer signing until after the Administration has acted on the Taiwan legislation.

Security in Wake of Peace Treaty Signing. Violent reactions against Americans in the wake of the Peace Treaty signing are possible, particularly in some Arab countries. We have alerted our missions abroad that the signing will probably take place March 26. We have instructed some of them to consult with host governments about increased protection and report to us on measures taken and their assessment of the threat.
Grenada. We announced at noon today that we will continue friendly and cooperative relations with Grenada, and that our Ambassador at Bridgetown will travel to Grenada to meet with the Governor General and the new Prime Minister. Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana have formally recognized the new government, as has the UK. Our public announcement explicitly noted that our decision was based on the new government's stated commitment to free elections and constitutional government. We have reiterated this same point to the Grenadians, other interested Caribbean states and the UK.

Common Fund. The framework agreement reached in Geneva on the Common Fund is a significant step forward in the North-South dialogue and effectively removes the Fund as a contentious political issue for UNCTAD V at Manila in May. An Interim Committee will meet later this year on remaining operational issues. We have said we cannot accept the current voting arrangement giving 47 percent of the votes to the developing countries and only 42 percent to OECD countries, and this will be further negotiated.

P-3 Flights. Djibouti has approved our request for increasing our monthly P-3 flight to two flights per week over the next two weeks. When we can judge better the Arab reaction to the Egypt-Israel Treaty, we will consider the prospects for Oman's approval of P-3 access on a longer-term basis.

Security Assistance. The House Foreign Affairs Committee completed mark-up of the security assistance authorization today. The FMS and MAP programs were approved, for the most part, as requested by the Administration. Zablocki hopes the security assistance bill will go to the floor March 29.

Human rights advocates eliminated IMET for Guatemala and derailed a proposal by Gus Yatron to permit Chile, Argentina and Brazil to participate in regional IMET programs. $10 million in FMS for Zaire was rejected partially on human rights grounds.
FMS for Panama was cut from $5 million to $2.5 million. This cut was initiated by Republicans as a slap at the Canal treaties, but they were supported by new Democratic members of the Committee who were lodging human rights protests.

Middle East Consultations. Dick Stone told us today that the U.S. proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was excellent, and that we should accept no further tightening of the language which would require approval by the Senate as a treaty. Javits agreed that the agreement as drafted was generally acceptable and would not require Senate approval. Hamilton felt that the whole concept of the MOA was hard to swallow. Although he accepted the need for some security assistance to Israel, he felt that the paragraphs dealing with U.S. policy should be omitted.

Stone and Javits seemed prepared to accept a $1.5 billion FMS program for Egypt. Both felt that they could, under certain circumstances, accept an F-4 sale to Egypt. Stone said he would find the whole package acceptable, unless there were some particularly threatening type of hardware included.

Mexico. While awaiting a formal response from the Mexican government on our proposal for reorganizing the Consultative Mechanism, we are moving ahead to establish the new working groups and to set up meetings with the Mexicans in April. The energy group will meet following preliminary meetings on natural gas and electricity exchanges in Mexico City the first week in April. On trade, we are pressing the Mexicans to conclude negotiations with us before we conclude our MTN tariff negotiations in Geneva April 6. For the other six working groups, we are proposing or already have agreed with the Mexicans on April meeting dates.

Israeli Settlements. With the U.S. abstaining, the UN Security Council today passed the Jordanian Resolution establishing a three-nation Commission "to examine the situation concerning the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories." The vote was 12-0 with three abstentions (U.S., UK, Norway). We abstained on the Resolution after it was moderated at our insistence. A tacit

SECRET
call for sanctions against Israel was deleted and the Commission's mandate was narrowed considerably from the original Arab proposal. Israel announced that the Commission would not be allowed to enter the occupied territories.

Castro. Yesterday we received the following message from Fidel Castro, through one of his aides: Cuba is not now interested in official conversations and needs a gesture from the U.S. before the dialogue can usefully be resumed. While Cuba foresees no immediate hope for progress in our relations, it does not want any backsliding either, and will do nothing to provoke hostile relations with us. Cuba remains interested in pursuing links with the Cuban-American community, keeping up contacts with the U.S. on the prisoner release programs, holding talks with the U.S. Coast Guard later this spring, and continuing its cooperation with the FBI on security matters affecting the Pan-American Games that will be held in Puerto Rico.
March 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached is a copy of your Evening Report of March 27, with comments by the President.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

DOS REVIEWED 11 APR 2012 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority NLC-7-21-5-13-1
NARA DE 7/9/14
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

1. Meeting with the Cranston Group: I had lunch today with Alan Cranston and a group of 15 senators interested in SALT II. I first brought them generally up to date and then outlined the foreign policy consequences of a failure of the Senate to ratify. John Glenn read a long list of items which he said we would not be able to verify as a result of the closing of the Iran installations. I assured the group that we would not sign a treaty that was not adequately verifiable and described in general terms the intelligence community's proposals for dealing with the Iran loss. John Culver expressed concern that members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were planning to push us to decide prematurely on a basing mode for the MX. Ted Kennedy asked whether we were contemplating other agreements with the Soviets that would create a more positive atmosphere for the consideration of SALT and suggested the possibility of an improvement in the human rights climate in the Soviet Union, e.g., the release of some of the dissidents.

2. PRC: Warren met with Ambassador Chai today and they discussed the Taiwan legislation for more than an hour. They went over the Chinese objections point-by-point, and Warren also handed over a paper responding to the Chinese points. Warren thinks he may have made some progress, especially in pointing out that some of the PRC's objections pertain to provisions which did not survive the Conference Committee. Warren also told Chai that we might wish to have a US Navy ship visit a Chinese port and that, while not ready to make definite plans, we would like a reaction as to whether such a visit would be welcomed. Chai promised an early answer. Chai was also told that we are prepared to exchange military attaches.

RDS - 2/3 3/27/99 (Vance, Cyrus)

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3. Shah’s Travel: Preparations for the Shah’s onward travel concentrated today on the Bahamas. Dave Newsom has worked closely with David Rockefeller’s office and Robert Armao, a New York public relations consultant who will meet with Bahamian Foreign Minister Adderley Wednesday. We have helped to arrange this meeting, and our Chargé in Nassau was scheduled to see Adderley late this afternoon. He will inform him of the Shah’s wish to arrive this Friday. In two recent soundings by our Embassy, Adderley did not close the door to the Shah, but his government has still not reached a final decision. Assuming the answer is positive, the Shah and his party would stay on the secluded island of Eleuthera. We understand that the Shah regards the Bahamas as a temporary stop. His principal interest remains Mexico, although his representatives have decided not to approach the Mexicans until after arrangements to move to Eleuthera are complete.

4. Uganda: Nyerere has told us that over the weekend Quadafi sent him an ultimatum giving Tanzania 24 hours to withdraw from Uganda. Nyerere ignored this threat and is continuing to pursue his military campaign against Amin, but he has expressed his concern to us and other Western representatives and has asked us for our assessment of Libyan involvement in Uganda. We will give him our intelligence on Libya’s military capability. Our initial estimate is that the Libyan threat contains a large element of bluff.

Ugandan exile leaders meeting in Tanzania have elected an 11-member council as a provisional government. The council, which is representative of the regional and ethnic groups of Uganda, plans to establish itself in southern Uganda.

5. OPEC Price Increase: OPEC decided today to raise the price of "marker crude" by about 9 percent to $14.54 per barrel -- the price originally supposed to take effect October 1. Each OPEC member, however, is free to set the price of its own crudes independently from the marker price taking into account differences of quality, transportation distances to major markets, and other factors. The Iranian representative said his government would like to get oil production up to a level of about 4 million
barrels per day (compared with about 6 mmbd under the Shah). He asked other OPEC members to stop supplying incremental output to the market as they have done since October to help offset the Iranian shortfall.

Results of the meeting are disquieting. The price increase alone will add about $12 billion to world oil import bills, with the surcharges adding more. Uncertainty about the amount of oil to be provided by producers with surplus capacity will aggravate the current tight market conditions. The meeting results illustrate that Saudi Arabia cannot, in present circumstances, exercise its traditional overwhelming influence on OPEC prices. Even with the Saudis producing oil at near-maximum levels, the reduction in Iranian exports leaves supply and demand essentially unbalanced, keeping pressure on prices and preventing the seasonal stock build-up needed to cover next winter.

6. Peru: Chris met today with the new Peruvian Ambassador, Alfonso Arias Schreiber. Chris told him of our concern about the Cuban candidacy for a seat on the Security Council and said the US would back Peru if it gained the support of the Latin American caucus. Arias will report this to his government, and may have something to say to you on the subject when he presents his credentials Friday.

Following up on the discussion Fritz had on this topic last week with Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro, I plan to send a personal letter to Guerreiro asking for more active Brazilian support of a Peruvian candidacy.

7. Argentina: I have been increasingly concerned about the absence of substantial human rights progress in Argentina. During 1978 Argentine security units continued to abduct and torture (and in many cases summarily execute) an average of more than 50 persons per month. Last month we informed the Argentines that, in the absence of substantial improvements, we would not be able to maintain our position of abstention on loans to Argentina in the multilateral development banks, and instead would have to vote against the loans. Late last week
the Argentine Ambassador responded with a number of potentially significant representations, including that the moderates have strengthened their position within the junta, that abductions by security units have been stopped, and that any reports of abductions will be immediately investigated. Although we have learned to be skeptical of Argentine promises, reports of abductions have greatly diminished in February and March. On the basis of their representations, Warren told the Argentines that we are adhering to our abstention position on a World Bank loan today and would continue to watch the situation closely.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting

Panama Canal. I met with Jack Murphy today to discuss plans for gaining House approval of the implementing legislation. Murphy said the crucial vote would probably occur on a motion by George Hansen to recommit the Murphy bill to committee, or on a substitute Hanson bill which would contravene the treaties.

We had a good talk, and (I hope) established a basis for working more closely together in subsequent stages. Murphy urged us to undertake a major educational campaign to convince House members, particularly Republicans, that the treaties cannot be overturned and that the Hanson approach would jeopardize efficient operation of the Canal. Ed Derwinski's excellent piece on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled "Panama: from No to Yes," should be helpful with Republicans.

Bill Rogers has been asked by Panama President Royo to come to Panama to provide counsel on the implementing legislation. I gave Bill our appraisal of the legislative situation this afternoon. It will be good to have his wise and calming counsel available to the Panamanians.
Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army force was deployed to southern Lebanon today. Haddad's artillery continued to shell UN positions in protest until about 7:00 p.m. our time. A Norwegian UN soldier was killed and another wounded in today's shelling. An American officer serving as a UN observer was briefly held by Haddad's forces and released only after Israeli intervention.

At the UN, work is continuing on Waldheim's report to the Security Council on the implementation of UN resolutions on Lebanon. We understand Begin's decision to cooperate with UNIFIL is likely to soften criticism of Israel in the report. The possibility of Security Council action will depend on whether the shelling resumes tomorrow.

The Shah. A campaign remains in progress to change our position with respect to the Shah's admission to the U.S. John McCloy, following up conversations with Cy and Zbig and a long letter to me, is continuing to call influential people throughout the country. We understand that McCloy's efforts continue to be stimulated by Henry Kissinger and by the efforts of Ardeshir Zahedi.

The Shah has turned down Panama. We are awaiting a response to an inquiry to President Lopez Portillo on behalf of the Shah.

Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go elsewhere, at least for the time being, is further strengthened by Khomeini's verbal attacks on American influence and the withdrawal of two-thirds of the Iranian guard force from our Embassy compound. A new evaluation has just come in from Tehran confirming our assessment that the safety of official and unofficial Americans would be jeopardized if the Shah comes here.

Argentina. I saw Ambassador Castro today to discuss the recent significant improvements in the human rights situation in Argentina. In the first months of 1979, the Argentines have almost eliminated the abductions by official security units which had occurred at a rate of almost 50 per month in 1978.
They appear to be investigating the few reports of recent abductions that have been received. The Argentine Supreme Court is also beginning to play a more active role in pressing the regime for information on missing persons. We believe these and other encouraging developments are partly attributable to our policy of pressing firmly for improvements and to the anticipated visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (now scheduled for late next month).

U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. U.S. participants in six of the eight working groups have now had organizational meetings and are preparing for meetings with their Mexican counterparts in April and May.
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NOT TO MENTION COX IN ANY ARTICLES.

6. TIMHERHAN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHT-WING AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CABILOO IS FINANCED BY DIANA DE MASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PIOVINCIA IN BAIIA BLANCA. (NS: MRS. MASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, AND IF MEMORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA MOORS CARoT OR JAPA AWARD IN 1973 OR 1974.)

7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, TIMHERHAN SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE AND RIGHT-VING ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERONIST SUPPORT, WHICH MAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERON WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA.

8. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIMHERHAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A CHILLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN AND ANTI-SEMUTIC.

9. TIMHERHAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV DAILY MAAR) AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED COLUMBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE WILL BRANCH INTO WIDER DISCUSSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITLED STATES WILL BE HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US


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DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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Authority NLC-6-4-7-2-1

NARA EF Date 794114

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-7-2-1
WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE.
There has been widespread civil violence in Argentina since 1970. The unique quality of the present situation is the very large number of people detained and "disappeared" since the military came to power in 1976. A worldwide storm of criticism has resulted. Some of the cases of greatest interest are:

**Deutsch Family**: Jewish groups, human rights organizations and some 25 Congressmen have asked our assistance for the family. President Carter raised the case of the Deutsches with President Videla during their bilateral.

The father, mother and three daughters were arrested in September. A son and his family fled and are now in the U.S. The Deutsch home was looted by the troops that arrested the family and there are reports that the family was tortured during the first weeks of confinement. In October, the mother and two daughters were released, but the youngest daughter and the father are still held. President Videla wrote to President Carter in October to say that the detained daughter was a member of a terrorist organization and that the father had known this yet had covered up for her. They would both be tried by military courts, the President said.

**Jacobo Timerman**: Editor and publisher of one of Argentina's largest newspapers, Timerman has become a cause celebre for Jewish groups and newspaper editors worldwide. Five Senators—Javits, Case, Sarbanes, Stone and Church—wrote you asking for your intercession on Timerman's behalf while you are in Argentina. He was arrested in April and there are reports that he was mistreated. No charges have been placed against him, and his arrest is more surprising in that his paper generally took a pro-military line. Last week, Timerman's civil rights and control over his property were cancelled by the government. The U.S. Jewish community sees Timerman's case as a specific example of the anti-semitism which they believe is rampant in Argentina. The government forcefully denies it is anti-semitic and has passed a law prohibiting the incitement of racial violence.

**Alfredo Bravo**: Vice President of a major Argentine human rights group and President of the Argentine Teachers Union, Bravo was arrested in September.
he had met a few days before his arrest with a visiting
AFL-CIO delegation, the U.S. labor movement is very
interested in his case.

Adolfo Perez Esquivel: A deeply religious and non-
violent man, Perez Esquivel was the Coordinator of the
ecumenical movement "Peace and Justice." He was arrested
in April and has been imprisoned without charges since
then. The Catholic Church and human rights groups have
pressed strongly for his release.

Vogler Family: Liliana Vogler was arrested in June
1975 and her father was arrested later that year,
reportedly because he was making inquiries on her behalf.
Liliana was tried on charges of subversion, but not
allowed to renounce a confession which had been obtained
under torture. The sentence should be given in the next
few months. Guillermo Vogler has been granted permission
to leave the country, (he will come to the U.S.) but
has not actually been released. The Foreign Ministry has
promised to try to speed up his release. There has been
White House and Congressional interest in the case.

Disappearances

Mauricio Lopez: Another ecumenical leader, Lopez
was rector of San Luis University when he disappeared
in January. Church groups in the U.S. and Europe have
shown great interest in his case.

Eduardo Sajon: The former press secretary to
Argentine President Lanusse, Sajon disappeared in April.

Dagmar Hagelin: A dual national Swedish-Argentine
student, Hagelin disappeared in January. The Swedish
Prime Minister wrote to Videla about her, but was told
the Argentines had no information. The Swedish govern­
ment has now appealed to us for assistance.

Procedures for Reporting Human Rights Cases

The Argentine Foreign Office Working Group on
Human Rights, to which we have made known our interest
in specific cases, has been generally unresponsive to our
requests for information. This week, however, they did
reply to a backlog of our requests, but provided little
new information. Their failure to provide information
may be a reflection of the GOA's indecision as to
how to handle the cases of the "disappeared."
Argentina

Bush Up

Declassified
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8787 DTG: 111649Z DEC 83 PSN: 675858
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SECRET FOR WHITE HOUSE ONLY

WHITE HOUSE PASS TO ADMIRAL MURPHY ABOARD VICE PRESIDENT'S AIRCRAFT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OA DR
TAGS: PREL, US, AR
SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSIN BILATERAL DRAFT MEMCON

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF THE BUSH/ALFONSIN BILATERAL. PLEASE ADVISE EMBASSY OF CONCURRENCE OR REVISIONS SO WE CAN SUBMIT AS FINAL. WE RECOMMEND DISTRIBUTION TO VARIOUS WASHINGTON AGENCIES, PARTICULARLY DEFENSE AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

3. PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, AMBASSADOR FRANK ORTIZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANTHONY MOTLEY, ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY, PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN, FOREIGN MINISTER DANTE CAPUTO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HUGO GOBBI, SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY GERMAN LOPEZ.


5. THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED BY SAYING HE SPENT AN UNBELIEVABLE DAY AS A PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR IN THE PUBLIC JUBILATION OVER ARGENTINA'S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. HE SAID NOW THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA COULD BECOME EQUAL PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE AND PROSPERITY. HE BELIEVED THERE IS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATIVE ACTIONS BY TWO GREAT NATIONS. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN REPLIED HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. ARGENTINA WANTS TO HAVE INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. SUCH RELATIONS WOULD BE BETWEEN MATURE PARTNERS. THE TWO NATIONS HAVE MANY COMMON INTERESTS. THEY NOW SHARED A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN. THERE WERE ALSO DIFFERING AND CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY. HE SAID WE SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THE DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW BECOME COMMON INTERESTS AND THE CONTRADICTORY POINTS OF VIEW SIMPLY BECOME DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW. HE SAID BILATERAL RELATIONS SUFFERED BECAUSE OF THE MALVINAS WAR, BUT THIS SAME PROBLEM COULD BECOME A POSSIBLE AVENUE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD MUST BE UNIFIED. THE MALVINAS ISSUE DIVIDES THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTION ON THE MALVINAS. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE U.K. AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BEGIN, EVEN IF WITH DIFFERING
AGENDAS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START TALKS. THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND AT ALL COSTS THE CONVERSION OF THE ISLANDS INTO A MILITARY FORTRESS MUST BE STOPPED BEFORE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS TURNED TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC. THERE IS A RISK THAT THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD, LIKE THE INDIAN OCEAN, BECOME AN AREA OF CONTEST BETWEEN WORLD POWERS. ARGENTINA IS DECISIVELY OPPOSED TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ARGENTINA HOPES THE UNITED STATES WILL COOPERATE WITH THE ARGENTINE NATION TO AVOID SUCH A SITUATION.

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED HE BELIEVES THE U.K. WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD IN REBUILDING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO CERTIFY TO THE CONGRESS ARGENTINA’S IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS NOT EASY FOR THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT. THE UNITED STATES HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT CAN HELP IN BETTERING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. IF THE UNITED STATES SEES THERE IS NO WAY IT CAN BE HELPFUL, WE SHALL TELL ARGENTINA SO FRANKLY AND TELL THEM WHY. THE UNITED STATES DESIRES A FRANK RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT ALFONSO SAID HE WAS VERY DELIGHTED TO HEAR THE VICE PRESIDENT SPEAK IN THIS MANNER. HE SAID HE ALSOANTED THAT THERE BE A FRANK DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

8. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ALLUDED TO SOME DEMONSTRATIONS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE IN THE GREAT CROWDS IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, THE PRESIDENT SAID AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE NAIVE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THERE IS ADVERSE SENTIMENT IN ARGENTINA SINCE THE MALVINAS WAR, THAT WAS NOT THE REASON FOR WHATEVER ISOLATED INSTANCES OF HOSTILITY THE VICE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE OBSERVED. THERE ARE GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA WHO RAISE BANNERS THAT ARE NOT NATIONAL BANNERS BUT ARE THOSE OF THE EAST/WEST CONFLICT. LATIN AMERICA IS A
CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSO BILATERAL DRAFT MEMCON

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID, GIVEN THE NEW RELATIONSHIP THAT IS BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE BE PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES. ALFONSO IMMEDIATELY AGREED. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A WORKING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES SOME TIME LATE IN 1984. HE PREDICTED THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSO WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN. PRESIDENT ALFONSO SAID IT WOULD GIVE HIM THE GREATEST PLEASURE TO MEET PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THERE ARE SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HOPED IT COULD BE COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTIVE. HE NOTED THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY MCNAMARA WAS A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION AND WAS THEN MEETING WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE ECONOMIC TEAM. THE UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE IN ASSISTING ARGENTINA TO MEET ITS GREAT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT ALFONSO SAID A LESSENING OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT PROBLEM IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO HIM. HE SAID THERE IS A DANGER THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT FULFILL THE EXPECTATIONS IT AWAKENED. HE SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE LIMITATIONS ON ARGENTINA'S DEVELOPMENT IMPOSED BY THE HUGE DEBT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID ARGENTINA ALWAYS PAYS ITS DEBTS. THE WAY FOR ARGENTINA TO PAY OFF ITS DEBT IS TO EXPORT. IT WAS VITAL TO FIND MARKETS FOR ARGENTINA'S EXPORTS AND TO ARRANGE AN EQUITABLE REFINANCING OF THE DEBT, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT ARGENTINA WILL PAY. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO HELP. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN VERY STRONGLY RESISTED THE SIREN-CALL OF PROTECTIONISM RAISED BY AFFECTED AMERICAN PRODUCERS. THE UNITED STATES WAS DOING IT NOT OUT OF GENEROSITY BUT BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES MARKET SHOULD BE OPEN TO EVERYONE. THE UNITED STATES SHALL CONTINUE TO RESIST RAISING BARRIERS TO TRADE. HE ASSURED PRESIDENT ALFONSO THAT WOULD BE THE CASE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A GOOD TRADING PARTNER. ALFONSO SAID THAT THIS WAS A BASIC COMMON INTEREST AND THanked
THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSURANCES. HE NOTED THAT EVEN ARGENTINA HAD TO EXTEND HELP TO COUNTRIES IN DISTRESS. HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO PAY BOLIVIA $270 MILLION VERY SOON, A SUM THAT ARGENTINA COULD SCARCELY AFFORD.

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PROBABLE AFFECT ON THE ECONOMIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES ALSO WOULD IMPROVE. PRESIDENT ALFONSON SAID THE TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO EXPAND THE ECONOMY AND TO HAVE GREATER PRODUCTION. HE BELIEVED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A REDUCTION IN INTEREST RATES.

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RAISED THE MATTER OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES LISTENED WITH GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE ALFONSON ADMINISTRATION'S STATEMENTS ON THE MATTER. HE NOTED THAT PURELY AS A BILATERAL UNITED STATES/ARGENTINE QUESTION, THE UNITED STATES COULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ASSURING THERE BE A STEADY FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION WERE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR DEVICES. HE SAID TO THE DEGREE ALFONSON COULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IT WOULD MAKE ALL AREAS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION MUCH EASIER. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS ISSUE WAS ARGENTINA'S BUSINESS, BUT PRESIDENT ALFONSON'S DECISIONS WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT BE LESS THAN FRANK ON AN ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. PRESIDENT ALFONSON SAID THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WAS THE CONVERSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, THE BIG POWERS WORRY ABOUT THE
13. The Vice President, in a forceful manner, conveyed to President Alfonsin the commitment of President Reagan to a major reduction in arms not solely limitation, but a reduction in armaments. He noted that a President with the credentials of President Reagan can make effective agreements with the Soviet Union and obtain ratification for such agreements in the Senate. It is necessary to engage the Soviet Union in discussions leading to such ends. President Reagan feels very strongly about this issue. The United States absolutely wants to reduce arms. However, it takes two to tango, the Vice President said he believed there was growing support in Eastern Europe for arms reduction. He knew that in the United States that President Reagan is strong enough to achieve it. President Alfonsin said that this truly was a message of hope. He wished President Reagan every success.

14. The Vice President asked for President Alfonsin's advice on Central America. The President said that in Central America there is an authentic struggle by the people against a feudal system that enslaves and exploits them. In this situation there is interference by both super powers, which complicates the attainment of local solutions. He advised that the United States honestly accept democratic socialism in Central America, consisting of constitutional government, agrarian reform, and the nationalization of such enterprises as banks. Historically, the United States has not been willing to do so. Such a decision by the United States in this regard would tranquilize these countries. The Vice President replied that the key word was "democratic". If by free exercise of the popular will such courses as those cited were decided upon, the United States would have no problem. He noted the United States was the most significant supporter of the Sandinista revolutionary government in a material, political and effective sense than any other nation. However, the Sandinistas promptly removed the "democratic" from their system and even the "socialist" attributes disappeared. Their country was converted into a Marxist/Leninist totalitarian state. The United States has no interest in creating mirror
IMAGES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO IS TO DEMOCRACY, TO FREE ELECTIONS, A FREE PRESS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREE INSTITUTIONS. THAT IS WHAT WE INSIST UPON, AND THAT IS WHAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN THAT AREA. IF CENTRAL AMERICA BECOMES A SERIES OF DEMOCRATIC STATES WE SHOULD BE VERY COMFORTABLE WITH WHATEVER THEY DECIDE TO DO. HE REFERRED TO THE HARSH STATEMENTS BY ORTEGA UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN BUENOS AIRES AND SAID UNFORTUNATELY ORTEGA MADE IT A HABIT TO SAY THINGS THAT ARE NOT TRUE. THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SANDINISTAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE LISTEN CAREFULLY TO NICARAGUAN OVERTURES AND WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO SINCERE OVERTURES. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE.

15. PRESIDENT ALFONSOIN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. HE WONDERED IF IT WAS A GENERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POSITION WHICH WAS APPLICABLE TO THE PENTAGON AS WELL AS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. HE NOTED PRESIDENT ALFONSOIN WAS STRIVING TO ESTABLISH SUCH CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ARGENTINA. THE POSITION HE OUTLINED IS A POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY IS THE POSITION OF THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE SLOW-MOVING BUREAUCRACY. PRESIDENT ALFONSOIN SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM WAS TRUE.

16. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN DELIVERED A PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THANKED PRESIDENT ALFONSOIN FOR HIS TIME, NOTING THAT HE MUST BE EXHAUSTED AFTER HIS INTENSIVE DAY. PRESIDENT ALFONSOIN WAS VERY EFFUSIVE IN HIS FAREWELL REMARKS, FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO OBSERVED
SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSO BILATERAL DRAFT MEMCON

WITH FEELING THAT HE CONSIDERED IT TO HAVE BEEN A "BEAUTIFUL" MEETING. ORTIZ
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINE CERTIFICATION -- DELIVERY OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT 1600 HOURS WASHINGTON TIME DECEMBER 7 I GAVE PRESIDENT BIGNONE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONCERNING CERTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS. PRESIDENT BIGNONE WAS GRATIFIED PARTICULARLY BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONGRATULATING HIM ON HIS ACCOMPLISHMENT IN RETURNING ARGENTINA TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

3. PRESIDENT BIGNONE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD MAINTAIN OUR DECISION IN CONFIDENCE.HE SAID THIS POSITIVE STEP BY THE UNITED STATES REMOVED AN IRRITATING OBSTACLE TO COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA.
"IN MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS". ORTIZ
1. HEREIN IS A PRECIS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS. THE FIRST SECTION COVERS BILATERAL ISSUES WITH LIKELY QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDED ANSWERS. THE SECOND SECTION DEALS WITH ISSUES OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK INDICATING THE ISSUE AS PERCEIVED BY THE ARGENTINES.

2. FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISSUE: THE INCOMING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND, PARTICULARLY, THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, EXPECT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO URGING THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS. HMG HAS REJECTED NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY.

QUESTION: NOW THAT ARGENTINA HAS A DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENT, WILL THE U.S. PRESS THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON SOVEREIGNTY OF THE MALVINAS?

ANSWER: THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT IS CLEAR. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE, AND WE HAVE REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, MOST RECENTLY BY SUPPORTING THE MALVINAS RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

3. THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA ISSUE: MOST ARGENTINES ARE EUPHORIC ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE AWARE THAT ARGENTINA'S DEMOCRACY, DESPITE ALFONSO'S MANDATE, IS STILL FRAGILE AND WOULD APPRECIATE REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. IS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM HERE. THERE ARE SOME CHARGES THE U.S. MILITARY, SOMES TIMES ENCOURAGES COUPS.

QUESTION: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTEND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT SUPPORTS THE CONSOLIDATION OF A STABLE AND LASTING DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA?

ANSWER: I CAN EMPHATICALLY ASSURE YOU, AND THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS THIS, THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, AND DEMOCRATIZING PROCESSES IN COUNTRIES WHICH LACK DEMOCRATIC RULE, NOT ONLY IN ARGENTINA BUT THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT ALFONSO AND TO ALL ARGENTINES OUR READINESS TO DO WHAT IS WITHIN OUR POWER TO HELP ENSURE THAT DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AND RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES ARE RESTORED FOREVER IN THIS GREAT NATION. ALL SECTORS OF THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA.

4. ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

ISSUE: THE KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION PROHIBITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING CASH SALES, TO ARGENTINA UNLESS THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO CONGRESS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. CONSIDERATIONS DEALING WITH THE MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE AREA COULD AFFECT MAJOR SALES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH LEGISLATION.

QUESTION: WILL THE UNITED STATES SELL ARMS TO ARGENTINA NOW THAT THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: THE OBVIOUS IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED CERTIFICATION THAT WOULD PERMIT ARMS SALES. THE TIMING OF SUCH A CERTIFICATION IS UNDER INTENSIVE REVIEW. AFTER SUCH CERTIFICATION ANY SALES WHICH MIGHT BE REQUESTED WILL BE EXAMINED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS IS THE PROCEDURE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. MY UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN THAT MAJOR ARMS PURCHASES ARE NOT A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AND IT CERTAINLY IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. TO URGE ARMS PURCHASES ON ARGENTINA.
5. BEAGLE CHANNEL

ISSUE: The Pope has proposed a framework for resolving the long-standing territorial waters dispute between Argentina and Chile in the South Atlantic, the so-called Beagle Channel dispute.

QUESTION: Does the U.S. intend to press Argentina and Chile to resolve the Beagle dispute?

ANSWER: It is certainly our hope that these two sister republics will find a peaceful solution to this long-pending dispute. However, we believe the mediation of the dispute is in the most capable hands possible. We wish the Pope and the two parties every success.

5. ARGENTINE NON-ALIGNMENT

ISSUE: Alfonsin will continue the military government's non-aligned policy in foreign affairs. Occasionally the press claims that this will prejudice Argentina's relations with the United States.

QUESTION: How will your government react to Argentina's assuming a strong non-aligned posture?

ANSWER: The U.S. government respects the non-aligned movement and has excellent relations with many of its members. We have no trouble with genuine non-aligned positions on international issues. We think that at times the non-aligned movement diverges widely from a truly non-aligned course and accordingly we have made our views known to the NAM leadership and its members.

7. THE FOREIGN DEBT

ISSUE: Argentina's foreign debt is over U.S. $40 billion dollars. Some Argentines believe democratic governments may provide a newly democratic Argentina assistance to provide breathing space to move the country toward recovery without adopting severe austerity measures. The Argentines believe they have a greater ability to service the debt than other Latin American debtors; therefore Argentina is less of a risk and should receive better terms.

QUESTION: What assistance can the United States government give us in managing the foreign debt incurred by the previous government?

ANSWER: I am pleased to be able to tell you that the U.S. Congress has approved the increase in the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund. Thus Argentina, which is also an active member of the fund, may well be able to acquire substantial additional financing from that source. In the context of a carefully developed plan to overcome current economic problems, moreover, the rapid U.S. economic expansion which has now been going...
ON FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IS ALREADY CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASING DEMAND FOR EXPORTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD INCLUDING FROM ARGENTINA. WE ARE COMMITTED BOTH TO KEEPING OUR RECOVERY MOVING FORWARD AND TO KEEPING OUR DOORS OPEN FOR COMPETITIVE EXPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. IN TERMS OF THE DETAIL OF THE DEBT AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR MORE FAVORABLE REPAYMENT CONDITIONS, I MUST POINT OUT THAT MOST OF THE ARGENTINE DEBT IS WITH PRIVATE BANKS NOT WITH THE U.S. OR OTHER GOVERNMENTS. HOWEVER, I KNOW THAT U.S. BANKERS, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER SECTORS OF THE U.S., WELCOMED THE RETURN OF STABLE DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA AND THEY WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE TERMS FOR THE DEBT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM YOUR NEW GOVERNMENT WORKS OUT WITH THE IMF.

B. BEEF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

ISSUE: THE U.S. DOES NOT PERMIT THE IMPORT OF FRESH OR CHILLED BEEF FROM ARGENTINA BECAUSE HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IS STILL PRESENT IN ARGENTINA. CHILE HAS RECENTLY BEEN DECLARED FREE OF HOOF AND MOUTH AND CAN NOW EXPORT FRESH BEEF TO THE U.S. ARGENTINA EXPORTS COOKED AND PROCESSED BEEF TO THE U.S.

QUESTION: WILL THE U.S. PERMIT THE EXPORT OF FRESH BEEF TO THE U.S. NOW THAT THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT?
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: U.S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION

ANSWER: I WISH IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO OPEN OUR MEAT MARKET FULLY TO ARGENTINA. I WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO EAT MORE OF YOUR EXCELLENT BEEF. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE OF HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN ARGENTINA WHICH MIGHT BE TRANSMITTED TO THE U.S. IN TIMES PASSED THE ELIMINATION OF THIS DISEASE HAS REQUIRED EXPENDITURES OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN THE U.S. THUS WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR STRICT SANITARY RESTRICTIONS. IF ARGENTINA CAN ELIMINATE THE DISEASE, WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO PLACE A GREAT DEAL OF YOUR EXCELLENT MEAT ON OUR TABLE.

ISSUE: THE U.S. HAS CHANGED ITS BEEF IMPORT INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TESTING SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATIONAL IN EXPORTING COUNTRIES BY JANUARY 1, 1984.

QUESTION: WILL ARGENTINE BEEF EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES BE RESTRICTED NEXT YEAR?

ANSWER: ALL FOREIGN SUPPLIERS OF MEAT AND POULTRY TO THE U.S. MARKET MUST COMPLY WITH CERTAIN INSPECTION PROCEDURES THAT ARE REQUIRED BY U.S. LAW. THESE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE THE SAME FOR U.S. DOMESTIC AS WELL AS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS. I UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA IS ADVANCED IN MEETING THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND I WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE THAT NECESSARY STEPS BE TAKEN DURING THIS PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT TRANSITION SO THAT PROCESSED MEAT EXPORTS TO THE U.S. ARE NOT INTERRUPTED.

9. U.S. GRAIN EXPORT CREDITS

ISSUE: MANY ARGENTINES BELIEVE THAT, THROUGH THE BLENDED CREDIT PROGRAM, THE U.S. IS DISPLACING ARGENTINE GRAIN EXPORTS.

QUESTION: WILL THE U.S. CONTINUE TO USE CREDIT TO DISPLACE ARGENTINE GRAIN EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

ANSWER: THE U.S. GOES TO GREAT PAINS NOT TO DISPLACE NORMAL ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL GRAIN EXPORTS. HOWEVER, SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO CURTAIL SEVERELY THEIR GRAIN IMPORTS WITHOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT. THEIR LARGER USE OF GRAIN CAUSES MORE GRAIN TO BE REMOVED FROM THE WORLD MARKET AND PRICES ARE THUS STRENGTHENED. I MIGHT ALSO ADD THAT WE HAVE PAID U.S. FARMERS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO TAKE LAND OUT OF PRODUCTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN WORLD GRAIN PRICES AND ARGENTINA IS BENEFITING FROM THESE HIGHER PRICES FOR MOST GRAINS.

10. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS INTO IMPORTS OF STEEL PRODUCTS

ISSUE: IN EARLY NOVEMBER U.S. STEEL CORPORATION PETITIONED THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO REVIEW
IMPORTS OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND MEXICO. U.S. STEEL ARGUES THAT THESE IMPORTS BENEFIT FROM GOVERNMENT EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND ASKS THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE RELIEF THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES.

QUESTION: WHY IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REVIEWING ARGENTINE STEEL IMPORTS AND WHAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST THESE IMPORTS?

ANSWER: THE U.S. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT IS INITIATING A REVIEW OF STEEL IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND MEXICO AT THE REQUEST OF A PRIVATE U.S. STEEL MANUFACTURER UNDER PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY U.S. LEGISLATION. AS THIS REVIEW IS JUST NOW BEGINNING, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT ITS RESULTS, AT ANY RATE THIS PROCESS IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS LITTLE DISCRETION.

11. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE: THE ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 18 THAT ARGENTINA HAD ACQUIRED ON ITS OWN URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY UNDER A SECRET PROGRAM UNDERWAY SINCE 1978 HAS PROMPTED STRONG PUBLIC REACTION WITHIN THE COUNTRY BOTH IN FAVOR AND IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT. SOME ARGENTINE OFFICIALS HAVE PREDICTED A STRONG HOSTILE REACTION BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, AND THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE
QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ARGENTINA'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT HAS ACQUIRED URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY?

ANSWER: THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE MUST BE VERY PROUD THAT ITS NUCLEAR TEAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP THIS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY THAT FEW COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD POSSESS. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WITH ALL TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN BE USED FOR PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES, WE WOULD HOPE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE DEVELOPED TO ENSURE THE TECHNOLOGY IS NOT MISUSED. I IMAGINE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WILL BE HIGH ON THE LIST OF PRIORITIES FOR THE NEW ARGENTINE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS.

QUESTION: DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINA MAY BE DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

ANSWER: NO. EVEN THOUGH URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY OBVIOUSLY HAS THAT POTENTIAL, I THINK MOST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WERE VERY MUCH REASSURED BY PRESIDENT ALFONSI'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD ENSURE THAT ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WOULD ONLY BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND THAT INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE THAT OBJECTIVE.

QUESTION: ARE YOU GOING TO URGE PRESIDENT ALFONSI TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TATELOCO?

ANSWER: I UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SOME TIME ON ACHIEVING A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR ARGENTINA TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TATELOCO. AS MR. HANS BLIX, DIRECTOR OF THE IAEA POINTED OUT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT HERE, A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ON ALL OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD THAT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WAS BEING USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

12. HUMAN RIGHTS

ISSUE: HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO SEEK AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED, INCLUDING PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE. THEY ALSO WANT REPEALED AN AMNESTY LAW PROMULGATED BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF THE SO-CALLED REPRESSIVE APPARATUS.

QUESTION: DID YOU RAISE WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE ISSUES OF THE AMNESTY LAW AND AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED?

ANSWER: THE RETURN TO A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ALSO PROVIDES LEGAL MECHANISMS TO DEAL WITH IMPORTANT ISSUES.
SUCH AS THE TWO YOU MENTIONED. PRESIDENT ALFONSO IS
KNOWN WORLDWIDE AS A DEFENDER OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO REVEAL THE CONTENTS
OF OUR DISCUSSION, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT
FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT ALFONSO'S COMMITMENT TO THE
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND FULL RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ARGENTINA.

13. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS CONTAINS ISSUES WHICH GO
BEYOND THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK. WE LEAVE TO THE
DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDED ANSWERS.

14. GRENADA
ISSUE: OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL PEACE-
KEEPING EFFORT IN GRENADA SPARKED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST
IN ARGENTINA AND SUBSTANTIAL CRITICISM FOR INTERVENTION
IN A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. PRESIDENT-ELECT ALFONSO
HIMSELF CRITICIZED THE INITIATIVE AT A PUBLIC RALLY
DURING THE CAMPAIGN. DUE TO SLANTED AND SELECTIVE
MEDIA COVERAGE HERE OF GRENADIAN EVENTS, THE REASONS
WHY THE U.S. UNDERTOOK THIS RESPONSIBILITY WERE NEVER
CLARIFIED TO THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE.
QUESTION: DOES THE U.S. BELIEVE IT CAN USE ITS TROOPS BT
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9527

UNCLASS SECTION 05 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES 08441

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, ODIP, PGOV, MNUC, MASS, EFIN, ETRD, EAGR, PBTS, SHUM, PREL, AR, US
SUBJ: U.S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURA-
IN LATIN AMERICA WHENEVER IT WANTS TO AS IT HAS IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HONDURAS, AND GRENA?

15. CENTRAL AMERICA

ISSUE: SOME ARGENTINES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE
INCOMING GOVERNMENT, ARE CONCERNED THAT GRENA
MAY BE A PRELUDE TO A U.S. OR U.S.-SPONSORED,
INVASION OF NICARAGUA. ALFONSOO AND THE OPPOSITION
PERONISTS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE
CONTADORA EFFORT.

QUESTION: IS THE U.S. GOING TO INVADE NICARAGUA OR
WOULD THE U.S. SUPPORT AN EFFORT BY OTHER CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO INVADE NICARAGUA?

QUESTION: IN RECENT WEEKS NICARAGUA HAS ASKED LARGE
NUMBERS OF CUBANS TO LEAVE AND HAS ALLOWED THE
OPPOSITION PRESS ACCESS TO NEWSPRINT. WILL YOUR
GOVERNMENT BE MORE TOLERANT OF THE GRN IN LIGHT OF
THESE FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS? WILL WASHINGTON STOP
ITS AID TO THE "CONTRAS"?

16. FELIPE GONZALEZ INITIATIVE ON CHILE

ISSUE: GONZALEZ AND OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS WHO WILL
ATTEND ALFONSOO'S INAUGURATION MAY BE THINKING ABOUT
A STATEMENT WHILE HERE EXPRESSING HOPE THAT "OTHER"
COUNTRIES MAY FOLLOW ARGENTINA'S DEMOCRATIC
EXAMPLE.

QUESTION: WILL THE U.S. SUPPORT EFFORTS BY EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC
RULE IN CHILE AND URUGUAY?

17. NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES

ISSUE: ARGENTINA HAS ASSERTED IN INTERNATIONAL FORA THAT
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S USE OF A NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE
to sink the Argentinian cruiser Belgrano in the 1982 SOUTH
ATLANTIC WAR WAS A NON-PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY OF Tlatelolco. IN RESPONSE,
ARGENTINA ANNOUNCED IT WAS UNDERTAKING A FEASIBILITY STUDY
TO CONSTRUCT ITS OWN NUCLEAR SUB.

QUESTION: WHY DOES THE UNITED STATES CONSIDER THE
SINKING OF THE BELGRANO BY A BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TO
BE A NON-PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PROHIBITED BY THE
Tlatelolco TREATY?

QUESTION: WOULD THE U.S. HAVE ANY OBJECTION IF ARGENTINA
WERE TO CONSTRUCT A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE?

ORTIZ
BT
SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSI N BILATERAL MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT - - NODIS

2. THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION OF THE BUSH/ALFONSI N BILATERAL. SECSTATE PASS TO DEFENSE AND AEC.

3. PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, AMBASSADOR FRANK ORTIZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANTHONY MOTLEY, ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY, PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSI N, FOREIGN MINISTER DANTE CAPUTO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HUGO GOBBI, SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY GERMAN LOPEZ.

SIMULTANEOUS SIDE MEETINGS WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY
BERNARDO GRINSPUN AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS.

6. THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED BY SAYING HE SPENT AN
UNBELIEVABLE DAY AS A PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR IN THE
PUBLIC JUBILATION OVER ARGENTINA'S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY.
HE SAID NOW THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA COULD BECOME
EQUAL PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE AND
PROSPERITY. HE BELIEVED THERE IS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR
COOPERATIVE ACTIONS BY TWO GREAT NATIONS. PRESIDENT
ALFONSI REPLIED HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS.
ARGENTINA WANTS TO HAVE INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES. SUCH RELATIONS WOULD BE BETWEEN
MATURE PARTNERS. THE TWO NATIONS HAVE MANY COMMON
INTERESTS. THEY NOW SHARED A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY
AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN. THERE WERE ALSO DIFFERING AND
CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY. HE
SAID WE SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THE DIFFERING POINTS OF
VIEW BECOME COMMON INTERESTS AND THE CONTRADICTORY POINTS
OF VIEW SIMPLY BECOME DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW. HE
SAID BILATERAL RELATIONS SUFFERED BECAUSE OF THE MALVINAS
WAR, BUT THIS SAME PROBLEM COULD BECOME A POSSIBLE
AVENUE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE DEMOCRACIES OF
THE WORLD MUST BE UNIFIED. THE MALVINAS ISSUE DIVIDES
THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE UN
RESOLUTION ON THE MALVINAS. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE
U.K. AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BEGIN, EVEN IF WITH DIFFERING
AGENDAS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START TALKS. THERE MUST
BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND AT ALL COSTS THE
CONVERSION OF THE ISLANDS INTO A MILITARY FORTRESS MUST
BE STOPPED BEFORE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS TURNED TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC. THERE IS A RISK THAT THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
WOULD, LIKE THE INDIAN OCEAN, BECOME AN AREA OF CONTEST
BETWEEN WORLD POWERS. ARGENTINA IS DECISIVELY OPPOSED
TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ARGENTINA HOPES THE UNITED
STATES WILL COOPERATE WITH THE ARGENTINE NATION TO AVOID
7. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED HE BELIEVES THE U.K. WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD IN REBUILDING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO CERTIFY TO THE CONGRESS ARGENTINA'S IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS NOT EASY FOR THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT. THE UNITED STATES HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT CAN HELP IN BETTERING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. IF THE UNITED STATES SEES THERE IS NO WAY IT CAN BE HELPFUL, WE SHALL TELL ARGENTINA SO FRANKLY AND TELL THEM WHY. THE UNITED STATES DESIRES A FRANK RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA.

J President Alfonsin said he was very delighted to hear the Vice President speak in this manner. He said he also wanted that there be a frank dialogue between the two countries.

8. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ALLUDED TO SOME DEMONSTRATIONS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE IN THE GREAT CROWDS IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, THE PRESIDENT SAID AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE NAIVE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THERE IS ADVERSE SENTIMENT IN ARGENTINA SINCE THE MALVINAS WAR, THAT WAS NOT THE REASON FOR WHATEVER ISOLATED INSTANCES OF HOSTILITY THE VICE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE OBSERVED. THERE ARE GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA WHO RAISE BANNERS THAT ARE NOT NATIONAL BANNERS BUT ARE THOSE OF THE EAST/WEST CONFLICT. LATIN AMERICA IS A BATTLEFIELD FOR IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA. IT WAS EAST/WEST NOT NORTH/SOUTH MANIFESTATIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT SAW. IN NO WAY DO THOSE WHO SO DEMONSTRATED REPRESENT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES. THEY ARE ONLY A SMALL GROUP WHICH IN ARGENTINA ARE CALLED "ULTRAS". THEY HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA, WHICH IS NOT ARGENTINA'S AGENDA.

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID, GIVEN THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
THAT IS BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE
WOUŁD SUGGEST THAT THERE BE PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES.
ALFONSI क IMEDIATELY AGREED. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO
EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A
WORKING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES SOME TIME LATE IN
1984. HE PREDICTED THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSI WOULD VERY
MUCH LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN. PRESIDENT ALFONSI SAID
IT WOULD GIVE HIM THE GREATEST PLEASURE TO MEET PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE DETAILS COULD
BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THERE ARE SPECIFIC AREAS
IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HOPED IT COULD BE COOPERATIVE
AND SUPPORTIVE. HE NOTED THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
TREASURY MCGNAMAR WAS A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION AND WAS
THEN MEETING WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE ECONOMIC TEAM. THE
UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE
IN ASSISTING ARGENTINA TO MEET ITS GREAT FINANCIAL
PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT ALFONSI SAID A LESSENING OF THE
MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT PROBLEM IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO HIM.
HE SAID THERE IS A DANGER THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION COULD
NOT FULFILL THE EXPECTATIONS IT AWAKENED. HE SAID IT
WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE LIMITATIONS ON ARGENTINA'S DEVELOPMENT IMPOSED BY THE HUGE DEBT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID ARGENTINA ALWAYS PAYS ITS DEBTS. THE WAY FOR ARGENTINA TO PAY OFF ITS DEBT IS TO EXPORT. IT WAS VITAL TO FIND MARKETS FOR ARGENTINA'S EXPORTS AND TO ARRANGE AN EQUITABLE REFINANCING OF THE DEBT, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT ARGENTINA WILL PAY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO HELP. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN VERY STRONGLY RESISTED THE SIREN-CALL OF PROTECTIONISM RAISED BY AFFECTED AMERICAN PRODUCERS. THE UNITED STATES WAS DOING IT NOT OUT OF GENEROSITY BUT BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES MARKET SHOULD BE OPEN TO EVERYONE. THE UNITED STATES SHALL CONTINUE TO RESIST RAISING BARRIERS TO TRADE. HE ASSURED PRESIDENT ALFONSI THAT WOULD BE THE CASE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A GOOD TRADING PARTNER. ALFONSI SAID THAT THIS WAS A BASIC COMMON INTEREST AND THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSURANCES. HE NOTED THAT EVEN ARGENTINA HAD TO EXTEND HELP TO COUNTRIES IN
DISTRESS. HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO PAY BOLIVIA $270 MILLION VERY SOON, A SUM THAT ARGENTINA COULD SCARCELY AFFORD.

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PROBABLE AFFECT ON THE ECONOMIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES ALSO WOULD IMPROVE. PRESIDENT ALFONSI S AID THE TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO EXPAND THE ECONOMY AND TO HAVE GREATER PRODUCTION. HE BELIEVED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A REDUCTION IN INTEREST RATES.

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RAISED THE MATTER OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES LISTENED WITH GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE ALFONSI ADMINISTRATION'S STATEMENTS ON THE MATTER. HE NOTED THAT PURELY AS A BILATERAL UNITED STATES/ARGENTINE QUESTION, THE UNITED STATES COULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ASSURING THERE BE A STEADY FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION WERE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR DEVICES. HE SAID TO THE DEGREE ALFONSON COULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IT WOULD MAKE ALL AREAS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION MUCH EASIER. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS ISSUE WAS ARGENTINA'S BUSINESS, BUT PRESIDENT ALFONSI S DECISIONS WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT BE LESS THAN FRANK ON AN ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. PRESIDENT ALFONSI SAID THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WAS THE CONVERSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, THE BIG POWERS WORRY ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE LITTLE POWERS. HE SAID HE WANTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO KNOW OF HIS IRREVOCABLE AND ABSOLUTE DECISION THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB. HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD MAKE AGREEMENTS WITH ITS
13. The Vice President, in a forceful manner, conveyed to President Alfonsin the commitment of President Reagan to a major reduction in arms not solely limitation, but a reduction in armaments. He noted that a President with the credentials of President Reagan can make effective agreements with the Soviet Union and obtain ratification for such agreements in the Senate. It is necessary to engage the Soviet Union in discussions leading to such ends. President Reagan feels very strongly about this issue. The United States absolutely wants to reduce arms, however, it takes two to tango.

The Vice President said he believed there was growing support in Eastern Europe for arms reduction. He knew that in the United States that President Reagan is strong enough to achieve it. President Alfonsin said that this truly was a message of hope. He wished President Reagan every success.

14. The Vice President asked for President Alfonsin's advice on Central America. The President said that in Central America there is an authentic struggle by the people against a feudal system that enslaves and exploits them. In this situation there is interference by both super powers, which complicates the attainment of local solutions. He advised that the United States honestly accept democratic socialism in Central America, consisting of constitutional government, agrarian reform, and the nationalization of such enterprises as banks.

Historically, the United States has not been willing to do so. Such a decision by the United States in this regard would tranquilize these countries. The Vice President replied that the key word was "democratic". If by free exercise of the popular will such courses as those cited were decided upon, the United States would
HAVE NO PROBLEM. HE NOTED THE UNITED STATES WAS THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTER OF THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT IN A MATERIAL, POLITICAL AND EFFECTIVE SENSE
THAN ANY OTHER NATION. HOWEVER, THE SANDINISTAS PROMPTLY
REMOVED THE "DEMOCRATIC" FROM THEIR SYSTEM AND EVEN THE
"SOCIALIST" ATTRIBUTES DISAPPEARED. THEIR COUNTRY WAS
CONVERTED INTO A MARXIST/LENINIST TOTALITARIAN STATE.
THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTEREST IN CREATING MIRROR
IMAGES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS
TOTALLY COMMITTED TO IS TO DEMOCRACY, TO FREE ELECTIONS,
A FREE PRESS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREE INSTITUTIONS.
THAT IS WHAT WE INSIST UPON, AND THAT IS WHAT WE HOPE
TO ACHIEVE IN THAT AREA. IF CENTRAL AMERICA BECOMES
A SERIES OF DEMOCRATIC STATES WE SHOULD BE VERY
COMFORTABLE WITH WHATEVER THEY DECIDE TO DO. HE REFERRED
TO THE "HARSH" STATEMENTS BY ORTEGA UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN
BUENOS AIRES AND SAID UNFORTUNATELY ORTEGA MADE IT A
HABIT TO SAY THINGS THAT ARE NOT TRUE. THE UNITED STATES
HAS HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SANDINISTAS AND WILL
CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE LISTEN CAREFULLY TO NICARAGUAN
OVERTURES AND WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO SINCERE OVERTURES.
BT
THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE.

15. PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. HE WONDERED IF IT WAS A GENERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POSITION WHICH WAS APPLICABLE TO THE PENTAGON AS WELL AS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. HE NOTED PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ WAS STRIVING TO ESTABLISH SUCH CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ARGENTINA. THE POSITION HE OUTLINED IS A POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY IS THE POSITION OF THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE SLOW-MOVING BUREAUCRACY. PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM WAS TRUE.

16. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN DELIVERED A PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THANKED PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ FOR HIS TIME, NOTING THAT HE MUST BE EXHAUSTED AFTER HIS INTENSIVE DAY. PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ WAS VERY EFFUSIVE...
IN HIS FAREWELL REMARKS, FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO OBSERVED WITH FEELING THAT HE CONSIDERED IT TO HAVE BEEN A "BEAUTIFUL" MEETING. ORTIZ
DECL. OADR

2308
BT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Argentine Certification

Issue

Whether to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant improvements in human rights.

Facts

With the recent elections, Argentina's human rights situation has improved dramatically and certification will signal our strong support for the return of democracy. Certification would be effective upon installation of the Alfonsin government on December 10. The U.K. and Chile will be especially concerned about the Argentine certification. A memo from George Shultz (Tab A) provides a recommended certification scenario. The first step would be a letter (Tab B) from you to Mrs. Thatcher. Cap Weinberger opposes certification (Tab C).

Discussion

Cap Weinberger's concerns focus on the reaction in the U.K. On balance, the strategy outlined by George Shultz, in my view, adequately addresses Cap's concerns. Moreover, the question is not whether but when we will certify Argentina. The game plan includes, inter alia, Congressional consultation in advance, and dispatching Dick Walters to explain our position to President Pinochet. I recommend approval, and OMB concurs.

Recommendation

OK No

That you approve the strategy for Argentine certification (Tab A) and sign the proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A Secretary Shultz memo
Tab B Proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab C Secretary Weinberger's letter

Prepared by: Robert H. Lilac

cc: The Vice President
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Admiral Murphy

FROM: Don Gregg

SUBJECT: Certification for Argentina

Attached is an advance copy of the certification package prepared at State for the President. If this package works out as intended, U.K. fears should be assuaged.

At the NSC meeting this morning, I learned that DoD opposes certification for Argentina. Weinberger will be sending a memorandum forward today stating his views on this matter.

Per your instructions, the letter to Margaret Thatcher will be held until the details pertaining to certification have been worked out.

Attachment
The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister  
London, England

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

Before leaving for Argentina, I want to send a few thoughts to you. Oliver Wright came in to see me on Tuesday, just before his departure for London. We had a very good talk about the overall relationship and I made clear to Oliver my desire to help in any way to deal with matters of mutual concern.

Since that meeting, I have read your most forthcoming response to President Reagan's letter about our certification of Argentina. I am also aware that you have sent a message to President-elect Alfonsin congratulating him and the people of Argentina on the restoration of democracy in that country. I will do all I can to help the Argentines understand your interest in restoring relations between Buenos Aires and London without having such restoration be dependent upon discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty issue.

I am concerned about recent events and am determined to do all I can to be helpful. Upon my return from Argentina, we will make certain that Sir Oliver is fully briefed on pertinent developments that took place during that trip.

I wish we could sit down and chat because I have been troubled by recent tensions and I know it hasn't been easy for you either.

Respectfully,

George Bush
TALKING POINTS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSI N OF ARGENTINA

COURTESY -- Extend President's congratulations both for Argentina's successful transition to democracy and, more personally, Alfonsin's election as President.

DEMOCRACY -- Promotion of democratic institutions major objective of Reagan administration. Argentina's successful transition to democracy sets important example for rest of hemisphere.

BILATERAL -- Note bright prospects for improved relations. Offer regular policy consultations. Suggest exploring Interparliamentary exchange.

-- Invite Alfonsin to US next year for official visit.

NUCLEAR -- Announcement of unsafeguarded gaseous diffusion enrichment plant will be seen by many as step to nuclear weapon. Perceptions important. Argentina's insistence that their nuclear program is strictly peaceful is best demonstrated by safeguarding all facilities.

-- Safeguards will in no way impede nuclear development. Argentina can play leadership role by accepting safeguards on all its nuclear activities.

-- Argentine nuclear policy is an issue which could impede development of improved bilateral relations.

CENTRAL AMERICA -- Progress is being made in effort to defeat Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan-sponsored insurgencies. US and others providing aid to cope with economic problems that make these countries vulnerable.

-- Offer team for briefing on Central America.

REGIONAL ISSUES -- We support peaceful negotiations on Malvinas dispute, and papal mediation on Beagle dispute. Ask Alfonsin how he sees these issues developing.

ECONOMIC -- Acknowledge current Argentine difficulties, importance of reaching an accord with IMF. Note US willingness to support Argentine recovery efforts.
SETTING AND OBJECTIVES

Your trip to Argentina comes at a historic moment and provides an excellent opportunity to set a very positive tone for our relations with the new government and to advance several other important objectives.

Alfonsin's election victory marks a sharp break with the past. His 52% of the popular vote represents a repudiation of seven years of military rule and of the traditionally dominant Peronist Party. Most Argentines are excited about the restoration of democracy and optimistic about the future of their country in the wake of the elections. While we perceive no immediate threat to democracy from either the discredited military or the extreme left, and while Alfonsin won a convincing mandate, democracy in Argentina is still fragile. Your presence at the inauguration emphasizes that the U.S. is solidly behind the democratization process, constitutional rule and human rights not only in Argentina but throughout the hemisphere.

With the advent of a democratically-elected government, human rights has ceased to be an issue of conflict between our two countries. On the contrary, it has become a common value and interest. On problems of concern to Argentina such as the Beagle Channel and Falklands/Malvinas disputes and negotiations with commercial banks and the IMF on the external debt we may be able to play a constructive and supportive role. In any case, these issues do not present serious constraints on improved relations.

There is a potential for conflict in at least two areas of our bilateral relations which also may be turned to common interest. Argentina's foreign policy under Alfonsin will likely continue along an independent nonaligned stance. While critical of our actions in Grenada and Central America, Alfonsin's Radical Party views this as a defense of the principle of nonintervention and not a bilateral issue. Argentina can be a moderating influence in the Third World, however, and Argentina's independent foreign policy can play a positive role despite an inclination to engage in occasional rhetorical excesses.

The other problem area is in the nuclear area. On November 18 the GOA announced the development of a gaseous diffusion enrichment facility. Technology of this kind can be used to produce weapons grade highly enriched uranium. We were unaware that Argentina was pursuing this technology. The Argentines are proud of their technical capabilities in the nuclear field, and are the most advanced in Latin America. While they have consistently stated they have no plans to develop nuclear weapons, they have refused to
adhere to the NPT or to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco (although Argentina has signed it). They argue that these accords discriminate against countries such as Argentina which are attempting to develop their own independent nuclear technology base. In the last year we have resumed a dialogue with Argentina on nuclear energy and non-proliferation matters. While this effort had positive results, there is strong Congressional sentiment for the prohibition of any cooperation with countries that do not have safeguards on all their facilities.

The inauguration of Alfonsin offers an opportunity to take up this issue before the policies of the new government are fixed. Argentine adherence to full-scope safeguards, be it under Tlatelolco or a separate agreement with the IAEA, would convert an issue of potential conflict into an area for further cooperation. It would set an example for other nations in the hemisphere as well. Moreover, putting at least the gaseous diffusion enrichment facility under safeguards would demonstrate Argentina's peaceful intentions.

Your specific objectives with Alfonsin should be to:

1. Extend the President's congratulations both for Argentina's successful transition to democracy and to Alfonsin for his election victory.

2. Indicate our desire to have close relations with Alfonsin's administration by inviting him to the U.S. next year for an official visit and by suggesting that regular policy consultations be held between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department.

3. Indicate our desire to see a safeguards agreement with the IAEA worked out that would cover all of Argentina's nuclear activities, and urge that the enrichment facility be placed under safeguards in order to demonstrate the peaceful intentions of the Argentine nuclear program and to avoid jeopardizing our nuclear dialogue.

4. Note our hope that peaceful negotiations through the papal mediation process to resolve the dispute on the Beagle Channel will lead to a successful outcome.

5. Reiterate our desire to see the Falklands/Malvinas conflict settled through peaceful negotiations.

6. Indicate our hope that Argentina will be successful in its negotiations with the IMF and commercial banks, noting our willingness, where possible, to be helpful.
TO AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 1383

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 078910
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PDEV, PDIP, PPDC, AR

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO INCOMING ARGENTINE PRESIDENT VIOLA

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING TO INCOMING PRESIDENT VIOLA AT APPROPRIATE TIME ON OR BEFORE MARCH 29. QUOTE.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS AS YOU ASSUME THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU AGAIN AS WE MOVE TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT THE NATIONS OF THE WEST. SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH. END QUOTE.

2. VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY GOA. HAIG

*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

Authority: State/WD/2015
NARA: EF Date 7/24/11

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SIT: VP
EDB: ARA

WHR COMMENTS:

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Admiral Murphy

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke

SUBJECT: Your Question on the Timmerman Affair

You asked the other morning "how much of what Timmerman says is true". The answer in a nutshell is:

-- His descriptions of what happened to him are probably fairly accurate, although he has tended to skate around the real reasons for which he was arrested and detained.

-- His description of the Jewish situation in Argentina -- both past and present -- leaves something to be desired, although there has no doubt been discrimination there -- perhaps more so than in some other countries with a sizeable Jewish population. There is no comparison, however, with Nazi Germany or even with a so-called systematic government policy of anti-semitism separate from other events.

Attached at Tab A is a short State paper on anti-semitism in Argentina. Tab B is a rather helpful article which you may have seen by Irving Kristol in the Wall Street Journal.
Argentina

Reagan

Declassified
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALFONSO'S COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CUTTING SHORT A VISIT TO TIERRA DEL FUEGO FROM WHICH JOINT U.S.-ARGENTINE-CHILEAN SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS IN ANTARCTICA ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN, I RETURNED TO BUENOS AIRES TO SEE PRESIDENT ALFONSO ON OCTOBER 27 TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT SITUATION WHICH LED HIM TO INVOKE A STATE OF SEIGE.

3. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED ME LOOKING TIRED AND PREOCCUPIED. I TOLD HIM I WANTED TO OPEN AND CLOSE OUR CONVERSATION BY REITERATING TO HIM THE STEADFAST SUPPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FOR ARGENTINA'S ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE ITS DEMOCRACY. THE PRESIDENT SAID U.S. SUPPORT IS A CONSTANT SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THIS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE CURRENT SITUATION IS A DIFFICULT ONE BUT HE DOES NOT FEEL DEMOCRACY IS IN DANGER. THE UNHAPPINESS IN THE MILITARY SERVICES PROVOKED BY THE REDUCTION IN THE BUDGET AND THE TRIALS OF MILITARY LEADERS ADDED TO THE HARD ELECTIONEERING AND CONTINUING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, MADE FOR DIFFICULT TIMES. HE SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THESE PROBLEMS HAD NOT BEGUN SOONER. IN ANY CASE, HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE CONFRONTING THEM AND EXPECTED THE SITUATION TO BE MUCH CALMER VERY SOON. HOWEVER, HE TOLD ME CONFIDENTIALLY HE WAS POSTPONING HIS STATE VISIT TO JAPAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ON WHICH HE WOULD HAVE LEFT IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS.

4. THE PRESIDENT SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE JUDGES WHO, DECLARING HIS DECREES AND ACTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HAD AGAIN RELEASED SEVERAL OF THOSE ARRESTED FOR ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND OTHER DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES. HE WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO DESCRIBE HOW THE MILITARY "INFILTRATED" THE COURTS AND HOW JUDGES WERE "OWNED" BY HIS GOVERNMENT'S ENEMIES. TO MY SURPRISE HE ADMITTED THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO PROOF OF THE ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THE ARRESTS WERE MADE BUT WOULD
SOON HAVE IT. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT HIS CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE COURTS WOULD MOST PROBABLY NOT BE HIS LAST; IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT EACH OF THE THREE POWERS ACTED AS A CHECK AND BALANCE AGAINST THE OTHER. THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY AGREED SAYING THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BOW TO THE JUDGES RELEASE OF MANY OF THE PRISONERS BUT WOULD APPEAL THEIR FINDINGS.

5. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT I WANTED HIM TO LEARN DIRECTLY FROM ME THAT AFTER CHECKING I COULD FIND NO ELEMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT HAD PROVIDED ANY INFORMATION TO THE GOA ON ANY OF THE TWELVE INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED. THE PRESIDENT READILY AGREED THAT WAS SO. I SAID, THEREFORE, WE WERE SURPRISED AND UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE EMBASSY TO READ IN THE PRESS THAT GOVERNMENT SOURCES WERE ATTRIBUTING THE U.S. AS BEING A SOURCE OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH THE ARRESTS WERE MADE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THIS COULD NOT BE, BUT I CITED TO HIM SPECIFIC ARTICLES. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO STOP SUCH NONSENSE WHICH WAS BAD FOR THE TWO OF US.

6. I ALSO TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD WAS REACHING THE POINT WHERE OFFICERS WERE OPENLY DISRESPECTFUL OF THEIR SENIORS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE SITUATION IS INDEED BAD; HE SAID THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A CAMPAIGN TO BRING DOWN ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF RIOS ERENU WHO WAS A LOYAL OFFICER OF STRONG DEMOCRATIC CONVINCION.

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH. HE WILL ADVISE US OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPED WE WOULD ALSO GIVE HIM INFORMATION HE SHOULD HAVE. I SAID HE COULD COUNT ON US.

8. THE PRESIDENT AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR U.S. SUPPORT. HE SAID OUR OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL BECAUSE HE WANTS TO ASSURE THAT ARGENTINA DOES NOT LOSE ITS GOOD IMAGE IN THE WORLD.
1. (C) SUMMARY: AN APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS STATE OF SIEGE DETentions AFTER A LOWER COURT ORDERS THE RELEASE OF THOSE HELD. POLITICAL REACTION TO THE STATE OF SIEGE IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE ALTHOUGH PRESSURE MAY BE BUILDING TO CONVENE CONGRESS IN A SPECIAL SESSION WHICH WOULD PREVIOUSLY CONFIRM THE DECREE. RADICAL BLOC LEADER IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES CESAR JAROSLAVSKY REPORTEDLY SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING SUCH A MOVE. PRoMInENT PERONISTS SUCH AS ITALO LUDER LAMENTED THE LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE STATE OF SIEGE. ON THE LEFT, DEPUTY AUGUSTO CONTE AND INTRANSIGENTS LEADER OSCAR ALENDE BLAMED THE LEGAL DECISIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON THE GOA’S FAILURE TO REMOVE FROM THE BENCH MANY JUDGES WHO SERVED DURING THE YEARS OF THE JUNTA GOVERNMENTS. THE UCD RESPONDED MILDLY, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GOOD REASON FOR ITS ACTION AND THAT PROOF AGAINST THOSE DETAINED WILL BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 3 ELECTIONS. CRITICISM CAME FROM THE PERONIST EXTREMES OF VICTOR E. MA'E AND HERNANDO IGLESIAS AND ARTURO FRONDIZI’S MID-WHICH CHARGED THE STATE OF SIEGE SERVED ELECTORAL PURPOSES.

2. (C) MEANWHILE, MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR THE ARREST DECREE WHICH TRIGGERED THE TENSE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FOUR DAYS IS LANDING ON JUSTICE MINISTER ALCONADA ARAMBURU. THAT DECREE (BA 1804) IS NOW SEEN AS A DISASTER WHICH INEVITABLY BROUGHT ON THE STATE OF SIEGE IT INTENDED TO AVOID. IN ADDITION TO CARRYING TWO WRONG KICKS—THE GOA ACTUALLY WANTED TO DETAIN PATRICIO CAMPS, APPARENTLY PICKED UP ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, RATHER THAN RAUL RIVANERA CABLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN RAUL RIVANERA CABLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN

3. (U) POLITICAL REACTION TO THE STATE OF SIEGE DEGREE IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE. SOME PRESSURE IS BUILDING TO CONVENE CONGRESS IN A SPECIAL SESSION WHICH WOULD PREVIOUSLY CONFIRM THE DECREE. RADICAL BLOC LEADER IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES CESAR JAROSLAVSKY REPORTEDLY SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING SUCH A MOVE. PRoMInENT PERONISTS SUCH AS ITALO LUDER LAMENTED THE LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE STATE OF SIEGE. ON THE LEFT, DEPUTY AUGUSTO CONTE AND INTRANSIGENTS LEADER OSCAR ALENDE BLAMED THE LEGAL DECISIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON THE GOA’S FAILURE TO REMOVE FROM THE BENCH MANY JUDGES WHO SERVED DURING THE YEARS OF THE JUNTA GOVERNMENTS. THE UCD RESPONDED MILDLY, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GOOD REASON FOR ITS ACTION AND THAT PROOF AGAINST THOSE DETAINED WILL BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 3 ELECTIONS. CRITICISM CAME FROM THE PERONIST EXTREMES OF VICTOR E. MA‘E AND HERNANDO IGLESIAS AND ARTURO FRONDIZI’S MID-WHICH CHARGED THE STATE OF SIEGE SERVED ELECTORAL PURPOSES.

4. (C) MEANWHILE, MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR THE ARREST DECREE WHICH TRIGGERED THE TENSE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FOUR DAYS IS LANDING ON JUSTICE MINISTER ALCONADA ARAMBURU. THAT DECREE (BA 1804) IS NOW SEEN AS A DISASTER WHICH INEVITABLY BROUGHT ON THE STATE OF SIEGE IT INTENDED TO AVOID. IN ADDITION TO CARRYING TWO WRONG KICKS—THE GOA ACTUALLY WANTED TO DETAIN PATRICIO CAMPS, APPARENTLY PICKED UP ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, Raul RIVANERA CABLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN RAUL RIVANERA CABLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN RAUL RIVANERA CABLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN...
GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL POSITION SOMEWHAT, BUT SOME DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE TO ITS IMAGE AND REPUTATION.

5. (C) FROM ALL REPORTS MILITARY ATTITUDES REMAIN DIVIDED. MANY OFFICERS BOTH ABOVE AND BELOW THE COLONEL LEVEL ARE COUNSELING MODERATION AND A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE WHILE STRONG GOVERNMENT CRITICS -- PARTICULARLY AT THE COLONEL LEVEL -- CONTINUE TO PRESSURE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMY CHIEF RIOS MENEU, RALLYING AROUND THEIR ACCUSED COLLEAGUES AND THREATENING TO TAKE DRAMATIC ACTION SHOULD THE GOA ORDER A NEW WAVE OF MILITARY ARRESTS. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, THE WAIT-AND-SEE NODSE SEEMS TO BE CARRYING THE DAY. AT A MINIMUM THE DETENTION HAS FURTHER COMPLICATED THE GOA'S RELATIONS WITH A HOSTILE AND SENSITIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

AS THE COUNTRY BEGINS THE FINAL WEEK OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, THERE IS A THREAT THAT NEW INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE OR SOME OTHER DRAMATIC CHARGES OR REVELATIONS COULD OCCUR TO STIR UP THE POT.

7. (C) APART FROM REACTIONS IN THE MILITARY, A BIG UNANSWERED QUESTION IS WHAT EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION DOES THE GOVERNMENT POSSESS THAT PRECIPITATED ITS DECISION TO DETAIN THESE TWELVE PERSONS. PRESS STORIES CONTINUE TO ALLEGEDLY THAT THE US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS (BRAZIL, ISRAEL, AND URUGUAY) PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE GOA THAT CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DECISION TO ACT BUT SO FAR THIS HAS NOT BECOME A MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE.

THEIR BROTHERS — THE DECREE CALLED FUGITIVE SUAREZ MASON A GENERAL EVEN THOUGH HE WAS STRIPPED OF HIS RANK AND CASHIERED IN 1814. IN ITS ARGUMENTATION IT ALSO CITED THE CONSTITUTION INCORRECTLY.

FUNDAMENTALLY, HOWEVER, THE DECREE IS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT FAILED THE TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. HOW HIGH A POLITICAL PRICE ALCONADA ARAMBURU PAYS FOR NOT RECOGNIZING THE ORDER'S CONSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS IS STILL UNCERTAIN. EVEN BEFORE LAST WEEK'S EVENTS, HOWEVER, THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT REPLACED IN A POST-ELECTION CABINET SHUFFLE.


CONFLICTS
3. In a separate interview, an official identified only as a high-ranking defense

ministry source reported to the press that the situation caused by comments regarding

possible new arrests of armed forces officials is under control. The unnamed source ruled out

the moment any more arrests.

- Referring to the alleged role of ex-General

Carlos Guillermo Suarez Nason in plotting and

goal efforts to locate and arrest him, the source

emphatically denied that the GOA had received

information from U.S. intelligence services

concerning Suarez Nason's activities. The

same rumor was also reportedly denied by Radical

Senator Fernando de la Rua, campaigning in Entre

Rios province, who also said—according to the

Radical Daily La Razon—that stories that the

United States was the source of information

regarding activities by groups which seek to

destabilize the constitutional government of

Argentina are "totally false."

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3 of 3, BUENOS AIRES BSS79,

CINCIR also for INTAFF

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DATE: 123546 DECL: 0000

TAGS: PGX, PUNH, MARR, PHUH, PTER, AR

SUB: STATE OF SIEGE: GOA/ARMAI FORCES TENSIONS

- Ease as electoral campaign enters final

phase

REF: BUENOS AIRES 88372 AND PREVIOUS

1. CI SUMMARY: GOA/ARMAI FORCES TENSIONS

DECREASED OCTOBER 25. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND

PRIVATE COMMENTS SUGGEST THE GOA BELIEVES ANY

MILITARY UNREST IS NOW UNDER CONTROL. IT

APPEARS THE GOA BACkS ARMY CHIEF RIOS ERENU

AND IS WORKING TO PORTRAY HIM AS INVOLVED IN

DECISIONS AFFECTING THE ARMY HE COMMANDS.

JUDICIAL ACTION ON THE STATE OF SIEGE DETENTION

MOVES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT. AFTER TWO

BOMBLESS DAYS, THERE WAS AN EARLY OCTOBER 30

A.M. EXPLOSION IN AN APARTMENT BUILDING. PUBLIC

ATTENTION TURNS TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. END SUMMARY.

2. (CI TENSIONS EASED PERCEPTIBLY FOLLOWING THE

OCTOBER 25 MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT ALFONSO AND

ARMED FORCES/MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CHIEFS. WHILE

ATTENDING A PUBLIC CEREMONY ON COAST GUARD DAY,

DEFENSE MINISTER CARRANZA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT

PUBLICATION OF PATRICIO KELLY'S LIST OF WOULD-BE

PLOTTERS HAD CAUSED SOME UNHAPPINESS IN THE ARMED

FORCES. CARRANZA ADDED THAT CONTRARY TO SOME

RUMORS, THE MONDAY MEETING AT OLIVOS WAS "VERY

TRANQUIL" AND THAT THERE ARE NO DECISIONS REGARDING

FUTURE ARRESTS. IN ANOTHER POSITIVE NOTE NAVY

CHIEF Ramon Aroa told the press that the OLIVOS

MEETING WAS A VERY POSITIVE WORKING SESSION AND

THAT THE NAVY HAS CONFIDENCE THAT THE POLITICAL

SYSTEM WILL FIND A FAIR SOLUTION.

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Authority: State, Reagan 11/25/15

NARA: EF Date: 6/25/14

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NUMERICAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 5972

SUBJ: STATE OF SIEGE: GOA/ARG/ARMED FORCES TENSIONS

RULERS ON THE LEGALITY OF THE DETAINMENT DECREES. ACCORDING TO THE DEFENDANT'S LAWYERS, REPORTEDLY STATED IN THE SUPREME COURT RULERS. THE SUPREME COURT WILL APPARENTLY BE ASKED TO RULE NOT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE OF SIEGE ITSELF, BUT ON WHETHER SUFFICIENT CAUSE EXISTS TO JUSTIFY DETAINMENT. AT LEAST ONE ELEMENT OF THIS GENERALIZED CONFUSION CAN BE REFINED—PATRICIO CAMPS, REPORTED DETAINED YESTERDAY, IS STILL IN HIDING.


7. P) PUBLIC ATTENTION IS FINALLY RETURNING TO THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WITH POLLS LESS THAN FOUR DAYS DISTANT. THE RADICALS CLOSED THEIR BUENOS AIRES CAMPAIGN WITH A TRADITIONAL SOCCER STADIUM RALLY, AT A NEARLY FULL STADIUM. THE PARTY HOPED TO AT LEAST HALF-FILL THE CITY AND COUNTRY'S LARGEST STADIUM. THE PARTY CAME AHEAD SOME STIFF COMPETITION—PRESIDENT ALFONSI S WILL ADDRESS THE NATION ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1983 ELECTIONS returning ARGENTINA TO DEMOCRACY.

8. C) COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE TOP MILITARY COMMANDER, HIS SPEECH TODAY EVENING, TOGETHER WITH PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, COULD HELP FURTHER DIFFUSE RECENT TENSIONS.
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E.O. 12356; DECL: OAAR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MARR, PTER, AR
SUBJ: STATE OF SIEGE: GOA/ARMED FORCES TENSIONS

CHIEFS TO ARTICULATE THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICE'S CONCERNS, COMBINED WITH THE MORE JUNIOR OFFICERS WORKING THEIR COMPLAINTS THROUGH THEIR SUPERIORS, MAY CONTRIBUTE TO RE-ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE ARMED FORCES. ORTIZ

8T
SUHMA: SUNDAY'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA ARE THE NEXT STEP IN THE COUNTRY'S ONGOING EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE AND STABILIZE DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE ALSO, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, A PLEBISUCOTE ON THE TWO YEARS OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION AND THE AUSTRAL ECONOMIC PLAN.

Much of the campaign played to voter apathy and under the shadow of violent incidents. Arguments over the origins of the violence continue, with the government blaming shall minorities which seek to overthrow Argentina's consolidation of democracy. Some government opponents argue that the radicals, having failed to convince the population that the violent incidents represent a serious threat to democracy, themselves are behind some of the violence and threats as they try to provoke an "Alfonsin or Chaos" mentality that will polarize the voters and build greater support for the government. No one yet has been charged with any of the terrorist acts. We do not rule out, therefore, that the government-ordered detention of 12 individuals and subsequent state of siege decree is a political ploy calculated by the goa to yield ballot box gains. If so, the Keystone Kops manner in which the action was implemented may work against the administration among some voters.

5. THE CAMPAIGN ALSO PLAYED TO APPARENT APATHE AMONG VOTERS. TO SOME, THE INDIFFERENCE SUGGESTS A PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE CONGRESS, IN ADDITION TO BEING DISORGANIZED AND INEFFECTIVE, SIMPLY DOES NOT MATTER; FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ARE NOT PASSED THROUGH IT. THESE SANE OBSERVERS ARGUE THAT WHAT OCCURED OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS IS MORE A CONSOLIDATION OF POWER IN A NEW CAUDILLO, WHO JUST HAPPENS TO BE PRESIDENT, RATHER THAN A GENUINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BT
THE PARTY'S ROGUE ELEMENT OF RAJOEUR OPTIMISM, CÉSAR JÁUREZ AVG., RECENTLY REITERATES HIS PREDICTION OF 66 PERCENT. ALFONSIIV CHEER PUBLIC WITH A PREDICTION OF UNDER 51 PERCENT, AND, WE ARE TOLD BY ONE CONTACT, GOES EVER LOWER IN PRIVATE, DOWN TO 45 PERCENT. IN NORMAL POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES A GROUP IN RULING PARTY SUPPORT WOULD BE LOGICAL EXPECTATION AFTER TWO YEARS. BUT IN THIS WAY, AS IN SO MANY OTHERS, ARGENTINA IS NOT NORMAL; IT HAS AN ENORMOUSLY POPULAR PRESIDENT PRESIDING OVER A LESS POPULAR GOVERNMENT AGAINST A DIVIDED OPPOSITION WHICH SPENT MUCH OF THE LAST TWO YEARS COVERING ITSELF WITH EGG RATHER THAN GLORY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE UCR WILL PROBABLY BE SEEN AS A LOSER IF IT DOES NOT EQUAL THE 48 PERCENT IT RECEIVED IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTING IN 1983. IT WILL BE A POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IF IT EXCEEDS ALFONSIIV'S PERSONAL TOTAL OF 51 PERCENT THAT YEAR. ANYTHING ELSE, AND PROBABLY THE MOST LIKELY RESULT WITH LESS THAN SEVENTY-TWO HOURS REMAINING BEFORE BALLOTING BEGINS, IS LIKELY TO BE READ AS A POLITICAL WASH.

B. POSSIBLE POLITICAL EFFECTS

RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 3 VOTING MAY AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY A NUMBER OF POLICY AND POLITICAL ISSUES. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, ALFONSIIV'S CONTROL OVER THE RADICAL PARTY COULD BE AFFECTED. A MIXED OR UNSATISFACTORY OUTCOME FOR THE UCR COULD TEND TO GALVANIZE THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH RESENT BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S APPARENT EFFORTS TO BREAK WITH THE PARTY'S STATIST PAST AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO STAFF SOME OF THE HIGHEST POSTS IN HIS ADMINISTRATION WITH INDIVIDUALS LACKING STRONG RADICAL CREDENTIALS AND TRADITIONAL PARTY CONVICTIONS. CONVERSELY, IF THE RADICALS SCORE WELL, THE SO FAR RELATIVELY IDLE TALK OF A THIRD HISTORICAL MOVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY, PARTICULARLY IF THE ELECTION RESULTS SUGGEST THAT THE OPPOSITION'S FRAGMENTATION IS IRREPARABLE IN THE SHORT TERM. AT THIS POINT WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW ALFONSIIV WOULD RESPOND TO PRESSURES SEEKING TO MAKE HIM, LIKE PERON AND YRIGOYEN EARLIER IN THIS CENTURY, MORE IMPORTANT BY

6. MEASURING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THE AUSTRAL PLAN IS TRICKIER BECAUSE THE RADICALS THEMSELVES VARY SO WIDELY IN THEIR ASSESSMENT.
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PAGE 01

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CONVICTION THAT INDIVIDUALS, NOT THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, ARE ON TRIAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THE MILITARY WANT NOT THAT REASSURANCE, BUT A PROPER "PUNTO FINAL" TO THIS ISSUE. ALFONSI CAN'T EASILY DELIVER THAT AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO EVEN WITH LANDSLIDE SUPPORT SUNDAY. AN AMNESTY LAW WOULD FACE HEAVY SEAS IN CONGRESS, INCLUDING MANY MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY. AN APPEALS COURT DECISION IN THE JUNTA TRIAL WHICH SEEK TO ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE DIFFICULT TO APPLY WITH 1868 CASES OPEN BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS OR THE SUPREME COURT OF THE MILITARY. (JUDICIAL DECISIONS OVER THE LAST WEEK ILLUSTRATE HOW PROBLEMATIC JUDICIAL UNANIMITY IS.) ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS MILITARY RESTRUCTURING AND SALARIES, SUNDAY'S VOTE COULD STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN ALFONSI'S HAND. A HEAVY TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE RADICALS WOULD PRESUMABLY LESSEN THE THREAT OF A CLASSIC (I.E. WITH SIGNIFICANT, PRIOR CIVILIAN SUPPORT) ARGENTINE COUP, BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY STOP PLANNING AMONG ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WHO MIGHT BE DETERMINED ENOUGH TO ACT DESPITE PUBLIC REJECTION. ALFONSI, HOWEVER, COULD BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO DEMAND THAT THE FORCES GRADUALLY WEED OUT-VIA RETIREMENT-HOSTILE AND POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS.

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13. VIOLENCE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE. ON OCTOBER 3R ALFONSI ANNOUNCED THAT DEMOCRACY WOULD NOT BE PUSHER OVER BY A SMALL FRINGE OF DESTABILIZERS AND CLAIMED THAT THE VIOLENT SOLUTION WAS NO LONGER IN THE ARGENTINE MENTALITY. AS BOMBINGS CONTINUE DESPITE THE RECENT STATE OF SIEGE AND DETENTION ORDERS, THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE BETTING THAT NOVEMBER 3R'S EXERCISE IN DEMOCRACY WILL SERVE NOTICE TO THE TERRORISTS THAT THEIR ACTIONS CANNOT PRODUCE THE DOWFALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE VIOLENT CAMPAIGN WILL GRADUALLY OR ABRUPTLY END.

14. GOA-TRADE UNION RELATIONSHIP MAY ALSO MOVE INTO B.

HOWEVER THE POLITICAL EFFECTS PLAY OUT, THEY COULD STIMULATE CORRESPONDING POLICY DEVELOPMENTS.

THE KEY INTERNAL ISSUES THE GOA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS MILITARY FORCES. IN HIS OCTOBER 3S SPEECH THE NATION PRESIDENT ALFONSI REITERATED HIS
The apparent lack of decision on next steps plus the unpopularity of forced savings law prompts increasing concern in the private sector that the government will not stay the course outlined last June. Our sense is that no dramatic economic policy changes will occur immediately after the election, no matter what the outcome Sunday. Large unrest over real or perceived declines in real wages and unemployment may rise, however. Radical party pressures on the Stroessner program also appear to be increasing. It is therefore conceivable that over the next weeks or months Alfonsin may feel conflicting pressures from the private sector, labor and his own party to adjust his economic policy. The president has consistently reiterated his intention to stay with his own economic game plan, however, and strong popular support November 3 could strengthen that determination.

ORTIZ
CONGRESS PASSES "PUNTO FINAL" BILL

CINCOS AND CIRCUIT ALSO IN INTAF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OAA
TAGS: PGV, RAR, SHUN, AR
SUBJECT: CONGRESS PASSES "PUNTO FINAL" BILL
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1318S (Dipl)

BEGIN SUMMARY


END SUMMARY

2. (C) SUMMARY: ARGENTINA'S HOUSE OF DEPUTIES APPROVED THE SO-CALLED "PUNTO FINAL" BILL -- IMPOSING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MILITARY PROSECUTIONS FOR PAST ABUSES -- BY A VOTE OF 236-15-1 ON DECEMBER 23. THE GOVERNING RADICAL PARTY VOTED ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY FOR THE BILL, MOST PERONISTS BOYCOTTED THE SESSION. THE HOUSE TEXT IS IDENTICAL TO THAT PASSED BY THE SENATE DECEMBER 22. THE BILL BECOMES LAW WHEN SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE. CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE OF THE BILL REPRESENTS A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR ALFONSIN. IT PROBABLY PROVIDES PERONISTS WITH A 1973 ELECTION ISSUE, HOPEFULLY, AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERONISTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

HAVE REPERCUSSIONS. MANY PERONISTS OBVIOUSLY
PERCEIVED 1987 ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE IN HANDLING THE
MATTER AS THEY DID. BUT A CASUALTY OF THE PERONIST
APPROACH MAY WELL BE THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE MILITARY MAY NOT BE
SATISFIED WITH ALFONSIÑ ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF
MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS TRIAL ISSUES, BUT IT IS NOW
PATENTLY CLEAR THAT IT IS THE RADICALS AND NOT THE
PERONISTS WHO ARE TAKING THE POLITICAL RISKS INHERENT
IN ATTEMPTING TO DIMINISH SENSE OF INSECURITY WITHIN
ARMED FORCES WITH REGARD TO THIS ISSUE. AS NOTED
REFTEL, THE BILL WHICH WAS PASSED IS NOT A FINAL
DEBATE CONTINUES IN THE COUNTRY ON WHETHER
THE LEGISLATION WILL RESOLVE THE UNCERTAINTY OF
FUTURE MILITARY PROSECUTIONS AND STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN
CONTROL OVER THE ARGENTINE MILITARY. ALFONSIÑ HAS
STILLED DEBATE, HOWEVER, ON WHETHER HE STILL CONTROLS
THE RADICAL PARTY MIDWAY THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION.

SILVERED
DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS' REFUSAL LAST WEEK TO DEFEND THE COUNCIL FROM AN ALLEGED CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT THE INSTITUTION. THE COUNCIL ITSELF PRECIPITATED THE SERIES OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACTION WITH AN OCTOBER 28 NOTE TO BORRAS DENOUNCING THE ALLEGED CAMPAIGN AND SEEKING A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FROM HIM. THE COUNCIL RECEIVED HARDS CRITICISM FROM MANY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT ANNOUNCED IN SEPTEMBER THAT IT COULD NOT REACH A PROMPT VERDICT IN TRIALS OF THE THREE JUNTA MEMBERS, BUT FOUND NOTHING LEGALLY WRONG WITH THE ORDERS LAUNCHED IN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. SEE BUENOS AIRES 7748. THE COUNCIL DID NOT HELP ITS CAUSE WITH BORRAS, A MINISTER WHO SHUN HEADLINES AND SEIZES TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE, WHEN IT RELEASED THE TEXT OF ITS NOTE TO THE PRESS.

4. BORRAS MET WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS NOVEMBER 5 AND TOLD THEM THAT DISSENT, CRITICISM AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS WERE ALL FUNDAMENTAL TO DEMOCRACY. IF THEY CONSIDERED ATTACKS SLANDEROUS OR LIBELOUS, THEY, LIKE ANY OTHER CITIZEN, COULD BRING JUDICIAL ACTION. THE COUNCIL CONSIDERED THIS RESPONSE OVER THE WEEKEND. PRESS REPORTS EARLIER THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED THE RESIGNATIONS OF TWO MEMBERS BEFORE THE UNANIMOUS ACTION.

5. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE RESPONDED CALMLY TO THE RESIGNATIONS, SAYING THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE A "MILITARY CRISIS." DEFENSE SECRETARY JAUNARENA ADDED THAT THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS WORK UNTIL THE RESIGNATIONS ARE ACCEPTED AND REPLACEMENTS NAMED. HE NOTED THAT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT BORRAS WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE RESIGNATIONS. ACCORDING TO AN EMBASSY RETIRED MILITARY SOURCE, COUNCIL REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT RESIGNATIONS NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL CASES ALREADY UNDER CONSIDERATION ARE CONCLUDED. IF TRUE, THIS WOULD MEAN THE CURRENT COUNCIL MAY BE WORKING FOR SOME TIME, DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF CASES IT HAS ALREADY OPENED.

6. COMMENT: WHILE THE RESIGNATIONS ARE NOT AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT, THEY CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CHALLENGE TO THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION. IF POORLY HANDLED, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE RESIGNATIONS COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS AND LONG-LASTING DETERIORATION IN CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS. TO PREVENT THIS, BORRAS WILL NEED TO ASSURE THAT THE
B. THE RESIGNATIONS WILL ALSO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR TRYING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THAT STRATEGY, DEVELOPED FROM THE BELIEF THAT THE MILITARY SHOULD JUDGE ITS OWN AND THAT—BY DEFINING LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY—the armed forces as an institution should be protected from prosecutions reaching deep into the officer ranks, is already somewhat tattered. Trials of the first three Junta passed into civilian courts without any decision from the Supreme Council. Press leaks naming alleged human rights violators are the hundreds of cases already clogging the Council's agenda raise great concern among mid- and lower-ranking officers that they will be punished for carrying out orders during the war on subversion.

S. FINALLY, THE SUPREME COUNCIL ACTION REFLECTS A WIDE-LAPSED ARMED FORCES VIEW THAT THE HOOD IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFENDING ITS ARMED FORCES FROM PUBLIC CRITICISM. IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THIS MILITARY VIEW, PRESIDENT ALFONSO REPORTEDLY TOLD A MILITARY DINNER EARLIER THIS WEEK HE SOUGHT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR "OFFICIALS TO WALK DOWN THE STREET ARM-IN-ARM WITH THEIR WIVES, WEARING THEIR UNIFORMS WITH PRIDE, AS IN THE PAST." END COMMENT. ORTIZ
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 03816
CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, MARR
SUBJECT: ARMY MAJOR DEFIES COURT SUMMONS AND TOUCHES
- OFF INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT

"BEGIN SUMMARY"
1. (C) SUMMARY: ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO BARREIRO HAS
DEFIED A COURT SUMMONS TO TESTIFY ON CASES OF ALLEGED
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND GARRISONED HIMSELF IN AN
ARMY REGIMENT IN CORDOBA. HE REMAINS THERE THIS MORN­
ing (1100 LOCAL TIME) AFTER BEING DECLARED IN REBELLION
BY THE COURT AND, LATER, CASHIERED BY THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE. ONE RADIO REPORT SAID CORDOBA POLICE FORCES
ARE OUTSIDE THE REGIMENT, BUT THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT FOR US. EFFORTS CONTINUE
TO CONVINCE BARREIRO TO GIVE HIMSELF UP VOLUNTARILY.
ARMY COS HECTOR RIOS ERENU INFORMED ALL ARMY UNITS
OF THE SITUATION AND URGED COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL
ORDERS AND RESPECT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.
PRESIDENT ALFONSIN HAS CONVOKED AN EMERGENCY CABINET
MEETING. THIS IS THE FIRST OVERT DEFIANCE OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY BY THE MILITARY AND A CHALLENGE TO BOTH
CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND ARMY HIGH COMMAND. THIS IS
EXACTLY THE SCENARIO WE HAVE BEEN SIGNALING FOR SOME
TIME AS A POSSIBILITY. AT THIS MOMENT THE SITUATION
IS TENSE, WITH NEXT DEVELOPMENT UNCLEAR, BUT IT IS
A MAJOR TEST OF WILLS. END SUMMARY.
"END SUMMARY"

2. (U) ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO GUILLERMO BARREIRO, WHO
HAD BEEN CITED BY THE CORDOBA FEDERAL COURT TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING
THE MILITARY REGIME IN A CLANDESTINE DETENTION CENTER
KNOWN AS LA PERLA, REFUSED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT
APRIL 15. LATE YESTERDAY THE COURT DECLARED HIM IN
REBELLION AND SEVERAL HOURS LATER MINISTER OF DEFENSE
JORACIO JAUNARENA ORDERED THE MAJOR CASHIERED FROM
THE ARMY. PRIOR TO JAUNARENA’S ORDER, THE MOD AND
MILITARY INTERLOCUTORS APPARENTLY UNDERTOOK EXTENSIVE
BUT FRUITLESS EFFORTS TO CONVINCE BARREIRO TO ANSWER
THE COURT SUMMONS.

3. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, BARREIRO

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GARRISONED HIMSELF AS OF EARLY APRIL 15 IN THE 14TH AIRBORNE REGIMENT IN CORDOBA. ONE RADIO REPORT AT 0800 BUENOS AIRES TIME APRIL 16 SAID BARREIRO HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO MAINTAIN HIS DEFIANCE AND THAT HE WAS SUPPORTED BY HIS ARMY COLLEAGUES. THE COMMANDER OF THE REGIMENT, LIEUTENANT COLONEL LUIS POLO, REPORTEDLY CONFIRMED THAT BARREIRO WAS IN THE REGIMENT, THAT THE SITUATION WAS "NORMAL" AND THAT AS COMMANDER HE WOULD "RESPOND TO THE NATURAL COMMANDERS."

4. (C) ONE RADIO REPORT SAID CORDOBA POLICE FORCES ARE AT THE REGIMENT, BUT THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT FOR US. ARMY COS HECTOR RIOS ERENU INFORMED ALL ARMY UNITS OF THE SITUATION. HIS MESSAGE REPORTEDLY URGED COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL ORDERS AND RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM.

5. (U) PRESIDENT ALFONSIIN HAS CONVENED A CABINET MEETING FOR THIS MORNING AND A NUMBER OF POLITICAL FIGURES FROM THE RADICAL AND PERONIST PARTIES ARE REPORTEDLY IN THE CASA ROSADA TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. RADIO COMMENTARIES BY POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE STRESSED THAT THIS IS A LAMENTABLE, BUT ISOLATED, INCIDENT AND ONE THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE ARMY CHAIN OF COMMAND.

6. (C) COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST OVERT DEFIANCE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY BY AN ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER AND A CHALLENGE TO BOTH CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND ARMY HIGH COMMAND. IT IS PRECISELY THE SCENARIO OF INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT THAT WE HAVE BEEN SIGNALLING AS A POSSIBILITY FOR SOME TIME. THE LONGER THE SITUATION OF DEFIANCE CONTINUES, THE MORE POSSIBLE IT BECOMES THAT OTHER UNITS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFIANCE OF AUTHORITY. CERTAINLY THERE IS SOME SYMPATHY FOR BARREIRO'S STANCE. THIS IS, IN SHORT, THE MOST IMPORTANT TEST OF WILLS THAT HAS THUS FAR OCCURRED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS SITUATION AND ITS OUTCOME WILL LIKELY HAVE FAR REACHING EFFECTS.

CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF
5.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, MARR
SUBJECT: ARMY MAJOR DEFIES COURT SUMMONS AND TOUCHES 7. (C) IT APPEARS THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROCEED FIRMLY BUT CAUTIOUSLY. ONE POSSIBLE GOA PLAN SUGGESTED TO INCLUDES DECLARING A STATE OF SIEGE, WHICH WOULD THEN BE ENDORSED BY CONGRESS IN AN EFFORT AT A ROADLY BASED COMMON FRONT IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND REJECTING THE ACT OF DEFIANCE.
ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA

ARGENTINA HAS THE LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION OF LATIN AMERICA. ARGENTINE JEWS HAVE WELL-ORGANIZED COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, EXERCISE THEIR RELIGION WITHOUT RESTRAINTS, AND PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ARGENTINE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE. YET OVER THE PAST 38 YEARS, ANTI-SEMITIC ATTITUDES IN SOME SECTORS OF THE POPULATION AND OCCASIONAL OVERT ACTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM HAVE BEEN A RECURRING PROBLEM.

DURING THE SECURITY FORCES WAR AGAINST TERRORISM FROM 1974-1978, MANY ARGENTINE JEWS WERE VICTIMS. HOWEVER, MOST OBSERVERS, INCLUDING LEADERS OF:

2. (BEGIN TEXT)
THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY, DENY THIS REFLECTED AN EFFORT TO SINGLE OUT JEWS, NOTING THAT INDIVIDUALS OF JEWISH ORIGIN WERE MEMBERS OF EDUCATED/INTELLECTUAL GROUPS TARGETED BY THE SECURITY FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF ANTI-SEMITIC PERSECUTION BY SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES FOLLOWING THE DETENTION OF JEWISH PRISONERS. THERE ALSO HAVE BEEN INCIDENTS WHICH REINFORCE THE BELIEF BY SOME THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TOLERATES A DEGREE OF ANTI-SEMITISM. A REPORTEDLY ANTI-SEMITIC INTERVIEW LAST OCTOBER ON A GOVERNMENT SPONSORED TELEVISION STATION, THE SALES OF ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE, AND GOVERNMENT REFUSAL TO PERMIT THE SHOWING OF THE HOLOCAUST HAVE BEEN CITED AS EXAMPLES.

IN HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE THE HOUSE AND SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES IN MARCH, 1981, PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS AND HAD ADOPTED ENERGETIC METHODS AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM. HE REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY ENGAGES IN ITS ACTIVITIES ON AN EQUAL LEVEL WITH OTHER ARGENTINE CITIZENS.

THE OAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTED AFTER ITS VISIT IN 1979 THAT THERE IS NO OFFICIALLY-SUPPORTED POLICY OF ANTI-SEMITISM. LEADERS OF THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY CONSISTENTLY HAVE MAINTAINED THE SAME POINT OF VIEW. THEY ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, TOOK STEPS TO MAKE IT LEGALLY POSSIBLE FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO COLLECT AND REMIT MONEY TO ISRAEL. THE MANDATORY CIVICS COURSE WHICH ALL CHILDREN MUST TAKE HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY.

PRESIDENT VIDELA'S MESSAGE LAST YEAR TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY ON THE OCCASION OF THE JEWISH HOLIDAYS TREATED THEM AS FULLY INTEGRATED MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE NATION. THUS, ACCORDING TO THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY, THOSE OUTSIDE ARGENTINA WHO STATE THAT ARGENTINE JEWS AND SOVIET JEWS ARE IN THE SAME SITUATION DO A GRAVE DISSERVICE TO ARGENTINE JEWS.

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS AN IMPORTANT SUPPLIER OF ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
TO AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0030
INFO AMBASSADOR SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0030
AMBASSADOR MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0030
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MONTEVIDEO FOR DAS BUSHNELL
E.O. 12065: GDS 5/12/87 (SERVICE, R.R.)
TAGS: ETRD, MASS, PMMC, US, AR
SUBJECT: HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (FFAC) ON MAY 12 APPROVED
BY VOICE VOTE AMENDMENT WHICH IMPOSES HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS
TO ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO LIFT SECTION 620 B OF
FAA. TEXT OF AMENDMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE:

(A) SECTION 620 B OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961,
RELATING TO ARGENTINA IS REPEALED.

(B) NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW, ASSIST-
ANCE MAY BE PROVIDED TO ARGENTINA UNDER CHAPTER 2, 4,
5, OR 6 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, CREDITS
(INCLUDING PARTICIPATIONS IN CREDITS) MAY BE EXTENDED
AND LOANS MAY BE GUARANTEED WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA
UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, DEFENSE ARTICLES
AND DEFENSE SERVICES MAY BE SOLD TO ARGENTINA UNDER
THE ARMS CONTROL ACT, AND EXPORT LICENSES MAY BE ISSUED
TO OR FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA UNDER SECTION
38 OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT ONLY IF THE PRESIDENT
HAS SUBMITTED TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELA-
S.

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Authority: Date 11/2015
NARA EF Date 11/25/15

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TIONS OF THE SENATE & DETAILED REPORT CERTIFYING THAT:

—(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS; AND

—(2) THE PROVISION OF SUCH ASSISTANCE, CREDITS, LOANS GUARANTEES, DEFENSE ARTICLES, DEFENSE SERVICES, OR EXPORT LICENSES IS IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

(C) IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT OF PARAGRAPH (1) OF SUBSECTION (B) HAS BEEN MET, PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHALL BE PAID TO WHETHER:

—(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ACCOUNT FOR THOSE CITIZENS IDENTIFIED AS "DISAPPEARED".

—(2) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS EITHER RELEASED OR BROUGHT TO JUSTICE THOSE PRISONERS HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER (PEN).

3. TEXT OF HOUSE AMENDMENT WAS DESCRIBED AS IDENTICAL TO AMENDMENT PASSED IN SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (SFRC) THE PREVIOUS DAY. (# WE UNDERSTAND CERTAIN "TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS" TO SENATE VERSION WHICH CLOSED COMMERCIAL SALES LOOPHOLE WERE MADE FOLLOWING SFRC ACTION). HOUSE HOWEVER DELETED ADDITIONAL SFRC LANGUAGE ATTACHED TO SECTION (C)(1) AFTER "DISAPPEARANCES".... AND HAS PROVIDED A LISTING OF ALL ARGENTINE CITIZENS KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT BOTH TO HAVE DISAPPEARED AND HAVE DIED AFTER NOVEMBER 6, 1974.

4. ARA/SC SERVICE PRESENTED ADMINISTRATION POSITION AGAINST AMENDMENT, EMPHASIZING DOUBLE STANDARD, RISK THAT COUNTRY SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WOULD BE USED BY ELEMENTS WITHIN ARGENTINA LEAST INTERESTED IN IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THAT AMENDMENT WOULD HARM OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND JOINT EFFORTS BY NEW PRESIDENTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER TO BROOMEFLED (SIMILAR LETTER ALSO SENT TO ZABLOCKI) MAKING ARGUMENTS AGAINST AMENDMENT ALSO INSERTED INTO RECORD.

5. ASIDE FROM STRONG DESIRE IN BOTH HOUSE AND SENATE NOT TO APPEAR TO BE ABANDONING EFFORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A NUMBER OF FACTORS APPEARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHEN
CONSENSUS ON COUPLING REPEAL WITH CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS, THEY WERE:

— ISSUE OF ANTI-SEMITISM, BROUGHT TO FORE BY TIMERMAN ARTICLE (DAAI PRESIDENT MARIO BORENSTEIN PRESENTED OPPOSING VIEWS IN PRIVATE TO SOME HFAC MEMBERS THE HOUR BEFORE THE LAST SESSION);

— DETERMINATION BY PELL AND OTHERS WHO MET WITH VIOLA FOR VIOLA TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS PLEDGE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CLARIFYING CASES OF DISAPPEARED;

— ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC INCIDENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS IN HIGH INTEREST PEN CASES SINCE VIOLA TOOK OFFICE; AND

— CONCERN FOR REGIONAL BALANCE IN VIEW OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS ON ARGENTINE-CHILEAN BORDER.

5. IN WEEKS AHEAD, WE WILL BE EXAMINING HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT WE MAY BE ABLE TO ELIMINATE OR MODIFY RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE ON FLOORS OF BOTH HOUSES. WHILE OUR BEST PROSPECTS APPEAR TO LIE IN SENATE, ELEVEN TO ONE VOTE IN SUPPORT OF RESTRICTION IN SYRC MAKES SUCCESS PROBLEMATIC.

HAIS
BT
SUBJECT: HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENTS—FIRST ARGENTINE REACTIONS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER CAMILION, DURING CALL LAST EVENING BY CHARGE AND FORMER NAVY SECRETARY HIDALGO, TOOK NOTE OF SFRC'S ACTION ON THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT. WHILE REFERENCE WAS BRIEF—THE MINISTER DID NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTION OR REQUEST—HE CLEARLY WISHED TO REGISTER GOA'S SENSITIVITY AND CONCERN OVER THE COMMITTEE'S ACTION. (THE MEETING TOOK PLACE ON MAY 11, AT CAMILION'S INITIATIVE, BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE'S MOVE BECAME KNOWN). EARLIER THAT DAY, DURING A LUNCHEON OF ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ADVERTISING COUNCIL, CAMILION HAD PUBLICLY ASKED THE UNITED STATES ELIMINATE "UNCONDITIONALLY" RESTRICTIONS TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ARGENTINA WANTS ACCESS TO SPARE PARTS AND US TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, THE MINISTER SAID.

3. IN A LATER MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER'S CHIEF OF CABINET, AMBASSADOR LISTRE, ADDRESSED THE ISSUE MORE DIRECTLY. NOTING THAT THE COMMITTEE'S CONDITIONS WERE MORE SPECIFIC EVEN THAN EXISTING LEGISLATION, LISTRE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE PLEASED, OBVIOUSLY, WITH THIS TURN OF EVENTS. THE PROGRAM THAT WOULD PRINCIPALLY BE AFFECTED, IF THE COMMITTEE'S ACTION STANDS, WOULD BE...
ARGENTINE MILITARY TRAINING IN THE US. WHILE EQUIPMENT PURCHASES WOULD HAVE BEEN SMALL, AT LEAST INITIALLY, HE SAID, THE MILITARY SERVICES HAD HOPED TO RESUME THE TRAINING OF PROMISING YOUNGER OFFICERS IN THE US. (SIMILAR REACTIONS ARE BEGINNING TO COME IN TO THE ATTACHES FROM THEIR CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY SERVICES.).

4. COMMENT. THE CONDITIONS POISED IN THE HOUSE-SENATE VERSION GO OF COURSE BEYOND ANYTHING EVEN WHAT MOST ARGENTINE POLITICIANS AND OTHERS CRITICAL OF THE GOV ARE PRESENTLY ADVISING IN TERMS OF AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE PAST. THESE POLITICAL LEADERS—AS MOST POLITICALLY INFORMED OPINION IN THIS COUNTRY—BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE DISAPPEARANCES, A MORALLY BURNING ISSUE, CAN COME ONLY GRADUALLY AS PART OF A LARGER POLITICAL SOLUTION; EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE NOW, IN THEIR VIEW, IS IN FACT AN OBSTACLE OF LIBERALIZATION AND EVENTUAL NORMALIZATION. CONFIRMING THE WORST FEARS OF THOSE WHO KNOW THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE, IT STRENGTHENS THE HAND OF HARD LINE ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED SERVICES WHO VIEW WITH MISGIVINGS THE RHETORIC—and EXPECTATIONS—ABOUT A MORE OPEN POLITICAL DIALOGUE GENERATED BY THE VIOLA ADMINISTRATION DURING ITS FIRST SIX WEEKS IN OFFICE.

5. VIOLA'S OWN STANDING—AND SUPPORT—COULD SUFFER IF THE PERCEPTION SHOULD GAIN GROUND IN SENIOR MILITARY RANKS THAT ALLEGED PROMISES BY VIOLA (DURING THE SENATE CODELS VISIT HERE AND VIOLA'S OWN VISIT TO WASHINGTON) HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE SFRC'S ACTION. AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, VIOLA IN OUR VIEW DID NOT IN FACT GIVE SUCH A PLEDGE EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON (A MISTRANSLATION HERE APPARENTLY LED TO A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THIS POINT) AND VIOLA PUBLICLY DENIED SUCH A COMMITMENT OUTRIGHT EXPLICITLY EVEN BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON.

6. WE HAVE NOTED SOME FRAGMENTARY INDICATIONS THAT DESPITE THIS SOME IN THE VIOLA ADMINISTRATION WERE BEGINNING TO LOOK FOR A FEW VERY LIMITED PRAGMATIC STEPS TO SHOW SOME MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA (THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE, EVEN IF IT CAME ABOUT, THE RELEASE OR TRIAL—IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT LEAST—OF WHAT THE REGIME CONSIDERS A HARD CORE GROUP OF KNOWN TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST COLLABORATORS AND INSTIGATORS HELD UNDER PEN; A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THEM ACTUALLY DETAINED BY THE PREVIOUS PERON ADMINISTRATION). BUT ANY GENERAL AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION REMAINS, IN THE OPINION OF VIRTUALLY ALL QUALIFIED OBSERVERS, AT PRESENT BEYOND THE REACH AND POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SYSTEM.

RUST
The trials of the military


2. TUESDAY THE 13TH FOR HISPANICS CAN BE EVERY BIT AS ILL-STARRED AS FRIDAY THE 13TH FOR SUPERSTITIOUS ANGLOS. ALFONSO'S THUNDERBOLT ORDERING MILITARY COURT TRIALS FOR THE FIRST THREE JUNTAS WAS THEREFORE A SURPRISE, COMING AS IT DID ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, HIS FOURTH DAY IN OFFICE (REFTEL). IT WAS FOLLOWED DECEMBER 28 BY DEFENSE MINISTER RODRIGUEZ ORDERING MILITARY COURT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE NINE, ALL AT ONE TIME OR OTHER, IN PRIVATE SUITS BROUGHT AGAINST THE MILITARY. THE SUPREME COUNCIL, HEADED BY AN AIR FORCE BRIGADIER GENERAL NAMED LUIS MARIA FACES, SCHEDULED APPEARANCES OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE 2STH AND 30TH OF DECEMBER TO HEAR THE CHARGES. ALL BUT ONE CASE—VIDELA, VIOLA AND SALTIERI, WHO WERE BOTH PRESIDENTS AND COMMANDERS AT ONE TIME; LAMBRUSCHI AND ADAN FROM THE NAVY, AND THE THREE AIR FORCE LEADERS, AGOSTI, GRAFFERGA AND LAMI DOLO. ONLY FORMER NAVY CHIEF NASSERI FAILED TO APPEAR; HE IS BEING HELD WITHOUT BAIL IN A CIVIL CASE BROUGHT EIGHT YEARS AGO INVOLVING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A BUSINESS ASSOCIATE.

3. THE SUPREME COUNCIL, HEADED BY AN AIR FORCE BRIGADIER GENERAL NAMED LUIS MARIA FACES, SCHEDULED APPEARANCES OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE 2STH AND 30TH OF DECEMBER TO HEAR THE CHARGES. ALL BUT ONE CASE—VIDELA, VIOLA AND SALTIERI, WHO WERE BOTH PRESIDENTS AND COMMANDERS AT ONE TIME; LAMBRUSCHI AND ADAN FROM THE NAVY, AND THE THREE AIR FORCE LEADERS, AGOSTI, GRAFFERGA AND LAMI DOLO. ONLY FORMER NAVY CHIEF NASSERI FAILED TO APPEAR; HE IS BEING HELD WITHOUT BAIL IN A CIVIL CASE BROUGHT EIGHT YEARS AGO INVOLVING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A BUSINESS ASSOCIATE.
The human rights movement, one of whose pioneer leaders was Alfonsin himself, about the president's

timidity. The junta, in the critic's view, should be tried by civilian magistrates, not in military

courts; the possibility that the council's final
decisions can be appealed in civil court by either
party is not enough. The critics also pick at
Alfonsin's selections for the blue-ribbon citizens
panel investigating the dirty war; they would prefer
a joint Senate-House investigation of the disappeared.
They cautiously applaud Alfonsin's quick action,
but they are concerned it is not sweeping enough.
They point to the selection of General Arquindegy
as army chief of staff as something more than reconstruc-
tion of the old system with different people;
Arquindegy's induction remarks, and the presence of
Videla and Viola at the ceremony, are all proof
that is needed for many in the movement.

6. Besides the supreme council proceedings against
leaders from the 1976-82 era, big names from the
Junta which just left office are being caught up in
investigations of several celebrated disappearances.
Federal judges have taken testimony from General
Nicolaides and Admiral Franco in the 1977 kidnapping
of Iker Olleiros, a communist activist. Former
President Bignone, who also may be called to testify
in the Olleiros case, faces investigation in the
disappearance of two young army conscripts, both
alleged to have been communists assigned to the military
college when Bignone commanded it; communist party
youth formally denounced the former president's
responsibility in the case on January 3. Bignone
also underwent the indignity of being "implicated
but not indicted" in the kidnapping of physicist
Alberto Giorgi from the national technological
institute five years ago. Bignone was thus thrown
together with some of the more notorious hardliners
of the dirty war who, as "impuladores" in the Giorgi
case, have all been barred from leaving the country.
Bignone begged off from what would be his first
court appearance December 28 because of a sick wife.

7. Investigations are spreading like ink stains in
other well-known disappearances and murder cases as
courts all over the country are getting involved.
Human rights organizations continue to keep
the pressure up in those areas where they see Alfonsin
to be a bit shy. Much complaining is heard from

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CINCSO FOR INTAFF

CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12358; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, AR
SUBJECT: THE TRIALS OF THE MILITARY

CULPABILITY, OR EXPOSURE TO PUNISHMENT, AGAINST THAT
GENERAL ASSERTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

9. ADMITTEDLY, ALL OF THIS COULD SINK INTO A SWAMP
OF LEGALISMS AND MORAL JUDGMENTS. IT CAN ALSO CAUSE
SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS UNLESS ALFONSI MAKES A
CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS INDICTMENT OF THE TOP
PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE AND HIS SUPPORT FOR THE INSTITUTIONS
OF THE ARMED FORCES THEMSELVES. ORTIZ
PROGRESS OF ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ON EARTH TO COME HERE AND HELP US TURN ARGENTINA, AS WELL, INTO ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ON EARTH.”

4. 01 CAMPS ARRESTED.

A FORMER POLICE CHIEF OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, ARMY GENERAL MIGUEL CAMPAS, WAS ARRESTED ON JANUARY 19 ON THE ORDERS OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN. THE PRESIDENT ORDERED CAMPAS TO BE COURT-MARTIALED ON GROUNDS THAT “IN PRESS STATEMENTS, GENERAL CAMPAS REPORTEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED HIS DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE ABDUCTION AND DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE, IN THE KIDNAPPING OF MINORS AND THE CHANGE OF THEIR FAMILY STATUS, AND ALSO REPORTEDLY JUSTIFIED VARIOUS CRIMES, INCLUDING TORTURE.” LAST YEAR THE SPANISH MAGAZINE “PUEBLO” QUOTED CAMPAS AS HAVING SAID THAT "WHILE I WAS THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEF, SOME 3,000 PEOPLE DISAPPEARED. SOME OF THEM IN BURIED IN MASS NAMELESS GRAVES." CAMPAS LATER DENIED MAKING THOSE AND OTHER CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS. NEVERTHLESS, ALFONSIN SAID THAT "THE TRUTH OF THESE STATEMENTS - WHICH SHOCKED PUBLIC OPINION HERE AND ABROAD - HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CORRESPONDENCE PUBLICATIONS," WITH THE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE "INNUMERABLE UNIDENTIFIED CORPSES" FOUND RECENTLY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE "MULTIPLE REPORTS OF ABDUCTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES OF PERSONS.

3. 01 ALFONSIN ESTIMATES THE DISAPPEARED AT "MORE THAN 15,000".

IN STATEMENTS MADE DURING AN INTERVIEW WITH NEW YORK CITY'S TELEVISION CHANNEL 41, RELEASED HERE JANUARY 23, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ESTIMATED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE MISSING AS A RESULT OF THE FORMER MILITARY REGIME'S SO-CALLED "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST SUBVERSION AT "ALMOST CERTAINLY MORE THAN 15,000." ONCE AGAIN, HE STATED HIS POSITION THAT IT WAS "FIGHTING EVIL WITH EVIL THAT TURNED ARGENTINA INTO A VERITABLE HELL." HE REJECTED, HOWEVER, ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN WHAT HAPPENED IN ARGENTINA AND THE EVENTS IN NAZI GERMANY "WHERE THERE WAS A TRUE GENOCIDE. THERE HAS BEEN NO SUCH RACIAL PERSECUTION HERE. WHAT THERE HAS BEEN HERE IS THE USE OF TERRORISM TO FIGHT TERRORISM." THUS, NOT ALL THE DISAPPEARANCES WERE THE WORK OF THE ARMED FORCES, HE SAID, MAKING IT INCUMBENT ON THE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE DIRTY WAR CRIMES NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF REVENGE BUT USING TRUTH AND JUSTICE TO RECONCILE THE NATION.

5. 01 ALFONSIN'S DEED, WHICH WAS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MINISTERS, ORDERED CAMPAS' TRIAL BY THE ARMED FORCES SUPREME COUNCIL FOR "PRIMA FACIE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PLANNING AND DIRECTING OF A MINISTER TERROR APPARATUS WHICH HAD

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E.O. 13526

data: 61/25/16

NARA: E.F. State Waiver

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INCOMING

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 00597 02 OF 03 251236Z 1168

ACTION ARA-BU

INFO OCT-02 COPY-01 ADR-92 INN-18 EUR-94 SS-99 G1C-92
CIAE-92 DOJ-01 R-01 10-15 NASA-03 N-01 L-03
PH-98 PA-95 RT-93 WM-91 USIE-92 SP-92 SN-91
PAX-91 ASA

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FH AMHASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE VASICO 002
INFO AMHASSY ASUCION
AMHASSY BRASILIA
AMHASSY LONDON
AMHASSY MADRID
AMHASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMHASSY ROME
AMHASSY SANTIAGO
MISSION USU NEW YORK
MISSION GENEVA
USCIN CSO FOR INTAFF, CSO ALSO FOR
VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 12356; DECL:QADR
TAB: SHU, PCOV, AR
SUBJ: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA

AMONG THOSE REPORTEDLY PROVIDING SOME OF THE EVIDENCE
WAS THE UNDERSECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ALFREDO BRAVO,
WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN TORTURED FOUR TIMES BY CAMPS
IN SEPTEMBER 1977. OTHER ALLEGED VICTIMS ALSO
REPORTEDLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE. ONE IS JOURNALIST
JACOB TIVERI, WELL-KNOWN EDITOR WHO WAS STRIPPED OF
HIS CITIZENSHIP BY THE FORMER MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND
WHO RETURNED TO ARGENTINA THIS MONTH ANNOUNCING HE WOULD
HELP SEND CAMPS TO JAIL. PRESS REPORTS STATED THAT
THE SUPREME COUNCIL WOULD BEGIN QUESTIONING CAMPS THIS
WEEK.

7. (U) HOUSE TO BE TRIED BY THE MILITARY?

FOREIGN MINISTER BIGNONE'S DEFENSE ATTORNEY CHARGED ON
JANUARY 12 THAT THE CIVILIAN TRIAL JUDGE WHO HAD
ORDERED BIGNONE'S DETENTION BECAUSE OF HIS SUSPECTED
INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO ARMY CONSCRIPTS
WAS NOT COMPETENT TO HANDLE THE CASE. THE DEFENSE
ATTORNEY ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE COURT PROCEEDINGS BE
TRANSFERRED TO MILITARY JURISDICTION ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE INVESTIGATION INVOLVED WHAT WERE CLEARLY "ACTS
OF DUTY." ON JANUARY 13 THE PROSECUTOR IN THE CASE
ALSO RECOMMENDED THE TRANSFER OF THE TRIAL TO MILITARY
JURISDICTION, STATING THAT THE KIDNAPPING OF THE CON­
SCRIPTS "HAD THE INDISPUTABLE, TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF A MILITARY INCIDENT," AND "THAT THE PROCEEDINGS MUST
BE SUBMITTED TO MILITARY JURISDICTION."

6. (U) CAMPS' ARREST DREW MIXED REACTIONS. ARGENTINE
WRITER AND CHAIRMAN OF ALFOSIN'S NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, ENRIQUE BARRO, DESCRIBED
THE ARREST AS "AN IMPORTANT STEP" TAKEN BY
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. A MEMBER OF THE MOTHERS OF THE
PLAZA DE MAYO AGREED, BUT ADDED THAT "WE ASK FOR HIM TO
BE TRIED BY CIVILIAN COURTS, AND THAT HE BE GIVEN THE
MAXIMUM SENTENCE, WHICH IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, RATHER
THAN THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY DICTATOR­
SHIP." NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ADOLFO PEREZ ESQUIVEL
SAID HE WAS SATISFIED THAT CAMPS WAS TO BE TRIED BUT
ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ALFOSIN "TOOK LONGER THAN HE
SHOULD HAVE" IN TAKING CAMPS TO COURT. ONE NATIONAL
CONGRESSMAN, RICARDO BALESTRA, OF THE LIBERAL
AUTONOMIST PARTY OF CORRIENTES, SOUNDED A THEME STILL
HEARD IN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES HERE. "THE WINNER OF A
VAR IS NEVER TRIED, AND WHAT WE LIVED THROUGH WAS A
VAR, DIRTY, BUT A WAR NEVERTHELESS," HE SAID. "AS LONG
AS CAMPS DID NOT COMMIT ANY ECONOMIC CRIMES, WAS ACTED
FOR PERSONAL REVENGE, OR COMMITTED ANY CRIMES OUTSIDE
THE ALLEGED POLITICAL PURPOSE OF FIGHTING SUBVERSION,
HE CANNOT BE GUILTY."

7. (U) PRESS REPORTS OF JANUARY 21 STATED THAT EVIDENCE
AGAINST CAMPS WAS TURNED OVER TO THE ARMED FORCES
SUPREME COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON JANUARY 20.
11. (Cl) CONTENT: ALFONSO'S STATEMENT THAT AT LEAST 18,000 DISAPPEARED IN THE REPRESSION, CARRIED IN ALL THE HEADLINES ON JANUARY 13, TAKE HIM INTO TERRAIN PRUDENT OBSERVERS HAVE AVOIDED IN THE PAST: PUTTING A NUMBER ON THE TOLL OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIRTY WAR. (INTERIOR MINISTER TROCCOLI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR DECEMBER 26 THAT THE TOTAL IS AROUND 6,000, A NUMBER DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF CASE HISTORY DOCUMENTATION BY THE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WIDELY ACCEPTED AS AUTHORITATIVE.) WHETHER IT IS 6,000, 18,000 OR 30,000 AS CLAIMED BY THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO, BECOMES IRRELEVANT AS EXHUMATION OF THE PAST CONTINUES TO SHOCK THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE. THE WEEKEND DISCLOSURE THAT THREE YOUNG CHILDREN APPARENTLY WERE EXECUTED IN MARCH WAS LATER DRESSED UP TO BE A MILITARY SHOOT-OUT WITH TERRORISTS SEVEN YEARS AGO ONLY HEIGHTENS THE GROWING PUBLIC HORROR OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED HERE. ALL THIS ONLY FUELS THE HIGH FEELING AGAINST MILITARY OFFICERS BEING HAULED BEFORE TRIBUNALS IN UNQUIET STREET SCENES. THIS IN TURN ADDS TO THE DISQUIET IN THE ARMED FORCES, AND DEMONSTRATES THE PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM WHEN HE CALLS FOR REASON ON ALL SIDES TO SECURE THE GREATER GOOD OF RULE OF LAW.

ORTIZ

CINCSO FOR INTAFF, CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD, ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 11356: DECL: DOD

TAGS: SHRM, POOV, AR

SUBJ: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA

FOR GENERAL RETI LUCIANO BENJAMIN HENNEO AFTER ACCEPTING HIS ASSURANCES THAT HIS RECENT STATEMENTS BRANDING ALL CRITICS OF EXCESSES DURING THE ANTI-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AS SUBVERSIVE WERE NOT DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, HENNEO HAD REITERATED THOSE STATEMENTS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 17 BUT HAD ALSO DECLARED HIS LOYALTY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN AND LEADING HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AUGUSTO CONTE WAS ALONE IN PRESSING FOR A 30-DAY PRISON TERM.

IK: ON LEGISLATION.

A. PENAL CODE REFORM.

PRESIDENT ALFONSO ON JANUARY 13 SIGNED A LAW PASSED BY CONGRESS THAT REFORMS THE CRIMINAL PENAL CODE BY ALLOWING FOR THE SUBMISSION OF WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS IN FAVOR OF CIVILIANS SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURTS, EVEN IF THE SENTENCES WERE CONFIRMED BY CIVILIAN COURTS. THIS NEW LAW WILL FACILITATE THE ANNULMENT OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL SENTENCES IMPOSED AGAINST CIVILIANS, WHO MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM PRISON OR MAY HAVE THEIR CASES SENT TO CIVILIAN COURTS FOR REVIEW BY APPEALING THEIR SENTENCES WITH A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

B. MILITARY CODE REFORM.

THE SENATE HAS FORMALY ACCEPTED FOR DEBATE LATER THE MILITARY CODE OF JUSTICE REFORM BILL PASSED EARLIER THIS MONTH BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. THE BILL IS CONTROVERSIAL. JUGICALIST PARTY LEADER IN THE SENATE VINCENzo SAADI HAS ALREADY CALLED IT "AN UNCHIEVED AMNESTY" OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE SO-CALLED DIRTY WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. THE BILL WILL REVOLVE AROUND ALFONSO'S PLAN FOR LIMITING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL WHO WILL STAND TRIAL.
The Department has been aware of these cases for some time. We and our Embassy in Buenos Aires on numerous occasions have solicited from the Argentine Government information as to their whereabouts. While we have been told that the Argentine Government has no knowledge concerning welfare of these individuals, we will continue to use our influence privately to encourage Argentine officials to make information available to the families of these as well as other cases of missing persons.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Walter J. Stoessel

Mr. Jan Kalicki,
Office of Senator Kennedy,
2241 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.,
Washington, D.C.
March 20, 1981

The Honorable
Walter J. Stoessel
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Walter:

To follow up the letter to the Secretary from Senators Cranston and Kennedy, I am enclosing the list of children who "disappeared" in Argentina since 1976. The Senators would appreciate the Department's pursuing these cases with the Government of Argentina.

With thanks and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jan Kalicki
Foreign Policy Adviser
Political Prisoners -- Argentina, March, 1981

--Jorge Albert TAIANA -- OAS/IACHR case 2353

--Gustavo WESTERKAMP -- OAS/IACHR case 2127
Arrested October 21, 1975, held without charges or trial.

--Raul Hector CANO -- OAS/IACHR case 3482
Detained at the disposition of the Executive since May 27, 1976.

--Norberto Ignacio LIWSKY -- OAS/IACHR case 3905
Held at the disposition of the Executive since April 25, 1978.

--Monica Maria Candelaria MIGNONE -- OAS/IACHR case 2209
Abducted from her parents' home May 14, 1976.

--Debora Esther BENSHOAM
Since kidnap in August, 1977, no charges have been brought against her.

--Pablo KLIMOVSKY
Abducted April 20, 1975. Now held at the disposition of the Executive.

--Alberto Maximo SCHPREJER
Abducted January 30, 1976, held without hearing at the disposition of the Executive.

--Horacio Rene MATOSO
Arrested October 8, 1976, held without charge or trial.

--Duilio Blas APONTE
Arrested November 18, 1974. Charged and acquitted, now held at the disposition of the Executive. Right of option to emigrate rescinded.

--María do las Esperanzas Beltramino de LOTO
Arrested with her husband September 25, 1976 -- he is a "disappeared" person, she has been held at the disposition of the Executive, her right of option to emigrate having been rescinded.

--Rodolfo Juan BEGNARDI
Arrested November 9, 1975, held without trial at the disposition of the Executive.

Photocopy Reagan Library
Dear Senator Kennedy:

Thank you for your letter of March 19 expressing your concern over the human rights situation in Argentina and asking that Secretary Haig raise these concerns with President-designate Viola and other Argentine officials.

This administration is committed to the protection and promotion worldwide of individual freedoms and legal rights. Through the use of quiet, private diplomacy we have and will continue to pursue this important interest within the context of our overall strategic, hemispheric and security interests.

In Argentina, there have been significant improvements in human rights. There have been no confirmed disappearances this year. The number of persons held by the Executive on other than common criminal charges has been reduced from about 8,000 in 1977 to under 900 today. Greater press and judicial discretion exists. We expect this progress to continue.

The issue of accounting for the disappeared is the most difficult human rights issue facing the Argentine Government today. To the extent that it raises concerns of the military over recriminations and reprisals by a future civilian government, it impedes progress in other important areas such as restoration of due process and return to democratic rule. Over the longer term, we expect the Argentines themselves will resolve this issue. In the interim, we will continue to use our influence privately and in international fora to encourage Argentine officials in their efforts to make information available to the families of missing persons.

We have decided to seek repeal of Section 623 of the Foreign Assistance Act. By imposing blanket restrictions on the sale of military supplies and

The Honorable
Edward M. Kennedy,
United States Senate.
training to Argentina, this legislation inhibits the accomplishment of our strategic objectives in the hemisphere while not permitting recognition of the considerable progress Argentina has made toward the restoration of due process and rule of law. As in countries without restrictive legislation, we intend to utilize existing legislation and control procedures to take into account the full range of U.S. interests.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations


Cleared: ARA/SC:REService
ARA:SDEaton
ARA:JABushnell
HA:RGrraham
HA:SPalmer
March 19, 1981

The Honorable
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
Washington

Dear Al:

Following your meetings this week with President Viola, we are writing to request that you intervene on behalf of political prisoners and those men, women and children who have "disappeared" in Argentina. Former Secretary of State Vance delivered an earlier list to the Government of Argentina, making clear that there could be no military relations until some accounting was made and prisoners released.

As you know, Senator Hubert Humphrey joined us and other Senators in introducing legislation in 1977 to end all military aid and support to Argentina because of the extremely serious violations of human rights in that country. Since the military coup in 1976, up to 15,000 individuals have been seized by security forces and then "disappeared". Periodically these disappearances continue: just this past week, two more were abducted by Buenos Aires provincial police, held incommunicado, and tortured before being released.

Amnesty International, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Commission and other international human rights groups have documented extensive use of torture and violations of fundamental human rights; and even today, there are several thousand political prisoners who have been denied due process as well as the right of option to depart their country guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution. We are enclosing a list of particularly pressing humanitarian cases.

We believe there will be significant Congressional and public opposition to U.S. military aid to Argentina until its military junta accounts for the "disappeared", releases political prisoners, and respects the rights of its citizens. You may be aware that each Thursday,
mothers of the "disappeared" hold a vigil in Buenos Aires; last week they were arrested by security police. We have met with some of them in the past and found their cases compelling reason for our country to continue to urge disclosure of the facts about their children and their grandchildren. We are making available to your Department all of the cases raised by these mothers with us, some of which are included in the enclosed list.

We hope that you will raise these concerns directly with President Viola and express your own support for these aims, as well as for the return to civilian rule and free elections in that country. To do so will be in the best traditions of our nation, and Argentine respect for freedom and human rights will make an essential contribution to increased stability and security in our Hemisphere.

With our thanks, and best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

Alan Cranston

Edward M. Kennedy
UNCLASSIFIED

TO: P - Mr. Walter J. Stoessel
FROM: ARA - Tom Enders
SUBJECT: Reply to Jan Kalicki on Disappeared Children in Argentina

Mr. Jan Kalicki, Foreign Policy Adviser to Senator Kennedy, has written you to provide a listing, promised in Senator Kennedy's letter to the Secretary of March 19, of children alleged to have disappeared in Argentina. Our response to the Senator's letter is attached at Tab 2.

Recommendation:

That you sign the reply attached at Tab 1.

Attachments:

1. Letter to Mr. Kalicki.
2. Our Response to Senator Kennedy.
3. Letter from Mr. Kalicki.

Drafted: ARA/SC: GJWhitman: mas
3-30-81 X29166

Cleared: H: JMcBride

AMB. STOESSEL HAS SEEN

APR 8 1981