The 1978 Guidelines for the U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation:

Process and the Historical Impact

 

Working Paper No. 17 

Michael J. Green

Olin Fellow for Asian Security Studies

Council on Foreign Relations

and

Koji Murata

Hiroshima University

 


The opinions expressed here are exclusively the authors' and do not necessarily represent any agencies or institutions. Please do not quote without authors' permission.


 

Introduction

This paper will analyze, first, the decision-making process that led to the adoption of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978, and second, the impact of the Guidelines on actual U.S. Japan defense relations since then. Both the process and the impact of the 1978 Guidelines must be assessed at three levels: operational, political, and strategic. The authors have conducted interviews with various Japanese and American former government officials to complete this assessment.

Background

Let us begin with the historical background in the early 1970s.

After the Nixon Doctrine in September 1969, the United States began to reduce its troop levels in Asia. The intensification of Sino-Soviet confrontation and the economic growth of U.S. allies in Asia, especially Japan, made this possible. During Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's visit to Washington in November 1969, President Richard Nixon urged him to increase Japan's share of American responsibilities in Asia. In December 1970, it was announced that the number of U.S. troops in Japan would be cut by 12,000. The U.S. Seventh Infantry Division was also withdrawn from South Korea. U.S. allies and friendly nations in Asia became concerned about a further withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region.

Under these international circumstances, in October 1970, Japanese Defense Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone launched the Fourth Defense Buildup Program from 1972 to 1976 (Yojibo). This five-year program put emphasis on expensive weapons such as fighters and submarines. As a result, the budget was 5,200 billion yen, twice the amount of the previous program. Because of the plan's huge budget, public opinion was negative to Nakasone's favorite program. While Nakasone's search for "autonomous" defense suffered a setback, Tokyo's unease about the U.S. defense commitment continued. Although Japanese public opinion had been long concerned about being entrapped into a U.S. war in Asia, its concern shifted to being abandoned. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Office of Prime Minister, while 14.9 % answered there was a danger for Japan to be entrapped into a war, 34.3 % said no in 1975.1 Masataka Kosaka noted: "a real danger will be the possibility of Japan placing too little trust in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, in contrast to the excessive trust she had before."2

It is also important to emphasize the role of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), and eventually the Guidelines, in terms of Japanese domestic politics. Nakasone's autonomous defense plan was not just a response to changing U.S. strategy, it was also linked to political strategy at home in Japan. In the late 1960s the succession battle for the next generation of factional leadership in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had led to the split between the A-Ken and the AA-Ken. Those who pushed autonomous defense were most hawkish on China and came out of the A-Ken group. Thus Nakasone's autonomous defense policies were sparking deep divisions within the LDP itself that could affect the struggle for leadership of the party. Nakasone himself came to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) as the victor in his own struggle for control of a faction, and he was eager to plant his flag on defense issues to build a larger political support base.

When the United States moved to normalize relations with China in 1972, the A-Ken/AA-Ken distinctions became less politically relevant and the viability of autonomous defense collapsed. Kakuei Tanaka began rebuilding a middle ground in 1972 with his "peacetime defense forces concept," based on memoranda prepared by Takuya Kubo, then-Director General of Defense Bureau, the JDA. This led eventually to the Boei o Kangaeru Kai and the NDPO, which Takeo Miki and his Defense Minister Michita Sakata believed were essential to end the divisive defense debate and remote issues that could split the LDP (remember that the Shina-decision to pick Miki was forced on the LDP by Keidanren in order to put an end to the corruption and deep fights of the Tanaka era). Miki was a liberal, but his real mission was to rebuild consensus middle ground and long-term credibility for the party. The Guidelines were essential to add operational credibility to the political compromise established by the NDPO. This pattern anticipated the review of the NDPO and the Guidelines between 1995-97.

Process

By the time Saigon fell to the Communists in April 1975, the Japanese government was faced with two important tasks: improving public support for its defense policy and keeping a credible U.S. defense commitment to Japan. Defense Minister Sakata of the Miki cabinet were well aware of both of these objections. The Guidelines became important for maintaining the above mentioned political consensus because the possibility of U.S. withdrawal threatened to end the internal political truce created by the NDPO and reignite internal LDP warfare over ideologically sensitive defense issues. "Abandonment" worried not only the Japanese public but also the architects of the new LDP middle ground.

On March 8th, 1975, in Upper House's Budget Committee, Tetsu Ueda, a Socialist Party member, pointed out that there was a secret agreement between Japanese and American military officers over sealane defense. Minister Sakata promised to investigate it. On April 1st, Prime Minister Miki denied Ueda's remark by saying that there were some studies between the uniformed military but no agreement. Minister Sakata also said: first, it was necessary to envision some division of labor for U.S.-Japan operational cooperation in the sea around Japan; and second, he would like to invite U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger to Japan for the purpose; and third, the government would do its best not to let the uniformed military have its own way in this matter. These questions and answers in the National Diet initiated the official dialogue on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

On September 2, 1996, the Asahi Shimbun reported that it was Morton Abramowitz, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, who first proposed the official dialogue on the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. According to Ko Maruyama, former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense, however, Abramowitz proposed only to hold regular meetings between the Japanese Defense Minister and the U.S. Defense Secretary. Maruyama says it was Sakata who most eagerly initiated the official dialogue. Most of Japanese interviewees involved confirmed this. Abramowitz himself points-out that at the time his first concern was the host nation support issue, but in general, "it was important to demonstrate that Japan was not just a free rider."

As a longtime Diet member, Sakata knew well the importance of public support for national defense. He had published the second Defense White Paper, which had been suspended since Nakasone published the first one in 1970. Kubo, now administrative Vice Minister of Defense under Sakata, shared the view on the importance of public support. According to one JDA official, the United States probably still questioned the extent to which Japan could really cooperate in the field of military endeavors. Noboru Hoshuyama, then-senior staff member of Defense Policy Division of the JDA, speculates, however, that it was the American initiative to start the dialogue for the Guidelines. According to Hoshuyama, "Later, Mr. Sakata beautifully decorated it." What this really means, however, is that there were frequent prior interactions between Japanese and American defense bureaucracies before official dialogue was initiated.

One of the authors interviewed Robert Lohman, then-director for Japan in the Department of Defense (DOD), who argued that the U.S. side recognized the importance of codifying the division of roles and missions with allies in Asia as the U.S. took the Seventh Infantry Division and 12,000 troops out of Japan.

The Dovish Prime Minister Miki was still somewhat cautious about promoting the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. He repeatedly asked Maruyama, then-Director-General of Defense Bureau, "You won't do anything new, will you? Everything should be done within the framework of the existing U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)." In fact, the U.S.-Japan Joint Communiqué on August 8th, 1975 started that the relevant authorities of the two nations would consult within the framework of the SCC.

At the end of August, U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited Tokyo via Seoul. On August 29th, Schlesinger met Sakata. They agreed on two points. First, the two defense ministers would meet regularly, at least once a year. Second, under the SCC, a subcommittee would be created to discuss U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

In July 1976, the SCC authorized the establishment of the Subcommittee on the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (SDC). The purpose of this subcommittee was to "study and consult" about U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. Given the sensitive domestic public opinion and the opposition parties, Maruyama directed Seiki Nishihiro, then-director of the JDA defense policy division, to exclude three areas from the SDC agenda: matters concerning "Prior Consultation," those concerning the Japanese constitutional limitations, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Instead, the focus of the Guidelines were operations, logistics, and intelligence.

The Japanese members of the SDC were: the Director-General of American Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Director-General of Defense Bureau, the JDA, and the Secretary-General of the Joint Chiefs Council. The U.S. members were the Deputy Chief of Mission, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). In December, the SDC decided to consult on (1) Japan contingencies, (2) contingencies in the Far East, and (3) the U.S.-Japan Joint Exercises and other activities under normal circumstances.

In August 1977, the SDC agreed on the following points. First, while the SDF would be in charge of limited and small scale aggression, in case of larger scale aggression, the SDF would be in charge of defensive operations and the U.S. forces offensive ones. This decision would guide the "roles and missions" approach to bilateral defense planning in the 1980s. Second, the Guidelines should be drafted. And third, three working groups on operation, intelligence, and logistic support would be established.

Keiji Ohmori, then-staff member of the JDA Defense Policy Division, recalls that there were two problems related to these issues. First, while the Japanese side insisted on a division of labor between the SDF and the U.S. forces (Japan defensive and the U.S. offensive), the U.S. side regarded it as unrealistic once an actual fight occurred. However, the U.S. side, understanding Japanese political constraints, compromised. Second, in those days, the JDA did not have enough direct communication channels with the Pentagon. Thus, the JDA had to first talk with the USFJ. Then, the USFJ brought the issue to Pentagon's International Security Affairs bureau (ISA) through the Pacific Command. As a result, it took a long time to communicate between Tokyo and Washington. This is a sharp contrast from the current close interactions between JDA's Internal Bureau (Naikyoku) and the ISA.

In October 1978, the SDC finished drafting the Guidelines. It consisted of three parts: posture for deterring aggression: actions in response to an armed attack against Japan: and Japan-U.S. cooperation in the ease of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.3 According to Admiral Naotoshi Sakonjo, then-Secretary-General of the Joint Chiefs Council, this last SDC meeting was "just a ceremony." He says that since the Guidelines' aim was to promote U.S.-Japan cooperations for the defense of Japan, the last part is "unrelated" to this original purpose. The U.S. Stated Department pushed for the Japanese government to include a reference to the Korean Peninsula in Section Three of the Guidelines, arguing that the precedent for doing so was already set by the 1969 Sato-Nixon Communiqué. The MOFA successfully resisted. The U.S. military wanted Japan to commit to a larger operational role in Section Three of the Guidelines, but MOFA resisted that as well. The JDA, in turn, wanted the United States to clarify its plans for reinforcing Japan in the event of attack (under Section Two of the Guidelines), but the U.S. military was not willing to clarify that commitment in the same way was done for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the Reforger Exercises.

This document was authorized by the Fukuda cabinet in the late November. General Takehiko Takashina, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs Council, noted that "for the first time since its revision in 1960, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has become substantive."4 U.S. Senator Sam Nun also noted:

It [the Guidelines] opens the door for joint planning and greater cooperation in many key defense areas, and provides an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable forces. In the past, a comprehensive evaluation of the adequacy of joint United States-Japanese defense efforts has been lacking. The guidelines will permit this evaluation.5

Product

Why were there no significant bilateral operational planning or studies before the Guidelines? One reason was that the U.S. military continued for some time after 1954 to think of the JSDF as little more than a large police force. In terms of logistical support, the U.S. military took time to adjust to Japanese sovereignty after the end of the occupation. Japanese rear area logistical support during the Korean War had been open ended, and Article VI of the 1960 U.S. military appreciated the bureaucratic and legal complexities of planning with a sovereign (and increasingly bureaucratic) Japan for such regional contingencies.

A second reason why operational planning and studies were rare before the Guidelines was that the Japanese officials had no political authorization to do so. The 1963 Mitsuya Kenkyu brought U.S. and JSDF planners together to study Korean Peninsula scenarios, but there was no explicit authorization for this on the Japanese side, and when the studies were leaked, the resulting Diet debate stifled further efforts. Tetsu Ueda obviously expected the revival of this when he raised the above-mentioned question in 1975. The U.S. side did invite JDA officials to CINCPAC in 1966 for "Bull Run" strategy session that examined a range of regional crises, but increasing political opposition in the Vietnam War in Japan crushed this endeavor as well. In terms of joint defense studies, therefore, the Guidelines represented an unprecedented level of political authorization for the JDA and JSDF.

At first, MOFA was not eager to promote the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. However, Maruyama and Haruo Natsume, then-director of Defense Policy Division at the JDA, recall that when Ambassador Togo assumed the position of the Administrative vice Minister, MOFA's attitude became more positive. MOFA seems to be more positively involved in current U.S.-Japan security talks. It is another sharp difference between the late 1970s and today. Surprisingly enough, Takuya Kubo, then-Administrative Vice Minister of Defense, who had originated the NDPO in 1976, was rather negative to the Guidelines. A JDA official speculated that because Kubo had been involved in the above-mentioned Mitsuya Kenkyu, he might have been concerned about negative public reactions on such an issue.

Impact

Soon after the Guidelines were adopted, the actual study on defense of Japan contingencies began. While the U.S. side wanted to initiate studies on the contingencies in the Far East, the Japanese side wanted to focus on the defense of Japan exclusively. Both sides agreed on starting the study on the contingency of Japan first. This was a sensible move since the Japanese side needed to investigate shortcomings in their own legal system for dealing with such contingencies. In addition both sides thought a study on contingencies in Japan could be applied to the Far East in many respects.

The study on the defense of Japan contingency assumed that an enemy (the Soviet Union) would attack Hokkaido with its airborne divisions. Admiral Sakonjo says that this scenario was unrealistic, because the Soviet Union did not have enough landing capability to take Hokkaido. One American former senior official said, according to Sakonjo, that if the Soviet Union invaded Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Prefectural Police could cope with it. Nonetheless, Sakonjo notes, the Ground SDF used this scenario to justify its forward deployment posture there. Other Japanese services and the U.S. side finally respected this approach. The study was roughly completed in Summer of 1981 and submitted to Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki.

The progress of the study on the contingency in the Far East, which was officially initiated in the 18th U.S.-Japan SCC on January 18, 1982, was much slower. Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, then-JDA's Councilor for International Affairs, explains: "the Article Six situation is related to the overall U.S.-Japan Security Treaty." The late Seiki Nishihiro, former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense, was more outspoken: "it was because MOFA was mainly in charge of the study on the contingency in the Far East. It was a mistake to separate the Article Six situation from that of the Article Five, which were inseparable in nature." Ambassador Shinichiro Asao, then-Director-General of North American Bureau, the MOFA, provides another perspective: "the study on the contingency of the Far East was related to many central agencies' jurisdiction. We had great difficulty persuading even one other central agency: the Ministry of Transportation." A JDA official speculates that the Ministry of Transportation was very reluctant to be involved in such an issue because there were strong leftist trade unions under its jurisdiction. The Ministry of Transportation, for example, tried to prevent U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield from boarding a U.S. military helicopter when he arrived at the Haneda Airport to welcome a senior official from Washington. According to them, the airport was exclusively for non-military use.

After the adoption of the Guidelines, the three services of the SDF promoted joint exercises with their U.S. counterparts. The number of joint exercises between the U.S. Army and the GSDF was least drastic. They were first held only twice in 1981. Hideo Ohtake, in his Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji, noted that many in the GSDF nationalistic views against the United States (p.228). Ohmori notes that the ASDF was most positive towards promoting the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and that the GSDF was the least among the three services. Technically speaking, air forces need joint exercises by their nature. Admiral Sakonjo points out that while the joint exercises between armies are highly visible to the people, those between air forces are not so visible, and those between navies in the ocean are least visible. In other words, the effects of the Guidelines differ among the services. As James Auer, then-director for Japan in the Pentagon, notes:

The Guidelines worked fine but were quite limited in scope, especially for the two countries' naval forces. Especially to the U.S. Navy, but also perhaps to the Japanese MSDF, the Guidelines were twenty years late. The navies had been doing joint exercises and intelligence sharing since the 1950s, although of course the Japanese ability was very low at first, but things were improving.

Auer also shared Sakonjo's view that "the U.S. never thought that the Soviet Union would invade Japan – The U.S.S.R. didn't have amphibious lift and would be busy elsewhere." Nevertheless, the planning for a Soviet invasion of Japan formed an important premise for bilateral U.S.-Japanese planning and exercises in the 1980s that seriously complicated Moscow's military options in the Pacific.

Conclusion

Let us conclude major legacies of the Guidelines at three levels: operational, political, and strategic.

(A) Operational

The Guidelines gave the first public authorization for the JSDF and U.S. forces to train together. This led to a much closer focus on and appreciation of the capabilities of the JSDF in Honolulu and Washington, and it eased the MSDF's participation in new areas as RIMPAC, which MSDF ships first joined in 1980 (though it had been planned before the Guidelines). The importance of credible civilian control to operational readiness and legitimacy of the JSDF cannot be overestimated. As a matter of fact, civilian control was one of the most important explicit reasons why Sakata took the initiative for U.S.-Japan defense dialogue.

In addition, the Guidelines established the first political authorization for studies in Japan, which eased the process of developing concrete bilateral plans for the defense of Japan. Through this process, the interservice coordination in the JSDF was also improved. There were still serious shortcomings, however. The Guidelines did NOT:

These shortcomings hindered the alliance at an operational/military level throughout the 1980s, even though the alliance played a critical strategic and political role in resolving the Cold War in East Asia. Events since the end of the Cold War have made these shortcomings more obvious and more acute (for example, the inability of the Japanese Government to prepare for possible contingencies associated with the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994). This is why President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to review the Guidelines in April 1996.

(B) Political

The Guidelines played an important role in sustaining the evolution of a new consensus on defense policies in Japan that was begun with Tanaka's "peacetime defense force concept" and embellished in Boei O Kangaeru Kai and the NDPO. At the bureaucratic level, the Guidelines brought MOFA, JDA, State and DOD together to form a "team" that would eventually build the close defense cooperation of the 1980s. On the U.S. key players in this team (Richard Armitage, Auer, etc.) were new, but on the Japanese side they were all veterans of the Guidelines process (Ryozo Kato, Nishihiro, Ohmori, Minoru Tanba, etc.) In fact, it may be said that the Guidelines process gave birth to the new "Anpo-ha" MOFA. Also, the civil-military relations in the JDA (Seifuku-Naikyoku Kankei) have been greatly improved since the adoption of the Guidelines.

One negative political impact of the Guidelines was on the U.S. side, where (as Hirose indicates) the demonstration of Japan's limited operational contribution led to more of a focus on budget burden sharing. Negotiations for the first bilateral Host Nation Support Agreement overlapped with the Guidelines process and eventually overwhelmed the Guidelines as the U.S. Congress pressed for more financial support from Japan. It may have been that without the host nations support issue, the United States and Japan might have pursued operational planning more vigorously, but it is also possible that the Japanese Government preferred burden sharing issues to the more contentious task of contingency legislation.

(C) Strategic

Strategically, the Guidelines were of little consequence in and of themselves. If anything, it might be argued that the weakness of Section Three of the Guidelines represented a step backward from the Sato-Nixon Communiqué. However, the operational and political effects of the Guidelines eventually had profound strategic consequences. The precedents set for civilian control, interagency cooperation, operational legitimacy for the JSDF, and generally locking the U.S. and Japanese strategies together, all laid the groundwork for the roles and missions approach of the 1980s. The increased perceived Soviet threat of the "New Cold War" created a strategic environment for closer alliance cooperation, but the fabric for that cooperation was spun by the Guidelines. This was particularly true of the regional context. The Guidelines indicated to Beijing that Japan would not act as a military power independent of the United States (as the Chinese had feared during the early 1970s), and thus when Beijing needed a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership felt comfortable supporting the U.S.-Japan Alliance. With Beijing's tacit support, broader regional acceptance for an expanded security role for Japan became easier. This will also be an important factor in the legacy of the newly revised Guidelines.


Endnotes

1 Shinkichi Eto and Yamamoto Yoshinobu. Sogo Anpo to Mirai no Sentaku. (Tokyo: Kodansha. 1991). p. 441.

2 Masataka Kosaka. Options for Japan's Foreign Policy. Adelphi Papers. No. 97. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1973). p. 10.

3 As for the English full text of the Guidelines, Defense agency. Defense of Japan 1995. (Tokyo: Japan Times. 1995). pp. 260-264.

4 Taiyukai, ed. 80 Nendai Kiki no Shinario to Taio. (Tokyo: Taiyukai. 1980). p. 191.

5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Pacific Study Group. United States-Japan Security Relationship: The Key to East Asian Security and Stability. (Washington, DC: GPO. March 22, 1979), 98th Congress, 1st Session. p. 1.

List of Interviewees

Selected Bibliography


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