Washington, D.C., 4 December 2003 - Newly declassified
State Department documents obtained by the National Security Archive
under the Freedom of Information Act show that in October 1976,
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and high ranking U.S. officials
gave their full support to the Argentine military junta and urged
them to hurry up and finish the "dirty war" before the
U.S. Congress cut military aid. A post-junta truth commission
found that the Argentine military had "disappeared"
at least 10,000 Argentines in the so-called "dirty war"
against "subversion" and "terrorists" between
1976 and 1983; human rights groups in Argentina put the number
at closer to 30,000.
The new documents are two memoranda of conversations (memcons)
with the visiting Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto
Guzzetti - one with Kissinger himself on October 7, 1976. At the
time, the U.S. Congress was about to approve sanctions against
the Argentine regime because of widespread reports of human rights
abuses by the junta.
The memcons contradict the official line given by Assistant Secretary
of State Harry Shlaudeman in response to complaints from the U.S.
ambassador in Buenos Aires that Guzzetti had come back "euphoric"
and "convinced that there is no real problem with the
USG" over human rights. Schlaudeman cabled, "Guz;etti
[sic] heard only what he wanted to hear."
According to the memcon's verbatim transcript, Secretary of State
Kissinger interrupted the Foreign Minister's report on the situation
in Argentina and said "Look, our basic attitude is that
we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that
friends ought to be supported. What is not understood in the United
States is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights
problems but not the context. The quicker you succeed the better…
The human rights problem is a 
growing
one. Your Ambassador can apprise you. We want a stable situation.
We won't cause you unnecessary difficulties. If you can finish
before Congress gets back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could
restore would help."
One day earlier, on October 6, 1976, Admiral Guzzetti had been
told by Acting Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson "that
it is possible to understand the requirement to be tough."
But Robinson also remarked on the "question of timing
of the relaxation of extreme countersubversion measures"
before Congress voted sanctions on Argentina. The memcon with
Robinson goes on to note that "[t]he Acting Secretary
said… The problem is that the United States is an idealistic
and moral country and its citizens have great difficulty in comprehending
the kinds of problems faced by Argentina today. There is a tendency
to apply our moral standards abroad and Argentina must understand
the reaction of Congress with regard to loans and military assistance.
The American people, right or wrong, have the perception that
today there exists in Argentina a pattern of gross violations
of human rights."
Beginning in September 1976, the U.S. ambassador to Argentina,
Robert Hill, had been pressing the Argentine military on human
rights issues, amid a dramatic increase in the number of victims
being disappeared, killed and tortured, including half a dozen
American citizens. The Argentine generals dismissed Ambassador
Hill's demarches, according to previously declassified cables
written by Hill, and alluded to an understanding with high ranking
U.S. officials "that the USG's overriding concern was
not human rights but rather that GOA 'get it over quickly.'"
After Admiral Guzzetti returned from Washington, Ambassador Hill
wrote "a sour note" from Buenos Aires complaining
that he could hardly present human rights demarches if the Argentine
Foreign Minister did not hear the same message from the Secretary
of State. Guzzetti had told Hill that "[t]he Secretary…
had urged Argentina 'to be careful' and had said that if the terrorist
problem was over by December or January, he (the Secretary) believed
serious problems could be avoided in the U.S..." Wrote Ambassador
Hill, "Guzzetti went to U.S. fully expecting to hear some
strong, firm, direct warnings on his government's human rights
practices, rather than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation,
convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over that
issue."
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Harry
W. Shlaudeman, who attended both the Kissinger and the Robinson
meetings with Guzzetti, responded to Hill on behalf of Kissinger
with a cable that directly misrepresented the actual conversations
recorded in the memcons: "As in other circumstances you
have undoubtedly en countered in your diplomatic career, Guz;etti
[sic] heard only what he wanted to hear. He was told in detail
how strongly opinion in this country has reacted against reports
of abuses by the security forces in Argentina and the nature of
the threat this poses to argentine interests… [T]he USG regards
most seriously Argentina's international commitments to protect
and promote fundamental human rights. There should be no mistake
on that score…"
A final note from Hill shows that the Ambassador was appeased
by the strong response from Washington. "Your message
on Guzzetti's visit was most helpful. It is reassuring to have
chapter and verse on what Guzzetti was told. We will keep after
him and other GOA officials," Hill wrote. There is no
evidence that Ambassador Hill ever saw the actual transcripts
of the conversations with Guzzetti included here.
The
two new memorandums of conversation (memcons) were not among the
4700 documents released in August 2002 by the Argentina Declassification
Project of the U.S. Department of State. Much to the credit of
Secretary of State Colin Powell and his predecessor, Madeleine
Albright, who began the project, that release made front page
news in Argentina, contributed dramatically to civilian control
of the military, provided documentation on military decisionmaking
now being used in dozens of court cases related to the "dirty
war," and for some of the families of the "disappeared,"
gave the first available evidence of what had actually happened
to their loved ones.
The State Department project, however, did not included documents
from the often-vigorous internal U.S. policy debates over Argentina;
and neither the CIA nor the Pentagon participated in the declassification
effort. The National Security Archive obtained the new memcons
in November 2003 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request
filed with the Department of State in November 2002, seeking to
fill in the missing pieces from the larger release.
In the following selection of documents, the memoranda of conversations
Guzzetti had at the Department of State are preceded by two cables
from Ambassador Hill reporting on the fruitless human rights demarches
he had made to Admiral Guzzetti and President Jorge Rafael Videla
in September, together with the contemporaneous Department of
State intelligence analysis of the counter-terrorism practices
of Argentine military, and the testimony of an American citizen
tortured by the Argentine security forces.
The torture report was written after an interview with the victim
on October 4, 1976 by the same U.S. official, Fernando Rondon,
who served as the notetaker at the October 7, 1976 Kissinger-Guzzetti
meeting.
The
Documents
Document 1: Subject:
Other aspects of September 17 conversation with Foreign Minister,
September 20, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Ambassador Robert Hill had just returned to Argentina amid reports
of massacres of prisoners and widespread human rights violations
by Argentine security forces, as well as mounting evidence of
assassinations of foreigners under Operation Condor. On instructions
from Washington, Hill was charged with raising the human rights
issue at the highest level of the Argentine government. But, as
Hill reported to Washington, "the Foreign Minister said
that GOA had been somewhat surprised by indications of such strong
concern on the part of the USG in human rights situation in Argentina.
When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter
had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist
problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that
he had reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and
that their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern
was not human rights but rather that GOA 'get it over quickly.'"
[Note: Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti met Secretary of State
Kissinger in Santiago in June 1976. The National Security Archive
has requested the minutes of this meeting which are still classified.]
Document 2: Subject:
Ambassador discusses U.S.-Argentine Relations with President Videla,
September 24, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
In this cable, Ambassador Hill reported how his human rights
concerns were also dismissed by the Argentine president.
"[The] President said he had been gratified when FONMIN
Guzzetti reported to him that Secretary of State Kissinger understood
their problem and had said he hoped they could get terrorism under
control as quickly as possible. Videla said he had the impression
senior officers of the USG understood situation his govt faces
but junior bureaucrats do not. I assured him this was not the
case. We all hope Argentina can get terrorism under control quickly
- but to do so in such a way as to do minimum damage to its image
and to its relations with other governments. If Security Forces
continue to kill people to tune of brass band, I concluded, this
will not be possible. I told him Secretary of State had told me
when I was in US that he wanted to avoid human rights problem
in Argentina."
Document 3: Argentina:
Six Months of Military Government, September 30, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Produced just a week before Argentina's Foreign Minister Guzzetti
visited Washington, this analysis from the Department of State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) provides the baseline
of U.S. knowledge about the Argentine military's counterterrorism
activities and complicity in human rights abuses.
"Counterterrorism and Human Rights…
There is no doubt that most, if not all, of the right-wing
terrorists are police or military personnel who act with the knowledge
and/or direction of high-level security and administration officials.
…
They continue to act with an impunity that belies government
denials of complicity.…
Videla and others who probably oppose the abuses fear that a severe
crackdown on the illegal activities of security personnel would
dampen their morale and under- mine the battle against subversives…
These factors do not absolve Videla of ultimate responsibility
for the abuses. However, they point out the problems he faces
in correcting the situation and suggest that the excesses are
likely to continue until: --the security forces have reduced the
subversive threat to what they consider to be an acceptable level;
and --Videla feels sufficiently secure and strong in the presidency
to assert his authority over free-lancing subordinates."
Document 4: [deleted] Statement,
October 4, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Also circulating at the time of the Guzzetti meetings among top
State Department officials including Assistant Secretary Schlaudeman
was this report produced by State's Argentina desk officer, Fernando
Rondon. Under pressure from Congress, the Department persuaded
the Argentines to free American citizen Gwenda Loken Lopez, who
had been detained and tortured for handing out communist leaflets
- one of thousands arrested by the military in 1976. Once back
in the U.S., Loken Lopez gave this shocking testimony of her suffering
in the hands of the Argentine security forces. "[They]
started using the picana [an electric prod]. Then they tied me
down and threw water on me… They questioned me but it was
more just give it to her. There. There. There. In genital area…
They said they'd fix me so I couldn't have children."
The document also points to the involvement of President Videla's
intelligence service, Servicio de Informaciones del Estado (SIDE).
Document 5: Subject:
US Argentine Relations, October 6, 1976
Source: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security
Archive, released November 2003.
While Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in New York, Acting
Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson and Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs Harry Shlaudeman received
Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti in Washington.
After Guzzetti described the situation in Argentina, Acting Secretary
Robinson stated, "Argentina is now facing a kind of subversive
civil war. During their initial period the situation may seem
to call for measures that are not acceptable in the long term.
The real question, he emphasized, is knowing how long to continue
these tough measures and noted that the Foreign Minister had indicated
that they might be required for another three or four months."
"The Acting Secretary said that it is possible to understand
the requirement to be tough at first but it is important to move
toward a more moderate posture which we would hope would be permanent.
It is helpful, he remarked, to hear the Minister's explanation
of the situation. The problem is that the United States is an
idealistic and moral country and its citizens have great difficulty
in comprehending the kinds of problems faced by Argentina today.
There is a tendency to apply our moral standards abroad and Argentina
must understand the reaction of Congress with regard to loans
and military assistance. The American people, right or wrong,
have the perception that today there exists in Argentina a pattern
of gross violations of human rights. Under current legislation
the administration might be prevented under certain circumstances
from voting for loans in the IDB, for example. The government
is placed in a difficult position. In reality there are two elements
that must be considered. First, how long is it necessary to maintain
very firm, tough position? Our Congress returns in January and
if there is a clear cut reduction in the intensity of the measures
being taken by the Government of Argentina, then there would in
fact be a changing situation where the charge that a consistent
pattern of gross violations exists could be seen as invalid. Second,
it is very important that Argentina find a means to explain the
Argentine position to the world. There is also a third element
and that is that there are many well meaning people in the United
States, though perhaps somewhat naïve, who indiscriminately
take the side of those imprisoned in Argentina. Their attitudes
are reinforced by instances where the U.S. government has been
unable, in the case of arrested U.S. citizens, to have consular
access. The U.S. is not going to defend these persons if they
break your laws but we must have prompt consular access."
"In summary there are three issues: the question of timing
of the relaxation of extreme countersubversion measures; promoting
an understand [sic] of the problems facing Argentina; and consular
access."
Document 6: Subject:
Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti,
October 7, 1976
Source: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security
Archive, released November 2003.
The following are excerpts of the memorandum of conversation,
previously classified SECRET NODIS, between Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti,
at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City:
"Foreign Minister Guzzetti: The terrorist organizations
have been dismantled. If this direction continues, by the end
of the year the danger will have been set aside. There will always
be isolated attempts, of course."
"The Secretary: When will they be overcome? Next Spring?"
"Foreign Minister Guzzetti: No, by the end of this year."…
"The Secreatry: Look, our basic attitude is that we would
like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends
ought to be supported. What is not understood in the United States
is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights problems
but not the context. The quicker you succeed the better."
"The human rights problem is a growing one. Your Ambassador
can apprise you. We want a stable situation. We won't cause you
unnecessary difficulties. If you can finish before Congress gets
back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could restore would help."
Document 7: Subject:
Foreign Minister Guzetti Euphoric over visit to United States,
October 19, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Transcription
Admiral Guzzetti had just returned from the U.S. and Ambassador
Robert Hill wrote what Assistant Secretary of State Shlaudeman
termed "a bitter complaint" to Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger protesting that the Argentine military were not
receiving a strong disapproving signal from Washington for their
human rights violations. Hill wrote that the Embassy was now in
an awkward position to present demarches on human rights and protest
the treatment received by American citizens.
In this memo Hill wrote that "[Guzzetti] spoke first
of his lunch in Washington with Deputy Secretary Robinson, Assistant
Secretary Shlaudeman and Ambassador Martin. He emphasized how
well they understood the Argentine problem and said that 'the
consensus of the meeting was to [unintelligible] the terrorist
problem as soon as possible.'"
"He considered his talk with Secretary of State Kissinger
a success. The Secretary… had urged Argentina 'to be careful'
and had said that if the terrorist problem was over by December
or January, he (the Secretary) believed serious problems could
be avoided in the U.S...."
"Guzzetti's remarks both to me and to the argentine press
since his return are not those of a man who has been impressed
with the gravity of the human rights problem as seen from the
U.S. Both personally and in press accounts of his trip Guzzetti's
reaction indicates little reason for concern over the human rights
issue. Guzzetti went to US fully expecting to hear some strong,
firm, direct warning of his govt's human rights practices. Rather
than that, he has returned in a state of jubilation. Convinced
that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue. Based
on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must now
believe that if it has any problems with the U.S. over human rights,
they are confined to certain elements of Congress and what it
regards as biased and/or uninformed minor segments of public opinion.
While that conviction lasts it will be unrealistic and unbelievable
for this embassy to press representations to the GOA over human
rights violations."
Document 8: Ambassador
Hill and Human Rights in Argentina, October 20, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
In a SECRET note to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Assistant
Secretary Shaludeman reported:
"Bob Hill has registered for the record his concern for
human rights in a bitter complaint about our purported failure
to impress on Foreign Minister Guzzetti how seriously we view
the rightist violence in Argentina (TAB 2)"
Document 9: Guzzetti's
Visit to the US, October 22, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman responded to Ambassador
Hill on behalf of Secretary Kissinger: "As in other circumstances
you have undoubtedly encountered in your diplomatic career, Guz;etti
[sic] heard only what he wanted to hear. He was told in detail
how strongly opinion in this country has reacted against reports
of abuses by the security forces in Argentina and the nature of
the threat this poses to argentine interests."
"Finally, with respect to Guzzetti's "jubilation"
and its effect, we doubt that the GOA has such illusions. It was
obvious in our contacts that Guzzetti knew his country has a problem--one
that requires a speedy solution. And we will continue to impress
on argentine representatives here, as we expect you to do there,
that the USG regards most seriously Argentina's international
commitments to protect and promote fundamental human rights. There
should be no mistake on that score… Kissinger"
Document 10: Guzzetti's
visit to the US, October 27, 1976
Source: U.S.
State Department, Argentina Declassification Project (1975-1984),
August 20, 2002.
Ambassador Hill got the message and brought the issue to an end
in this memo stating:
"Your message on Guzzetti's visit was most helpful. It
is reassuring to have chapter and verse on what Guzzetti was told.
We will keep after him and other GOA officials."
"At the same time we continue to believe many in GOA
maintain their illusions GOA has no serious human rights problems,
and Guzzetti's behavior since his return has done nothing to change
their views. Presentation of protest by department should be most
effective way, at this point, of reinforcing message Guzzetti
got in Washington."
